From c3eff8156b2858cbcb078ed92568572ca9b37c79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maria Xynou Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 16:17:21 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Hopefully final edit to KZ report (#1621) --- content/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/index.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/index.md b/content/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/index.md index a56fd222..5a45e5da 100644 --- a/content/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/index.md +++ b/content/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/index.md @@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ The results of our analysis show that most ISPs in Kazakhstan appear to implemen Notably, through [OONI data](https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20210808015758.022737_KZ_webconnectivity_3b9213f9ee4f2d06) collected from Kazakhstan between 2021 to 2024, we found **7 distinct intermediate certificates signed by 4 distinct root CAs being used to carry out TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan**. We found that these intermediate certificates were even being used to perform MITM attacks during periods of certificate invalidity. This raises concerns because such practices weaken the online privacy and security of internet users in Kazakhstan. -We found the latest government root CA and many TLS MITM attacks on at least 19 networks by only analyzing OONI data collected from Kazakhstan between June 2023 to June 2024. As OONI data from Kazakhstan [spans from 2017](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2017-01-02&until=2017-12-02&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity) to date, with [new measurements published every day](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2024-07-02&until=2024-08-02&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity), we encourage researchers to analyze [OONI data](https://ooni.org/data/) to investigate the scale of TLS MITM attacks in Kazakhstan further. +We found TLS MITM attacks on at least 19 networks by only analyzing OONI data collected from Kazakhstan between June 2023 to June 2024. As OONI data from Kazakhstan [spans from 2017](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2017-01-02&until=2017-12-02&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity) to date, with [new measurements published every day](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2024-07-02&until=2024-08-02&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity), we encourage researchers to analyze [OONI data](https://ooni.org/data/) to investigate the scale of TLS MITM attacks in Kazakhstan further. ### **Acknowledgements**