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docs: incorporated feedback from docs review
Co-authored-by: Aron Gunn <[email protected]>
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@@ -5,32 +5,35 @@ The following sections explain a few concepts of Trustify. | |
[#vulnerability] | ||
== Vulnerability | ||
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A vulnerability is mostly, primarily a *name* that is used to ensure all advisories are discussing the same thing. | ||
Generally, to this point, most vulnerabilities come from the CVE Project, with the format of `CVE-2024-1234`. | ||
A vulnerability is primarily a *name* for ensuring all advisories are discussing the same thing. | ||
Generally, most vulnerabilities come from the CVE Project, with the format of `CVE-2024-1234`. | ||
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Within the database, generally a vulnerability is added as a side effect of an advisory mentioning it. | ||
Within the database, Trustify adds the vulnerability when discovering an advisory mentioning it. | ||
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A *CVE Record* from NIST/NVD is a low-value advisory that is generally the first discovered advisory that mentions a vulnerability. | ||
A *CVE Record* from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)/National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) is a | ||
low-value advisory that is generally the first discovered advisory that mentions a vulnerability. | ||
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== Advisory | ||
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An advisory is an opinion about a vulnerability. | ||
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These opinions include the context to which the opinions apply. | ||
These opinions include evaluation of the severity and scoring of a vulnerability within that context, such as CVSS scores. | ||
These opinions include evaluation of the severity and scoring of a vulnerability within that context, such as | ||
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) scores. | ||
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As mentioned above, a *CVE Record* from the CVE Project is a low-value advisory that mentions the vulnerability and provides a base opinion about it. | ||
It may include CVSS scores, within the context of the abstract origin containing the vulnerability. | ||
This may be simply in reference to the vulnerability *as it exists in source-code form*. | ||
It might include CVSS scores, within the context of the abstract origin containing the vulnerability. | ||
This might be simply in reference to the vulnerability *as it exists in source-code form*. | ||
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Other, more-involved stakeholders (product vendors, upstream project owners) may issue *additional* advisories. | ||
These opinions may be in reference to *concrete* shipped products, contextualized to how the vulnerable code is *actually used*. | ||
Other, more-involved stakeholders, such as, product vendors, upstream project owners, might issue *additional* | ||
advisories. | ||
These opinions might be in reference to *concrete*, shipped products, contextualized to how the vulnerable code is *actually used*. | ||
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== SBOM | ||
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An SBOM is a source-of-someone's-truth about "what's inside it?", so | ||
everything in our DB is ultimately sourced from some | ||
source-of-truth. We can't really say definitively "product X is | ||
source-of-truth. We cannot really say definitively "product X is | ||
composed of A1, A2 + A3". Instead, we can have multiple simultaneous | ||
statements -- SBOM's -- from multiple people saying "product X is | ||
claimed by Bob to be A1 + A2" and "product X is claimed by Jim to be | ||
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== Package | ||
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A package is an atomic artifact or component. | ||
Packages may be addressed using pURLs. | ||
A package may be described by an SBOM describing how it is created and its contents. | ||
A package may certainly contain other packages (e.g. shading one Java jar into another). | ||
A package may also be the sole member of a Product (`UBI-8.0.13-x86.oci` may be the singular package within the "UBI 8.0.13-x86" product). | ||
Packages can be addressed using pURLs. | ||
A package can be described by an SBOM describing how it is created and its contents. | ||
A package can certainly contain other packages. For example, shading one Java jar into another. | ||
A package can also be the sole member of a product. For example `UBI-8.0.13-x86.oci` can be the singular package within the "UBI 8.0.13-x86" product. | ||
A package is one step more abstract than an *artifact*. | ||
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=== pURL | ||
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Package URLs (pURLs) are possibly ambiguous names applied to packages. | ||
A simple pURL such as `pkg:maven/org.apache/[email protected]` may or may not refer to a unique artifact. | ||
A simple pURL such as `pkg:maven/org.apache/[email protected]` can or cannot refer to a unique artifact. | ||
With additional qualifiers, it is possible to produce a URI that asserts uniqueness, such as `pkg:maven/org.apache/[email protected]?repository_url=repo.jboss.com`. | ||
Without additional qualifiers, the implicit aspects (such as `repository_url`) must be taken into account. | ||
Without additional qualifiers, the implicit aspects, such as `repository_url`, must be taken into account. | ||
For instance, an unqualified `pkg:maven` pURL *implies* "the jar from Maven Central, and none other". | ||
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== Product | ||
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A product is a *named collection of 1 or more packages* for a concrete shippable thing. | ||
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Products may be addressed using CPEs or some other future identification method. | ||
A product may be described by an SBOM describing its components, which may be other products or packages, or their SBOMs. | ||
Products can be addressed using Common Platform Enumerations (CPE) or some other future identification method. | ||
A product can be described by an SBOM describing its components, which might be other products or packages, or their SBOMs. | ||
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NOTE: Given Red Hat ProdSec definitions, grouping of Products may need to occur within some sense of Product Versions, or Product Streams. | ||
NOTE: Given Red Hat Product Security definitions, grouping of products might need to occur within some sense of product | ||
versions, or product streams. | ||
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`RHEL8` may be a *product stream*. | ||
`RHEL 8.2.03 PowerPC` may be a concrete *product* distinct from `RHEL 8.2.03 AArch64`. | ||
`Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8` might be a *product stream*. | ||
`Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2.03 PowerPC` might be a concrete *product* distinct from `Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2.03 AArch64`. | ||
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=== CPE | ||
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A CPE is a "Common Product Enumeration" from the NIST organization. | ||
CPEs are self-assigned but registered occasionally with NIST. | ||
CPEs describe the vendor, the product, the version, target architecture, etc. | ||
CPEs may also be non-fully specified, to use as pattern-matching. | ||
For instance, "All versions of RHEL 8.2.013, regardless of platform", or if more fully-specified, could imply "All versions of RHEL 8.x on AArch64". | ||
CPEs can also be non-fully specified, to use as pattern-matching. | ||
For instance, "All versions of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2.013, regardless of platform", or if more fully-specified, | ||
could imply "All versions of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.x on AArch64". | ||
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NOTE: CPEs are somewhat contentious, and used enough for us to not ignore, but not used enough to be a pivotal definition of "product" for any users of Trustify. | ||
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== Artifact | ||
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For a given *package*, there may be zero or more instances of that package. | ||
For a given *package*, there can be zero or more instances of that package. | ||
Given `log4j-1.2.3.jar`, seventeen different people could compile the same source with the same arguments, and still end | ||
up with 17 distinct Java jars (due to non-reproducible builds). | ||
up with 17 distinct Java jars, due to non-reproducible builds. | ||
Each is an artifact of the *same* package. | ||
Each may (will probably) have its own SHA-256 related to it. | ||
Each might, and most likely will, have its own SHA-256 related to it. | ||
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Consider an *artifact* to be a concrete *instance* of a package. |