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Data From Chinese Security Services Company i-Soon Linked to Previous Chinese APT Campaigns

Executive Summary

On Feb. 16, 2024, someone uploaded data to GitHub that included possible internal company communications, sales-related materials and product manuals
belonging to the Chinese IT security services company i-Soon, also known as Anxun Information Technology. The leaked materials appear to show how a
commercial entity developed and supported cyber espionage tools in support of Chinese-affiliated threat actors. As part of initial investigation into the
leaked data, Unit 42 discovered links between information in the data leak and previous Chinese-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns.
Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that the leaks are genuine.

For example, documents in the leak appear to show i-Soon was marketing the Treadstone malware controller software, which was attributed to Elemental
Taurus (aka APT41) in the 2019 U.S. grand jury indictment against three Chengdu 404 employees [PDF].

Through analysis of the leaked data, Unit 42 has identified actor-owned infrastructure and potential malware related to historic reporting on Chinese
threat actors. Given the scope of the data leak, this report will cover initial analysis and significant findings, with further reporting likely to come
at a future time. (While the original GitHub repo where the leak was posted has now been taken down by GitHub staff, citing a violation of terms of
service, researchers will continue to study what was initially shared.)

Based on our current understanding of the data leak, customers can be better protected through Palo Alto Networks security products against the tools and
techniques used by the Chinese threat actors mentioned in this article.
Related Unit 42 Topics GitHub, China

Technical Analysis

Text on the GitHub repository claims that i-Soon has targeted the governments of India, Thailand, Vietnam and South Korea, as well as the
intergovernmental organization NATO. We continue to analyze the leaked data to verify these claims.

The GitHub repository contains a mixture of online chat conversations, screenshots and probable victim data, as well as sales- and support-related
documents. The text conversations dated between November 2018 and January 2023, and they involve 37 unique usernames.

The conversations range from general conversation and workplace issues to talking about targets, software vulnerabilities and customers.

Figure 1 graphs the text communications observed between the members of i-Soon, showing relationships between employees and the volume of messages
between them. (Specific user names and given names have been redacted.)
Image 1 is a relationship diagram of employees and message volume. Blue icons represent people with their user names underneath. Arrows connect these
users with each other. Numbers along the arrows indicate the number of messages. Usernames have been redacted. Figure 1. Visualization of i-Soon's leaked
online chats (specific user names redacted).

Links to Previous Threat Intelligence Reporting

Unit 42 has found links in the leaked i-Soon text message conversations to two previously reported campaigns attributed to Chinese advanced persistent
threat (APT) groups.

Campaign 1: 2022 Supply Chain Attack

In September 2022, Trend Micro reported about a supply chain attack on the Canadian software company Comm100. The attackers trojanized the installer for
Comm100's chat-based customer engagement application hosted on their official website. When we looked through the i-Soon data leak, we found indications
that i-Soon was involved in that attack.

Table 1 includes an excerpt taken from a conversation between two members of i-Soon where they claim IP address 8.218.67[.]52 is their server.
Date From To Message Translated
2022-06-13 7:39:19 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx ������pc [A person or organization from Yangzhou] wants to ask for or request access to a PC
channel that belongs to a specific individual.
2022-06-13 7:39:21 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx [�] [emoji suggesting embarrassment or sorry to bother you]
2022-06-13 7:39:23 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx ��� Can you give it now?
2022-06-13 7:40:26 wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx ("�)"

("�)"

8.218.67[.]52:27011

("TCP�)"

8.218.67[.]52:17011

("��)"

admin

(")"

88888888
("Gambling or lottery site)"

("Proxy)"

8.218.67[.]52:27011

("TCP Tunnel)" 8.218.67[.]52:17011

("account)"

admin

("password)"

88888888
2022-06-13 7:40:34 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx �� Uh-huh
2022-06-13 7:40:37 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx � [Expletive]
2022-06-13 7:40:54 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx ����� This server is in Hong Kong
2022-06-13 7:41:06 wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx �� You don't need to worry about it
2022-06-13 7:41:07 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx <a

href='068f70a1-1ff9-451 b-999e-2569860fd348.

md'>domain_access_r esult(1).csv</a>
2022-06-13 7:41:11 wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx � Um
2022-06-13 7:41:14 wxid_zbxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_c9xxxxxxxxxxxx ����� This server is ours

Table 1. Transcript of conversation between i-Soon members about IP address 8.218.67[.]52.

On June 17, 2022, days after the above conversation occurred, the IP address 8.218.67[.]52 served a Linux ELF file with the SHA256 of
db4497090a94d0189aa3c3f4fcee30d5381453ec5aa38962e2ca971074b74e8b. The file was served from the URL hxxp[://]8.218.67[.]52/js/xxx.jpg. When executed, the
file attempts to contact the domain unix.s3amazonbucket[.]com (which is not a legitimate Amazon domain).

The Trend Micro report also mentioned that another subdomain of s3amazonbucket[.]com (analyaze.s3amazonbucket[.]com) was used as a command and control
(C2) server for the trojanized installers.

Given the domain s3amazonbucket[.]com was likely under the control of i-Soon, Unit 42 assesses with moderate confidence that a group of hackers within
i-Soon was involved in the supply chain attack on Comm100.

Campaign 2: 2019 Poison Carp Attack

In September 2019, Citizen Lab reported on attackers targeting Tibetan groups via multiple iOS and Android exploits. Citizen Lab attributed the attack to
the Chinese threat group they track as POISON CARP. The report references domains that were tied to an IP address that we found references to in this
data leak.

The IP address 74.120.172[.]10 was associated with the domain mailteso[.]online between Sept. 22, 2020, and Feb. 20, 2024, and mailnotes[.]online between
Aug. 7, 2021, and July 12, 2022.

Table 2 outlines the conversation between i-Soon employees about IP address 74.120.172[.]10.
Date From To Message Translated
2023-01-09 02:28:14 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx ���� Wait, there are some issues with the platform
2023-01-09 02:28:18 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx � OK
2023-01-09 02:36:19 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx hxxps[://]74.120.172[.]10:100

92/home
2023-01-09 02:36:25 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx access OrFRXV

LZtestUser lzqzmp@123
2023-01-09 02:43:51 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx �� Send over a demo video
2023-01-09 02:44:06 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx ��� No need to give this information
2023-01-09 02:44:09 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx [�] [Grinning emoji]
2023-01-09 02:44:20 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx ���� This is the trial version of the Microsoft [tool]
2023-01-09 02:44:33 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx �,� I saw it
2023-01-09 02:44:51 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx ��� Do you have a demo video [for Microsoft Windows tool]?
2023-01-09 02:44:58 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx � Let me ask
2023-01-09 02:48:54 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx <a

href='12cef436-c870-4e0e

-b36c-ae2a4e839f79.md'>

������.7z</a>
<a

href='12cef436-C870

-4E0E-B36C-AE2A4 E839F79.MD'>

Microsoft Mail Secret Platform .7z

</a>
2023-01-09 02:52:01 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx ���� Is your video wrong?
2023-01-09 02:52:03 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx I can not open it
2023-01-09 02:55:53 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx �? Huh?
2023-01-09 02:55:56 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx �� Just decompress it
2023-01-09 02:56:36 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx ���� I guess I didn't watch the video
2023-01-09 03:01:26 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx � Also the Android RAT
2023-01-09 03:02:07 wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx �� Wait, there's some issues with the Android one
2023-01-09 03:02:26 wxid_12xxxxxxxxxxxx wxid_hlxxxxxxxxxxxx � ok

Table 2. Transcript of conversation between i-Soon employees about IP address 74.120.172[.]10.

At the time of Citizen Lab publication, mailnotes[.]online was associated with IP address 207.246.101[.]169, which was concurrently associated with the
domain gmail.isooncloud[.]com.

Links to Known Chinese Intrusion Sets

The data leaks include manuals and whitepapers for various software tools. Of particular importance, these tools include software previously attributed
to Chinese APT groups.

We do not currently know whether i-Soon were developers, resellers or even simply end users of these tools. However, the leaked documents help confirm
previous reporting that multiple China-attributed threat actor groups often use the same, likely commercialized, malware tool sets.

One document contains a footer that translates to "Anxun Information Technology Co., Ltd." and appears to be a product manual for a range of software
tools sold by i-Soon. These tools include remote control management systems for Windows, Mac, iOS, Android and Linux.

The Linux remote control management software shown in Figure 2 is notable because the screenshot provided in the document to help explain the tool's
functionality shows the malware control panel is named "Treadstone." The 2019 U.S. grand jury indictment of three Chengdu 404 employees directly
references Treadstone.
Image 2 is a screenshot of the malware Treadstone's control panel. Two red boxes highlight the host information and a group name. The language in the
screenshot is a mix of English and Chinese characters. Figure 2. Screenshot of the Treadstone Linux malware control panel from a leaked product manual.

The indictment claims the Treadstone malware controller software "was designed to work with Winnti malware which, at the time, was used only by a small
group of hackers." Given reporting from October 2023 of Chengdu 404 taking i-Soon to court for a software development contract dispute, i-Soon might have
developed the Treadstone panel.

Another document relating to known Chinese APT tools is a whitepaper for a Windows remote control management system. This document covers the system and
network architecture and the product's features. On one of the pages explaining management of the tool is a screenshot of what is likely the
administrator panel, shown in Figure 3.
Image 3 is a screenshot of the administrator panel that includes the configured public IP address and port included in the whitepaper for the Windows
remote control management system. Figure 3. Administrator panel from Windows remote control management system related to known Chinese APT tool.

The screenshot shows the configured public IP address and port as TCP[://]118.31.3[.]116:44444. SentinelLabs reported this IP address was used as a
ShadowPad C2 server in August 2021 and attributed to the Winnti group. This second link to the Winnti group adds further evidence that i-Soon was
involved in the development of known Winnti tool sets.

Conclusion

This data leak provides unique insight into the Chinese private-sector hacking industry, which had previously only been seen through U.S. government
indictments and reports. It also gives us a better understanding of the capabilities of Chinese threat actors, including how these groups are likely
sharing or reselling the same tool sets. This dissemination of tools makes attribution more difficult for defenders and threat intelligence analysts.

1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions README.md
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Expand Up @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Please fire issue to me if any lost APT/Malware events/campaigns.
* Mar 07 - [[ESET] Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/evasive-panda-leverages-monlam-festival-target-tibetans/) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.03.07_Evasive_Panda)
* Feb 27 - [[Mandiant] When Cats Fly: Suspected Iranian Threat Actor UNC1549 Targets Israeli and Middle East Aerospace and Defense Sectors](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-iranian-unc1549-targets-israel-middle-east) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.02.27.UNC1549)
* Feb 23 - [[Sophos] ConnectWise ScreenConnect attacks deliver malware](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/02/23/connectwise-screenconnect-attacks-deliver-malware/) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.02.23.ConnectWise_Malware)
* Feb 23 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Data From Chinese Security Services Company i-Soon Linked to Previous Chinese APT Campaigns](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/i-soon-data-leaks/) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.02.23.Data_From_Chinese_Security_Services_Company_i-Soon_Linked_to_Previous)
* Feb 16 - [[---] inside I-Soon APT(Earth Lusca) operation center](https://github.com/I-S00N/I-S00N) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.02.16_I-Soon_Earth_Lusca)
* Feb 14 - [[Microsoft] Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.02.14_APT_AI)
* Feb 13 - [[Trend Micro] CVE-2024-21412: Water Hydra Targets Traders With Microsoft Defender SmartScreen Zero-Day](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/cve202421412-water-hydra-targets-traders-with-windows-defender-s.html) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2024/2024.02.13.Water_Hydra)
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