4 open redirects CVE

[s-b-repo]

Open Redirect

url = url.substring(0, qq);
buf.append(url);
if (q != null && q.length() > 0)
buf.append(q.replace("&", "&")); // no you don't html escape the redirect header
resp.setHeader("Location", buf.toString());
line # 2480

[‎apps/susimail/src/src/i2p/susi/webmail/WebMail.java]
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   url = url.substring(0, url.length() - 5);
    buf.append(url);
    if (p.length() > 0)
        buf.append(p.replace("&", "&"));  // no you don't html escape the redirect header
    resp.setHeader("Location", buf.toString());

line 1617

Unsanitized input from the request URL flows into setHeader, where it is used as an URL to redirect the user. This may result in an Open Redirect vulnerability.
[‎apps/i2psnark/java/src/org/klomp/snark/web/I2PSnarkServlet.java]

Unsanitized input from the request URL flows into setHeader, where it is used as an URL to redirect the user. This may result in an Open Redirect vulnerability.
[‎apps/routerconsole/jsp/index.jsp:50]

Unsanitized input from the request URL flows into setHeader, where it is used as an URL to redirect the user. This may result in an Open Redirect vulnerability.
[‎apps/routerconsole/java/src/net/i2p/router/web/HostCheckHandler.java:193]

[eyedeekay]

Probably low-priority, these are coming from inside the I2P application itself, i.e. they are probably trusted inputs. Leaving it open to have a look at the I2PSnarkServlet and the WebMail points, those could potentially come from partially user-supplied inputs. Not likely actionable.

[s-b-repo]

Probably low-priority, these are coming from inside the I2P application itself, i.e. they are probably trusted inputs. Leaving it open to have a look at the I2PSnarkServlet and the WebMail points, those could potentially come from partially user-supplied inputs. Not likely actionable.

may able to do something un wanted with webmail like when a attacker mails a exploit activating the redirect