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Go: Tweak go tainted path additions #16180

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53 changes: 37 additions & 16 deletions go/ql/lib/semmle/go/security/TaintedPathCustomizations.qll
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -88,13 +88,41 @@ module TaintedPath {
}
}

/**An call to ParseMultipartForm creates multipart.Form and cleans multipart.Form.FileHeader.Filename using path.Base() */
class MultipartClean extends Sanitizer {
MultipartClean() {
exists(DataFlow::FieldReadNode frn |
frn.getField().hasQualifiedName("mime/multipart", "FileHeader", "Filename") and
this = frn
)
/**
* A read from the field `Filename` of the type `mime/multipart.FileHeader`,
* considered as a sanitizer for path traversal.
*
* The only way to create a `mime/multipart.FileHeader` is to create a
* `mime/multipart.Form`, which creates the `Filename` field of each
* `mime/multipart.FileHeader` by calling `Part.FileName`, which calls
* `path/filepath.Base` on its return value. In general `path/filepath.Base`
* is not a sanitizer for path traversal, but in this specific case where the
* output is going to be used as a filename rather than a directory name, it
* is adequate.
*/
class MimeMultipartFileHeaderFilenameSanitizer extends Sanitizer {
MimeMultipartFileHeaderFilenameSanitizer() {
this.(DataFlow::FieldReadNode)
.getField()
.hasQualifiedName("mime/multipart", "FileHeader", "Filename")
}
}

/**
* A call to `mime/multipart.Part.FileName`, considered as a sanitizer
* against path traversal.
*
* `Part.FileName` calls `path/filepath.Base` on its return value. In
* general `path/filepath.Base` is not a sanitizer for path traversal, but in
* this specific case where the output is going to be used as a filename
* rather than a directory name, it is adequate.
*/
class MimeMultipartPartFileNameSanitizer extends Sanitizer {
MimeMultipartPartFileNameSanitizer() {
this =
any(Method m | m.hasQualifiedName("mime/multipart", "Part", "FileName"))
.getACall()
.getResult()
}
}

Expand All @@ -120,15 +148,8 @@ module TaintedPath {
* A replacement of the form `!strings.ReplaceAll(nd, "..")` or `!strings.ReplaceAll(nd, ".")`, considered as a sanitizer for
* path traversal.
*/
class DotDotReplace extends Sanitizer {
DotDotReplace() {
exists(DataFlow::CallNode cleanCall, DataFlow::Node valueNode |
cleanCall = any(Function f | f.hasQualifiedName("strings", "ReplaceAll")).getACall() and
valueNode = cleanCall.getArgument(1) and
valueNode.asExpr().(StringLit).getValue() = ["..", "."] and
this = cleanCall.getResult()
)
}
class DotDotReplaceAll extends StringOps::ReplaceAll, Sanitizer {
DotDotReplaceAll() { this.getReplacedString() = ["..", "."] }
}

/**
Expand Down
32 changes: 16 additions & 16 deletions go/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-022/TaintedPath.expected
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
edges
| TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:30 | call to Query | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:30 | call to Query | TaintedPath.go:16:29:16:40 | tainted_path | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:30 | call to Query | TaintedPath.go:20:57:20:68 | tainted_path | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:30 | call to Query | TaintedPath.go:67:39:67:56 | ...+... | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:20:57:20:68 | tainted_path | TaintedPath.go:20:28:20:69 | call to Join | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:67:39:67:56 | ...+... | TaintedPath.go:67:28:67:57 | call to Clean | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:30 | call to Query | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:30 | call to Query | TaintedPath.go:17:29:17:40 | tainted_path | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:30 | call to Query | TaintedPath.go:21:57:21:68 | tainted_path | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:30 | call to Query | TaintedPath.go:68:39:68:56 | ...+... | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:21:57:21:68 | tainted_path | TaintedPath.go:21:28:21:69 | call to Join | provenance | |
| TaintedPath.go:68:39:68:56 | ...+... | TaintedPath.go:68:28:68:57 | call to Clean | provenance | |
nodes
| TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | semmle.label | selection of URL |
| TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:30 | call to Query | semmle.label | call to Query |
| TaintedPath.go:16:29:16:40 | tainted_path | semmle.label | tainted_path |
| TaintedPath.go:20:28:20:69 | call to Join | semmle.label | call to Join |
| TaintedPath.go:20:57:20:68 | tainted_path | semmle.label | tainted_path |
| TaintedPath.go:67:28:67:57 | call to Clean | semmle.label | call to Clean |
| TaintedPath.go:67:39:67:56 | ...+... | semmle.label | ...+... |
| TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | semmle.label | selection of URL |
| TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:30 | call to Query | semmle.label | call to Query |
| TaintedPath.go:17:29:17:40 | tainted_path | semmle.label | tainted_path |
| TaintedPath.go:21:28:21:69 | call to Join | semmle.label | call to Join |
| TaintedPath.go:21:57:21:68 | tainted_path | semmle.label | tainted_path |
| TaintedPath.go:68:28:68:57 | call to Clean | semmle.label | call to Clean |
| TaintedPath.go:68:39:68:56 | ...+... | semmle.label | ...+... |
subpaths
#select
| TaintedPath.go:16:29:16:40 | tainted_path | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:16:29:16:40 | tainted_path | This path depends on a $@. | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | user-provided value |
| TaintedPath.go:20:28:20:69 | call to Join | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:20:28:20:69 | call to Join | This path depends on a $@. | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | user-provided value |
| TaintedPath.go:67:28:67:57 | call to Clean | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:67:28:67:57 | call to Clean | This path depends on a $@. | TaintedPath.go:13:18:13:22 | selection of URL | user-provided value |
| TaintedPath.go:17:29:17:40 | tainted_path | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:17:29:17:40 | tainted_path | This path depends on a $@. | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | user-provided value |
| TaintedPath.go:21:28:21:69 | call to Join | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:21:28:21:69 | call to Join | This path depends on a $@. | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | user-provided value |
| TaintedPath.go:68:28:68:57 | call to Clean | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | TaintedPath.go:68:28:68:57 | call to Clean | This path depends on a $@. | TaintedPath.go:14:18:14:22 | selection of URL | user-provided value |
17 changes: 17 additions & 0 deletions go/ql/test/query-tests/Security/CWE-022/TaintedPath.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package main

import (
"io/ioutil"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"path"
"path/filepath"
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -76,4 +77,20 @@ func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
data, _ = ioutil.ReadFile(files[0].Filename)
w.Write(data)

// GOOD: Part.FileName sanitized by filepath.Base
r.ParseMultipartForm(32 << 20)
file, _, err := r.FormFile("uploadfile")
if err != nil {
return
}
reader := multipart.NewReader(file, "foo")

// Read the first part
part, err := reader.NextPart()
if err != nil {
return
}

data, _ = ioutil.ReadFile(part.FileName())
}
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