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Update dependency vite to v4.5.2 [SECURITY] #820

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merged 1 commit into from
Feb 23, 2024

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@renovate renovate bot commented Dec 6, 2023

Mend Renovate

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
vite (source) 4.4.9 -> 4.5.2 age adoption passing confidence

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-49293

Summary

When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact

Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:

<script type="module">
  // Inline script
</script>

This script is transformed into a proxy script like

<script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

due to Vite's HTML plugin:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts#L429-L465

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/73ef074b80fa7252e0c46a37a2c94ba8cba46504/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts#L44-L47

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces

<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like

"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>

so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like

<script type="module" src="/@&#8203;id/__x00__/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/docs/guide/ssr.md?plain=1#L114-L126

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script

import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as vite from 'vite';

const html = `
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  </head>
  <body>
    <script type="module">
      // Inline script
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
`;
const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' });
const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html);
console.log(transformed);
await server.close();

and using it I was able to narrow down to #​13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

CVE-2024-23331

Summary

Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches

Fixed in [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Details

Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC

Setup

  1. Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance.
  2. Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem
  3. Populated vite.config.js with
export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.*', '*.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction

  1. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@&#8203;fs//
    • Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root
  2. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@&#8203;fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js
    • Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets
  3. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@&#8203;fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT
    • Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof
Screenshot 2024-01-19 022736

Impact

Who

  • Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What

  • Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v4.5.2

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v4.5.1

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v4.5.0

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v4.4.12

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v4.4.11

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v4.4.10

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.


Configuration

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  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from a00dbbb to d128936 Compare December 14, 2023 12:29
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from d128936 to a528867 Compare December 14, 2023 12:33
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from a528867 to 6f7b6e3 Compare January 16, 2024 16:24
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from 6f7b6e3 to 295c266 Compare January 16, 2024 16:31
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from 295c266 to d52f182 Compare January 25, 2024 17:33
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from d52f182 to 8fdcb26 Compare January 25, 2024 17:38
@renovate renovate bot changed the title Update dependency vite to v4.4.12 [SECURITY] Update dependency vite to v4.5.2 [SECURITY] Jan 25, 2024
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from 8fdcb26 to 81ca012 Compare February 19, 2024 17:02
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from 81ca012 to fbb2a12 Compare February 19, 2024 17:12
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from fbb2a12 to a53c6bb Compare February 21, 2024 15:33
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from a53c6bb to a4972cf Compare February 21, 2024 16:46
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