fix: Guard against malicious processors [SUP-8873] #639
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…erfromRouterPlusAsync.sol
0xTimepunk
reviewed
Oct 17, 2024
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Changes in RouterPlus async look good to me.
Please review formatting changes in all the other src files and forge-scripts folder (which should be reverted to their original state).
Once you commit CI should run and let us know if there was any coverage drop with the function changes.
Also wondering why yAudit mentioned to revert at slippage check failure, it doesn't seem necessary to me - after we clean up let's bring this PR for discussion in discord for them to review the fix.
…-against-malicious-processors
…ttps://github.com/superform-xyz/superform-core into tamara-sup-8873-guard-against-malicious-processors
0xTimepunk
approved these changes
Oct 25, 2024
0xTimepunk
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Problem
A malicious processor can take advantage of the refund mechanism.
completeCrossChainRebalance()complete a cross chain rebalance initiated by the user withstartCrossChainRebalance(). This function could be called only by an address with aROUTER_PLUS_PROCESSOR_ROLE. As the processor can pass arbitrary data as function arguments to both functions he can take advantage of the refund mechanism, leading to two possible scenarios:Processor can force unnecessary refunds in
completeCrossChainRebalance(): by passing a specificexpectedAmountInterimAsset, he can force unnecessary refunds on every payload to be processed.Processor can steal all SuperformRouterPlusAsync funds: by starting a cross chain rebalance himself and thus passing a fake
expectedAmountInterimAsset, he can issue a refund to himself stealing funds from the SuperformRouterPlusAsync contract.Solution
Refactor refund mechanism to include a
requestRefund()function and a correspondingapproveRefund()function that is only callable byCORE_STATE_REGISTRY_RESCUERUpdate tests