-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Update Security Considerations and IANA Section #3
Conversation
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
The "customer" term is really confusing. I would prefer it changed. Everything else is just my two cents.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Rustignoli <[email protected]>
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
My comments have been sufficiently addressed for now.
Co-authored-by: knmeynell <[email protected]>
…uncing seemingly desirable paths
### Peering Link Misuse {#peer-link-misuse} | ||
|
||
The misuse of a peering link by an adversary represents another type of attack. Consider the case where AS A wants to share its peering link only with one of its downstream neighbors, AS B, and therefore selectively includes the peering link only in PCBs sent to B. An adversary may now try to gain access to this peering link by prepending the relevant PCBs to its own path. For this, the adversary needs to be able to (1) eavesdrop on the link from A to B, and (2) obtain the necessary hop fields by querying a control service and extracting the hop fields from registered paths. | ||
|
||
Even if an adversary succeeds in misusing a peering link as described above, SCION is able to mitigate this kind of attack: Each AS includes an egress interface as well as specific “next hop” information to the PCB before disseminating it further downstream. If a malicious entity tries to misuse a stolen PCB by adding it to its own segments, verification will fail upstream as the egress interface mismatches. Therefore, the peering link can only be used by the intended AS. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Choose a reason for hiding this comment
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
This seems to me just a special case of "Path Hijacking through Interposition" described in the paragraph above. I'd leave it for now, but perhaps it could be merged to the paragraph above in the long term.
No description provided.