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csv-lint & json-lint: Use printf %q to sanatize input and avoid command injection #196

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merged 1 commit into from
Dec 14, 2023

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jentfoo
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@jentfoo jentfoo commented Dec 8, 2023

printf %q is a useful feature whenever we need to provide the input into a shell command. It will escape characters which could be used for injection.

This PR fixes https://github.com/gravitational/security-findings/issues/52

@jentfoo jentfoo requested review from wadells and adaadb6 December 8, 2023 19:29
@jentfoo jentfoo self-assigned this Dec 8, 2023
@jentfoo jentfoo requested review from a team December 8, 2023 19:29
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ jobs:
run: |
cd csvlint
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
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Is 42 subject to injection?

Did you asses env laundering as a potential mitigation? See the discussion in the "Remediation" section here:

https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/

env:
    FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run:
  for file in $FILES; ...

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Is 42 subject to injection?

I don't believe so. My understanding is that bash has a strict interpenetration of the input parameter for a for loop. Similar to how command injection should not be possible with FOO=${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}

Related since we are discussing it, I considered also setting the IFS to correctly handle filenames with spaces. But setting this value would actually make a theoretically command injection easier (though in theory not possible given the printf change).

Let me know if you have any opinion on if I should make that change.

Did you asses env laundering as a potential mitigation?

As I understand it the printf would still be necessary. Once the for loop logic breaks apart the input I think injection may still be possible. Do you think it's worth adding this protection given the above? I have no concerns, just trying to keep complexity to a minimum.

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@wadells friendly ping on this when you have a chance. Not high priority, but it would be nice to finish this NCC finding out.

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@wadells wadells Dec 14, 2023

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Sorry -- you hadn't requested re-review, so this wasn't showing up in my review queue:

image

The best way to make sure I (or most other folks) revisit something (especially if I've requested changes) is to re-request review. Otherwise, if I get pulled away from the initial @ notification (for whatever reason), it'll never show back up in my queue.

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Thank you, requested. To be clear I have not made any changes yet, I am just looking for feedback on if we want to additionally add the environment filter.

@jentfoo jentfoo requested a review from wadells December 14, 2023 19:29
@jentfoo jentfoo merged commit 019b2d1 into main Dec 14, 2023
7 of 8 checks passed
@jentfoo jentfoo deleted the jent/command_injection_fix branch December 14, 2023 20:29
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3 participants