Update research.md

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 *Management Science*, Accepted. 2024. Kang, H.
   + Former title: *How Does Price Competition Affect Innovation? Evidence from US Antitrust Cases.*
 <span style="float:right"><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516974" class="btn btn--info btn--small">SSRN</a>
-<a href="/assets/pdf/Kang-2021-Price Competition and Innovation-Paper.pdf" class="btn btn--danger btn--small">PDF (Paper)</a>
-<a href="/assets/pdf/Kang-2021-Price Competition and Innovation-Appendix.pdf" class="btn btn--danger btn--small">PDF (Appendix)</a></span>
+<a href="/assets/pdf/Kang-2024-Price-Fixing Cartels (ManSci).pdf" class="btn btn--danger btn--small">PDF (Paper)</a>
+<a href="/assets/pdf/Kang-2024-Price-Fixing Cartels (ManSci) - Appendix.pdf" class="btn btn--danger btn--small">PDF (Appendix)</a></span>
   <details>
   <summary><font color="gray">Abstract +</font></summary>
-    <blockquote>This paper examines how price competition in the product market affects the intensity and breadth of innovation. I assemble a unique data set comprising all 461 collusion cases prosecuted in the United States from 1975 through 2016 and match 1,818 collusive firms to firm-level data on innovation. Empirical results from a difference-in-differences methodology show a negative relationship between price competition and innovation. When collusion suppressed price competition, colluding firms increased patent filings by 28 percent and top-quality patents by 20 percent. A significant portion of these patents are attributable to genuine innovation activities because innovation inputs—R&D investment and the number of unique patenting inventors—increased in tandem by 16 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Furthermore, the number of patented technology classes increased by 16 percent as firms broadened their scope of innovation by exploring new technological areas. When competition was restored by collusion breakup, the increased and broadened innovation activities reverted to their previous levels. The effects were greater for collusion that was stronger and in fast-growing industries. I further explore market profitability and financial constraints on firms as potential mechanisms driving the trade-off between price competition and innovation growth.</blockquote>
+    <blockquote>This paper examines the relationship between price-fixing cartels and firm innovation using a dataset encompassing all 461 cartel cases and 1,818 firms identified in the United States in the years 1975–2016. A difference-in-differences estimation reveals a positive relationship between collusion and innovation. Colluding firms exhibited increases of 28% in patent filings, 20% in top-quality patents, and 16% in R&D investment. Innovation breadth also expanded by 16%, suggesting that firms explored new technological areas. Once cartels were dissolved, innovation activities reverted to pre-collusion levels. The effect varied across industries and was more pronounced in fast-growing and patent-intensive industries, underscoring the importance of technological opportunities. Further, the umbrella pricing effect that also benefits non-colluding competitors offers a unique opportunity to unpack mechanisms. Results reveal that the extra financial resources account for at least a quarter of the effect, with stronger cartels exhibiting more pronounced effects. Specifically, firms that relied more on internal financing before collusion and that generated higher revenues during collusion showed a greater effect; no evidence was found of capital reallocation within firms. As much as the remaining three-quarters of the effect can be attributed to managerial expectations of future profitability. These findings offer insights for managers and policymakers aiming to foster novel innovation, although careful interpretation is required given the heterogeneous effects.</blockquote>
   </details>
 
 + **How Does AI Improve Human Decision-Making? Evidence from the AI-Powered Go Program**.