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Provide description for measurement transcript usage.
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Signed-off-by: Jiewen Yao <[email protected]>
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jyao1 committed Nov 28, 2024
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Expand Up @@ -203,6 +203,35 @@ Although the device measurement and certificate are not required to be included
in the TVM report, the TVM should provide a mechanism to return the device
measurement and certificate for the verifier to perform further verification.

To support the remote verification, the device measurement data should be the
signed <<SPDM>> measurement transcript, including `VCA` and all
`{GET_MEASUREMENTS, MEASUREMENTS}` pairs that are exchanged between the SPDM
measurement requester and the responder. Only the last `MEASUREMENTS` shall
include the digital signature of the measurement transcript.

To provide the signed <<SPDM>> measurement transcript has multiple benefits:
* The measurement record is protected by the digital signature.
There is no need to use other mechanism (such as TLS) to protect the
measurement record between the host and the remote verifier.
* The opaque data in <<SPDM>> `MEASUREMENTS` response is provided.
A device vendor may use opaque data to store extra information for device
specific information, which may be required for device specific verifier.
* The verifier can attest the <<SPDM>> connection parameter in `VCA`.
It includes the negotiated version, capability and algorithm.
* Using digital signature to protect the measurement record can resist
the device internal attack.
Using <<SPDM>> session can only resist the attack during data transport,
but not the device internal attack in some case.
For example, a device may include an RoT to do measurement, have private key,
and provide the digital signature for the measurement. However, an SPDM session
may be managed by a high level component. Without the digital signature
the high level component may forge the measurement and return to the requester.
The difference between session based protection and digital signature based
protection is the scope of TCB. With digital signature, the TCB is device RoT.
With session only, the TCB must include the high level component which provides
SPDM functionality.


.TVM Attestation Comparison
[width=90%, align="center", options="header"]
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