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@@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ features of consciousness of self. Far from his model having been superseded by
 to the model have not even been assimilated by it.
 :::</p>
 <h2>Kant's Critical Project and How the Mind Fits Into It</h2>
-<p>The major works so far as Kant's views on the mind are concerned are the monumental <em>Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)</em> and
-his little, late <em>Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View</em>, first published in 1798 only six years before his death.
-Kant's view of the mind arose from his
+<p>The major works so far as Kant's views on the mind are concerned are the monumental <strong>Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)</strong>
+and his little, late <strong>Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View</strong>, first published in 1798 only six years before his
+death. Kant's view of the mind arose from his
 <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/">general philosophical project</a> in CPR the following way. Kant
 aimed among other things to,</p>
 <ul>
@@ -260,6 +260,105 @@ structure (Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition). It must associate spatio-tem
 spatio-temporally structured items (Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination). And it must recognize items using
 concepts, the Categories in particular (Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept)</em>. This threefold doctrine of synthesis is
 one of the cornerstones of Kant's model of the mind. We will consider it in more detail in the next Section.</p>
+<p>The 'deduction of the categories' should now be complete. Strangely enough, the chapter has only nicely got started. In
+the first edition version, for example, we have only reached about one-third of the way through the chapter. At this
+point, Kant introduces the notion of transcendental apperception for the first time and the unity of such apperception,
+the unity of consciousness. Evidently, something is happening (something, moreover, not at all well heralded in the
+text)</p>
+<p>We can now understand in more detail why Kant said that the subjective deduction is inessential. Since the objective
+deduction is about the conditions of representations having objects, a better name for it might have been 'deduction of
+the object'. Similarly, a better name for the subjective deduction might have been 'the deduction of the subject' or
+'the deduction of the subject's nature'. The latter enquiry was inessential to Kant's main critical project because the
+main project was to defend the synthetic <em>a priori</em> credentials of physics in the objective deduction. From this point
+of view, anything uncovered about the nature and functioning of the mind was a happy accident.</p>
+<h3>Attack on the Paralogisms, 1st Edition</h3>
+<p>The chapter on the Paralogisms, the first of the three parts of Kant's second project, contains Kant's most original
+insights into the nature of consciousness of the self. In the first edition, he seems to have achieved a stable position
+on self-consciousness only as late as this chapter. Certainly his position was not stable in TD. Even his famous term
+for consciousness of self, 'I think', occurs for the first time only in the introduction to the chapter on the
+Paralogisms. His target is claims that we know what the mind is like. Whatever the merits of Kant's attack on these
+claims, in the course of mounting it, he made some very deep-running observations about consciousness and knowledge of
+self.</p>
+<p>:::tip
+To summarize: in the first edition, TD contains most of what Kant had to say about synthesis and unity, but little on
+the nature of consciousness of self. The chapter on the Paralogisms contains most of what he has to say about
+consciousness of self.
+:::</p>
+<h3>The Two Discussions in the 2nd-edition TD and Other Discussions</h3>
+<p>In other new material prepared for the second edition, we find a first gloss on the topic of self-consciousness as early
+as the Aesthetic (B68). The mind also appears in a new passage called the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant attempts to
+tie the possibility of one sort of consciousness of self to consciousness of permanence in something other than
+ourselves, in a way he thought to be inconsistent with Berkeleian idealism. This new Refutation of Idealism has often
+been viewed as a replacement for the argument against the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition.</p>
+<p>Elsewhere in his work, the only sustained discussion of the mind and consciousness is, as we said, his little, late
+<strong>Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View</strong>. By 'anthropology' Kant meant the study of human beings from the point of
+view of their (psychologically-controlled) behaviour, especially their behaviour toward one another, and of the things
+revealed in behaviour such as character. Though Kant sometimes contrasted anthropology as a legitimate study with what
+he understood empirical psychology to be, namely, psychology based on introspective observation, he meant by
+anthropology something fairly close to what we now mean by behavioural or experimental psychology.</p>
+<h2>Kant's View of the Mind</h2>
+<h3>Method</h3>
+<p>Turning now to Kant's view of the mind, we will start with a point about method: Kant held surprisingly strong and not
+entirely consistent views on the empirical study of the mind. The empirical method for doing psychology that Kant
+discussed was introspection.</p>
+<p>Sometimes he held such study to be hopeless. The key text on psychology is in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
+Science. There Kant tell us that “the empirical doctrine of the soul … must remain even further removed than chemistry
+from the rank of what may be called a natural science proper”. (In Kant's defence, there was nothing resembling a single
+unified theory of chemical reactions in his time.) The contents of introspection, in his terms inner sense, cannot be
+studied scientifically for at least 5 reasons.</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Having only one universal dimension and one that they are only represented to have at that, namely, distribution in
+time, the contents of inner sense cannot be quantified; thus no mathematical model of them is possible.</li>
+<li>“The manifold of internal observation is separated only by mere thought”. That is to say, only the introspective
+observer distinguishes the items one from another; there are no real distinctions among the items themselves.</li>
+<li>These items “cannot be kept separate” in a way that would allow us to connect them again “at will”, by which Kant
+presumably means, according to the dictates of our developing theory.</li>
+<li>“Another thinking subject does not submit to our investigations in such a way as to be conformable to our purposes” -
+the only thinking subject whose inner sense one can investigate is oneself.</li>
+<li>“Even the observation itself alters and distorts the state of the object observed”. Indeed, introspection can be bad
+for the health: it is a road to “mental illness” ('Illuminism and Terrorism', 1798, Ak. VII:133; see 161).</li>
+</ol>
+<p>In these critical passages, it is not clear why he didn't respect what he called anthropology more highly as an
+empirical study of the mind, given that he himself did it. He did so elsewhere. In the Anthropology, for example, he
+links 'self-observation' and observation of others and calls them both sources of anthropology</p>
+<p>Whatever, no kind of empirical psychology can yield necessary truths about the mind. In the light of this limitation,
+how <em>should</em> we study the mind? Kant's answer was: transcendental method using transcendental arguments (notions
+introduced earlier). If we cannot observe the connections among the denizens of inner sense to any purpose, we can study
+what the mind <em>must</em> be like and what capacities and structures (in Kant's jargon, faculties) it <em>must</em> have if it is to
+represent things as it does. With this method we can find universally true, that is to say, 'transcendental'
+psychological propositions. We have already seen what some of them are: minds must be able to synthesize and minds must
+have a distinctive unity, for example. Let us turn now to these substantive claims.</p>
+<h3>Synthesis and Faculties</h3>
+<p>We have already discussed Kant's view of the mind's handling of space and time, so we can proceed directly to his
+doctrine of synthesis. As Kant put it in one of his most famous passages, “<strong>Concepts without intuitions are empty,
+intuitions without concepts are blind</strong>”. Experience requires both percepts and concepts. As we might say now, to
+discriminate, we need information; but for information to be of any use to us, we must organize the information. This
+organization is provided by acts of synthesis.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>By <em>synthesis</em>, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of
+grasping what is manifold in them in one knowledge</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>If the doctrine of space and time is the first major part of his model of the mind, the doctrine of synthesis is the
+second. Kant claimed, as we saw earlier, that three kinds of synthesis are required to organize information, namely
+apprehending in intuition, reproducing in imagination, and recognizing in concepts. Each of the three kinds of synthesis
+relates to a different aspect of Kant's fundamental duality of intuition and concept. Synthesis of apprehension concerns
+raw perceptual input, synthesis of recognition concerns concepts, and synthesis of reproduction in imagination allows
+the mind to go from the one to the other.</p>
+<p>They also relate to three fundamental faculties of the mind. One is the province of Sensibility, one is the province of
+Understanding, and the one in the middle is the province of a faculty that has a far less settled position than the
+other two, namely, Imagination</p>
+<p>The first two, apprehension and reproduction, are inseparable; one cannot occur without the other. The third,
+recognition, requires the other two but is not required by them. It seems that only the third requires the use of
+concepts; this problem of non-concept-using syntheses and their relationship to use of the categories becomes a
+substantial issue in the second edition, where Kant tries to save the universality of the objective deduction by arguing
+that all three kinds of syntheses are required to represent objects.</p>
+<p>Acts of synthesis are performed on that to which we are passive in experience, namely intuitions (<em>Anschauungen</em>).
+Intuitions are quite different from sense-data as classically understood; we can become conscious of intuitions only
+after acts of synthesis and only by inference from these acts, not directly. Thus they are something more like
+theoretical entities (better, events) postulated to explain something in what we do recognize. What they explain is the
+non-conceptual element in representations, an element over which we have no control. Intuitions determine how our
+representations will serve to confirm or refute theories, aid or impede our efforts to reach various goals.</p>
+<h4>Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition</h4>
 </content:encoded></item><item><title>Managing Tech Assets - Is a Common Library a Good Idea? No</title><link>https://leadership.qubitpi.org/posts/managing-tech-assets-common-lib-or-not/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://leadership.qubitpi.org/posts/managing-tech-assets-common-lib-or-not/</guid><description>Managing Tech Assets - Is a Common Library a Good Idea? No</description><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;h2&gt;A Story - A Person Created a Common Library and Then...&lt;/h2&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&quot;Embarrassingly I introduced a &quot;common&quot; library, named as such, in a team environment a couple of decades back.
 I didn&apos;t really understand the dynamics back then of what could happen in a loosely-coordinated team setting in just a