Update delegated alteration docs

docs/name-owners/delegated-alteration/index.md

@@ -9,8 +9,11 @@ title: Delegated Alteration (for name owners)
 
 * You want to require authorization from multiple persons (e.g. via multisig) in order to transfer a name, but you want a single person to be able to alter the name's value.
 * You want to require a hardware wallet (e.g. Trezor) in order to transfer a name, but you want to alter the name's value on your regular computer.
+* You want to require signing with a paper wallet (loaded into a Tails live system) in order to transfer a name, but you want to alter the name's value from your regular desktop OS.
 * You want to require your regular computer in order to transfer a name, but you want to allow a publicly facing server to alter the name's value automatically (e.g. for dynamic DNS functionality such as provided by DyName).
 
+More generally, if you only need the transfer key rarely, and at predictable intervals (i.e. renewing the name), you can keep it in a wallet that is highly secure but also inconvenient to access.
+
 To use delegated alteration, you register two names rather than one.  The first name is in the `d/` namespace as usual, and is the one that determines what domain name points to your name.  The second name is in the `dd/` namespace (`dd` stands for "domain data"), and can be any name you like (but shorter names will incur lower transaction fees).  Let's say that you register `d/valuablename` and `dd/useless`.  You then set the value of `d/valuablename` to `{"import":"dd/useless"}`.  You can then set the value of `dd/useless` to `{"ip":"123.45.67.89"}`.  The result is that the domain name `valuablename.bit` will point to the IPv4 address `123.45.67.89`.  The owner of `dd/useless` will be able to change the IPv4 address (or any other DNS records associated with the name), but will **not** be able to permanently steal `valuablename.bit`.  If `dd/useless` gets stolen, the owner of `d/valuablename` can register a new `dd/` name, change the value of `d/valuablename` to point to the new `dd/` name, and the thief is left with a worthless `dd/` name.  There is no requirement that the `d/` name and the `dd/` name be held by the same wallet; e.g. you can store the `d/` name with multisig or a hardware wallet while storing the `dd/` name on an unencrypted hot wallet.
 
 You can also use **delegated partial alteration**.  This prevents the `dd/` name from setting certain JSON fields.  For example, you can set a `tls` field in the `d/` name (alongside the `import` field), which will prevent the `dd/` name from setting a `tls` field for that domain name.  In this example, if the `dd/` name is stolen, the thief could change the IP address but not the TLS fingerprint, which would prevent the thief from performing MITM attacks (even before you switch to a new `dd/` name).  If the thief does change the IP address to a server she controls, then visitors to the website will get a TLS error, which converts a MITM attack (very bad) to a DoS attack (much less bad).