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IEC61850SecurityDataset

This repository contains network traces that describe GOOSE communications in a substation. Figure 1 depicts the one-line diagram of a power system used for generating the network traces. It consists of 4-buses and 18 LEDs. As can be seen in the figure, the line feeders (1-6) are connected to different loads while the remaining feeder lines are connected to other substations. The IEDs communicate with each other using the GOOSE protocol defined in the IEC 61850 standard. Based on the one-line diagram, we generate multiple GOOSE network traces to represent normal, disturbance, and attack scenarios.

one-line substation diagram

Figure 1: Substation one-line diagram

Normal Scenario

There are 18 IEDs in substation including Line Feeder IEDs, Transformer Feeder IEDs, Bus IED and Under Frequency Load Shedding IEDs. These IEDs send multicast packets every second to share and update their status. For each transmission of a GOOSE frame under a normal scenario, the stNum and timestamp values remain the same, but the sqNum is incremented. This behavior is captured in the Normal.pcapng stored under the following directory: Normal/No_Variable_Loading.

Disturbance Scenario

We consider three disturbance scenarios under which the substation protection system operates and created three representative network traces, namely BusbarProtection.pcapng, BreakFailure.pcapng, and UnderFrequency.pcapng.

Busbar protection

  1. Let us consider that a fault occurs at busbar 66kV bus-1. The incomer line LIED10 will pick up on overcurrent, the other IEDs wont.
  2. The incomer line LIED10 will know through GOOSE communication that the overcurrent elements of other IEDs have not picked up.
  3. The incomer line LIED10 will quickly realise of busbar fault and trigger a trip to its own breaker CB-10 first and subsequently to the breakers associated with the busbars i.e., CB-11, CB-12 and CB-13.
  4. The trip status of CB-10 is sent by LIED10 through GOOSE communication to LIED11, LIED12 and TIED13 to trigger trip for their respective breakers.

Breaker failure protection

  1. Assume that a fault occurs in the feeder connecting substation S/S 3-1. The associated LIED11 overcurrent (O/C) element picks up, however, the breaker CB-11 does not trip due to mechanical failure.
  2. The GOOSE communication of breaker failure and O/C element pick-up is sent from LIED11 to the LIED10(incomer), LIED12 and TIED13.
  3. The communication triggers tripping of circuit breakers CB-10, CB-12 and CB-13. Subsequently, the remote CB (in S/S 3-1) is tripped using proper communication media

Underfrequencey load-shedding

  1. Under frequency IED (UFIED) can sense the under frequency in both 11kV buses when voltage transformer (VT) inputs are directly given to this IED.
  2. Alternately, incomer line IEDs (LIED30 and LIED40) can relay the information to the under frequency IED over GOOSE (when there is no direct VT input to UFIED).
  3. UFIED triggers a trip over GOOSE to the least priority (Priority 6) consumer first via LIED43. Then, CB-43 is tripped at first stage.
  4. After a time delay (usually 2-4 seconds) if the frequency is not stabilized at the desired value, further loads are shed. The sequence of tripping goes as: Priority 6 (CB43) →Priority 5 (CB-42)→Priority 4 (CB-32) . . .
  5. Between each two stages of tripping there is a time delay of 2-4 seconds. The trip is initiated via GOOSE communication to respective IEDs such as LIED43, LIED42, LIED32, etc.

Attack Scenarios

Table 1 lists the different types of GOOSE attacks and the tactics for realizing them. Basically, a denial of service (DoS) attack is a malicious attempt by an attacker to block a legitimate IED from accessing a particular resource through flooding. A message suppression (MS) attack refers to the hijacking of the communication channel by modifying the GOOSE header fields to prevent legitimate IEDs from receiving critical messages or updates. Data Manipulation (DM) refers to the process of injecting modified network payloads into the network to negatively impact the power grid stability or to mask unauthorized changes. These attacks are organized into three subfolders under the Attack directory where each subfolder contains attack trace(s) generated using the Normal.pcapng as a baseline. We also consider a more advanced attack scenario where an attacker combines multiple tactics to attack circuit breaker (CB-11). The duration of each PCAP file is 10 minutes, and the details of each file are as follows.

Attacks Tactics
DoS.1 - Flood bogus frames
MS.1 - Inject GOOSE sequence number (sqNum)
MS.2 - Inject GOOSE status number (stNum)
DM.1 - Modify current measurements reported by the merging units
DM.2 - Inject modified Boolean value of circuit breaker
DM.3 - Replay a previously valid message

Data Manipulation (DM)

Name: AS1.pcapng

Attack scenario 1: Inject false current measurements to bias the power system state estimation process without being detected.

- LIED10 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 588) containing a value of 380 to the current magnitude of phase A at time= 11.9 sec.

- LIED10 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 1175) containing a value of 270 to the current magnitude of phase B at time= 22.5 sec.

- LIED10 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 1771) containing a value of 360 to the current magnitude of phase C at time= 33.1 sec.

Name: AS2.pcapng

Attack scenario 2: Inject a malicious GOOSE frame to control the state of the circuit breaker

- LIED11 injects a malicious GOOSE frame (No. 597) by toggling the status of the circuit breaker from FALSE to TRUE ('tripped') at time= 12.3 sec

Name: AS3.pcapng

Attack scenario 3: Replay an old GOOSE payload containing circuit breaker 'trip' status and other measurements messages

- LIED11 replays previously valid GOOSE frames (No. 2734 and No. 2764) containing "open" circuit breaker information at time= 53.8 sec and 54.8 sec

- LIED22 replays previously captured fault current measurements (No. 7847, No. 7901, No. 7955, No. 8009, and No. 8063) between time= 155.8 sec and 159.88 sec

Denial of Service (DoS)

Name: AS1.pcapng

Attack scenario 1: Flood GOOSE messages to congest the substation network

- LIED10 injects 5000 GOOSE frames between time= 12.5 sec and time= 22.1 sec

- LIED12 injects 5000 GOOSE frames between time= 54.7 sec and time= 68.3 sec

Message Suppression (MS)

Name: AS1.pcapng

Attack scenario 1: Inject a high stNum value or slightly higher than the previously recorded stNum, where sqNum≠0.

- LIED10 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 542) with stNum=9999 and sqNum=10 at time= 13.9 sec.

- LIED12 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 784) with stNum=5 and sqNum=15 at time= 18.9 sec.

Name: AS2.pcapng

Attack scenario 2: Replay a previously valid GOOSE frame containing high stNum, sqNum =0 but stale timestamp

- LIED10 replays a GOOSE frame (No. 534) with stNum=9999 and sqNum=0 at time= 10.4 sec.

- LIED12 replays a GOOSE frame (No. 774) with stNum=5 and sqNum=0 at time= 15.5 sec.

Name: AS3.pcapng

Attack scenario 3: Inject a high stNum frame with sqNum = 0 and a valid timestamp.

- LIED10 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 534) with stNum=9999 and sqNum=0 at time= 10.4 sec, where the timestamp of the injected GOOSE frame > previously received GOOSE frames.

- LIED12 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 774) with stNum=5 and sqNum=0 at time=15.5 sec, where the timestamp of the injected GOOSE frame > previously received GOOSE frames.

Name: AS4.pcapng

Attack scenario 4: Inject a high sqNum frame to cause GOOSE frames to arrive at the receiver out-of-sequence i.e., not matching the order of transmission at the sender.

- LIED10 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 556) with sqNum=9999 at time= 12.7 sec

Others

Name: CompositeAttack.pcapng

Attack scenario: Inject high stNum attack followed by modifying the circuit breaker status associated with CB-11.

- LIED11 injects a GOOSE frame (No. 542) with stNum=9999 and sqNum=0 at time=11.3 sec

- LIED11 modifies the Boolean value of CB-11 from ‘1’ to ‘0’ and injects the modified GOOSE frame (No. 792) at time=16.3 sec.

Other Information

Scenario folder: each folder represents one scenario, it contains

  1. PCAP files: captures GOOSE packets from 18 IEDs during 10 mins.
  2. 18 CSV files: list transmitted data from 18 IEDs at every second during 10 mins. Since the attacking scenario is based on the normal scenario's transmission traffic, so the CSV files in the Attack directory are the same as the files in the normal directory.

SCL folder:

It contains 18 IID files to define the configuration of 18 IEDs. It also describes the data exchange format and the related data attributes for each IED. From those files, you can understand the payload structure in the PCAP files.

Note: This repository will be updated as new trace file becomes available.

Reference

Our dataset is free to download. However, please cite our paper accordingly.

Partha Biswas, Heng Chuan Tan, Qingbo Zhu, Yuan Li, Daisuke Mashima, and Binbin Chen, "A Synthesized Dataset for Cybersecurity Study of IEC 61850 based Substation." To appear at IEEE SmartGridComm 2019.