xsave/cet: add author at the head of code file

Signed-off-by: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>

cet/.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 cet_app
+glibc_shstk_test
 glibc_supported_shstk_test
 quick_test
 shstk_alloc

cet/cet_driver/cet_app.c

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 /*
  * cet_app.c
  *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * This file will test cet driver with parameters
  *      - Test CET driver app
  */

cet/cet_driver/cet_ioctl.c

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 /*
  * cet_ioctl.c
  *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * This file simulated stack changed by hack, CET should block hack func
  *      - For cet hack simulation driver
  */

cet/cet_tests.sh

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 # Copyright (c) 2022 Intel Corporation
+# Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
 # @Desc  Test script to verify Intel CET functionality
 
 cd "$(dirname "$0")" 2>/dev/null && source ../.env

cet/glibc_shstk_test.c

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2022 Intel Corporation.
 /*
  *    glibc_shstk_test.c:
+ *
+ *    Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  *      - Test CET shadow stack function, should trigger #CP protection.
  *      - Some stack changes that don't affect sp should not trigger #CP.
  *      - Add more print to show stack address and content before and after

cet/shstk_alloc.c

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 /*
  * shstk_alloc.c - allocate a new shadow stack buffer aligenment by instructions
  *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * 1. Test shstk buffer allocation for one new shstk buffer
  * 2. Test rstorssp, saveprevssp, rdsspq to load new shstk buffer
  * 3. Test rstorssp, saveprevssp to restore the previous shstk buffer

cet/shstk_cp.c

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 /*
  * shstk_cp.c: enable shstk and then do shstk violation
  *             expected #CP should be triggered
+ *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  */
 
 #include <sys/syscall.h>

cet/shstk_huge_page.c

@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 // Copyright (c) 2022 Intel Corporation.
 
-/* shstk_huge_page.c - allocate a 4M shadow stack buffer and works well. */
+/*
+ * shstk_huge_page.c - allocate a 4M shadow stack buffer and works well.
+ *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
+ */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>

cet/shstk_unlock_test.c

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2022 Intel Corporation.
 
 /*
+ *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * shstk_unlock_test.c: unlock child process shstk by ptrace and then tests
  *                      get/set shstk regsets and shstk status syscalls
  */

cet/wrss.c

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 /*
  * wrss.c: enable writable shadow stack and write value into shadow stack.
  *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * 1. Enable writable shadow stack via syscall "ARCH_CET_ENABLE and ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS"
  * 2. Write one incorrect value into shadow stack
  * 3. The expected SISEGV should be received after ret instruction

tools/cpuid_check/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+cpuid_check

tools/cpuid_check/cpuid_check.c

@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 // Copyright (c) 2022 Intel Corporation.
+/*
+ * cpuid_check.c: one CPU ID check tool for script usage
+ *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
+ */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>

xsave/xstate.c

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 /*
  * xstate.c - tests XSAVE feature with fork and signal handling.
  *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * The XSAVE feature set supports the saving and restoring of state components.
  * It tests "FP, SSE(XMM), AVX2(YMM), AVX512_OPMASK/AVX512_ZMM_Hi256/
  * AVX512_Hi16_ZMM and PKRU parts" xstates with the following cases:

xsave/xstate_helpers.c

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 /*
  * xstate_helpers.c - xstate helpers to prevent GCC from generating any FP code.
  *
+ * Author: Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>
+ *
  * Because xstate like XMM will not be preserved across function calls, it uses
  * assembly instruction to call a system call of fork or raise signal, and uses
  * the "inline" keyword in test functions in this file.