diff --git a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma.rs b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma.rs
index 083b59b..a3d8460 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma.rs
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ mod dec;
 mod dec_new;
 mod elog;
 mod enc;
+mod enc_elg;
 mod fac;
 mod log_star;
 mod mod_;
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ pub(crate) use aff_g::{AffGProof, AffGPublicInputs, AffGSecretInputs};
 pub(crate) use dec::{DecProof, DecPublicInputs, DecSecretInputs};
 pub(crate) use elog::{ElogProof, ElogPublicInputs, ElogSecretInputs};
 pub(crate) use enc::{EncProof, EncPublicInputs, EncSecretInputs};
+pub(crate) use enc_elg::{EncElgProof, EncElgPublicInputs, EncElgSecretInputs};
 pub(crate) use fac::FacProof;
 pub(crate) use log_star::{LogStarProof, LogStarPublicInputs, LogStarSecretInputs};
 pub(crate) use mod_::ModProof;
diff --git a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/aff_g.rs b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/aff_g.rs
index d16b137..43a78cb 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/aff_g.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/aff_g.rs
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ impl<P: SchemeParams> AffGProof<P> {
 
         // g^{z_1} = B_x X^e
         if scalar_from_signed::<P>(&self.z1).mul_by_generator()
-            != self.cap_b_x + public.cap_x * &scalar_from_signed::<P>(&e)
+            != self.cap_b_x + public.cap_x * scalar_from_signed::<P>(&e)
         {
             return false;
         }
diff --git a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/enc_elg.rs b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/enc_elg.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3fe572
--- /dev/null
+++ b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/enc_elg.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+//! Range Proof w/ EL-Gamal Commitment ($\Pi^{enc-elg}$, Section A.2, Fig. 24)
+
+#![allow(dead_code)]
+
+use rand_core::CryptoRngCore;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use super::super::{
+    conversion::{public_signed_from_scalar, scalar_from_signed, secret_scalar_from_signed},
+    SchemeParams,
+};
+use crate::{
+    curve::{Point, Scalar},
+    paillier::{
+        Ciphertext, CiphertextWire, MaskedRandomizer, PaillierParams, PublicKeyPaillier, RPCommitmentWire, RPParams,
+        Randomizer,
+    },
+    tools::{
+        hashing::{Chain, Hashable, XofHasher},
+        Secret,
+    },
+    uint::{PublicSigned, SecretSigned},
+};
+
+const HASH_TAG: &[u8] = b"P_enc_elg";
+
+pub struct EncElgSecretInputs<'a, P: SchemeParams> {
+    /// $x \in \pm 2^\ell$.
+    pub x: &'a SecretSigned<<P::Paillier as PaillierParams>::Uint>,
+    /// $\rho$, a Paillier randomizer for the public key $N_0$.
+    pub rho: &'a Randomizer<P::Paillier>,
+    /// Scalar $a$.
+    pub a: &'a Secret<Scalar>,
+    /// Scalar $b$.
+    pub b: &'a Secret<Scalar>,
+}
+
+pub struct EncElgPublicInputs<'a, P: SchemeParams> {
+    /// Paillier public key $N_0$.
+    pub pk0: &'a PublicKeyPaillier<P::Paillier>,
+    /// Paillier ciphertext $C = enc_0(x, \rho)$.
+    pub cap_c: &'a Ciphertext<P::Paillier>,
+    /// Point $A = g * a$, where $g$ is the curve generator.
+    pub cap_a: &'a Point,
+    /// Point $B = g * b$, where $g$ is the curve generator.
+    pub cap_b: &'a Point,
+    /// Point $X = g * (a b + x)$, where $g$ is the curve generator.
+    pub cap_x: &'a Point,
+}
+
+/// ZK proof: Paillier encryption in range.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub(crate) struct EncElgProof<P: SchemeParams> {
+    e: Scalar,
+    cap_s: RPCommitmentWire<P::Paillier>,
+    cap_d: CiphertextWire<P::Paillier>,
+    cap_y: Point,
+    cap_z: Point,
+    cap_t: RPCommitmentWire<P::Paillier>,
+    z1: PublicSigned<<P::Paillier as PaillierParams>::Uint>,
+    w: Scalar,
+    z2: MaskedRandomizer<P::Paillier>,
+    z3: PublicSigned<<P::Paillier as PaillierParams>::WideUint>,
+}
+
+impl<P: SchemeParams> EncElgProof<P> {
+    pub fn new(
+        rng: &mut impl CryptoRngCore,
+        secret: EncElgSecretInputs<'_, P>,
+        public: EncElgPublicInputs<'_, P>,
+        setup: &RPParams<P::Paillier>,
+        aux: &impl Hashable,
+    ) -> Self {
+        secret.x.assert_exponent_range(P::L_BOUND);
+        assert_eq!(public.cap_c.public_key(), public.pk0);
+
+        let hat_cap_n = setup.modulus(); // $\hat{N}$
+
+        let alpha = SecretSigned::random_in_exponent_range(rng, P::L_BOUND + P::EPS_BOUND);
+        let mu = SecretSigned::random_in_exponent_range_scaled(rng, P::L_BOUND, hat_cap_n);
+        let r = Randomizer::random(rng, public.pk0);
+        let beta = Secret::init_with(|| Scalar::random(rng));
+        let gamma = SecretSigned::random_in_exponent_range_scaled(rng, P::L_BOUND + P::EPS_BOUND, hat_cap_n);
+
+        let cap_s = setup.commit(secret.x, &mu).to_wire();
+        let cap_d = Ciphertext::new_with_randomizer(public.pk0, &alpha, &r).to_wire();
+        let cap_y = public.cap_a * &beta + secret_scalar_from_signed::<P>(&alpha).mul_by_generator();
+        let cap_z = beta.mul_by_generator();
+        let cap_t = setup.commit(&alpha, &gamma).to_wire();
+
+        let mut reader = XofHasher::new_with_dst(HASH_TAG)
+            // commitments
+            .chain(&cap_s)
+            .chain(&cap_d)
+            .chain(&cap_y)
+            .chain(&cap_z)
+            .chain(&cap_t)
+            // public parameters
+            .chain(public.pk0.as_wire())
+            .chain(&public.cap_c.to_wire())
+            .chain(&public.cap_a)
+            .chain(&public.cap_b)
+            .chain(&public.cap_x)
+            .chain(&setup.to_wire())
+            .chain(aux)
+            .finalize_to_reader();
+
+        // Non-interactive challenge
+        let e = Scalar::from_xof_reader(&mut reader);
+        let e_signed = public_signed_from_scalar::<P>(&e);
+
+        let z1 = (alpha + secret.x * e_signed).to_public();
+        let w = *(beta + secret.b * e).expose_secret();
+        let z2 = secret.rho.to_masked(&r, &e_signed);
+        let z3 = (gamma + mu * e_signed.to_wide()).to_public();
+
+        Self {
+            e,
+            cap_s,
+            cap_d,
+            cap_y,
+            cap_z,
+            cap_t,
+            z1,
+            w,
+            z2,
+            z3,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn verify(
+        &self,
+        public: EncElgPublicInputs<'_, P>,
+        setup: &RPParams<P::Paillier>,
+        aux: &impl Hashable,
+    ) -> bool {
+        assert_eq!(public.cap_c.public_key(), public.pk0);
+
+        let mut reader = XofHasher::new_with_dst(HASH_TAG)
+            // commitments
+            .chain(&self.cap_s)
+            .chain(&self.cap_d)
+            .chain(&self.cap_y)
+            .chain(&self.cap_z)
+            .chain(&self.cap_t)
+            // public parameters
+            .chain(public.pk0.as_wire())
+            .chain(&public.cap_c.to_wire())
+            .chain(&public.cap_a)
+            .chain(&public.cap_b)
+            .chain(&public.cap_x)
+            .chain(&setup.to_wire())
+            .chain(aux)
+            .finalize_to_reader();
+
+        // Non-interactive challenge
+        let e = Scalar::from_xof_reader(&mut reader);
+
+        if e != self.e {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        let e_signed = public_signed_from_scalar::<P>(&e);
+
+        // z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell + \eps}
+        if !self.z1.in_range_bits(P::L_BOUND + P::EPS_BOUND) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        // enc_0(z1, z2) == D (+) C (*) e
+        let c = Ciphertext::new_public_with_randomizer(public.pk0, &self.z1, &self.z2);
+        let cap_d = self.cap_d.to_precomputed(public.pk0);
+        if c != cap_d + public.cap_c * &e_signed {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        // A * w + g * z1 == Y + X * e
+        if public.cap_a * self.w + scalar_from_signed::<P>(&self.z1).mul_by_generator() != self.cap_y + public.cap_x * e
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        // g * w == Z + B * e
+        if self.w.mul_by_generator() != self.cap_z + public.cap_b * e {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        // s^{z_1} t^{z_3} == T S^e \mod \hat{N}
+        let cap_t = self.cap_t.to_precomputed(setup);
+        let cap_s = self.cap_s.to_precomputed(setup);
+        if setup.commit(&self.z1, &self.z3) != &cap_t * &cap_s.pow(&e_signed) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        true
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use rand_core::OsRng;
+
+    use super::{EncElgProof, EncElgPublicInputs, EncElgSecretInputs};
+    use crate::{
+        cggmp21::{conversion::secret_scalar_from_signed, SchemeParams, TestParams},
+        curve::Scalar,
+        paillier::{Ciphertext, RPParams, Randomizer, SecretKeyPaillierWire},
+        tools::Secret,
+        uint::SecretSigned,
+    };
+
+    #[test]
+    fn prove_and_verify() {
+        type Params = TestParams;
+        type Paillier = <Params as SchemeParams>::Paillier;
+
+        let sk = SecretKeyPaillierWire::<Paillier>::random(&mut OsRng).into_precomputed();
+        let pk = sk.public_key();
+
+        let setup = RPParams::random(&mut OsRng);
+
+        let aux: &[u8] = b"abcde";
+
+        let x = SecretSigned::random_in_exponent_range(&mut OsRng, Params::L_BOUND);
+        let rho = Randomizer::random(&mut OsRng, pk);
+        let a = Secret::init_with(|| Scalar::random(&mut OsRng));
+        let b = Secret::init_with(|| Scalar::random(&mut OsRng));
+
+        let cap_c = Ciphertext::new_with_randomizer(pk, &x, &rho);
+        let cap_a = a.mul_by_generator();
+        let cap_b = b.mul_by_generator();
+        let cap_x = (&a * &b + secret_scalar_from_signed::<Params>(&x)).mul_by_generator();
+
+        let proof = EncElgProof::<Params>::new(
+            &mut OsRng,
+            EncElgSecretInputs {
+                x: &x,
+                rho: &rho,
+                a: &a,
+                b: &b,
+            },
+            EncElgPublicInputs {
+                pk0: pk,
+                cap_c: &cap_c,
+                cap_a: &cap_a,
+                cap_b: &cap_b,
+                cap_x: &cap_x,
+            },
+            &setup,
+            &aux,
+        );
+        assert!(proof.verify(
+            EncElgPublicInputs {
+                pk0: pk,
+                cap_c: &cap_c,
+                cap_a: &cap_a,
+                cap_b: &cap_b,
+                cap_x: &cap_x,
+            },
+            &setup,
+            &aux
+        ));
+    }
+}
diff --git a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/log_star.rs b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/log_star.rs
index b32500c..50084dd 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/log_star.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/log_star.rs
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ impl<P: SchemeParams> LogStarProof<P> {
         }
 
         // g^{z_1} == Y X^e
-        if public.g * &scalar_from_signed::<P>(&self.z1) != self.cap_y + public.cap_x * &scalar_from_signed::<P>(&e) {
+        if public.g * scalar_from_signed::<P>(&self.z1) != self.cap_y + public.cap_x * scalar_from_signed::<P>(&e) {
             return false;
         }
 
diff --git a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/mul_star.rs b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/mul_star.rs
index cd17e34..18fa8f3 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/mul_star.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/mul_star.rs
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ impl<P: SchemeParams> MulStarProof<P> {
 
         // g^{z_1} == B_x X^e
         if scalar_from_signed::<P>(&self.z1).mul_by_generator()
-            != self.cap_b_x + public.cap_x * &scalar_from_signed::<P>(&e)
+            != self.cap_b_x + public.cap_x * scalar_from_signed::<P>(&e)
         {
             return false;
         }
diff --git a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/sch.rs b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/sch.rs
index 08e3bfc..101f3bc 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/sch.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/cggmp21/sigma/sch.rs
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ impl SchProof {
 
     pub fn verify(&self, commitment: &SchCommitment, cap_x: &Point, aux: &impl Hashable) -> bool {
         let challenge = SchChallenge::new(cap_x, commitment, aux);
-        challenge == self.challenge && self.proof.mul_by_generator() == commitment.0 + cap_x * &challenge.0
+        challenge == self.challenge && self.proof.mul_by_generator() == commitment.0 + cap_x * challenge.0
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/synedrion/src/tools/secret.rs b/synedrion/src/tools/secret.rs
index 860a755..ddf91ef 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/tools/secret.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/tools/secret.rs
@@ -233,6 +233,13 @@ impl<'a, T: Zeroize + Clone + Mul<&'a T, Output = T>> Mul<&'a Secret<T>> for Sec
     }
 }
 
+impl<'a, T: Zeroize + Clone + Mul<&'a T, Output = T>> Mul<&'a Secret<T>> for &Secret<T> {
+    type Output = Secret<T>;
+    fn mul(self, rhs: &'a Secret<T>) -> Self::Output {
+        self * rhs.expose_secret()
+    }
+}
+
 // Division
 
 impl<'a, T: Zeroize + DivAssign<&'a NonZero<T>>> DivAssign<&'a NonZero<T>> for Secret<T> {
diff --git a/synedrion/src/tools/sss.rs b/synedrion/src/tools/sss.rs
index 442aac7..a3e12fa 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/tools/sss.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/tools/sss.rs
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ pub(crate) fn shamir_join_points(pairs: &BTreeMap<ShareId, Point>) -> Point {
     let share_ids = pairs.keys().cloned().collect::<BTreeSet<_>>();
     pairs
         .iter()
-        .map(|(share_id, val)| val * &interpolation_coeff(&share_ids, share_id))
+        .map(|(share_id, val)| val * interpolation_coeff(&share_ids, share_id))
         .sum()
 }
 
diff --git a/synedrion/src/www02/entities.rs b/synedrion/src/www02/entities.rs
index 80e0acd..7e48d63 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/www02/entities.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/www02/entities.rs
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ impl<P: SchemeParams, I: Clone + Ord + PartialEq + Debug> ThresholdKeyShare<P, I
                     .ok_or_else(|| LocalError::new("id={id:?} is missing in the share_ids"))?;
                 Ok((
                     id.clone(),
-                    public_share * &interpolation_coeff(&share_ids_set, this_share_id),
+                    public_share * interpolation_coeff(&share_ids_set, this_share_id),
                 ))
             })
             .collect::<Result<_, LocalError>>()?;
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ impl<P: SchemeParams, I: Clone + Ord + PartialEq + Debug> ThresholdKeyShare<P, I
                     .public_shares
                     .get(id)
                     .expect("There is one public share (Point) for each party")
-                    * &interpolation_coeff(&share_ids_set, share_id)
+                    * interpolation_coeff(&share_ids_set, share_id)
                         .invert()
                         .expect("the interpolation coefficient is a non-zero scalar");
                 (id.clone(), public_share)
diff --git a/synedrion/src/www02/key_resharing.rs b/synedrion/src/www02/key_resharing.rs
index 916be77..0a2e59b 100644
--- a/synedrion/src/www02/key_resharing.rs
+++ b/synedrion/src/www02/key_resharing.rs
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ impl<P: SchemeParams, I: PartyId> Round<I> for Round1<P, I> {
                 payload
                     .public_polynomial
                     .coeff0()
-                    .map(|coeff0| coeff0 * &interpolation_coeff(&old_share_ids, &payload.old_share_id))
+                    .map(|coeff0| coeff0 * interpolation_coeff(&old_share_ids, &payload.old_share_id))
             })
             .sum::<Result<_, _>>()?;
         if Point::from_verifying_key(&new_holder.inputs.verifying_key) != vkey {