Added vfsid and hashChallenge to limit stolen signing key issues #35
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A potential security issue exists in Veriflow, whereby in the event the signing key is stolen, the attacker and impersonate any user by constructing specific JWTs and signing in as that user.
This PR adds a user-specific security identifier that is populated by the IdP adapter, and issues a hash of this SID to every /set request. When these SIDs do not match, do not log the user in.
This will force an attacker to steal the signing key, and also the users SID to construct a correct attack. The SID of the user is rotated on every IdP update