diff --git a/kernel/Kconfig b/kernel/Kconfig
index 67f177f4708a..eb5df732d026 100644
--- a/kernel/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/Kconfig
@@ -16,4 +16,139 @@ config KSU_DEBUG
 	help
 	  Enable KernelSU debug mode.
 
+menu "KernelSU - SUSFS"
+config KSU_SUSFS
+    bool "KernelSU addon - SUSFS"
+    depends on KSU
+    default y
+    help
+      Patch and Enable SUSFS to kernel with KernelSU.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+    bool "Enable to hide suspicious path (NOT recommended)"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow hiding the user-defined path and all its sub-paths from various system calls.
+      - tmpfs filesystem is not allowed to be added. 
+      - Effective on process with uid > 2000 only.
+      - Use with cautious as it may cause performance loss and will be vulnerable to side channel attacks,
+        just disable this feature if it doesn't work for you or you don't need it at all.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+    bool "Enable to hide suspicious mounts"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow hiding the user-defined mount paths from /proc/self/[mounts|mountinfo|mountstat].
+      - Effective on all processes for hiding mount entries.
+      - Mounts mounted by process with ksu domain will be forced to be assigned the dev name "KSU".
+      - mnt_id and mnt_group_id of the sus mount will be assigned to a much bigger number to solve the issue of id not being contiguous.  
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+    bool "Enable to hide KSU's default mounts automatically (experimental)"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+    default y
+    help
+      - Automatically add KSU's default mounts to sus_mount.
+      - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+      - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+    bool "Enable to hide suspicious bind mounts automatically (experimental)"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+    default y
+    help
+      - Automatically add binded mounts to sus_mount.
+      - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+      - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+    bool "Enable to spoof suspicious kstat"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow spoofing the kstat of user-defined file/directory.
+      - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_OVERLAYFS
+    bool "Enable to automatically spoof kstat and kstatfs for overlayed files/directories"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Automatically spoof the kstat and kstatfs for overlayed files/directories.
+      - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+      - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+    bool "Enable to use ksu's ksu_try_umount"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow using ksu_try_umount to umount other user-defined mount paths prior to ksu's default umount paths.
+      - Effective on all NO-root-access-granted processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+    bool "Enable to add bind mounts to ksu's ksu_try_umount automatically (experimental)"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+    default y
+    help
+      - Automatically add binded mounts to ksu's ksu_try_umount.
+      - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
+      - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+    bool "Enable to spoof uname"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow spoofing the string returned by uname syscall to user-defined string.
+      - Effective on all processes.
+      
+config KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+    bool "Enable logging susfs log to kernel"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow logging susfs log to kernel, uncheck it to completely disable all susfs log.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_HIDE_KSU_SUSFS_SYMBOLS
+    bool "Enable to automatically hide ksu and susfs symbols from /proc/kallsyms"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Automatically hide ksu and susfs symbols from '/proc/kallsyms'.
+      - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_PROC_CMDLINE
+    bool "Enable to spoof /proc/cmdline"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Spoof the output of /proc/cmdline with a user-defined file.
+      - Effective on all processes.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+    bool "Enable to redirect a path to be opened with another path (experimental)"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow redirecting a target path to be opened with another user-defined path.
+      - Effective only on processes with uid < 2000.
+      - Please be reminded that process with open access to the target and redirected path can be detected.
+
+config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+    bool "Enable SUS-SU in runtime temporarily"
+    depends on KSU_SUSFS && KPROBES && HAVE_KPROBES && KPROBE_EVENTS
+    default y
+    help
+      - Allow user to enable or disable core ksu kprobes hooks temporarily in runtime. There are 2 working modes for sus_su.
+      - Mode 0 (default): Disable sus_su, and enable ksu kprobe hooks for su instead.
+      - Mode 1 (deprecated): 
+      - Mode 2: Enable sus_su, and disable ksu kprobe hooks for su, which means the kernel inline hooks are enabled,
+                the same as the su implementaion of non-gki kernel without kprobe supported.
+      - Only apps with root access granted by ksu manager are allowed to get root.
+
+endmenu
+
 endmenu
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 669297563b1d..e686fad34eb9 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -56,14 +56,112 @@ $(info -- KernelSU Manager signature hash: $(KSU_EXPECTED_HASH))
 ccflags-y += -DEXPECTED_SIZE=$(KSU_EXPECTED_SIZE)
 ccflags-y += -DEXPECTED_HASH=\"$(KSU_EXPECTED_HASH)\"
 
-ifeq ($(shell grep -q "int path_umount" $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c; echo $$?),0)
+#ifeq ($(shell grep -q "int path_umount" $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c; echo $$?),0)
+#ccflags-y += -DKSU_UMOUNT
+#else
+#$(info -- Did you know you can backport path_umount to fs/namespace.c from 5.9?)
+#$(info -- Read: https://kernelsu.org/guide/how-to-integrate-for-non-gki.html#how-to-backport-path-umount)
+#endif
+
 ccflags-y += -DKSU_UMOUNT
-else
-$(info -- Did you know you can backport path_umount to fs/namespace.c from 5.9?)
-$(info -- Read: https://kernelsu.org/guide/how-to-integrate-for-non-gki.html#how-to-backport-path-umount)
+
+ifneq ($(shell grep -Eq "^static int can_umount" $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c; echo $$?),0)
+$(info -- KSU_SUSFS: adding function 'static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags);' to $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c)
+CAN_UMOUNT = static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags)\n\
+{\n\t\
+        struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);\n\t\
+        if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))\n\t\t\
+                return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+        if (!may_mount())\n\t\t\
+                return -EPERM;\n\t\
+        if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)\n\t\t\
+                return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+        if (!check_mnt(mnt))\n\t\t\
+                return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+        if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)\n\t\t\
+                return -EINVAL;\n\t\
+        if (flags & MNT_FORCE && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))\n\t\t\
+                return -EPERM;\n\t\
+        return 0;\n\
+}\n
+$(shell sed -i '/^static bool is_mnt_ns_file/i $(CAN_UMOUNT)' $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c;)
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(shell grep -Eq "^int path_umount" $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c; echo $$?),0)
+$(info -- KSU_SUSFS: adding function 'int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);' to $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c)
+PATH_UMOUNT = int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags)\n\
+{\n\t\
+        struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);\n\t\
+        int ret;\n\t\
+        ret = can_umount(path, flags);\n\t\
+        if (!ret)\n\t\t\
+                ret = do_umount(mnt, flags);\n\t\
+        dput(path->dentry);\n\t\
+        mntput_no_expire(mnt);\n\t\
+        return ret;\n\
+}\n
+$(shell sed -i '/^static bool is_mnt_ns_file/i $(PATH_UMOUNT)' $(srctree)/fs/namespace.c;)
+endif
+
+ifneq ($(shell grep -Eq "^int path_umount" $(srctree)/fs/internal.h; echo $$?),0)
+$(shell sed -i '/^extern void __init mnt_init/a int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);' $(srctree)/fs/internal.h;)
+$(info -- KSU_SUSFS: adding 'int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags);' to $(srctree)/fs/internal.h)
 endif
 
 ccflags-y += -Wno-implicit-function-declaration -Wno-strict-prototypes -Wno-int-conversion -Wno-gcc-compat
 ccflags-y += -Wno-declaration-after-statement -Wno-unused-function
 
+ifeq ($(shell test -e $(srctree)/fs/susfs.c; echo $$?),0)
+$(eval SUSFS_VERSION=$(shell cat $(srctree)/include/linux/susfs.h | grep -E '^#define SUSFS_VERSION' | cut -d' ' -f3 | sed 's/"//g'))
+$(info -- SUSFS_VERSION: $(SUSFS_VERSION))
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SUS_OVERLAYFS
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SUS_OVERLAYFS
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_HIDE_KSU_SUSFS_SYMBOLS
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_HIDE_KSU_SUSFS_SYMBOLS
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_PROC_CMDLINE
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_PROC_CMDLINE
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+endif
+ifdef KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+ccflags-y += -DKSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+endif
+else
+$(info -- You have not integrate susfs in your kernel.)
+$(info -- Read: https://gitlab.com/simonpunk/susfs4ksu)
+endif
+
 # Keep a new line here!! Because someone may append config
diff --git a/kernel/allowlist.c b/kernel/allowlist.c
index 4fbba9355949..31fd5b2dc1e7 100644
--- a/kernel/allowlist.c
+++ b/kernel/allowlist.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static uint8_t allow_list_bitmap[PAGE_SIZE] __read_mostly __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 static struct work_struct ksu_save_work;
 static struct work_struct ksu_load_work;
 
-bool persistent_allow_list(void);
+static bool persistent_allow_list(void);
 
 void ksu_show_allow_list(void)
 {
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ bool __ksu_is_allow_uid(uid_t uid)
 
 	if (unlikely(uid == 0)) {
 		// already root, but only allow our domain.
-		return is_ksu_domain();
+		return ksu_is_ksu_domain();
 	}
 
 	if (forbid_system_uid(uid)) {
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ bool ksu_get_allow_list(int *array, int *length, bool allow)
 	return true;
 }
 
-void do_save_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
+static void do_save_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	u32 magic = FILE_MAGIC;
 	u32 version = FILE_FORMAT_VERSION;
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ void do_save_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
 	filp_close(fp, 0);
 }
 
-void do_load_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
+static void do_load_allow_list(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	loff_t off = 0;
 	ssize_t ret = 0;
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ void ksu_prune_allowlist(bool (*is_uid_valid)(uid_t, char *, void *), void *data
 }
 
 // make sure allow list works cross boot
-bool persistent_allow_list(void)
+static bool persistent_allow_list(void)
 {
 	return ksu_queue_work(&ksu_save_work);
 }
diff --git a/kernel/apk_sign.c b/kernel/apk_sign.c
index ba8b73f2eb2b..fe91b10466a1 100644
--- a/kernel/apk_sign.c
+++ b/kernel/apk_sign.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ module_param_cb(ksu_debug_manager_uid, &expected_size_ops,
 
 #endif
 
-bool is_manager_apk(char *path)
+bool ksu_is_manager_apk(char *path)
 {
 	return check_v2_signature(path, EXPECTED_SIZE, EXPECTED_HASH);
 }
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/kernel/apk_sign.h b/kernel/apk_sign.h
index bed501c49264..e02aa5144065 100644
--- a/kernel/apk_sign.h
+++ b/kernel/apk_sign.h
@@ -3,6 +3,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
-bool is_manager_apk(char *path);
+bool ksu_is_manager_apk(char *path);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/kernel/core_hook.c b/kernel/core_hook.c
index 009216efa454..dcd3e1eb1113 100644
--- a/kernel/core_hook.c
+++ b/kernel/core_hook.c
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+#include <linux/susfs.h>
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+
 #include "allowlist.h"
 #include "arch.h"
 #include "core_hook.h"
@@ -45,9 +49,26 @@
 #include "throne_tracker.h"
 #include "kernel_compat.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+bool susfs_is_allow_su(void)
+{
+	if (is_manager()) {
+		// we are manager, allow!
+		return true;
+	}
+	return ksu_is_allow_uid(current_uid().val);
+}
+
+extern u32 susfs_zygote_sid;
+extern void susfs_run_try_umount_for_current_mnt_ns(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+extern bool susfs_is_sus_su_ready;
+#endif
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+
 static bool ksu_module_mounted = false;
 
-extern int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4);
+extern int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4);
 
 static inline bool is_allow_su()
 {
@@ -110,7 +131,7 @@ static void setup_groups(struct root_profile *profile, struct cred *cred)
 	set_groups(cred, group_info);
 }
 
-void escape_to_root(void)
+void ksu_escape_to_root(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred;
 
@@ -167,7 +188,7 @@ void escape_to_root(void)
 
 	setup_groups(profile, cred);
 
-	setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
+	ksu_setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
 }
 
 int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
@@ -204,7 +225,7 @@ int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 	pr_info("renameat: %s -> %s, new path: %s\n", old_dentry->d_iname,
 		new_dentry->d_iname, buf);
 
-	track_throne();
+	ksu_track_throne();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -253,7 +274,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	if (arg2 == CMD_GRANT_ROOT) {
 		if (is_allow_su()) {
 			pr_info("allow root for: %d\n", current_uid().val);
-			escape_to_root();
+			ksu_escape_to_root();
 			if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
 				pr_err("grant_root: prctl reply error\n");
 			}
@@ -288,7 +309,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			if (!post_fs_data_lock) {
 				post_fs_data_lock = true;
 				pr_info("post-fs-data triggered\n");
-				on_post_fs_data();
+				ksu_on_post_fs_data();
 			}
 			break;
 		}
@@ -315,7 +336,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		if (!from_root) {
 			return 0;
 		}
-		if (!handle_sepolicy(arg3, arg4)) {
+		if (!ksu_handle_sepolicy(arg3, arg4)) {
 			if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
 				pr_err("sepolicy: prctl reply error\n");
 			}
@@ -376,6 +397,335 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+	if (current_uid_val == 0) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_path))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_add_sus_path((struct st_susfs_sus_path __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_PATH -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_mount))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_add_sus_mount((struct st_susfs_sus_mount __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_MOUNT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_kstat))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_add_sus_kstat((struct st_susfs_sus_kstat __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_kstat))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_update_sus_kstat((struct st_susfs_sus_kstat __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_UPDATE_SUS_KSTAT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_sus_kstat))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_add_sus_kstat((struct st_susfs_sus_kstat __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_SUS_KSTAT_STATICALLY -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+        }
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_try_umount))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_add_try_umount((struct st_susfs_try_umount __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_RUN_UMOUNT_FOR_CURRENT_MNT_NS) {
+			int error = 0;
+			susfs_run_try_umount_for_current_mnt_ns();
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_RUN_UMOUNT_FOR_CURRENT_MNT_NS -> ret: %d\n", error);
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_uname))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_set_uname((struct st_susfs_uname __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_UNAME -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (arg3 != 0 && arg3 != 1) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG -> arg3 can only be 0 or 1\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			susfs_set_log(arg3);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_PROC_CMDLINE
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SET_PROC_CMDLINE) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, SUSFS_FAKE_PROC_CMDLINE_SIZE)) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_PROC_CMDLINE -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_PROC_CMDLINE -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_set_proc_cmdline((char __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SET_PROC_CMDLINE -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_PROC_CMDLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_susfs_open_redirect))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_add_open_redirect((struct st_susfs_open_redirect __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_ADD_OPEN_REDIRECT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(struct st_sus_su))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = susfs_sus_su((struct st_sus_su __user*)arg3);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SUS_SU -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION) {
+			int error = 0;
+			int len_of_susfs_version = strlen(SUSFS_VERSION);
+			char *susfs_version = SUSFS_VERSION;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, len_of_susfs_version+1)) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)susfs_version, len_of_susfs_version+1);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VERSION -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES) {
+			int error = 0;
+			u64 enabled_features = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(u64))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 0);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 1);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_KSU_DEFAULT_MOUNT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 2);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_SUS_BIND_MOUNT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 3);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 4);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_OVERLAYFS
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 5);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 6);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 7);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_UNAME
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 8);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_ENABLE_LOG
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 9);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_HIDE_KSU_SUSFS_SYMBOLS
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 10);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SPOOF_PROC_CMDLINE
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 11);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_OPEN_REDIRECT
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 12);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+			enabled_features |= (1 << 13);
+#endif
+			error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)&enabled_features, sizeof(enabled_features));
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_ENABLED_FEATURES -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT) {
+			int error = 0;
+			int len_of_variant = strlen(SUSFS_VARIANT);
+			char *susfs_variant = SUSFS_VARIANT;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, len_of_variant+1)) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)susfs_variant, len_of_variant+1);
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_VARIANT -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY) {
+			int error = 0;
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(susfs_is_sus_su_ready))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)&susfs_is_sus_su_ready, sizeof(susfs_is_sus_su_ready));
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_IS_SUS_SU_READY -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (arg2 == CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE) {
+			int error = 0;
+			int working_mode = susfs_get_sus_su_working_mode();
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg3, sizeof(working_mode))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE -> arg3 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (!ksu_access_ok((void __user*)arg5, sizeof(error))) {
+				pr_err("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE -> arg5 is not accessible\n");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			error = copy_to_user((void __user*)arg3, (void*)&working_mode, sizeof(working_mode));
+			pr_info("susfs: CMD_SUSFS_SHOW_SUS_SU_WORKING_MODE -> ret: %d\n", error);
+			if (copy_to_user((void __user*)arg5, &error, sizeof(error)))
+				pr_info("susfs: copy_to_user() failed\n");
+			return 0;
+		}
+#endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+	}
+#endif //#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+
 	// all other cmds are for 'root manager'
 	if (!from_manager) {
 		return 0;
@@ -460,7 +810,11 @@ static int ksu_umount_mnt(struct path *path, int flags)
 #endif
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+void ksu_try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
+#else
 static void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
+#endif
 {
 	struct path path;
 	int err = kern_path(mnt, 0, &path);
@@ -484,6 +838,18 @@ static void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+void susfs_try_umount_all(uid_t uid) {
+	susfs_try_umount(uid);
+	ksu_try_umount("/system", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/system_ext", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/vendor", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/product", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH);
+	ksu_try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", false, MNT_DETACH);
+}
+#endif
+
 int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 	// this hook is used for umounting overlayfs for some uid, if there isn't any module mounted, just ignore it!
@@ -503,6 +869,17 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+	// check if current process is zygote
+	bool is_zygote_child = susfs_is_sid_equal(old->security, susfs_zygote_sid);
+	if (likely(is_zygote_child)) {
+		// if spawned process is non user app process, run ksu_try_umount()
+		if (unlikely(new_uid.val < 10000 && new_uid.val >= 1000)) {
+			goto out_ksu_try_umount;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (!is_appuid(new_uid) || is_unsupported_uid(new_uid.val)) {
 		// pr_info("handle setuid ignore non application or isolated uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
 		return 0;
@@ -512,6 +889,12 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 		// pr_info("handle setuid ignore allowed application: %d\n", new_uid.val);
 		return 0;
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_PATH
+	else {
+		// if new uid is not root granted, then drop a payload to inidicate that sus_path will be effective on this uid
+		new->user->android_kabi_reserved2 |= USER_STRUCT_KABI2_NON_ROOT_USER_APP_PROFILE;
+	}
+#endif
 
 	if (!ksu_uid_should_umount(new_uid.val)) {
 		return 0;
@@ -521,31 +904,42 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 #endif
 	}
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
 	// check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
 	// because some su apps may setuid to untrusted_app but they are in global mount namespace
 	// when we umount for such process, that is a disaster!
-	bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old->security);
+	bool is_zygote_child = ksu_is_zygote(old->security);
+#endif
 	if (!is_zygote_child) {
 		pr_info("handle umount ignore non zygote child: %d\n",
 			current->pid);
 		return 0;
 	}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_DEBUG
 	// umount the target mnt
 	pr_info("handle umount for uid: %d, pid: %d\n", new_uid.val,
 		current->pid);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+out_ksu_try_umount:
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
+	// susfs come first, and lastly umount by ksu, make sure umount in reversed order
+	susfs_try_umount_all(new_uid.val);
+#else
 	// fixme: use `collect_mounts` and `iterate_mount` to iterate all mountpoint and
 	// filter the mountpoint whose target is `/data/adb`
-	try_umount("/system", true, 0);
-	try_umount("/vendor", true, 0);
-	try_umount("/product", true, 0);
-	try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH);
+	ksu_try_umount("/system", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/vendor", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/product", true, 0);
+	ksu_try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH);
 
 	// try umount ksu temp path
-	try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", false, MNT_DETACH);
-	try_umount("/sbin", false, MNT_DETACH);
+	ksu_try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", false, MNT_DETACH);
+	ksu_try_umount("/sbin", false, MNT_DETACH);
+#endif
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/kernel_compat.c b/kernel/kernel_compat.c
index b242bc637398..0ec3df624f94 100644
--- a/kernel/kernel_compat.c
+++ b/kernel/kernel_compat.c
@@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ void ksu_android_ns_fs_check()
 	task_unlock(current);
 }
 
+int ksu_access_ok(const void *addr, unsigned long size) {
+#if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(5,0,0)
+    /* For kernels before 5.0.0, pass the type argument to access_ok. */
+    return access_ok(VERIFY_READ, addr, size);
+#else
+    /* For kernels 5.0.0 and later, ignore the type argument. */
+    return access_ok(addr, size);
+#endif
+}
+
 struct file *ksu_filp_open_compat(const char *filename, int flags, umode_t mode)
 {
 #if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(4, 10, 0) || defined(CONFIG_IS_HW_HISI)
diff --git a/kernel/kernel_compat.h b/kernel/kernel_compat.h
index ba9981857fd1..34050e73d790 100644
--- a/kernel/kernel_compat.h
+++ b/kernel/kernel_compat.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ extern struct key *init_session_keyring;
 #endif
 
 extern void ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
+extern int ksu_access_ok(const void *addr, unsigned long size);
 extern struct file *ksu_filp_open_compat(const char *filename, int flags,
 					 umode_t mode);
 extern ssize_t ksu_kernel_read_compat(struct file *p, void *buf, size_t count,
diff --git a/kernel/ksu.c b/kernel/ksu.c
index 3639edc21503..b6dc86812cdd 100644
--- a/kernel/ksu.c
+++ b/kernel/ksu.c
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
 #include "ksu.h"
 #include "throne_tracker.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+#include <linux/susfs.h>
+#endif
+
 static struct workqueue_struct *ksu_workqueue;
 
 bool ksu_queue_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -37,7 +41,7 @@ extern void ksu_sucompat_exit();
 extern void ksu_ksud_init();
 extern void ksu_ksud_exit();
 
-int __init kernelsu_init(void)
+int __init ksu_kernelsu_init(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_DEBUG
 	pr_alert("*************************************************************");
@@ -49,6 +53,10 @@ int __init kernelsu_init(void)
 	pr_alert("*************************************************************");
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+	susfs_init();
+#endif
+
 	ksu_core_init();
 
 	ksu_workqueue = alloc_ordered_workqueue("kernelsu_work_queue", 0);
@@ -72,7 +80,7 @@ int __init kernelsu_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void kernelsu_exit(void)
+void ksu_kernelsu_exit(void)
 {
 	ksu_allowlist_exit();
 
@@ -88,8 +96,8 @@ void kernelsu_exit(void)
 	ksu_core_exit();
 }
 
-module_init(kernelsu_init);
-module_exit(kernelsu_exit);
+module_init(ksu_kernelsu_init);
+module_exit(ksu_kernelsu_exit);
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("weishu");
diff --git a/kernel/ksud.c b/kernel/ksud.c
index 68e473524284..cae073806854 100644
--- a/kernel/ksud.c
+++ b/kernel/ksud.c
@@ -64,17 +64,22 @@ bool ksu_execveat_hook __read_mostly = true;
 bool ksu_input_hook __read_mostly = true;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+bool ksu_devpts_hook = false;
+bool susfs_is_sus_su_ready = false;
+#endif
+
 u32 ksu_devpts_sid;
 
-void on_post_fs_data(void)
+void ksu_on_post_fs_data(void)
 {
 	static bool done = false;
 	if (done) {
-		pr_info("on_post_fs_data already done\n");
+		pr_info("ksu_on_post_fs_data already done\n");
 		return;
 	}
 	done = true;
-	pr_info("on_post_fs_data!\n");
+	pr_info("ksu_on_post_fs_data!\n");
 	ksu_load_allow_list();
 	// sanity check, this may influence the performance
 	stop_input_hook();
@@ -197,7 +202,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 					first_arg);
 				if (!strcmp(first_arg, "second_stage")) {
 					pr_info("/system/bin/init second_stage executed\n");
-					apply_kernelsu_rules();
+					ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
 					init_second_stage_executed = true;
 					ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
 				}
@@ -221,7 +226,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 				pr_info("/init first arg: %s\n", first_arg);
 				if (!strcmp(first_arg, "--second-stage")) {
 					pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
-					apply_kernelsu_rules();
+					ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
 					init_second_stage_executed = true;
 					ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
 				}
@@ -258,7 +263,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 					    (!strcmp(env_value, "1") ||
 					     !strcmp(env_value, "true"))) {
 						pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
-						apply_kernelsu_rules();
+						ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
 						init_second_stage_executed =
 							true;
 						ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
@@ -273,7 +278,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 		first_app_process = false;
 		pr_info("exec app_process, /data prepared, second_stage: %d\n",
 			init_second_stage_executed);
-		on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
+		ksu_on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
 		stop_execve_hook();
 	}
 
@@ -616,6 +621,10 @@ static void stop_execve_hook()
 	ksu_execveat_hook = false;
 	pr_info("stop execve_hook\n");
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+	susfs_is_sus_su_ready = true;
+	pr_info("susfs: sus_su is ready\n");
+#endif
 }
 
 static void stop_input_hook()
diff --git a/kernel/ksud.h b/kernel/ksud.h
index cc2df243a8f0..26974c9c4fe5 100644
--- a/kernel/ksud.h
+++ b/kernel/ksud.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 #define KSUD_PATH "/data/adb/ksud"
 
-void on_post_fs_data(void);
+void ksu_on_post_fs_data(void);
 
 bool ksu_is_safe_mode(void);
 
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/rules.c b/kernel/selinux/rules.c
index 1ba6d853f2a9..e4c651068f92 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/rules.c
+++ b/kernel/selinux/rules.c
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ static struct policydb *get_policydb(void)
 	return db;
 }
 
-void apply_kernelsu_rules()
+void ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules()
 {
-	if (!getenforce()) {
+	if (!ksu_getenforce()) {
 		pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled, apply rules!\n");
 	}
 
@@ -134,6 +134,14 @@ void apply_kernelsu_rules()
     ksu_allow(db, "system_server", KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN, "process", "getpgid");
     ksu_allow(db, "system_server", KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN, "process", "sigkill");
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+	// Allow umount in zygote process without installing zygisk
+	ksu_allow(db, "zygote", "labeledfs", "filesystem", "unmount");
+	susfs_set_init_sid();
+	susfs_set_ksu_sid();
+	susfs_set_zygote_sid();
+#endif
+
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
@@ -195,13 +203,13 @@ static void reset_avc_cache()
 	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 }
 
-int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
+int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 {
 	if (!arg4) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (!getenforce()) {
+	if (!ksu_getenforce()) {
 		pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled when handle policy!\n");
 	}
 
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/selinux.c b/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
index 4ba20b0435c2..e171e0109d29 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
+++ b/kernel/selinux/selinux.c
@@ -8,6 +8,14 @@
 
 #define KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN "u:r:su:s0"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+#define KERNEL_INIT_DOMAIN "u:r:init:s0"
+#define KERNEL_ZYGOTE_DOMAIN "u:r:zygote:s0"
+u32 susfs_ksu_sid = 0;
+u32 susfs_init_sid = 0;
+u32 susfs_zygote_sid = 0;
+#endif
+
 static int transive_to_domain(const char *domain)
 {
 	struct cred *cred;
@@ -37,7 +45,7 @@ static int transive_to_domain(const char *domain)
 	return error;
 }
 
-void setup_selinux(const char *domain)
+void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *domain)
 {
 	if (transive_to_domain(domain)) {
 		pr_err("transive domain failed.\n");
@@ -52,7 +60,7 @@ if (!is_domain_permissive) {
 }*/
 }
 
-void setenforce(bool enforce)
+void ksu_setenforce(bool enforce)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 #ifdef KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
@@ -63,7 +71,7 @@ void setenforce(bool enforce)
 #endif
 }
 
-bool getenforce()
+bool ksu_getenforce()
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 #ifdef KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
@@ -99,7 +107,7 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-bool is_ksu_domain()
+bool ksu_is_ksu_domain()
 {
 	char *domain;
 	u32 seclen;
@@ -113,7 +121,7 @@ bool is_ksu_domain()
 	return result;
 }
 
-bool is_zygote(void *sec)
+bool ksu_is_zygote(void *sec)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec;
 	if (!tsec) {
@@ -131,6 +139,83 @@ bool is_zygote(void *sec)
 	return result;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
+static inline void susfs_set_sid(const char *secctx_name, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	int err;
+	
+	if (!secctx_name || !out_sid) {
+		pr_err("secctx_name || out_sid is NULL\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	err = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx_name, strlen(secctx_name),
+					   out_sid);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("failed setting sid for '%s', err: %d\n", secctx_name, err);
+		return;
+	}
+	pr_info("sid '%u' is set for secctx_name '%s'\n", *out_sid, secctx_name);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_sid_equal(void *sec, u32 sid2) {
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec;
+	if (!tsec) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	return tsec->sid == sid2;
+}
+
+u32 susfs_get_sid_from_name(const char *secctx_name)
+{
+	u32 out_sid = 0;
+	int err;
+	
+	if (!secctx_name) {
+		pr_err("secctx_name is NULL\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	err = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx_name, strlen(secctx_name),
+					   &out_sid);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("failed getting sid from secctx_name: %s, err: %d\n", secctx_name, err);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return out_sid;
+}
+
+u32 susfs_get_current_sid(void) {
+	return current_sid();
+}
+
+void susfs_set_zygote_sid(void)
+{
+	susfs_set_sid(KERNEL_ZYGOTE_DOMAIN, &susfs_zygote_sid);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_current_zygote_domain(void) {
+	return unlikely(current_sid() == susfs_zygote_sid);
+}
+
+void susfs_set_ksu_sid(void)
+{
+	susfs_set_sid(KERNEL_SU_DOMAIN, &susfs_ksu_sid);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_current_ksu_domain(void) {
+	return unlikely(current_sid() == susfs_ksu_sid);
+}
+
+void susfs_set_init_sid(void)
+{
+	susfs_set_sid(KERNEL_INIT_DOMAIN, &susfs_init_sid);
+}
+
+bool susfs_is_current_init_domain(void) {
+	return unlikely(current_sid() == susfs_init_sid);
+}
+#endif
+
 #define DEVPTS_DOMAIN "u:object_r:ksu_file:s0"
 
 u32 ksu_get_devpts_sid()
diff --git a/kernel/selinux/selinux.h b/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
index 07120c253268..d0dfdf9c935b 100644
--- a/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
+++ b/kernel/selinux/selinux.h
@@ -8,17 +8,29 @@
 #define KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
 #endif
 
-void setup_selinux(const char *);
+void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *);
 
-void setenforce(bool);
+void ksu_setenforce(bool);
 
-bool getenforce();
+bool ksu_getenforce();
 
-bool is_ksu_domain();
+bool ksu_is_ksu_domain();
 
-bool is_zygote(void *cred);
+bool ksu_is_zygote(void *cred);
 
-void apply_kernelsu_rules();
+void ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
+bool susfs_is_sid_equal(void *sec, u32 sid2);
+u32 susfs_get_sid_from_name(const char *secctx_name);
+u32 susfs_get_current_sid(void);
+void susfs_set_zygote_sid(void);
+bool susfs_is_current_zygote_domain(void);
+void susfs_set_ksu_sid(void);
+bool susfs_is_current_ksu_domain(void);
+void susfs_set_init_sid(void);
+bool susfs_is_current_init_domain(void);
+#endif
 
 u32 ksu_get_devpts_sid();
 
diff --git a/kernel/sucompat.c b/kernel/sucompat.c
index 9b45cd0d9490..9fd4f48f17bf 100644
--- a/kernel/sucompat.c
+++ b/kernel/sucompat.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 #define SU_PATH "/system/bin/su"
 #define SH_PATH "/system/bin/sh"
 
-extern void escape_to_root();
+extern void ksu_escape_to_root();
 
 static void __user *userspace_stack_buffer(const void *d, size_t len)
 {
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_sucompat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 	pr_info("do_execveat_common su found\n");
 	memcpy((void *)filename->name, sh, sizeof(sh));
 
-	escape_to_root();
+	ksu_escape_to_root();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execve_sucompat(int *fd, const char __user **filename_user,
 	pr_info("sys_execve su found\n");
 	*filename_user = ksud_user_path();
 
-	escape_to_root();
+	ksu_escape_to_root();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -365,3 +365,25 @@ void ksu_sucompat_exit()
 	unregister_kprobe(&pts_unix98_lookup_kp);
 #endif
 }
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_SU
+extern bool ksu_devpts_hook;
+
+void ksu_susfs_disable_sus_su(void) {
+	enable_kprobe(&execve_kp);
+	enable_kprobe(&newfstatat_kp);
+	enable_kprobe(&faccessat_kp);
+	enable_kprobe(&pts_unix98_lookup_kp);
+	ksu_devpts_hook = false;
+}
+
+void ksu_susfs_enable_sus_su(void) {
+	disable_kprobe(&execve_kp);
+	disable_kprobe(&newfstatat_kp);
+	disable_kprobe(&faccessat_kp);
+	disable_kprobe(&pts_unix98_lookup_kp);
+	ksu_devpts_hook = true;
+}
+#endif
+
diff --git a/kernel/throne_tracker.c b/kernel/throne_tracker.c
index 725c910336ac..e7ae295e6fc3 100644
--- a/kernel/throne_tracker.c
+++ b/kernel/throne_tracker.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ FILLDIR_RETURN_TYPE my_actor(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name,
 				}
 			}
 
-			bool is_manager = is_manager_apk(dirpath);
+			bool is_manager = ksu_is_manager_apk(dirpath);
 			pr_info("Found new base.apk at path: %s, is_manager: %d\n",
 				dirpath, is_manager);
 			if (is_manager) {
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ static bool is_uid_exist(uid_t uid, char *package, void *data)
 	return exist;
 }
 
-void track_throne()
+void ksu_track_throne()
 {
 	struct file *fp =
 		ksu_filp_open_compat(SYSTEM_PACKAGES_LIST_PATH, O_RDONLY, 0);
diff --git a/kernel/throne_tracker.h b/kernel/throne_tracker.h
index 5d7f477003ac..428c737dddc9 100644
--- a/kernel/throne_tracker.h
+++ b/kernel/throne_tracker.h
@@ -5,6 +5,6 @@ void ksu_throne_tracker_init();
 
 void ksu_throne_tracker_exit();
 
-void track_throne();
+void ksu_track_throne();
 
 #endif