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3.7 Naveed et al., Privacy in the Genomic Era.txt
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3.7 Naveed et al., Privacy in the Genomic Era.txt
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1.
Whole genome sequencing has become increasingly feasible the last years:
- 1990 first posited
- 2003 first whole genome, cost 3 billion
- 2014 cost only 5000, 2-3 days
- cost 1000, 1 day is soon a reality
Several opportunities, but also raises ethical questions:
- targeted medicines according to genome profile
- privacy issues, framework for CS:
- - what security / privacy is needed in each handling step?
- - what threat models are realized at each step?
- - open computational research problems?
2.
One likely scenario for use is a company which uses genomic data to explore family trees.
Suppose it is later discovered that your genomic profile indicates you are vulnerable to dementia.
The company has this data as well.
Sharing genomic data therefore might result in unexpected or undesired consequences.
DNA based data is of long-lived value, contrary to most other tests, and distinguished by:
- kinship
- health
- traceable
- unique
- mystique
- value
Therefore DNA data is 'exceptional' and warrants particular care.
3.
This section reviews several major applications:
3.1. Health Care
3.2. Research
3.3. Direct-to-Consumer Services
Genome sequencing has become feasible for individuals and has led to applications such as:
- genetic compatibility tests with potential partners
- personal 'genome passport'
- track kinship
3.4. Legal and Forensic
DNA data can be used for tracking:
- parentage suits
- track down suspected criminals
- - use kinship data to determine likely identity of perpetrator
- - unclear whether law enforcement may retain and/or use in the future
- - currently 'abandoned' DNA may be used without consent
4.
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
6.
Threats:
6.1.
Re-identification of pseudo-anonimized data, for example from donors.
6.2.
Phenotype inference through aggregate genomic data:
- only 75 SNP's are needed for identification
- correlation of genomic data
- kinship breach (when a kid gives up DNA, the parent can be identified)
6.3.
Other threats:
- anonymous paternity breach
- legal and forensic