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false duplicates are possible #55
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rhansen
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Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 28, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 29, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jun 29, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Jul 31, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen
added a commit
to rhansen/rpstir
that referenced
this issue
Apr 17, 2020
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration: avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already been verified. (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of explanatory comments.) However: * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any perceptable way. First, it's unclear how often an object is added multiple times. Second, it's trading crypto work for database operations. * This code permits evil twin ROAs: A malicious CA can generate an evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid EE certificate. The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this code shortcuts the signature check. Fortunately there's another bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
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The current duplicate RPKI object detection isn't strict enough. Malicious repositories could cause collisions of malicious objects with benign objects, invalidating those benign objects. Ideally duplicate detection should be done at the level of file hash.
Also see #28.
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