Merge branch 'tiann:main' into main

docs/README.md

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ A Kernel-based root solution for Android devices.
 
 ## Compatibility State
 
-KernelSU officially supports Android GKI 2.0 devices(with kernel 5.10+), old kernels(4.14+) are also compatible, but you need to build the kernel yourself.
+KernelSU officially supports Android GKI 2.0 devices (kernel 5.10+). Older kernels (4.14+) are also compatible, but the kernel will have to be built manually.
 
-WSA, ChromeOS and container-based Android can also work with KernelSU integrated.
+With this, WSA, ChromeOS, and container-based Android are all supported.
 
-And the current supported ABIs are: `arm64-v8a` and `x86_64`
+Currently, only `arm64-v8a` and `x86_64` are supported.
 
 ## Usage
 
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ And the current supported ABIs are: `arm64-v8a` and `x86_64`
 
 ## Translation
 
-To translate KernelSU into your language or improve an existing translation, please use [Weblate](https://hosted.weblate.org/engage/kernelsu/).
+To help translate KernelSU or improve existing translations, please use [Weblate](https://hosted.weblate.org/engage/kernelsu/).
 
 ## Discussion
 

kernel/allowlist.c

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void ksu_show_allow_list(void)
 {
 	struct perm_data *p = NULL;
 	struct list_head *pos = NULL;
-	pr_info("ksu_show_allow_list");
+	pr_info("ksu_show_allow_list\n");
 	list_for_each (pos, &allow_list) {
 		p = list_entry(pos, struct perm_data, list);
 		pr_info("uid :%d, allow: %d\n", p->profile.current_uid,

kernel/apk_sign.c

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ check_v2_signature(char *path, unsigned expected_size, unsigned expected_hash)
 	int i;
 	struct file *fp = ksu_filp_open_compat(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(fp)) {
-		pr_err("open %s error.", path);
+		pr_err("open %s error.\n", path);
 		return PTR_ERR(fp);
 	}
 
@@ -138,15 +138,15 @@ static int set_expected_size(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
 	int rv = param_set_uint(val, kp);
 	ksu_invalidate_manager_uid();
-	pr_info("ksu_expected_size set to %x", ksu_expected_size);
+	pr_info("ksu_expected_size set to %x\n", ksu_expected_size);
 	return rv;
 }
 
 static int set_expected_hash(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
 	int rv = param_set_uint(val, kp);
 	ksu_invalidate_manager_uid();
-	pr_info("ksu_expected_hash set to %x", ksu_expected_hash);
+	pr_info("ksu_expected_hash set to %x\n", ksu_expected_hash);
 	return rv;
 }
 

kernel/core_hook.c

@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 	if (strcmp(buf, "/system/packages.list")) {
 		return 0;
 	}
-	pr_info("renameat: %s -> %s, new path: %s", old_dentry->d_iname,
+	pr_info("renameat: %s -> %s, new path: %s\n", old_dentry->d_iname,
 		new_dentry->d_iname, buf);
 
 	update_uid();
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			static bool post_fs_data_lock = false;
 			if (!post_fs_data_lock) {
 				post_fs_data_lock = true;
-				pr_info("post-fs-data triggered");
+				pr_info("post-fs-data triggered\n");
 				on_post_fs_data();
 			}
 			break;
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			static bool boot_complete_lock = false;
 			if (!boot_complete_lock) {
 				boot_complete_lock = true;
-				pr_info("boot_complete triggered");
+				pr_info("boot_complete triggered\n");
 			}
 			break;
 		}
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static int ksu_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 		return 0;
 	}
 	init_session_keyring = cred->session_keyring;
-	pr_info("kernel_compat: got init_session_keyring");
+	pr_info("kernel_compat: got init_session_keyring\n");
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif

kernel/ksud.c

@@ -59,11 +59,11 @@ void on_post_fs_data(void)
 {
 	static bool done = false;
 	if (done) {
-		pr_info("on_post_fs_data already done");
+		pr_info("on_post_fs_data already done\n");
 		return;
 	}
 	done = true;
-	pr_info("on_post_fs_data!");
+	pr_info("on_post_fs_data!\n");
 	ksu_load_allow_list();
 	// sanity check, this may influence the performance
 	stop_input_hook();
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused count(struct user_arg_ptr argv, int max)
 
 // the call from execve_handler_pre won't provided correct value for __never_use_argument, use them after fix execve_handler_pre, keeping them for consistence for manually patched code
 int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
-			     struct user_arg_ptr *argv, void *__never_use_envp, int *__never_use_flags)
+				struct user_arg_ptr *argv, struct user_arg_ptr *envp, int *__never_use_flags)
 {
 #ifndef CONFIG_KPROBES
 	if (!ksu_execveat_hook) {
@@ -151,7 +151,11 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 
 	static const char app_process[] = "/system/bin/app_process";
 	static bool first_app_process = true;
+
+	/* This applies to versions Android 10+ */
 	static const char system_bin_init[] = "/system/bin/init";
+	/* This applies to versions between Android 6 ~ 9  */
+	static const char old_system_init[] = "/init";
 	static bool init_second_stage_executed = false;
 
 	if (!filename_ptr)
@@ -162,17 +166,17 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(!memcmp(filename->name, system_bin_init,
-		    sizeof(system_bin_init) - 1))) {
+	if (unlikely(!memcmp(filename->name, system_bin_init, 
+				sizeof(system_bin_init) - 1))) {
 		// /system/bin/init executed
 		int argc = count(*argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
 		pr_info("/system/bin/init argc: %d\n", argc);
 		if (argc > 1 && !init_second_stage_executed) {
 			const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(*argv, 1);
 			if (p && !IS_ERR(p)) {
 				char first_arg[16];
-                                ksu_strncpy_from_user_nofault(first_arg, p, sizeof(first_arg));
-				pr_info("first arg: %s\n", first_arg);
+				ksu_strncpy_from_user_nofault(first_arg, p, sizeof(first_arg));
+				pr_info("/system/bin/init first arg: %s\n", first_arg);
 				if (!strcmp(first_arg, "second_stage")) {
 					pr_info("/system/bin/init second_stage executed\n");
 					apply_kernelsu_rules();
@@ -183,10 +187,63 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 				pr_err("/system/bin/init parse args err!\n");
 			}
 		}
+	} else if (unlikely(!memcmp(filename->name, old_system_init,
+				sizeof(old_system_init) - 1))) {
+		// /init executed
+		int argc = count(*argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
+		pr_info("/init argc: %d\n", argc);
+		if (argc > 1 && !init_second_stage_executed) {
+			/* This applies to versions between Android 6 ~ 7 */
+			const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(*argv, 1);
+			if (p && !IS_ERR(p)) {
+				char first_arg[16];
+				ksu_strncpy_from_user_nofault(first_arg, p, sizeof(first_arg));
+				pr_info("/init first arg: %s\n", first_arg);
+				if (!strcmp(first_arg, "--second-stage")) {
+					pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
+					apply_kernelsu_rules();
+					init_second_stage_executed = true;
+					ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
+				}
+			} else {
+				pr_err("/init parse args err!\n");
+			}
+		} else if (argc == 1 && !init_second_stage_executed) {
+			/* This applies to versions between Android 8 ~ 9  */
+			int envc = count(*envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
+			if (envc > 0) {
+				int n;
+				for (n = 1; n <= envc; n++) {
+					const char __user *p = get_user_arg_ptr(*envp, n);
+					if (!p || IS_ERR(p)) {
+						continue;
+					}
+					char env[256];
+					// Reading environment variable strings from user space
+					if (ksu_strncpy_from_user_nofault(env, p, sizeof(env)) < 0)
+						continue;
+					// Parsing environment variable names and values
+					char *env_name = env;
+					char *env_value = strchr(env, '=');
+					if (env_value == NULL)
+						continue;
+					// Replace equal sign with string terminator
+					*env_value = '\0';
+					env_value++;
+					// Check if the environment variable name and value are matching
+					if (!strcmp(env_name, "INIT_SECOND_STAGE") && (!strcmp(env_value, "1") || !strcmp(env_value, "true"))) {
+						pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
+						apply_kernelsu_rules();
+						init_second_stage_executed = true;
+						ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(first_app_process &&
-	    !memcmp(filename->name, app_process, sizeof(app_process) - 1))) {
+		!memcmp(filename->name, app_process, sizeof(app_process) - 1))) {
 		first_app_process = false;
 		pr_info("exec app_process, /data prepared, second_stage: %d\n", init_second_stage_executed);
 		on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
@@ -207,7 +264,7 @@ static ssize_t read_proxy(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
 	bool first_read = file->f_pos == 0;
 	ssize_t ret = orig_read(file, buf, count, pos);
 	if (first_read) {
-		pr_info("read_proxy append %ld + %ld", ret, read_count_append);
+		pr_info("read_proxy append %ld + %ld\n", ret, read_count_append);
 		ret += read_count_append;
 	}
 	return ret;
@@ -218,7 +275,7 @@ static ssize_t read_iter_proxy(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
 	bool first_read = iocb->ki_pos == 0;
 	ssize_t ret = orig_read_iter(iocb, to);
 	if (first_read) {
-		pr_info("read_iter_proxy append %ld + %ld", ret,
+		pr_info("read_iter_proxy append %ld + %ld\n", ret,
 			read_count_append);
 		ret += read_count_append;
 	}
@@ -287,7 +344,7 @@ int ksu_handle_vfs_read(struct file **file_ptr, char __user **buf_ptr,
 		current->comm, count, rc_count);
 
 	if (count < rc_count) {
-		pr_err("count: %d < rc_count: %d", count, rc_count);
+		pr_err("count: %d < rc_count: %d\n", count, rc_count);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -457,6 +514,7 @@ static void stop_vfs_read_hook()
 	pr_info("unregister vfs_read kprobe: %d!\n", ret);
 #else
 	ksu_vfs_read_hook = false;
+	pr_info("stop vfs_read_hook\n");
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -467,6 +525,7 @@ static void stop_execve_hook()
 	pr_info("unregister execve kprobe: %d!\n", ret);
 #else
 	ksu_execveat_hook = false;
+	pr_info("stop execve_hook\n");
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -482,6 +541,7 @@ static void stop_input_hook()
 	pr_info("unregister input kprobe: %d!\n", ret);
 #else
 	ksu_input_hook = false;
+	pr_info("stop input_hook\n");
 #endif
 }
 

kernel/manager.c

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ bool become_manager(char *pkg)
 			continue;
 		}
 		// we have found the apk!
-		pr_info("found apk: %s", cwd);
+		pr_info("found apk: %s\n", cwd);
 		char *pkg_index = strstr(cwd, pkg);
 		if (!pkg_index) {
 			pr_info("apk path not match package name!\n");
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ bool become_manager(char *pkg)
 			result = true;
 			goto clean;
 		} else {
-			pr_info("manager signature invalid!");
+			pr_info("manager signature invalid!\n");
 		}
 
 		break;

kernel/selinux/rules.c

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static struct policydb *get_policydb(void)
 void apply_kernelsu_rules()
 {
 	if (!getenforce()) {
-		pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled, apply rules!");
+		pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled, apply rules!\n");
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 		} else if (subcmd == 4) {
 			success = ksu_dontaudit(db, s, t, c, p);
 		} else {
-			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d", subcmd);
+			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d\n", subcmd);
 		}
 		ret = success ? 0 : -1;
 
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 		} else if (subcmd == 3) {
 			success = ksu_dontauditxperm(db, s, t, c, perm_set);
 		} else {
-			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d", subcmd);
+			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d\n", subcmd);
 		}
 		ret = success ? 0 : -1;
 	} else if (cmd == CMD_TYPE_STATE) {
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 		} else if (subcmd == 2) {
 			success = ksu_enforce(db, src);
 		} else {
-			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d", subcmd);
+			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d\n", subcmd);
 		}
 		if (success)
 			ret = 0;
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 			success = ksu_type_member(db, src, tgt, cls,
 						  default_type);
 		} else {
-			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d", subcmd);
+			pr_err("sepol: unknown subcmd: %d\n", subcmd);
 		}
 		if (success)
 			ret = 0;

kernel/selinux/selinux.c

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int transive_to_domain(const char *domain)
 void setup_selinux(const char *domain)
 {
 	if (transive_to_domain(domain)) {
-		pr_err("transive domain failed.");
+		pr_err("transive domain failed.\n");
 		return;
 	}
 

kernel/selinux/sepolicy.c

@@ -592,14 +592,14 @@ static bool add_filename_trans(struct policydb *db, const char *s,
 		trans = (struct filename_trans_datum *)kcalloc(sizeof(*trans),
 							       1, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!trans) {
-			pr_err("add_filename_trans: Failed to alloc datum");
+			pr_err("add_filename_trans: Failed to alloc datum\n");
 			return false;
 		}
 		struct filename_trans *new_key =
 			(struct filename_trans *)kmalloc(sizeof(*new_key),
 							 GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!new_key) {
-			pr_err("add_filename_trans: Failed to alloc new_key");
+			pr_err("add_filename_trans: Failed to alloc new_key\n");
 			return false;
 		}
 		*new_key = key;

website/docs/index.md

@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ hero:
 
 features:
   - title: Kernel-based
-    details: KernelSU is working in Linux kernel mode, it has more control over userspace applications.
-  - title: Whitelist access control
-    details: Only App that is granted root permission can access `su`, other apps cannot perceive su.
-  - title: Restricted root permission
-    details: KernelSU allows you to customize the uid, gid, groups, capabilities and SELinux rules of su. Lock up the root power in a cage.
-  - title: Module & Open source
-    details: KernelSU supports modify /system systemlessly by overlayfs and it is open-sourced under GPL-3.
+    details: As the name suggests, KernelSU works under the Linux kernel giving it more control over userspace applications.
+  - title: Root Access Control
+    details: Only permitted apps may access or see `su`, all other apps are not aware of this.
+  - title: Customizable Root Privileges
+    details: KernelSU allows customization of `su`'s uid, gid, groups, capabilities, and SELinux rules, locking up root privileges.
+  - title: Modules
+    details: Modules may modify /system systemlessly using overlayfs enabling great power.