fix: formatting after merge, ASAN caught memory leak in crypto_test.c

TokTok · Dec 11, 2024 · cabca2a · cabca2a
1 parent 87e6350
commit cabca2a
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Showing 2 changed files with 17 additions and 14 deletions.
diff --git a/auto_tests/crypto_test.c b/auto_tests/crypto_test.c
@@ -971,6 +971,9 @@ static void test_noiseik(void)
     // char ciphertext5_transport1_responder_print[sizeof(ciphertext5_transport1_responder) * 2 + 1];
     // bin2hex_toupper(ciphertext5_transport1_responder_print, sizeof(ciphertext5_transport1_responder_print), ciphertext5_transport1_responder, sizeof(ciphertext5_transport1_responder));
     // printf("Responder: Transport1 ciphertext: (length: %d) %s\n", length_ciphertext5_transport1_responder, ciphertext5_transport1_responder_print);
+
+    free(noise_handshake_initiator);
+    free(noise_handshake_responder);
 }
 
 int main(void)

diff --git a/toxcore/net_crypto.c b/toxcore/net_crypto.c
@@ -706,14 +706,14 @@ static int create_crypto_handshake(const Net_Crypto *c, uint8_t *packet, const u
         memcpy(cookie_plain, peer_real_pk, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
         memcpy(cookie_plain + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE, peer_dht_pubkey, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
 
-    if (create_cookie(c->mem, c->rng, c->mono_time, plain + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE,
-                      cookie_plain, c->secret_symmetric_key) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
+        if (create_cookie(c->mem, c->rng, c->mono_time, plain + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE,
+                        cookie_plain, c->secret_symmetric_key) != 0) {
+            return -1;
+        }
 
-    random_nonce(c->rng, packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH);
-    const int len = encrypt_data(c->mem, peer_real_pk, c->self_secret_key, packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH, plain, sizeof(plain),
-                                 packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE);
+        random_nonce(c->rng, packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH);
+        const int len = encrypt_data(c->mem, peer_real_pk, c->self_secret_key, packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH, plain, sizeof(plain),
+                                    packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE);
 
         if (len != HANDSHAKE_PACKET_LENGTH - (1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE)) {
             return -1;
@@ -954,9 +954,9 @@ static bool handle_crypto_handshake(const Net_Crypto *c, uint8_t *nonce, uint8_t
 
         uint8_t cookie_plain[COOKIE_DATA_LENGTH];
 
-    if (open_cookie(c->mem, c->mono_time, cookie_plain, packet + 1, c->secret_symmetric_key) != 0) {
-        return false;
-    }
+        if (open_cookie(c->mem, c->mono_time, cookie_plain, packet + 1, c->secret_symmetric_key) != 0) {
+            return false;
+        }
 
         /* Compares static identity public keys from the peer */
         if (expected_real_pk != nullptr && !pk_equal(cookie_plain, expected_real_pk)) {
@@ -966,10 +966,10 @@ static bool handle_crypto_handshake(const Net_Crypto *c, uint8_t *nonce, uint8_t
         uint8_t cookie_hash[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE];
         crypto_sha512(cookie_hash, packet + 1, COOKIE_LENGTH);
 
-    uint8_t plain[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE + COOKIE_LENGTH];
-    const int len = decrypt_data(c->mem, cookie_plain, c->self_secret_key, packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH,
-                                 packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE,
-                                 HANDSHAKE_PACKET_LENGTH - (1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE), plain);
+        uint8_t plain[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE + COOKIE_LENGTH];
+        const int len = decrypt_data(c->mem, cookie_plain, c->self_secret_key, packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH,
+                                    packet + 1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE,
+                                    HANDSHAKE_PACKET_LENGTH - (1 + COOKIE_LENGTH + CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE), plain);
 
         if (len != sizeof(plain)) {
             return false;