Round 2 with Q

docs/understand/fairness.mdx

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ However, payoff functions in the context of _liquidations_ are discontinuous. If
 
 > **People taking leverage serves as the basis for the set of all payoffs**. 
 
-Moreover, the maximum and expected payoff in the context of liquidation games is separated multiplicatively by a factor of `n!`. This is a much bigger problem if we're trying to craft fair systems that do not advantage those who can act on price information they receive first.
+Derivatives really are weapons of mass destruction. Tarun's proof - which shows that the maximum and expected payoff in the context of liquidation games is separated multiplicatively by a factor of `n!` - is powerful because _it explains why derivatives are destructive_. Everyone knows leveraged positions are more risky. However, when we look through the lens of MEV, we can see that taking a leveraged position creates systemic risk because it increases the chance that the payoff sophisticated users can get will differ extremely from the average, which shifts the global incentive structure toward private ownership (manipulation for individual profit) and away from shared stewardship (reciprocity for mutual flourishing).
 
 # Fairier transforms
 
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ In practice, this means that to avoid maximally unfair payoffs, we need to have
 
 # Generally suave
 
-This is exactly what SUAVE is: an open marketplace for applications that determine specific ways of ordering transactions, such that we can provide approximate fairness guarantees _in general_, i.e. across any new use case that occurs indefinitely into the future.
+This is exactly what SUAVE is: an open marketplace for applications that act on the information in transactions in verifiable ways, such that we can provide approximate fairness guarantees _in general_, i.e. across any new use case that occurs indefinitely into the future.
 
 It's important to understand the _general_ nature of SUAVE. As we have stressed, MEV is a general phenomenon which arises from the time it takes to communicate. People have been aware of this for centuries, but no-one has attempted to build systems that can account for it, because no-one had the sort of verifiable commitment devices (blockchains) we enjoy.
 

docs/understand/index.mdx

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) is a general phenomenon. It can occur anywhere i
 
 One of the [first known exploits in the modern era took place in 1834](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/05/1834_the_first_.html) between Bordeaux and Paris. Communication is never instantaneous (leaving aside quantum entanglement for now), and those who receive information first have an advantage because they can act prior to anyone else, giving them greater ability to extract value from it.
 
-There is a deep link between time, information, value, meaning, and power. If we investigate the intersection between informtation theory and economics, we can make a case that [information is the new money](https://youtu.be/vi-rVTFTb6s). Money is a _verifiable record_ for the quantification, storage, and/or exchange of value just as information quantifies, stores, and/or communicates meaning.
+There is a deep link between time, information, value, meaning, and power. If we investigate the intersection between informtation theory and economics, we can make a case that [information is the new money](https://youtu.be/vi-rVTFTb6s?t=675). Money is a _verifiable record_ for the quantification, storage, and/or exchange of value just as information quantifies, stores, and/or communicates meaning.
 
 Moreover, time seems to be like money because there is a duration between receiving information, assessing its value, and constructing meaning. Duration advantages those who receive information first, or can act on it most quickly. Advantage means that power accrues to more sophisticated experts over time, often in the form of more money. If the way we communicate–and the media we use–do not account for this in their design then they tend to be unfair, resulting in the centralization of power irrespective of how they function.
 

docs/understand/meaning.mdx

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import Video from "@site/src/components/Video/Video.tsx";
 
 # The meaning of it all
 
-We established in the [introduction](/understand/index) that MEV is a general phenomenon which arises from the time it takes to communicate. If communication is not instantaneous, then those who receive information first can act on it prior to anyone else. 
+We established in the introduction that MEV is a general phenomenon which arises from the time it takes to communicate. If communication is not instantaneous, then those who receive information first can act on it prior to anyone else. 
 
 Why is the ability to act on information first more valuable?
 
@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ However, as the old adage goes: "Price is what you pay. Value is what you get."
 
 Does programmable money provide a means of addressing this problem? We know that [systems which only have win-lose transactions](https://github.com/norvig/pytudes/blob/main/ipynb/Economics.ipynb) amplify inequality, and we're looking for ways to quantify and distribute the added value of information as it is ordered by the people who receive it first. Essentially, we're trying to program money such that we can participate in win-win transactions, where the shared wins come from accounting for the time it takes to communicate price.
 
-How can we do this? SUAVE is one option: create an open marketplace for mechanisms that enables anyone to develop applications which strive for a balance between maximizing revenue and returning that revenue to the people whose information created it.
+What does this look like in practice? A win-lose transaction is easy to understand: if my option is "in the money", then the person on the other side is losing money. I win, they lose. However, if a searcher finds a profitable backrun transaction based on information I share with them about my trade, it is a win for that searcher, but it is also (directly) a win for me because some of the additional revenue generated from aggregated information about all transactions is shared with me, **and** it is (indirectly) a _win for everyone_ because we get to transact in a more efficient system. This is new and not possible in the traditional system.
+
+SUAVE is a unified environment for the expression of win-win values. That is, without permission, anyone can create mechanisms which both create the greatest win for themselves while _simultaneously_ ensuring that the people whose information made their win possible also win. The incentive in such an environment is to maximise both efficiency and welfare simultaneously. 
 
 If the systems we create do not find this balance, then those who can access information first interpret it in ways which assume that they deserve payoffs significantly different than the average. We may not consciously agree to this, but every time we take a loan, or buy a stock, or interact with money in general, we give our implicit agreement. In this, we get stuck playing unbalanced games in which we are [both victims and perpertrators](https://www.kernel.community/en/conversation/power-less#defenders-advantage), all hoping we can manipulate things such that the lack of balance works in our favor.
 

docs/understand/power.mdx

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Such contracts might help us “perfect the means of communication of meanings s
 
 That sounds nice, but what does it actually mean to perfect the communication of meanings? In our context, it is nothing other than enabling people to make credible commitments, while crafting a system which can order responses to those commitments in ways that simultaneously create the most collective value _and_ distribute it fairly. 
 
-The mechanisms that do this generally look like auctions, which discover price in uncertain environments, and result in the exchange of information (“meanings”) for commitments (“payments”). Most importantly, the method that the auction uses to determine the price can be transparently and publicly encoded in a builder solidity contract, though the actual bids individual users submit need not be (indeed, _must_ not be for optimum functionality).
+The mechanisms that do this generally look like auctions, which discover price in uncertain environments, and result in the exchange of information (“meanings”) for commitments (“payments”). Most importantly, the method that the auction uses to determine the price can be transparently and publicly encoded in a builder solidity contract, though the actual bids individual users submit need not be.
 
 Public process with private inputs is a _fundamentally democratic idea_. It may be the only concept capable of defending true democracy in the modern age: verifiable mechanisms for collective decisions; privacy for the individuals who contribute to the decision-making process. This is not a new idea. In fact, Dewey says exactly the same thing: