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false duplicates are possible #55

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rhansen opened this issue Jun 15, 2016 · 0 comments
Open

false duplicates are possible #55

rhansen opened this issue Jun 15, 2016 · 0 comments

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@rhansen
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rhansen commented Jun 15, 2016

The current duplicate RPKI object detection isn't strict enough. Malicious repositories could cause collisions of malicious objects with benign objects, invalidating those benign objects. Ideally duplicate detection should be done at the level of file hash.

Also see #28.

rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 25, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 27, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 28, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 29, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jun 29, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Jul 31, 2016
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
rhansen added a commit to rhansen/rpstir that referenced this issue Apr 17, 2020
The purpose of this code appears to be verification acceleration:
avoid performing expensive crypto work when the object has already
been verified.  (The purpose isn't entirely clear due to lack of
explanatory comments.)  However:

  * It's unclear that this code actually improves performance in any
    perceptable way.  First, it's unclear how often an object is added
    multiple times.  Second, it's trading crypto work for database
    operations.

  * This code permits evil twin ROAs:  A malicious CA can generate an
    evil ROA with an EE certificate containing the same SKI as a valid
    EE certificate.  The malicious CA won't be able to produce a valid
    signature for the evil ROA, but that doesn't matter because this
    code shortcuts the signature check.  Fortunately there's another
    bug preventing this from being exploitable (issue bgpsecurity#55).
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