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@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
PART 10
- For I believe that I shall prove that the organs which have to do with the disposal of the nutriment, as also their faculties, exist for the sake of this nutritive faculty. For since the action of this facultyThe activation or functioning of this faculty, the faculty in actual operation. cf. p. 3, note 2. is assimilation, and it is impossible for anything to be assimilated by, and to change into anything else unless they already possess a certain community and affinity in their qualities,"Un rapport commun et une affinitè" (Daremberg). "Societatem aliquam cognationemque in qualitatibus" (Linacre). cf. p. 36, note 2. therefore, in the first place, any animal cannot naturally derive nourishment from any kind of food, and secondly, even in the case of those from which it can do so, it cannot do this at once. Therefore, by reason of this law,Lit. "necessity" ; more restrictive, however, than our "law of Nature." cf. p. 314, note 1. every animal needs several organs for altering the nutriment. For in order that the yellow may become red, and the red yellow, one simple process of alteration is required, but in order that the white may become black, and the black white, all the intermediate stages are needed.His point is that no great change, in coours or in anything else, can take place at one step. So also, a thing which is very soft cannot all at once become very hard, nor vice versa; nor, similarly can anything which has a very bad smell suddenly become quite fragrant, nor again, can the converse happen.
+ For I believe that I shall prove that the organs which have to do with the disposal of the nutriment, as also their faculties, exist for the sake of this nutritive faculty. For since the action of this facultyThe activation or functioning of this faculty, the faculty in actual operation. cf. p. 3, note 2. is assimilation, and it is impossible for anything to be assimilated by, and to change into anything else unless they already possess a certain community and affinity in their qualities,"Un rapport commun et une affinitè" (Daremberg). "Societatem aliquam cognationemque in qualitatibus" (Linacre). cf. p. 36, note 2. therefore, in the first place, any animal cannot naturally derive nourishment from any kind of food, and secondly, even in the case of those from which it can do so, it cannot do this at once. Therefore, by reason of this law,Lit. "necessity" ; more restrictive, however, than our "law of Nature." cf. p. 314, note 1. every animal needs several organs for altering the nutriment. For in order that the yellow may become red, and the red yellow, one simple process of alteration is required, but in order that the white may become black, and the black white, all the intermediate stages are needed.His point is that no great change, in coours or in anything else, can take place at one step. So also, a thing which is very soft cannot all at once become very hard, nor vice versa; nor, similarly can anything which has a very bad smell suddenly become quite fragrant, nor again, can the converse happen.
How, then, could blood ever turn into bone, without having first become, as far as possible, thickened and white? And how could bread turn into blood without having gradually parted with its whiteness and gradually acquired redness? Thus it is quite easy for blood to become flesh; for, if Nature thicken it to such an extent that it acquires a certain consistency and ceases to be fluid, it thus becomes original newly-formed flesh; but in order that blood may turn into bone, much time is needed and much elaboration and transformation of the blood. Further, it is quite clear that bread, and, more particularly lettuce, beet, and the like, require a great deal of alteration, in order to become blood.
This, then, is one reason why there are so many organs concerned in the alteration of food. A second reason is the nature of the superfluities.Not quite our "waste products," since these are considered as being partly synthetic, whereas the Greek perittomata were simply superfluous substances which could not be used and were thrown aside. For, as we are unable to draw any nourishment from grass, although this is possible for cattle, similarly we can derive nourishment from radishes, albeit not to the same extent as from meat; for almost the whole of the latter is mastered by our naturesNote "our natures," cf. p. 12, note 4; p. 47, note 1.; it is transformed and altered and constituted useful blood; but, not withstanding, in the radish, what is appropriateTher term oi)kei=os, here rendered appropriate, is explained on p. 33. cf. also footnote on same page. Linacre often translated it conveniens, and it may usually be rendered proper, peculiar, own special, or own particular in English. Sometimes it is almost equal to akin, cognate, related: cf. p. 319, note 2. With Galen's oi)kei=os and a)llo/triov we may compare the German terms eigen and fremd used by Aberthalden in connection with his theory of defensive ferments in the blood-serum and capable of being altered (and that only with difficulty, and with much labour) is the very smallest part; almost the whole of it is surplus matter, and passes through the digestive organs, only a very little being taken up into the veins as blood- nor is this itself entirely utilisable blood. Nature, therefore, had need of a second process of separation for the superfluities in the veins. Moreover, these superfluities need, on the one hand, certain fresh routes to conduct them to the outlets, so that they may not spoil the useful substances, and they also need certain reservoirs, as it were, in which they are collected till they reach a sufficient quantity, and are then discharged.
Thus, then, you have discovered bodily parts of a second kind, consecrated in this case to the [removal of the] superfluities of the food. There is, however, also a third kind, for carrying the pabulum in every direction; these are like a number of roads intersecting the whole body.
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
Now, speaking generally, there have arisen the following two sects in medicine and philosophy among those who have made any definite pronouncement regarding Nature. I speak, of course, of such of them as know what they are talking about, and who realize the logical sequence of their hypotheses, and stand by them; as for those who cannot understand even this, but who simply talk any nonsense that comes to their tongues, and who do not remain definitely attached either to one sect or the other- such people are not even worth mentioning.
What, then, are these sects, and what are the logical consequences of their hypotheses?Here follows a contrast between the Vitalists and the Epicurean Atomists. cf. p. 153 et seq. The one class supposes that all substance which is subject to genesis and destruction is at once continuousA unity or continuum, an individuum. and susceptible of alteration. The other school assumes substance to be unchangeable, unalterable, and subdivided into fine particles, which are separated from one another by empty spaces.
All people, therefore, who can appreciate the logical sequence of an hypothesis hold that, according to the second teaching, there does not exist any substance or faculty peculiar either to Nature or to Soul,Lit. to the physis or the psyche; that is, a denial of the autonomy of physiology and psychology. but that these result from the way in which the primary corpuscles,Lit. somata. which are unaffected by change, come together. According to the first-mentioned teaching, on the other hand, Nature is not posterior to the corpuscles, but is a long way prior to them and older than they; and therefore in their view it is Nature which puts together the bodies both of plants and animals; and this she does by virtue of certain faculties which she possesses- these being, on the one hand, attractive and assimilative of what is appropriate, and, on the other, explusive of what is foreign. Further, she skilfully moulds everything during the stage of genesis; and she also provides for the creatures after birth, employing here other faculties again, namely, one of affection and forethought for offspring, and one of sociability and friendship for kindred. According to the other school, none of these things exist in the natures [of living things], nor is there in the soul any original innate idea, whether of agreement or difference, of separation or synthesis, of justice or injustice, of the beautiful or ugly; all such things, they say, arise in us from sensation and through sensation, and animals are steered by certain images and memories.
- Some of these people have even expressly declared that the soul possesses no reasoning faculty, but that we are led like cattle by the impression of our senses, and are unable to refuse or dissent from anything. In their view, obviously, courage, wisdom, temperance, and self-control are all mere nonsense, we do not love either each other or our offspring, nor do the gods care anything for us. This school also despises dreams, birds, omens, and the whole of astrology, subjects with which we have dealt at greater length in another work,A lost work. in which we discuss the views of Asclepiades the physician.For Asclepiades v. p. 49, note 5. Those who wish to do so may familiarize themselves with these arguments, and they may also consider at this point which of the two roads lying before us is the better one to take. Hippocrates took the first-mentioned. According to this teaching, substance is one and is subject to alteration; there is a consensus in the move-ments of air and fluid throughout the whole body;"Le corps tout entier a unité de souffle (perspiration et expiration) et unité de flux (courants, cirulation des liquides)" (Daremberg). "Conspirabile et confluxile corpus esse" (Linacre). Apparently Galen refers to the pneuma and the various humours. cf. p. 293, note 2. Nature acts throughout in an artistic and equitable manner, having certain faculties, by virtue of which each part of the body draws to itself the juice which is proper to it, and, having done so, attaches it to every portion of itself, and completely assimilates it; while such part of the juice as has not been mastered,i.e. "Appropriated"; very nearly "assimilated." and is not capable of undergoing complete alteration and being assimilated to the part which is being nourished, is got rid of by yet another (an expulsive) faculty.
+
Some of these people have even expressly declared that the soul possesses no reasoning faculty, but that we are led like cattle by the impression of our senses, and are unable to refuse or dissent from anything. In their view, obviously, courage, wisdom, temperance, and self-control are all mere nonsense, we do not love either each other or our offspring, nor do the gods care anything for us. This school also despises dreams, birds, omens, and the whole of astrology, subjects with which we have dealt at greater length in another work,A lost work. in which we discuss the views of Asclepiades the physician.For Asclepiades v. p. 49, note 5. Those who wish to do so may familiarize themselves with these arguments, and they may also consider at this point which of the two roads lying before us is the better one to take. Hippocrates took the first-mentioned. According to this teaching, substance is one and is subject to alteration; there is a consensus in the move-ments of air and fluid throughout the whole body;"Le corps tout entier a unité de souffle (perspiration et expiration) et unité de flux (courants, cirulation des liquides)" (Daremberg). "Conspirabile et confluxile corpus esse" (Linacre). Apparently Galen refers to the pneuma and the various humours. cf. p. 293, note 2. Nature acts throughout in an artistic and equitable manner, having certain faculties, by virtue of which each part of the body draws to itself the juice which is proper to it, and, having done so, attaches it to every portion of itself, and completely assimilates it; while such part of the juice as has not been mastered,i.e. "Appropriated"; very nearly "assimilated." and is not capable of undergoing complete alteration and being assimilated to the part which is being nourished, is got rid of by yet another (an expulsive) faculty.
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
Now the method of demonstration is as follows. One has to divide the peritoneum in front of the ureters, then secure these with ligatures, and next, having bandaged up the animal, let him go (for he will not continue to urinate). After this one loosens the external bandages and shows the bladder empty and the ureters quite full and distended- in fact almost on the point of rupturing; on removing the ligature from them, one then plainly sees the bladder becoming filled with urine.
When this has been made quite clear, then, before the animal urinates, one has to tie a ligature round his penis and then to squeeze the bladder all over; still nothing goes back through the ureters to the kidneys. Here, then, it becomes obvious that not only in a dead animal, but in one which is
still living, the ureters are prevented from receiving back the urine from the bladder. These observations having been made, one now loosens the ligature from the animal's penis and allows him to urinate, then again ligatures one of the ureters and leaves the other to discharge into the bladder. Allowing, then, some time to elapse, one now demonstrates that the ureter which was ligatured is obviously full and distended on the side next to the kidneys, while the other one- that from which the ligature had been taken- is itself flaccid, but has filled the bladder with urine. Then, again, one must divide the full ureter, and demonstrate how the urine spurts out of it, like blood in the operation of vene-section; and after this one cuts through the other also, and both being thus divided, one bandages up the animal externally. Then when enough time seems to have elapsed, one takes off the bandages; the bladder will now be found empty, and the whole region
- between the intestines and the peritoneum full of urine, as if the animal were suffering from dropsy. Now, if anyone will but test this for himself on an animal, I think he will strongly condemn the rashness of Asclepiades, and if he also learns the reason why nothing regurgitates from the bladder into the ureters, I think he will be persuaded by this also of the forethought and art shown by Nature in relation to animals. "De l'habileté et de la prévoyance de la nature à l'égard des animaux" (Daremberg). cf. p. 56, note 1.
+ between the intestines and the peritoneum full of urine, as if the animal were suffering from dropsy. Now, if anyone will but test this for himself on an animal, I think he will strongly condemn the rashness of Asclepiades, and if he also learns the reason why nothing regurgitates from the bladder into the ureters, I think he will be persuaded by this also of the forethought and art shown by Nature in relation to animals. "De l'habileté et de la prévoyance de la nature à l'égard des animaux" (Daremberg). cf. p. 56, note 1.
Now Hippocrates, who was the first known to us of all those who have been both physicians and philosophers in as much as he was the first to recognize what Nature effects, expresses his admiration of her, and is constantly singing her praises and calling her "just." Alone, he says, she suffices for the animal in every respect, performing of
her own accord and without any teaching all that is required. Being such, she has, as he supposes, certain faculties, one attractive of what is appropriate,cf. p. 36, note 2. and another eliminative of what is foreign, and she nourishes the animal, makes it grow, and expels its diseases by crisis.The morbid material passed successively through the stages of "crudity," "coction" (pepsis) and "elimination" (crisis). For "critical days" cf. p. 74, note 1. Therefore he says that there is in our bodies a concordance in the movements of air and fluid, and that everything is in sympathy. According to Asclepiades, however, nothing is naturally in sy mpathy with anything else, all substance being divided and broken up into inharmonious elements and absurd "molecules." Necessarily, then, besides making countless other statements in opposition to plain fact, he was ignorant of Nature's faculties, both that attracting what is appropriate, and that expelling what is foreign. Thus he invented some wretched nonsense to explain blood-production and anadosis,This was the process by which nutriment was taken up from the alimentary canal; "absoprtion," "dispersal;" cf. p. 13, note 5. The subject is dealt with more fully in chap. xvi. and, being utterly unable to find anything to say regarding the clearing-outLit. catharsis. of superfluities, he did not hesitate to join issue with obvious facts, and, in this matter of urinary secretion, to deprive both the kidneys and the ureters of their activity, by assuming that there were certain invisible channels opening into the bladder. It was, of course, a grand and impressive thing to do, to mistrust the obvious, and to pin one's faith in things which
could not be seen!
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@
PART 16
Now, while ErasistratusOn Erasistratus v. Introd. p. xii. for some reason replied at great length to certain other foolish doctrines, he entirely passed over the view held by Hippocrates, not even thinking it worth while to mention it, as he did in his work "On Deglutition"; in that work, as may be seen, he did go so far as at least to make mention of the word attraction, writing somewhat as follows:
"Now, the stomach does not appear to exercise any attraction."Erasistatus' view that the stomach exerts no holke/, or attraction, is dealt with more fully in Book III., chap. viii. But when he is dealing with anadosis he does not mention the Hippocratic view even to the extent of a single syllable. Yet we should have been satisfied if he had even merely written this: "Hippocrates lies in saying 'The fleshi.e. the tissues. attracts both from the stomach and from without,' for it cannot attract either from the stomach or from without." Or if he had thought it worth while to state that Hippocrates was wrong in criticizing the weakness of the neck of the uterus, "seeing that the orifice of the uterus has no power of attracting semen,"cf. p. 291. or if he [Erasistratus] had thought proper to write any other similar opinion, then we in our turn would have defended ourselves in the following terms:
- "My good sir, do not run us down in this rhetorical fashion without some proof; state some definite objection to our view, in order that either you may convince us by a brilliant refutation of the ancient doctrine, or that, on the other hand, we may convert you from your ignorance." Yet why do I say "rhetorical"? For we too are not to suppose that when certain rhetoricians pour ridicule upon that which they are quite incapable of refuting, without any attempt at argument, their words are really thereby constituted rhetoric. For rhetoric proceeds by persuasive reasoning; words without reasoning are buffoonery rather than rhetoric. Therefore, the reply of Erasistratus in his treatise "On Deglutition" was neither rhetoric nor logic. For what is it that he says? "Now, the stomach does not appear to exercise any traction." Let us testify against him in return, and set our argument beside his in the same form. Now, there appears to be no peristalsisPeristalsis may be used here to translate Gk. peristolé, meaning the contraction and dilation of muscle-fibres circularly round a lumen cf.p. 263, note 2. of the gullet. "And how does this appear?" one of his adherents may perchance ask. "For is it not indicative of peristalsis that always when the upper parts of the gullet contract the lower parts dilate?" Again, then, we say, "And in what way does the attraction of the stomach not appear? For is it not indicative of attraction that always when the lower parts of the gullet dilate the upper parts contract?" Now, if he would but be sensible and recognize that this phenomenon is not more indicative of the one than of the other view, but that it applies equally to both,For a demonstration that this phenomenon is a conclusive proof neither of peristolé nor of real vital attraction, but is found even in dead bodies v. p. 267. we should then show him without further delay the proper way to the discovery of truth.
+ "My good sir, do not run us down in this rhetorical fashion without some proof; state some definite objection to our view, in order that either you may convince us by a brilliant refutation of the ancient doctrine, or that, on the other hand, we may convert you from your ignorance." Yet why do I say "rhetorical"? For we too are not to suppose that when certain rhetoricians pour ridicule upon that which they are quite incapable of refuting, without any attempt at argument, their words are really thereby constituted rhetoric. For rhetoric proceeds by persuasive reasoning; words without reasoning are buffoonery rather than rhetoric. Therefore, the reply of Erasistratus in his treatise "On Deglutition" was neither rhetoric nor logic. For what is it that he says? "Now, the stomach does not appear to exercise any traction." Let us testify against him in return, and set our argument beside his in the same form. Now, there appears to be no peristalsisPeristalsis may be used here to translate Gk. peristolé, meaning the contraction and dilation of muscle-fibres circularly round a lumen cf.p. 263, note 2. of the gullet. "And how does this appear?" one of his adherents may perchance ask. "For is it not indicative of peristalsis that always when the upper parts of the gullet contract the lower parts dilate?" Again, then, we say, "And in what way does the attraction of the stomach not appear? For is it not indicative of attraction that always when the lower parts of the gullet dilate the upper parts contract?" Now, if he would but be sensible and recognize that this phenomenon is not more indicative of the one than of the other view, but that it applies equally to both,For a demonstration that this phenomenon is a conclusive proof neither of peristolé nor of real vital attraction, but is found even in dead bodies v. p. 267. we should then show him without further delay the proper way to the discovery of truth.
We will, however, speak about the stomach again. And the dispersal of nutriment [anadosis] need not make us have recourse to the theory regarding the natural tendency of a vacuum to become refilled,This was Erasistratus's favourite principle, known in Latin as the "horror vacui" and in English as "Nature's abhorrence of a vacuum," although these terms are not an exact translation of the Greek. to\ kenou/menon probably means the vacuum, not the matter evacuated, although Galen elsewhere uses keno/w in the latter (non-classical) sense, e.g. pp. 67, 215. Akolouthia is a following-up, a sequence, almost a consequence. when once we have granted the attractive faculty of the kidneys. Now, although Erasistratus knew that this faculty most certainly existed, he neither mentioned it nor denied it, nor did he make any statement as to his views on the secretion of urine.
Why did he give notice at the very beginning of his "General Principles" that he was going to speak about natural activities- firstly what they are, how they take place, and in what situations- and then, in the case of urinary secretion, declared that this took place through the kidneys, but left out its method of occurrence? It must, then, have been for no purpose that he told us how digestion occurs, or spends time upon the secretion of biliary superfluities;v. p. 123. for in these cases also it would have been sufficient to have named the parts through which the function takes place, and to have omitted the method. On the contrary, in these cases he was able to tell us not merely through what organs, but also in what way it occurs- as he also did, I think, in the case of anadosis; for he was not satisfied with saying that this took place through the veins, but he also considered fully the method, which he held to be from the tendency of a vacuum to become refilled. Concerning the secretion of urine, however, he writes that this occurs through the kidneys, but does not add in what way it occurs. I do not think he could say that this was from the tendency of matter to fill a vacuum,cf. Book II., chap. i. for, if this were so, nobody would have ever died of retention of urine, since no more can flow into a vacuum than has run out. For, if no other factor comes into operationVital factor necessary over and above the mechanical. save only this tendency by which a vacuum becomes refilled, no more could ever flow in than had been evacuated. Nor, could he suggest any other plausible cause, such, for example, as the of nutriment by the stomachcf. p. 199, note 2. which occurs in the process of anadosis; this had been entirely disproved in the case of blood in the vena cava;pp. 91, 93. it is excluded, not merely owing to the long distance, but also from the fact that the overlying heart, at each diastole, robs the vena cava by violence of a considerable quantity of blood.
In relation to the lower part of the vena cavai.e. the part below the liver; cf. p. 91, note 2. there would still remain, solitary and abandoned, the specious theory concerning the filling of a vacuum. This, however, is deprived of plausibility by the fact that people die of retention of urine, and also, no less, by the situation of the kidneys. For, if the whole of the blood were carried to the kidneys, one might properly maintain that it all undergoes purification there. But, as a matter of fact, the whole of it does not go to them, but only so much as can be contained in the veins going to the kidneys;Renal veins. this portion only, therefore, will be purified. Further, the thin serous part of this will pass through the kidneys as if through a sieve, while the thick sanguineous portion remaining in the veins will obstruct the blood flowing in from behind; this will first, therefore, have to run back to the vena cava, and so to empty the veins going to the kidneys; these veins will no longer be able to conduct a second quantity of
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
Yet neither Hippocrates nor any of the other physicians or philosophers whom I mentioned a short while ago thought it right to omit this; they say that when the heat which exists naturally in every animal is well blended and moderately moist it generates blood; for this
reason they also say that the blood is a virtually warm and moist humour, and similarly also that yellow bile is warm and dry, even though for the most part it appears moist. (For in them the apparently dry would seem to differ from the virtually dry.) Who does not know that brine and sea-water preserve meat and keep it uncorruptedLit. aseptic., whilst all other water- the drinkable kind- readily spoils and rots it? And who does not know that when yellow bile is contained in large quantity in the stomach, we are troubled with an unquenchable thirst, and that when we vomit this up, we at once become much freer from thirst than if we had drunk very large quantities of fluid? Therefore this humour has been very properly termed warm, and also virtually dry. And, similarly, phlegm has been called cold and moist; for about this also clear proofs have been given by Hippocrates and the other Ancients.
ProdicusProdicus of Ceos, a Sophist, contemporary of Socrates. also, when in his book "On the Nature of Man" he gives the name "phlegm"
- to that element in the humours which has been burned or, as it were, over-roasted, while using a different terminology, still keeps to the fact just as the others do; this man's innovations in nomenclature have also been amply done justice to by Plato.Plato, Timaeus, 83-85, passim Thus, the white-coloured substance which everyone else calls phlegm, and which Prodicus calls blenna [mucus],cf. the term blennorrhoea, which is still used. is the well-known cold, moist humour which collects mostly in old people and in those who have been chilledcf. the Scotch term "colded" for "affected with a cold"; Germ. erkältet. in some way, and not even a lunatic could say that this was anything else than cold and moist.
+ to that element in the humours which has been burned or, as it were, over-roasted, while using a different terminology, still keeps to the fact just as the others do; this man's innovations in nomenclature have also been amply done justice to by Plato.Plato, Timaeus, 83-85, passim Thus, the white-coloured substance which everyone else calls phlegm, and which Prodicus calls blenna [mucus],cf. the term blennorrhoea, which is still used. is the well-known cold, moist humour which collects mostly in old people and in those who have been chilledcf. the Scotch term "colded" for "affected with a cold"; Germ. erkältet. in some way, and not even a lunatic could say that this was anything else than cold and moist.
If, then, there is a warm and moist humour, and another which is warm and dry, and yet another which is moist and cold, is there none which is virtually cold and dry? Is the fourth combination of temperaments, which exists in all other things, non-existent in the humours alone? No; the black bile is such a humour. This, according to intelligent physicians and philosophers, tends to be in excess, as regards seasons, mainly in the fall of the year, and, as regards ages, mainly after the prime of life. And, similarly, also they say that there are cold and dry modes of life, regions, constitutions, and diseases. Nature, they suppose, is not defective in this single combination; like the three other combinations, it extends everywhere.
At this point, also, I would gladly have been able to ask Erasistratus whether his "artistic" Nature has not constructed any organ for clearing away a humour such as this. For whilst there
are two organs for the excretion of urine, and another of considerable size for that of yellow bile, does the humour which is more pernicious than these wander about persistently in the veins mingled with the blood? Yet Hippocrates says,
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@
understood from a comparison. Imagine, then, some new wine which has been not long ago pressed from the grape, and which is fermenting and undergoing alteration through the agency of its contained heat.i.e. its innate heat. Imagine next two residual substances produced during this process of alteration, the one tending to be light and air-like and the other to be heavy and more of the nature of earth;
of these the one, as I understand, they call the flower and the other the lees. Now you may correctly compare yellow bile to the first of these, and black bile to the latter, although these humours have not the same appearance when the animal is in normal health as that which they often show when it is not so; for then the yellow bile becomes vitelline, Lit. lecithoid. being so termed because it becomes like the yolk of an egg, both in colour and density; and again, even the black bile itself becomes much more malignant than when in its normal condition,Note that there can be "normal" blakc bile. but no particular name has been given to [such a condition of] the humour, except that some people have called it corrosive or acetose, because it also becomes sharp like vinegar and corrodes the animal's body- as also the earth, if it be poured out upon it- and it produces a kind of fermentation and seething, accompanied by bubbles- an abnormal putrefaction having become added to the natural condition of the black humour. It seems to me also that most of the ancient physicians give the name black humour and not black bile to the
normal portion of this humour, which is discharged from the bowel and which also frequently rises to the top [of the stomach-contents]; and they call black bile that part which, through a kind of combustion and putrefaction, has had its quality changed to acid. There is no need, however, to dispute about names, but we must realise the facts, which are as follow:-
- In the genesis of blood, everything in the nutrimentthe term food here means the food as introduced into the stomach; the term nutriment (trophé) means the same food in the digested condition, as it is conveyed to the tissues. cf. pp. 41-43. Note idea of imperfectly oxidized material being absorbed by the spleen. cf. p. 214, note 1. which belongs naturally to the thick and earth-like part of the food, and which does not take on well the alteration produced by the innate heat- all this the spleen draws into itself. On the other hand, that part of the nutriment which is roasted, so to speak, or burnt (this will be the warmest and sweetest part of it, like honey and fat), becomes
+
In the genesis of blood, everything in the nutrimentthe term food here means the food as introduced into the stomach; the term nutriment (trophé) means the same food in the digested condition, as it is conveyed to the tissues. cf. pp. 41-43. Note idea of imperfectly oxidized material being absorbed by the spleen. cf. p. 214, note 1. which belongs naturally to the thick and earth-like part of the food, and which does not take on well the alteration produced by the innate heat- all this the spleen draws into itself. On the other hand, that part of the nutriment which is roasted, so to speak, or burnt (this will be the warmest and sweetest part of it, like honey and fat), becomes
yellow bile, and is cleared away through the so-called biliaryLit. choledochous, bile-receiving. vessels; now, this is thin, moist, and fluid, not like what it is when, having been roasted to an excessive degree, it becomes yellow, fiery, and thick, like the yolk of eggs; for this latter is already abnormal, while the previously mentioned state is natural. Similarly with the black humour: that which does not yet produce, as I say, this seething and fermentation on the ground, is natural, while that which has taken over this character and faculty is unnatural; it has assumed an acridity owing to the combustion caused by abnormal heat, and has practically become transformed into ashes.Thus over-roasting - shall we say excessive oxidation? - produces the abnormal forms of both black and yellow bile. In somewhat the same way burned lees differ from unburned. The former is a warm substance, able to burn, dissolve, and destroy the flesh. The other kind, which has not yet undergone combustion, one may find the physicians employing for the same purposes that one uses the so-called potter's earth and other substances which have naturally a combined drying and chilling
action.
Now the vitelline bile also may take on the appearance of this combusted black bile, if ever it chance to be roasted, so to say, by fiery heat. And all the other forms of bile are produced, some the from blending of those mentioned, others being, as it were, transition-stages in the genesis of these or in their conversion into one another. And they differ in that those first mentioned are unmixed and unique, while the latter forms are diluted with various kinds of serum. And all the serums in the humours are waste substances, and the animal body needs to be purified from them. There is, however, a natural use for the humours first mentioned, both thick and thin; the blood is purified both by the spleen and by the bladder beside the liver, and a part
@@ -576,10 +576,10 @@
"The stomach does not appear to exercise any traction."cf. p. 97.
Now the fact is that the stomach possesses two coats, which certainly exist for some purpose; they extend as far as the mouth, the internal one remaining throughout similar to what it is in the stomach, and the other one tending to become of a more fleshy nature in the gullet. Now simple observation will testify that these coats have their fibres inserted in contrary directions.It appears to me, from comparison between this and other passages in Galen's writings (notably Use of Parts, iv., 8), that he means by the "two coats" simply the mucous and the muscular coats. In this case the "straight" or "longitudinal" fibres of the inner coat would be the rugae; the "circular" fibres of the inner intestinal coat would be the valvulae conniventes.And, although Erasistratus did not attempt to say for what reason they are like this, I am going to do so.
The inner coat has its fibres straight, since it exists for the purpose of traction. The outer coat has its fibres transverse, for
- the purpose of peristalsis.The term here rendered peristalisis peristoé in greek; it is applied on ly to the intermittent movements of muscles placed circularly round a lumen or cavity, and comprehends systolé or contraction and diastolé or dilation. In its modern significance, peristalsis, hoever, also includes the movements of longitudinal fibres. cf. p. 97, note 1. In fact, the movements of each of the mobile organs of the body depend on the setting of the fibres. Now please test this assertion first in the muscles themselves; in these the fibres are most distinct, and their movements visible owing to their vigour. And after the muscles, pass to the physical organs,i.e.those containing non-striped or "involuntary" muscle fibres; organs governed by the "natural" pneuma ; cf. p. 186, note 3. and you will see that they all move in correspondence with their fibres. This is why the fibres throughout the intestines are circular in both coats- they only contract peristaltically, they do not exercise traction. The stomach, again, has some of its fibres longitudinal for the purpose of traction and the others transverse for the purpose of peristalsis.The term here rendered peristalisis peristoé in greek; it is applied on ly to the intermittent movements of muscles placed circularly round a lumen or cavity, and comprehends systolé or contraction and diastolé or dilation. In its modern significance, peristalsis, hoever, also includes the movements of longitudinal fibres. cf. p. 97, note 1. For just as the movements in the musclesBy this term is meant only what we should call the "voluntary" muscles. take place when each of the fibres becomes tightened and drawn towards its origin, such also is what happens in the stomach; when the transverse fibres tighten, the breadth of the cavity contained by them becomes less; and when the longitudinal fibres contract and draw in upon themselves, the length must necessarily be curtailed. This curtailment of length, indeed, is well seen in the act of swallowing: the larynx is seen to rise
+ the purpose of peristalsis.The term here rendered peristalisis peristoé in greek; it is applied on ly to the intermittent movements of muscles placed circularly round a lumen or cavity, and comprehends systolé or contraction and diastolé or dilation. In its modern significance, peristalsis, hoever, also includes the movements of longitudinal fibres. cf. p. 97, note 1. In fact, the movements of each of the mobile organs of the body depend on the setting of the fibres. Now please test this assertion first in the muscles themselves; in these the fibres are most distinct, and their movements visible owing to their vigour. And after the muscles, pass to the physical organs,i.e.those containing non-striped or "involuntary" muscle fibres; organs governed by the "natural" pneuma ; cf. p. 186, note 3. and you will see that they all move in correspondence with their fibres. This is why the fibres throughout the intestines are circular in both coats- they only contract peristaltically, they do not exercise traction. The stomach, again, has some of its fibres longitudinal for the purpose of traction and the others transverse for the purpose of peristalsis.The term here rendered peristalisis peristoé in greek; it is applied on ly to the intermittent movements of muscles placed circularly round a lumen or cavity, and comprehends systolé or contraction and diastolé or dilation. In its modern significance, peristalsis, hoever, also includes the movements of longitudinal fibres. cf. p. 97, note 1. For just as the movements in the musclesBy this term is meant only what we should call the "voluntary" muscles. take place when each of the fibres becomes tightened and drawn towards its origin, such also is what happens in the stomach; when the transverse fibres tighten, the breadth of the cavity contained by them becomes less; and when the longitudinal fibres contract and draw in upon themselves, the length must necessarily be curtailed. This curtailment of length, indeed, is well seen in the act of swallowing: the larynx is seen to rise
upwards to exactly the same degree that the gullet is drawn downwards; while, after the process of swallowing has been completed and the gullet is released from tension, the larynx can be clearly seen to again. This is because the inner coat of the stomach, which has the longitudinal fibres and which also lines the gullet and the mouth, extends to the interior of the larynx, and it is thus impossible for it to be drawn down by the stomach without the larynx being involved in the traction.
Further, it will be found acknowledged in Erasistratus's own writings that the circular fibres (by which the stomach as well as other parts performs its contractions) do not curtail its length, but contract and lessen its breadth. For he says that the stomach contracts peristaltically round the food during the whole period of digestion. But if it contracts, without in any way being diminished in length, this is because downward traction of the gullet is not a property of the movement of circular peristalsis. For what alone happens, as Erasistratus himself said, is that when the upper parts contract the lower ones dilate.cf. p. 97. And everyone knows that this can be plainly seen happening even in a dead man, if water be poured down his throat; this symptomFor "symptom," cf. p. 13, and p. 12, note 3. "Transitum namque materiae per angustum corpus id accidens consequitur" (Linacre). Less a "result" or "consequence" than an "accompaniment." results from the passage of matter through a narrow channel; it would be extraordinary if the channel did not dilate when a mass was passing through it.i.e. this is a purely mechanical process.
- Obviously then the dilatation of the lower parts along with the contraction of the upper is common both to dead bodies, when anything whatsoever is passing through them, and to living ones, whether they contract peristaltically round their contents or attract them.i.e. this pneomenon is a proof neither of peristolé nor of attraction. cf. p. 97, note 2.
+ Obviously then the dilatation of the lower parts along with the contraction of the upper is common both to dead bodies, when anything whatsoever is passing through them, and to living ones, whether they contract peristaltically round their contents or attract them.i.e. this pneomenon is a proof neither of peristolé nor of attraction. cf. p. 97, note 2.
Curtailment of length, on the other hand, is peculiar to organs which possess longitudinal fibres for the purpose of attraction. But the gullet was shown to be pulled down; for otherwise it would not have drawn upon the larynx. It is therefore clear that the stomach attracts food by the gullet.
Further, in vomiting, the mere passive conveyance of rejected matter up to the mouth will certainly itself suffice to keep open those parts of the oesophagus which are distended by the returned food; as it occupies each part in front [above], it first dilates this, and of course leaves the part behind [below] contracted. Thus, in this respect at least, the condition of the gullet is precisely similar to what it is in the act of swallowing.Contraction and dilatation of course being reversed. But there being no traction, the whole length remains equal in such cases.
And for this reason it is easier to swallow than to vomit, for deglutition results from both coats of the stomach being brought into action, the inner one exerting a
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- Diodorus Siculus
- Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by
- C. H. Oldfather. Vol. 4-8
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- Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: William
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- 1989
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- Fragmenta libri IX
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- h)=n de\
- kai\ *so/lwn patro\s me\n *)echkesti/dou, to\ ge/nos e)k *salami=nos th=s
- *)attikh=s, sofi/a| de\ kai\ paidei/a| pa/ntas tou\s kaq' e(auto\n
- u(perbeblhkw/s. fu/sei de\ pro\s a)reth\n tw=n a)/llwn polu\ diafe/rwn
- e)zh/lwsen a)reth\n e)painoume/nhn: pa=si ga\r toi=s maqh/masi polu\n xro/non
- e)ndiatri/yas a)qlhth\s e)ge/neto pa/shs a)reth=s. kata\ me\n ga\r th\n tou= paido\s h(liki/an paideutai=s
- e)xrh/sato toi=s a)ri/stois, a)ndrwqei\s de\ sundie/triye toi=s megi/sthn
- e)/xousi du/namin e)pi\ filosofi/a|. dio\ kai\ tou/tois o(milw=n kai\
- sundiatri/bwn w)noma/sqh me\n ei(=s tw=n e(pta\ sofw=n kai\ to\ prwtei=on th=s
- sune/sews ou) mo/non para\ tou/tois toi=s a)ndra/sin, a)lla\ kai\ para\ pa=si
- toi=s qaumazome/nois a)phne/gkato. o(/ti o( au)to\s *so/lwn, e)n th=| nomoqesi/a| mega/lhn
- do/can peripoihsa/menos, e)n tai=s i)diwtikai=s o(mili/ais kai\ a)pokri/sesin,
- e)/ti de\ sumbouli/ais, qaumasto\s e)tu/gxane dia\ th\n e)n paidei/a| prokoph/n.
- o(/ti o(
- au)to\s *so/lwn, th\n o(/lhn a)gwgh\n th=s po/lews e)xou/shs *)iwnikh/n, kai\
- dia\ th\n trufh\n kai\ th\n r(a|stw/nhn e)kteqhlumme/nwn tw=n a)nqrw/pwn,
- mete/qhke th=| sunhqei/a| pro\s a)reth\n kai\ zh=lon tw=n a)ndrei/wn pra/cewn.
- dio\ th=| tou/tou nomoqesi/a| kaqoplisqe/ntes ta\s yuxa\s *(armo/dios kai\
- *)aristogei/twn katalu/ein e)pexei/rhsan th\n tw=n *peisistratidw=n
- a)rxh/n.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 217.
- o(/ti
- *kroi=sos o( *ludw=n basileu\s mega/las kekthme/nos duna/meis kai\ polu\n e)k
- paraskeuh=s seswreukw\s a)/rguro/n te kai\ xruso/n, metepe/mpeto tw=n *(ellh/nwn
- tou\s sofwta/tous, kai\ sundiatri/bwn au)toi=s meta\ pollw=n dw/rwn e)ce/pemye
- kai\ au)to\s pro\s a)reth\n w)felei=to polla/. pote\ de\ tou=ton metapemya/menos
- kai\ ta\s duna/meis kai\ to\n plou=ton e)pideica/menos, h)rw/thsen ei)/ tis
- e(/teros au)tw=| dokei= makariw/teros ei)=nai. o( de\ *so/lwn th=| sunh/qei toi=s filoso/fois xrhsa/menos parrhsi/a| e)/fh
- mhde/na tw=n zw/ntwn ei)=nai maka/rion: to\n ga\r e)p' eu)daimoni/a|
- pefronhmatisme/non kai\ dokou=nta th\n tu/xhn e)/xein sunergo\n mh\ ginw/skein
- ei) diamenei= met' au)tou= me/xri th=s e)sxa/ths. skopei=n ou)=n e)/fhse dei=n
- th\n tou= bi/ou teleuth\n kai\ to\n dieutuxh/santa to/te proshko/ntws le/gein
- maka/rion. o( de\ *kroi=sos u(/steron
- geno/menos ai)xma/lwtos u(po\ *ku/rou kai\ me/llwn e)pi\ mega/lh| pura=|
- katakai/esqai, th=s *so/lwnos a)pofa/sews e)mnhmo/neusen. dio\ kai\ tou= puro\s
- h)/dh perifle/gontos a)nebo/a sunexw=s to\ tou= *so/lwnos o)/noma. o( de\ *ku=ros prospe/myas tou\s peusome/nous, ti/s h(
- sunexh/s e)sti tou= *so/lwnos o)nomasi/a, maqw\n ta)lhqe\s mete/pese toi=s
- logismoi=s kai\ nomi/sas th\n a)po/krisin tou= *so/lwnos a)lhqinh\n ei)=nai th=s
- me\n u(perhfanei/as a)pani/stato, th\n de\ pura\n katasbe/sas e)/swse to\n
- *kroi=son kai\ to\ loipo\n e(/na tw=n fi/lwn kathri/qmhsen.cf. frag. 34.
- o(/ti o( *so/lwn
- h(gei=to tou\s me\n pu/ktas kai\ stadiei=s kai\ tou\s a)/llous a)qlhta\s mhde\n
- a)cio/logon sumba/llesqai tai=s po/lesi pro\s swthri/an, tou\s de\ fronh/sei
- kai\ a)reth=| diafe/rontas mo/nous du/nasqai ta\s patri/das e)n toi=s kindu/nois
- diafula/ttein. o(/ti peri\ tou= xrusou= tri/podos
- a)mfisbhth/sews ou)/shs h( *puqi/a e)/xrhsen ou(/tws:
- e)/kgone *milh/tou, tri/podos pe/ri *foi=bon e)rwta=|s;
- o(\s sofi/a| prw=tos pa/ntwn, tou/tou tri/pod' au)dw=.
-
oi( de/ fasin a)/llws o(/ti pole/mou genome/nou toi=s *)/iwsi pro\s
- a)llh/lous, kai\ tou= tri/podos para\ saghne/wn a)nenexqe/ntos, e)perwth=sai
- to\n qeo\n peri\ th=s katalu/sews tou= pole/mou. h( de\ e)/fh,
- ou)/pote mh\ lh/ch| po/lemos *mero/pwn kai\ *)iw/nwn,
- pri\n tri/poda xru/seion, o(\n *(/hfaistos ka/me teu/xwn,
- e)k me/ssou pe/myhte, kai\ e)s do/mon a)ndro\s i(/khtai
- o(\s sofi/a| ta/ t' e)o/nta ta/ t' e)sso/mena prode/dorken.
-
- o(/ti oi(
- *milh/sioi a)kolouqh=sai boulo/menoi tw=| xrhsmw=| *qa/lhti tw=| *milhsi/w| to\
- a)ristei=on e)bou/lonto dou=nai: to\n d' ei)pei=n w(s ou)k e)/sti pa/ntwn
- sofw/tatos, sumbouleu/ein de\ pro\s e(/teron pe/mpein sofw/teron. tou/tw| de\
- tw=| tro/pw| kai\ tw=n a)/llwn tw=n e(pta\ sofw=n a)popoihsame/nwn to\n tri/poda
- *so/lwni di/dosqai dokou=nti pa/ntas a)nqrw/pous u(perbeblh=sqai sofi/a| te kai\
- sune/sei. to\n de\ sumbouleu=sai tou=ton a)naqei=nai *)apo/llwni: tou=ton ga\r
- ei)=nai sofw/teron pa/ntwn.cf. frag. 13.
- 2.1 o(/ti o( au)to\s pro\s th=| tou= bi/ou
- katastrofh=| o(rw=n *peisi/straton pro\s xa/rin ta\ plh/qh dhmagwgou=nta kai\
- pro\s turanni/da parormw=nta, to\ me\n prw=ton lo/gois e)pexei/rhsen
- a)potre/pein tau/ths th=s e)pibolh=s: ou) prose/xontos de\ au)tou= proh=lqen
- ei)s th\n a)gora\n meta\ th=s panopli/as pantelw=s h)/dh geghrakw/s. sundramo/ntos de\ tou= plh/qous pro\s au)to\n dia\ to\
- para/docon, pareka/lei tou\s poli/tas a)nalabei=n ta\ o(/pla kai\ paraxrh=ma
- katalu/ein to\n tu/rannon: ou)deno\s de\ au)tw=| prose/xontos, kai\ pa/ntwn
- au)tou= mani/an kataginwsko/ntwn, tinw=n de\ paraghra=n au)to\n a)pofainome/nwn,
- o( me\n *peisi/stratos h)/dh tina\s dorufo/rous periago/menos prosh=lqe tw=|
- *so/lwni kai\ e)pu/qeto ti/ni qarrw=n th\n turanni/da katalu/ein au)tou=
- bou/letai, tou= de\ ei)po/ntos o(/ti tw=| gh/ra|, qauma/sas th\n fro/nhsin
- au)tou= ou)de\n au)to\n h)di/khsen.cf. frag.
- 20. 4.
- o(/ti to\n parano/mois kai\ a)di/kois pra/cesin
- e)pibalo/menon ou)k a)\n proshko/ntws sofo\n nomi/zesqai. o(/ti fasi\n *)ana/xarsin to\n *sku/qhn fronou=nta e)pi\
- sofi/a| me/ga paragene/sqai *puqw/de kai\ e)perwth=sai ti/s e)stin au)tou= tw=n
- *(ellh/nwn sofw/teros. kai\ ei)pei=n,
- *oi)tai=o/n tina/ fasi *mu/swna
- sou= ma=llon prapi/dessin a)rhro/ta peukali/mh|sin,
-
o(/stis h)=n *malieu\s kai\ w)/|kei th\n *oi)/thn ei)s kw/mhn *xhna\s
- kaloume/nhn.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 281-283.
- o(/ti
- *mu/swn tis h)=n *malieu/s, o(\s w)/|kei e)n kw/mh| *xhna\s kaloume/nh|, to\n
- a(/panta xro/non e)n a)grw=| diatri/bwn kai\ u(po\ tw=n pollw=n a)gnoou/menos:
- o(\n a)nteish=can ei)s tou\s e(pta\ sofou/s, e)kkri/nantes to\n *peri/andron
- to\n *kori/nqion dia\ to\ tu/rannon gegone/nai pikro/n.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 217.
- o(/ti o(
- *so/lwn polupragmonh/sas to\n to/pon e)n w(=| die/tribe *mu/swn, kate/laben
- au)to\n e)pi\ th=s a(/lw pro\s a)/rotron prosbalo/nta e)xe/tlhn, kai\ peiraqei\s
- tou= a)ndro\s e)/fh, ou)x w(/ra nu=n a)ro/trou, w)= *mu/swn, kai\ ou(=tos, ou)
- xrh=sqai, ei)=pen, a)ll' e)piskeua/zein.Const. Exc. 4, p.
- 283.
- o(/ti
- *xi/lwn tw=| lo/gw| su/mfwnon e)/sxe to\n bi/on, o(/per spani/ws eu(/roi tis
- a)\n gino/menon. tw=n ga\r kaq' h(ma=s filoso/fwn tou\s plei/stous i)dei=n
- e)/sti le/gontas me\n ta\ ka/llista, pra/ttontas de\ ta\ xei/rista, kai\ th\n
- e)n tai=s a)paggeli/ais au)tw=n semno/thta kai\ su/nesin dia\ th=s pei/ras
- e)legxome/nhn. o( de\ *xi/lwn xwri\s th=s kata\ to\n bi/on e)n a(/pasi toi=s
- prattome/nois a)reth=s polla\ dienoh/qh kai\ a)pefqe/gcato mnh/mhs a)/cia.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 218.
- o(/ti
- *xi/lwn a)fiko/menos ei)s *delfou\s kai\ kaqa/per a)parxa\s poiou/menos tw=|
- qew=| th=s i)di/as sune/sews e)pe/grayen e)pi/ tina ki/ona tri/a tau=ta,
- gnw=qi seauto/n
, kai\ mhde\n a)/gan
,
- kai\ tri/ton e)ggu/a, pa/ra d' a)/ta
. tou/twn e(/kaston
- u(pa/rxon braxu\ kai\ *lakwniko\n mega/lhn e)/xei th\n a)naqew/rhsin. to\ ga\r gnw=qi sauto\n paragge/llei paideuqh=nai kai\
- fro/nimon gene/sqai: ou(/tw ga\r a)/n tis e(auto\n gnoi/h: h)\ o(/ti oi(
- a)/moiroi paidei/as kai\ a)lo/gistoi kata\ to\ plei=ston e(autou\s sunetwta/tous
- u(peilh/fasin, h(/per e)sti\ tw=n a)maqiw=n a)maqesta/th kata\ to\n *pla/twna,
- h)\ o(/ti tou\s ponhrou\s e)pieikei=s h(gou=ntai, tou\s de\ xrhstou\s a)na/palin
- fau/lous: mo/nws ga\r a)/n tis ou(/tws e(auto\n gnoi/h kai\ e(/teron, tuxw\n
- paidei/as kai\ sune/sews perittote/ras. to\ de\
- mhde\n a)/gan metria/zein e)n pa=si kai\ mhde\ peri\ e(no\s tw=n a)nqrwpi/nwn
- telei/ws diori/zesqai, w(s *)epida/mnioi. ou(=toi ga\r para\ to\n *)adri/an
- oi)kou=ntes kai\ pro\s a)llh/lous diafero/menoi, mu/drous diapu/rous
- kataponti/santes e)n me/sw| tw=| pela/gei diwmo/santo mh\ spei/sesqai th\n pro\s
- a)llh/lous e)/xqran pro/teron e(/ws a)\n ou(=toi qermoi\ a)nenexqw=sin. ou(/tw
- de\ sklhrw=s o)mo/santes kai\ to\ mhde\n a)/gan
ou)k
- e)pinoh/santes u(/steron u(po\ tw=n pragma/twn a)nagkazo/menoi dielu/santo th\n
- e)/xqran, e)a/santes tou\s mu/drous yuxrou\s e)n tw=| buqw=|. to\ de\ e)ggu/a, pa/ra d' a)/ta, tine\s u(pe/labon ga/mon
- a)pagoreu/ein: th\n ga\r tou= ga/mou su/nqesin para\ toi=s plei/stois tw=n
- *(ellh/nwn e)ggu/hn o)noma/zesqai, kai\ bebaiwth\s o( koino\s bi/os, e)n w(=|
- plei=stai kai\ me/gistai gi/nontai sumforai\ dia\ ta\s gunai=kas. e)/nioi de/
- fasin a)na/cion ei)=nai *xi/lwnos dia\ to\ mh\ du/nasqai a)nairoume/nou tou=
- ga/mou diame/nein to\n bi/on, th\n de\ a)/thn a)pofai/nesqai parei=nai e)ggu/ais
- tai=s e)pi\ tw=n sumbolai/wn kai\ tai=s u(pe\r tw=n a)/llwn diomologh/sesi peri\
- xrhma/twn. kai\ *eu)ripi/dhs
- ou)k e)gguw=mai: zhmi/an fileggu/wn
- skopw=n: ta\ *puqoi= d' ou)k e)a=| me gra/mmata.
-
Eur. fr. 923
- (Nauck 2)
- e)/nioi de/ fasi
- mh\ *xi/lwnos ei)=nai mhde\ politiko\n to\ mhdeni\ tw=n fi/lwn e)n tai=s
- toiau/tais xrei/ais e)parkei=n, a)lla\ ma=llon ta\s katabebaiw/seis
- a)pagoreu/ein kai\ to\ katatetame/nws e)ggua=sqai/ te kai\ diori/zesqai tw=n
- a)nqrwpi/nwn, w(s poih=sai tou\s *(/ellhnas o(/te kathgwni/santo to\n *ce/rchn.
- w)/mosan ga\r e)n *plataiai=s paradw/sein pai/dwn paisi\ th\n pro\s tou\s
- *pe/rsas e)/xqran, e(/ws a)\n oi( potamoi\ r(e/wsin ei)s th\n qa/lattan kai\
- ge/nos a)nqrw/pwn h)=| kai\ gh= karpou\s fe/rh|: to\ de\ th=s tu/xhs
- eu)meta/ptwton bebai/ws e)gguhsa/menoi meta/ tina xro/non e)presbeu/onto pro\s
- *)artace/rchn to\n ui(o\n *ce/rcou peri\ fili/as kai\ summaxi/as. o(/ti o( *xi/lwnos
- lo/gos braxu\s w)\n o(/lhn periei/lhfe th\n pro\s to\n a)/riston bi/on
- u(poqh/khn, w(s kai\ tw=n e)n *delfoi=s a)naqhma/twn belti/w tau=ta ta\
- a)pofqe/gmata. ai( me\n ga\r xrusai= *kroi/sou pli/nqoi kai\ ta\ a)/lla
- kataskeua/smata h)fani/sqh kai\ mega/las a)forma\s pare/sxe toi=s a)sebei=n ei)s
- to\ i(ero\n e(lome/nois, ai( de\ gnw=mai to\n a(/panta xro/non sw/zontai e)n
- tai=s tw=n pepaideume/nwn yuxai=s teqhsaurisme/nai kai\ ka/lliston e)/xousai
- qhsauro/n, pro\s o(\n a)\n ou)/te *fwkei=s ou)/te *gala/tai prosenegkei=n ta\s
- xei=ras spouda/seian.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 283-285.
- o(/ti
- *pittako\s o( *mitulhnai=os ou) mo/non e)n sofi/a| qaumasto\s h)=n, a)lla\ kai\
- poli/ths e)ge/neto toiou=tos oi(=on e(/teron ou)k h)/negken h( nh=sos, dokw= d'
- ou)d' a)\n u(/steron e)ne/gkai, me/xri a)\n to\n oi)=non fe/rh| plei/w te kai\
- h(di/w. nomoqe/ths te ga\r a)gaqo\s u(ph=rxe ka)n toi=s kata\ me/ros pro\s tou\s
- poli/tas koino\s kai\ fila/nqrwpos, kai\ th\n patri/da triw=n tw=n megi/stwn
- sumforw=n a)pe/luse, turanni/dos, sta/sews, pole/mou. o(/ti *pittako\s baqu\s h)=n
- kai\ h(/meros kai\ th\n parai/thsin e)/xwn au)to\s e)n au)tw=|. dio\ dh\ pa=sin
- e)do/kei te/leios a)nh\r ei)=nai pro\s pa=san a)reth\n o(mologoume/nws: kata\
- me\n ga\r th\n nomoqesi/an e)fai/neto politiko\s kai\ fro/nimos, kata\ de\ th\n
- pi/stin di/kaios, kata\ de\ th\n e)n toi=s o(/plois u(peroxh\n a)ndrei=os, kata\
- de\ th\n pro\s to\ ke/rdos megaloyuxi/an a)fila/rguros.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 218.
- o(/ti tw=n
- *mitulhnai/wn dido/ntwn tw=| *pittakw=| th=s xw/ras u(pe\r h(=s e)monoma/xhse
- th\n h(mi/seian ou)k e)de/cato, sune/tace de\ e(ka/stw| klhrw=sai to\ i)/son,
- e)pifqegca/menos w(s to\ i)/son e)sti\ tou= plei/onos plei=on. metrw=n ga\r
- e)pieikei/a| to\ plei=on, ou) ke/rdei, sofw=s e)gi/nwsken: th=| me\n ga\r
- i)so/thti do/can kai\ a)sfa/leian a)kolouqh/sein, th=| de\ pleoneci/a|
- blasfhmi/an kai\ fo/bon, di' w(=n taxe/ws a)\n au)tou= th\n dwrea\n a)fei/lanto.
- o(/ti
- su/mfwna tou/tois e)/prace kai\ pro\s *kroi=son dido/nta tw=n e)k tou=
- gazofulaki/ou xrhma/twn labei=n o(po/sa bou/loito. kai\ ga\r to/te th\n dwrea\n
- ou) prosdeca/meno/n fasin ei)pei=n, kai\ nu=n e)/xein w(=n h)/qele dipla/sia.
- qauma/santos de\ tou= *kroi/sou th\n a)filarguri/an kai\ peri\ th=s a)pokri/sews
- e)perwth/santos, ei)pei=n w(s teleuth/santos a)/paidos ta)delfou=
- keklhronomhkw\s ou)si/an ei)/h th\n i)/shn h(=|per ei)=xen, h(\n ou)x h(de/ws
- proseilhfe/nai. o(/ti kai\ to\n poihth\n *)alkai=on, e)xqro/taton au)tou= gegenhme/non kai\
- dia\ tw=n poihma/twn pikro/tata leloidorhko/ta, labw\n u(poxei/rion a)fh=ken,
- e)pifqegca/menos w(s suggnw/mh timwri/as ai(retwte/ra.Const.
- Exc. 4, p. 285.
- o(/ti
- fasi\n oi( *prihnei=s w(s *messhni/as to\ ge/nos e)pish/mous parqe/nous
- lutrwsa/menos o( *bi/as para\ lh|stw=n h)=gen w(s i)di/as qugate/ras e)nti/mws.
- meta\ de/ tinas xro/nous paragenome/nwn tw=n suggenw=n kata\ zh/thsin,
- a)pe/dwken au)ta\s ou)/te trofei=a praca/menos ou)/te lu/tra, tou)nanti/on de\
- tw=n i)di/wn polla\ dwrhsa/menos. ei)=xon ou)=n pro\s au)to\n ai( ko/rai
- patrikh\n eu)/noian dia/ te th\n suntrofi/an kai\ to\ me/geqos th=s
- eu)ergesi/as, w(/ste kai\ xwrisqei=sai meta\ tw=n i)di/wn ei)s th\n patri/da
- th=s u(perori/ou xa/ritos ou)k e)pela/qonto. o(/ti saghnei=s *messh/nioi kata\ to\n
- bo/lon e(/teron me\n ou)de\n a)nei/lkusan, xalkou=n de\ tri/poda mo/non
- e)pigrafh\n e)/xonta tw=| sofwta/tw|
. a)naxqe/ntos de\
- tou= kataskeua/smatos doqh=nai tw=| *bi/anti.cf. frag. 3.
- o(/ti *bi/as
- h)=n deino/tatos kai\ tw=| lo/gw| prwteu/wn tw=n kaq' e(auto/n. katexrh/sato de\
- th=| tou= le/gein duna/mei polloi=s a)na/palin: ou) ga\r ei)s misqarni/an ou)de\
- ei)s proso/dous, a)ll' ei)s th\n tw=n a)dikoume/nwn kateti/qeto boh/qeian.
- o(/per spaniw/tat' a)/n tis eu(/roi.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp.
- 218-219.
- o(/ti
- me/ga e)sti\n ou) to\ du/namin o(/tou dh/pote sxei=n, a)lla\ to\ tau/th|
- deo/ntws xrh=sqai. e)pei\ ti/ o)/felos *mi/lwni tw=| *krotwnia/th| to\ me/geqos
- th=s peri\ to\ sw=ma r(w/mhs; o(/ti *poluda/mas o( *qettalo\s u(po\ th=s pe/tras diarragei\s
- pa=sin e)poi/hse fanero\n w(s e)pisfale/s e)stin i)sxu\n me\n mega/lhn e)/xein,
- nou=n de\ mikro/n.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 285-286.
-
- o( *poluda/mas ou(=tos h)=n e)k po/lews *skotou/shs,
- gumnai=s xersi\ me\n le/ontas w(s a)/rnas diafqei/rwn,
- pteroi=s posi\ d' u(pernikw=n a(/rmata taxudro/ma,
- th=| de\ xeiri/ ti sph/laion a)nth/reise sumpi=pton.
- o( *sikelo\s *dio/dwros gra/fei th\n i(stori/an.
-
Tzetz. Hist. 2. 555-559.
- o(/ti tw=n
- *kirrai/wn poliorkoume/nwn polu\n h)/dh xro/non dia\ to\ to\ xrhsth/rion
- e)pixeirei=n sula=n, tine\s me\n tw=n *(ellh/nwn ei)s ta\s patri/das
- e)panh=lqon, oi( de\ e)perwth/santes th\n *puqi/an e)/labon xrhsmo\n
- ou(/tws,
- ou) pri\n th=sde po/lhos e)rei/yete pu/rgon e(lo/ntes,
- pri/n ken e)mw=| teme/nei kuanw/pidos *)amfitri/ths
- ku=ma potiklu/zh| keladou=n i(erh=|sin e)p' a)ktai=s.
-
Const. Exc. 4, p. 286.
- i)ste/on
- o(/ti o( me\n *so/lwn e)ge/neto e)pi\ tw=n xro/nwn tw=n tura/nnwn e)n tai=s
- *)aqh/nais pro\ tw=n *persikw=n xro/nwn, o( de\ *dra/kwn pro\ au)tou= e(pta\
- kai\ tessara/konta e)/tesin, w(/s fhsin o( *dio/dwros.Ulpian
- on the Timocrates of Demosthenes, 9, p. 805.
- o(/ti
- *peri/laos o( a)ndriantopoio\s *fala/ridi tw=| tura/nnw| kataskeua/sas bou=s
- xalkou=s pro\s timwri/an tw=n o(mofu/lwn au)to\s prw=tos e)peira/qh tou=
- mege/qous th=s timwri/as: oi( ga\r kata\ tw=n a)/llwn bouleuo/menoi/ ti fau=lon
- w(s e)pi/pan tai=s i)di/ais e)piqumi/ais ei)w/qasin a(li/skesqai.Const. Exc. 4, p. 286.
-
- o(\s *fa/laris *peri/laon to\n xalkourgo\n e)kei=non
- to\n *)attiko\n kate/kausen e)n tau/rw| tw=| xalke/w|.
- ou(=tos ga\r to\ mhxa/nhma tou= tau/rou xalkourgh/sas
- toi=s mucwth=rsi tou= boo\s e)te/kthnen au)li/skous,
- a)ne/ptuce kai\ qu/ran de\ pro\s tw=| pleurw=| tou= tau/rou:
- kai\ dw=ron tw=| *fala/ridi tou=ton to\n tau=ron a)/gei.
- *fa/laris de\ to\n a)/nqrwpon e)n dw/rois deciou=tai,
- to\ de\ mhxa/nhma qeoi=s kaqierou=n keleu/ei.
- w(s d' a)naptu/cas to\ pleuro\n o( xalkourgo\s e)kei=nos
- do/lon to\n kakomh/xanon e)cei=pen a)panqrw/pws,
- ei)/ tina bou/lei, *fa/lari, kola/zein tw=n a)nqrw/pwn,
- e)/ndon tou= tau/rou kateirgnu\s pu=r u(postrw/nnu ka/tw:
- do/cei d' o( tau=ros stenagmoi=s muka=sqai toi=s e)kei/nou,
- su\ d' h(donh\n toi=s stenagmoi=s e(/ceis au)loi=s mukth/rwn.
- tou=to maqw\n o( *fa/laris kai\ musaxqei\s e)kei=non,
- a)/ge, fhsi/, *peri/lae, su\ prw=tos dei=con tou=to,
- kai\ tou\s au)lou=ntas mi/mhsai, tra/nwso/n sou th\n te/xnhn.
- w(s de\ pare/du mimhth\s dh=qen tw=n au)lhma/twn,
- klei/ei to\n tau=ron *fa/laris kai\ pu=r u(poswreu/ei.
- o(/pws de\ to\ xalkou/rghma qanw\n mh\ e)mmia/nh|,
- kata\ petrw=n e)krh/mnisen e)ca/cas h(miqnh=ta.
- gra/fei peri\ tou= tau/rou de\ *loukiano\s o( *su/ros,
- *dio/dwros kai\ *pi/ndaros, su\n tou/tois te muri/oi.
-
Tzetz. Hist. 1. 646-668.
- o(/ti
- *so/lwn o( nomoqe/ths parelqw\n ei)s th\n e)kklhsi/an pareka/lei tou\s
- *)aqhnai/ous katalu/ein to\n tu/rannon pri\n tele/ws i)sxuro\n gene/sqai.
- ou)deno\s de\ au)tw=| prose/xontos a)nalabw\n th\n panopli/an proh=lqen ei)s
- th\n a)gora\n geghrakw/s, kai\ tou\s qeou\s e)pimarturo/menos e)/fhse kai\
- lo/gw| kai\ e)/rgw| th=| patri/di kinduneuou/sh| bebohqhke/nai to\ kat' au)to\n
- me/ros: tw=n de\ o)/xlwn a)gnoou/ntwn th\n e)pibolh\n *peisistra/tou sune/bh
- to\n *so/lwna ta)lhqh= le/gonta parape/mpesqai. le/getai de\ *so/lwn kai\ proeipei=n toi=s *)aqhnai/ois th\n e)some/nhn
- turanni/da di' e)legei/wn,
- e)k nefe/lhs pe/letai xio/nos me/nos h)de\ xala/zhs,
- bronth\ d' e)k lampra=s gi/netai a)steroph=s.
- a)ndrw=n d' e)k mega/lwn po/lis o)/llutai, ei)s de\ mona/rxou
- dh=mos a)idrei/h| doulosu/nhn e)/pesen.
- li/hn d' e)ca/rant' ou) r(a/|dio/n e)sti katasxei=n
- u(/steron, a)ll' h)/dh xrh\ peri\ pa/nta noei=n.
-
Solon fr. 10 (Diehl)
- kai\ meta\ tau=ta turannou=ntos e)/fh,
- ei) de\ pepo/nqate lugra\ di' u(mete/ran kako/thta,
- mh\ qeoi=sin tau/thn moi=ran e)pamfe/rete:
- au)toi\ ga\r tou/tous hu)ch/sate r(u/mata do/ntes,
- kai\ dia\ tou=to kakh\n e)/sxete doulosu/nhn.
- u(mw=n d' ei(=s me\n e(/kastos a)lw/pekos i)/xnesi bai/nei,
- su/mpasin d' u(mi=n kou=fos e)/nesti no/os.
- ei)s ga\r glw=ssan o(ra=te kai\ ei)s e)/pos ai)o/lon a)ndro/s,
- ei)s e)/rgon d' ou)de\n gino/menon ble/pete.
-
Solon fr. 8 (Diehl)
- o(/ti o(
- *peisi/stratos pareka/lei to\n *so/lwna ta\s h(suxi/as e)/xein kai\ tw=n th=s
- turanni/dos a)gaqw=n sunapolau/ein: ou)deni\ de\ tro/pw| duna/menos au)tou=
- metaqei=nai th\n proai/resin, a)ll' o(rw=n ma=llon a)ei\ e)cegeiro/menon kai\
- meta\ a)nata/sews a)peilou=nta timwri/an e)piqh/sein, h)rw/thsen au)to\n ti/ni
- pepoiqw\s a)ntipra/ttei tai=s e)pibolai=s au)tou=. to\n de/ fasin ei)pei=n tw=|
- gh/ra|.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 286-287.*(hro/dotos kata\ *ce/rchn gegonw\s toi=s xro/nois fhsi\n
- *)assuri/ous e)/th pentako/sia pro/teron th=s *)asi/as a)/rcantas u(po\ *mh/dwn
- kataluqh=nai. e)/peita basile/a me\n mhde/na gene/sqai to\n a)mfisbhth/sonta
- tw=n o(/lwn e)pi\ polla\s genea/s, ta\s de\ po/leis kaq' e(auta\s tattome/nas
- dioikei=sqai dhmokratikw=s: to\ de\ teleutai=on pollw=n e)tw=n dielqo/ntwn
- ai(reqh=nai basile/a para\ toi=s *mh/dois a)/ndra dikaiosu/nh| dia/foron,
- o)/noma *kuaca/rhn. tou=ton de\ prw=ton e)pixeirh=sai prosa/gesqai tou\s
- plhsioxw/rous, kai\ toi=s *mh/dois a)rxhgo\n gene/sqai th=s tw=n o(/lwn
- h(gemoni/as: e)/peita tou\s e)kgo/nous a)ei\ proskataktwme/nous pollh\n th=s
- o(mo/rou xw/ras au)ch=sai th\n basilei/an me/xri *)astua/gous tou=
- katapolemhqe/ntos u(po\ *ku/rou kai\ *persw=n: peri\ w(=n nu=n h(mei=s ta\
- kefa/laia proeirhko/tes ta\ kata\ me/ros u(/steron a)kribw=s a)nagra/yomen,
- e)peida\n e)pi\ tou\s oi)kei/ous xro/nous e)piba/lwmen. kata\ ga\r to\ deu/teron
- e)/tos th=s e(ptakaideka/ths *)olumpia/dos h(|re/qh basileu\s u(po\ *mh/dwn
- *kuaca/rhs kaq' *(hro/doton.
Diod.
- 2.32.2-3.*)astiba/ra tou= basile/ws tw=n *mh/dwn e)n
- *)ekbata/nois gh/ra| teleuth/santos th\n a)rxh\n *)aspa/ndan to\n ui(o\n
- diade/casqai, to\n u(po\ tw=n *(ellh/nwn *)astua/ghn kalou/menon: tou/tou d'
- u(po\ *ku/rou tou= *pe/rsou katapolemhqe/ntos metapesei=n th\n basilei/an ei)s
- *pe/rsas, peri\ w(=n h(mei=s ta\ kata\ me/ros e)n toi=s i)di/ois xro/nois
- a)kribw=s a)nagra/yomen.
Diod. 2.34. 6.
- *ku=ros
- *persw=n e)basi/leusen w(=| e)/tei *)olumpia\s h)/xqh ne, w(s e)k tw=n *biblioqhkw=n *diodw/rou kai\ tw=n *qallou= kai\
- *ka/storos i(storiw=n, e)/ti de\ *polubi/ou kai\ *fle/gontos e)/stin eu(rei=n,
- a)lla\ kai\ e(te/rwn, oi(=s e)me/lhsen *)olumpia/dwn: a(/pasi ga\r sunefw/nhsen
- o( xro/nos.Eusebius, Praep. evang. 10.10.488
- c.
- o(/ti
- *ku=ros, o( *kambu/sou me\n ui(o\s kai\ *manda/nhs th=s qugatro\s *)astua/gous
- tou= *mh/dwn basile/ws, a)ndrei/a| kai\ sune/sei kai\ tai=s a)/llais a)retai=s
- e)prw/teue tw=n kaq' au(to/n: basilikw=s ga\r au)to\n o( path\r h)=ge paideu/wn,
- zh=lon e)mpoiw=n tw=n krati/stwn. kai\ e)/kdhlos h)=n a(drw=n a(yo/menos
- pragma/twn dia\ to\ th\n a)reth\n profai/nein u(pe\r th\n h(liki/an. o(/ti *)astua/ghs o( tw=n *mh/dwn basileu\s h(tthqei\s kai\
- fugw\n ai)sxrw=s di' o)rgh=s ei)=xe tou\s stratiw/tas: kai\ tou\s me\n e)f'
- h(gemoniw=n tetagme/nous a(/pantas a)palla/cas, e(te/rous a)nt' e)kei/nwn
- kate/sthse, tou\s de\ th=s fugh=s ai)ti/ous a(/pantas e)pile/cas a)pe/sface,
- nomi/zwn th=| tou/twn timwri/a| tou\s a)/llous a)nagka/sein a)/ndras a)gaqou\s
- e)n toi=s kindu/nois gene/sqai: w)mo\s ga\r h)=n kai\ fu/sei a)phnh/s. ou) mh\n
- ta\ plh/qh katepla/gh au)tou= th\n baru/thta, a)ll' e(/kastos mish/sas to\
- bi/aion kai\ para/nomon th=s pra/cews metabolh=s w)re/geto. dio\ kai\ kata\
- lo/xous e)gi/nonto sundromai\ kai\ lo/goi taraxw/deis, parakalou/ntwn a)llh/lous
- tw=n plei/stwn pro\s th\n kata\ tou/tou timwri/an. o(/ti *ku=ros, w(/s fasin, ou) mo/non h)=n kata\ to\n po/lemon
- a)ndrei=os, a)lla\ kai\ pro\s tou\s u(potetagme/nous eu)gnw/mwn kai\
- fila/nqrwpos. dio/per au)to\n oi( *pe/rsai proshgo/reusan pate/ra.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 219.
- o(/ti
- *kroi=sos nauphgw=n ploi=a makra/, fasi/n,e)/melle strateu/ein e)pi\ ta\s
- nh/sous. parepidhmou=nta de\ *bi/anta h)\ *pittako\n kai\ qewrou=nta th\n
- nauphgi/an, u(po\ tou= basile/ws e)rwthqh=nai mh/ ti new/teron a)khkow\s ei)/h
- para\ toi=s *(/ellhsi gino/menon. tou= de\ ei)po/ntos o(/ti pa/ntes oi(
- nhsiw=tai suna/gousin i(/ppous, dianoou/menoi strateu/ein e)pi\ *ludou/s,
- le/getai to\n *kroi=son ei)pei=n, ei)/qe ga/r tis pei/seie nhsiw/tas
- su\n i(/ppois parata/casqai *ludoi=s.
tw=n ga\r *ludw=n i(ppeu/ein
- ei)do/twn e)no/mize proterei=n au)tou\s pezh=|. o( de\ *pittako\s h)\ *bi/as u(polabw/n fhsin, ei)=ta *ludou\s me\n h)/peiron
- oi)kou=ntas speu/dein a)pofai/nh| labei=n e)pi\ gh=s nhsiw/tas a)/ndras, tou\s
- de\ nh=son oi)kou=ntas ou)k oi)/ei qeoi=s eu)/casqai labei=n e)n qala/tth|
- *ludou/s, i(/n' u(pe\r tw=n kata\ th\n h)/peiron toi=s *(/ellhsi sumba/ntwn
- kakw=n kata\ pe/lagos a)mu/nwntai to\n tou\s suggenei=s katadedoulwme/non; o(
- de\ *kroi=sos qauma/sas to\n lo/gon paraxrh=ma meteno/hse kai\ th=s nauphgi/as
- a)pe/sth. o(/ti o( *kroi=sos metepe/mpeto e)k th=s
- *(ella/dos tou\s e)pi\ sofi/a| prwteu/ontas, e)pideiknu/menos to\ me/geqos th=s
- eu)daimoni/as, kai\ tou\s e)cumnou=ntas th\n eu)tuxi/an au)tou= e)ti/ma
- mega/lais dwreai=s. metepe/myato de\ kai\ *so/lwna, o(moi/ws de\ kai\ tw=n
- a)/llwn tw=n e)pi\ filosofi/a| megi/sthn do/can e)xo/ntwn, th\n i)di/an
- eu)daimoni/an dia\ th=s tou/twn tw=n a)ndrw=n marturi/as e)pisfragi/zesqai
- boulo/menos. paregenh/qh de\ pro\s au)to\n
- *)ana/xarsis o( *sku/qhs kai\ *bi/as kai\ *so/lwn kai\ *pittako/s, ou(\s e)pi\
- ta\s e(stia/seis kai\ to\ sune/drion ei)=xen e)n megi/sth| timh=|, to/n te
- plou=ton au)toi=s e)pideiknu/menos kai\ to\ me/geqos th=s e(autou= dunastei/as.
- para\ de\ toi=s pepaideume/nois th=s
- braxulogi/as to/te zhloume/nhs, o( de *kroi=sos
- e)pideica/menos th\n th=s basilei/as eu)daimoni/an toi=s a)ndra/si kai\ to\
- plh=qos tw=n kexeirwme/nwn e)qnw=n, h)rw/thsen *)ana/xarsin, o)/nta presbu/teron
- tw=n sofistw=n, ti/na nomi/zei tw=n o)/ntwn a)ndreio/taton. o( de\ ta\
- a)griw/tata tw=n zw/|wn e)/fhse: mo/na ga\r proqu/mws a)poqnh/skein u(pe\r th=s
- e)leuqeri/as. o( de\ *kroi=sos nomi/sas
- h(marthke/nai au)to/n, e)n de\ tw=| deute/rw| pro\s xa/rin au)tw=| poih/sesqai
- th\n a)po/krisin u(polabw\n h)rw/thse, ti/na dikaio/taton kri/nei tw=n o)/ntwn.
- o( de\ pa/lin a)pefai/neto ta\ a)griw/tata tw=n qhri/wn: mo/na ga\r kata\ fu/sin
- zh=n, ou) kata\ no/mous: ei)=nai ga\r th\n me\n fu/sin qeou= poi/hsin, to\n de\
- no/mon a)nqrw/pou qe/sin, kai\ dikaio/teron ei)=nai xrh=sqai toi=s tou= qeou=
- h)\ toi=s tw=n a)nqrw/pwn eu(rh/masin. o( de\
- diasu=rai boulo/menos *)ana/xarsin h)rw/thsen ei) kai\ sofw/tata ta\ qhri/a. o(
- de\ sugkataqe/menos e)di/dasken, o(/ti th\n th=s fu/sews a)lh/qeian th=s tou=
- no/mou qe/sews protima=n i)diw/taton u(pa/rxein sofi/as. o( de\ tou/tou
- katege/lasen w(s e)k th=s *skuqi/as kai\ qhriw/dous diagwgh=s pepoihme/nou ta\s
- a)pokri/seis. h)rw/thse de\ to\n *so/lwna ti/na tw=n
- o)/ntwn eu)daimone/staton e(w/raken, w(s tou=to/ ge pa/ntws a)podoqhso/menon
- e(autw=|. tou= de\ ei)po/ntos w(s ou)de/na dikai/ws a)\n ei)pei=n e)/xoi dia\
- to\ mhdeno\s tw=n o)/ntwn e(wrake/nai to\ te/los tou= bi/ou, ou(= xwri\s
- ou)dei\s a)\n proshko/ntws maka/rios nomi/zoito: polla/kis ga\r oi( to\n
- e)/mprosqen pa/nta bi/on eu)dai/mones do/cantes ei)=nai pro\s au)th=| th=| tou=
- bi/ou katastrofh=| megi/stais perie/peson sumforai=s. o( de\ basileu/s, ou)de\ plousiw/taton a)/ra me kri/neis;
- e)/fh. kai\ o( *so/lwn th\n au)th\n a)po/krisin poihsa/menos e)di/dasken w(s ou)
- tou\s plei=sta kekthme/nous, a)lla\ tou\s plei/stou a)ci/an th\n fro/nhsin
- h(goume/nous nomiste/on plousiwta/tous: h( de\ fro/nhsis ou)deni\ tw=n a)/llwn
- a)nti/rropos ou)=sa mo/nous poiei= tou\s au)th\n peri\ pollou= poioume/nous
- me/giston kai\ bebaio/taton e)/xein plou=ton. h)rw/thse kai\ to\n *bi/anta, po/teron o)rqw=s e)poih/sato th\n a)po/krisin o(
- *so/lwn h)\ dih/marten. o( de\ u(peipw/n, o)rqw=s, e)/fh: ta\ ga\r e)/n soi
- bou/letai qewrh/sas a)gaqa\ diagnw=nai, nuni\ de\ ta\ para/ soi mo/non
- e(w/raken: ei)=nai de\ di' e)kei=na ma=llon h)\ tau=ta tou\s a)nqrw/pous
- eu)dai/monas. o( de\ basileu/s, a)ll' ei) to\n tw=n xrhma/twn, e)/fhse, plou=ton
- mh\ protima=|s, to/ ge plh=qos tw=n fi/lwn o(ra=|s tosou=ton u(pa/rxon o(/son
- ou)deni\ tw=n a)/llwn. o( de\ kai\ tou=ton a)pefh/nato to\n a)riqmo\n a)/dhlon
- ei)=nai dia\ th\n eu)tuxi/an. pro\s de\
- *pittako\n ei)pei=n fasi, poi/an e(w/rakas a)rxh\n krati/sthn; to\n de\
- a)pokriqh=nai, th\n tou= poiki/lou cu/lou, diashmai/nonta tou\s no/mous.
- o(/ti *ai)/swpos kata\ tou\s au)tou\s
- xro/nous sunh/kmaze toi=s e(pta\ sofoi=s kai\ ei)=pen w(s ou)k oi)/dasin ou(=toi
- o(milei=n duna/sth|: kai\ ga\r w(s h(/kista dei=n h)\ w(s h(/dista sumbiou=n
- toi=s toiou/tois.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 287-289.
- o(/ti
- *)/adrasto/s tis *fru\c to\n tou= basile/ws *kroi/sou tou= *ludou= ui(o\n
- *)/atun kalou/menon pro\s kunhgi/an a)kousi/ws, e)cakonti/sas kata\ suo/s,
- plh/cas a)pe/kteine. kai\ o( me\n kai\ a)kousi/ws a)nh|rhkw\s ou)k e)/fhsen
- e(auto\n e)/ti zh=n a)/cion ei)=nai: dio\ kai\ pareka/lei to\n basile/a mh\
- fei/sasqai, th\n taxi/sthn de\ e)pikatasfa/cai tw=| tou= teteleuthko/tos ta/fw|.
- o( de\ *kroi=sos th\n me\n a)rxh\n w(s a)\n
- e)pi\ fo/nw| te/knou di' o)rgh=s ei)=xe to\n *)/adraston, a)peilw=n zw=nta
- katakau/sein: e)pei\ de\ au)to\n e(w/ra proqumou/menon kai\ ei)s th\n tou=
- teteleuthko/tos timh\n to\ zh=n e)pidido/nta, to\ thnikau=ta lh/cas th=s o)rgh=s
- a)pe/luse th=s timwri/as to\n a)nelo/nta, th\n i)di/an tu/xhn, a)ll' ou) th\n
- e)kei/nou proai/resin ai)tiw/menos. o( de\ *)/adrastos ou)de\n h(=tton kat'
- i)di/an e)pi\ to\n *)/atuos ta/fon poreuqei\s e(auto\n kate/sfacen.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp. 219-220.
- o(/ti o(
- *fa/laris i)dw\n peristerw=n plh=qos u(f' e(no\s i(e/rakos diwko/menon e)/fh,
- o(ra=te, w)= a)/ndres, tosou=to plh=qos u(f' e(no\s diwko/menon dia\
- deili/an; e)pei/ toi ge ei) tolmh/seian e)pistre/yai, r(a|di/ws tou= diw/kontos
- a)\n perige/nointo.
(au)to\s de\ peplasme/nws e)/legen: th\n
- me\n ga\r ni/khn a)reth=| kai\ ou) poluplhqi/a| xeirw=n perigi/nesqai).
- kai\ e)k tou/tou tou= lo/gou a)pe/bale th\n dunastei/an, w(s ge/graptai e)n tw=|
- peri\ diadoxh=s basile/wn. o(/ti *kroi=sos e)pi\ *ku=ron
- to\n *pe/rshn e)kstrateu/wn e)pu/qeto tou= mantei/ou. o( de\ xrhsmo/s,
- *kroi=sos *(/alun diaba\s mega/lhn a)rxh\n katalu/sei.
-
o( de\ to\ a)mfi/bolon tou= xrhsmou= kata\ th\n e(autou= proai/resin
- e)kdeca/menos e)dustu/xhsen. o(/ti pa/lin e)phrw/thsen, ei) polu\n xro/non e(/cei th\n
- dunastei/an. ei)=pe de\ ta\ e)/ph tau=ta,
- a)ll' o(/tan h(mi/onos basileu\s *mh/doisi ge/nhtai,
- kai\ to/te, *lude\ podabre/, poluyh/fida par' *(/ermon
- feu/gein mhde\ me/nein mhd' ai)dei=sqai kako\s ei)=nai.
-
o(/ti h(mi/onon to\n *ku=ron e)/fh dia\
- to\ th\n mhte/ra au)tou= *mhdikh\n ei)=nai, to\n de\ pate/ra *pe/rshn.
- o(/ti
- *ku=ros o( tw=n *persw=n basileu\s paragenhqei\s meta\ pa/shs duna/mews ei)s ta\
- th=s *kappadoki/as stena/, a)pe/steile kh/rukas pro\s to\n *kroi=son th/n te
- dunastei/an au)tou= kataskeyome/nous kai\ dhlw/sontas o(/ti *ku=ros au)to\n
- a)fi/hsi tw=n pro/teron a(marthma/twn kai\ *ludi/as kaqi/sthsi satra/phn, a)\n
- e)pi\ qu/ras geno/menos o(moi/ws toi=s a)/llois o(mologh=| dou=los ei)=nai.
- pro\s ou(\s o( *kroi=sos a)pekri/qh, dio/ti proshko/ntws a)\n *ku=ros kai\
- *pe/rsai *kroi/sw| douleu/ein u(pome/noien: e)kei/nous me\n ga\r to\n
- e)/mprosqen xro/non diateteleke/nai *mh/dois douleu/ontas, au)to\n de\
- ou)de/pote pepoihke/nai to\ prostatto/menon u(f' e(te/rou.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 289-290.
- o(/ti
- *kroi=sos o( tw=n *ludw=n basileu\s prospoihsa/menos ei)s *delfou\s pe/mpein,
- e)/pempen ei)s *pelopo/nnhson *eu)ru/baton to\n *)efe/sion, dou\s au)tw=|
- xrusi/on, o(/pws w(s plei/stous cenologh/sh| tw=n *(ellh/nwn. o( de\ pemfqei\s
- pro\s *ku=ron to\n *pe/rshn a)poxwrh/sas ta\ kata\ me/ros e)dh/lwse. dio\ kai\
- para\ toi=s *(/ellhsin e)pish/mou genome/nhs th=s peri\ to\n *eu)ru/baton
- ponhri/as, me/xri tou= nu=n, o(/tan tis o)neidi/sai tini\ bou/lhtai moxqhri/an,
- *eu)ru/baton a)pokalei=.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 220.
- o(/ti oi(
- ponhroi\ ka)\n au)ti/ka para\ tw=n a)dikhqe/ntwn th\n timwri/an e)kkli/nwsin,
- h(/ ge blasfhmi/a di' ai)w=nos throume/nh kai\ teleuth/santas au)tou\s kata\ to\
- dunato\n mete/rxetai. o(/ti fasi\ to\n *kroi=son pro\ tou= pro\s *ku=ron pole/mou
- pe/myai qewrou\s ei)s *delfou\s e)perwth/sontas, pw=s a)\n o( ui(o\s au)tou=
- du/naito fwnh\n proe/sqai. th\n de\ *puqi/an ei)pei=n,
- *lude\ ge/nos, pollw=n basileu=, me/ga nh/pie *kroi=se,
- mh\ bou/lou polu/eukton i)a\n kata\ dw/mat' a)kou/ein
- paido\s fqeggome/nou: to\ de/ soi polu\ lw/ion a)mfi\s
- e)/mmenai: au)dh/sei ga\r e)n h)/mati prw=ton a)no/lbw|.
-
- o(/ti dei= th\n
- eu)tuxi/an metri/ws fe/rein kai\ mh\ pepoiqe/nai tai=s a)nqrwpi/nais
- eu)praci/ais e)n mikra=| r(oph=| mega/las metabola\s lambanou/sais. o(/ti meta\ to\
- gene/sqai ai)xma/lwton *kroi=son kai\ th\n pura\n sbesqh=nai, i)dw\n th\n po/lin
- diarpazome/nhn kai\ pro\s toi=s a)/llois polu\n a)/rguro/n te kai\ xruso\n
- diaforou/menon, e)phrw/thse to\n *ku=ron, ti/ poiou=sin oi( stratiw=tai. tou=
- de\ meta\ ge/lwtos a)pokriqe/ntos, ta\ sa\ xrh/mata diarpa/zousi. ma\ *di/a me\n
- ou)=n, ei)=pen, a)lla\ ta\ sa/: *kroi/sou ga\r i)/dion ou)ke/ti ou)qe\n
- u(pa/rxei. o( de\ *ku=ros qauma/sas to\n lo/gon eu)qu\s meteno/hse kai\ tou\s
- stratiw/tas a)nei/rcas th=s diarpagh=s ei)s to\ basiliko\n a)ne/labe ta\s tw=n
- *sardianw=n kth/seis.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 290-291.
- o(/ti
- *ku=ros eu)sebh= nomi/sas ei)=nai to\n *kroi=son dia\ to\ katarragh=nai o)/mbron
- kai\ sbe/sai th\n flo/ga, kai\ dia\ mnh/mhs e)/xwn th\n *so/lwnos a)po/krisin,
- meq' e(autou= perih/geto to\n *kroi=son e)nti/mws. mete/dwke de\ au)tw=| kai\
- tou= sunedri/ou, dialamba/nwn u(pa/rxein suneto/n, w(s a)\n polloi=s kai\
- pepaideume/nois kai\ sofoi=s a)ndra/si sumbebiwko/ta.Const.
- Exc. 2 (1), p. 220.
- o(/ti
- *(/arpagos katastaqei\s u(po\ *ku/rou tou= *pe/rsou e)pi\ th=s qala/tths
- strathgo/s, kai\ tw=n kata\ th\n *)asi/an *(ellh/nwn pro\s *ku=ron
- diapresbeuome/nwn sunqe/sqai fili/an, ei)=pe pro\s au)tou\s o(/ti paraplh/sio/n
- ti poiou=si tw=n pro/teron e(autw=| sumba/ntwn. kai\ ga/r pote gh=mai boulo/menon ai)tei=sqai para\ tou= patro\s th\n ko/rhn:
- to\n de\ to\ me\n prw=ton ou)k a)/cion kri/nanta tou= ga/mou dunatwte/rw|
- kategguh=sai, meta\ de\ tau=q' o(rw=nta au)to\n u(po\ tou= basile/ws timw/menon
- dido/nai th\n qugate/ra: au)to\n de\ a)pokriqh=nai, dio/ti gunai=ka me\n
- ou)ke/ti a)\n e)/xoi au)th/n, pallaki/da de\ sugxwrh/sai labei=n. dia\ de\ tw=n toiou/twn lo/gwn e)dh/lou toi=s
- *(/ellhsin, o(/ti *ku/rou pro/teron a)ciou=ntos gene/sqai *persw=n fi/lous ou)k
- e)boulh/qhsan, nu=n de\ e)k metabolh=s e)kei/nwn speudo/ntwn suna/yai fili/an
- w(s me\n pro\s summa/xous ou) poih/setai ta\s o(mologi/as, w(s de\ dou/lous ei)s
- th\n tw=n *persw=n pi/stin e(autou\s paradido/ntas prosde/cetai. o(/ti *lakedaimo/nioi punqano/menoi tou\s kata\ th\n *)asi/an
- *(/ellhnas kinduneu/ein, e)/pemyan pro\s *ku=ron, o(/ti *lakedaimo/nioi
- suggenei=s o)/ntes tw=n kata\ th\n *)asi/an *(ellh/nwn a)pagoreu/ousin au)tw=|
- katadoulou=sqai ta\s *(ellhni/das po/leis. o( de\ qauma/sas to\n lo/gon e)/fh
- gnw/sesqai th\n a)reth\n au)tw=n, o(/tan e(/na tw=n e(autou= dou/lwn pe/myh|
- katastreyo/menon th\n *(ella/da. o(/ti *lakedaimo/nioi th\n *)arkadi/an me/llontes
- katastre/fein e)/labon xrhsmo/n,
- *)arkadi/an m' ai)tei=s; me/ga m' ai)tei=s: ou)/ toi
- dw/sw.
- polloi\ e)n *)arkadi/a| balanhfa/goi a)/ndres e)/asin,
- oi(/ s' a)pokwlu/sousin: e)gw\ de/ toi ou)/ti megai/rw.
- dw/sw soi *tege/an possi/kroton o)rxh/sasqai
- kai\ kalo\n pedi/on sxoi/nw| diametrh/sasqai.
-
- o(/ti oi(
- *lakedaimo/nioi e)/pemyan ei)s *delfou\s peri\ tw=n o)ste/wn *)ore/stou tou=
- *)agame/mnonos, e)n poi/w| tini\ to/pw| kei=ntai. kai\ e)/xrhsen ou(/tws,
- e)/sti tis *)arkadi/as *tege/h leurw=| e)ni\ xw/rw|,
- e)/nq' a)/nemoi pnei/ousi du/w kraterh=s u(p' a)na/gkhs
- kai\ tu/pos a)nti/tupos kai\ ph=m' e)pi\ ph/mati kei=tai.
- e)/nq' *)agamemnoni/dhn kate/xei fusi/zoos ai)=a:
- to\n su\ komissa/menos *tege/hs e)pita/rroqos e)/ssh|.
-
h)=n de\ xalkei=on, kai\ dhloi= ta\s fu/sas, tu/pon de\ to\n a)/kmona/
- fhsi kai\ ta\s sfu/ras, ph=ma de\ e)pi\ ph/mati to\n si/dhron e)pi\ sidh/rw|:
- ph=ma ga\r ei)/rhtai dia\ to\ e)pi\ kakw=| tw=n a)nqrw/pwn eu(rh=sqai.
- krei=tton
- ga\r ei)=nai teleuta=n h)\ zw=ntas e(autou\s meta\ tw=n suggenw=n e)fora=n
- a)/cia qana/tou pra/ttontas. o(/ti kanhforou/shs pote\
- th=s qugatro\s *peisistra/tou, kai\ dokou/shs tw=| ka/llei diafe/rein,
- proselqw/n tis tw=n neani/skwn katapefronhkw\s e)fi/lhse th\n parqe/non.
- a)kou/santes de\ oi( th=s ko/rhs a)delfoi\ bare/ws h)/negkan th\n u(/brin, kai\
- to\n neani/skon a)gago/ntes pro\s to\n pate/ra di/khn h)ci/oun dido/nai: o( de\
- *peisi/stratos gela/sas, kai\ ti/ tou\s misou=ntas h(ma=s, e)/fh, poih/swmen,
- e)a\n tou\s filou=ntas timwri/ais periba/lwmen; o(/ti o( au)to\s diaporeuo/meno/s pote dia\
- th=s xw/ras kateno/hsen a)/nqrwpon kata\ to\n *(/umhtton e)rgazo/menon e)n
- xwri/ois leptoi=s kaq' u(perbolh\n kai\ traxe/si. qauma/sas de\ th\n filergi/an
- e)/pemye tou\s e)rwth/sontas, ti/ lamba/noi toiau/thn xw/ran e)rgazo/menos.
- w(=n poihsa/ntwn to\ prostaxqe/n, o(
- e)rga/ths e)/fhse lamba/nein e)k tou= xwri/ou kaka\s o)du/nas, a)ll' ou)qe\n
- au)tw=| me/lein: tou/twn ga\r to\ i me/ros
- *peisistra/tw| dido/nai. o( de\ duna/sths a)kou/sas to\n lo/gon kai\ gela/sas
- e)poi/hse to\ xwri/on a)tele/s, kai\ e)nteu=qen h( paroimi/a, kai\ sfa/keloi
- poiou=sin a)te/leian. Const. Exc. 4, pp. 291-293.
-
-
-
- Fragmenta libri X
-
-
- o(/ti
- *serou/ios *tu/llios *tarkuni/ou e)piqeme/nou paragenhqei\s ei)s to\
- bouleuth/rion, kai\ qeasa/menos th\n kaq' e(autou= paraskeuh/n, tosou=ton mo/non
- ei)=pe, ti/s h( to/lma, *tarku/nie; o( de\ u(polabw/n, h( me\n ou)=n sh/, fhsi/,
- ti/s, o(\s doule/kdoulos w)\n *(rwmai/wn basileu/ein e)to/lmhsas kai\ th=s tou=
- patro\s h(gemoni/as h(mi=n proshkou/shs para\ no/mous a)fei/lou th\n ou)de\ kaq'
- e(/na soi tro/pon e)piba/llousan a)rxh/n; tau=ta le/gwn a(/ma prose/drame kai\
- draca/menos th=s tou= *tulli/ou xeiro\s e)/rriyen au)to\n kata\ th=s krhpi=dos.
- kai\ dianasta\s kai\ xwleu/wn dia\ to\ ptw=ma e)pexei/rhse fugei=n, a)pekta/nqh
- de/.Const. Exc. 4, p. 293.
- o(/ti
- *serou/ios *tu/llios o( *(rwmai/wn basileu\s e)basi/leusen e)/th tettara/konta
- te/ttara, dia\ th=s i)di/as a)reth=s katwrqwkw\s ou)k o)li/ga tw=n koinw=n.
- o(/ti e)p' a)/rxontos *)aqh/nhsi *qhrikle/ous kata\ th\n
- e(chkosth\n prw/thn *)olumpia/da *puqago/ras o( filo/sofos e)gnwri/zeto,
- prokekofw\s h)/dh e)n paidei/a|: ge/gone ga\r i(stori/as a)/cios, ei) kai/ tis
- e(/teros tw=n peri\ paidei/an diatriya/ntwn. ge/gone de\ *sa/mios to\ ge/nos:
- oi( de/ fasin o(/ti *turrhno/s. tosau/th d'
- h)=n e)n toi=s au)tou= lo/gois peiqw\ kai\ xa/ris, w(s kai\ th=s po/lews sxedo\n
- o(/lhs e)p' au)to\n e)pistrefou/shs kaq' h(me/ran w(sperei\ pro/s tinos qeou=
- parousi/an a(/pantas suntre/xein e)pi\ th\n a)kro/asin. ou) mo/non de\ peri\ th\n e)n tw=| le/gein du/namin
- e)fai/neto me/gas, a)lla\ kai\ yuxh=s e)ne/fainen h)=qos katestalme/non kai\
- pro\s mi/mhsin bi/ou sw/fronos toi=s ne/ois qaumasto\n a)rxe/tupon, kai\ tou\s
- e)ntugxa/nontas a)pe/trepen a)po\ th=s polutelei/as kai\ trufh=s, a(pa/ntwn dia\
- th\n eu)pori/an a)ne/dhn e)kkexume/nwn ei)s a)/nesin kai\ diafqora\n a)gennh=
- tou= sw/matos kai\ th=s yuxh=s. o(/ti *puqago/ras puqo/menos *fereku/dhn to\n
- e)pista/thn au)tou= gegenhme/non e)n *dh/lw| nosei=n kai\ tele/ws e)sxa/tws
- e)/xein, e)/pleusen e)k th=s *)itali/as ei)s th\n *dh=lon. e)kei= de\ xro/non
- i(kano\n to\n a)/ndra ghrotrofh/sas, pa=san ei)shne/gkato spoudh\n w(/ste to\n
- presbu/thn e)k th=s no/sou diasw=sai. katisxuqe/ntos de\ tou= *fereku/dou dia\
- gh=ras kai\ dia\ to\ me/geqos th=s no/sou, perie/steilen au)to\n khdemonikw=s,
- kai\ tw=n nomizome/nwn a)ciw/sas w(sanei/ tis ui(o\s pate/ra pa/lin e)panh=lqen
- ei)s th\n *)itali/an. o(/ti e)peida/n tines tw=n sunh/qwn e)k th=s ou)si/as
- e)kpe/soien, dih|rou=nto ta\ xrh/mata au)tw=n w(s pro\s a)delfou/s. ou) mo/non
- de\ pro\s tou\s kaq' h(me/ran sumbiou=ntas tw=n gnwri/mwn toiau/thn ei)=xon th\n
- dia/qesin, a)lla\ kaqo/lou pro\s pa/ntas tou\s tw=n pragma/twn tou/twn
- metasxo/ntas. o(/ti *kleini/as, *taranti=nos to\ ge/nos,
- ei(=s de\ tw=n e)k tou= proeirhme/nou susth/matos w)/n, puqo/menos *prw=ron to\n
- *kurhnai=on dia/ tina politikh\n peri/stasin a)polwleko/ta th\n ou)si/an kai\
- tele/ws a)porou/menon, e)cedh/mhsen e)k th=s *)itali/as ei)s *kurh/nhn meta\
- xrhma/twn i(kanw=n, kai\ th\n ou)si/an a)pokate/sthse tw=| proeirhme/nw|,
- ou)de/pote tou=ton e(wrakw/s, a)kou/wn de\ mo/non o(/ti *puqago/reios h)=n.
- kai\ a)/lloi de\ polloi\ to\ paraplh/sion
- pepoihko/tes diamnhmoneu/ontai. ou) mo/non de\ e)n th=| tw=n xrhma/twn
- e)pido/sei toiou/tous au(tou\s parei/xonto toi=s gnwri/mois, a)lla\ kai\ kata\
- tou\s e)pisfalesta/tous kairou\s sunekindu/neuon. kai\ ga\r *dionusi/ou turannou=ntos *finti/as tis
- *puqago/reios e)pibebouleukw\s tw=| tura/nnw|, me/llwn de\ th=s timwri/as
- tugxa/nein, h)|th/sato para\ tou= *dionusi/ou xro/non ei)s to\ peri\ tw=n
- i)di/wn pro/teron a(\ bou/letai dioikh=sai: dw/sein d' e)/fhsen e)gguhth\n tou=
- qana/tou tw=n fi/lwn e(/na. tou= de\ duna/stou
- qauma/santos, ei) toiou=to/s e)sti fi/los o(\s e(auto\n ei)s th\n ei(rkth\n
- a)nt' e)kei/nou paradw/sei, prosekale/sato/ tina tw=n gnwri/mwn o( *finti/as,
- *da/mwna o)/noma, *puqago/reion filo/sofon, o(\s ou)de\ dista/sas e)/gguos
- eu)qu\s e)genh/qh tou= qana/tou. tine\s me\n
- ou)=n e)ph/|noun th\n u(perbolh\n th=s pro\s tou\s fi/lous eu)noi/as, tine\s de\
- tou= e)ggu/ou prope/teian kai\ mani/an kategi/nwskon. pro\s de\ th\n tetagme/nhn
- w(/ran a(/pas o( dh=mos sune/dramen, karadokw=n ei) fula/cei th\n pi/stin o(
- katasth/sas. h)/dh de\ th=s w(/ras
- sugkleiou/shs pa/ntes me\n a)pegi/nwskon, o( de\ *finti/as a)nelpi/stws e)pi\
- th=s e)sxa/ths tou= xro/nou r(oph=s dromai=os h)=lqe, tou= *da/mwnos
- a)pagome/nou pro\s th\n a)na/gkhn. qaumasth=s de\ th=s fili/as fanei/shs
- a(/pasin, a)pe/lusen o( *dionu/sios th=s timwri/as to\n e)gkalou/menon, kai\
- pareka/lese tou\s a)/ndras tri/ton e(auto\n ei)s th\n fili/an proslabe/sqai.
- o(/ti oi( *puqago/reioi kai\ th=s mnh/mhs megi/sthn
- gumnasi/an e)poiou=nto, toiou=to/n tina tro/pon th=s mele/ths u(posthsa/menoi.
- ou) pro/teron e)k th=s eu)nh=s h)gei/ronto, pri\n a)\n pro\s e(autou\s
- a)nqwmologh/santo ta\ kata\ th\n prote/ran h(me/ran au)toi=s praxqe/nta, th\n
- a)rxh\n a)po\ th=s prwi/as, th\n de\ teleuth\n e(/ws e(spe/ras poiou/menoi. ei)
- d' a)nastrofh\n e)/xoien kai\ plei/ona sxolh\n a)/goien, kai\ ta\ tri/th| kai\
- teta/rth| kai\ tai=s e)/ti pro/teron h(me/rais praxqe/nta prosanela/mbanon.
- tou=to pro\s e)pisth/mhn kai\ fro/nhsin e)peth/deuon pa/ntwn e)mpeiri/an te tou=
- du/nasqai polla\ mnhmoneu/ein. o(/ti e)poiou=nto kai\ th=s e)gkratei/as gumnasi/an
- to/nde to\n tro/pon. paraskeuasa/menoi pa/nta ta\ kata\ ta\s lamprota/tas
- e(stia/seis paratiqe/mena polu\n au)toi=s e)ne/blepon xro/non: ei)=ta dia\ th=s
- qe/as ta\s th=s fu/sews e)piqumi/as pro\s th\n a)po/lausin e)kkalesa/menoi ta\s
- trape/zas e)ke/leuon ai)/rein tou\s pai=das, kai\ paraxrh=ma a)/geustoi tw=n
- parateqe/ntwn e)xwri/zonto.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp. 220-223.
- o(/ti o(
- *puqago/ras metemyu/xwsin e)do/caze kai\ kreofagi/an w(s a)potro/paion h(gei=to,
- pa/ntwn tw=n zw/|wn ta\s yuxa\s meta\ qa/naton ei)s e(/tera zw=|a le/gwn
- ei)se/rxesqai. kai\ au)to\s de\ e(auto\n e)/fasken e)pi\ tw=n *trwikw=n xro/nwn
- memnh=sqai gegenhme/non *eu)/forbon to\n *pa/nqou me\n ui(o/n, a)naireqe/nta de\
- u(po\ *menela/ou. o(/ti fasi\n au)to\n e)n *)/argei pote\ parepidhmh/santa kai\ qeasa/menon tw=n
- *trwikw=n sku/lwn a)spi/da proshlwme/nhn dakru/ein. e)rwthqe/nta de\ u(po\ tw=n
- *)argei/wn th\n tou= pa/qous ai)ti/an ei)pei=n, o(/ti th\n a)spi/da tau/thn
- ei)=xen au)to\s e)n *troi/a| gegonw\s *eu)/forbos. a)pi/stws de\ diakeime/nwn kai\ mani/an au)tou=
- kataginwsko/ntwn, shmei=on e)rei=n e)/fhsen a)lhqe\s tou= tau=q' ou(/tws
- e)/xein: e)k tou= ga\r e)nto\s me/rous e)pigegra/fqai th\n a)spi/da gra/mmasin
- a)rxai/ois *e*u*f*o*r*b*o*u. pa/ntwn de\ dia\ to\ para/docon ei)po/ntwn
- kaqelei=n au)th\n, e)nto\s sune/bh th\n e)pigrafh\n eu(reqh=nai. o(/ti *kalli/maxos
- ei)=pe peri\ *puqago/rou, dio/ti tw=n e)n gewmetri/a| problhma/twn ta\ me\n
- eu(=re, ta\ de\ e)k th=s *ai)gu/ptou prw=tos ei)s tou\s *(/ellhnas h)/negken,
- e)n oi(=s le/gei o(/ti
- e)ceu=re *fru\c *eu)/forbos, o(/stis a)nqrw/pois
- tri/gwna/ te skalhna\ kai\ ku/klwn e(pta\
- mh/kh di/dace nhsteu/ein
- tw=n e)mpneo/ntwn: oi( ta/d' ou)d' u(ph/kousan
- pa/ntes.
-
Call. Iambi 124ff.
- o(/ti pareka/lei th\n lito/thta zhlou=n: th\n ga\r
- polute/leian a(/ma ta/s te ou)si/as tw=n a)nqrw/pwn diafqei/rein kai\ ta\
- sw/mata. tw=n ga\r no/swn tw=n plei/stwn e)c w)mo/thtos ginome/nwn, au)th\n
- tau/thn e)k th=s polutelei/as gi/nesqai. pollou\s de\ e)/peiqen a)pu/rois siti/ois xrh=sqai kai\ u(droposi/ais pa/nta
- to\n bi/on e(/neken tou= ta)gaqa\ qhra=sqai ta\ kata\ a)lh/qeian. tw=n de\ kaq'
- h(ma=s ei)/ tis u(pagoreu/seien h)\ e(no\s h)\ duei=n a)pe/xesqai tw=n h(de/wn
- ei)=nai dokou/ntwn e)p' o)li/gas h(me/ras, a)pei/paint' a)\n th\n filosofi/an,
- fh/santes eu)/hqes u(pa/rxein ta)fane\s a)gaqo\n zhtei=n a)fe/nta to\ fanero/n.
- ka)\n me\n de/h| dhmokopei=n h)\
- polupragmonei=n peri\ tw=n a)llotri/wn, sxola/zousi kai\ u(p' ou)deno\s
- e)mpodi/zontai: e)a\n de\ gi/nesqai de/h| peri\ paidei/an kai\ th\n tw=n h)qw=n
- e)piskeuh/n, a)kairei=n fasin, w(/ste a)sxolei=sqai me\n eu)sxolou=ntas, sxolh\n
- d' a)/gein ou) sxola/zontas. o(/ti fasi\ to\n *taranti=non *)arxu/tan to\n o)/nta
- *puqago/reion e)pi\ mega/lois a)dikh/masin oi)ke/tais o)rgisqh=nai, kai\
- katecanasta/nta tou= pa/qous ei)pei=n, w(s ou)k a)\n e)genh/qhsan a)qw=|oi
- thlikau=ta a(marth/santes, ei) mh\ e)/tuxen o)rgizo/menos. o(/ti oi( *puqago/reioi megi/sthn e)poiou=nto pro/noian th=s
- pro\s tou\s fi/lous bebaio/thtos, th\n tw=n fi/lwn eu)/noian a)ciologw/taton
- a)gaqo\n ei)=nai tw=n e)n tw=| bi/w| dieilhfo/tes. o(/ti me/giston a)/n tis
- h(gh/saito kai\ ma/lista qauma/sai to\ ai)/tion th=s pro\s tou\s fi/lous
- eu)noi/as. ti/nes ga/r pote h)=san e)qismoi\ h)\ ti/s tro/pos e)pithdeuma/twn
- h)\ ti/s lo/gou deino/ths, di' h(=s e)neirga/zonto th\n toiau/thn dia/qesin
- toi=s a)fiknoume/nois ei)s th\n tou= bi/ou koinwni/an; tau=ta ga\r polloi\ me\n e)piqumh/santes gnw=nai tw=n
- e)/cwqen e)peba/lonto polupragmonei=n, ou)de/pote de\ ou)dei\s maqei=n
- h)dunh/qh. ai)/tion de\ tou= diathrei=sqai ta\s u(pe\r tou/twn u(poqh/kas to\
- tou\s *puqagorei/ous u(po/stasin e)/xein mhde\n toiou=to poiei=n e)/ggrafon,
- a)lla\ dia\ mnh/mhs e)/xein ta\ paraggello/mena. o(/ti o(
- *puqago/ras pro\s toi=s a)/llois parh/ggelle toi=s manqa/nousi spani/ws me\n
- o)mnu/nai, xrhsame/nous de\ toi=s o(/rkois pa/ntws e)mme/nein kai\ pro\s te/los
- a)/gein u(pe\r w(=n a)/n tis o)mo/sh| pragma/twn, ou)x o(moi/an a)po/fasin
- poiou/menos *lusa/ndrw| te tw=| *la/kwni kai\ *dhma/dh| tw=| *)aqhnai/w|, w(=n
- o( me\n a)pefai/neto tou\s me\n pai=das dei=n e)capata=n toi=s a)straga/lois,
- tou\s de\ a)/ndras toi=s o(/rkois, o( de\ diabebaiou/menos o(/ti dei= to\
- lusitele/staton w(/sper e)pi\ tw=n a)/llwn, ou(/tw kai\ e)pi\ tw=n o(/rkwn
- ai(rei=sqai: o(ra=n de\ to\n e)piorkh/santa paraxrh=ma tau=t' e)/xonta peri\
- w(=n w)/mose, to\n d' eu)orkh/santa fanerw=s to\ i)/dion a)pollu/nta. tou/twn
- ga\r e(ka/teros ou) kaqa/per *puqago/ras u(pesth/sato to\n o(/rkon ei)=nai
- pi/stews e)ne/xuron be/baion, a)ll' ai)sxrokerdei/as kai\ a)pa/ths de/lear.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 293-295.
- o(/ti *puqago/ras parh/ggelle toi=s
- manqa/nousi spani/ws me\n o)mnu/nai, xrhsame/nous de\ toi=s o(/rkois pa/ntws
- e)mme/nein. o(/ti o( au)to\s *puqago/ras kai\ peri\ tw=n a)frodisi/wn e)klogizo/menos to\
- sumfe/ron parh/ggelle kata\ me\n to\ qe/ros mh\ plhsia/zein gunaici/, kata\ de\
- to\n xeimw=na prosie/nai tetamieume/nws. kaqo/lou ga\r to\ ge/nos tw=n
- a)frodisi/wn u(pela/mbanen ei)=nai blabero/n, th\n de\ sune/xeian au)tw=n
- tele/ws a)sqenei/as kai\ o)le/qrou poihtikh\n e)no/mize.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 423.
- o(/ti *puqago/ran fasi\n u(po/ tinos
- e)rwthqe/nta po/te xrhste/on a)frodisi/ois ei)pei=n, o(/tan e(autou= qe/lh|s
- h(/ttwn gene/sqai. o(/ti oi( *puqago/reioi dih/|roun kai\ ta\s h(liki/as tw=n
- a)nqrw/pwn ei)s te/ssara me/rh, paido/s, ne/ou, neani/skou, ge/rontos, kai\
- tou/twn e(ka/sthn e)/fasan o(moi/an ei)=nai tai=s kata\ to\n e)niauto\n tw=n
- w(rw=n metabolai=s, to\ me\n e)/ar tw=| paidi\ dido/ntes, to\ de\ fqino/pwron
- tw=| a)ndri/, to\n de\ xeimw=na tw=| ge/ronti, to\ de\ qe/ros tw=| ne/w|.Const. Exc. 4, p. 295.
- o(/ti o( au)to\s *puqago/ras parh/ggelle
- pro\s tou\s qeou\s prosie/nai tou\s qu/ontas mh\ polutelei=s, a)lla\ lampra\s
- kai\ kaqara\s e)/xontas e)sqh=tas, o(moi/ws de\ mh\ mo/non to\ sw=ma kaqaro\n
- parexome/nous pa/shs a)di/kou pra/cews, a)lla\ kai\ th\n yuxh\n
- a(gneu/ousan.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 223.
- o(/ti o( au)to\s a)pefai/neto toi=s qeoi=s
- eu)/xesqai dei=n ta\ a)gaqa\ tou\s froni/mous u(pe\r tw=n a)fro/nwn: tou\s ga\r
- a)sune/tous a)gnoei=n, ti/ pote/ e)stin e)n tw=| bi/w| kata\ a)lh/qeian
- a)gaqo/n. o(/ti
- o( au)to\s e)/faske dei=n e)n tai=s eu)xai=s a(plw=s eu)/xesqai ta)gaqa/, kai\
- mh\ kata\ me/ros o)noma/zein, oi(=on e)cousi/an, ka/llos, plou=ton, ta)/lla ta\
- tou/tois o(/moia: polla/kis ga\r tou/twn e(/kaston tou\s kat' e)piqumi/an
- au)tw=n tuxo/ntas toi=s o(/lois a)natre/pein. kai\ tou=to gnoi/h a)/n tis
- e)pisth/sas toi=s e)n tai=s *eu)ripi/dou *foini/ssais sti/xois, e)n oi(=s oi(
- peri\ to\n *polunei/khn eu)/xontai toi=s qeoi=s, w(=n h( a)rxh\
- ble/yas e)s *)/argos,
-
e(/ws
- ei)s ste/rn' a)delfou= th=sd' a)p' w)le/nhs balei=n.
-
Eur. Phoen. 1364-1375ou(=toi ga\r dokou=ntes
- e(autoi=s eu)/xesqai ta\ ka/llista tai=s a)lhqei/ais katarw=ntai.Const. Exc. 4, p. 295.
- o(/ti o( au)to\s polla\ kai\ a)/lla
- dialego/menos pro\s bi/ou sw/fronos zh=lon kai\ pro\s a)ndrei/an te kai\
- karteri/an, e)/ti de\ ta\s a)/llas a)reta/s, i)/sa qeoi=s para\ toi=s
- *krotwnia/tais e)tima=to.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 223.
- o(/ti
- *puqago/ras filosofi/an, a)ll' ou) sofi/an e)ka/lei th\n i)di/an ai(/resin.
- katamemfo/menos ga\r tou\s pro\ au)tou= keklhme/nous e(pta\ sofou\s e)/legen,
- w(s sofo\s me\n ou)dei/s e)stin a)/nqrwpos w)\n kai\ polla/kis dia\ th\n
- a)sqe/neian th=s fu/sews ou)k i)sxu/wn pa/nta katorqou=n, o( de\ zhlw=n to\n
- tou= sofou= tro/pon te kai\ bi/on proshko/ntws a)\n filo/sofos o)noma/zoito.
- a)ll' o(/mws
- thlikau/ths prokoph=s genome/nhs peri/ te *puqago/ran au)to\n kai\ tou\s met'
- e)kei=non *puqagorei/ous, kai\ tosou/twn a)gaqw=n ai)/tioi geno/menoi tai=s
- po/lesin ou(=toi to\n pa/nta ta\ kala\ lumaino/menon xro/non ou) die/fugon:
- ou)de\n ga/r, oi)=mai, tw=n par' a)nqrw/pois kalw=n ou(/tw sune/sthken w(/ste
- mhdemi/an au)tw=| fqora/n te kai\ dia/lusin gennh=sai to\n polueth=
- xro/non.Const. Exc. 4, p. 296.
- o(/ti
- *krotwnia/ths tis *ku/lwn o)/noma, th=| ou)si/a| kai\ do/ch| prw=tos tw=n
- politw=n, e)pequ/mhse *puqago/reios gene/sqai. w)\n de\ xalepo\s kai\ bi/aios
- to\n tro/pon, e)/ti de\ stasiasth\s kai\ turanniko/s, a)pedokima/sqh.
- parocunqei\s ou)=n tw=| susth/mati tw=n *puqagorei/wn, e(tairei/an mega/lhn
- sunesth/sato, kai\ diete/lei pa/nta kai\ le/gwn kai\ pra/ttwn kat' au)tw=n.
- o(/ti
- *lu=sis o( *puqago/reios ei)s *qh/bas th=s *boiwti/as geno/menos dida/skalos
- *)epaminw/ndou, tou=ton me\n te/leion a)/ndra pro\s a)reth\n kate/sthse, kai\
- path\r au)tou= qeto\s e)ge/neto di' eu)/noian. o( de\ *)epaminw/ndas th=s te
- karteri/as kai\ lito/thtos kai\ tw=n a)/llwn a)retw=n e)k th=s *puqagorei/ou
- filosofi/as e)nau/smata labw/n, ou) mo/non *qhbai/wn, a)lla\ kai\ pa/ntwn tw=n
- kat' au)to\n e)prw/teuen. o(/ti de\ tw=n progegono/twn
- a)ndrw=n h( tw=n bi/wn a)nagrafh\ duskoli/an me\n pare/xetai toi=s gra/fousin,
- w)felei= d' ou) metri/ws to\n koino\n bi/on. meta\ parrhsi/as ga\r dhlou=sa ta\
- kalw=s te kai\ kakw=s; praxqe/nta tou\s me\n a)gaqou\s kosmei=, tou\s de\
- ponhrou\s tapeinoi=, dia\ tw=n oi)kei/wn e(ka/stois e)gkwmi/wn te kai\ yo/gwn.
- e)/sti d' o( me\n e)/painos, w(s a)/n tis ei)/poi, e)/paqlon a)reth=s
- a)da/panon, o( de\ yo/gos timwri/a faulo/thtos a)/neu plhgh=s. kalo\n de\ toi=s metageneste/rois u(pokei=sqai, dio/ti bi/on
- oi(=on a)/n tis e(/lhtai zw=n, toiau/ths a)ciwqh/setai meta\ to\n qa/naton
- mnh/mhs, i(/na mh\ peri\ ta\s tw=n liqi/nwn mnhmei/wn kataskeua\s spouda/zwsin,
- a(\ kai\ to/pon e(/na kate/xei kai\ fqora=s o)cei/as tugxa/nei, a)lla\ peri\
- lo/gon kai\ ta\s a)/llas a)reta/s, ai(\ pa/nth| foitw=si dia\ th=s fh/mhs. o(
- de\ xro/nos o( pa/nta marai/nwn ta)/lla tau/tas a)qana/tous fula/ttei, kai\
- presbu/teros geno/menos au)to\s tau/tas poiei= newte/ras. dh=lon de\ e)pi\ tou/twn tw=n a)ndrw=n e)ge/neto to\
- proeirhme/non: pa/lai ga\r gegono/tes w(/sper nu=n o)/ntes u(po\ pa/ntwn
- mnhmoneu/ontai.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp. 223-224.
- o(/ti
- *ku=ros o( tw=n *persw=n basileu\s e)peidh\ tw=n *babulwni/wn kai\ tw=n *mh/dwn
- th\n xw/ran katepole/mhse, tai=s e)lpi/si pa=san periela/mbane th\n
- oi)koume/nhn. tw=n ga\r dunatw=n kai\ mega/lwn e)qnw=n katapepolemhme/nwn
- e)no/mize mhde/na mh/te basile/a mh/te dh=mon u(posth/sesqai th\n i)di/an
- du/namin: tw=n ga\r e)n e)cousi/ais a)nupeuqu/nois o)/ntwn ei)w/qasin e)/nioi
- th\n eu)tuxi/an mh\ fe/rein kat' a)/nqrwpon.Const. Exc. 4,
- p. 296.
- o(/ti o(
- *kambu/shs h)=n me\n fu/sei maniko\s kai\ parakekinhkw\s toi=s logismoi=s, polu\
- de\ ma=llon au)to\n w)mo\n kai\ u(perh/fanon e)poi/ei to\ th=s basilei/as
- me/geqos. o(/ti
- *kambu/shs o( *pe/rshs meta\ th\n a(/lwsin *me/mfews kai\ *phlousi/ou th\n
- eu)tuxi/an ou) fe/rwn a)nqrwpi/nws, to\n *)ama/sios tou= pro/teron
- bebasileuko/tos ta/fon a)ne/skayen. eu(rw\n de\ e)n th=| qh/kh| to\n nekro\n
- tetarixeume/non, to/ te sw=ma tou= teteleuthko/tos h)|ki/sato kai\ pa=san
- u(/brin ei)s to\n ou)k ai)sqano/menon ei)senegka/menos teleutai=on prose/tace
- katakau=sai to\n nekro/n. ou)k ei)wqo/twn ga\r puri\ paradido/nai tw=n
- e)gxwri/wn ta\ sw/mata tw=n teteleuthko/twn, u(pela/mbane kai\ dia\ tou/tou tou=
- tro/pou plhmmelh/sein to\n pa/lai proteteleuthko/ta. o(/ti *kambu/shs me/llwn
- strateu/ein e)p' *ai)qiopi/an e)/pemye me/ros th=s duna/mews e)p' *)ammwni/ous,
- prosta/cas toi=s h(gemo/si to\ mantei=on sulh/santas e)mprh=sai, tou/s te
- perioikou=ntas to\ i(ero\n a(/pantas e)candrapodi/sasqai.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp. 224-225.
- o(/ti
- *kambu/sou tou= *persw=n basile/ws kurieu/santos pa/shs *ai)gu/ptou, pro\s
- tou=ton oi( *li/bues kai\ *kurhnai=oi, sunestrateuko/tes toi=s *ai)gupti/ois,
- a)pe/steilan dw=ra, kai\ to\ prostatto/menon poih/sein e)phggei/lanto.Const. Exc. 1, p. 397.
- o(/ti o(
- *polukra/ths o( tw=n *sami/wn tu/rannos ei)s tou\s e)pikairota/tous to/pous
- a)poste/llwn trih/reis e)lh/|steuen a(/pantas tou\s ple/ontas, a)pedi/dou de\
- mo/nois toi=s summa/xois ta\ lhfqe/nta. pro\s de\ tou\s memfome/nous tw=n
- sunh/qwn e)/legen, w(s pa/ntes oi( fi/loi plei/ona xa/rin e(/cousin
- a)polabo/ntes a(/per a)pe/balon h)/per a)rxh\n mhde\n a)pobalo/ntes. o(/ti tai=s a)di/kois
- pra/cesin w(s e)pi/pan a)kolouqei= tis ne/mesis oi)kei/ous timwri/as toi=s
- a(marta/nousin e)pife/rousa. o(/ti pa=sa xa/ris a)metame/lhtos ou)=sa kalo\n e)/xei karpo\n
- to\n para\ to\n tw=n eu)ergetoume/nwn e)/painon: kai\ ga\r a)\n mh\ pa/ntes,
- ei(=s ge/ tis tw=n eu)= peponqo/twn e)ni/ote th\n u(pe\r a(pa/ntwn a)pe/dwke
- xa/rin.Const. Exc. 4, p. 296.
- o(/ti *ludoi/ tines feu/gontes th\n
- *)oroi/tou tou= satra/pou dunastei/an kate/pleusan ei)s *sa/mon meta\ pollw=n
- xrhma/twn kai\ tou= *polukra/tous i(ke/tai e)gi/nonto. o( de\ to\ me\n prw=ton
- au)tou\s filofro/nws u(pede/cato, met' o)li/gon de\ pa/ntas a)posfa/cas tw=n
- xrhma/twn e)gkrath\s e)ge/neto. o(/ti *qettalo\s o(
- *peisistra/tou ui(o\s sofo\s u(pa/rxwn a)pei/pato th\n turanni/da, kai\ th\n
- i)so/thta zhlw/sas mega/lhs a)podoxh=s h)ciou=to para\ toi=s poli/tais: oi( de\
- a)/lloi, *(/ipparxos kai\ *(ippi/as, bi/aioi kai\ xalepoi\ kaqestw=tes
- e)tura/nnoun th=s po/lews. polla\ de\ paranomou=ntes ei)s tou\s *)aqhnai/ous,
- kai/ tinos meiraki/ou diafo/rou th\n o)/yin *(/ipparxos e)rasqei/s, dia\ tou=to
- e)kindu/neusen h( me\n ou)=n e)pi\ tou\s
- tura/nnous e)pi/qesis kai\ h( pro\s th\n th=s patri/dos e)leuqeri/an spoudh\
- koinh\ tw=n proeirhme/nwn u(ph=rcen a)ndrw=n: h( de\ e)n tai=s basa/nois
- para/stasis th=s yuxh=s kai\ to\ karteriko\n th=s tw=n deinw=n u(pomonh=s peri\
- mo/non e)genh/qh to\n *)aristogei/tona,o(\s e)n toi=s foberwta/tois kairoi=s
- du/o me/gista dieth/rhse, th/n te pro\s tou\s fi/lous pi/stin kai\ th\n pro\s
- tou\s e)xqrou\s timwri/an.Const. Exc. 2 (1), p. 225.
- o(/ti o( *)aristogei/twn pa=sin e)poi/hse
- fanero\n w(s h( th=s yuxh=s eu)ge/neia katisxu/ei ta\s megi/stas tou= sw/matos
- a)lghdo/nas. o(/ti *zh/nwnos tou= filoso/fou dia\ th\n
- e)piboulh\n th\n kata\ tou= *nea/rxou tou= tura/nnou kata\ ta\s e)n tai=s
- basa/nois a)na/gkas e)rwtwme/nou u(po\ *nea/rxou ti/nes h)=san oi( suneido/tes,
- w)/felon ga/r, e)/fh, w(/sper th=s glw/tths ei)mi\ ku/rios, ou(/tw kai\ tou=
- sw/matos.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 296-297.
- o(/ti turannoume/nhs th=s patri/dos u(po\
- *nea/rxou sklhrw=s, e)piboulh\n kata\ tou= tura/nnou sunesth/sato. katafanh\s
- de\ geno/menos, kai\ kata\ ta\s e)n tai=s basa/nois a)na/gkas dierwtw/menos
- u(po\ tou= *nea/rxou ti/nes h)=san oi( suneido/tes, w)/felon ga/r, e)/fhsen,
- w(/sper th=s glw/tths ei)mi\ ku/rios, ou(/tws u(ph=rxon kai\ tou= sw/matos.
- tou= de\ tura/nnou polu\ ma=llon tai=s
- basa/nois prosepitei/nantos, o( *zh/nwn me/xri me/n tinos diekarte/rei: meta\
- de\ tau=ta speu/dwn a)poluqh=nai/ pote th=s a)na/gkhs kai\ a(/ma timwrh/sasqai
- to\n *ne/arxon, e)penoh/sato/ ti toiou=ton. kata\ th\n e)pitonwta/thn e)pi/tasin th=s basa/nou prospoihqei\s e)ndido/nai
- th\n yuxh\n tai=s a)lghdo/sin a)ne/kragen, a)/nete, e)rw= ga\r pa=san
- a)lh/qeian. w(s d' a)nh=kan, h)ci/wsen au)to\n a)kou=sai kat' i)di/an
- proselqo/nta: polla\ ga\r ei)=nai tw=n le/gesqai mello/ntwn a(\ sunoi/sei
- threi=n e)n a)porrh/tw|. tou= de\ tura/nnou
- proselqo/ntos a)sme/nws kai\ th\n a)koh\n tw=| sto/mati parabalo/ntos, o(
- *zh/nwn tou= duna/stou perixanw\n to\ ou)=s e)ne/prise toi=s o)dou=si. tw=n de\
- u(phretw=n taxu\ prosdramo/ntwn, kai\ pa=san tw=| basanizome/nw| prosfero/ntwn
- timwri/an ei)s to\ xala/sai to\ dh=gma, polu\ ma=llon prosenefu/eto. te/los d' ou) duna/menoi ta)ndro\s nikh=sai th\n
- eu)yuxi/an, pareke/nthsan au)to\n i(/na dii/h| tou\s o)do/ntas. kai\ toiou/tw|
- texnh/mati tw=n a)lghdo/nwn a)pelu/qh kai\ para\ tou= tura/nnou th\n
- e)ndexome/nhn e)/labe timwri/an.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp.
- 225-226.pollai=s u(/steron geneai=s *dwrieu\s o(
- *lakedaimo/nios katanth/sas ei)s th\n *sikeli/an kai\ th\n xw/ran a)polabw\n
- e)/ktise po/lin *(hra/kleian. taxu\ d' au)th=s au)come/nhs, oi( *karxhdo/nioi
- fqonh/santes a(/ma kai\ fobhqe/ntes mh/pote ple/on i)sxu/sasa th=s *karxhdo/nos
- a)fe/lhtai tw=n *foini/kwn th\n h(gemoni/an, strateu/santes e)p' au)th\n
- mega/lais duna/mesi kai\ kata\ kra/tos e(lo/ntes kate/skayan. a)lla\ peri\ me\n
- tou/twn ta\ kata\ me/ros e)n toi=s oi)kei/ois xro/nois
- a)nagra/yomen.
Diod. 4.23.3.
- o(/ti
- toi=s e)pi/ tinwn pragma/twn diorizome/nois w(s ou)k a)/n pote praxqhsome/nwn
- e)/oiken e)pakolouqei=n w(sanei/ tis ne/mesis e)le/gxousa th\n a)nqrwpi/nhn
- a)sqe/neian. o(/ti *megabu/zou tou= kai\ *zwpu/rou, fi/lou o)/ntos *darei/ou tou=
- basile/ws, mastigw/santos d' e(auto\n kai\ ta\ peri\ to\ pro/swpon a)krwth/ria
- a)poko/yantos dia\ to\ au)to/molon gene/sqai kai\ *babulw=na prodou=nai
- *pe/rsais, fasi\ bare/ws fe/rein to\n *darei=on kai\ ei)pei=n bou/lesqai to\n
- *mega/buzon, ei) dunato\n h)=n, a)/rtion geno/menon h)\ de/ka *babulw=nas
- labei=n u(po\ th\n e)cousi/an, kai/per a)pra/ktou th=s e)piqumi/as ou)/shs.
- o(/ti oi(
- *babulw/nioi strathgo\n ei(/lanto *mega/buzon, a)gnoou=ntes o(/ti th\n
- eu)ergesi/an th=s mellou/shs a)kolouqei=n a)pwlei/as oi(onei\ de/lear au)toi=s
- proqh/sei. o(/ti
- to\ a)pote/lesma tw=n e)piteugma/twn i(kano/n e)sti martu/rion tw=n
- prorrhqe/ntwn. o(/ti to\ *darei=os th=s *)asi/as sxedo\n o(/lhs kurieu/sas th\n *eu)rw/phn
- e)pequ/mei katastre/yasqai. ta\s ga\r tou= plei/onos e)piqumi/as a)plh/stous
- e)/xwn kai\ tw=| mege/qei th=s *persikh=s duna/mews pepoiqw/s, periela/mbane
- th\n oi)koume/nhn, ai)sxro\n ei)=nai nomi/zwn tou\s pro\ au)tou= bebasileuko/tas
- katadeeste/ras a)forma\s kthsame/nous ta\ me/gista tw=n e)qnw=n
- katapepolemhke/nai, au)to\n de\ thlikau/tas e)/xonta duna/meis h(li/kas ou)dei\s
- tw=n pro\ au)tou= e)/sxe mhdemi/an a)cio/logon pra=cin kateirga/sqai. o(/ti oi( *turrhnoi\
- dia\ to\n tw=n *persw=n fo/bon e)klipo/ntes th\n *lh=mnon e)/faskon w(s dia/
- tinas xrhsmou\s tou=to poiei=n, kai\ tau/thn tw=| *miltia/dh| pare/dwkan. tau=ta
- de\ pra/cantos *(/ermwnos tou= proesthko/tos tw=n *turrhnw=n, sune/bh ta\s
- toiau/tas xa/ritas a)p' e)kei/nwn tw=n xro/nwn *(ermwnei/ous
- prosagoreuqh=nai.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 297-298.
- o(/ti
- *leuki/ou *tarkuini/ou tou= *(rwmai/wn basile/ws o( ui(o\s *se/ctos e)cedh/mhsen
- ei)s po/lin *kollati/an kaloume/nhn, kai\ kate/luse pro\s *leu/kion *tarkui/nion
- a)neyio\n tou= basile/ws, e)/xonta gunai=ka *loukrhti/an, h(/tis h)=n eu)preph\s
- me\n th\n o)/yin, sw/frwn de\ to\n tro/pon. e)pi\ stratope/dou ga\r o)/ntos
- ta)ndro/s, o( ce/nos nukto\s e)gerqei\s e)k tou= koitw=nos w(/rmhsen e)pi\ th\n
- gunai=ka koimwme/nhn e)n tw=| qala/mw|. e)pista\s de\ tai=s qu/rais a)/fnw kai\ spasa/menos to\ ci/fos,
- paraskeua/sasqai me\n e)/fhsen oi)ke/thn e)pith/deion ei)s a)nai/resin,
- sugkatasfa/cein de\ ka)kei/nhn, w(s e)pi\ moixei/a| kateilhmme/nhn kai\
- teteuxui=an th=s proshkou/shs timwri/as u(po\ tou= suggenesta/tou tw=|
- sunoikou=nti. dio/per ai(retw/teron u(pa/rxein u(pourgh=sai tai=s e)piqumi/ais
- au)tou= siwpw=san: lh/yesqai de\ e)/paqlon th=s xa/ritos dwrea/s te mega/las
- kai\ th\n met' au)tou= sumbi/wsin kai\ genh/sesqai basi/lissan, i)diwtikh=s
- e(sti/as e)chllagme/nhn h(gemoni/an. h( de\
- *loukrhti/a dia\ to\ para/docon e)kplagh\s genome/nh, kai\ fobhqei=sa mh/pote
- tai=s a)lhqei/ais do/ch| dia\ th\n moixei/an a)nh|rh=sqai,to/te me\n h(suxi/an
- e)/sxen: h(me/ras de\ genome/nhs o( *se/ctos e)xwri/sqh: h( de\ e)ka/lese tou\s
- oi)kei/ous, kai\ h)ci/ou mh\ periidei=n a)timw/rhton to\n a)sebh/santa ei)s
- ceni/an a(/ma kai\ sugge/neian. e(auth=| de\ fh/sasa mh\ prosh/kein e)fora=n
- to\n h(/lion thlikau/ths u(/brews pepeirame/nhn, cifidi/w| pata/casa to\ sth=qos
- e(auth=s e)teleu/thsen.Const. Exc. 2 (1), pp. 226-227.
- o(/ti
- th=s *loukrhti/as moixeuqei/shs para\ *se/ctou kai\ e(auth\n a)nelou/shs dia\
- to\ a(ma/rthma, ou)k a)/cion h(gou/meqa to\ gennai=on th=s proaire/sews
- paralipei=n a)nepish/manton. th\n ga\r e)pidou=san e(kousi/ws to\ zh=n toi=s
- metageneste/rois ei)s kalo\n zh=lon proshko/ntws a)\n eu)fhmi/as a)cioi=men
- a)qana/tou, o(/pws ai( th\n tou= sw/matos a(gnei/an kata\ pa=n a)nepi/lhpton
- pare/xesqai proairou/menai pro\s e)piteteugme/non a)rxe/tupon paraba/lwntai.
- ai( me\n ou)=n a)/llai gunai=kes ka)\n
- fanerw=s ti tw=n toiou/twn pra/cwsi, katakru/ptousi to\ suntelesqe/n,
- eu)labou/menai th\n u(pe\r tw=n a(marthma/twn timwri/an: h( de\ to\ la/qra|
- praxqe\n poih/sasa peribo/hton a)pe/sfacen e(auth/n, kai\ th\n tou= bi/ou
- teleuth\n kalli/sthn u(pe\r au)th=s a)pologi/an a)pe/lipe. kai\ tw=n a)/llwn e)pi\ tw=n a)kousi/wn th\n suggnw/mhn
- proballome/nwn, au(/th th\n meta\ bi/as u(/brin e)timh/sato qana/tou, i(/na mhd'
- ei)/ tis e)piqumh=| blasfhmei=n, th\n e)cousi/an e)/xh| kathgorei=n th=s
- proaire/sews w(s e(kousi/ou gegenhme/nhs. tw=n
- ga\r a)nqrw/pwn fu/sei ta\s loidori/as e)pai/nwn protimw/ntwn, th\n tw=n
- filaiti/wn a)pe/koye kathgori/an, ai)sxro\n ei)=nai nomi/zousa tw=n a)/llwn
- ei)pei=n tina dio/ti zw=ntos tou= kata\ no/mous sumbiou=ntos a)ndro\s e(te/rou
- parano/mws e)peira/qh, kai\ kaq' ou(= oi( no/moi toi=s pra/casi qa/naton
- tiqe/asi to\ pro/stimon, toiou=to paqou=sa to\n plei/w xro/non filoyuxei=n,
- i(/na to\n pa/ntws o)feilo/menon para\ th=s fu/sews qa/naton braxu\ prolabou=sa
- th=s ai)sxu/nhs a)lla/chtai tou\s megi/stous e)pai/nous. toigarou=n ou) mo/non qnhtou= bi/ou do/can a)qa/naton
- a)ntikathlla/cato dia\ th=s i)di/as a)reth=s, a)lla\ kai\ tou\s suggenei=s kai\
- pa/ntas tou\s poli/tas proetre/yato labei=n a)parai/thton timwri/an para\ tw=n
- ei)s au)th\n paranomhsa/ntwn. o(/ti *leu/kios *tarku/nios
- o( basileu\s turannikw=s kai\ biai/ws a)/rxwn tw=n politw=n tou\s eu)po/rous
- tw=n *(rwmai/wn a)nh/|rei, yeudei=s e)pife/rwn ai)ti/as e(/neken tou=
- nosfi/sasqai ta\s ou)si/as au)tw=n. dio/per *leu/kios *)iou/nios, o)rfano\s w)\n
- kai\ pa/ntwn *(rwmai/wn plousiw/tatos, di' a)mfo/tera th\n tou= *tarkuni/ou
- pleoneci/an u(pw/pteuen: a)delfidou=s d' w)\n au)tou= kai\ par' e(/kasta tw=|
- basilei= sunw/n, prosepoih/qh mwro\s ei)=nai, a(/ma me\n boulo/menos to\n u(pe\r
- tou= du/nasqai/ ti fqo/non e)kkli/nein, a(/ma d' a)nuponoh/tws parathrei=n to\
- pratto/menon kai\ toi=s th=s basilei/as e)fedreu/ein kairoi=s. o(/ti oi( *subari=tai meta\ tria/konta muria/dwn
- e)kstrateu/santes e)pi\ tou\s *krotwnia/tas kai\ po/lemon a)/dikon
- e)panelo/menoi toi=s o(/lois e)/ptaisan, kai\ th\n eu)daimoni/an ou)k
- e)negko/ntes e)pideci/ws i(kano\n para/deigma th\n i)di/an a)pw/leian kate/lipon
- tou= polu\ ma=llon dei=n prose/xein e)n tai=s i)di/ais eu)tuxi/ais h)/per e)n
- tai=s talaipwri/ais. o(/ti peri\ *(hrodo/tou
- fhsi\n o( *dio/dwros kai\ tau=ta parece/bhmen ou)x ou(/tws
- *(hrodo/tou kathgorh=sai boulhqe/ntes w(s u(podei=cai o(/ti tw=n lo/gwn oi(
- qauma/sioi tou\s a)lhqei=s katisxu/ein ei)w/qasin.
. o(/ti prosh=ko/n e)sti
- tima=sqai th\n a)reth/n, ka)\n h)=| para\ gunaici/n. o(/ti *)aqhnai=oi deciw=s
- th=| ni/kh| xrhsa/menoi kai\ nikh/santes *boiwtou/s te kai\ *xalkidei=s, eu)qu\s
- a)po\ th=s ma/xhs *xalki/dos e)kuri/eusan. e)k th=s w)felei/as th=s tw=n
- *boiwtw=n deka/thn a(/rma xalkou=n ei)s th\n a)kro/polin a)ne/qesan to/de to\
- e)legei=on gra/yantes,
- e)/qnea *boiwtw=n kai\ *xalkide/wn dama/santes
- pai=des *)aqhnai/wn e)/rgmasin e)n pole/mou
- desmw=| e)n a)xluo/enti sidhre/w| e)/sbesan u(/brin:
- w(=n i(/ppous deka/thn *palla/di ta/sd' e)/qesan.
-
- o(/ti to\ katakai/ein ta\ i(era\ para\ *(ellh/nwn
- e)/maqon *pe/rsai, th\n au)th\n toi=s proadikh/sasin a)podido/ntes u(/brin.
- o(/ti
- *ka=res u(po\ *persw=n kataponou/menoi e)phrw/thsan peri\ summaxi/as ei)
- prosla/bointo *milhsi/ous summa/xous. o( de\ a)nei=len,
- pa/lai pot' h)=san a)/lkimoi *milh/sioi.
-
- ou) mh\n a)ll'
- o( fo/bos e)ggu\s kei/menos e)poi/hsen au)tou\s e)pilaqe/sqai th=s pro\s
- a)llh/lous filotimi/as, pro\s de\ to\ plhrou=n ta\s trih/reis kata\ ta/xos
- sunhna/gkazen. o(/ti *(ekatai=os o( *milh/sios presbeuth\s a)pestalme/nos u(po\ tw=n
- *)iw/nwn, h)rw/thse di' h(\n ai)ti/an a)pistei= au)toi=s o( *)artafe/rnhs. tou=
- de\ ei)po/ntos, mh/pote u(pe\r w(=n katapolemhqe/ntes kakw=s e)/paqon
- mnhsikakh/swsin, ou)kou=n, e)/fhsen, ei) to\ peponqe/nai kakw=s th\n a)pisti/an
- peripoiei=, to\ paqei=n a)/ra eu)= poih/sei ta\s po/leis *pe/rsais eu)noou/sas.
- a)podeca/menos de\ to\ r(hqe\n o( *)artafe/rnhs a)pe/dwke tou\s no/mous tai=s
- po/lesi kai\ taktou\s fo/rous kata\ du/namin e)pe/tacen. o( ga\r toi=s polloi=s para\ tw=n politw=n fqo/nos to\n
- e)/mprosqen xro/non e)gkrupto/menos, e)peidh\ kairo\n e)/laben, a)/qrous
- e)cerra/gh. dia\ de\ th\n filotimi/an tou\s dou/lous h)leuqe/rwsan, ma=llon
- boulo/menoi toi=s oi)ke/tais metadou=nai th=s e)leuqeri/as h)\ toi=s
- e)leuqe/rois th=s politei/as. o(/ti *da=tis o( tw=n
- *persw=n strathgo/s, *mh=dos w)\n to\ ge/nos kai\ para\ tw=n progo/nwn
- pareilhfw\s o(/ti *mh/dou tou= susthsame/nou th\n *mhdi/an *)aqhnai=oi
- kaqesth/kasin a)po/gonoi, a)pe/steile pro\s tou\s *)aqhnai/ous dhlw=n w(s
- pa/resti meta\ duna/mews a)paith/swn th\n a)rxh\n th\n progonikh/n: *mh=don ga\r
- tw=n e(autou= progo/nwn presbu/taton geno/menon a)faireqh=nai th\n basilei/an
- u(po\ tw=n *)aqhnai/wn kai\ parageno/menon ei)s th\n *)asi/an kti/sai th\n
- *mhdi/an. a)\n me\n ou)=n au)tw=| th\n a)rxh\n
- a)podw=sin, a)feqh/sesqai th=s ai)ti/as tau/ths kai\ th=s e)pi\ *sa/rdeis
- stratei/as: a)\n de\ e)nantiwqw=si, polu\ deino/tera pei/sesqai tw=n
- *)eretrie/wn. o( de\ *miltia/dhs a)pekri/qh
- a)po\ th=s tw=n de/ka strathgw=n gnw/mhs, dio/ti kata\ to\n tw=n presbeutw=n
- lo/gon ma=llon prosh/kei th=s *mh/dwn a)rxh=s kurieu/ein *)aqhnai/ous h)\
- *da=tin th=s *)aqhnai/wn po/lews: th\n me\n ga\r tw=n *mh/dwn basilei/an
- *)aqhnai=on a)/ndra susth/sasqai, ta\s de\ *)aqh/nas mhde/pote *mh=don to\
- ge/nos a)/ndra katesxhke/nai. o( de\ pro\s ma/xhn a)kou/sas tau=ta
- pareskeua/zeto.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 298-301.
- o(/ti
- *(ippokra/ths o( *gelw=|os tu/rannos tou\s *surakousi/ous nenikhkw\s
- katestratope/deusen ei)s to\ tou= *dio\s i(ero/n. kate/labe de\ au)to\n to\n
- i(ere/a kai\ tw=n *surakousi/wn tina\s kaqairou=ntas a)naqh/mata xrusa=, kai\
- ma/lista i(ma/tion tou= *dio\s periairoume/nous e)k pollou= kateskeuasme/non
- xrusi/ou. kai\ tou/tois me\n e)piplh/cas w(s
- i(erosu/lois e)ke/leusen a)pelqei=n ei)s th\n po/lin, au)to\s de\ tw=n
- a)naqhma/twn a)pe/sxeto, filodoch=sai qe/lwn kai\ nomi/zwn dei=n to\n
- thlikou=ton e)panairou/menon po/lemon mhqe\n e)camarta/nein ei)s to\ qei=on,
- a(/ma de\ nomi/zwn diaba/llein tou\s proestw=tas tw=n e)n *surakou/sais
- pragma/twn pro\s ta\ plh/qh dia\ to\ dokei=n au)tou\s pleonektikw=s, a)ll' ou)
- dhmotikw=s ou)d' i)/sws a)/rxein. o(/ti *qh/rwn o( *)akraganti=nos ge/nei kai\ plou/tw|
- kai\ th=| pro\s to\ plh=qos filanqrwpi/a| polu\ proei=xen ou) mo/non tw=n
- politw=n, a)lla\ kai\ tw=n *sikeliwtw=n.Const. Exc. 2 (1),
- p. 227.
-
- *ge/lwna *surakou/sion kaq' u(/pnous de\ bow=nta,
- keraunoblh\s ga\r e)/docen o)nei/rois gegone/nai,
- o( ku/wn qorubou/menon a)me/trws gnou\s e)kei=non,
- kaqulaktw=n ou)k e)/lhcen, e(/ws e)gei/rei tou=ton.
- tou=ton e)ce/swse/ pote kai\ lu/kos e)k qana/tou.
- sxolh=| proskaqhme/nou ga\r e)/ti paidi/ou o)/ntos
- lu/kos e)lqw\n a)fh/rpace th\n de/lton th\n e)kei/nou.
- tou= de\ dramo/ntos pro\s au)to\n to\n lu/kon kai\ th\n de/lton,
- kataseisqei=sa h( sxolh\ baqro/qen katapi/ptei,
- kai\ su/mpantas a)pe/kteine pai=das su\n didaska/lw|.
- tw=n pai/dwn de\ to\n a)riqmo\n oi( suggrafei=s bow=si,
- *ti/maioi, *dionu/sioi, *dio/dwroi kai\ *di/wn,
- plei/w telou=nta e(kato/n. to\ d' a)kribe\s ou)k oi)=da.
-
Tzetzes, Hist. 4. 266-278.
- o(/ti
- tou= *miltia/dou ui(o\s o( *ki/mwn, teleuth/santos tou= patro\s au)tou= e)n th=|
- dhmosi/a| fulakh=| dia\ to\ mh\ i)sxu=sai e)kti=sai to\ o)/flhma, i(/na la/bh|
- to\ sw=ma tou= patro\s ei)s tafh/n, e(auto\n ei)s th\n fulakh\n pare/dwke kai\
- diede/cato to\ o)/flhma. o(/ti o( *ki/mwn filo/timos w)\n ei)s th\n tw=n koinw=n
- dioi/khsin, e)c u(ste/rou a)gaqo\s strathgo\s e)genh/qh, kai\ dia\ th=s i)di/as
- a)reth=s e)ndo/cous pra/ceis kateirga/sato.Const. Exc. 2
- (1), pp. 227-228.
-
- *ki/mwn ui(o\s kata/ tinas u(ph=rxe *miltia/dou,
- kata\ d' e(te/rous h)=n patro\s th\n klh=sin *sthsago/rou.
- e)c *)isodi/khs tou/tw| pai=s u(ph=rxen o( *kalli/as.
- o( *ki/mwn ou(=tos a)delfh\n i)di/an *)elpini/khn
- ei)=xen, w(s *ptolemai=os me\n u(/steron *bereni/khn,
- kai\ *zeu\s th\n *(/hran pro\ au)tw=n, kai\ nu=n *persw=n to\ ge/nos.
- *kalli/as de\ penth/konta ta/lanta zhmiou=tai,
- o(/pws o( *ki/mwn o( path\r mhde\n deino/n ti pa/qh|
- e(/neka ga/mwn tw=n ai)sxrw=n, th=s a)delfomici/as.
- to\ d' o(/soi tau=ta gra/fousi makro/n e)sti/ moi le/gein:
- e)/sti ga\r plh=qos a)/peiron tw=n tau=ta gegrafo/twn,
- oi( kwmikoi\ kai\ r(h/tores, *dio/dwros kai\ a)/lloi.
-
Tzetzes, Hist. 1. 582-593.
- o(/ti
- *qemistoklh=s o( tou= *neokle/ous, proselqo/ntos tino\s au)tw=| plousi/ou kai\
- zhtou=ntos khdesth\n eu(rei=n plou/sion, parekeleu/sato au)tw=| zhtei=n mh\
- xrh/mata a)ndro\s deo/mena, polu\ de\ ma=llon a)/ndra xrhma/twn e)ndea=.
- a)podecame/nou de\ ta)nqrw/pou to\ r(hqe\n sunebou/leusen au)tw=| sunoiki/sai
- th\n qugate/ra tw=| *ki/mwni. dio/per e)k tau/ths th=s ai)ti/as o( *ki/mwn
- eu)porh/sas xrhma/twn a)pelu/qh th=s fulakh=s, kai\ tou\s kataklei/santas
- a)/rxontas eu)qu/nas katadi/kous e)/laben.Const. Exc. 4, p.
- 301.h( me\n ou)=n pro\ tau/ths bi/blos, th=s o(/lhs
- sunta/cews ou)=sa deka/th, to\ te/los e)/sxe tw=n pra/cewn ei)s to\n
- prohgou/menon e)niauto\n th=s *ce/rcou diaba/sews ei)s th\n *eu)rw/phn kai\ ei)s
- ta\s genome/nas dhmhgori/as e)n th=| koinh=| suno/dw| tw=n *(ellh/nwn e)n
- *kori/nqw| peri\ th=s *ge/lwnos summaxi/as toi=s *(/ellhsin.
Diod. Sic. 11.1.1
- o(/ti
- tw=n *(ellh/nwn pa/ntwn diapresbeusame/nwn pro\s *ge/lwna peri\ summaxi/as,
- o(/te *ce/rchs die/baine ei)s th\n *eu)rw/phn, tou= de\ e)paggeilame/nou
- summaxh=sai kai\ sitarkh=sai, ei)/ ge th\n h(gemoni/an ei)/te th\n kata\ gh=n
- ei)/te th\n kata\ qa/lattan pare/cousin, h( me\n u(pe\r th=s h(gemoni/as
- filodoci/a th\n summaxi/an parekrou/eto, to\ de\ me/geqos th=s bohqei/as kai\ o(
- tw=n polemi/wn fo/bos proe/trepe metadou=nai th=s do/chs tw=| *ge/lwni.
- h( me\n ga\r tw=n *persw=n u(peroxh\ pro\s
- to\ krath=sai th=s e)piqumi/as e)/xei ta\s dwrea/s, h( de\ turannikh\ pleoneci/a
- kai\ ta\ mikra\ tw=n lhmma/twn ou) pari/hsin. bebaiota/th ga\r th=s swthri/as fu/lac h(
- a)pisti/a. pai=des me\n ou)=n a)dikou/menoi pro\s pate/ras katafeu/gousi, po/leis de\
- pro\s tou\s a)poiki/santas dh/mous. o(/ti tura/nnou pleoneci/a toi=s me\n u(pa/rxousin ou)k
- a)rkei=tai, tw=n de\ a)llotri/wn e)piqumei=, plhrou=tai de\ ou)de/pote.
- tou\s de\
- kata\ th=s dunastei/as au)tou= pefuko/tas e)/xwn kairo\n ou)k e)a/sei du/namin
- labei=n. e)kei/nwn ga\r tw=n a)ndrw=n e)ste a)po/gonoi oi(\ ta\s au(tw=n a)reta\s meta\
- to\n qa/naton a)qana/tous th=| do/ch| kataleloi/pasi. to\ ga\r e)/paqlon th=s
- summaxi/as ou)k a)rgu/rion ai)tei=, ou(= polla/kis i)dei=n e)/sti katafronou=nta
- kai\ to\n faulo/taton i)diw/thn peplouthko/ta, a)ll' e)/painon kai\ do/can,
- peri\ h(=s oi( a)gaqoi\ tw=n a)nqrw/pwn ou)k o)knou=sin a)poqnh/skein: misqo\s
- ga/r e)stin h( do/ca mei/zwn a)rguri/ou. paralamba/nousi ga\r oi( *spartia=tai para\
- tw=n pate/rwn ou)x w(/sper oi( loipoi\ plou=ton, a)lla\ proqu/mws teleuta=n
- peri\ th=s e)leuqeri/as, w(/ste pa/nta ta\ kata\ to\n bi/on a)gaqa\ deu/tera
- ti/qesqai th=s do/chs. mh\ tw=n cenikw=n duna/mewn e)piqumou=ntes ta\s politika\s
- a)poba/llwmen kai\ tw=n a)dh/lwn o)rego/menoi tw=n fanerw=n mh\ kurieu/wmen.
- ou)/ fhmi
- katapeplh=xqai to\ me/geqos th=s tw=n *persw=n stratei/as: a)reth=| ga\r o(
- po/lemos, ou) plh/qei brabeu/etai. pareilh/fasi ga\r u(po\ tw=n pate/rwn zh=n me\n
- e(autoi=s, teleuta=n d' o(/tan xrei/a tai=s patri/sin e)ph=|. ti/ fobhqw=men to\n xruso\n
- w(=| kekosmhme/noi badi/zousin ei)s ta\s ma/xas w(s gunai=kes ei)s tou\s
- ga/mous, w(/ste th\n ni/khn mh\ mo/non e)/paqlon e)/xein do/can, a)lla\ kai\
- plou=ton; ou) fobei=tai ga\r h( a)reth\ xruso/n, o(\n o( si/dhros ei)/wqen
- a)/gein ai)xma/lwton, a)lla\ th\n strathgi/an tw=n h(goume/nwn. pa=sa ga\r du/namis
- u(perai/rousa th\n summetri/an u(f' e(auth=s bla/ptetai ta\ plei=sta. pri\n h)\
- ga\r a)kou=sai th\n fa/lagga, fqa/somen h(mei=s pra/cantes a(\ boulo/meqa.Const. Exc. 4, pp. 301-302.
-
-
-
- Incerta
-
-
- to\ teleutai=on pollai=s
- geneai=s u(/steron e)k th=s *)itali/as to\ tw=n *sikelw=n e)/qnos pandhmei\
- peraiwqe\n ei)s th\n *sikeli/an th\n u(po\ tw=n *sikanw=n e)kleifqei=san xw/ran
- katw/|khsan. a)ei\ de\ th=| pleoneci/a| probaino/ntwn tw=n *sikelw=n, kai\ th\n
- o(/moron porqou/ntwn, e)ge/nonto po/lemoi pleona/kis au)toi=s pro\s tou\s
- *sikanou/s, e(/ws sunqh/kas poihsa/menoi sumfw/nous o(/rous e)/qento th=s
- xw/ras: peri\ w(=n ta\ kata\ me/ros e)n toi=s oi)kei/ois xro/nois
- a)nagra/yomen.
Diod. 5.6.3-4.
- *dio/dwros me/ntoi diafora\n tou/twn oi)=den e)n oi(=s le/gei, *sikanw=n kai\
- *sikelw=n.Eustathius, Commentary on the
- Odyssey, Book 20, p. 1896.
- *dio/dwros de/ pou tw=n deka/twn bibli/wn
- ei)pw\n peri/ te *sikelw=n kai\ *sikanw=n diafora\n oi)=den, w(s kai\
- proerre/qh, *sikelou= kai\ *sikanou=.Eustathius,
- Commentary on the Odyssey, Book 24, p. 1962.
- *dio/dwros de\ o( *sikelo\s kai\ o( *)oppiano\s th\n *nea/polin u(f'
- *(hrakle/ous oi)kisqh=nai/ fasi ktisqh=nai.Tzetzes, on the
- Alexandra of Lycophron, v. 717.
- kai\ to\
- *palla/dion de\ th=s *)aqhna=s toiou=ton h)=n tri/phxu, cu/linon, e)c ou)ranou=
- katapeso/n, w(/s fasin, e)n *pesinou=nti th=s *frugi/as, o(/qen o( *dio/dwros
- kai\ *di/wn to\n to/pon klhqh=nai/ fasin.Eudocia,
- Violarium, 322.
- kai\
- *dio/dwros a)/kran tina\ tw=n *)/alpewn korufh\n tou= su/mpantos o)/rous
- dokou=san ou)ranou= r(a/xin i(storei= para\ tw=n e)gxwri/wn kalei=sqai.Eustathius, loc. cit. Book 1, p. 1390.
-
-
-
-
diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg009/tlg0086.tlg009.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg009/tlg0086.tlg009.perseus-eng1.xml
index c8c2e090a..6de4f7758 100644
--- a/data/tlg0086/tlg009/tlg0086.tlg009.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg009/tlg0086.tlg009.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -158,13 +158,13 @@
whatever may be proper to the inquiry when the suitable occasion
occurs. But we must
consider first what the good life consists in and how it is to be
- obtained—whether all of those who receive the designation
+ obtained—whether all of those who receive the designation
'happy' acquire happiness by nature, as is the case with tallness and
shortness of stature and differences of complexion, or by study, which
would imply that there is a science of happiness, or by some form of
training,for there
are many human attributes that are not bestowed by nature nor acquired
- by study but gained by habituation—bad attributes by those
+ by study but gained by habituation—bad attributes by those
trained in bad habits and good attributes by those trained in good
ones. Or does happiness
come in none of these ways, but either by a sort of elevation of mind
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@
Pleasure. And certain
persons debate about their importance in relation to happiness,
declaring that one contributes more to it
- than another—some holding that Wisdom is a greater good than
+ than another—some holding that Wisdom is a greater good than
Goodness, others the reverse, and others that Pleasure is a greater
good than either of them; and some think that the happy life comes
from them all, others from two of them, others that it consists in
@@ -197,8 +197,8 @@
purposive choice should set before him some object for noble living to
aim atCf. Aristot.
Nic. Eth. 1094a 22, 1095a
- 22-26.—either honor or else glory or wealth or
- culture—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his
+ 22-26.—either honor or else glory or wealth or
+ culture—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his
conduct (since clearly it is a mark of much folly not to have one's
life regulated with regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary first to decide
within oneself, neither hastily nor carelessly, in which of the things
@@ -211,11 +211,11 @@
finely is impossible. And
in the latter class of things some that are indispensable conditions
of health and life are not peculiar to special people but common to
- practically all men—both some states and some
- actions—for instance, without breathing or being awake or
+ practically all men—both some states and some
+ actions—for instance, without breathing or being awake or
participating in movement we could not possess any good or any evil at
all; whereas others are more peculiar to special types of natural
- constitution—for instance, eating meat and taking walking exercise after dinner
+ constitution—for instance, eating meat and taking walking exercise after dinner
are not closely related to health in the same way as the conditions
mentioned. And these facts must not be overlooked,In the Mss. this clause comes before the
preceding one, 'for instance, eating meat . . .
@@ -244,22 +244,22 @@
refutations advanced by those who challenge them are demonstrations of
the theories that are opposed to them.Moreover to
notice such matters is especially advantageous with a view to the
- subjects to which all inquiry ought to be directed—the
+ subjects to which all inquiry ought to be directed—the
question what are the means that make it possible to participate in
living well and finely (if 'blissfully' is too invidious an
- expression)—and with a view to the hope that we may have of
+ expression)—and with a view to the hope that we may have of
the things that are good in the various departments. For if living finely depends
on things that come by fortune or by nature, it would be beyond the
hopes of many men, for then its attainment is not to be secured by
effort, and does not rest with men themselves and is not a matter of
their own conduct; but if
it consists in oneself and one's own actions having a particular
- quality, the good would be more common and more divine—more
+ quality, the good would be more common and more divine—more
common because it would be possible for more people to share it, and
more divine because happiness would then be in store for those who
made themselves and their actions of a particular quality. Most of the points debated and the difficulties
raised will be clear if it be satisfactorily determined what the
- proper conception of happiness is—does it consist merely in
+ proper conception of happiness is—does it consist merely in
a person's possessing some particular quality of spirit,The word YUXH/, usually rendered 'soul,' has no term
exactly corresponding to it in English, as it denotes the whole
vitality of a living creature, with the unconscious factors of
@@ -270,14 +270,14 @@
necessary?There are various different modes of life,
and some do not lay any claim to well-being of the kind under
consideration, but are pursued merely for the sake of things
- necessary—for instance the lives devoted to the vulgar and
+ necessary—for instance the lives devoted to the vulgar and
mechanic arts and those dealing with business (by vulgar arts I mean
those pursued only for reputation, by mechanic the sedentary and
wage-earning pursuits, and by arts of business those concerned with
market purchase and retail selling); but on the other hand, the things
related to the happy conduct of life being three, the things already
mentionedSee Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1214a 30-b 5. as the
- greatest possible goods for men—goodness, wisdom and
+ greatest possible goods for men—goodness, wisdom and
pleasure, we see that there are also three ways of life in which those
to whom fortune gives opportunityPerhaps the Greek should be emended to give 'those who happen
to be in power.' invariably choose to live, the life of
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
hedonism of Epicurus.While there are many
different things as to which it is not easy to make a right judgement,
this is especially the case with one about which everybody thinks that
- it is very easy to judge and that anybody can decide—the
+ it is very easy to judge and that anybody can decide—the
question which of the things contained in being alive is preferable,
and which when attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. For many
of life's events are such that they cause men to throw life
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@
of these things any way it would actually be preferable, if someone
offered us the choice, not to be born at all.Cf. Soph. O.C. 1225MH\ FU=NAI TO\N A(/PANTA NIKA=|
LO/GON. And in addition, the kind of life that people live
- while still children is not desirable—in fact no sensible
+ while still children is not desirable—in fact no sensible
person could endure to go back to it again. And further, many of the
experiences that contain no pleasure nor pain, and also of those that
do contain pleasure but pleasure of an ignoble kind, are such that
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@
their own sake, whereas the majority embrace that mode of life for the
sake of money and gain.What has been said, therefore,
demonstrates that all men ascribe happiness to three modes of
- life—the political, the philosophic, and the life of
+ life—the political, the philosophic, and the life of
enjoyment.The Greek word is
specially associated with sensual pleasures. Among these,
the nature and quality of the pleasure connected with the body and
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
discussion does not occur, but see Aristot. Nic.
Eth. 1153b 7-25. Let us first consider
Goodness and WisdomSee Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1214a 33n.; but practical
- wisdom is specially implied here.—what the
+ wisdom is specially implied here.—what the
nature of each is, and also whether they themselves or the actions
that spring from them are parts of the good life, since that they are connected with happiness is asserted,
if not by everybody, at all events by all of mankind who are worthy of
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
constructive or practical thought.i.e. practical men often think that any string of arguments
constitutes philosophy, though the arguers may be mere
charlatans.
- And this befalls them owing to lack of education—for in
+ And this befalls them owing to lack of education—for in
respect of each subject inability to distinguish arguments germane to
the subject from those foreign to it is lack of education. And it is also well to judge
separately the statement of the cause and the demonstrated fact, both
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@
their nature the best things; and some things, though practicable, are
only practicable for beings superior to us. And inasmuch as 'practicable'
has two meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the actions
- that we do as means to those Ends have to do with action—for
+ that we do as means to those Ends have to do with action—for
example we class among things practicable both health and wealth and
the pursuits that are followed for the sake of health and wealth,
healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear that happiness
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@
signifies now substance, now quality, now quantity, now time, and in
addition to these meanings it consists now in undergoing change and
now in causing it; and the good is found in each of these casesi.e. categories. The last two
- specified are elsewhere designated KINEI=N and KINEI=SQAI, Action and Passion.—in
+ specified are elsewhere designated KINEI=N and KINEI=SQAI, Action and Passion.—in
essence, as mind and God, in quality justice, in quantity moderation,
in time opportunity, and as instances of change, the teacher and the
taught. Therefore, just
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@
of the method now adopted. At present it is from things not admitted
to possess goodness that they prove the things admitted to be good,
for instance, they prove from numbers that justice and health are
- good, because they are arrangements and numbers—on the assumption that goodness
+ good, because they are arrangements and numbers—on the assumption that goodness
is a property of numbers and monads because the Absolute Good is
unity. But the proper
method is to start from things admitted to be good, for instance
@@ -581,20 +581,20 @@
even more in the unchanging; for all these admitted goods consist in
order and rest, and therefore, if that is so, the things unchanging
are good in an even greater degree, for they possess order and rest in
- a greater degree.— And it is a hazardous way of proving that the
+ a greater degree.— And it is a hazardous way of proving that the
Absolute Good is unity to say that numbers aim at unity; for it is not
clearly stated how they aim at it, but the expression is used in too
unqualified a manner; and how can one suppose that things not
possessing life can have appetition? One ought to study this matter carefully, and
not make an unreasoned assumption about something as to which it is
not easy to attain certainty even with the aid of
- reason.—And the statement that all existing things desire
+ reason.—And the statement that all existing things desire
some one good is not true; each thing seeks its own particular good,
the eye sight, the body health, and similarly another thing another
good.Such then are the difficulties indicating
- that the Absolute Good does not exist,—and that it is of no
+ that the Absolute Good does not exist,—and that it is of no
use for political science, but that this has a special good of its
- own, as have the other sciences also—for instance the good
+ own, as have the other sciences also—for instance the good
of gymnastics is good bodily condition.This sentence reads like a mere
note. The reference seems to be to Aristot. Eud.
Eth. 1217b 16-1218a 32, especially Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1217a 19-25.Further
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@
good as universal, for the Form is unchangeable and impracticable, and
the universal good though changeable is not practicable. But the
object aimed at as End is the chief good, and is the cause of the
- subordinate goods and first of all; so that the Absolute Good would be this—the
+ subordinate goods and first of all; so that the Absolute Good would be this—the
End of the goods practicable for man. And this is the good that comes
under the supreme of all the practical sciences, which is Politics and
Economics and Wisdom; for these states of character differ from the
@@ -628,10 +628,10 @@
health is so-and-so, what contributes to health must necessarily be
so-and-so;the
wholesome is the efficient cause of health, though only the cause of
- its existing—it is not the cause of health's being a good.
+ its existing—it is not the cause of health's being a good.
Furthermore nobody
proves that health is a good (unless he is a sophist and not a
- physician—it is sophists that juggle with irrelevant
+ physician—it is sophists that juggle with irrelevant
arguments), any more than he proves any other first
principle.After this we must take
a fresh starting-pointThis clause
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@
For we think that to do well and live well
are the same as to be happy; but each of these, both life and action,
is employment and activity, inasmuch as active life involves employing
- things—the coppersmith makes a bridle, but the horseman uses
+ things—the coppersmith makes a bridle, but the horseman uses
it. There is also the evidence of the opinion that a person is not
happy for one day only,A single
happy day does not make one a happy (i.e. fortunate) man.
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@
statement of a man's general distinction, felicitation is bestowed on
an end achieved. From
these considerations light is also thrown on the question sometimes
- raised—what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for
+ raised—what is the precise reason why the virtuous are for
half their lives no better than the base, since all men are alike when
asleep?The reason is
that sleep is inaction of the spirit, not an activity. Hence the goodness of any
@@ -775,22 +775,22 @@
belong to the rational part, which as having reason is in command of
the spirit; whereas the moral virtues belong to the part that is
irrational but by nature capable of following the
- rational—for in stating a man's moral qualities we do not
- say that he is wise or clever but that he is gentle or rash.After this we must first consider Moral Goodness—its
+ rational—for in stating a man's moral qualities we do not
+ say that he is wise or clever but that he is gentle or rash.After this we must first consider Moral Goodness—its
essence and the nature of its divisions (for that is the subject now
arrived at), and the means by which it is produced. Our method of
inquiry then must be that employed by all people in other matters when
- they have something in hand to start with—we must endeavor
+ they have something in hand to start with—we must endeavor
by means of statements that are true but not clearly expressed to
arrive at a result that is both true and clear. For our present state is as
if we knew that health is the best disposition of the body and that
CoriscusCf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1240b 25 n. is the
darkest man in the market-place;for that is not to know what health is and who Coriscus
is, but nevertheless to be in that state is a help towards knowing
- each of these things.— Then let it first be taken as granted that the best
+ each of these things.— Then let it first be taken as granted that the best
disposition is produced by the best means, and that the best actions
in each department of conduct result from the excellences belonging to
- each department—for example, it is the best exercises and
+ each department—for example, it is the best exercises and
food that produce a good condition of body, and a good condition of
body enables men to do the best work; further, that every disposition is both
produced and destroyed by the same things applied in a certain manner,
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@
a certain way a habit not innate in us is finally trained to be
operative in that way (which we do not observe in inanimate objects,
for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will it
- ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let
+ ever rise upward unless under the operation of force)—let
moral character then be defined as a quality of the spirit in
accordance with governing reason that is capable of following the
reason. We have then to
@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@
best state. This is proved by induction and reason: contraries are
mutually destructive, and extremes are contrary both to each other and
to the mean, as the mean is either extreme in relation to the
- other—for example the equal is greater than the less and
+ other—for example the equal is greater than the less and
less than the greater.
Hence moral goodness must be concerned with certain means and must be
a middle state. We must, therefore, ascertain what sort of middle
@@ -976,7 +976,7 @@
himself too high is vain, he that rates himself too low,
small-spirited. Again, he that exceeds in all expenditure is prodigal,
he that falls short in all, mean. Similarly the shabby man and the
- swaggerer—the latter exceeds what is fitting and the former
+ swaggerer—the latter exceeds what is fitting and the former
falls below it. The rascal grasps profit by every means and from every
source, the simpleton does not make profit even from the proper
sources. Envy consists
@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@
prosper; the opposite character is less definitely named, but it is the man that goes too far in not being annoyed
even at the prosperity of the undeserving, and is easy going, as
gluttons are in regard to food, whereas his opposite is
- difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy.— It is superfluous to state in
+ difficult-tempered in respect of jealousy.— It is superfluous to state in
the definition that the specified relation to each thing must not be
accidental; no science whether theoretical or productive makes this
addition to the definition either in discourse or in practice, but
@@ -1046,11 +1046,11 @@
sometimes be in pleasures (for even in these there is excess and
deficiency), sometimes in pains, sometimes in both. For he that
exceeds in feeling delight exceeds in the pleasant, and he that
- exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite—and this
+ exceeds in feeling pain exceeds in the opposite—and this
whether his feelings are excessive absolutely or excessive in relation
to some standard, for instance are felt more than ordinary men feel
them; whereas the good man feels in the proper
- way.— And
+ way.— And
since there is a certain state of character which results in its
possessor's being in one instance such as to accept an excess and in
another such as to accept a deficiency of the same thing,it follows that as these actions
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@
and nearer the middle than deficiency in the case of exercises but
deficiency than excess in the case of food. Consequently the states of
will favorable to athletic training will be variously favorable to
- health according to the two different fields of choice—in
+ health according to the two different fields of choice—in
the one caseIn respect of amount
of exercise. the over-energetic men <will be
nearer the mean than the slack ones>, in the otherIn respect of amount of
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@
to which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as
itself, for example a man engenders men, and in general an animal
animals, and a plant plants. And in addition to this, obviously man alone among
- animals initiates certain conduct—for we should not ascribe conduct to any of
+ animals initiates certain conduct—for we should not ascribe conduct to any of
the others. And the first
principles of that sort, which are the first source of motions, are
called first principles in the strict sense, and most rightly those
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@
angles of a quadrilateral are necessarily equal to four right angles,
that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly
the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle were to change, a
- quadrilateral would necessarily change too—for example if
+ quadrilateral would necessarily change too—for example if
the angles of a triangle became equal to three right angles, the
angles of a quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles, or
if four, eight; also if a triangle does not change but is as
@@ -1178,10 +1178,10 @@
and involuntary mean, and what is purposive choice, since they enter
into the definition of goodness and badness. And first we must
consider the meaning of voluntary and involuntary. Now they would seem to refer
- to one of three things—conformity with appetition, or with
+ to one of three things—conformity with appetition, or with
purposive choice, or with thought: voluntary is what conforms with one
of these and involuntary is what contravenes one of them. But moreover there are three
- subdivisions of appetition—wish, passion and desire; so that
+ subdivisions of appetition—wish, passion and desire; so that
we have to distinguish these. And first we must consider conformity
with desire.It would seem that everything that conforms
with desire is voluntary. For everything involuntary seems to be
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@
under necessity is painful, as indeed Evenus says:
For all necessity doth cause
- distress—
+ distress—
Evenus of Paros = Theog. 472
Quoted also Aristot. Met. 1015a 28 and Aristot.
Rhet.1370a 10, and = Theognidea 472 (but that has
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
Indeed it would be strange if those who become uncontrolled will be
more righteous.This sentence would
come in better above, after 'acting in conformity with
- desire.'— From these considerations, then, it would appear that
+ desire.'— From these considerations, then, it would appear that
what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the
oppositeViz. that what is
against desire is involuntary. follows, for all that a
@@ -1267,17 +1267,17 @@
'It was proved not that acting in accordance with one's wishes
is the same thing as acting voluntarily, but rather that all one
wishes is also voluntary although it is possible to act
- voluntarily without wishing—this is all that has been
- proved; but many things that we wish—' that
+ voluntarily without wishing—this is all that has been
+ proved; but many things that we wish—' that
acting in accordance with one's wish is not acting involuntarily,
but rather everything that one wishes is also
- voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do
+ voluntary—it has only been proved that it is possible to do
a thing voluntarily without wishing; but many things that we wish we
do suddenly, whereas nobody makes a purposive choice
suddenly.But if as we saidCf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1223a
23ff. the voluntary must necessarily be one of
- three things—what is in conformity with appetition, or with
- purposive choice, or with thought—, and if it is not the two
+ three things—what is in conformity with appetition, or with
+ purposive choice, or with thought—, and if it is not the two
former, it remains that voluntariness consists in acting with some
kind of thought.
Moreover, let us put a conclusion to our delimitation of the voluntary
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@
say that a stone travels upwards and fire downwards by force and under
necessity, whereas when they travel according to their natural and
intrinsic impulse we say that they do not move under
- force—although nevertheless they are not spoken of as moving
+ force—although nevertheless they are not spoken of as moving
voluntarily:the state
opposite to forced motion has no name, but when they travel contrary
to their natural impulse we say that they move by force. Similarly also in the case of
@@ -1306,7 +1306,7 @@
the case of the other animals the factor of force is simple, as it is
in the case of inanimate objects, for animals do not possess rational
principle and appetition in opposition to it, but live by their
- appetition, in man both forms of force are present—that is,
+ appetition, in man both forms of force are present—that is,
at a certain age, the age to which we attribute actionOr 'conduct.' in the proper
sense; for we do not speak of a child as acting, any more than a wild
animal, but only a person who has attained to acting by rational
@@ -1328,14 +1328,14 @@
a man on without employing persuasion, since it possesses no element
of rational principle. It
has, then, been stated that these men only seem to act under force and
- involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because
+ involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because
their action has a certain resemblance to forced action, just as we
speak of forced action even in the case of inanimate objects too.
Yet nevertheless
if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the
statement is refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act
when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against
- the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no
+ the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no
external motive, we do not say that it acts under force; and in the
uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in
the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@
force, but voluntarily;
nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an
external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to
- his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B's hand and with
+ his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B's hand and with
it strike C, B's will and desire both resisting; whereas when the
source of action is from within, we do not speak of the act as done
under force. Again, both
@@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@
a bad thing. Hence it is
reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and
that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of
- appetition and of rational calculation—for calculation and
+ appetition and of rational calculation—for calculation and
appetition are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the
other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they
see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit.
@@ -1365,12 +1365,12 @@
admissible to say this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a
whole both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled man acts
voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under compulsion,
- but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by
+ but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by
nature both parts; since rational principle is a natural property,
because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not
stunted, and also desire is natural, because it accompanies and is
present in us from birth; and these are pretty nearly the two things by which we define the
- natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is
+ natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is
born, or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on
regularly, for example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of the
two persons in a way acts not in accordance with nature, but
@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@
difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled and the
self-controlled man are these: do both, or does one of them, act under
compulsion, so that they either act not voluntarily or else
- voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if
+ voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if
what is done under compulsion is involuntary, act voluntarily and
involuntarily at the same time? And it is fairly clear from what has
been said how these difficulties are to be met. But there is another way in which people are
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@
blind-man's-bluff, MUI/+NDA or
XALKH= MUI=A. it
would be ridiculous for him to say that he had done it under
- compulsion and of necessity—there must be some greater and
+ compulsion and of necessity—there must be some greater and
more painful evil that he will suffer if he does not do it. It is when
a man does something evil for the sake of something good, or for
deliverance from another evil, that he will be acting under necessity
@@ -1421,7 +1421,7 @@
when his object is to avoid violent pain than when it is to avoid mild
pain, and in general more when his object is the avoidance of pain
than when it is to gain enjoyment. For what rests with
- himself—and it wholly turns on this—means what his
+ himself—and it wholly turns on this—means what his
nature is able to bear; what his nature is not able to bear and what
is not a matter of his own natural appetition or calculation does not
rest with himself. On
@@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@
such thoughts and calculations, do not rest with ourselves, but it is
as PhilolausPythagorean
philosopher contemporary with Socrates.
- said—'some arguments are too strong for us.' Hence if it was
+ said—'some arguments are too strong for us.' Hence if it was
necessary to consider the voluntary and involuntary with reference
also to acting under compulsion, let this be our decision of the
matter (for those who cause most hindrance . . . the voluntary . .
@@ -1448,10 +1448,10 @@
voluntary seems to be the opposite of the involuntary; and acting with
knowledge of either the person acted on or the instrument or the
result (for sometimes the agent knows that it is his father but does
- not intend to kill him but to save him—as the PeliadsThe daughters of Pelias, King of
+ not intend to kill him but to save him—as the PeliadsThe daughters of Pelias, King of
Iolchus, cut him up and boiled him, having been told by Medea
(who wanted Jason to leave his throne) that this would restore
- his youth. did—or knows that what he is
+ his youth. did—or knows that what he is
offering is a drink but offers it as a love-charm or wine, when really
it is hemlock) seems to be the opposite of acting without knowing the
person acted on, the instrument and the nature of the act, through
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@
know has two meanings, one being to have the knowledge and the other
to use it, a man who has knowledge but is not using it would in one
case be justly described as acting in ignorance but in another case
- unjustly— namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge
+ unjustly— namely, if his non-employment of the knowledge
were due to carelessness. And similarly one would be blamed for not
having the knowledge, if it were something that was easy or necessary
and his not having it is due to carelessness or pleasure or pain.
@@ -1494,7 +1494,7 @@
be immortal, but nobody purposively chooses a thing knowing it to be
impossible, nor in general a thing that, though possible, he does not
think in his own power to do or not to do. So that this much is
- clear—a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be
+ clear—a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be
something that rests with oneself. And similarly it is manifest
that purposive choice is not opinion either, nor something that one
simply thinks; for we sawAristot. Eud. Eth. 1223a 16-19. that a
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@
things within one's own power that makes us think that we ought to do
or not to do something; but this characteristic is common to opinion
and to wish. For no one
- purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean
+ purposively chooses any End, but the means to his End—I mean
for instance no one chooses to be healthy, but to take a walk or sit
down for the sake of being healthy, no one chooses to be well off, but
to go into business or to speculate for the sake of being well off;
@@ -1557,12 +1557,12 @@
with a person choosing.
But how purposive choice arises out of opinion and wish must be
considered. And indeed in a manner the actual term 'choice' makes this
- clear. 'Choice' is 'taking,' but not taking simply—it is
+ clear. 'Choice' is 'taking,' but not taking simply—it is
taking one thing in preference to another; but this cannot be done
without consideration and deliberation; hence purposive choice arises
out of deliberative opinion.Now nobody deliberates
- about his End—this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate
- about the means leading to their End—does this contribute to
+ about his End—this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate
+ about the means leading to their End—does this contribute to
it, or does this ? or when a means has been decided on, how will that
be procured? and this deliberation as to means we all pursue until we
have carried the starting-point in the process of producing the End
@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@
possible that many men may possess the faculty of forming an opinion
whether to do or not to do a thing without also having the power of
forming this opinion by process of reasoning. For the deliberative faculty
- is the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause—for
+ is the spirit's power of contemplating a kind of cause—for
one sort of cause is the final cause, as although cause means anything
because of which a thing comes about, it is the object of a thing's
existence or production that we specially designate as its cause: for
@@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@
contravention of nature and by perversion not the good but the
apparent good is the End. The reason is that there are some things
that cannot be employed for something other than their natural
- objects, for instance sight—it is not possible to see a
+ objects, for instance sight—it is not possible to see a
thing that is not visible, or to hear a thing that is not audible; but
a science does enable us to do a thing that is not the object of the
science. For health and disease are not the objects of the same
@@ -1654,7 +1654,7 @@
science. It
therefore necessarily follows that both error and purposive choice
take place from the middle point to the contraries (the contraries of
- the middle being the more and the less).—And the cause is
+ the middle being the more and the less).—And the cause is
pleasure and pain; for things are so constituted that the pleasant
appears to the spirit good and the more pleasant better, the painful
bad and the more painful worse. So from these things also it
@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@
correct and the End right in the sense of making the agent choose for
the sake of the proper End, or whether (as some hold) it makes the
rational principle right. But what does this is
- self-control—for that saves the rational principle from
+ self-control—for that saves the rational principle from
being corrupted; and goodness and self-control are different.
But we must speak
about this later, since all who do hold that goodness makes the
@@ -1703,7 +1703,7 @@
assumptions are first principles, so in the productive sciences the
End is a starting-point and assumption: since it is required that
so-and-so is to be in good health, if that is to be secured it is
- necessary for such-and-such a thing to be provided—just as
+ necessary for such-and-such a thing to be provided—just as
in mathematics, if the angles of a triangle are together equal to two
right angles, such and such a consequence necessarily follows.
Therefore the End
@@ -1718,13 +1718,13 @@
which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the
causeVirtue by choosing the
right means to achieve the End causes the End to be
- realized. by its act of choice—though the choice is
+ realized. by its act of choice—though the choice is
not of the End but of the means adopted for the sake of the End.
Therefore though
it belongs to another faculty to hit on the things that must be done
for the sake of the End, goodness is the
cause of the End aimed at by choice being right. And owing to this it is by a
- man's purposive choice that we judge his character—that is,
+ man's purposive choice that we judge his character—that is,
not by what he does but what he does it for. Similarly also badness
causes purposive choice to be made from the opposite motives. If
therefore, when a man has it in his power to do what is honorable and
@@ -1760,18 +1760,18 @@
daring and fear as contraries, for they are indeed in a manner opposed
to one another. It is
clear, therefore, that the persons named after these states of
- character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that
+ character will also be similarly opposed to each other—that
is, the coward (for that is the term that denotes being more afraid
than is proper and less daring than is proper) and the daring man (for
that denotes the characteristic of being less afraid than is proper
- and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is
+ and more daring than is proper—and from this the name is
derived, as the word 'daring' is cognate with the word 'dare').
So that since
courage is the best state of character in relation to feelings of fear
and daring, and the proper character is neither that of the daring
(for they fall short in one respect and exceed in another) nor that of
the cowardly (for they also do the same, only not as regards the same
- things but inversely— they fall short in
+ things but inversely— they fall short in
daring and exceed in being afraid), it is clear that the middle state
of character between daring and cowardice is courage, for this is the
best state.And it seems that the brave man is in
@@ -1790,7 +1790,7 @@
himself, what is formidable to him must be things of great magnitude
and number. But formidable things are productive of fearOr, emending the text, 'of
corresponding fear.' in the particular person to whom
- they are formidable—that is, if they are very formidable,
+ they are formidable—that is, if they are very formidable,
the fear they produce will be violent, if slightly formidable, it will
be weak; so it follows that the brave man's fears are great and many.
Yet on the contrary it appeared that courage makes a man fearless, and
@@ -1799,7 +1799,7 @@
'pleasant' and 'good.' Some things are pleasant and good
absolutely,whereas
others are so to a particular person but absolutely are not so, but on
- the contrary are bad and unpleasant—all the things that are
+ the contrary are bad and unpleasant—all the things that are
beneficial for the base, and all those that are pleasant to children
qua children. And similarly some things are formidable
absolutely and others to a particular person: thus the things that the
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@
nature, we pronounce to be formidable absolutely. But the brave man is fearless
in regard to them, and endures formidable things of this sort, which
are formidable to him in one way but in another way are
- not—they are formidable to him qua
+ not—they are formidable to him qua
human being, but qua brave not formidable
except slightly, or not at all. Yet such things really are formidable,
for they are formidable to most men. Owing to this the brave man's state of
@@ -1852,7 +1852,7 @@
rushing on them, or grasp snakes. Another is the courage caused by
hope, which often makes those who have had a stroke of luck endure
dangers,and those who
- are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine. Another is due to some
+ are intoxicated—for wine makes men sanguine. Another is due to some
irrational emotion, for example love or passion. For if a man is in
love he is more daring than cowardly, and endures many dangers, like
the manUnknown. who
@@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@
property of things that appear capable of causing pain of a
destructive kind: for persons expecting some other pain might perhaps
experience a different sort of pain and a different feeling, but will
- not have fear—for example if a man foresaw that he was going
+ not have fear—for example if a man foresaw that he was going
to feel the pain felt by the jealous, or the sort of pain felt by the
envious or by those who are ashamed. But fear only occurs in the case of pains that
seem likely to be of the kind whose nature it is to destroy life.
@@ -1892,7 +1892,7 @@
appears to be danger.The formidable
things, therefore, in relation to which we speak of a man as brave
are, we have said, those that appear likely to cause pain of the
- destructive kind—provided that these appear close at hand
+ destructive kind—provided that these appear close at hand
and not far off, and are or appear to be of a magnitude proportionate
to a human being; for
some things must necessarily appear fearful to every human being and
@@ -1912,7 +1912,7 @@
echo of the story survives in Shakespeare's metaphor, 'to take
arms against a sea of troubles.'; and in general, the
courage of barbarians has an element of passion. And some men endure terrors
- for the sake of other pleasures also—for even passion
+ for the sake of other pleasures also—for even passion
contains pleasure of a sort, since it is combined with hope of
revenge. But nevertheless neither if a man endures death for the sake
of this pleasure nor for another, nor for the sake of avoiding greater
@@ -1943,7 +1943,7 @@
things are formidable, but because they know how to protect themselves
against the dangers; also courage is not merely what makes men more
daring fighters, for in
- that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis
+ that case strength and wealth would be courage—as Theognis
puts it:
@@ -1961,7 +1961,7 @@
to be bravest, as Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering Achilles:
And shame on Hector
- seized—
+ seized—
Source unknown
Not in our
@@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@
forces to protect him, for in that case he will not think that there
is really anything to be afraid of. But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive
choice (it has been said before what we mean by
- this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of
+ this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of
some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that
courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable
things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance
@@ -1998,7 +1998,7 @@
include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it:
'undivided' means both that which cannot be
divided and that which though it can be has not been; and similarly with
- 'unchaste'—it denotes both that which is by nature incapable
+ 'unchaste'—it denotes both that which is by nature incapable
of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been
chastened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man
acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this
@@ -2021,7 +2021,7 @@
more in the other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness to
pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It specially attaches
to persons like the boors who are a stock character in
- comedy—people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary
+ comedy—people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary
indulgences.And since the temperate
character is shown in connection with pleasures, it follows that it is
also related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascertain what
@@ -2035,17 +2035,17 @@
conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet with the pleasures and
pains of smell, derived from good and bad scents; for neither is
anyone termed profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive
- to sensations of that sort— for example, a man would not be considered
+ to sensations of that sort— for example, a man would not be considered
profligate if when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or person,
or listening to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or
sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or
- listen to the music,—any more than the persons held
+ listen to the music,—any more than the persons held
spell-bound in the abode of the Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with those
two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which alone the lower
animals also happen to be sensitive and to feel pleasure and
- pain—the objects of taste and of touch, whereas about virtually all
+ pain—the objects of taste and of touch, whereas about virtually all
the pleasures of the other senses alike animals are clearly so
- constituted as to be insensitive— e.g.
+ constituted as to be insensitive— e.g.
harmonious sound, or beauty; for clearly they are not affected in any
degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of beautiful objects or by
listening to musical sounds, except possibly in the case of some
@@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@
throat, the sensation of which seems more like touch than taste; so
that gourmands do not pray that they may have a long tongue but a
crane's gullet, like Philoxenus son of Eryxis.Mr. Hospitable, son of Mistress
- Belch—presumably a character in
+ Belch—presumably a character in
comedy. It
follows that broadly speaking profligacy must be considered to be
related to the objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of
@@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@
on.And also the nature of Gentleness and
Harshness must be ascertained in the same way. For we see that the
term 'gentle' is concerned with the pain that arises from
- passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way
+ passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way
towards that pain. And in our diagramSee Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220b
38, Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1221b
12-15. we opposed to the irascible and harsh and fierce
@@ -2166,7 +2166,7 @@
And of these classes themselves there are species designated as
exceeding or deficient in respect of parts of the matter concerned:
for example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profiteer are
- mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in
+ mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in
accepting anything, the skinflint is he who is very excited about
small sums; also the man who offends by way of meanness is a false
reckoner and a cheat.
@@ -2245,8 +2245,8 @@
great things and to claim them as one's desert; and there are small
things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size; and as
regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is
- possible—one man may be of such a character that although
- deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held
+ possible—one man may be of such a character that although
+ deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held
in high honor, and another man though deserving great things may claim
small ones. Now the man
worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it
@@ -2292,7 +2292,7 @@
he might become great-spirited, for he will claim the things that he
is worthy of; whereas the small-spirited man, who when great goods
corresponding to his worth are available does not think himself worthy
- of them—what would he have done if his deserts were small?
+ of them—what would he have done if his deserts were small?
For either he would have conceitedly thought himself worthy of great
things, or of still less.The Ms.
reading hardly gives a sense. An emendation gives 'for if he
@@ -2330,10 +2330,10 @@
is magnificent, for the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting
that is unsuitable. But
it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the
- agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example,
+ agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example,
what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at
that of a favorite; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is
- of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people
+ of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people
thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for
him, because of his former low station, but would have been for
Cimon.The story of
@@ -2347,12 +2347,12 @@
illiberal.Generally speaking the other praiseworthy
and blameworthy states of character also are excesses or deficiencies
or middle states, but in respect of an emotion: for instance, the
- envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of
- character after which they are named—Envy means being pained at people who are
+ envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of
+ character after which they are named—Envy means being pained at people who are
deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is
itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his feeling joy
at undeserved adversities; and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what
- the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at
+ the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at
undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are
deserved; hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity.Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness and Bashfulness: the
man who pays regard to nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards
@@ -2382,10 +2382,10 @@
squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that the former takes
nothing or little, and that reluctantly, and the latter accepts
everything readily, so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man
- or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty,
+ or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty,
the latter accepts everything easily and with pleasure. Neither course
is right: one should allow some things and not others, and on
- principle,—that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is
+ principle,—that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is
the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the
qualityViz. BWMOLOXI/A, 'buffoonery,' Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1128a 15. to which
we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of
@@ -2399,7 +2399,7 @@
even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the
vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the
thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he
- may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the
+ may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the
middle position, since his judgement is good.All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor
are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive
choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each
@@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@
combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur
in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are
venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in
- others, and in general not uniform in a bad way— for when men lack uniformity
+ others, and in general not uniform in a bad way— for when men lack uniformity
in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the
mean contains both extremes.The
opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to
@@ -2441,11 +2441,11 @@
- Friendship—its nature
+ Friendship—its nature
and qualities, what constitutes a friend, and whether the term
friendship has one or several meanings,and if several, how many, and also what is
our duty towards a friend and what are the just claims of
- friendship—is a matter that calls for investigation no less
+ friendship—is a matter that calls for investigation no less
than any of the things that are fine and desirable in men's
characters. For to
promote friendship is thought to be the special task of political
@@ -2467,7 +2467,7 @@
rights in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, whereas
our rights in relation to the rest of men are established by law and
do not depend on us.Many questions are raised about
- friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider
+ friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider
considerations and extend the term. For some hold that like is friend
to like, whence the sayings:
@@ -2486,8 +2486,8 @@
and in the form KOLOIO\N POTI\ KOLOIO/N
Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1155a 35, where the
dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).
;
- “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow
- wolf.”'Set a thief
+ “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow
+ wolf.”'Set a thief
to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is
unknown.And the natural philosophers
even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first
@@ -2499,14 +2499,14 @@
have gone on to infer protective mimicry.Some people then give this account of a friend; but others say that
opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired
that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the
- wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain,"Quoted as from Euripides, Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1154a 34; the play is not
+ wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain,"Quoted as from Euripides, Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1154a 34; the play is not
known. and "In all things change is
- sweet—"Eur. Orest. 234. change being transition to
+ sweet—"Eur. Orest. 234. change being transition to
the opposite), whereas like hates like, for "Potter against potter has
a grudge,"Hes. WD
25 ('Two of a trade never agree'). and animals
that live on the same food are hostile to one another. These opinions, therefore, are thus widely
- variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe—
+ variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe—
The less is rooted enemy to the more
For ever, and begins the day of hate,
@@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@
bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends,
and HeracleitusThe natural
philosopher of Ephesus,
- fl. end of 6th cent. B.C. rebukes the poet who wrote—
+ fl. end of 6th cent. B.C.
rebukes the poet who wrote—
Would strife might perish out of heaven
and earth,
@@ -2535,7 +2535,7 @@
observation. Some persons think that it is not possible for bad men to
be friends, but only for the good. Others think it strange that
mothers should not love their own children (and maternal affection we see existing even
- among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their
+ among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their
young). Others hold that
only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually
do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own
@@ -2544,7 +2544,7 @@
to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away
even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body
itself, when it dies, as a corpse is
- useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in
+ useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in
Egypt. Now all these factorsi.e. likeness, contrariety,
utility (Solomon). seem to be somewhat opposed to one
another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest
@@ -2583,7 +2583,7 @@
good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same
things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For things
advantageous for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body
- absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example
+ absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example
doses of medicine and surgical operations; and likewise also the things pleasant for a
healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, for
example to live in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse
@@ -2601,7 +2601,7 @@
that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable
and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely
pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and
- apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may
+ apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may
choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the
case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and
for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another
@@ -2612,7 +2612,7 @@
termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet
have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of
the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is
- primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical
+ primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical
mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical
operation,but we
apply the term properly to that which is primarily so called.
@@ -2633,11 +2633,11 @@
in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the
things said already,ll.
7-17. as we have distinguished three senses of the term
- friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness,
+ friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness,
another on utility, another on pleasure.Of these the one
based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they
love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are
- and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a
+ and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a
friend, as long as he our battle fights,A friend in need is a friend indeed. and
Athens no longer knows Megara.
@@ -2671,7 +2671,7 @@
injure a bad man, and those who suffer injury from one another do not
feel affection for one another. But as a matter of fact bad men do feel affection for
one another, though not according to the primary form of
- friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being
+ friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being
friends under the other forms, since for the sake of pleasure they put
up with one another although they are being harmed, so long as they
are lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held, when people look into the
@@ -2711,7 +2711,7 @@
a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by
nature things that are absolutely good are good to him), and similarly a man rather
than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one; but the road is
- through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be
+ through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be
pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet
perfectly good; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in
him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the
@@ -2720,11 +2720,11 @@
sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because
of being useful, but in another manner. For good for a given person and good
absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of
- character as with profitableness—what is profitable
+ character as with profitableness—what is profitable
absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different
things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking
drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two
- kinds—
+ kinds—
for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by
nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is
good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only
@@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@
therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether
there is any friendship without pleasure,and how such a friendship differs from other
friendship, and on which exactly of the two thingsGoodness and pleasantness. the affection
- depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is
+ depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is
not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'or
not, but because he is pleasant.' Then, affection having
two meanings,Potential and actual
@@ -2759,7 +2759,7 @@
Hence to love is
to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an
activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an
- activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only
+ activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only
in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate
thing also, for even inanimate things are loved. And since to love actively is
to treat the loved object qua loved, and the friend is an object of love to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the
@@ -2769,11 +2769,11 @@
Nor ought any
accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness
causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people
- cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not
+ cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not
expect our society!This then is the
primary friendship, which all people recognize. It is on account of it that
the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their
- claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing
+ claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing
stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is
stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement
right. And there is no
@@ -2804,17 +2804,17 @@
unless as a result of trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the goods
of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things;
and so they are not friends, for the proverbial 'common property as
- between friends' is not realized in this way—the friend is
+ between friends' is not realized in this way—the friend is
made an appendage of the things, not the things of the
friends.Therefore the first kind of friendship does
not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test
- many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor
+ many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor
indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same
way as about a coat;
although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose
the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat
for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one
- ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old
+ ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old
friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man.
For a friend is not to be had without trial
and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the
@@ -2832,7 +2832,7 @@
just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been
rightly saidEur. El.
941.: "Nature is permanent, but wealth is
- not—" although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship'
+ not—" although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship'
than 'Nature.'Or, emending the
text, 'that friendship is goodness of nature.' And it is proverbial that
time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For
@@ -2843,20 +2843,20 @@
latter; and misfortune shows those
who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility.
And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown
- quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is
+ quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is
absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are
like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but
when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in
the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by
the End it effects and the time it lasts. And even the multitude would agree, not in
consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a
- drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant
+ drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant
not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not
continuous, although at first it quite takes one in.The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes
the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness
and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The
other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked
- people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other
+ people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other
gladden" and "Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad."Eur.
Bellerophontes Fr. 298 (Nauck).And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or
neutral,i.e. neither good
@@ -2869,11 +2869,11 @@
the good man for his purpose at the time-and the good man to the
uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for
the purpose natural to him; and he will wish his friend what is
- good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a
+ good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a
given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be
beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the
absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink
- medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it
+ medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it
for the given purpose.
Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in
which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant
@@ -2903,7 +2903,7 @@
reasonable. The friendship of father for son is in this class,
and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of these sorts of friendship themselves
there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different
- from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as
+ from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as
between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for
beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of
affection or it is not returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous if
@@ -2916,7 +2916,7 @@
them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the
same. And in the same way
also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for
- pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of
+ pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of
superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former
footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar
manner; and also in the case of pleasure.i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit
@@ -2955,7 +2955,7 @@
that of others because of its remoteness small); but when there is an excessive
amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand
that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved
- alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love
+ alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love
from God. It is manifest, therefore,
that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return
of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek
@@ -3019,7 +3019,7 @@
opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself,
and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need
one another; and the opposite is pleasant and desirable as useful, not
- as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a
+ as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a
thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not
strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet
the dry.But in a way love of the opposite is also
@@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@
of which may control the other; and similarly self-love implies
that one part of the personality can have a certain feeling in
regard to another part. how one has those qualities
- voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's
+ voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's
spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such
matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or
foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly.For all these relations involve
@@ -3080,8 +3080,8 @@
(Stock). For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for
somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on
his own account but for the other's sake; and in another way when a man wishes another's
- existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone
- existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he
+ existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone
+ existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he
would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other;
and in another way
a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake
@@ -3091,13 +3091,13 @@
friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their
existence is desired, others unless their society. Again we shall reckon it
affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior
- motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters
+ motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters
share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for
their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and
birds that share each other's pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only
feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same
- pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his
- thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same
+ pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his
+ thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same
as may be. The same
principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a
friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is
@@ -3111,8 +3111,8 @@
exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and 'being
one spirit'Cf. 1. 3: DH/ marks a quotation. and
being unable even to live without one another but dying
- together—for this is the case with the single individual,
- and he associates with himself in this way,—all these
+ together—for this is the case with the single individual,
+ and he associates with himself in this way,—all these
characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself.
In a wicked man on
the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is
@@ -3129,13 +3129,13 @@
by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature. But a good man does not
rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his
former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his
- former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as
+ former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as
the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'John Styles' is related
to 'good John Styles'See Sophistici Elenchi 175b
15ff. 'Coriscus' is used for any imaginary person, cf.
Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220a 19 f.;
for it is clear that the same amount of 'John Styles' is good as of
- 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they
+ 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they
are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to
himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to
himself, as has been said,ll.
@@ -3188,7 +3188,7 @@
lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another
in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire
also. Agreement occurs in
- the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and
+ the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and
desire the same things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement,
like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the
primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for
@@ -3199,7 +3199,7 @@
possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a
thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will
quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice
- as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to
+ as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to
rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for
the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel
more affection for those who have received it than those who have
@@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@
utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it
is the other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not this
alone; it is also a law
- of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and
+ of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and
activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it
were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the
philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and
@@ -3239,7 +3239,7 @@
exist. For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave is as it
were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate
slave.The other partnerships are a constituent
- part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of
+ part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of
the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or with business
partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the
household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same
@@ -3249,7 +3249,7 @@
PARAKEXRWSME/NA, 'those harmonies and melodies
that are highly strung and irregular in coloration (i.e.
divergent from the regular scale in having smaller intervals)
- are deviations.'— paternal authority being royal, the
+ are deviations.'
— paternal authority being royal, the
relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a
republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy
and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of
@@ -3267,18 +3267,18 @@
one as between brothers, another as of father and sonThese two clauses look like an
interpolation.: it may be proportional, for example
paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of
- brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in
+ brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in
this also they claim privileges of seniority. Civic friendship on the other
hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility,
for it seems to be the individual's lack of self-sufficiency that
- makes these unions permanent—since they would have been
+ makes these unions permanent—since they would have been
formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic
friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but
also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of
superiority. The justice
that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just,
because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of
- a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it
+ a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it
is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like
instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them.
It does indeed
@@ -3302,7 +3302,7 @@
the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there
would be partnership; and justice of a sort, even if there were no
state. And a household
- is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of
+ is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of
master and slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body,
and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but
something analogous, just as healthPerhaps the text is corrupt. is not justice but
@@ -3312,10 +3312,10 @@
benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and
natural subject. That
between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being
- on a footing of equality—
+ on a footing of equality—
For never did he make me out a bastard,
But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire
- Of both—
+ Of both—
Soph. Fr. 755 (Jebb and Pearson; 684 Nauck). The
third line is completed in a quotation by
Philo, QNHTW=N D' OU)DEI/S. (For TW=|DE dative of agent see Kuhner-Gerth, i.
@@ -3328,12 +3328,12 @@
superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is
clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the
proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party
- claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the
+ claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the
inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in
to the inferior, his attitude being that of ruler to subject;
or if not that,
at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in fact it
- happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the
+ happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the
shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties
contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share
equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally
@@ -3370,15 +3370,15 @@
Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1262b
26.
Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a
- ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules
+ ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules
in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God
rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and
of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing
of equality. But useful
friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic
friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers
- do—hence the saying
- Unto a friend his wage—
+ do—hence the saying
+ Unto a friend his wage—
.Aristot. Nic.
Eth. 1164a 28. Hes. WD
371MISQO\S D' A)NDRI\ FI/LW|
@@ -3390,7 +3390,7 @@
of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being
that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and
friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to
- have it both ways at once—they associate together for the
+ have it both ways at once—they associate together for the
sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between
good men, and so represent it as not merely legal,
pretending that it is a matter of trust.For in general,
@@ -3403,12 +3403,12 @@
of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as
a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in
some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this
- sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly,
+ sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly,
since it is not natural for good men to go to law,Or, adopting another conjectural emendation,
'since it is natural for good men to be just of their own
accord.' and these men make their contracts as good men
and as dealing with trustworthy people. And in fact in this sort of friendship the
- recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of
+ recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of
accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a
moral kind and not merely legal.Solomon renders 'It is uncertain how either will recriminate on
the other, seeing that they trust each other, not in a limited
@@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@
question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just
return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the
service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for
- it may be as Theognis says—
+ it may be as Theognis says—
Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to
me
,Theog.
@@ -3434,16 +3434,16 @@
much it was to the donor and not bow much it was to himself.
And at other
times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of
- it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for
+ it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for
instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of
benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other
about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money
- loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to
+ loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to
be repaid the value that the money had when lent,the other claims to
repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the
contract.Civic friendship, then, looks
at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the
- intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly
+ intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly
justice. The cause of
conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility
more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on
@@ -3461,7 +3461,7 @@
another, it is not honorable, when an active return is due, merely to
make fine speeches, and similarly also in the other casei.e. in a moral friendship it is
not honorable to insist on a return on a business
- footing.;— but since they did not provide for this in the
+ footing.;— but since they did not provide for this in the
contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must
judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must
be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention,
@@ -3504,7 +3504,7 @@
a number. For we must measure by proportion, as also the civic
partnership is measured. For how is a shoemaker to be partner with a
farmer unless their products are equalized by proportion? Therefore the measure for
- partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for
+ partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for
example if one party complains that he has given wisdom and the other
says he has given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom to
being rich? and then, what is the amount given for each? for if one
@@ -3560,8 +3560,8 @@
with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many
of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it
does not: for instance, the desire for the friend's
- existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes
- existence to belong to his own worki.e. the beneficiary.—and to him who gave one
+ existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes
+ existence to belong to his own worki.e. the beneficiary.—and to him who gave one
existenceThis also means the
beneficiary, who is the cause of the benefactor's being a
benefactor; so the benefactor ought to repay him in kind by
@@ -3628,13 +3628,13 @@
class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally
speaking constituted by their participation in the 'determined'
nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be
- of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of
+ of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of
these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties
in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one
becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives,i.e. perception of something
outside oneself causes consciousness of self. in the
manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing
- one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to
+ one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to
live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes
to be oneself the object known. To choose to live in the society of others might,
therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the
@@ -3646,11 +3646,11 @@
receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing,
since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and
imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is
- friendship)— but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it
+ friendship)— but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it
pleasanter to share good things with our friends,as far as these fall to each,
- and the best that each can— but among these, it falls to one to share
+ and the best that each can— but among these, it falls to one to share
bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another
- philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend
+ philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend
(whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are'This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a
line of verse.), so that they must not be separated when
this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship,
@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@
the truth from the following consideration: 'friend' really denotes,
in the language of the proverb,Quoted elsewhere in the same connection, but one may conjecture
that the phrase originally meant 'as strong as
- Hercules.''another Hercules'—another self; but the
+ Hercules.''another Hercules'—another self; but the
characteristics are scattered, and it is difficult for all to be
realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what
is most akin, yet one resembles his friend in body and another in
@@ -3680,7 +3680,7 @@
live well oneself and for one's friend also to live well, and if
living together involves working together, surely their partnership
will be pre-eminently in things included in the End. Hence we should
- study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of
+ study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of
food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to
be real social intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really wishes to
share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or
@@ -3771,20 +3771,20 @@
possible to use any given thing both for its natural purpose and
otherwise, and in the latter case to use it qua
itself or on the contrary incidentally: for instance, with an eye qua eye, to see, or also just to see wrong,
- by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses
+ by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses
of the eye, then, use it because it is an eye, but it would be
possible to make use of an eye but to use it in another way,
incidentally, for example, if it were possible to sell it or to eat
it. And similarly with
the use of knowledge: one can use it truly, and one can use it
- wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on
+ wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on
purpose, then at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just as
dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and the foot and use foot
as hand and hand as foot.i.e.
stand on their hands and wave their feet in the
air. If then
all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it would be possible to use
- even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be
+ even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be
behaving unjustly by doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when
one makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge; but if this is impossible,
it is clear that the virtues cannot be branches of knowledge.
@@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@
Who then is there in whom this occurs? or is it in the same way as the
vice of the irrational part of the spirit is termed lack of control,
and the uncontrolled man is in a manner
- profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite
+ profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite
is powerful it will turn him round, and he will draw the opposite
inference? Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the
irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and folly are
@@ -3820,12 +3820,12 @@
there is folly in the rational should not convert the folly and make
it form wise and proper judgements, and again wisdom in the rational
part should not make profligacy in the irrational act
- temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially
+ temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially
is. So that there will actually be wise action arising from folly.
But these
consequences are absurd, especially that of using wisdom wisely as a
result of folly; for that is a thing which we certainly do not see in
- other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical
+ other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical
knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one's ignorance if
it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but
rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to
@@ -3845,7 +3845,7 @@
that some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed
in things in which luck is paramount, and some even in things which
involve skill although also containing a large element of
- luck—for example strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men fortunate
+ luck—for example strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men fortunate
as a result of a certain state of character, or are they enabled to
achieve fortunate results not by reason of a certain quality in
themselves? As it is, people think the latter, holding that some men
@@ -3856,9 +3856,9 @@
For it is clear
that they do not succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is not
irrational but can give reason why it acts as it does, whereas they
- could not say why they succeed—for that would be science;
+ could not say why they succeed—for that would be science;
and moreover it is
- manifest that they succeed in spite of being unwise—not
+ manifest that they succeed in spite of being unwise—not
unwise about other matters (for that would not be anything strange,
for example HippocratesA
Pythagorean philosopher of Chios, fl. 460
@@ -3886,7 +3886,7 @@
fortune is the opposite. If, then, unexpected achievement seems a
matter of fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune, it
would seem that the cause is not of such a sort as to produce the same
- result always or generally— further, if a man's succeeding or not
+ result always or generally— further, if a man's succeeding or not
succeeding is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does not
see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune but nature is the
cause; therefore he is not a man who has good fortune but one who has
@@ -3899,7 +3899,7 @@
certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether,
then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the
fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it
- we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it
+ we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it
as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human
reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then,
would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some
@@ -3920,17 +3920,17 @@
appetition? and are not the latter prior?because if the impulse caused by desire for
what is pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely by
nature proceed towards what is good in every case. If, therefore, some men have
- good natures—just as musical people though they have not
+ good natures—just as musical people though they have not
learnt to singOr, with
Jackson's additions, 'just
as untaught musical geniuses, without professional knowledge of
- singing.' have a natural aptitude for it—and
+ singing.' have a natural aptitude for it—and
without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the
natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at
the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact
foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although
unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are
- fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually
+ fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually
successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by
nature.Or has the term 'good fortune' more than one
meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the
@@ -3969,9 +3969,9 @@
nor does it prove that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that
fortune is not the cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of
all the things of which it seems to be the cause.Yet someone may raise the question whether fortune is the cause of
- precisely this—forming a desire for the right thing at the
+ precisely this—forming a desire for the right thing at the
right time. Or, on that showing, will not fortune be the cause of
- everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not
+ everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not
the case, that one only deliberates when one has deliberated even
previously to that deliberation,nor does one only think when one has previously thought
before thinking, and so on to infinity, but there is some
@@ -3982,7 +3982,7 @@
there is no other, and that this, merely owing to its being of such
and such a nature, can produce a result of such and such a nature?
But this is what
- we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in
+ we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in
the spirit? The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there,
everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us
is the cause of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason is not reason but
@@ -3997,7 +3997,7 @@
(whereas the
others have reason but have not this): they have inspiration, but they
cannot deliberate. For although irrational they attain even what
- belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination:
+ belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination:
only the divination that is based on reason we must not specify, but
some of them attain it by experience and others by practice in the use
of observation; and these men use the divine.The Ms. reading gives 'and experience and habit
@@ -4011,14 +4011,14 @@
also have it whose reason is disengaged in the manner
described.' This is why the melancholic even have dreams
that are true; for it seems that when the reason is disengaged
- principle has more strength— just as the
+ principle has more strength— just as the
blind remember better, being released from having their faculty of
memory engaged with objects of sight.Jackson
(with some hints from the Latin version) emends to give 'just as
blind men, who are released from attention to visibles, remember
better than others, because the faculty of memory is thus more
earnestly addressed to what has been said.'It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good
- fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's
+ fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's
success is thought to be due to the aid of God, and this is the man
who is successful in accordance with his impulse, while the other is
he who succeeds against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. The
@@ -4033,7 +4033,7 @@
'gentleman.'
Now it is manifest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly
must possess the particular virtues; for it is impossible for it to be
- otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for
+ otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for
instance, no one is healthy in his whole body but not in any part of
it, but all the parts, or most of them and the most important, must
necessarily be in the same condition as the whole. Now being good and being noble
@@ -4042,10 +4042,10 @@
themselves. Of these, all those are fine
which are laudable as existing for their own sakes, for these are the
Ends which are both the motives of laudable actions and laudable
- themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate
+ themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate
actions, for temperance also is laudable; but health is not laudable,
for its effect is not, nor is vigorous action laudable, for strength
- is not—these things are good but they are not laudable.
+ is not—these things are good but they are not laudable.
And similarly
induction makes this clear in the other cases also. Therefore a man is
good for whom the things good by nature are good. For the things men
@@ -4073,7 +4073,7 @@
the noble man the things good by nature are fine; for what is just is
fine, and what is according to worth is just, and he is worthy of
these things; and what is
- befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth,
+ befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth,
power. Hence for the noble man the same things are both advantageous
and fine; but for the multitude these things do not coincide, for
things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are
@@ -4119,13 +4119,13 @@
(Solomon).); since clearly God is in need of nothing.
Therefore whatever
mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by
- nature—whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the
- other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God, that
+ nature—whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the
+ other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God, that
is the best mode, and that standard is the finest;and any mode of choice and
acquisition that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from
- serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one.
+ serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one.
This is how it is
- for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to
+ for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to
be as far as possible unconscious of the irrational part of the
spirit, as such.Let this, then, be our
statement of what is the standard of nobility and what is the aim of
diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg010/tlg0086.tlg010.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg010/tlg0086.tlg010.perseus-eng1.xml
index 0f2ad8fd4..8400a718e 100644
--- a/data/tlg0086/tlg010/tlg0086.tlg010.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg010/tlg0086.tlg010.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -157,29 +157,29 @@ convert to P3
Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking,
seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all
- things aim. (It is true that a certain variety
+ things aim. (It is true that a certain variety
is to be observed among the ends at which the arts and sciences aim: in some cases the
activity of practising the art is itself the end,Aristotle gives flute-playing as an instance of an art the practice of which is an end
in itself, in contrast with the art of building, the end of which is the house built
Aristot. Gtr. Mor. 1211b 27 ff. whereas
in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the
arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these
- products are essentially superior in value to the activities.) But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows
+ products are essentially superior in value to the activities.) But as there are numerous pursuits and arts and sciences, it follows
that their ends are correspondingly numerous: for instance, the end of the science of
medicine is health, that of the art of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory,
that of domestic economy wealth. Now in cases where
- several such pursuits are subordinate to some single faculty—as bridle-making
+ several such pursuits are subordinate to some single faculty—as bridle-making
and the other trades concerned with horses' harness are subordinate to horsemanship, and
this and every other military pursuit to the science of strategy, and similarly other arts
- to different arts again—in all these cases, I say, the ends of the master arts
+ to different arts again—in all these cases, I say, the ends of the master arts
are things more to be desired than the ends of the arts subordinate to them; since the
- latter ends are only pursued for the sake of the former. (And it makes no difference whether the ends of the pursuits are the activities
+ latter ends are only pursued for the sake of the former. (And it makes no difference whether the ends of the pursuits are the activities
themselves or some other thing beside these, as in the case of the sciences
- mentioned.)
+ mentioned.)
If therefore among the ends at which our actions aim there be one which we will for its
own sake, while we will the others only for the sake of this, and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else
- (which would obviously result in a process ad
- infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear
+ (which would obviously result in a process ad
+ infinitum, so that all desire would be futile and vain), it is clear
that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed the Supreme Good. Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great
practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better enable us to attain our
proper object, like archers having a target to aim at? If
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ convert to P3
this Supreme Good is, and of which of the sciences or faculties it is the object.
Now it would seem that this supreme End must be the object of the most authoritative of
- the sciences—some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such is manifestly the science of Politics; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist in
+ the sciences—some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such is manifestly the science of Politics; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences are to exist in
states, and
what branches of knowledge the different classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to
what point; and we observe that even the most highly esteemed of the faculties, such as
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ convert to P3
shall refrain from doing, the end of this science must include the ends of all the others.
Therefore, the Good of man must be the end of the science of Politics. For even though it be the case that the Good is the same for the
individual and for the state, nevertheless, the good of the state is manifestly a greater
- and more perfect good, both to attain and to preserve.Or perhaps ‘both to ascertain and to secure.’ To secure the
+ and more perfect good, both to attain and to preserve.Or perhaps ‘both to ascertain and to secure.’ To secure the
good of one person only is better than nothing; but to secure the good of a nation or a
state is a nobler and more divine achievement.
This then being its aim, our investigation is in a sense the study of Politics.
@@ -205,10 +205,10 @@ convert to P3
all departments of philosophy alike, any more than in all the products of the arts and
crafts. The subjects studied by political science are
Moral Nobilitykalo/n
- is a term of admiration applied to what is correct, especially (1)
- bodies well shaped and works of art or handicraft well made, and (2)
- actions well done (see 3.7.6); it thus means (1)
- beautiful, (2) morally right. For the analogy between material and
+ is a term of admiration applied to what is correct, especially (1)
+ bodies well shaped and works of art or handicraft well made, and (2)
+ actions well done (see 3.7.6); it thus means (1)
+ beautiful, (2) morally right. For the analogy between material and
moral correctness see 2.6.9. and Justice; but these conceptions involve much
difference of opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be mere
conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of things. And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the Good, because
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ convert to P3
in character: the defect is not a question of time, it is because their life and its
various aims are guided by feeling; for to such persons their knowledge is of no use, any
more than it is to persons of defective self-restraint.The argument is, that even if the young could gain a knowledge of Ethics
- (which they cannot, because it requires experience of life), they
+ (which they cannot, because it requires experience of life), they
would not use it as a guide to conduct, because they are led by their passions and
appetites; and therefore the study is of no value for them, since Ethics, being a
practical science, is only pursued for the sake of its practical application. But
@@ -248,17 +248,17 @@ convert to P3
what is the highest of all the goods that action can achieve. As far as the name goes, we may almost say that the great majority of
mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of
it as Happiness,This translation of eu)daimoni/a can hardly be avoided, but it would perhaps be
- more accurately rendered by ‘Well-being’ or
- ‘Prosperity’; and it will be found that the writer does not
+ more accurately rendered by ‘Well-being’ or
+ ‘Prosperity’; and it will be found that the writer does not
interpret it as a state of feeling but as a kind of activity. and conceive
- ‘the good life’ or ‘doing well’The English phrase preserves the ambiguity of the Greek,
- which in its ordinary acceptation rather means ‘faring well’ than
- ‘acting well,’ though in the sequel Aristotle diverts it to the
+ ‘the good life’ or ‘doing well’The English phrase preserves the ambiguity of the Greek,
+ which in its ordinary acceptation rather means ‘faring well’ than
+ ‘acting well,’ though in the sequel Aristotle diverts it to the
active sense. to be the same thing as
- ‘being happy.’ But what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute;
+ ‘being happy.’ But what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute;
and the popular account of it is not the same as that given by the philosophers.
Ordinary people identify it with some obvious and
- visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some say one thing and some
+ visible good, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some say one thing and some
another, indeed very often the same man says different things at different times: when he
falls sick he thinks health is happiness, when he is poor, wealth. At other times, feeling
conscious of their own ignorance, men admire those who propound something grand and above
@@ -274,8 +274,8 @@ convert to P3
raise this question, and to enquire whether the true procedure is to start from or to lead
up to one's first principles, as in a race-course one may run from the judges to the far end of
the track or the reverse. Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known. But
- ‘the known’ has two meanings—‘what is known to
- us,’ which is one thing, and ‘what is knowable in itself,’
+ ‘the known’ has two meanings—‘what is known to
+ us,’ which is one thing, and ‘what is knowable in itself,’
which is another. Perhaps then for usIn contrast
apparently with the school of Plato. at all events it proper to start from what
is known to us. This is why in order to be a competent
@@ -299,29 +299,29 @@ convert to P3
we digressed. To judge from men's lives, the more or less reasoned conceptions of the Good
or Happiness that seem to prevail are the following. On the one hand the generality of men
and the most vulgar identify the Good with pleasure, and
- accordingly are content with the Life of Enjoyment—for there are three specially
+ accordingly are content with the Life of Enjoyment—for there are three specially
prominent Lives,The doctrine of the three Lives goes
back to Pythagoras, who compared the three kinds of men to the three classes of
strangers who went to the Games, traders, competitors, and spectators
- (Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 58). This apologue brings out
+ (Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 58). This apologue brings out
the metaphor underlying the phrase qewrhtiko\s bi/os,
- lit. ‘the life of the spectator’ (
- Burnet). the one just mentioned, the
+ lit. ‘the life of the spectator’ (
+ Burnet). the one just mentioned, the
Life of Politics, and thirdly, the Life of Contemplation. The generality of mankind then show themselves to
be utterly slavish, by preferring what is only a life for cattle; but they get a hearing
for their view as reasonable because many persons of high position share the feelings of
Sardanapallus.The last two words of the Greek look
like a verse passage loosely quoted. Sardanapallus was a mythical Assyrian king; two
- versions of his epitaph are recorded by Athenaeus (336, 530), one
+ versions of his epitaph are recorded by Athenaeus (336, 530), one
containing the words e)/sqie, pi=ne, pai=ze: w(s ta)=lla tou/tou
- ou)k a)/cia tou= a)pokroth/matos, ‘Eat, drink, play, since all
- else is not worth that snap of the fingers’; the other ends kei=n' e)/xw o(/ss' e)/fagon kai\ e)fu/brisa kai\ met' e)/rwtos te/rpn'
- e)/paqon: ta\ de\ kai\ o)/lbia pa/nta le/luntai, ‘I have what I
+ ou)k a)/cia tou= a)pokroth/matos, ‘Eat, drink, play, since all
+ else is not worth that snap of the fingers’; the other ends kei=n' e)/xw o(/ss' e)/fagon kai\ e)fu/brisa kai\ met' e)/rwtos te/rpn'
+ e)/paqon: ta\ de\ kai\ o)/lbia pa/nta le/luntai, ‘I have what I
ate; and the delightful deeds of wantonness and love which I did and suffered; whereas
- all my wealth is vanished.’
+ all my wealth is vanished.’
Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is
- honor—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. But honor
+ honor—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. But honor
after all seems too superficial to be the Good for which we are seeking; since it appears
to depend on those who confer it more than on him upon whom it is conferred, whereas we
instinctively feel that the Good must be something proper to its possessor and not easy to
@@ -333,27 +333,27 @@ convert to P3
the Political Life. But even virtue proves on examination to be too incomplete to be the
End; since it appears possible to possess it while you are asleep, or without putting it
into practice throughout the whole of your life; and also for the virtuous man to suffer
- the greatest misery and misfortune— though no one would pronounce a man living a life
+ the greatest misery and misfortune— though no one would pronounce a man living a life
of misery to be happy, unless for the sake of maintaining a paradox. But we need not
pursue this subject, since it has been sufficiently treated in the ordinary
discussions.It is not certain whether this phrase
- refers to written treatises (whether Aristotle's own dialogues and other
- popular works, now lost, or those of other philosophers), or to philosophical
- debates like those which Plato's dialogues purport to report (as did doubtless
- those of Aristotle). Cf. De caelo 279a 30
- e)n toi=s e)gkukli/ois filosofh/masi, ‘in the
- ordinary philosophical discussions,’ and De anima
+ refers to written treatises (whether Aristotle's own dialogues and other
+ popular works, now lost, or those of other philosophers), or to philosophical
+ debates like those which Plato's dialogues purport to report (as did doubtless
+ those of Aristotle). Cf. De caelo 279a 30
+ e)n toi=s e)gkukli/ois filosofh/masi, ‘in the
+ ordinary philosophical discussions,’ and De anima
407b 29
- toi=s e)n koinw=| ginome/nois lo/gois, ‘the
- discussions that go on in public’; and see 13.9 note for similar references to
- ‘extraneous discussions.’
+ toi=s e)n koinw=| ginome/nois lo/gois, ‘the
+ discussions that go on in public’; and see 13.9 note for similar references to
+ ‘extraneous discussions.’
The third type of life is the Life of Contemplation, which we shall consider in the
sequel.
The Life of Money-making is a constrainedLiterally
- ‘violent’; the adjective is applied to the strict diet and and
+ ‘violent’; the adjective is applied to the strict diet and and
laborious exercises of athletes, and to physical phenomena such as motion, in the sense
- of ‘constrained’, ‘not natural’. The text here
+ of ‘constrained’, ‘not natural’. The text here
has been suspected. kind of life, and clearly wealth is not the Good we are in
search of, for it is only good as being useful, a means to something else. On this score
indeed one might conceive the ends before mentioned to have a better claim, for they are
@@ -362,32 +362,32 @@ convert to P3
them.
But perhaps it is desirable that we should examine the notion of a Universal Good, and
review the difficulties that it involves, although such an inquiry goes against the grain
- because of our friendship for the authors of the Theory of Ideas.The translation ‘Forms’ is perhaps less misleading:
+ because of our friendship for the authors of the Theory of Ideas.The translation ‘Forms’ is perhaps less misleading:
ei)=dos is not a psychological term. Still
perhaps it would appear desirable, and indeed it would seem to be obligatory, especially
for a philosopher, to sacrifice even one's closest personal ties in defense of the truth.
Both are dear to us, yet 'tis our duty to prefer the truth.Probably a verse quotation.
The originatorsOr perhaps
- ‘importers’ from the Pythagoreans of S. Italy. of this
- theory, then, used not to postulate Ideas of groups of things in which they positedPerhaps ‘we posit’. an order of
- priority and posteriorityA is ‘prior in
- nature’ (though not necessarily in time) to B, when A can
+ ‘importers’ from the Pythagoreans of S. Italy. of this
+ theory, then, used not to postulate Ideas of groups of things in which they positedPerhaps ‘we posit’. an order of
+ priority and posteriorityA is ‘prior in
+ nature’ (though not necessarily in time) to B, when A can
exist without B but not B without A; and they cannot then be on a par as members of one
- class. (for which reason they did not construct an Idea of numbers in
- general). But Good is predicated alike in
- the Categories of Substance, of Quality, and Relation; yet the Absolute,Lit. ‘that which is by itself’.
+ class. (for which reason they did not construct an Idea of numbers in
+ general). But Good is predicated alike in
+ the Categories of Substance, of Quality, and Relation; yet the Absolute,Lit. ‘that which is by itself’.
or Substance, is prior in nature to the Relative, which seems to be a sort of offshoot or
- ‘accident’ of Substance; so that there cannot be a common Idea
+ ‘accident’ of Substance; so that there cannot be a common Idea
corresponding to the absolutely good and the relatively good.
- Again, the word ‘good’ is used in as many senses as the word
- ‘is’; for we may predicate good in the Category of Substance, for
- instance of God, or intelligence; in that of Quality—the excellences; in that of
- Quantity—moderate in amount; in that of Relation—useful; in that of
- Time—a favorable opportunity; in that of Place—a suitable
- ‘habitat’di/aita is used of the habitat of a species of animals, De mundo 398b 32; though it has been taken here to mean
- ‘a favorable climate’ for human beings. In Aristoph. Frogs 114 it may mean ‘a
- lodging’, and later it denotes an apartment or suite of rooms, as in
+ Again, the word ‘good’ is used in as many senses as the word
+ ‘is’; for we may predicate good in the Category of Substance, for
+ instance of God, or intelligence; in that of Quality—the excellences; in that of
+ Quantity—moderate in amount; in that of Relation—useful; in that of
+ Time—a favorable opportunity; in that of Place—a suitable
+ ‘habitat’di/aita is used of the habitat of a species of animals, De mundo 398b 32; though it has been taken here to mean
+ ‘a favorable climate’ for human beings. In Aristoph. Frogs 114 it may mean ‘a
+ lodging’, and later it denotes an apartment or suite of rooms, as in
Pliny's descriptions of Italian
villas.; and so on. So clearly good cannot be a single and universal general
notion; if it were, it would not be predicable in all the Categories, but only in
@@ -399,32 +399,32 @@ convert to P3
that of medicine; and the due amount in diet comes under medicine, in bodily exercise
under gymnastics.
One might also raise the question what precisely they mean by their expression the
- ‘Ideal so and-so,’Literally
- ‘so-and-so itself.’ seeing that one and the same definition
- of man applies both to ‘the Ideal man’ and to
- ‘man,’i.e., ‘the
- ordinary notion of man’—the concept of man in general which we form
+ ‘Ideal so and-so,’Literally
+ ‘so-and-so itself.’ seeing that one and the same definition
+ of man applies both to ‘the Ideal man’ and to
+ ‘man,’i.e., ‘the
+ ordinary notion of man’—the concept of man in general which we form
from our experience of particular men, but do not regard as a thing existing
- independently of them—; or perhaps ‘a particular man,’ but
+ independently of them—; or perhaps ‘a particular man,’ but
this seems to require a)nqrw/pw| tini/ or tw=|de. for in so far as both are man, there will be no
difference between them; and if so, no more will there be any difference between
- ‘the Ideal Good’ and ‘Good’ in so far as both are
+ ‘the Ideal Good’ and ‘Good’ in so far as both are
good. Nor yet will the Ideal Good be any more good
because it is eternal, seeing that a white thing that lasts a long time is no whiter than
one that lasts only a day.
The PythagoreansThis parenthetical note might come
- better after 6.4 (Burnet, Cl. Rev. 3:198). The
- Pythagoreans, instead of (like Plato) saying the Good was one, more
- wisely said the One was good (or akin to the Good). Some of them
- (Aristot. Met. 986a 22)
+ better after 6.4 (Burnet, Cl. Rev. 3:198). The
+ Pythagoreans, instead of (like Plato) saying the Good was one, more
+ wisely said the One was good (or akin to the Good). Some of them
+ (Aristot. Met. 986a 22)
taught that there were ten pairs of opposing principles, which they ranged in two
- columns—limit and the unlimited, odd and even, unity and plurality, right and
+ columns—limit and the unlimited, odd and even, unity and plurality, right and
left, male and female, resting and moving, straight and crooked, light and darkness,
- good and bad, square and oblong. They also held (Aristot. Met. 1072b 32) that good and
+ good and bad, square and oblong. They also held (Aristot. Met. 1072b 32) that good and
beauty were not original, but appeared in the course of the evolution of the world;
hence perhaps the late position of good in the list of opposites. The phrase
- ‘column of goods’ (cf. Aristot. Met. 1093b 12 ‘column of the beautiful’)
- is inexact, as good was only one of the things in the column—unless it means
+ ‘column of goods’ (cf. Aristot. Met. 1093b 12 ‘column of the beautiful’)
+ is inexact, as good was only one of the things in the column—unless it means
the column to which good things among others belong; but doubtless all the positive
principles were regarded as akin. seem to give a more probable doctrine on the
subject of the Good when they place Unity in their column of goods; and indeed
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ convert to P3
things pursued and accepted for their own sake are pronounced good as belonging to a
single species, while things productive or preservative of these in any way, or preventive
of their opposites, are said to be good as a means to these, and in a different sense.
- Clearly then the term ‘goods’ would
- have two meanings, (1) things good in themselves and
- (2) things good as a means to these; let us then separate things good in
+ Clearly then the term ‘goods’ would
+ have two meanings, (1) things good in themselves and
+ (2) things good as a means to these; let us then separate things good in
themselves from things useful as means, and consider whether the former are called good
because they fall under a single Idea. But what sort of
things is one to class as good in themselves? Are they not those things which are sought
@@ -446,8 +446,8 @@ convert to P3
and honors? for even if we also pursue these things as means to something else, still one
would class them among things good in themselves. Or is there nothing else good in itself except the Idea? If so, the species will be of
no use.i.e., the species or class of things good in
- themselves will be a class to which nothing belongs (for the Idea is not
- in the class).
+ themselves will be a class to which nothing belongs (for the Idea is not
+ in the class).
If on the contrary the class of things good in
themselves includes these objects, the same notion of good ought to be manifested in all
of them, just as the same notion of white is manifested in snow and in white paint. But as
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ convert to P3
in virtue of being derived from one good; or because they all contribute to one good. Or
perhaps it is rather by way of a proportionThe
writer's own solution: when different things are called good, it means they each bear
- the same relation to (viz. contribute to the welfare of) certain other
+ the same relation to (viz. contribute to the welfare of) certain other
things, not all to the same thing.: that is, as sight is good in the body, so
intelligence is good in the soul, and similarly another thing in something else.
Perhaps however this question must be dismissed for the present, since a detailed
@@ -473,15 +473,15 @@ convert to P3
pattern we shall more easily know what things are good for us, and knowing them, obtain
them. Now it is true that this argument has a certain
plausibility; but it does not seem to square with the actual procedure of the sciences.
- For these all aim at some good, and seek to make up their deficiencies,Or perhaps ‘to supply what is lacking of
- it’ (the good at which they aim); cf. 7.17. but they
+ For these all aim at some good, and seek to make up their deficiencies,Or perhaps ‘to supply what is lacking of
+ it’ (the good at which they aim); cf. 7.17. but they
do not trouble about a knowledge of the Ideal Good. Yet if it were so potent an aid, it is
improbable that all the professors of the arts and sciences should not know it, nor even
seek to discover it. Moreover, it is not easy to see how
knowing that same Ideal Good will help a weaver or carpenter in the practice of his own
craft, or how anybody will be a better physician or general for having contemplated the
absolute Idea. In fact it does not appear that the physician studies even healthi.e., the particular good which is the end of his own
- science. in the abstract; he studies the health of the human being—or
+ science. in the abstract; he studies the health of the human being—or
rather of some particular human being, for it is individuals that he has to cure.
Let us here conclude our discussion of this subject.
We may now return to the Good which is the object of our search, and try to find out what
@@ -489,23 +489,23 @@ convert to P3
another: it is different in medicine from what it is in strategy, and so on with the rest
of the arts. What definition of the Good then will hold true in all the arts? Perhaps we
may define it as that for the sake of which everything else is done. This applies to
- something different in each different art—to health in the case of medicine,
+ something different in each different art—to health in the case of medicine,
to victory in that of strategy, to a house in
architecture, and to something else in each of the other arts; but in every pursuit or
undertaking it describes the end of that pursuit or undertaking, since in all of them it
is for the sake of the end that everything else is done. Hence if there be something which
is the end of all the things done by human action, this will be the practicable
- Good—or if there be several such ends, the sum of these will be the Good.
+ Good—or if there be several such ends, the sum of these will be the Good.
Thus by changing its ground the argument has reached
the same result as before.Cf. 2.1. We must
attempt however to render this still more precise.
Now there do appear to be several ends at which our actions aim; but as we choose some of
- them—for instance wealth, or flutes,Perhaps
- a note on ‘instruments,’ interpolated. and instruments
- generally—as a means to something else, it is clear that not all of them are
+ them—for instance wealth, or flutes,Perhaps
+ a note on ‘instruments,’ interpolated. and instruments
+ generally—as a means to something else, it is clear that not all of them are
final ends; whereas the Supreme Good seems to be something final. Consequently if there be
- some one thing which alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several
- final ends, the one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which we
+ some one thing which alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several
+ final ends, the one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which we
are seeking. In speaking of degrees of finality, we mean
that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a means to
something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more final
@@ -513,23 +513,23 @@ convert to P3
a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely final. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in
this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and never as a means to something else;
whereas honor, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose
- indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them although
- no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for the sake
+ indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them although
+ no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for the sake
of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it. But no one
chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, etc., nor as a means to anything
whatever other than itself.
The same conclusion also appears to follow from a consideration of the self-sufficiency
- of happiness—for it is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in
+ of happiness—for it is felt that the final good must be a thing sufficient in
itself. The term self-sufficient, however, we employ with reference not to oneself alone,
living a life of isolation, but also to one's parents and children and wife, and one's
- friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a social being.Lit. ‘a political thing.’ Aristot. Pol. 1253a 2 adds zw=|on, ‘a political animal.’
+ friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a social being.Lit. ‘a political thing.’ Aristot. Pol. 1253a 2 adds zw=|on, ‘a political animal.’
On the other hand a limit has to be assumed in these
relationships; for if the list be extended to one's ancestors and descendants and to the
friends of one's friends, it will go on ad infinitum. But
this is a point that must be considered later on; we take a self-sufficient thing to mean
a thing which merely standing by itself alone renders life desirable lacking in
nothing,A probable emendation gives
- ‘renders life sufficient, that is, lacking in nothing.’ and
+ ‘renders life sufficient, that is, lacking in nothing.’ and
such a thing we deem happiness to be. Moreover, we think
happiness the most desirable of all good things without being itself reckoned as one among
the restSc. but as including all other good things as
@@ -555,47 +555,47 @@ convert to P3
function be? The mere act of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are
looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore set aside the vital activity of
nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come some form of sentient life; but this too
- appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally. There remains therefore what may be called the practical‘Practice’ for Aristotle denotes
+ appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally. There remains therefore what may be called the practical‘Practice’ for Aristotle denotes
purposeful conduct, of which only rational beings are capable, cf. 6.2.2 note.
- life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions,This anticipation of 13.19 is irrelevant, and states
+ life of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions,This anticipation of 13.19 is irrelevant, and states
decisively a point there left doubtful. Also on grounds of Greek this parenthesis has
been suspected as an interpolation, and perhaps we should leave it out and render the
- preceding words ‘the practical life of a rational being.’ one
+ preceding words ‘the practical life of a rational being.’ one
rational as obedient to principle, the others possessing principle and exercising
- intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are
+ intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are
here concerned with the active exerciseIn contrast
with the mere state of possessing the faculty. of the rational faculty, since
this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. If
- then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul's facultiesLiterally ‘activity of soul’; yuxh/ however has a wider connotation than either
- ‘soul’ or ‘mind,’ and includes the whole of the
+ then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul's facultiesLiterally ‘activity of soul’; yuxh/ however has a wider connotation than either
+ ‘soul’ or ‘mind,’ and includes the whole of the
vitality of any living creature. in conformity with rational principle, or at all
events not in dissociation from rational principle, and if we acknowledge the function of
- an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a harper
- and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the same,
+ an individual and of a good individual of the same class (for instance, a harper
+ and a good harper, and so generally with all classes) to be generically the same,
the qualification of the latter's superiority in excellence being added to the function in
- his case (I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a
- good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the
+ his case (I mean that if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a
+ good harper is to play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the
function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of
the soul's faculties and activities in association with rational principle, and say that the function of a good man is to perform these
activities well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in
- accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that
+ accordance with its own proper excellence—from these premises it follows that
the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with
excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity
with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover, to
be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one
fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessedThe word maka/rios, rendered
- ‘blessed’ or ‘supremely happy,’ is a derivative
+ ‘blessed’ or ‘supremely happy,’ is a derivative
of ma/kar, the adjective applied in Homer and Hesiod to
the gods and to those of mankind who have been admitted after death to the Islands of
the Blest. See 10.16, 12.4. and happy.
- Let this account then serve to describe the Good in outline—for no doubt the
+
Let this account then serve to describe the Good in outline—for no doubt the
proper procedure is to begin by making a rough sketch, and to fill it in afterwards. If a
work has been well laid down in outline, to carry it on and complete it in detail may be
supposed to be within the capacity of anybody; and in this working out of details Time
seems to be a good inventor or at all events coadjutor. This indeed is how advances in the
arts have actually come about, since anyone can fill in the gaps. Also the warning given above3.1-4. must not be forgotten; we must not look for equal exactness in all
departments of study, but only such as belongs to the subject matter of each, and in such
- a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry. A carpenter and a geometrician both try to find a right angle,Or ‘straight line.’ but in
+ a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry. A carpenter and a geometrician both try to find a right angle,Or ‘straight line.’ but in
different ways; the former is content with that approximation to it which satisfies the
purpose of his work; the latter, being a student of truth, seeks to find its essence or
essential attributes. We should therefore proceed in the same manner in other subjects
@@ -603,18 +603,18 @@ convert to P3
Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of the reason why things are
what they are; in some cases it is enough if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily
established.Cf. 4.7. This is the case with
- first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a first
- principle. And principles are studied—some by
+ first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a first
+ principle. And principles are studied—some by
induction, others by perception, others by some form of habituation, and also others
- otherwiseThis is usually taken ‘that is,
- different ones in different ways,’ but kai\ . . .
+ otherwiseThis is usually taken ‘that is,
+ different ones in different ways,’ but kai\ . . .
de/ seems to refer to other classes as well.; so we must endeavor to arrive at the principles of each kind in their
natural manner, and must also be careful to define them correctly, since they are of great importance for the subsequent course of the
- enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole,The usual form of the proverb is ‘The beginning is half of the
- whole.’ Aristotle applies it by a sort of play on words to a)rxh/ in its technical sense of a general principle of
- science, which is a ‘beginning’ in the sense that it is the
+ enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole,The usual form of the proverb is ‘The beginning is half of the
+ whole.’ Aristotle applies it by a sort of play on words to a)rxh/ in its technical sense of a general principle of
+ science, which is a ‘beginning’ in the sense that it is the
starting-point of deductive reasoning. There is a reminiscence of Hesiod, Hes. WD 30, ple/on h(/misu
- panto/s, ‘The half is more than the whole,’ though the
+ panto/s, ‘The half is more than the whole,’ though the
meaning of that is entirely different. and throws light at once on many of the
questions under investigation.
Accordingly we must examine our first principlei.e.
@@ -624,28 +624,28 @@ convert to P3
false, it is quickly seen to be discordant with them.
Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and
goods of the soul and of the body on the otherThe turn
- of phrase associates ‘bodily goods’ with ‘goods of the
- soul,’ both being personal, in contrast with the third class,
- ‘external goods.’ But it at once appears that the important
- distinction is between ‘goods of the soul’ on the one hand and all
- rest (‘the good in the body and those outside and of
- fortune,’ 7.13.2) on the other. Hence in 8.3 ‘external
- goods’ must include ‘bodily goods’ as also 8.15 f., where
- ‘external goods’ are subdivided into the instruments and the
- indispensable conditions of well-being (and so in more scientific language,
- 9.7), the latter subdivision including beauty, the only bodily good there
+ of phrase associates ‘bodily goods’ with ‘goods of the
+ soul,’ both being personal, in contrast with the third class,
+ ‘external goods.’ But it at once appears that the important
+ distinction is between ‘goods of the soul’ on the one hand and all
+ rest (‘the good in the body and those outside and of
+ fortune,’ 7.13.2) on the other. Hence in 8.3 ‘external
+ goods’ must include ‘bodily goods’ as also 8.15 f., where
+ ‘external goods’ are subdivided into the instruments and the
+ indispensable conditions of well-being (and so in more scientific language,
+ 9.7), the latter subdivision including beauty, the only bodily good there
specified.; and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly
pronounce good in the fullest sense and the highest degree. But it is our actions and the
soul's active exercise of its functionsSee the
- definition, 7.15. that we posit (as being Happiness); hence so
- far as this opinion goes—and it is of long standing, and generally accepted by
- students of philosophy—it supports the correctness of our definition of
+ definition, 7.15. that we posit (as being Happiness); hence so
+ far as this opinion goes—and it is of long standing, and generally accepted by
+ students of philosophy—it supports the correctness of our definition of
Happiness.
It also shows it to be right in declaring the End to consist in certain actions or
activities, for thus the End is included among goods of the soul, and not among external goods.See 8.2, first note.
Again, our definition accords with the description of the happy man as one who
- ‘lives well’ or ‘does well’; for it has virtually
+ ‘lives well’ or ‘does well’; for it has virtually
identified happiness with a form of good life or doing well.Cf. 4.2 note.
And moreover all the various characteristics that are looked for in happiness are found
@@ -658,36 +658,36 @@ convert to P3
and neither class is likely to be altogether mistaken; the probability is that their
beliefs are at least partly, or indeed mainly, correct.
Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our
- definition is in agreement; for ‘activity in conformity with virtue’
+ definition is in agreement; for ‘activity in conformity with virtue’
involves virtue. But no doubt it makes a great difference
whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying
- it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man
+ it—on disposition, or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man
may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is
asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise
- cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the
+ cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act, and act well. And just as at the
Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest
- persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among
- these that the winners are found,—so it is those who act rightly
+ persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among
+ these that the winners are found,—so it is those who act rightly
who carry off the prizes and good things of life.
And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of
pleasure is an experience of the soul,Not an
- experience of the body (cf. 10.3.6), even the case of
- ‘bodily pleasures.’ This brings pleasure within the definition of
- happiness as “an activity of the soul.” and a thing gives a
- man pleasure in regard to which he is described as ‘fond of’
+ experience of the body (cf. 10.3.6), even the case of
+ ‘bodily pleasures.’ This brings pleasure within the definition of
+ happiness as “an activity of the soul.” and a thing gives a
+ man pleasure in regard to which he is described as ‘fond of’
so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond
of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice, and acts
conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue. But whereas the mass of mankind take pleasure in things that conflict with one
another,Morally inferior people like things that are
- only pleasant ‘accidentally,’ i.e. owing not to some quality
+ only pleasant ‘accidentally,’ i.e. owing not to some quality
inherent in the thing but to something extraneous to it, viz. some depravity of taste or
temporary affection in the person. Hence not only do different people think different
things pleasant but the same person thinks the same thing pleasant at one time and
- unpleasant at another—and so repents today of his indulgence yesterday; or he
+ unpleasant at another—and so repents today of his indulgence yesterday; or he
desires two incompatible things at once, or desires a thing with one part of his nature
that he dislikes with another, so that there is a conflict between his desires, or
- between his desire for pleasure and his wish for what he thinks good (see Bk.
- 9.4, esp. 4.8-10, and contrast 4.5.) because they are not pleasant of
+ between his desire for pleasure and his wish for what he thinks good (see Bk.
+ 9.4, esp. 4.8-10, and contrast 4.5.) because they are not pleasant of
their own nature, things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and
so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so that they are pleasant essentially as
well as pleasant to lovers of the noble. Therefore their
@@ -701,10 +701,10 @@ convert to P3
But they are also of course both good and noble, and each in the highest degree, if the
good man judges them rightly; and his judgement is as we have said. It follows therefore that happiness is at once the best, the noblest,
and the pleasantest of things: these qualities are not separated as the inscription at
- Delos makes out—
+ Delos makes out—
Justice is noblest, and health is best,
- But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,
+ But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,
for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one
activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness
@@ -713,38 +713,38 @@ convert to P3
we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished
with the necessary equipment.It was one of the public
duties of rich citizens at Athens to equip the
- chorus and actors of a drama at their own expense. One so doing was called xorhgo/s (chorus-leader, as no doubt originally he
- was), and the dresses, etc., he supplied, xorhgi/a. The latter term is frequently used by Aristotle to denote the
+ chorus and actors of a drama at their own expense. One so doing was called xorhgo/s (chorus-leader, as no doubt originally he
+ was), and the dresses, etc., he supplied, xorhgi/a. The latter term is frequently used by Aristotle to denote the
material equipment of life, and has almost or quite ceased to be felt as a
metaphor. For many noble actions require instruments for their performance, in the
shape of friends or wealth or political power; also
there are certain external advantages, the lack of which sullies supreme felicity, such as
good birth, satisfactory children, and personal beauty: a man of very ugly appearance or
low birth, or childless and alone in the world, is not our idea of a happy man, and still
- less so perhaps is one who has children or friendsPerhaps ‘or friends’ is slipped in because of ‘alone in
- the world’ just above, but friends should not be mentioned here among the
+ less so perhaps is one who has children or friendsPerhaps ‘or friends’ is slipped in because of ‘alone in
+ the world’ just above, but friends should not be mentioned here among the
indispensable conditions of happiness, as they were included just above among its
- instruments (see 8.2, first note). that are worthless, or who
+ instruments (see 8.2, first note). that are worthless, or who
has had good ones but lost them by death. As we said
therefore, happiness does seem to require the addition of external prosperity, and this is
- why some people identify it with good fortune (though some identify it with
+ why some people identify it with good fortune (though some identify it with
virtueThis irrelevant addition looks like an
- interpolation.).
+ interpolation.).
It is this that gives rise to the question whether happiness is a thing that can be
learnt, or acquired by training, or cultivated in some other manner, or whether it is
- bestowed by some divine dispensation or even by fortune. (1) Now if anything that men have is a gift of the gods, it is
- reasonable to suppose that happiness is divinely given—indeed of all man's
+ bestowed by some divine dispensation or even by fortune. (1) Now if anything that men have is a gift of the gods, it is
+ reasonable to suppose that happiness is divinely given—indeed of all man's
possessions it is most likely to be so, inasmuch as it is the best of them all. This subject however may perhaps more properly belong to another
branch of study.i.e., theology, but Aristotle does not
reopen the question in the Metaphysics or elsewhere. Still, even
if happiness is not sent us from heaven, but is won by virtue and by some kind of study or
practice, it seems to be one of the most divine things that exist. For the prize and end
- of virtue must clearly be supremely good—it must be something divine and
- blissful. (2) And also on our view it
+ of virtue must clearly be supremely good—it must be something divine and
+ blissful. (2) And also on our view it
will admit of being widely diffused, since it can be attained through some process of
study or effort by all persons whose capacity for virtue has not been stunted or maimed.
- (3) Again, if it is better to be happy
+ (3) Again, if it is better to be happy
as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is reasonable to
suppose that this is how happiness is won; inasmuch as in the world of nature things have
a natural tendency to be ordered in the best possible way, and the same is true of the products of art, and of causation of any kind, and
@@ -773,15 +773,15 @@ convert to P3
obey Solon's warning,See Hdt.
1.30-33. Solon visited Croesus, king of Lydia, and was shown all his treasures, but refused to call him the
happiest of mankind until he should have heard that he had ended his life without
- misfortune; he bade him ‘mark the end of every matter, how it should turn
- out.’ and ‘look to the end’? And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy
+ misfortune; he bade him ‘mark the end of every matter, how it should turn
+ out.’ and ‘look to the end’? And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy
after he is dead? Surely that is an extremely strange notion, especially for us who define
happiness as a form of activity! While if on the other
hand we refuse to speak of a dead man as happy, and Solon's words do not mean this, but
that only when a man is dead can one safely call him blessed as being now beyond the reach
of evil and misfortune, this also admits of some dispute; for it is believed that some
evil and also some good can befall the dead, just as much as they can happen to the living
- without their being aware of it— for
+ without their being aware of it— for
instance honors, and disgraces, and the prosperity and misfortunes of their children and
their descendants in general. But here too there is a
difficulty. For suppose a man to have lived in perfect happiness until old age, and to
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ convert to P3
remoteness from the ancestors in question. Now it would be a strange thing if the dead man
also were to changei.e., if our estimate of his life
as happy or the reverse had to change. There is no idea of the dead being conscious of
- what happens to their descendants (cf. 10.3 fin.), though this is
+ what happens to their descendants (cf. 10.3 fin.), though this is
inconsistently suggested by the wording of 10.5. with the fortunes of his family,
and were to become a happy man at one time and then miserable at another; yet on the other hand it would also be strange if ancestors were not
affected at all, even over a limited period, by the fortunes of their
@@ -806,8 +806,8 @@ convert to P3
and not readily subject to change, whereas the wheel of fortune often turns full circle in
the same person's experience. For it is clear that if we
are to be guided by fortune, we shall often have to call the same man first happy and then
- miserable; we shall make out the happy man to be a sort of ‘chameleon, or a
- house built on the sand.’Perhaps a verse
+ miserable; we shall make out the happy man to be a sort of ‘chameleon, or a
+ house built on the sand.’Perhaps a verse
from an unknown play.
But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgement by the changes of fortune,
@@ -826,8 +826,8 @@ convert to P3
remain happy all his life; since he will be always or at least most often employed in
doing and contemplating the things that are in
conformity with virtue. And he will bear changes of fortunes most nobly, and with perfect
- propriety in every way, being as he is ‘good in very truth’ and
- ‘four-square without reproach.’From the poem of Simonides quoted and discussed in Plat.
+ propriety in every way, being as he is ‘good in very truth’ and
+ ‘four-square without reproach.’From the poem of Simonides quoted and discussed in Plat.
Prot. 339.
But the accidents of fortune are many and vary in degree of magnitude; and although small
@@ -855,8 +855,8 @@ convert to P3
May not we then confidently pronounce that man happy who realizes complete goodness in
action, and is adequately furnished with external goods? Or should we add, that he must
also be destined to go on living notThe clause
- ‘not . . . lifetime’ stands above after ‘external
- goods’ in the mss. for any casual period but throughout a complete
+ ‘not . . . lifetime’ stands above after ‘external
+ goods’ in the mss. for any casual period but throughout a complete
lifetime in the same manner, and to die accordingly, because the future is hidden from us,
and we conceive happiness as an end, something utterly and absolutely final and complete?
If this is so, we shall pronounce those of the living who possess and are destined to go on
@@ -888,9 +888,9 @@ convert to P3
praise or rather one of those that we honorThe
definition of happiness is now shown to be supported by the current terms of moral
approbation; apparently e)paineton,
- ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘commendable,’ was appropriate
+ ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘commendable,’ was appropriate
to means , or things having relative value, and ti/mion,
- ‘valued’ or ‘revered,’ to ends, or things of
+ ‘valued’ or ‘revered,’ to ends, or things of
absolute value.; for it is at all events clear that it is not a mere
potentiality.i.e., not merely a potentiality of good
but an actual good, whether as means or end.
@@ -908,9 +908,9 @@ convert to P3
what is relative, it is clear that the best things do not merit praise, but something
greater and better: as indeed is generally recognized, since we speak of the gods as
blessed and happy,But we do not praise them.
- and also ‘blessed’ is the term that we apply to the most godlike men;
- and similarly with good things—no one praises happiness as one praises justice,
- but we call it a ‘blessing,’ deeming it something higher and more
+ and also ‘blessed’ is the term that we apply to the most godlike men;
+ and similarly with good things—no one praises happiness as one praises justice,
+ but we call it a ‘blessing,’ deeming it something higher and more
divine than things we praise.
Indeed it seems that EudoxusFor a criticism of the
hedonism of this unorthodox pupil of Plato see Bk. 10.2, 3. took a good line in
@@ -921,13 +921,13 @@ convert to P3
For praise belongs to goodness, since it is this that makes men capable of accomplishing
noble deeds, while encomiaEncomia or laudatory
orations are the chief constituent of Epideictic or Declamatory Oratory, one of the
- three branches (the others being Deliberative and Forensic) into which
- rhetoric is divided by Aristotle (Rhet. 1.3.). The
+ three branches (the others being Deliberative and Forensic) into which
+ rhetoric is divided by Aristotle (Rhet. 1.3.). The
topics of encomia are virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, which are analyzed
from this point of view in Rhet. 1.9. That chapter contains a parenthesis
- (9.33,34) distinguishing praise, as proper to pra/ceis, actions in operation, from encomia, which belong to e)/rga, the results achieved by action; but this distinction is
- not maintained in the context (9.35, and cf. 9.2 where God as well as man is
- given as an object of praise). are for deeds accomplished, whether
+ (9.33,34) distinguishing praise, as proper to pra/ceis, actions in operation, from encomia, which belong to e)/rga, the results achieved by action; but this distinction is
+ not maintained in the context (9.35, and cf. 9.2 where God as well as man is
+ given as an object of praise). are for deeds accomplished, whether
bodily feats or achievements of the mind. However, to
develop this subject is perhaps rather the business of those who have made a study of
encomia. For our purpose we may draw the conclusion from the foregoing remarks, that happiness is a
@@ -939,21 +939,21 @@ convert to P3
virtue, it is necessary to examine the nature of virtue. For this will probably assist us
in our investigation of the nature of happiness. Also,
the true statesman seems to be one who has made a special study of goodness, since his aim
- is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men—witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history;
+ is to make the citizens good and law-abiding men—witness the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta, and the other great legislators of history;
but if the study of virtue falls within the province of
Political Science, it is clear that in investigating virtue we shall be keeping to the
plan which we laid down at the outset.
Now the goodness that we have to consider is clearly human virtue, since the good or
happiness which we set out to seek is human good and human happiness. But human virtue means in our view excellence of soul, not excellence of
body; also our definition of happiness is an activity of the soul. Now if this is so, clearly it behoves the statesman to have some
- acquaintance with psychology, just as the physician who is to heal the eye or the other parts of the bodyThe context seems to disprove the alternative rendering ‘just
+ acquaintance with psychology, just as the physician who is to heal the eye or the other parts of the bodyThe context seems to disprove the alternative rendering ‘just
as to cure eyes the oculist must have a general of the structure of the whole of the
- body as well.’ The illustration is a reminiscence of Plat. Charm. 156b-e, but does not follow that passage
+ body as well.’ The illustration is a reminiscence of Plat. Charm. 156b-e, but does not follow that passage
exactly. must know their anatomy. Indeed a foundation of science is even more
requisite for the statesman, inasmuch as politics is a higher and more honorable art than
medicine; but physicians of the better class devote much attention to the study of the
human body. The student of politicspolitiko/s means for Aristotle both
- “political scientist” and “statesman”: for him
+ “political scientist” and “statesman”: for him
they are the same thing, since politikh/ is a practical
science. therefore as well as the psychologist must study the nature of the soul,
though he will do so as an aid to politics, and only so far as is requisite for the
@@ -962,34 +962,34 @@ convert to P3
Now on the subject of psychology some of the teaching current in extraneous
discoursesThese e)cwterikoi\
lo/goi are also mentioned in 6.4.2 and six other places in Aristotle
- (see Ross on Aristot. Met. 1076a 28). In Aristot. Pol. 1323a 22 they are appealed to for the
+ (see Ross on Aristot. Met. 1076a 28). In Aristot. Pol. 1323a 22 they are appealed to for the
tripartite classification of goods which in 8.2 above is ascribed to current opinion
- ‘of long standing and generally accepted by students of philosophy.’
- The phrase therefore seems to denote arguments or doctrines (whether familiar
+ ‘of long standing and generally accepted by students of philosophy.’
+ The phrase therefore seems to denote arguments or doctrines (whether familiar
in philosophic debates, for which see note on 5.6, or actually recorded in
- books), that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school; in some cases, as
+ books), that were not peculiar to the Peripatetic school; in some cases, as
here, it may refer specially to the tenets of the Academy. is satisfactory, and
may be adopted here: namely that the soul consists of two parts, one irrational and the
- other capable of reason.Literally “having a
- plan or principle.”
- (Whether these two parts are really distinct in
+ other capable of reason.Literally “having a
+ plan or principle.”
+ (Whether these two parts are really distinct in
the sense that the parts of the body or of any other divisible whole are distinct, or
whether though distinguishable in thought as two they are inseparable in reality, like the
convex and concave sides of a curve, is a question of no importance for the matter in
- hand.) Of the irrational part of the soul again
+ hand.) Of the irrational part of the soul again
one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature: I
refer to the part that causes nutrition and growth; for we must assume that a vital
faculty of this nature exists in all things that assimilate nourishment, including
- embryos—the same faculty being present also in the fully-developed organism
- (this is more reasonable than to assume a different nutritive faculty in the
- latter). The excellence of this faculty
+ embryos—the same faculty being present also in the fully-developed organism
+ (this is more reasonable than to assume a different nutritive faculty in the
+ latter). The excellence of this faculty
therefore appears to be common to all animate things and not peculiar to man; for it is
believed that this faculty or part of the soul is most active during sleep, but when they
- are asleep you cannot tell a good man from a bad one (whence the saying that for
- half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the miserable).
+ are asleep you cannot tell a good man from a bad one (whence the saying that for
+ half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the miserable).
This is a natural result of the fact that sleep is a
cessation of the soul from the functions on which its goodness or badness
- depends—except that in some small degree certain of the sense-impressions may
+ depends—except that in some small degree certain of the sense-impressions may
reach into soul during sleep, and consequently the dreams of the good are better than
those of ordinary men. We need not however pursue this
subject further, but may omit from consideration the nutritive part of the soul, since it
@@ -1005,31 +1005,31 @@ convert to P3
unrestrained persons their impulses run counter to their principle. But whereas in the
body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not see it; nevertheless it
cannot be doubted that in the soul also there is an element beside that of principle,
- which opposes and runs counter to principle (though in what sense the two are
- distinct does not concern us here). But this
+ which opposes and runs counter to principle (though in what sense the two are
+ distinct does not concern us here). But this
second element also seems, as we said, to participate in rational principle; at least in
- the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle—and no doubt in the
+ the self-restrained man it obeys the behest of principle—and no doubt in the
temperate and brave man it is still more amenable, for all parts of his nature are in
harmony with principle.
Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One
division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other,
the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in
- principle, as being amenable and obedient to it (in the sense in fact in which we
- speak of ‘paying heed’ to one's father and friends, not in the sense
- of the term ‘rational’ in mathematicsThis parenthetical note on the phrase ‘to have logos’ is untranslatable, and confusing even in the
- Greek. According to the psychology here expounded, the intellect ‘has a plan
- or principle,’ in the sense of understanding principle, and being able to
+ principle, as being amenable and obedient to it (in the sense in fact in which we
+ speak of ‘paying heed’ to one's father and friends, not in the sense
+ of the term ‘rational’ in mathematicsThis parenthetical note on the phrase ‘to have logos’ is untranslatable, and confusing even in the
+ Greek. According to the psychology here expounded, the intellect ‘has a plan
+ or principle,’ in the sense of understanding principle, and being able to
reason and make a plan: in other words, it is fully rational. The appetitive part of
- man's nature ‘has a plan or principle’ in so far as it is capable of
+ man's nature ‘has a plan or principle’ in so far as it is capable of
following or obeying a principle. It happens that this relationship of following or
- obeying can itself be expressed by the words ‘to have logos’ in another sense of that phrase, viz. ‘to take
- account of, pay heed to.’ To be precise the writer should say that the
- appetitive part lo/gon e)/xei tou= lo/gou ‘has
- logos (takes account) of the
- logos.’ The phrase has yet a third sense in
- mathematics, where “to have logos”
- (ratio) means ‘to be
- rational’ in the sense of commensurable.). And that principle
+ obeying can itself be expressed by the words ‘to have logos’ in another sense of that phrase, viz. ‘to take
+ account of, pay heed to.’ To be precise the writer should say that the
+ appetitive part lo/gon e)/xei tou= lo/gou ‘has
+ logos (takes account) of the
+ logos.’ The phrase has yet a third sense in
+ mathematics, where “to have logos”
+ (ratio) means ‘to be
+ rational’ in the sense of commensurable.). And that principle
can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing
delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally.
If the other hand it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as
@@ -1042,11 +1042,11 @@ convert to P3
distinguished from speculative, wisdom.
are intellectual, Liberality and
Temperance are moral virtues. When describing a man's moral character we do not say that
he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate; but a wise man also is praised for his
- dispositionViz. Speculative Wisdom (as
- distinguished from Prudence or Practical Wisdom), which is therefore a virtue,
+ dispositionViz. Speculative Wisdom (as
+ distinguished from Prudence or Practical Wisdom), which is therefore a virtue,
though not a virtue in the narrower sense of moral virtue. Throughout Aristotle's
- ethical works, praise and blame are the ordinary tests of virtue and vice. (See
- also chap. 12.) , and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.
+ ethical works, praise and blame are the ordinary tests of virtue and vice. (See
+ also chap. 12.) , and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.
@@ -1056,10 +1056,10 @@ convert to P3
Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue
is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, and therefore requires
experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit
- (ethos), and has indeed derived its
- name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.It is probable that e)/qos, ‘habit’
- and h)=qos, ‘character’
- (whence ‘ethical,’ moral) are kindred words.
+ (ethos), and has indeed derived its
+ name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.It is probable that e)/qos, ‘habit’
+ and h)=qos, ‘character’
+ (whence ‘ethical,’ moral) are kindred words.
And therefore it is
clear that none of the moral virtues formed is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by habit. For
instance, it is the nature of a stone to move downwards, and it cannot be trained to move
@@ -1067,29 +1067,29 @@ convert to P3
ten thousand times; nor can fire be trained to move downwards, nor can anything else that
naturally behaves in one way be trained into a habit of behaving in another way.
The virtuesa)reth/ is here as often
- in this and the following Books employed in the limited sense of ‘moral
- excellence’ or ‘goodness of character,’ i.e. virtue in the
+ in this and the following Books employed in the limited sense of ‘moral
+ excellence’ or ‘goodness of character,’ i.e. virtue in the
ordinary sense of the term. therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor
yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this
capacity is brought to maturity by habit.
Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in a potential form;
we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This is clearly so with our senses: we did
not acquire the faculty of sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing or repeatedly listening,
- but the other way about—because we had the senses we began to use them, we did
+ but the other way about—because we had the senses we began to use them, we did
not get them by using them. The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first having
actually practised them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art or craft by doing the
- things that we shall have to do when we have learnt itOr possibly ‘For things that we have to learn to do [in contrast
- with things that we do by nature], we learn by doing them.’:
+ things that we shall have to do when we have learnt itOr possibly ‘For things that we have to learn to do [in contrast
+ with things that we do by nature], we learn by doing them.’:
for instance, men become builders by building houses, harpers by playing on the harp.
Similarly
we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave
acts. This truth is
attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in
- habits of right action—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do
+ habits of right action—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do
this it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad
one. Again, the actions
from or through which any virtue is produced are the same as those through which it also
- is destroyed—just as is the case with skill in the arts, for both the good
+ is destroyed—just as is the case with skill in the arts, for both the good
harpers and the bad ones are produced by harping, and similarly with builders and all the
other craftsmen: as you will become a good builder from building well, so you will become
a bad one from building badly. Were this not so, there would be no need for teachers of the arts, but
@@ -1107,17 +1107,17 @@ convert to P3
trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very
great, or rather of supreme, importance.
As then our present study, unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim
- (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what
+ (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what
it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result our investigation would
- be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of
+ be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of
conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly; since our actions, as we have said,
determine the quality of our dispositions.
- Now the formula ‘to act in conformity with right principle’ is common
- ground, and may be assumed as the basis of our discussion. (We shall speak about
+
Now the formula ‘to act in conformity with right principle’ is common
+ ground, and may be assumed as the basis of our discussion. (We shall speak about
this formula later,i.e., in Bk. 6. For the sense in
- which ‘the right principle’ can be said to be the virtue of Prudence
+ which ‘the right principle’ can be said to be the virtue of Prudence
see 6.13.5 note. and consider both the definition of right principle and its
- relation to the other virtues.)
+ relation to the other virtues.)
But let it be granted to begin with that the whole theory of conduct is bound to be an
outline only and not an exact system, in accordance with the rule we laid down at the
beginning,See 1.3.1. that philosophical
@@ -1132,9 +1132,9 @@ convert to P3
discussion now proceeding is thus necessarily inexact, we must do our best to help it
out.
First of all then we have to observe, that moral qualities are so constituted as to be
- destroyed by excess and by deficiency—as we see is the case with bodily strength
- and health (for one is forced to explain what is invisible by means of visible
- illustrations). Strength is destroyed both by excessive and by deficient
+ destroyed by excess and by deficiency—as we see is the case with bodily strength
+ and health (for one is forced to explain what is invisible by means of visible
+ illustrations). Strength is destroyed both by excessive and by deficient
exercises, and similarly health is destroyed both by too much and by too little food and
drink; while they are produced, increased and preserved by suitable quantities. The same therefore is true of
Temperance, Courage, and the other virtues. The man
@@ -1163,20 +1163,20 @@ convert to P3
itself enjoyable, profligate if he feels it irksome; he is brave if he faces danger with
pleasure or at all events without pain, cowardly if he does so with pain.
In fact pleasures and pains are the things with which moral virtue is concerned.
- For (1) pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain cause us to
+
For (1) pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain cause us to
abstain from doing noble actions. Hence the importance, as Plato points out, of having been definitely
trained from childhood to like and dislike the proper things; this is what good education
means.
- (2)Again, if the virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and
+
(2)Again, if the virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and
every action is attended with pleasure or pain, this too shows that virtue has to do with
pleasure and pain.
- (3) Another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of
+
(3) Another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of
punishment; for punishment is a sort of medicine, and the nature of medicine to work by
means of opposites.The contrary maxim to similia similibus curantur or homoeopathy. Fever, caused by heat,
is cured by cold, hence if the remedy for wickedness is pain, it must have been caused
by pleasure.
- (4)Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul
+
(4)Again, as we said before, every formed disposition of the soul
realizes its full naturei.e., is actively exercised
when fully developed, cf. 2.8.
in relation to and in dealing with that class of
@@ -1188,33 +1188,33 @@ convert to P3
Speusippus, although in the extant remains of Greek philosophy apathy, or
freedom from passions or emotions, first appears as an ethical ideal of the
Stoics. define the virtues as states of impassivity or tranquillity, though they
- make a mistake in using these terms absolutely, without adding ‘in the right
- (or wrong) manner’ and ‘at the right (or
- wrong) time’ and the other qualifications.
+ make a mistake in using these terms absolutely, without adding ‘in the right
+ (or wrong) manner’ and ‘at the right (or
+ wrong) time’ and the other qualifications.
We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in
relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite.
But the following considerations also will give us further light on the same point.
- (5) There are three things that are the motives of choice and three
+
(5) There are three things that are the motives of choice and three
that are the motives of avoidance; namely, the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant, and
their opposites, the base, the harmful, and the painful. Now in respect of all these the
good man is likely to go right and the bad to go wrong, but especially in respect of
pleasure; for pleasure is common to man with the lower animals, and also it is a
concomitant of all the objects of choice, since both the noble and the expedient appear to
us pleasant.
- (6) Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us
+
(6) Again, the susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with all of us
from the cradle. Hence this feeling is hard to eradicate, being engrained in the fabric of
our lives.
- (7) Again, pleasure and pain are alsoSc., as well as being the sources of our feelings. the standards
+
(7) Again, pleasure and pain are alsoSc., as well as being the sources of our feelings. the standards
by which we all, in a greater or less degree, regulate our actions. On this account therefore pleasure and
pain are necessarily our main concern, since to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly
has a great effect on conduct.
- (8) And again, it is harder to fight against pleasure than against
- anger (hard as that is, as HeracleitusHeraclitus, Fr. 105 (Bywater) qumw=| ma/xesqai
+ (8) And again, it is harder to fight against pleasure than against
+ anger (hard as that is, as HeracleitusHeraclitus, Fr. 105 (Bywater) qumw=| ma/xesqai
xalepo/n: o(/ ti ga\r a)\n xrhi/zh| gi/nesqai, yuxh=s w)ne/etai,
- ‘it is hard to fight with anger [or ‘desire,’
+ ‘it is hard to fight with anger [or ‘desire,’
qumw=| in the Homeric sense,
- Burnet]. Whatever it wishes to get, it
- purchases at the cost of life.’ says); but virtue, like art,
+ Burnet]. Whatever it wishes to get, it
+ purchases at the cost of life.’
says); but virtue, like art,
is constantly dealing with what is harder, since the harder the task the better is
success. For this reason also therefore pleasure and pain are necessarily the main concern
both of virtue and of political science, since he who comports himself towards them
@@ -1237,9 +1237,9 @@ convert to P3
certain quality of their own; but acts done in conformity with the virtues are not done
justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also
is in a certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledgeSee Bk. 3.1, where this is interpreted as meaning both
- knowledge of what he is doing (the act must not be unconscious or
- accidental), and knowledge of moral principle (he must know that the
- act is a right one).; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and
+ knowledge of what he is doing (the act must not be unconscious or
+ accidental), and knowledge of moral principle (he must know that the
+ act is a right one).; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and
choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent
disposition of character. For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included,
except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues,
@@ -1259,14 +1259,14 @@ convert to P3
will the mode of treatment produce health of body.
We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue.
- A state of the soul is either (l) an emotion, (2) a
- capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these
+
A state of the soul is either (l) an emotion, (2) a
+ capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these
three things. By the emotions, I mean desire, anger,
fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally
those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The capacities
are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for
example, capable of feeling anger or painProbably for
- ‘pain’ we should read ‘fear.’ or pity.
+ ‘pain’ we should read ‘fear.’ or pity.
The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill
disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to
anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good
@@ -1274,12 +1274,12 @@ convert to P3
the other emotions.
Now the virtues and vices are not emotions because we are not pronounced good or bad
according to our emotions, but we are according to our virtues and vices; nor are we
- either praised or blamed for our emotions—a man is not praised for being
+ either praised or blamed for our emotions—a man is not praised for being
frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a
- certain way— but we are praised or blamed for our virtues and vices. Again, we are not angry or afraid from choice, but the virtues are
+ certain way— but we are praised or blamed for our virtues and vices. Again, we are not angry or afraid from choice, but the virtues are
certain modes of choice, or at all events involve choice. Moreover, we are said to be
- ‘moved’ by the emotions, whereas in respect of the virtues and vices
- we are not said to be ‘moved’ but to be ‘disposed’
+ ‘moved’ by the emotions, whereas in respect of the virtues and vices
+ we are not said to be ‘moved’ but to be ‘disposed’
in a certain way.
And the same considerations also prove that the virtues and vices are not capacities;
since we are not pronounced good or bad, praised or blamed, merely by reason of our
@@ -1300,25 +1300,25 @@ convert to P3
function well. We have already indicated2.8 f. what this means; but it will throw more
light on the subject if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue.
Now of everything that is continuousi.e., without
- distinct parts, and so (if divisible at all), divisible at any point,
+ distinct parts, and so (if divisible at all), divisible at any point,
as opposed to what is dih|rhme/non,
- ‘discrete,’ or made up of distinct parts and only divisible between
+ ‘discrete,’ or made up of distinct parts and only divisible between
them. and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller part,
or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal either with respect to
the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being a mean between excess and
deficiency.Greek comparatives,
- ‘larger’, ‘smaller’, etc., may also mean
- ‘too large’, ‘too small’, etc.; and there is the
- same ambiguity in the words translated ‘excess’ and
- ‘deficiency’. Again me/son,
- ‘middle’ or ‘mean’, is used as a synonym for
- me/trion ‘moderate’ or of the
- right amount, and i)/son ‘equal’ can
- mean ‘equitable’. Hence ‘to take an equal part with
- respect to the thing itself’ means to take a part equal to the part left, viz.
- a half; ‘to take an equal part relatively to us,’ means to take what
+ ‘larger’, ‘smaller’, etc., may also mean
+ ‘too large’, ‘too small’, etc.; and there is the
+ same ambiguity in the words translated ‘excess’ and
+ ‘deficiency’. Again me/son,
+ ‘middle’ or ‘mean’, is used as a synonym for
+ me/trion ‘moderate’ or of the
+ right amount, and i)/son ‘equal’ can
+ mean ‘equitable’. Hence ‘to take an equal part with
+ respect to the thing itself’ means to take a part equal to the part left, viz.
+ a half; ‘to take an equal part relatively to us,’ means to take what
is a fair or suitable amount. The former is a mean as being exactly in the middle
- between all and none—if the thing in question is represented by a line, this
+ between all and none—if the thing in question is represented by a line, this
is bisected at a point equidistant from its two ends; the latter is a mean in the sense
of being the right amount for the recipient, and also of lying somewhere between any two
other amounts that happen to be too much and too little for him.
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ convert to P3
from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us,
that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one and the same for
everybody. For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then
- one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6; since 6 —2 = 10 — 6, and this is the mean according
+ one takes the mean with respect to the thing if one takes 6; since 6 —2 = 10 — 6, and this is the mean according
to arithmetical proportion.We should rather call this
an arithmetical progression. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean
relative to us. Suppose that 10 lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2 lb.
@@ -1335,13 +1335,13 @@ convert to P3
it is a small ration for a Milo,A famous wrestler. but a large one for a man just
beginning to go in for athletics. And similarly with the amount of running or wrestling
exercise to be taken. In the same way then an expert in
- any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean—the mean
+ any art avoids excess and deficiency, and seeks and adopts the mean—the mean
that is not of the thing but relative to us. If therefore
the way in which every art or science performs its work well is by looking to the mean and
- applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a
- perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it—meaning that
+ applying that as a standard to its productions (hence the common remark about a
+ perfect work of art, that you could not take from it nor add to it—meaning that
excess and deficiency destroy perfection, while adherence to the mean preserves
- it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work,
+ it)—if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work,
and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will
follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue,The formula of the mean does
not apply to the intellectual virtues. for this is concerned with emotions and
@@ -1350,28 +1350,28 @@ convert to P3
both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these feelings at
the right time, on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose and
in the right manner, is to feel the best amount of them, which is the mean
- amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue. And similarly there can be excess, deficiency, and the due mean in
+ amount—and the best amount is of course the mark of virtue. And similarly there can be excess, deficiency, and the due mean in
actions. Now feelings and actions are the objects with which virtue is concerned; and in
feelings and actions excess and deficiency are errors, while the mean amount is praised,
and constitutes success; and to be praised and to be successful are both marks of virtue.
Virtue, therefore is a mean state in the sense that it
is able to hit the mean. Again, error is multiform
- (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery,Cf. 1.6.7. and good of the limited),
- whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and
- difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it);
+ (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery,Cf. 1.6.7. and good of the limited),
+ whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and
+ difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it);
so this is another reason why excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of
the mean a mark of virtue:
Goodness is simple, badness manifold.The verse from
an unknown source would come in better just before or just after the last parenthesis.
Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice*proai/resis,
- ‘choice’ or ‘purpose’, is discussed in Bk. 3.2,
+ ‘choice’ or ‘purpose’, is discussed in Bk. 3.2,
where see note. of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance
- of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is,A variant reading gives ‘determined by principle, or whatever
- we like to call that by which the prudent man would determine it’
- (vide
+ of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is,A variant reading gives ‘determined by principle, or whatever
+ we like to call that by which the prudent man would determine it’
+ (vide
Taylor, Aristotle, p.
- 77). as the prudent man would determine it.
+ 77). as the prudent man would determine it.
And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore,
it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right
in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean. Hence while in respect of its substance and the definition that states
@@ -1379,11 +1379,11 @@ convert to P3
and rightness it is an extreme.Cf. 3.4.8.
Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the
- very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice,See 7.15. The word means ‘delight at another's
- misfortune’, Schadenfreude. shamelessness,
+ very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice,See 7.15. The word means ‘delight at another's
+ misfortune’, Schadenfreude. shamelessness,
envy, and, of actions, adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings
are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we
- blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them—one must
+ blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them—one must
always be wrong; nor does right or wrong in their case depend on the circumstances, for
instance, whether one commits adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the
right manner; the mere commission of any of them is wrong. One might as well suppose there could be a due mean and excess and
@@ -1397,27 +1397,27 @@ convert to P3
observance of a mean.
We must not however rest content with stating this general definition, but must show that
it applies to the particular virtues. In practical philosophy, although universal
- principles have a wider application,Or ‘have
- a wider acceptance.’ those covering a particular part of the field
+ principles have a wider application,Or ‘have
+ a wider acceptance.’ those covering a particular part of the field
possess a higher degree of truth; because conduct deals with particular facts, and our
theories are bound to accord with these.
- Let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram.Here apparently the lecturer displayed a table of virtues (like
+ Let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram.Here apparently the lecturer displayed a table of virtues (like
the one in Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220b
- 37), exhibiting each as a mean between two vices of excess and defect in
+ 37), exhibiting each as a mean between two vices of excess and defect in
respect of a certain class of action or feeling. This is developed in detail in Bk. 3.
6-end and Bk. 4.
The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is Courage. The man that exceeds in
- fearlessness not designated by any special name (and this the case with many of
- the virtues and vices); he that exceeds in confidence is Rash; he that exceeds in
+ fearlessness not designated by any special name (and this the case with many of
+ the virtues and vices); he that exceeds in confidence is Rash; he that exceeds in
fear and is deficient in confidence is Cowardly. In
- respect of pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a less degree in respect
+ respect of pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a less degree in respect
of painsThis parenthesis looks like an interpolation
- from 3.10.1.—the observance of the mean is Temperance, the excess
+ from 3.10.1.
—the observance of the mean is Temperance, the excess
Profligacy. Men deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures scarcely occur, and hence this
character also has not been assigned a name, but we may call it Insensible. In regard to giving and getting money, the observance of the mean
is Liberality; the excess and deficiency are Prodigality and Meanness,The Greek word is the negative of that translated Liberality, but
- ‘illiberality’ and ‘illiberal’ we do not usually
+ ‘illiberality’ and ‘illiberal’ we do not usually
employ with reference to money. but the prodigal man and the mean man exceed and
fall short in opposite ways to one another: the prodigal exceeds in giving and is
deficient in getting, whereas the mean man exceeds in getting and is deficient in giving.
@@ -1425,8 +1425,8 @@ convert to P3
outline and summarily, which is enough for the purpose in hand; but they will be more
accurately defined later.
There are also other dispositions in relation to money, namely, the mode of observing the
- mean called Magnificence (the magnificent man being different from the liberal,
- as the former deals with large amounts and the latter with small ones), the
+ mean called Magnificence (the magnificent man being different from the liberal,
+ as the former deals with large amounts and the latter with small ones), the
excess called Tastelessness or Vulgarity, and the defect called Paltriness. These are not the same as Liberality and the
vices corresponding to it; but the way in which they differ will be discussed
later.
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ convert to P3
be called truthful, and the observance of the mean TruthfulnessFrom Bk. 4.7 it appears that the quality intended is sincerity of speech
and conduct in the matter of asserting one's own merits. The observance of the mean in
this respect is there said to have no name; and here the form of expression apologizes
- for using ‘Truthfulness’ in so limited a sense. The defect in this
+ for using ‘Truthfulness’ in so limited a sense. The defect in this
respect Aristotle expresses by ei)rwnei/a, a word
specially associated with the affectation of ignorance practised by
Socrates. Neither this nor its other shades of meaning
@@ -1482,12 +1482,12 @@ convert to P3
There are also modes of observing a mean in the sphere of and in relation to the
emotions. ForThis sentence in the mss. follows the
next one. in these also one man is spoken of as moderate and another as
- excessive—for example the bashful man whose modesty takes alarm at everything;
+ excessive—for example the bashful man whose modesty takes alarm at everything;
while he that is deficient in shame, or abashed at nothing whatsoever, is shameless, and
the man of middle character modest. For though Modesty is not a virtue, it is praised, and
so is the modest man.
- Again, Righteous Indignation is the observance of a mean between Envy and Malice,See 6.18 (and note): there envy and
- ‘rejoicing-in-evil’ come in a list of emotions in which a due mean
+ Again, Righteous Indignation is the observance of a mean between Envy and Malice,See 6.18 (and note): there envy and
+ ‘rejoicing-in-evil’ come in a list of emotions in which a due mean
is impossible; and in Aristot. Rh. 1386b 34 they
are said to be two sides of the same character. The present attempt to force them into
the scheme as opposite extremes is not very successful, and it is noteworthy that this
@@ -1495,18 +1495,18 @@ convert to P3
pain and pleasure felt at the fortunes of one's neighbors. The righteously indignant man
is pained by undeserved good fortune; the jealous man exceeds him and is pained by all the
good fortune of others;It is difficult not to think
- that some words have been lost here, such as ‘and the righteously indignant
- man is pained by the undeserved misfortune of others.’ while the
+ that some words have been lost here, such as ‘and the righteously indignant
+ man is pained by the undeserved misfortune of others.’ while the
malicious man so far falls short of being pained that he actually feels
pleasure.
These qualities however it will be time to discuss in another place. After them we will
treat Justice,Bk. 6 distinguishing its two
- kinds—for it has more than one sense—and showing in what way each is a
- mode of observing the mean. [And we will deal similarly with the logical
+ kinds—for it has more than one sense—and showing in what way each is a
+ mode of observing the mean. [And we will deal similarly with the logical
virtues.Grant rightly rejects this sentence, since
the intellectual virtues are nowhere else thus designated by Aristotle, nor does he
- regard them as modes of observing a mean.]
- There are then three dispositions—two vices, one of excess and one of defect,
+ regard them as modes of observing a mean.
]
+ There are then three dispositions—two vices, one of excess and one of defect,
and one virtue which is the observance of the mean; and each of them is in a certain way
opposed to both the others. For the extreme states are the opposite both of the middle
state and of each other, and the middle state is the opposite of both extremes; since just as the equal is greater in comparison with the less and
@@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ convert to P3
other than from the mean, just as great is farther from small and small from great than
either from equal. AgainThis sentence should perhaps follow the next one, as it gives a second
test of opposition, viz. unlikeness. However, unlikeness and remoteness are blended
- together in 8.7. some extremes show a certain likeness to the mean—for
+ together in 8.7.
some extremes show a certain likeness to the mean—for
instance, Rashness resembles Courage, Prodigality Liberality, whereas the extremes display
the greatest unlikeness to one another. But it is things farthest apart from each other
that logicians define as contraries, so that the farther apart things are the more
@@ -1541,10 +1541,10 @@ convert to P3
more remote from the mean are thought to be more contrary to it. This then is one cause, arising out of the thing itself. The other cause
has its origin in us: those things appear more contrary to the mean to which we are
ourselves more inclined by nature. For example, we are of ourselves more inclined to
- pleasure, which is why we are prone to Profligacy [more than to
- Propriety].These words are probably an
- interpolation, since the sense requires ‘more than to
- Insensibility’. We therefore rather call those things the contrary of
+ pleasure, which is why we are prone to Profligacy [more than to
+ Propriety].These words are probably an
+ interpolation, since the sense requires ‘more than to
+ Insensibility’. We therefore rather call those things the contrary of
the mean, into which we are more inclined to lapse; and hence Profligacy, the excess, is
more particularly the contrary of Temperance
@@ -1554,28 +1554,28 @@ convert to P3
actions. This is why it is a hard task to be good, for it
is hard to find the middle point in anything: for instance, not everybody can find the
center of a circle, but only someone who knows geometry. So also anybody can become
- angry—that is easy, and so it is to give and spend money; but to be angry with
+ angry—that is easy, and so it is to give and spend money; but to be angry with
or give money to the right person, and to the right amount, and at the right time, and for
- the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not within everybody's power and
+ the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not within everybody's power and
is not easy; so that to do these things properly is rare, praiseworthy, and
noble.
Hence the first rule in aiming at the mean is to avoid that extreme which is the more
opposed to the mean, as Calypso advisesHom. Od. 12.219: really the words are said by Odysseus,
conveying to his steersman Circe's advice, to avoid the whirlpool of
Charybdis which will engulf them all, and steer nearer
- to the monster Scylla who will devour only some of them.—
+ to the monster Scylla who will devour only some of them.—
Steer the ship clear of yonder spray and surge.
For of the two extremes one is a more serious error than the other. Hence, inasmuch as to hit the mean extremely well is
- difficult,Or ‘to hit the mean is extremely
- difficult.’ the second best way to sail,A proverb, meaning to take to the oars when the wind fails. as the
+ difficult,Or ‘to hit the mean is extremely
+ difficult.’ the second best way to sail,A proverb, meaning to take to the oars when the wind fails. as the
saying goes, is to take the least of the evils; and the best way to do this will be the
way we enjoin.
The second rule is to notice what are the errors to which we are ourselves most prone
- (as different men are inclined by nature to different
- faults)—and we shall discover what these are by observing the pleasure
- or pain that we experience—; then we must drag
+ (as different men are inclined by nature to different
+ faults)—and we shall discover what these are by observing the pleasure
+ or pain that we experience—; then we must drag
ourselves away in the opposite direction, for by steering wide of our besetting error we
shall make a middle course. This is the method adopted by carpenters to straighten warped
timber
@@ -1584,7 +1584,7 @@ convert to P3
course is therefore to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards
Helen,Hom. Il.
3.156-160. and to applyOr
- ‘repeat’. their words to her on every occasion; for if we
+ ‘repeat’. their words to her on every occasion; for if we
roundly bid her be gone, we shall be less likely to err.
These then, to sum up the matter, are the precautions that will best enable us to hit the
mean. But no doubt it is a difficult thing to do, and especially in particular cases: for
@@ -1612,22 +1612,22 @@ convert to P3
Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary feelings
and actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned,
and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to
- define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntarye(kou/sion and a)kou/sion are most conveniently rendered ‘voluntary’
- and ‘involuntary’; but the word a)kou/sion suggests ‘unwilling’ or ‘against the
- will,’ and to this meaning Aristotle limits it in 1.13. There he introduces a
- third term, ou)x e(kou/sion, ‘not
- voluntary’ or ‘not willing,’ to describe acts done in
+ define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntarye(kou/sion and a)kou/sion are most conveniently rendered ‘voluntary’
+ and ‘involuntary’; but the word a)kou/sion suggests ‘unwilling’ or ‘against the
+ will,’ and to this meaning Aristotle limits it in 1.13. There he introduces a
+ third term, ou)x e(kou/sion, ‘not
+ voluntary’ or ‘not willing,’ to describe acts done in
ignorance of their full circumstances and consequences, and so not willed in the full
sense; but such acts when subsequently regretted by the agent are included in the class
of a)kou/sia or unwilling acts, because had the agent
not been in ignorance he would not have done them.; and this will also be of
service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.
- It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a)
- under compulsion or (b) through ignorance; and that (a) an act is compulsory
+
It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a)
+ under compulsion or (b) through ignorance; and that (a) an act is compulsory
when its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really
passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when a ship's captain is carried
somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power. But there is some doubt about actions
- done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object— as for
+ done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object— as for
instance if a tyrant having a man's parents and children in his power commands him to do
something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses they will
be put to death. It is open to question whether such actions are voluntary or involuntary.
@@ -1635,20 +1635,20 @@ convert to P3
case is when cargo is jettisoned in a storm; apart from circumstances, no one voluntarily
throws away his property, but to save his own life and that of his shipmates any sane man
would do so. Acts of
- this kind, then, are ‘mixed’ or compositei.e., partly voluntary, partly involuntary.; but they approximate
+ this kind, then, are ‘mixed’ or compositei.e., partly voluntary, partly involuntary.; but they approximate
rather to the voluntary class. For at the actual time when they are done they are chosen
or willed; and the end or motive of an act varies with the occasion, so that the terms
- ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ should be used with
+ ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ should be used with
reference to the time of action; now the actual deed in the cases in question is done
voluntarily, for the origin of the movement of the parts of the body instrumental to the
act lies in the agent; and when the origin of an action is in oneself, it is in one's own
power to do it or not. Such acts therefore are voluntary, though perhaps involuntary apart
- from circumstances—for no one would choose to do any such action in and for
+ from circumstances—for no one would choose to do any such action in and for
itself.
Sometimes indeed men are actually praisedWhich shows
- that the acts are regarded as voluntary (
- Peters). for deeds of this ‘mixed’
+ that the acts are regarded as voluntary (
+ Peters). for deeds of this ‘mixed’
class, namely when they submit to some disgrace or pain as the price of some great and
noble object; though if they do so without any such motive they are blamed, since it is
contemptible to submit to a great disgrace with no advantage or only a trifling one in
@@ -1665,7 +1665,7 @@ convert to P3
Seven against Thebes. Foreseeing he would lose
his life, he charged his sons to avenge his death upon their mother, invoking on them
famine and childlessness if they disobeyed. The verse in question is preserved: ma/lista me\n m' e)ph=r' e)piskh/yas path/r. Alcmaeon, fr. 69
- (Nauck). is compelled by certain threats to murder his mother!
+ (Nauck). is compelled by certain threats to murder his mother!
But it is sometimes
difficult to decide how far we ought to go in choosing to do a given act rather than
suffer a given penalty, or in enduring a given penalty rather than commit a given action;
@@ -1673,7 +1673,7 @@ convert to P3
dilemmas the penalty threatened is painful and the deed forced upon us dishonorable, which
is why praise and blame are bestowed according as we do or do not yield to such
compulsion.
- What kind of actions then are to be called ‘compulsory’? Used without
+
What kind of actions then are to be called ‘compulsory’? Used without
qualification, perhaps this term applies to any case where the cause of the action lies in
things outside the agent, and when the agent contributes nothing. But when actions
intrinsically involuntary are yet in given circumstances deliberately chosen in preference
@@ -1682,27 +1682,27 @@ convert to P3
to the alternative. They approximate however rather to the voluntary class, since conduct
consists of particular things done,There is no such
thing as an act which is not this particular act in these particular circumstances
- (Burnet). and the
+ (Burnet). and the
particular things done in the cases in question are voluntary. But it is not easy to lay
down rules for deciding which of two alternatives is to be chosen, for particular cases
differ widely.
- To apply the term ‘compulsory’ to acts done for the sake of pleasure
+
To apply the term ‘compulsory’ to acts done for the sake of pleasure
or for noble objects, on the plea that these exercise constraint on us from without, is to
- make every action compulsory. For (1) pleasure and nobility between them
- supply the motives of all actions whatsoever. Also (2) to act under
+ make every action compulsory. For (1) pleasure and nobility between them
+ supply the motives of all actions whatsoever. Also (2) to act under
compulsion and involuntarily is painful, but actions aiming at something pleasant or noble
- are done with pleasure. And (3) it is absurd to blame external things,
+ are done with pleasure. And (3) it is absurd to blame external things,
instead of blaming ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attractions; or to take the
credit of our noble deeds to ourselves, while putting the blame for our disgraceful ones
upon the temptations of pleasure. It appears therefore that an act is compulsory when its origin is from
outside, the person compelled contributing nothing to it.
- (b) An act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary,See note on 1.1 above. but it is involuntary only
+
(b) An act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary,See note on 1.1 above. but it is involuntary only
when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has acted through ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has
done, cannot indeed be said to have acted voluntarily, as he was not aware of his action,
yet cannot be said to have acted involuntarily, as he is not sorry for it. Acts done
through ignorance therefore fall into two classes: if the agent regrets the act, we think
that he has acted involuntarily; if he does not regret it, to mark the distinction we may
- call him a ‘non-voluntary’ agent—for as the case is
+ call him a ‘non-voluntary’ agent—for as the case is
different it is better to give it a special name. Acting through ignorance however seems
to be different from acting in ignorance; for when a man is drunk or in a
rage, his actions are not thought to be done through ignorance but owing to one or other
@@ -1710,41 +1710,41 @@ convert to P3
ignorance. Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do and
refrain from doing, and that this error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general.
But the term
- ‘involuntary’ does not really apply to an action when the agent is
+ ‘involuntary’ does not really apply to an action when the agent is
ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not
ignorance displayed in moral choicei.e., choice of
- Ends: see 3.2.1 note. (that sort of ignorance constitutes
- vice)—that is to say, they result not from general ignorance
- (because that is held to be blameworthy), but from particular ignorance,
- ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things‘Things’ seems to include persons, see example
- (3) below. affected by it; for in this case the act is
+ Ends: see 3.2.1 note. (that sort of ignorance constitutes
+ vice)—that is to say, they result not from general ignorance
+ (because that is held to be blameworthy), but from particular ignorance,
+ ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things‘Things’ seems to include persons, see example
+ (3) below. affected by it; for in this case the act is
pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an
involuntary agent.
Perhaps then it will be as well to specify the nature and number of these circumstances.
- They are (1) the agent, (2) the act,
- (3) the thing‘Things’ seems to include persons, see example
- (3) below. that is affected by or is the sphere ofe)n ti/ni seems to bear a
+ They are (1) the agent, (2) the act,
+ (3) the thing‘Things’ seems to include persons, see example
+ (3) below. that is affected by or is the sphere ofe)n ti/ni seems to bear a
more limited sense than e)n oi(=s ll. 1, 16, 19, 24,
which covers the circumstances of all sorts. the act; and sometimes also
- (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done,
- (5) the effect, for instance, saving a man's life, and
- (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.
+ (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done,
+ (5) the effect, for instance, saving a man's life, and
+ (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.
Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet,
- obviously, of (l) the agent—for a man must know who he is
- himself. But a man may be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as for
- instance when people say ‘it slipped out while they were speaking,’ or
- ‘they were not aware that the matter was a secret,’ as Aeschylus said
+ obviously, of (l) the agent—for a man must know who he is
+ himself. But a man may be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as for
+ instance when people say ‘it slipped out while they were speaking,’ or
+ ‘they were not aware that the matter was a secret,’ as Aeschylus said
of the MysteriesAeschylus was accused before the
Areopagus of having divulged the Mysteries of Demeter in certain of his tragedies, but
- was acquitted. A phrase of his, ‘It came to my mouth,’ became
- proverbial (Plat. Rep. 563c, etc.),
- and he may have used it on this occasion.; or that ‘they let it off
- when they only meant to show how it worked’ as the prisoner pleaded in the
- catapult case. Again (3) a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as
+ was acquitted. A phrase of his, ‘It came to my mouth,’ became
+ proverbial (Plat. Rep. 563c, etc.),
+ and he may have used it on this occasion.; or that ‘they let it off
+ when they only meant to show how it worked’ as the prisoner pleaded in the
+ catapult case. Again (3) a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as
Merope doesIn the lost Cresphontes of
- Euripides.; or (4) mistake a sharp spear for one with a button
- on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or (5) one might kill a man
- by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or (6) in
+ Euripides.; or (4) mistake a sharp spear for one with a button
+ on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or (5) one might kill a man
+ by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or (6) in
loose wrestlingA style of wrestling in which the
adversaries only gripped each other's hands without closing. hit him a blow when
meaning only to grip his hand. Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances
@@ -1759,14 +1759,14 @@ convert to P3
act would seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the
particular circumstances in which he is acting. For it is probably a mistake to sayPlat. Laws 683b ff.,
coupled anger and appetite with ignorance as sources of wrong action. that acts
- caused by anger or by desire are involuntary. In the first place, (1) if we do so, we can no
- longer say that any of the lower animals act voluntarily, or children either. Then (2) are
+ caused by anger or by desire are involuntary. In the first place, (1) if we do so, we can no
+ longer say that any of the lower animals act voluntarily, or children either. Then (2) are
none of our actions that are caused by desire or anger voluntary, or are the noble ones
voluntary and the base involuntary? Surely this is an absurd distinction when one person
is the author of both. Yet perhaps it is strange to speak of acts aiming at things which it is right to aim at
as involuntary; and it is right to feel anger at some things, and also to feel desire for
- some things, for instance health, knowledge. Also (3) we think that involuntary actions are
- painful and actions that gratify desire pleasant. And again (4) what difference is
+ some things, for instance health, knowledge. Also (3) we think that involuntary actions are
+ painful and actions that gratify desire pleasant. And again (4) what difference is
there in respect of their involuntary character between wrong acts committed deliberately
and wrong acts done in anger? Both are to be avoided; and also we think that the irrational feelings
are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger
@@ -1775,42 +1775,42 @@ convert to P3
Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of
Choice.The writer here examines the operation of the
Will, which is regarded as essentially an act of choosing between alternatives of
- conduct. The technical term employed, ‘choice’ or
- ‘preference,’ has appeared in the formal definition of virtue
- (2.6.15). In the present passage, cf. 2.9, it is viewed as directed to
+ conduct. The technical term employed, ‘choice’ or
+ ‘preference,’ has appeared in the formal definition of virtue
+ (2.6.15). In the present passage, cf. 2.9, it is viewed as directed to
means: at the moment of action we select from among the alternative acts possible
- (or expressing it more loosely, among the various things here and now
- obtainable by our action) the one which we think will conduce to the end we
- wish. Elsewhere however (3.1.15 and 6.12.8) it is used of the
- selection of ends, and it is almost equivalent to ‘purpose’; while
- at 6.13.8 it includes both ends and means (see also 7.9.1). The writer
+ (or expressing it more loosely, among the various things here and now
+ obtainable by our action) the one which we think will conduce to the end we
+ wish. Elsewhere however (3.1.15 and 6.12.8) it is used of the
+ selection of ends, and it is almost equivalent to ‘purpose’; while
+ at 6.13.8 it includes both ends and means (see also 7.9.1). The writer
returns to the subject in Bk. 6.2. For this appears to be intimately connected
with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.
Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter
being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary
action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be
said to be done by choice.
- Some identify Choice with (1) Desire, or (2) Passion,
- or (3) Wish, or (4) some form of Opinion. These views
+
Some identify Choice with (1) Desire, or (2) Passion,
+ or (3) Wish, or (4) some form of Opinion. These views
however appear to be mistaken.
- (1) The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel
+
(1) The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel
desire, and also passion. Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the
contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire. Again, desire can run counter to
choice, but not desire to desire.i.e., you cannot feel
- two contradictory desires at once (though you can of course desire two
+ two contradictory desires at once (though you can of course desire two
incompatible things: you may want to eat your cake and have it; but you cannot strictly
speaking at the same time both desire to eat the cake and desire not to eat
- it). But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it. And
+ it). But you can desire to do a thing and choose not to do it. And
desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.But as good or bad.
- (2) Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion
+
(2) Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion
seem very far from being done of deliberate choice.
- (3) Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object
+
(3) Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object
impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a
fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality. Also we may wish for what cannot
- be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actorGreek dramas were produced in competitions (and it is noteworthy
+ be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actorGreek dramas were produced in competitions (and it is noteworthy
that in the Old Comedy at Athens the play
- itself dramatized a contest or debate). or athlete may win; but no one
+ itself dramatized a contest or debate). or athlete may win; but no one
chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his
own act. Again, we wish
rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be
@@ -1818,15 +1818,15 @@ convert to P3
we use in this connection, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy;
since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own
control.
- (4) Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be
- matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal,Cf. 3.3 and note. or impossible, just as much as about what is
+
(4) Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be
+ matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal,Cf. 3.3 and note. or impossible, just as much as about what is
within our power. Also we distinguish opinion by its truth or falsehood, not by its being
good or bad, but choice is distinguished rather as being good or bad. Probably therefore nobody actually identifies choice
with opinion in general. But neither is it the same as some particular opinion.i.e., an opinion or belief that so-and-so is good, and is
within our power to obtain. For it is our choice of good or evil that determines
our character, not our opinion about good or evil. And we choose to take or avoid some good or evil
- thing, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is advantageous, or how it is so:Perhaps to be emended ‘how it is to be
- achieved.’ we do not exactly form an opinion to take or avoid a thing.
+ thing, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is advantageous, or how it is so:Perhaps to be emended ‘how it is to be
+ achieved.’ we do not exactly form an opinion to take or avoid a thing.
Also we praise a
choice rather for choosing the right thing, but an opinion for opining in the right way.
And we choose only things that we absolutely know to be good, we opine things we do not
@@ -1842,35 +1842,35 @@ convert to P3
involves reasoning and some process of thought. Indeed previous deliberation seems to be
implied by the very term proaireton, which denotes
something chosen before other things.
- As for Deliberation, do people deliberate about everything—are all things
- possible objects of deliberation—, or are there some things about which
+
As for Deliberation, do people deliberate about everything—are all things
+ possible objects of deliberation—, or are there some things about which
deliberation is impossible?
The term
- ‘object of deliberation’ presumably must not be taken to include
+ ‘object of deliberation’ presumably must not be taken to include
things about which a fool or a madman might deliberate, but to mean what a sensible person
would deliberate about.
Well then, nobody deliberates about things eternal,The term includes the notion if immutability. such as the order of the universe,
or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side, of a square. Nor yet about things that change but
- follow a regular process, whether from necessity or by natureHere and in 3.7 ‘necessity’ denotes natural law in
- the inanimate world, while ‘nature’ or ‘growth’
+ follow a regular process, whether from necessity or by natureHere and in 3.7 ‘necessity’ denotes natural law in
+ the inanimate world, while ‘nature’ or ‘growth’
means natural law as governing animate creatures. Aristotle held that these agencies,
and with them the operation of human intelligence and art, beside their designed
results, produced by their interplay certain by-products in the shape of undesigned and
irregular occurrences, which are referred to in the next section. These in the natural
world he spoke of as due to to\ au)to/maton, or
- ‘spontaneous’; when due to the activity of man he ascribed them to
- fortune or chance. In 3.7 chance is made to include ‘the
- spontaneous.’ or through some other cause: such phenomena for instance
+ ‘spontaneous’; when due to the activity of man he ascribed them to
+ fortune or chance. In 3.7 chance is made to include ‘the
+ spontaneous.’ or through some other cause: such phenomena for instance
as the solstices and the sunrise. Nor about irregular occurrences, such as droughts and rains. Nor about
the results of chance, such as finding a hidden treasure. The reasonIn the
- mss. the words ‘The reason why . . . list of causes’ come after
- ‘But we do not deliberate . . . Scythia.’ why we do not deliberate about these things is
+ mss. the words ‘The reason why . . . list of causes’ come after
+ ‘But we do not deliberate . . . Scythia.’ why we do not deliberate about these things is
that none of them can be effected by our agency. We deliberate about things that are in our control
- and are attainable by action (which are in fact the only things that still remain
+ and are attainable by action (which are in fact the only things that still remain
to be considered; for Nature, Necessity, and Chance, with the addition of Intelligence and
- human agency generally, exhaust the generally accepted list of causes). But we do
+ human agency generally, exhaust the generally accepted list of causes). But we do
not deliberate about all human affairs without exception either: for example, no
- Lacedaemonian deliberates about the best form of governmentOr, ‘the best line of policy.’ for Scythia; but any particular set of men deliberates about
+ Lacedaemonian deliberates about the best form of governmentOr, ‘the best line of policy.’ for Scythia; but any particular set of men deliberates about
the things attainable by their own actions. Also there is no room for deliberation about matters fully ascertained
and completely formulated as sciences; such for instance as orthography, for we have no
uncertainty as to how a word ought to be spelt. We deliberate about things in which our
@@ -1879,14 +1879,14 @@ convert to P3
training, because it has been less completely reduced to a science; and similarly with
other pursuits also. And
we deliberate more about the artsA less well attested
- reading gives ‘more about our opinions,’ and Aristotle does not
+ reading gives ‘more about our opinions,’ and Aristotle does not
usually distinguish sharply between the arts and crafts and the practical sciences
- (the theoretic sciences cannot here be meant, see 3.3,4). than
+ (the theoretic sciences cannot here be meant, see 3.3,4). than
about the sciences, because we are more uncertain about them.
Deliberation then is employed in matters which, though subject to rules that generally
hold good, are uncertain in their issue; or where the issue is indeterminate,The text is probably corrupt, and perhaps should be
- altered to run ‘and in which the right means to take are not definitely
- determined.’ and where, when the matter is important, we take others
+ altered to run ‘and in which the right means to take are not definitely
+ determined.’ and where, when the matter is important, we take others
into our deliberations, distrusting our own capacity to decide.
And we deliberate not about ends, but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether
he is to cure his patient, nor an orator whether he is to convince his audience, nor a
@@ -1896,22 +1896,22 @@ convert to P3
they proceed to consider which of these will attain it most easily and best. If there is
only one means by which it can be accomplished, they ask how it is to be accomplished by
that means, and by what means that means can itself be achieved, until they reach the
- first link in the chain of causes, which is the last in the order of discovery. (For when deliberating one seems in the procedure
+ first link in the chain of causes, which is the last in the order of discovery. (For when deliberating one seems in the procedure
described to be pursuing an investigation or analysis that resembles the analysis of a
figure in geometryThe reference is to the analytical
method of solving a problem: the figure required to be drawn is assumed to have been
drawn, and then we analyse it and ask what conditions it implies, until we come down to
- something that we know how to draw already. —indeed it appears that though not all
+ something that we know how to draw already. —indeed it appears that though not all
investigation is deliberation, for example, mathematical investigation is not, yet all
- deliberation is investigation—and the last step in the analysis seems to be the
- first step in the execution of the design.) Then, if they have come up against an impossibility,
- they abandon the project—for instance, if it requires money and money cannot be
+ deliberation is investigation—and the last step in the analysis seems to be the
+ first step in the execution of the design.) Then, if they have come up against an impossibility,
+ they abandon the project—for instance, if it requires money and money cannot be
procured; but if on the other hand it proves to be something possible, they begin to act.
- By possible, I mean able to be performed by our agency—things we do through the
+ By possible, I mean able to be performed by our agency—things we do through the
agency of our friends counting in a sense as done by ourselves, since the origin of their
action is in us.
- (In practising an artThis clause seems
- implied by the context.) the question is at one moment what tools to
+
(In practising an artThis clause seems
+ implied by the context.) the question is at one moment what tools to
use, and at another how to use them; and similarly in other spheres, we have to consider
sometimes what means to employ, and sometimes how exactly given means are to be
employed.
@@ -1952,10 +1952,10 @@ convert to P3
If therefore neither of these views is satisfactory, perhaps we should say that what is
wished for in the true and unqualified sense is the good, but that what appears good to
each person is wished for by him; and accordingly that the good man wishes for what is
- truly wished for, the bad man for anything as it may happen (just as in the case
+ truly wished for, the bad man for anything as it may happen (just as in the case
of our bodies, a man of sound constitution finds really healthy food best for his health,
but some other diet may be healthy for one who is delicate; and so with things bitteri.e., things really bitter, etc. seem so to a healthy man,
- but not in some cases to an invalid. and sweet, hot, heavy, etc.). For
+ but not in some cases to an invalid. and sweet, hot, heavy, etc.). For
the good man judges everything correctly; what things truly are, that they seem to him to
be, in every departmenti.e., in each department of
character and conduct.
@@ -1981,8 +1981,8 @@ convert to P3
None would be vile, and none would not be blest
Anon. Possibly a verse of Solon. Doubtless
- ponhro/s, translated ‘vile’ to
- suit the context here, in the original meant ‘wretched.’
+ ponhro/s, translated ‘vile’ to
+ suit the context here, in the original meant ‘wretched.’
seems to be half false, though half true: it is true that no one is unwilling to be
blessed, but not true that wickedness is involuntary; or
else we must contradict what we just now3.15.
@@ -1993,8 +1993,8 @@ convert to P3
which the origins are within us, themselves depend upon us, and are voluntary.
This conclusion seems to be attested both by men's behavior in private life and by the
practice of lawgivers; for they punish and exact redress from those who do evil
- (except when it is done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the
- agent himself is not responsible), and honor those who do noble deeds, in order
+ (except when it is done under compulsion, or through ignorance for which the
+ agent himself is not responsible), and honor those who do noble deeds, in order
to encourage the one sort and to repress the other; but nobody tries to encourage us to do
things that do not depend upon ourselves and are not voluntary, since it is no good our
being persuaded not to feel heat or pain or hunger or the like, because we shall feel them
@@ -2015,8 +2015,8 @@ convert to P3
way. This is shown by the way in which men train
themselves for some contest or pursuit: they practice continually. Therefore only an utterly senseless person can fail to know that our
characters are the result of our conduct;The words,
- ‘but if a man . . . unjust’ in the mss. come after 5.13,
- ‘unjust or dissolute.’ but if a man knowingly acts in a way
+ ‘but if a man . . . unjust’ in the mss. come after 5.13,
+ ‘unjust or dissolute.’ but if a man knowingly acts in a way
that will result in his becoming unjust, he must be said to be voluntarily
unjust.
Again, though it is unreasonable to say that a man who acts unjustly or dissolutely does
@@ -2040,7 +2040,7 @@ convert to P3
bodily defects for which we are ourselves responsible are blamed, while those for which we
are not responsible are not. This being so, it follows that we are responsible for
blameworthy moral defects also.
- But suppose somebody says: “All men seek what seems to them good, but they are
+
But suppose somebody says: “All men seek what seems to them good, but they are
not responsible for its seeming good: each man's conception of his end is determined by his
character, whatever that may be. Although therefore, on the hypothesisThis is Aristotle's view, which the imaginary objector challenges. It is
not quite certain that his objection is meant to go as far as the point indicated by the
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ convert to P3
greatest and noblest of gifts, and is something which cannot be acquired or learnt from
another, but which a man will possess in such form as it has been bestowed on him at
birth, a good and noble natural endowment in this respect will constitute a good
- disposition in the full and true meaning of the term.”
+ disposition in the full and true meaning of the term.”
Now if this theory be true, how will virtue be voluntary any more than vice? Both for the
good man and the bad man alike, their view of their end is determined in the same manner,
by nature or however it may be; and all their actions of whatever sort are guided by
@@ -2065,13 +2065,13 @@ convert to P3
because the good man's actions to gain his end are voluntary, in either case vice will be just as much voluntary as virtue; for the bad
man equally with the good possesses spontaneity in his actions, even if not in his choice
of an end. If then, as is said, our virtues are
- voluntary (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause of our moral
+ voluntary (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause of our moral
dispositions, and it is our having a certain character that makes us set up an end of a
- certain kind), it follows that our vices are voluntary also; they are voluntary
+ certain kind), it follows that our vices are voluntary also; they are voluntary
in the same manner as our virtues.
We have then now discussed in outline the virtues in general, having indicated their
- genus [namely, that it is a mean, and a dispositionThis clause looks like an interpolation: e(/cis is the genus of virtue, Bk. 2.5 fin.,
- 6 init., meso/ths its differentia, 2.6.5,17.] and having shown that they render us
+ genus [namely, that it is a mean, and a dispositionThis clause looks like an interpolation: e(/cis is the genus of virtue, Bk. 2.5 fin.,
+ 6 init., meso/ths its differentia, 2.6.5,17.] and having shown that they render us
apt to do the same actions as those by which they are produced,See 2.2.8. and to do them in the way in which right reason may
enjoinSee 2.2.2. This clause in the mss. follows the
next one.; and that they depend on ourselves and are voluntary.See 5.2 and 20.This section some editors place before 5.21, but it is rather a footnote to 5.14; and
@@ -2079,7 +2079,7 @@ convert to P3
But our dispositions are not voluntary in the same way
as are our actions. Our actions we can control from beginning to end, and we are
conscious, of them at each stage.ta\ kaq' e(/kasta seems to bear a somewhat different sense here from 1.15,
- h( kaq' e(/kasta ( a)/gnoia). With our dispositions on the other hand, though
+ h( kaq' e(/kasta ( a)/gnoia). With our dispositions on the other hand, though
we can control their beginnings, each separate addition to them is imperceptible, as is the case with
the growth of a disease; though they are voluntary in that we were free to employ our
capacities in the one way or the other.
@@ -2099,8 +2099,8 @@ convert to P3
man also is a fearless person.
Again, it is no doubt right not to fear poverty, disease, or in general any evil not
caused by vice and not due to ourselves. But one who is fearless in regard to these things
- is not courageous either (although the term is applied to him, too, by
- analogy); since some men who are cowards
+ is not courageous either (although the term is applied to him, too, by
+ analogy); since some men who are cowards
in war are liberal with money, and face loss of fortune boldly.
Nor yet is a man cowardly if he fears insult to his wife and children, or envy, or the
like; nor courageous if he shows a bold face when about to undergo a flogging.
@@ -2116,10 +2116,10 @@ convert to P3
which public honors are bestowed in republics and under monarchies.
The courageous man, therefore, in the proper sense of the term, will be he who fearlessly
confronts a noble death, or some suddenOr perhaps
- ‘imminent,’ but cf. 8.15. peril that threatens death; and the
+ ‘imminent,’ but cf. 8.15. peril that threatens death; and the
perils of war answer this description most fully. Not
- that the courageous man is not also fearless in a storm at sea (as also in
- illness), though not in the same way as sailors are fearless, for he thinks
+ that the courageous man is not also fearless in a storm at sea (as also in
+ illness), though not in the same way as sailors are fearless, for he thinks
there is no hope of safety, and to die by drowning is revolting to him,i.e., he resents it as inglorious. whereas sailors
keep up heart because of their experience. Also Courage
is shown in dangers where a man can defend himself by valor or die nobly, but neither is
@@ -2147,23 +2147,23 @@ convert to P3
wrong time, or the like; and similarly with regard to occasions for confidence.
The courageous man then is he that endures or fears the right things and for the right
purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and who shows confidence in a
- similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit,
+ similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit,
and as principle may dictate. And every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition
of which it is the manifestation. So it is therefore with the activity of the courageous
man: his courage is noble; therefore its end is nobility, for a thing is defined by its
end; therefore the courageous man endures the terrors and dares the deeds that manifest
- courage, for the sake of that which is noble.)
+ courage, for the sake of that which is noble.)
Of the characters that run to excess, on the other hand, he who exceeds in fearlessness
- has no name (this, as we remarked before,2.7.2. is the case with many qualities), but we should call a man mad,
- or else insensitive to pain, if he feared nothing, ‘earthquake nor
- billows,’Apparently a verse quotation. Cf.
+ has no name (this, as we remarked before,2.7.2. is the case with many qualities), but we should call a man mad,
+ or else insensitive to pain, if he feared nothing, ‘earthquake nor
+ billows,’Apparently a verse quotation. Cf.
Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1229b 28,
- ‘As the Kelts take up arms and march against the waves’; and Strab. 7.2.1 gives similar stories, partly on the authority of
+ ‘As the Kelts take up arms and march against the waves’; and Strab. 7.2.1 gives similar stories, partly on the authority of
the fourth-century historian Ephorus. An echo survives in
- Shakespeare's simile ‘to take arms against a sea of
- troubles.’ as they say of the Kelts; he who exceeds in confidence
- [in the face of fearful thingsThese words
- seem to be an interpolation: confidence is shown in face of qarrale/a, not fobera/.] is
+ Shakespeare's simile ‘to take arms against a sea of
+ troubles.’ as they say of the Kelts; he who exceeds in confidence
+ [in the face of fearful thingsThese words
+ seem to be an interpolation: confidence is shown in face of qarrale/a, not fobera/.] is
rash. The rash man is generally thought to be an
impostor, who pretends to courage which he does not possess; at least, he wishes to appear
to feel towards fearful things as the courageous man actually does feel, and therefore he
@@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ convert to P3
make a bold show in situations that inspire confidence, but do not endure
terrors.
He that exceeds in fearFor symmetry this should have
- been ‘he that is deficient in fearlessness.’ is a coward, for
+ been ‘he that is deficient in fearlessness.’ is a coward, for
he fears the wrong things, and in the wrong manner, and soon with the rest of the list.
He is also
deficient in confidence; but his excessive fear in face of pain is more apparent.
@@ -2187,20 +2187,20 @@ convert to P3
though eager before the danger comes they hang back at the critical moment; whereas the
courageous are keen at the time of action but calm beforehand.
As has been said then, Courage is the observance of the mean in relation to things that
- inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances statedSee 6.10.; and it is confident and enduresThe mss. have ‘it chooses and endures.’ because it is noble
+ inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances statedSee 6.10.; and it is confident and enduresThe mss. have ‘it chooses and endures.’ because it is noble
to do so or base not to do so. But to seek death in order to escape from poverty, or the
pangs of love, or from pain or sorrow, is not the act of a courageous man, but rather of a
coward; for it is weakness to fly from troubles, and the suicide does not endure death
because it is noble to do so, but to escape evil.
Such is the nature of Courage; but the name is also applied to five divergent types of
character.
- (1) First, as most closely resembling true Courage comes the citizen's
- courage.‘Political courage’:
- Plato uses this phrase (Plat. Rep.
- 430c) of patriotic courage, based on training and ‘right
- opinion about what is terrible and what is not,’ and in contrast with the
+ (1) First, as most closely resembling true Courage comes the citizen's
+ courage.‘Political courage’:
+ Plato uses this phrase (Plat. Rep.
+ 430c) of patriotic courage, based on training and ‘right
+ opinion about what is terrible and what is not,’ and in contrast with the
undisciplined courage of slaves and brute beasts. Elsewhere, on the other hand, he
- contrasts ‘popular and citizen virtue’ in general with the
+ contrasts ‘popular and citizen virtue’ in general with the
philosopher's virtue, which is based on knowledge. Citizen troops appear to
endure dangers because of the legal penalties and the reproach attaching to cowardice, and
the honors awarded to bravery; hence those races
@@ -2208,16 +2208,16 @@ convert to P3
It is this citizen courage which inspires the heroes
portrayed by Homer, like Diomede and Hector:
- Polydamas will be the first to flout me;Hom. Il. 22.100 (
- Hector)—‘Alas, should
- I retire within the gates, Polydamas, . . .’
+ Polydamas will be the first to flout me;Hom. Il. 22.100 (
+ Hector)—‘Alas, should
+ I retire within the gates, Polydamas, . . .’
and Diomede says
Hector will make his boast at Troy hereafter:
- “By me was Tydeus' son . . .”Hom. Il.
- 8.148—‘By me was Tydeus's son routed in flight Back to
- the ships.’
+ “By me was Tydeus' son . . .”Hom. Il.
+ 8.148—‘By me was Tydeus's son routed in flight Back to
+ the ships.’
@@ -2231,7 +2231,7 @@ convert to P3
and the desire to avoid not disgrace but pain. Their masters compel them to be brave,
after Hector's fashion:
- Let me see any skulking off the field—
+ Let me see any skulking off the field—
He shall not save his carcase from the dogs!Hom. Il. 2.391, but the words are Agamemnon's,
and are slightly different in our Homer.
@@ -2241,17 +2241,17 @@ convert to P3
they give ground, or who form them in line with a trench or some other obstacle in the
rear; all these are using compulsion. A man ought not to be brave because he is compelled
to be, but because courage is noble.
- (2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a
+
(2) Again, experience of some particular form of danger is taken for a
sort of Courage; hence arose Socrates' notion
that Courage is Knowledge.i.e., knowledge of what is
- truly formidable and what is not (cf. note on 8.1); but
+ truly formidable and what is not (cf. note on 8.1); but
Socrates went on to show that this depended on knowledge
of the good, with which he identified all virtue: see Plato's
Laches. This type of bravery is displayed in various circumstances,
and particularly in war by professional soldiers.i.e.,
ce/noi, foreign mercenary troops, much employed in
Greek warfare in Aristotle's time. For
- war (as the saying is) is full of false alarms, a fact which these men
+ war (as the saying is) is full of false alarms, a fact which these men
have had most opportunity of observing; thus they appear courageous owing to others'
ignorance of the true situation. Also experience renders
them the most efficient in inflicting loss on the enemy without sustaining it themselves,
@@ -2264,45 +2264,45 @@ convert to P3
equipment; for they are the first to run away, while citizen troops stand their ground and
die fighting, as happened in the battle at the temple of Hermes.In Coronea, 353 B.C.; the Acropolis had been seized by Onomarchus the Phocian, and
mercenaries, brought in by the Boeotarchs to aid the citizens, ran away at the beginning
- of the battle (schol.). This is because citizens think it
+ of the battle (schol.). This is because citizens think it
disgraceful to run away, and prefer death to safety
so procured; whereas professional soldiers were relying from the outset on superior
strength, and when they discover they are outnumbered they take to flight, fearing death
more than disgrace. But this is not true courage.
- (3) Spirit or angerqumo/s means both ‘spirit’ or
- ‘high spirit’ and also its manifestation in anger. is also
+
(3) Spirit or angerqumo/s means both ‘spirit’ or
+ ‘high spirit’ and also its manifestation in anger. is also
classed with Courage. Men emboldened by anger, like wild beasts which rush upon the hunter
that has wounded them, are supposed to be courageous, because the courageous also are
high-spirited; for spirit is very impetuous in encountering danger. Hence Homer
writes,i.e., in describing courageous men, Hom. Il. 14.151 or Hom. Il.
- 16.529, Hom. Il.5.470, Hom. Od. 24.318. The fourth phrase is not in our Homer, but occurs in Theocritus 20.15. ‘he put strength in
- their spirit,’ and ‘roused their might and their spirit,’
- and ‘bitter wrath up through his nostrils welled,’ and ‘his
- blood boiled’; for all such symptoms seem to indicate an excitement and impulse
+ 16.529, Hom. Il.5.470, Hom. Od. 24.318. The fourth phrase is not in our Homer, but occurs in Theocritus 20.15. ‘he put strength in
+ their spirit,’ and ‘roused their might and their spirit,’
+ and ‘bitter wrath up through his nostrils welled,’ and ‘his
+ blood boiled’; for all such symptoms seem to indicate an excitement and impulse
of the spirit. Thus the real motive of courageous men is
the nobility of courage, although spirit operates in them as well; but wild animals are
emboldened by pain, for they turn to bay because they are wounded, or
- frightened—since if they are in a forest or a swampi.e., in a place where they can escape. The words ‘or a
- swamp,’ are probably interpolated. they do not attack. Therefore they
+ frightened—since if they are in a forest or a swampi.e., in a place where they can escape. The words ‘or a
+ swamp,’ are probably interpolated. they do not attack. Therefore they
are not to be considered courageous for rushing upon danger when spurred by pain and
anger, and blind to the dangers that await them; since on that reckoning even asses would
be brave, when they are hungry, for no blows will make them stop grazing!See Hom. Il. 11.558.
- (And adulterers also are led to do many daring things by lust.)This parenthetical note does not bear on the context.
+ (And adulterers also are led to do many daring things by lust.)This parenthetical note does not bear on the context.
ButThis sentence should apparently come at the end of
- the section, ‘but’ being amended to
- ‘for.’ the form of courage that is inspired by spirit seems to
+ the section, ‘but’ being amended to
+ ‘for.’ the form of courage that is inspired by spirit seems to
be the most natural, and when reinforced by deliberate choice and purpose it appears to be
true Courage. And human beings also feel pain when angry, and take pleasure in revenge.
But those who fight for these motives, though valiant fighters, are not courageous; for
the motive of their confidence is not honor, nor is it guided by principle, but it springs
from feeling. However, they show some affinity to true Courage.
- (4) Nor yet again is the boldness of the sanguine the same thing as
+
(4) Nor yet again is the boldness of the sanguine the same thing as
Courage. The sanguine are confident in face of danger because they have won many victories
over many foes before. They resemble the courageous, because both are confident, but
whereas the courageous are confident for the reasons already explained,Cf. 7.2-6 the sanguine are so because they think
- they are stronger than the enemy, and not likely told come to any harm. (A similar boldness is shown by men who get drunk, for this
- makes them sanguine for the time being.) When however things do not turn out as
+ they are stronger than the enemy, and not likely told come to any harm. (A similar boldness is shown by men who get drunk, for this
+ makes them sanguine for the time being.) When however things do not turn out as
they expect, the merely sanguine run away, whereas the mark of the courageous man, as we
have seen,Cf. 7.2-6. is to endure things that
are terrible to a human being and that seem so to him, because it is noble to do so and
@@ -2312,14 +2312,14 @@ convert to P3
from character, as there is less time for preparation; one might resolve to face a danger
one can foresee, from calculation and on principle, but only a fixed disposition of
Courage will enable one to face sudden peril.
- (5) Those who face danger in ignorance also appear courageous; and they
+
(5) Those who face danger in ignorance also appear courageous; and they
come very near to those whose bravery rests on a sanguine temperament, though inferior to
them inasmuch as they lack self-confidence, which the sanguine possess. Hence the sanguine
stand firm for a time; whereas those who have been deceived as to the danger, if they
learn or suspect the true state of affairs, take to flight, as the Argives did when they
encountered the Lacedaemonians and thought they were Sicyonians.This occurred in the battle at the Long Walls of Corinth, 392 B.C.
Lacedaemonian cavalry had dismounted and armed themselves with the shields of the routed
- Sicyonians, marked *s (Xen. Hell. 4.4.10).
+ Sicyonians, marked *s (Xen. Hell. 4.4.10).
We have now described the characteristics both of the courageous and of those who are
thought to be courageous.
@@ -2333,8 +2333,8 @@ convert to P3
that the end correspondingCf. 7.6. to the
virtue of Courage is really pleasant, only its pleasantness is obscured by the attendant
circumstances. This is illustrated by the case of athletic contests: to boxers, for
- example, their end—the object they box for, the wreath and the honors of
- victory—is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of
+ example, their end—the object they box for, the wreath and the honors of
+ victory—is pleasant, but the blows they receive must hurt them, being men of
flesh and blood, and all the labor of training is painful; and these painful incidentals
are so numerous that the final object, being a small thing, appears not to contain any
pleasure at all. If then the same is true of Courage, the
@@ -2358,8 +2358,8 @@ convert to P3
After Courage let us speak of Temperance; for these appear to be the virtues of the
irrational parts of the soul.
Now we have said2.7.3. that Temperance is the
- observance of the mean in relation to pleasures (for it is concerned only in a
- lesser degree and in a different way with pains); and Profligacy also is
+ observance of the mean in relation to pleasures (for it is concerned only in a
+ lesser degree and in a different way with pains); and Profligacy also is
displayed in the same matters. Let us then now define the sort of pleasures to which these
qualities are related.
Now we must make a distinction between pleasures of the body and pleasures of the soul:
@@ -2390,7 +2390,7 @@ convert to P3
The lion does not care about the lowing of the
ox, but about devouring it, though the lowing tells him that the ox is near, and
consequently he appears to take pleasure in the sound. Similarly he is not pleased by the
- sight of ‘or stag or mountain goat,’
+ sight of ‘or stag or mountain goat,’
Hom. Il. 3.24
but by the prospect of a meal.
Temperance and Profligacy are therefore concerned with those pleasures which man shares
@@ -2402,8 +2402,8 @@ convert to P3
actually enjoying the object that is pleasant, and this is done solely through the sense
of touch, alike in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex.
This is why a certain gourmandApparently a character of comedy, though later writers speak of him as a
- real person. Some mss. here insert his name, ‘Hospitable, the son of
- Belch,’ cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1231a
+ real person. Some mss. here insert his name, ‘Hospitable, the son of
+ Belch,’ cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1231a
16, where the story recurs, and Aristoph. Frogs
934. wished that his throat might be longer than a crane's, showing that
his pleasure lay in the sensation of contact.
@@ -2421,21 +2421,21 @@ convert to P3
Hom. Il. 24.130. when young and lusty. But not
everybody desires this or that particular sort of nourishment, any more than everyone
desires the same particular portion of food;The text
- should perhaps be amended to run ‘nor desires the same food
- always.’ hence a taste for this or that sort of food seems to be an
+ should perhaps be amended to run ‘nor desires the same food
+ always.’ hence a taste for this or that sort of food seems to be an
individual peculiarity. Not but what there is also
something natural in such tastes; for different things are pleasant to different people,
- and there are some special delicacies which all men like better than ordinary food.Preferences are natural because (1)
- men's natures vary and therefore their tastes vary, (2) some
+ and there are some special delicacies which all men like better than ordinary food.Preferences are natural because (1)
+ men's natures vary and therefore their tastes vary, (2) some
preferences are universal.
In the case of the natural desires, then, few men err, and in one way only, that of
excess in quantity; for to eat or drink to repletion of ordinary food and drink is to
exceed what is natural in amount, since the natural desire is only to satisfy one's wants.
- Hence people who over-eat are called ‘mad-bellies,’ meaning that they fill that organ beyond the right measure; it is
+ Hence people who over-eat are called ‘mad-bellies,’ meaning that they fill that organ beyond the right measure; it is
persons of especially slavish nature that are liable to this form of excess.
But in regard to the pleasures peculiar to particular people, many men err, and err in
- many ways. For when people are said to be ‘very fond of’ so-and-so, it
+ many ways. For when people are said to be ‘very fond of’ so-and-so, it
is either because they like things that it is not right to like, or like them more than
most people do, or like them in a wrong manner; and the profligate exceed in all these
ways. For they like some things that are wrong, and indeed abominable, and any such things
@@ -2445,8 +2445,8 @@ convert to P3
blameworthy. As regards pains on the other hand, it is not with Temperance as it is with
Courage: a man is not termed temperate for enduring pain and profligate for not enduring
it, but profligate for feeling more pain than is right when he fails to get pleasures
- (in his case pleasure actually causing pain), and temperate for not
- feeling pain at the absence of pleasure [or at abstaining from it].
+ (in his case pleasure actually causing pain), and temperate for not
+ feeling pain at the absence of pleasure [or at abstaining from it].
The profligate therefore desires all pleasures, or those that are the most pleasant, and
is led by his desire to pursue these in preference to everything else. He consequently
@@ -2484,13 +2484,13 @@ convert to P3
cowardly actions actually seem to be done under compulsion. But with the profligate on the contrary the particular acts are
voluntary, for they are done with desire and appetite, but the character in general is
less so, since no one desires to be a profligate.
- The word Profligacya)kolasi/a, literally ‘the result of not being punished,’
+ The word Profligacya)kolasi/a, literally ‘the result of not being punished,’
seems to have been used of spoiled children as well as of vicious adults. or
wantonness we also apply to the naughtiness of children, which has some resemblance to
the licentiousness of adults. Which of the two takes its name from the other is of no
importance for the present enquiry, but it would seem clear that the state which comes
later in life must be named from the one which comes earlier. The metaphor appears apt enough, since it is that which desires what is
- disgraceful and whose appetites grow apace that needs chastisement or pruning,The primary meaning of kola/zein, ‘to punish.’ and this description
+ disgraceful and whose appetites grow apace that needs chastisement or pruning,The primary meaning of kola/zein, ‘to punish.’ and this description
applies in the fullest degree to desire, as it does to the child. For children, like
profligates, live at the prompting of desire; and the appetite for pleasure is strongest
in childhood, so that if it be not disciplined and made obedient to authority, it will
@@ -2498,12 +2498,12 @@ convert to P3
for pleasure is insatiable and undiscriminating, and the innate tendency is fostered by
active gratification; indeed, if such gratification be great and intense it actually
overpowers the reason. Hence our indulgences should be moderate and few, and never opposed
- to principle—this is what we mean by
- ‘well-disciplined’ and ‘chastened—; and the
+ to principle—this is what we mean by
+ ‘well-disciplined’ and ‘chastened—; and the
appetitive part of us should be ruled by principle, just as a boy should live in obedience
to his tutor. Hence in the temperate man the appetitive
- element must be in harmony with principle. For (1) the aim of both
- Temperance and principle is that which is noble; and (2) the temperate
+ element must be in harmony with principle. For (1) the aim of both
+ Temperance and principle is that which is noble; and (2) the temperate
man desires the right thing in the right way at the right time, which is what principle
ordains.
Let this then be our account of Temperance.
@@ -2517,9 +2517,9 @@ convert to P3
Next let us speak of Liberality. This virtue seems to be the observance of the mean in
relation to wealth: we praise a man as liberal not in war, nor in matters in which we
praise him as temperate nor in judicial decisions, but in relation to giving and
- gettingThe word lamba/nein, the antithesis of ‘give,’ varies in meaning
- with the context between ‘get,’ ‘receive’ and
- ‘take.’ wealth, and especially in giving; wealth meaning all
+ gettingThe word lamba/nein, the antithesis of ‘give,’ varies in meaning
+ with the context between ‘get,’ ‘receive’ and
+ ‘take.’ wealth, and especially in giving; wealth meaning all
those things whose value is measured by money.
Prodigality and MeannessSee note on 2.7.4. on
the other hand are both of them modes of excess and of deficiency in relation to wealth.
@@ -2529,8 +2529,8 @@ convert to P3
debauchery prodigal; and therefore prodigality is thought to be extremely wicked, because
it is a combination of vices. But this is not the proper application of the word: really it denotes
the possessor of one particular vice, that of wasting one's substance; for he who is ruined by his
- own agency is a hopeless case indeed,a)/swtos, ‘prodigal,’ means literally
- ‘not saved,’ ‘in desperate case.’ and to
+ own agency is a hopeless case indeed,a)/swtos, ‘prodigal,’ means literally
+ ‘not saved,’ ‘in desperate case.’ and to
waste one's substance seems to be in a way to ruin oneself, inasmuch as wealth is the
means of life. This then is the sense in which the term Prodigality is here
understood.
@@ -2559,10 +2559,10 @@ convert to P3
man therefore will give for the nobility of giving. And he will give rightly, for he will
give to the right people, and the right amount, and at the right time, and fulfil all the
other conditions of right giving. Also he will give with pleasure, or at all events without pain; for
- virtuous action is pleasant, or painless—it certainly cannot be painful.
+ virtuous action is pleasant, or painless—it certainly cannot be painful.
One who gives to the
- wrong people,The ms. text gives ‘to the
- wrong people,’ but cf. 1.12, l.25 o)rqw=s. or not for the nobility of giving but from some other motive,
+ wrong people,The ms. text gives ‘to the
+ wrong people,’ but cf. 1.12, l.25 o)rqw=s. or not for the nobility of giving but from some other motive,
will not be called liberal, but by some different title; nor will he who gives with pain,
for he would prefer the money to the noble deed, which is not the mark of a liberal
man.
@@ -2579,8 +2579,8 @@ convert to P3
for it is a mark of a liberal nature to be regardless of self.
In crediting people with Liberality their resources must be taken into account; for the
liberality of a gift does not depend on its amount, but on the disposition of the giver,
- and a liberal disposition gives according to its substance.Or (accepting Bywater's emendation) ‘and this
- is relative to his substance.’ It is therefore possible that the
+ and a liberal disposition gives according to its substance.Or (accepting Bywater's emendation) ‘and this
+ is relative to his substance.’ It is therefore possible that the
smaller giver may be the more liberal, if he give from smaller means. Men who have inherited a fortune are
reputed to be more liberal than those who have made one, since they have never known what
it is to want; moreover everybody is specially fond of a thing that is his own creation:
@@ -2618,9 +2618,9 @@ convert to P3
manner. This will become clearer as we proceed.
We have saidSee 1.2. then that Prodigality and
Meanness are modes of excess and of deficiency, and this in two things, giving and
- getting—giving being taken to include spending. Prodigality exceeds in giving
- [without gettingThese words seem to be
- interpolated.], and is deficient in getting; Meanness falls short in
+ getting—giving being taken to include spending. Prodigality exceeds in giving
+ [without gettingThese words seem to be
+ interpolated.], and is deficient in getting; Meanness falls short in
giving and goes to excess in getting, only not on the great scale. Now the two forms of Prodigality are
very seldom found united in the same person, because it is not easy to give to everyone
without receiving from anyone: the giver's means are soon exhausted, if he is a private
@@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ convert to P3
In fact, a man who is
prodigal in both ways may be thought considerably superior to the mean man; for he is easily cured by age or by poverty, and
is able to be brought to the due mean, because he possesses the essentials of the liberal
- character—he gives, and he refrains from taking, though he does neither in the
+ character—he gives, and he refrains from taking, though he does neither in the
proper way or rightly. Correct this by training, or otherwise reform him, and he will be
liberal, for he will now give his money to the right objects, while he will not get it
from the wrong sources. This is why he is felt to be not really bad in character; for to
@@ -2659,14 +2659,14 @@ convert to P3
while others fall short in giving. The characters described by such names as niggardly, close-fisted, and
stingy all fall short in giving, but they do not covet the goods of others nor wish to
take them. With some of them this is due to an honorable motive of a sort, namely a
- shrinking from base conduct—since some persons are thought, or at all events
+ shrinking from base conduct—since some persons are thought, or at all events
profess, to be careful of their money because they wish to avoid being forced at some time
or other to do something base; to this class belong the skinflintkuminopri/sths means literally
- ‘one who saws cumminseed in half.’ and similar characters,
+ ‘one who saws cumminseed in half.’
and similar characters,
who get their names from an excessive reluctance to give. But some keep their hands off
their neighbors' goods from fear; they calculate that it is not easy to take what belongs
- to others without others taking what belongs to oneself, and so they ‘prefer
- (as they say) neither to take nor to give.’ The other sort of people are those who
+ to others without others taking what belongs to oneself, and so they ‘prefer
+ (as they say) neither to take nor to give.’ The other sort of people are those who
exceed in respect of getting, taking from every source and all they can; such are those
who follow degrading trades, brothel-keepers and all people of that sort, and petty
usurers who lend money in small sums at a high rate of interest; all these take from wrong
@@ -2690,12 +2690,12 @@ convert to P3
discussing it Aristotle is thinking especially of the lh|tourgi/ai or public services discharged at Athens, and in other Greek cities, by wealthy individuals; such as the
refitting of a naval trireme, the equipment of a dramatic chorus, and the defraying of
the cost of a qewri/a or delegation representing the
- State at one of the great Hellenic festivals. The word literally means ‘great
- conspicuousness’ or splendor, but in eliciting its connotation Aristotle
+ State at one of the great Hellenic festivals. The word literally means ‘great
+ conspicuousness’ or splendor, but in eliciting its connotation Aristotle
brings in another meaning of the verb pre/pein, viz.
- ‘to be fitting,’ and takes the noun to signify
- ‘suitability on a great scale’; and also he feels that the element
- ‘great’ denotes grandeur as well as mere magnitude. for this
+ ‘to be fitting,’ and takes the noun to signify
+ ‘suitability on a great scale’; and also he feels that the element
+ ‘great’ denotes grandeur as well as mere magnitude. for this
also appears to be a virtue concerned with wealth.
It does not however, like Liberality, extend to all actions dealing with wealth, but only
refers to the spending of wealth; and in this sphere it surpasses Liberality in point of
@@ -2707,7 +2707,7 @@ convert to P3
suitability of the expenditure therefore is relative to the spender himself, and to the
occasion or object. At the same time the term magnificent is not applied to one who spends
adequate sums on objects of only small or moderate importance, like the man who said
- ‘Oft gave I alms to homeless wayfarers’Hom. Od. 17.420; said by Odysseus
+ ‘Oft gave I alms to homeless wayfarers’Hom. Od. 17.420; said by Odysseus
pretending to be a beggar who formerly was well-to-do.; it denotes someone who
spends suitably on great objects. For though the magnificent man is liberal, the liberal
man is not necessarily magnificent.
@@ -2717,13 +2717,13 @@ convert to P3
occasions and in the wrong way. We will however speak of them later.2.20-22.
The magnificent man is an artist in expenditure: he can discern what is suitable, and
- spend great sums with good taste. (For as we said at the outset,Cf. 2.1.7 fin., chap. 2.8. a disposition is defined by the
- activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.)
+ spend great sums with good taste. (For as we said at the outset,Cf. 2.1.7 fin., chap. 2.8. a disposition is defined by the
+ activities in which it is displayed, and by the objects to which it is related.)
So the magnificent man's expenditure is suitable as well as great. And consequently the
objects he produces must also be great and suitable; for so only will a great expenditure
- be suitable [to the resultThese words are
- better omitted: ‘suitable to the occasion’ seems to be
- meant.] as well. Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the
+ be suitable [to the resultThese words are
+ better omitted: ‘suitable to the occasion’ seems to be
+ meant.] as well. Hence, as the object produced must be worthy of the
expenditure, so also must the expenditure be worthy of or even exceed the object produced.
Again, the motive of
the munificent man in such expenditure will be the nobility of the action, this motive
@@ -2732,19 +2732,19 @@ convert to P3
think how he can carry out his project most nobly and splendidly, rather than how much it
will cost and how it can be done most cheaply. The magnificent man will therefore necessarily be also a liberal
man. For the liberal man too will spend the right amount in the right manner; and it is in
- the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element ‘great’ in
- the magnificent or ‘greatly splendid’See note on 2.1. man, that is to say his greatness, is shown,
+ the amount and manner of his expenditure that the element ‘great’ in
+ the magnificent or ‘greatly splendid’See note on 2.1. man, that is to say his greatness, is shown,
these being the things in which Liberality is displayed. And the magnificent man from an
equal outlay will achieve a more magnificent resultSc.
than the vulgar man or the shabby man.; for the same standard of excellence does
not apply to an achievement as to a possession: with possessions the thing worth the
highest price is the most honored, for instance gold, but the achievement most honored is
- one that is great and noble (since a great achievement arouses the admiration of
- the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to magnificence);
+ one that is great and noble (since a great achievement arouses the admiration of
+ the spectator, and the quality of causing admiration belongs to magnificence);
and excellence in an achievement involves greatness. Now there are some forms of expenditure definitely
- entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods—
+ entitled honorable, for instance expenditure on the service of the gods—
votive offerings, public buildings,
- sacrifices—and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions
+ sacrifices—and the offices of religion generally; and those public benefactions
which are favorite objects of ambition, for instance the duty, as it is esteemed in
certain states, of equipping a chorus splendidly or fitting out a ship of war, or even of
giving a banquet to the public. But in all these matters, as has been said, the scale of expenditure
@@ -2774,11 +2774,11 @@ convert to P3
greatness of any form of expenditure varies with its particular kind, and, although the
most magnificent expenditure absolutely is great expenditure on a great object, the most
magnificent in a particular case is the amount that is great in that case, and since the greatness of the
- result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure (for the
+ result achieved is not the same as the greatness of the expenditure (for the
finest ball or oil-flask does not cost much or involve a very liberal outlay, though it
- makes a magnificent present in the case of a child), it follows that it is the mark of the
+ makes a magnificent present in the case of a child), it follows that it is the mark of the
magnificent man, in expenditure of whatever kind, to produce a magnificent result
- (for that is a standard not easily exceeded), and a result proportionate
+ (for that is a standard not easily exceeded), and a result proportionate
to the cost.
Such then is the character of the magnificent man. His counterpart on the side of excess,
the vulgar man, exceeds, as has been said, by
@@ -2789,11 +2789,11 @@ convert to P3
chorus appear in character as charcoal-burners, cavalrymen, wasps, clouds, etc., and
take part in the action of the play as such. They seem to have stripped off their outer
dress for the Parabasis, or interlude, in which they address the audience on behalf of
- the author (Aristoph. Ach. 627,Aristoph. Peace 730). In the later scenes they
+ the author (Aristoph. Ach. 627,Aristoph. Peace 730). In the later scenes they
tend to fall more into the position of spectators, like the chorus of tragedy; and the
play usually ends with something in the nature of a triumphal procession, when purple
- robes (like the scarlet worn by the chorus at the end of the
-
Eumenides of Aeschylus) would not be inappropriate, as they
+ robes (like the scarlet worn by the chorus at the end of the
+ Eumenides of Aeschylus) would not be inappropriate, as they
would be in the opening scenes. Megarian comedy is elsewhere associated with coarse
buffoonery. Moreover, he does all this not from a noble motive but to show off
his wealth, and with the idea that this sort of thing makes people admire him; and he
@@ -2806,8 +2806,8 @@ convert to P3
they do not bring serious discredit, since they are not injurious to others, nor are they
excessively unseemly.
Greatness of Soul,megaloyuxi/a, magnanimitas, means lofty pride
- and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-mindedness (in the modern sense
- of the word). as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great
+ and self-esteem rather than magnanimity or high-mindedness (in the modern sense
+ of the word). as the word itself implies, seems to be related to great
objects; let us first ascertain what sort of objects these are. It will make no difference whether we examine the
quality itself or the person that displays the quality.
Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much; he who
@@ -2830,7 +2830,7 @@ convert to P3
the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.
If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the
greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially.
- ‘Worthy’ is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods
+ ‘Worthy’ is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods
external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which
we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and
is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds; and
@@ -2852,18 +2852,18 @@ convert to P3
truly great-souled man must be a good man. Indeed greatness in each of the virtues would
seem to go with greatness of soul. For instance, one cannot imagine the great-souled man running at full
speed when retreating in battle,Literally,
- ‘fleeing swinging his arms at his side,’ i.e. deficient in the
+ ‘fleeing swinging his arms at his side,’ i.e. deficient in the
virtue of Courage. If this be the meaning, the phrase recalls by contrast the leisurely
- retirement of Socrates from the stricken field of Delium (Plato, Plat. Sym.
- 221a). But the words have been taken with what follows, as illustrating
- the lack of Justice or Honesty, and the whole translated either ‘outstripping
- an opponent in a race by flinging the arms backward [which was considered
- unsportsmanlike], nor fouling,’ or else ‘being prosecuted
- on a charge of blackmailing, nor cheating in business.’ Emendation would give
- a buried verse-quotation, ‘To swing his arms in flight, nor in
- pursuit.’ nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct
+ retirement of Socrates from the stricken field of Delium (Plato, Plat. Sym.
+ 221a). But the words have been taken with what follows, as illustrating
+ the lack of Justice or Honesty, and the whole translated either ‘outstripping
+ an opponent in a race by flinging the arms backward [which was considered
+ unsportsmanlike], nor fouling,’ or else ‘being prosecuted
+ on a charge of blackmailing, nor cheating in business.’ Emendation would give
+ a buried verse-quotation, ‘To swing his arms in flight, nor in
+ pursuit.’ nor acting dishonestly; since what motive for base conduct
has a man to whom nothing is great?i.e., nothing is of
- much value in his eyes (cf. 3.30,34), so that gain, which is a motive
+ much value in his eyes (cf. 3.30,34), so that gain, which is a motive
to dishonesty with others, is no temptation to him. Considering all the virtues
in turn, we shall feel it quite ridiculous to picture the great-souled man as other than a
good man. Moreover, if he were bad, he would not be worthy of honor, since honor is the
@@ -2884,10 +2884,10 @@ convert to P3
then, as has been said, is especially concerned with honor; but he will also observe due
measure in respect to wealth, power, and good and bad fortune in general, as they may
befall him; he will not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity.
- For he does not care much even about honor, which is the greatest of external goodsThe ms. reading gives ‘For even honor he does
- not feel to be of the greatest importance.’ (since power and
+ For he does not care much even about honor, which is the greatest of external goodsThe ms. reading gives ‘For even honor he does
+ not feel to be of the greatest importance.’ (since power and
wealth are desirable only for the honor they bring, at least their possessors wish to be
- honored for their sake); he therefore to whom even honor is a small thing will be
+ honored for their sake); he therefore to whom even honor is a small thing will be
indifferent to other things as well. Hence
great-souled men are thought to be haughty.
But it is thought that the gifts of fortune also conduce to greatness of soul; for the
@@ -2904,7 +2904,7 @@ convert to P3
to the rest of mankind, despise other people, although their own conduct is no better than
another's. The fact is that they try to imitate the great-souled man without being really
like him, and only copy him in what they can, reproducing his contempt for others but not
- his virtuous conduct. For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people—his estimates
+ his virtuous conduct. For the great-souled man is justified in despising other people—his estimates
are correct; but most proud men have no good ground for their pride.
The great-souled man does not run into danger for trifling reasons, and is not a lover of
danger, because there are few things he values; but he will face danger in a great cause,
@@ -2914,8 +2914,8 @@ convert to P3
mark of superiority and the latter of inferiority. He returns a service done to him with
interest, since this will put the original benefactor into his debt in turn, and make him
the party benefited. The great-souled are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred,
- but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of a
- benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior);
+ but a bad memory for those which they have received (since the recipient of a
+ benefit is the inferior of his benefactor, whereas they desire to be superior);
and to enjoy being reminded of the former but to dislike being reminded of the latter:
this is why the poet makes ThetisAn incorrect
recollection of Hom. Il. 1.393 ff., Hom. Il. 1.503 f.; there Achilles says that his mother
@@ -2944,7 +2944,7 @@ convert to P3
greatness of soul to recall things against people, especially the wrongs they have done
you, but rather to overlook them. He is no gossip, for he will not talk either about himself or about
another, as he neither wants to receive compliments nor to hear other people run down
- (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking
+ (nor is he lavish of praise either); and so he is not given to speaking
evil himself, even of his enemies, except when he deliberately intends to give offence.
In troubles that
cannot be avoided or trifling mishaps he will never cry out or ask for help, since to do
@@ -2958,9 +2958,9 @@ convert to P3
deficiency is the Small-souled man, and on that of excess the Vain man. These alsoCf. 2.22. are not thought to be actually vicious,
since they do no harm, but rather mistaken. The small-souled man deprives himself of the good things that he deserves; and his
failure to claim good things makes it seem that he has something bad about him
- [and also that he does not know himself],These words seem to be interpolated. The small-souled man does not claim
+ [and also that he does not know himself],These words seem to be interpolated. The small-souled man does not claim
his deserts, but he may know what they are; he is not charged with ignorance of self, as
- is the vain man, 3.36. for (people argue), if he deserved any
+ is the vain man, 3.36. for (people argue), if he deserved any
good, he would try to obtain it. Not that such persons are considered foolish, but rather
too retiring; yet this estimate of them is thought to make them still worse, for men's
ambitions show what they are worth, and if they hold aloof from noble enterprises and
@@ -2969,7 +2969,7 @@ convert to P3
The vain on the other hand are foolish persons, who are deficient in self-knowledge and
expose their defect: they undertake honorable responsibilities of which they are not
worthy, and then are found out. They are ostentatious in dress, manner and so on. They
- want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it,A variant reading is ‘talk about themselves.’
+ want people to know how well off they are, and talk about it,A variant reading is ‘talk about themselves.’
imagining that this will make them respected.
Smallness of Soul is more opposed than Vanity to Greatness of Soul, being both more
prevalent and worse.
@@ -2988,11 +2988,11 @@ convert to P3
if he does not care about receiving honor even on noble grounds. But at another time we praise the ambitious man as manly and a lover of
what is noble, or praise the unambitious man as modest and temperate, as we said in the
first part of this work.See 2.7.8. The fact is
- that the expression ‘fond of’ so-and-so is ambiguous, and we do not
- always apply the word ‘fond of honor’ (ambitious) to
- the same thing; when we use it as a term of praise, we mean ‘more fond of honor
- than most men,’ but when as a reproach, ‘more than is
- right.’ As the observance of the mean has no name, the two extremes dispute as
+ that the expression ‘fond of’ so-and-so is ambiguous, and we do not
+ always apply the word ‘fond of honor’ (ambitious) to
+ the same thing; when we use it as a term of praise, we mean ‘more fond of honor
+ than most men,’ but when as a reproach, ‘more than is
+ right.’ As the observance of the mean has no name, the two extremes dispute as
it were for the unclaimed estate. But where there is excess and deficiency there must also
be a mean. Now men do seek honor both more and less than is right; it must therefore be possible also to do
so rightly. It is therefore this nameless middle disposition in regard to honor that we
@@ -3002,19 +3002,19 @@ convert to P3
but in the present case the extremes appear to be opposed only to one another, because the
middle character has no name.
Gentleness is the observance of the mean in relation to anger. There is as a matter of
- fact no recognized name for the mean in this respect—indeed there can hardly be
- said to be names for the extremes either—, so we apply the word Gentleness to
+ fact no recognized name for the mean in this respect—indeed there can hardly be
+ said to be names for the extremes either—, so we apply the word Gentleness to
the mean though really it inclines to the side of the defect. This has no name, but the excess may be called a sort of Irascibility,
for the emotion concerned is anger, though the causes producing it are many and
various.
Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against the right persons,
and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time. He
may then be called gentle-tempered, if we take gentleness to be a praiseworthy quality
- (for ‘gentle’ really denotes a calm temper, not led by
+ (for ‘gentle’ really denotes a calm temper, not led by
emotion but only becoming angry in such a manner, for such causes and for such a length of
time as principle may ordain; although the quality is thought
rather to err on the side of defect, since the gentle-tempered man is not prompt to seek
- redress for injuries, but rather inclined to forgive them).
+ redress for injuries, but rather inclined to forgive them).
The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit or what not, is blamed;
since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered
foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the a right time,
@@ -3037,7 +3037,7 @@ convert to P3
because they keep their wrath in; whereas when a man retaliates there is an end of the
matter: the pain of resentment is replaced by the pleasure of obtaining redress, and so
his anger ceases. But if they do not retaliate, men continue to labour under a sense of
- resentment—for as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them
+ resentment—for as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them
either, and it takes a long time to digest one's wrath within one. Bitterness is the most
trouble some form of bad temper both to a man himself and to his nearest friends.
Those who lose their temper at the wrong things, and
@@ -3058,7 +3058,7 @@ convert to P3
and judgement rests with the faculty of perception. But
thus much at all events is clear, that the middle disposition is praiseworthy, which leads
us to be angry with the right people for the right things in the right manner and so on,
- while the various forms of excess and defect are blameworthy—when of slight
+ while the various forms of excess and defect are blameworthy—when of slight
extent, but little so, when greater, more, and when extreme, very blameworthy indeed. It
is clear therefore that we should strive to attain the middle disposition.
Let this be our account of the dispositions related to anger.
@@ -3069,16 +3069,16 @@ convert to P3
everything and do not care in the least what pain they cause, are called Surly or
Quarrelsome. Now it is clear that the dispositions
described are blameworthy, and that the middle disposition between them is
- praiseworthy—that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the right things, and
+ praiseworthy—that is, the tendency to acquiesce in the right things, and
likewise to disapprove of the right things, in the right manner. But to this no special name has been assigned, though it very closely resembles friendshipAt 2.7.13 it was actually termed fili/a,
Friendliness.; for he who exemplifies this middle disposition is the sort of man
- we mean by the expression ‘a good friend,’ only that includes an
+ we mean by the expression ‘a good friend,’ only that includes an
element of affection. It differs from friendship in not
possessing the emotional factor of affection for one's associates; since a man of this
character takes everything in the right way not from personal liking or dislike, but from
natural amiability. He will behave with the same propriety towards strangers and
acquaintances alike, towards people with whom he is familiar and those with whom he is
- not—though preserving the shades of distinction proper to each class, since it
+ not—though preserving the shades of distinction proper to each class, since it
is not appropriate to show the same regard or disregard for the feelings of friends and of
strangers.
We have said then in general terms that he will behave in the right manner in society. We
@@ -3126,7 +3126,7 @@ convert to P3
is praised, and the insincere of both kinds are blamed, more especially the boaster. Let
us discuss each of the two, beginning with the truthful man.
We are speaking not of truthfulness in business relations, nor in matters where honesty
- and dishonesty are concerned (for these matters would come under a different virtueViz. Justice, Book 5.), but of cases where
+ and dishonesty are concerned (for these matters would come under a different virtueViz. Justice, Book 5.), but of cases where
a man is truthful both in speech and conduct when no considerations of honesty come in,
from an habitual sincerity of disposition. Such sincerity
may be esteemed a moral excellence; for the lover of truth, who is truthful even when
@@ -3139,17 +3139,17 @@ convert to P3
The man who pretends to more merit than he possesses for no ulterior object seems, it is
true, to be a person of inferior character, since otherwise he would not take pleasure in
falsehood; but he appears to be more foolish than vicious. When, on the other hand, a man exaggerates his own merits to gain some
- object, if that object is glory or honor he is not very much to be blamed [as is
- the boaster], but if he boasts to get money or things that fetch money, this is
- more unseemly. (Boastfulness is not a matter of
+ object, if that object is glory or honor he is not very much to be blamed [as is
+ the boaster], but if he boasts to get money or things that fetch money, this is
+ more unseemly. (Boastfulness is not a matter of
potential capacity but of deliberate purpose; a man is a boaster if he has a fixed
- disposition to boast—a boastful character.) Similarly liars are divided
+ disposition to boast—a boastful character.) Similarly liars are divided
into those who like lying for its own sake and those who lie to get reputation or profit.
Those then who boast for the sake of reputation
pretend to possess such qualities as are praised and admired; those who do so for profit
pretend to accomplishments that are useful to their fellows and also can be counterfeited
- without detection; for instance,The true text very probably is ‘for example
- “physician or seer sage,”’ a verse quotation.
+ without detection; for instance,The true text very probably is ‘for example
+ “physician or seer sage,”’ a verse quotation.
proficiency in prophecy, philosophy, or medicine. Because these arts have the two
qualities specified they are the commonest fields of pretence and bragging.
Self-depreciators, who understate their own merits, seem of a more refined character, for
@@ -3161,7 +3161,7 @@ convert to P3
contemptible; and sometimes such mock humility seems to be really boastfulness, like the
dress of the Spartans,Aristotle regards the cheapness
and simplicity of the Spartans' dress as an affectation; or perhaps the reference is to
- ‘Laconizers’ at Athens
+ ‘Laconizers’ at Athens
who affected Spartan manners. for extreme negligence in dress, as well as
excessive attention to it, has a touch of ostentation. But a moderate use of self-depreciation in matters not too commonplace and obvious has a
not ungraceful air.
@@ -3180,8 +3180,8 @@ convert to P3
keep within the bounds of decorum and avoid giving pain to the object of their raillery.
Those on the other hand who never by any chance say anything funny themselves and take
offence at those who do, are considered boorish and morose. Those who jest with good taste
- are called wittyeu)tra/peloi, lit. ‘turning well,’ nimble-witted.
- or versatile—that is to say, full of good turns; for such sallies seem to spring
+ are called wittyeu)tra/peloi, lit. ‘turning well,’ nimble-witted.
+ or versatile—that is to say, full of good turns; for such sallies seem to spring
from the character, and we judge men's characters, like their bodies, by their movements.
But as matter for ridicule is always ready to hand, and
as most men are only too fond of fun and raillery, even buffoons are called witty and pass
@@ -3203,8 +3203,8 @@ convert to P3
raillery is a sort of vilification, and some forms of vilification are forbidden by law;
perhaps some forms of raillery ought to be prohibited also. The cultivated gentleman will therefore regulate his wit, and will be as
it were a law to himself.
- Such then is the middle character, whether he be called ‘tactful’ or
- ‘witty.’ The buffoon is one who cannot resist a joke; he will not keep
+
Such then is the middle character, whether he be called ‘tactful’ or
+ ‘witty.’ The buffoon is one who cannot resist a joke; he will not keep
his tongue off himself or anyone else, if he can raise a laugh, and will say things
which a
man of refinement would never say, and some of which he would not even allow to be said to
@@ -3229,16 +3229,16 @@ convert to P3
shamefaced, since we think he ought not to do anything of which he need be ashamed.
For indeed the virtuous man does not feel shame, if
shame is the feeling caused by base actions; since one
- ought not to do base actions (the distinction between acts really shameful and
- those reputed to be so is immaterial, since one ought not to do either), and so
+ ought not to do base actions (the distinction between acts really shameful and
+ those reputed to be so is immaterial, since one ought not to do either), and so
one never ought to feel shame. Shame is a mark of a base
man, and springs from a character capable of doing a shameful act. And it is absurd that,
because a man is of such a nature that he is ashamed if he does a shameful act, he should
therefore think himself virtuous, since actions to cause shame must be voluntary, but a
- virtuous man will never voluntarily do a base action. Modesty can only be virtuous conditionally—in the sense that a good man would
+ virtuous man will never voluntarily do a base action. Modesty can only be virtuous conditionally—in the sense that a good man would
be ashamed if he were to do so and so; but the virtues are not conditional.
And though shamelessness and not shrinking from shameful actions is base, this does not
- prove that to be ashamed when one a does shameful acts is virtuous—any more than Self-restraint is a virtue, and not rather a mixture
+ prove that to be ashamed when one a does shameful acts is virtuous—any more than Self-restraint is a virtue, and not rather a mixture
of virtue and vice. But this will be explained later.In Bk. 7. Let us now speak of Justice.
@@ -3250,20 +3250,20 @@ convert to P3
In regard to JusticeIn what follows dikaiosu/nh is found to possess both the wider meaning of
Righteousness in general, covering all right conduct in relation to others, and the
narrower sense of the virtue of right conduct in relation to others where gain or loss
- (whether to the agent or to other parties) is involved. dikaiosu/nh in this narrower sense is the special Moral Virtue
+ (whether to the agent or to other parties) is involved. dikaiosu/nh in this narrower sense is the special Moral Virtue
which is the subject of Book 5; it would be described in English sometimes as Justice,
sometimes as Honesty or uprightness. The related adjectives and verbs have various
connotations connected with the various meanings of dikaiosu/nh both in its wider and in its narrower usage. For instance,
- ta\ di/kaia means sometimes ‘just
- acts’ in the English sense, sometimes any acts in conformity with the law,
- sometimes ‘rights’ or ‘claims,’ i.e., any
+ ta\ di/kaia means sometimes ‘just
+ acts’ in the English sense, sometimes any acts in conformity with the law,
+ sometimes ‘rights’ or ‘claims,’ i.e., any
consideration which by law, equity, or custom, certain persons have a right to expect
from certain others. Or again a)dikei=n means not only
to act unjustly, or dishonestly, but also to do, or have done, any wrongful injury to
another, or any wrongful or illegal act, and so, as a legal term, to be guilty of a
breach of the law. In translating however, if the connection of all these various
meanings in the writer's mind is to be represented, it seems necessary to keep the words
- ‘justice,’ ‘injustice,’ etc., throughout, in
+ ‘justice,’ ‘injustice,’ etc., throughout, in
spite of their occasional unsuitability to the context. and Injustice, we have to
enquire what sort of actions precisely they are concerned with, in what sense Justice is
the observance of a mean, and what are the extremes between which that which is just is a
@@ -3286,29 +3286,29 @@ convert to P3
what good condition is from bodies in good condition, and know what bodies are in good
condition from knowing what good condition is. Thus, supposing good condition is firmness
of flesh, bad condition must be flabbiness of flesh, and a diet productive of good
- conditionLiterally ‘that which has to do
- with good condition’: the word here slightly shifts its meaning, for just
- above it meant ‘that which is in good condition.’ must be a
+ conditionLiterally ‘that which has to do
+ with good condition’: the word here slightly shifts its meaning, for just
+ above it meant ‘that which is in good condition.’ must be a
diet producing firmness of flesh.
Also, if one of two correlative groups of words is used in several senses, it follows as
a rule that the other is used in several senses too: for example, if
- ‘just’ has more than one meaning, so also has
- ‘unjust’ and ‘Injustice.’ Now it appears that the terms Justice
+ ‘just’ has more than one meaning, so also has
+ ‘unjust’ and ‘Injustice.’ Now it appears that the terms Justice
and Injustice are used in several senses, but as the equivocal uses are closely connected,
the equivocation is not detected; whereas in the case of widely different things called by
- a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the
- difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use
- of the word kleis (key) to denote both
- the boneThe clavicle (clavis, a key), or collar-bone. at the base of the neck and
+ a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the
+ difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use
+ of the word kleis (key) to denote both
+ the boneThe clavicle (clavis, a key), or collar-bone. at the base of the neck and
the instrument with which we lock our doors.
Let us then ascertain in how many senses a man is said to be
- ‘unjust.’ Now the term ‘unjust’ is held to apply
+ ‘unjust.’ Now the term ‘unjust’ is held to apply
both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the
- unfairThe word i)/sos means both ‘equal’ and
- ‘equitable’ or ‘fair.’ man. Hence it is
- clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. ‘The
- just’ therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and
- ‘the unjust’ means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or
+ unfairThe word i)/sos means both ‘equal’ and
+ ‘equitable’ or ‘fair.’ man. Hence it is
+ clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. ‘The
+ just’ therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and
+ ‘the unjust’ means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or
unfair.
Again, as the unjust man is one who takes the larger share, he will be unjust in respect
of good things; not all good things, but those on which good and bad fortune depend. These
@@ -3320,9 +3320,9 @@ convert to P3
absolutely, are bad he chooses the smaller share; but nevertheless he is thought to take
more than his due, because the lesser of two evils seems in a sense to be a good, and
taking more than one's due means taking more than one's due of good. Let us call him
- ‘unfair,’ for that is a comprehensive term, and includes both taking
- too much of good things and too little of bad things.Here some mss. add ‘Also a law-breaker, for this, law-breaking or else
- unfairness, includes all injustice and is a common term for all injustice.’
+ ‘unfair,’ for that is a comprehensive term, and includes both taking
+ too much of good things and too little of bad things.Here some mss. add ‘Also a law-breaker, for this, law-breaking or else
+ unfairness, includes all injustice and is a common term for all injustice.’
Again, we saw that the law-breaker is unjust and the law-abiding man just. It is
therefore clear that all lawful things are just in one sense of the word, for what is
@@ -3330,66 +3330,66 @@ convert to P3
rules of justice. Now
all the various pronouncements of the law aim either at the common interest of all, or at
the interest of a ruling class determined either by excellence or in some other similar
- way; so that in one of its senses the term ‘just’ is applied to
+ way; so that in one of its senses the term ‘just’ is applied to
anything that produces and preserves the happiness, or the component parts of the
happiness, of the political community.
But the law also prescribes certain conduct: the conduct of a brave man, for example not to desert one's post, not to run
away, not to throw down one's arms; that of a temperate man, for example not to commit
adultery or outrage; that of a gentle man, for example not to strike, not to speak evil;
and so with actions exemplifying the rest of the virtues and vices, commanding these and
- forbidding those—rightly if the law has been rightly enacted, not so well if it
+ forbidding those—rightly if the law has been rightly enacted, not so well if it
has been made at random.
Justice then in this sense is perfect Virtue, though with a qualification, namely that it
is displayed towards others. This is why Justice is often thought to be the chief of the
- virtues, and more sublime ‘or than the evening or the morning
- star’According to a scholiast, this is a
+ virtues, and more sublime ‘or than the evening or the morning
+ star’According to a scholiast, this is a
quotation, slightly altered, from the lost play Melanippe of Euripides
- (fr. 490 Dindorf).; and we have the proverb—
+ (fr. 490 Dindorf).
; and we have the proverb—
In Justice is all Virtue found in sum.Theog. 147.
And Justice is perfect virtue because it is the practice of perfect virtue; and
perfect in a special degree,In the mss. the words
- ‘in a special degree’ follow ‘perfect’ in the
+ ‘in a special degree’ follow ‘perfect’ in the
line before. because its possessor can practise his virtue towards others and not
merely by himself; for there are many who can practise virtue in their own private affairs
- but cannot do so in their relations with another. This is why we approve the saying of Bias, ‘Office will
- show a man’; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes
+ but cannot do so in their relations with another. This is why we approve the saying of Bias, ‘Office will
+ show a man’; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes
a member of a community.
The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the
viewPut into the mouth of the sophist Thrasymachus
in Plato's Plat. Rep. 343c. that Justice alone
- of the virtues is ‘the good of others,’ because it does what is for
+ of the virtues is ‘the good of others,’ because it does what is for
the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate. As then the worst man is he who practises vice
towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the best is not he who practises
virtue in regard to himself but he who practises it towards others; for that is a
difficult task.
Justice in this sense then is not a part of Virtue, but the whole of Virtue; and its
- opposite Injustice is not a part of Vice but the whole of Vice (the distinction between
+ opposite Injustice is not a part of Vice but the whole of Vice (the distinction between
Virtue and Justice in this sense being clear from what has been said: they are the same
quality of mind, but their essence is differentCf.
6.8.1.; what as displayed in relation to others is Justice, as being simply a
- disposition of a certain kind is Virtue).
+ disposition of a certain kind is Virtue).
What we are investigating, however, is the Justice which is a part of Virtue, since we
hold that there is such a thing as Justice in this sense; and similarly we are
investigating Injustice in the particular sense. The existence of the latter is proved by the
- following considerations: (1) When a man displays the other
- vices—for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive
+ following considerations: (1) When a man displays the other
+ vices—for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive
language, from Bad Temper, or refuses to assist a friend with money, from
- Meanness—though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of
+ Meanness—though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of
anything; whereas when a man takes more than his
share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices, and certainly not to all of them,
yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it; in fact it displays
the vice of Injustice. Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the
universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general,
- or illegal. (2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and
+ or illegal. (2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and
gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then
the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his
due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is
- being done for profit that makes the action unjust. (3) Again, whereas all other unjust
- acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is
+ being done for profit that makes the action unjust. (3) Again, whereas all other unjust
+ acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is
put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to
- Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice
+ Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice
except Injustice.
Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice,
the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its
@@ -3401,12 +3401,12 @@ convert to P3
Thus it is clear that there are more kinds of Justice than one, and that the term has
another meaning besides Virtue as a whole. We have then to ascertain the nature and
attributes of Justice in this special sense.
- Now we have distinguished two meanings of ‘the unjust,’ namely the
- unlawful and the unequal or unfair, and two meanings of ‘the just,’
+
Now we have distinguished two meanings of ‘the unjust,’ namely the
+ unlawful and the unequal or unfair, and two meanings of ‘the just,’
namely the lawful and the equal or fair. Injustice then, in the sense previously
- mentioned, corresponds to the meaning ‘unlawful’; but since the unfair is not the same as
- the unlawful, but different from it, and related to it as part to whole (for not
- everything unlawful is unfair, though everything unfair is unlawful), so also the
+ mentioned, corresponds to the meaning ‘unlawful’; but since the unfair is not the same as
+ the unlawful, but different from it, and related to it as part to whole (for not
+ everything unlawful is unfair, though everything unfair is unlawful), so also the
unjust and Injustice in the particular sense are not the same as the unjust and Injustice
in the universal sense, but different from them, and related to them as part to whole; for
Injustice in this sense is a part of universal Injustice, and similarly the Justice we are
@@ -3434,7 +3434,7 @@ convert to P3
wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among its
members in equal or unequal shares. The other kind is that which supplies a corrective principle
in private transactions.This Corrective Justice again has two sub-divisions, corresponding to the two classes of
- private transactions, those which are voluntary and those which are involuntary.‘Involuntary’ here means lacking the
+ private transactions, those which are voluntary and those which are involuntary.‘Involuntary’ here means lacking the
consent of one of the parties. Examples of voluntary transactions are selling,
buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, letting for
hire; these transactions being termed voluntary because they are voluntarily entered
@@ -3447,22 +3447,22 @@ convert to P3
abusive language, contumelious treatment.
Now since an unjust man is one who is unfair, and the unjust is the unequal, it is clear
that corresponding to the unequal there is a mean, namely that which is equal; for every action admitting of
- more and less admits of the equal also. If then the unjust is the unequal, the just is the equal—a
+ more and less admits of the equal also. If then the unjust is the unequal, the just is the equal—a
view that commends itself to all without proof; and since the equal is a mean, the just
will be a sort of mean too. Again, equality involves two terms at least. It accordingly follows not
- only (a) that the just is a mean and equal [and relative to
+ only (a) that the just is a mean and equal [and relative to
something and just for certain personsThese words
- appear to be an interpolation.], but also (b) that, as
+ appear to be an interpolation.], but also (b) that, as
a mean, it implies certain extremes between which it lies, namely the more and the less;
- (c) that, as equal, it implies two shares that are equal; and
- (d) that, as just, it implies certain persons for whom it is just.
+ (c) that, as equal, it implies two shares that are equal; and
+ (d) that, as just, it implies certain persons for whom it is just.
It follows therefore
that justice involves at least four terms, namely, two persons for whom it is just and two shares which are just. And there will be the same equality
between the shares as between the persons, since the ratio between the shares will be
equal to the ratio between the persons; for if the persons are not equal, they will not
have equal shares; it is when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares, or persons
not equal equal shares, that quarrels and complaints arise.
- This is also clear from the principle of ‘assignment by desert.’ All
+
This is also clear from the principle of ‘assignment by desert.’ All
are agreed that justice in distributions must be based on desert of some sort, although
they do not all mean the same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion free birth;
those of oligarchical sympathies wealth, or in other cases birth; upholders of aristocracy
@@ -3470,22 +3470,22 @@ convert to P3
is therefore a sort of proportion; for proportion is not a property of numerical quantity
only, but of quantity in general, proportion being equality of ratios, and involving four
terms at least.
- (That a discrete proportionA
- ‘discrete proportion’ means one in which the two ratios are
- disconnected, being between different terms, whereas in a ‘continuous
- proportion’ they have one term in common. has four terms is plain, but
+
(That a discrete proportionA
+ ‘discrete proportion’ means one in which the two ratios are
+ disconnected, being between different terms, whereas in a ‘continuous
+ proportion’ they have one term in common. has four terms is plain, but
so also has a continuous proportion, since it treats one term as two, and repeats it:
for
example,Here the lecturer displayed a
diagram. as the line representing term one is to the line representing term two, so
is the line representing term two to the line representing term three; here the line
representing term two is mentioned twice, so that if it be counted twice, there will be
- four proportionals.)
+ four proportionals.)
Thus the just also involves four terms at least, and the ratio between the first pair of
terms is the same as that between the second pair. For the two lines representing the
persons and shares are similarly dividedHere was
- another diagram (one would expect the sentence to run ‘Let two lines
- representing . . . have been similarly divided’). Two segments, A and
+ another diagram (one would expect the sentence to run ‘Let two lines
+ representing . . . have been similarly divided’). Two segments, A and
B, of one line represented two persons, two segments, C and D, of another their shares.
It is shown that, if A:B::C:D, then A+C:B+D::A:B, i.e., if the shares are proportioned
to the persons, their relative condition after receiving them will be the same as it was
@@ -3503,11 +3503,11 @@ convert to P3
meaning more or less than is proportionate to A's claim. Cf. Bk. 2.6.4, third note, and
6.7. since the proportionate is a mean, and the just is the
proportionate.
- (This kind of proportion is termed by mathematicians geometrical proportionWe call this a proportion simply: cf. 4.3 and
+ (This kind of proportion is termed by mathematicians geometrical proportionWe call this a proportion simply: cf. 4.3 and
note.; for a geometrical proportion is one in which the sum of the first and third
terms will bear the same ratio to the sum of the second and fourth as one term of either
- pair bears to the other term.—Distributive justice is not a continuous proportion, for its second and
- third terms, a person and a share, do not constitute a single term.)
+ pair bears to the other term.—Distributive justice is not a continuous proportion, for its second and
+ third terms, a person and a share, do not constitute a single term.)
The just in this sense is therefore the proportionate, and the unjust is that which
violates proportion. The unjust may therefore be either too much or too little; and this
is what we find in fact, for when injustice is done, the doer has too much and the
@@ -3521,16 +3521,16 @@ convert to P3
The remaining kind is Corrective Justice, which operates in private transactions, both
voluntary and involuntary. This justice is of a different
sort from the preceding. For justice in distributing common property always conforms with
- the proportion we have described (since when a distribution is made from the
+ the proportion we have described (since when a distribution is made from the
common stock, it will follow the same ratio as that between the amounts which the several
- persons have contributed to the common stock); and the injustice opposed to
- justice of this a kind is a violation of this proportion. But the just in private transactions, although it is the equal in a sense (and
- the unjust the unequal), is not the equal according to geometrical but according to
+ persons have contributed to the common stock); and the injustice opposed to
+ justice of this a kind is a violation of this proportion. But the just in private transactions, although it is the equal in a sense (and
+ the unjust the unequal), is not the equal according to geometrical but according to
arithmetical proportion.That is, two pairs of terms
- (e.g. 1, 3; 7, 9), of which the second term exceeds the first by the
+ (e.g. 1, 3; 7, 9), of which the second term exceeds the first by the
same amount as the fourth exceeds the third. We do not call this a proportion at all,
- but, if also the third term exceeds the second by the same amount (e.g. 1, 3,
- 5, 7), an arithmetical progression. For it makes no differenceFor Corrective Justice the merits of the parties are
+ but, if also the third term exceeds the second by the same amount (e.g. 1, 3,
+ 5, 7), an arithmetical progression. For it makes no differenceFor Corrective Justice the merits of the parties are
immaterial. whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one,
nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only at
the nature of damage, treating the parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has
@@ -3540,12 +3540,12 @@ convert to P3
inflicted a blow, or one has killed and the other been killed, the lineAgain a diagram is employed, cf. 3.9,10, and infra 4.8. representing the suffering and doing of the deed
is divided into unequal parts, but the judge endeavors to make them equal by the penalty
or losszhmi/a has both
- senses. he imposes, taking away the gain. (For the term ‘gain’ is used in a general way to apply to
+ senses. he imposes, taking away the gain. (For the term ‘gain’ is used in a general way to apply to
such cases, even though it is not strictly appropriate to some of them, for example to a
- person who strikes another, nor is ‘loss’ appropriate to the victim in
+ person who strikes another, nor is ‘loss’ appropriate to the victim in
this case; but at all events the results are called
- ‘loss’ and ‘gain’ respectively when the amount of
- the damage sustained comes to be estimated.) Thus, while the equal is a mean
+ ‘loss’ and ‘gain’ respectively when the amount of
+ the damage sustained comes to be estimated.) Thus, while the equal is a mean
between more and less, gain and loss are at once both more and less in contrary ways, more
good and less evil being gain and more evil and less good loss; and as the equal, which we
pronounce to be just, is, as we said, a mean between them, it follows that Justice in
@@ -3555,23 +3555,23 @@ convert to P3
This is why when disputes occur men have recourse
to a judge. To go to a judge is to go to justice, for the ideal judge is so to speak
justice personified. Also, men require a judge to be a middle term or
- medium—indeed in some places judges are called
- mediators—, for they think that if they get the mean they will get
+ medium—indeed in some places judges are called
+ mediators—, for they think that if they get the mean they will get
what is just. Thus the just is a sort of mean, inasmuch as the judge is a medium between
the litigants.
Now the judge restores equality: if we represent the matter by a line divided into two
unequal parts, he takes away from the greater segment that portion by which it exceeds
one-half of the whole line, and adds it to the lesser segment. When the whole has been
- divided into two halves, people then say that they ‘have their own,’
+ divided into two halves, people then say that they ‘have their own,’
having got what is equal.
In the mss. this sentence follows the next
one.This is indeed the origin of the word dikaion
- (just): it means dicha (in
- half), as if one were to pronounce it dichaion;
- and a dikast (judge) is a dichast (halver). The equal is a mean by way
+ (just): it means dicha (in
+ half), as if one were to pronounce it dichaion;
+ and a dikast (judge) is a dichast (halver). The equal is a mean by way
of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less. For when of two equalsIf a=b, then
- (b+n)-(a-n)=2n, and (b+n)-a=N, and
- (b+n)-(b+n)+(a-n)/2=n=(b+n)+(a-n)/2-(a-n).
+ (b+n)-(a-n)=2n, and (b+n)-a=N, and
+ (b+n)-(b+n)+(a-n)/2=n=(b+n)+(a-n)/2-(a-n).
Aristotle, of course, represented the quantities by lines, not algebraically. a
part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed the former by
twice that part, since if it had been taken from the one but not added to the other, the
@@ -3587,45 +3587,45 @@ convert to P3
line EA by CD+CF; then DCC will exceed BB by CD.The
mss. here insert the sentence that appears again at 5.9 init.
- The terms ‘loss’ and ‘gain’ in these cases are
+
The terms ‘loss’ and ‘gain’ in these cases are
borrowed from the operations of voluntary exchange. There, to have more than one's own is
called gaining, and to have less than one had at the outset is called losing, as for
- instance in buying and selling, and all other transactions sanctioned by law;Literally ‘where the law gives
- immunity,’ that is, does not give redress for inequality resulting from the
+ instance in buying and selling, and all other transactions sanctioned by law;Literally ‘where the law gives
+ immunity,’ that is, does not give redress for inequality resulting from the
contract. Should inequality result from a breach of the contract, this would of course
be a case for the intervention of Corrective Justice in Voluntary Transactions
- (chap. 2 fin.).
+ (chap. 2 fin.).
while if the result of the transaction is neither an
increase nor a decrease, but exactly what the parties had of themselves, they say they
- ‘have their own’ and have neither lost nor gained. Hence Justice in
+ ‘have their own’ and have neither lost nor gained. Hence Justice in
Involuntary Transactions is a mean between gain and loss in a sense: it is to have after
the transaction an amount equal to the amount one
had before it.
The view is also held by some that simple Reciprocity is Justice. This was the doctrine
- of the Pythagoreans, who defined the just simply as ‘suffering reciprocally with
- another.’That is, retaliation: A shall
+ of the Pythagoreans, who defined the just simply as ‘suffering reciprocally with
+ another.’That is, retaliation: A shall
have done to him what he has done to B.
Reciprocity however does not coincide either with Distributive or with Corrective Justice
- (although people mean to identify it with the
- latter when they quote the rule of Rhadamanthys—
+ (although people mean to identify it with the
+ latter when they quote the rule of Rhadamanthys—
An a man suffer even that which he did,
- Right justice will be done).
+ Right justice will be done).
For in many cases Reciprocity is at variance with
Justice: for example, if an officer strikes a man, it is wrong for the man to strike him
back; and if a man strikes an officer, it is not enough for the officer to strike him, but
he ought to be punished as well. Again, it makes a great
- difference whether an act was done with or without the consent of the other party.Literally ‘whether the act was voluntary or
- involuntary’; see first note on 2.13.
+ difference whether an act was done with or without the consent of the other party.Literally ‘whether the act was voluntary or
+ involuntary’; see first note on 2.13.
But in the interchange of services Justice in the form of
Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis
of proportion, not on the basis of equality. The very existence of the state depends on
proportionate reciprocity; for men demand that they shall be able to requite evil with
- evil— if they cannot, they feel they are in the position of
- slaves—and to repay good with good— failing which, no exchange takes
+ evil— if they cannot, they feel they are in the position of
+ slaves—and to repay good with good— failing which, no exchange takes
place, and it is exchange that binds them together. This
is why we set up a shrine of the Graces in a public place, to remind men to return a
kindness; for that is a special characteristic of grace, since it is a duty not only to
@@ -3637,8 +3637,8 @@ convert to P3
of the product of his own. NowThe relative value of
the units of the two products must be ascertained, say one house must be taken as worth
n. Then the four terms are and cross-conjunction gives totals
- A+nD, B+C, which are in ‘arithmetical proportion’
- (see first note on 5.4.3) with the two first terms, i.e. the
+ A+nD, B+C, which are in ‘arithmetical proportion’
+ (see first note on 5.4.3) with the two first terms, i.e. the
differentce between each pair is the same; the builder and the shoemaker after the
transaction are by an equal amount richer than they were before they began to make the
articles. if proportionate equality between the products be first established,
@@ -3649,12 +3649,12 @@ convert to P3
if the active element did not produce, and did not receive the equivalent in quantity and
quality of what the passive element receives.This
sentence also appeared in the mss. above, at 4.12, where it made no sense. If genuine
- here, the phrases ‘active element’ and ‘passive
- element’ seem to mean producer and consumer. Even so, it is probable that
+ here, the phrases ‘active element’ and ‘passive
+ element’ seem to mean producer and consumer. Even so, it is probable that
there is some corruption; Jackson's insertion
- gives ‘unless the passive element produced the same in quantity and quality as
+ gives ‘unless the passive element produced the same in quantity and quality as
the active, and the latter received the same in quantity and quality as the
- former.’ For an association for interchange of services is not formed
+ former.’ For an association for interchange of services is not formed
between two physicians, but between a physician and a farmer, and generally between
persons who are different, and who may be unequal, though in that case they have to be
equalized. Hence all commodities exchanged must be able
@@ -3663,11 +3663,11 @@ convert to P3
for it is a measure of all things, and so of their superior or inferior value, that is to
say, how many shoes are equivalent to a house or to a given quantity of food. As therefore
a builder is to a shoemaker,It is uncertain whether
- this merely refers to the difference in value (or perhaps in labor used in
- production) between the unit products of different trades, or whether it
+ this merely refers to the difference in value (or perhaps in labor used in
+ production) between the unit products of different trades, or whether it
introduces the further conception that different kinds of producers have different
social values and deserve different rates of reward. so must such and such a
- number of shoes be to a house, [or to a given quantity of food]Apparently interpolated from the last sentence.;
+ number of shoes be to a house, [or to a given quantity of food]Apparently interpolated from the last sentence.;
for without this reciprocal proportion, there can be no exchange and no association; and
it cannot be secured unless the commodities in question be equal in a sense.
It is therefore necessary that all commodities shall be measured by some one standard, as
@@ -3675,37 +3675,37 @@ convert to P3
together, since if men cease to have wants or if their wants alter, exchange will go on no
longer, or will be on different lines. But demand has come to be conventionally
represented by money; this is why money is called nomisma
- (customary currency), because it does not exist by nature but by custom
- (nomos), and can be altered and
- rendered uselessa)/xrhston also connotes ‘worthless,’ but an obsolete
+ (customary currency), because it does not exist by nature but by custom
+ (nomos), and can be altered and
+ rendered uselessa)/xrhston also connotes ‘worthless,’ but an obsolete
coin retains some value as metal. at will.
There will therefore be reciprocal proportion when the products have been equated, so
that as farmer is to shoemaker,See 5.10, first
note. so may the shoemaker's product be to the farmer's product. And when they
exchange their products they must reduce them to the form of a proportion, otherwise one
of the two extremes will have both the excessesThat is
- ‘after any unfair exchange one party has too much by just the amount by which
+ ‘after any unfair exchange one party has too much by just the amount by which
the other has too little. I ought to have given you ten shillings more or something
worth that. Then I have ten shillings too much, and you have ten too little; these two
- tens are my two “excesses”; in respect of the exchange. I am better
- off then you by twice ten’ (Richards). Cf. 4.10-12.;
+ tens are my two “excesses”; in respect of the exchange. I am better
+ off then you by twice ten’ (Richards). Cf. 4.10-12.;
whereas when they have their own,For this proverbial
phrase see 4.8,14. they then are equal, and can form an association together,
- because equality in this sense can be established in their case (farmer A, food
+ because equality in this sense can be established in their case (farmer A, food
C, shoemaker B, shoemaker's product equalized DOr
- ‘shoemaker's product D multiplied to equivalence with C’
- (Blunt).); whereas if it were impossible for
+ ‘shoemaker's product D multiplied to equivalence with C’
+ (Blunt).); whereas if it were impossible for
reciprocal proportion to be effected in this way, there could be no association between
them.
That it is demand which, by serving as a single standard, holds such an association
together, is shown by the fact that, when there is no demand for mutual service on the
part of both or at least of one of the parties, no exchange takes place between them
- [as when someone needs something that one has oneself, for instance the state
- offering a license to export corn in exchange for wine].The clauses bracketed make neither grammar nor sense, and have justly
- been suspected as interpolated. Munscher inserts a negative: ‘Just as there is
+ [as when someone needs something that one has oneself, for instance the state
+ offering a license to export corn in exchange for wine].The clauses bracketed make neither grammar nor sense, and have justly
+ been suspected as interpolated. Munscher inserts a negative: ‘Just as there is
no exchange when the producer wants what the consumer has <not> got, for
example, when one state needs wine while another can only offer corn for
- export.’ But there seems to be no question here of foreign commerce.
+ export.’ But there seems to be no question here of foreign commerce.
This inequality of demand has therefore to be equalized.
Now money serves us as a guarantee of exchange in the future: supposing we need nothing
at the moment, it ensures that exchange shall be possible when a need arises, for it meets
@@ -3719,12 +3719,12 @@ convert to P3
equality, and no equality without commensurability. Though therefore it is impossible for
things so different to become commensurable in the strict sense, our demand furnishes a sufficiently accurate common measure for
practical purposes. There must therefore be some one
- standard, and this accepted by agreement (which is why it is called nomisma, customary currency); for such a standard makes
+ standard, and this accepted by agreement (which is why it is called nomisma, customary currency); for such a standard makes
all things commensurable, since all things can be measured by money. Let A be a house, B
- ten minae and C a bedstead. Then A=B/2 (supposing the house to be worth, or equal
- to, five minae), and C (the bedstead) =B/10; it is now clear
+ ten minae and C a bedstead. Then A=B/2 (supposing the house to be worth, or equal
+ to, five minae), and C (the bedstead) =B/10; it is now clear
how many bedsteads are equal to one house, namely five. It is clear that before money existed this is how the rate of exchange was actually
- stated—five beds for a house—since there is no real difference between
+ stated—five beds for a house—since there is no real difference between
that and the price of five beds for a house.
We have now stated what Justice and Injustice are in principle. From the definition
given, it is plain that just conduct is a mean between doing and suffering injustice, for
@@ -3742,8 +3742,8 @@ convert to P3
and defect: namely, in the offender's own case, an excess of anything that is generally
speaking beneficial and a deficiency of anything harmful, and in the case of others,That is, when A distributes unjustly not between himself
and B but between B and C, the result for either B or C may be either excess or defect,
- either too large a share or too small of something beneficial (and either too
- small a share or too large of something harmful). though the result as a
+ either too large a share or too small of something beneficial (and either too
+ small a share or too large of something harmful). though the result as a
whole is the same, the deviation from proportion may be in either direction as the case
may be.
Of the injustice done, the smaller part is the suffering and the larger part the doing of
@@ -3764,14 +3764,14 @@ convert to P3
The relation of Reciprocity to Justice has been stated already.
But we must not forget that the subject of our investigation is at once Justice in the
absolute sense and Political Justice. Political Justice means justice as between free and
- (actually or proportionately) equal persons, living a common life for
+ (actually or proportionately) equal persons, living a common life for
the purpose of satisfying their needs. Hence between people not free and equal political
justice cannot exist, but only a sort of justice in a metaphorical sense. For justice can
only exist between those whose mutual relations are regulated by law, and law exists among
those between whom there is a possibility of injustice, for the administration of the law
means the discrimination of what is just and what is unjust. Persons therefore between
- whom injustice can exist can act unjustly towards each other (although unjust
- action does not necessarily involve injustice): to act unjustly meaning to assign
+ whom injustice can exist can act unjustly towards each other (although unjust
+ action does not necessarily involve injustice): to act unjustly meaning to assign
oneself too large a share of things generally good and too small a share of things
generally evil. This is why we do not permit a man to
rule, but the law, because a man rules in his own interest, and becomes a tyrant; but the
@@ -3780,7 +3780,7 @@ convert to P3
for he does not allot to himself a larger share of things generally good, unless it be
proportionate to his merits; so that he labors for others, which accounts for the saying
mentioned above,See 1.17 note. that
- ‘Justice is the good of others.’ Consequently some recompense has to be given him, in the shape of honor and dignity. It
+ ‘Justice is the good of others.’ Consequently some recompense has to be given him, in the shape of honor and dignity. It
is those whom such rewards do not satisfy who make themselves tyrants.
Justice between master and slave and between father and child is not the same as absolute
and political justice, but only analogous to them. For there is no such thing as injustice
@@ -3801,22 +3801,22 @@ convert to P3
mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations
enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honor of Brasidas,The Spartan Brasidas detached Amphipolis from the Athenian empire 424 B.C.,
and fell defending it against Cleon 422. He was worshipped as a hero by the city,
- ‘with games and yearly sacrifices’ (Thuc. 5.11). and ordinances in the nature of special decrees.
+ ‘with games and yearly sacrifices’ (Thuc. 5.11). and ordinances in the nature of special decrees.
Some people think that all rules of justice are merely
conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable and has the same validity
everywhere, as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary. That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among
the gods indeed it is perhaps not true at all; but in our world,The order of the following sentences seems confused. With the
transpositions suggested by Richards, and the emendations given in the critical notes,
- they will run: ‘But in our world, although there is such a thing as natural
+ they will run: ‘But in our world, although there is such a thing as natural
law, yet everything is capable of change. For example, the right hand is naturally
stronger than the left, yet it is possible for some persons to be born ambidextrous; and
the same distinction will hold good in all matters; though what sort of things that
admit of variation are as they are by nature, and what are merely customary and
conventional, it is not easy to see, inasmuch as both alike are capable of change. But
- nevertheless some things are ordained by nature and others not.’
+ nevertheless some things are ordained by nature and others not.’
although there is such a thing as Natural Justice, all rules of justice are variable. But
nevertheless there is such a thing as Natural Justice as well as justice not ordained by
- nature; and it is easyPerhaps Aristotle wrote ‘though is is not easy.’ to see
+ nature; and it is easyPerhaps Aristotle wrote ‘though is is not easy.’ to see
which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural, and which are not natural but
legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable. The same distinction will hold
good in all other matters; for instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the
@@ -3830,17 +3830,17 @@ convert to P3
The several rules of justice and of law are related to the actions conforming with them
as universals to particulars, for the actions done are many, while each rule or law is
one, being universal.
- There is a difference between ‘that which is unjust’ and
- ‘unjust conduct,’ and between ‘that which is just’
- and ‘just conduct.’ Nature or ordinance pronounces a thing unjust:
- when that thing is done, it is ‘unjust conduct’; till it is done, it
- is only ‘unjust.’ And similarly with ‘just
- conduct,’ a dikaioma (or more
+
There is a difference between ‘that which is unjust’ and
+ ‘unjust conduct,’ and between ‘that which is just’
+ and ‘just conduct.’ Nature or ordinance pronounces a thing unjust:
+ when that thing is done, it is ‘unjust conduct’; till it is done, it
+ is only ‘unjust.’ And similarly with ‘just
+ conduct,’ a dikaioma (or more
correctly, the general term is dikaiopragema, dikaioma denoting the rectification of an act of
- injustice).
+ injustice).
We shall have laterPossibly a reference to an
- intended (or now lost) book of the Politics on laws
- (Ross). to consider
+ intended (or now lost) book of the
Politics on laws
+ (Ross). to consider
the several rules of justice and of law, and to enumerate their various kinds and describe
them and the things with which they deal.
Such being an account of just and unjust actions, it is their voluntary performance that
@@ -3854,9 +3854,9 @@ convert to P3
voluntariness be absent. By a voluntary action, as has
been said before,3.1.19. I mean any action
within the agent's own control which he performs knowingly, that is, without being in
- ignorance of the person affected, the instrument employed, and the result (for
+ ignorance of the person affected, the instrument employed, and the result (for
example, he must know whom he strikes, and with what weapon, and the effect of the
- blow); and in each of these respects both accidenti.e., mistake, ignorance: as in the illustration, it is an accident that
+ blow); and in each of these respects both accidenti.e., mistake, ignorance: as in the illustration, it is an accident that
the person struck is the striker's father. and compulsion must be excluded. For
instance, if A took hold of B's hand and with it struck C, B would not be a voluntary
agent, since the act would not be in his own control. Or again, a man may strike his
@@ -3866,8 +3866,8 @@ convert to P3
generally. An involuntary act is therefore an act done in ignorance, or else one that
though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's control, or is done under compulsion;
since there are many natural processes too that we perform or undergo knowingly, though none
- of them is either voluntary or involuntary‘Involuntary’ is certainly corrupt: perhaps Aristotle wrote
- ‘in our control.’; for example, growing old, and
+ of them is either voluntary or involuntary‘Involuntary’ is certainly corrupt: perhaps Aristotle wrote
+ ‘in our control.’; for example, growing old, and
dying.
Also an act may be either just or unjust incidentally. A man may restore a deposit
unwillingly and from fear of consequences, and we must not then say that he does a just
@@ -3879,8 +3879,8 @@ convert to P3
deliberation.
There are then three waysThe three sorts of injury
are a)tu/xhma, a(ma/rthma, and a)di/khma. The second term is introduced first, in its wider sense of a
- mistake which leads to an offense against someone else (the word connotes both
- things). It is then subdivided into two; a)tu/xhma, accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and not
+ mistake which leads to an offense against someone else (the word connotes both
+ things). It is then subdivided into two; a)tu/xhma, accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and not
reasonably to be expected, and a(ma/rthma in the narrow
sense, a similar offense that ought to have been foreseen. The third term, a)di/khma, a wrong, is subdivided into wrongs done in a
passion, which do not prove wickedness, and wrongs done deliberately, which do.
@@ -3888,15 +3888,15 @@ convert to P3
affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent supposed;
for example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not
with this result, but it happened that either the result was other than he expected
- (for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound but only a prick), or
+ (for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound but only a prick), or
the person, or the missile. When then the injury happens
- contrary to reasonable expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When,
+ contrary to reasonable expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When,
though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done without evil intent, it is
- (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's
+ (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's
ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself.
When an injury is done knowingly but not deliberately, it
- is (3) an act of injustice or wrong; such, for instance, are injuries
+ is (3) an act of injustice or wrong; such, for instance, are injuries
done through anger, or any other unavoidable or natural passion to which men are liable;
since in committing these injuries and errors a man acts unjustly, and his action is an
act of injustice, but he is not ipso facto unjust or wicked,
@@ -3904,9 +3904,9 @@ convert to P3
the doer is unjust and wicked. Hence acts due to sudden
anger are rightly held not to be done of malice aforethought, for it is the man who gave
the provocation that began it, not he who does the deed in a fit of passion. And moreover the issue is not one of fact, but of justification
- (since it is apparent injustice that arouses anger); the fact of the
- injury is not disputed (as it is in cases of contract, where one or the other of
- the parties must be a knave, unless they dispute the facts out of forgetfulness).
+ (since it is apparent injustice that arouses anger); the fact of the
+ injury is not disputed (as it is in cases of contract, where one or the other of
+ the parties must be a knave, unless they dispute the facts out of forgetfulness).
They agree as to the facts but dispute on which side justice lies so that one thinks he
has been unjustly treated and the other does not. On the other hand, one who has planned
an injury is not acting in ignorance;In the mss. this
@@ -3922,10 +3922,10 @@ convert to P3
But it may perhaps be doubted whether our discussion of suffering and doing injustice has
been sufficiently definite; and in the first place, whether the matter really is as
Euripides has put it in the strange linesApparently
- from a dialogue between Alcmaeon and (possibly) Phegeus in the lost
- play of Euripides named after the former. Cf. 3.1.8.—
+ from a dialogue between Alcmaeon and (possibly) Phegeus in the lost
+ play of Euripides named after the former. Cf. 3.1.8.
—
- I killed my mother—that's the tale in brief!
+ I killed my mother—that's the tale in brief!
Were you both willing, or unwilling both?
Is it really possible to suffer injusticei.e., to suffer wrong: for the wide sense of a)dikei=n
@@ -3933,7 +3933,7 @@ convert to P3
involuntary, just as acting unjustly is always voluntary? And again, is suffering
injustice always voluntary, or always involuntary, or sometimes one and sometimes the
other? And similarly with being treated justly
- (acting justly being always voluntary). Thus it would be reasonable to
+ (acting justly being always voluntary). Thus it would be reasonable to
suppose that both being treated unjustly and being
treated justly are similarly opposed to acting unjustly and acting justly respectively:
that either both are voluntary or both involuntary. But it would seem paradoxical to
@@ -3952,32 +3952,32 @@ convert to P3
the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of injury, it will follow both that
the man of defective self-restraint, inasmuch as he voluntarily harms himself, voluntarily
suffers injustice, and also that it is possible for a man to act unjustly towards himself
- (for the possibility of this is also a debated question). Moreover, lack of self-restraint may make a person voluntarily
+ (for the possibility of this is also a debated question). Moreover, lack of self-restraint may make a person voluntarily
submit to being harmed by another; which again would prove that it is possible to suffer
injustice voluntarily. But perhaps this definition of acting unjustly is incorrect, and we
- should add to the words ‘to do harm knowing the person affected, the instrument
- and the manner’ the further qualification ‘against that person's
- wish.’ If so, though a man can be harmed and
+ should add to the words ‘to do harm knowing the person affected, the instrument
+ and the manner’ the further qualification ‘against that person's
+ wish.’ If so, though a man can be harmed and
can have an unjust thing done to him voluntarily, no one can suffer injustice voluntarily,
because no one can wish to be harmed: even the unrestrained man does not, but acts
contrary to his wish, since no one wishes for a thing that he does not think to be good,
- and the unrestrained man does what he thinks he ought not to do. One who gives away what is his own—as HomerHom. Il. 6.236.
+ and the unrestrained man does what he thinks he ought not to do. One who gives away what is his own—as HomerHom. Il. 6.236.
says that Glaucus gave to Diomede
golden arms for bronze,
- An hundred beeves' worth for the worth of nine—
+ An hundred beeves' worth for the worth of nine—
cannot be said to suffer injustice; for giving rests with oneself, suffering
- injustice does not—there has to be another person who acts unjustly.
+ injustice does not—there has to be another person who acts unjustly.
It is clear then that it is not possible to suffer injustice voluntarily.
There still remain two of the questions that we proposed to discuss:
- (1) Is it ever he who gives the unduly large share, or is it always he
- who receives it, that is guilty of the injustice? and (2) Can one act
+ (1) Is it ever he who gives the unduly large share, or is it always he
+ who receives it, that is guilty of the injustice? and (2) Can one act
unjustly towards oneself?
If the former alternative is possible, that is, if it may be the giver and not the
receiver of too large a share who acts unjustly, then when a man knowingly and voluntarily
- assigns a larger share to another than to himself— as modest people are thought to do, for an equitable man is apt to
- take less than his due—this is a case of acting unjustly towards oneself. But
+ assigns a larger share to another than to himself— as modest people are thought to do, for an equitable man is apt to
+ take less than his due—this is a case of acting unjustly towards oneself. But
perhaps this also requires qualification. For the man who gave himself the smaller share
may possibly have got a larger share of some other good thing, for instance glory, or
intrinsic moral nobility. Also the inference may be refuted by referring to our definition
@@ -3990,16 +3990,16 @@ convert to P3
whom it can be said that he does this voluntarily, that is to say one from whom the action
originates; and the origin of the act in this case lies in the giver and not in the
receiver of the share.
- Again, ‘to do a thing’ has more than one meaning. In a certain sense
+
Again, ‘to do a thing’ has more than one meaning. In a certain sense
a murder is done by the inanimate instrument, or by the murderer's hand, or by a slave
acting under orders. But though these do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act
unjustly.It is not clear whether this is meant to
apply, in certain circumstances, to the distributor, or to the receiver, or to both.
Again, although if a judge has given an unfair judgement in ignorance, he is not guilty
- of injustice, nor is the judgement unjust, in the legal sense of justice (though
+ of injustice, nor is the judgement unjust, in the legal sense of justice (though
the judgement is unjust in one sense, for legal justice is different from justice in the
- primary sense), yet if he knowingly gives an unjust judgement, he is himself taking
+ primary sense), yet if he knowingly gives an unjust judgement, he is himself taking
more than his share, either of favor or of vengeance. Hence a judge who gives an unjust judgement for these motives takes more than his due
just as much as if he shared the proceeds of the injustice; for even a judge who assigns a
piece of land on that condition does not receive land but money.
@@ -4012,7 +4012,7 @@ convert to P3
difficult to understand the pronouncements of the law. But the actions prescribed by law
are only accidentally just actions. How an action must be performed,
how a distribution must be made to be a just action or a just
- distribution—to know this is a harder task than to know what medical treatment
+ distribution—to know this is a harder task than to know what medical treatment
will produce health. Even in medicine, though it is easy to know what honey, wine and
hellebore, cautery and surgery are, to know how and to whom and when to apply them so as
to effect a cure is no less an undertaking than to be a physician. And for this very reasoni.e., that
@@ -4022,7 +4022,7 @@ convert to P3
lie with a woman, or strike a blow, and a brave man
can throw away his shield, and can wheel to the right or left
and run away. But to be a coward and to be guilty of injustice consists not in doing these
- things (except accidentally), but in doing them from a certain
+ things (except accidentally), but in doing them from a certain
disposition of mind; just as to be a physician and cure one's patients is not a matter of
employing or not employing surgery or drugs, but of doing so in a certain
manner.
@@ -4036,11 +4036,11 @@ convert to P3
to what is just respectively. For upon examination it appears that Justice and Equity are
neither absolutely identical nor generically different. Sometimes, it is true, we praise
equity and the equitable man, so much so that we even apply the word
- ‘equitable’e)pieike/s in some contexts means ‘suitable’ or
- ‘reasonable.’
+ ‘equitable’e)pieike/s in some contexts means ‘suitable’ or
+ ‘reasonable.’
as a term of
approval to other things besides what is just, and use it as the equivalent of
- ‘good,’ denoting by ‘more equitable’ merely that a
+ ‘good,’ denoting by ‘more equitable’ merely that a
thing is better. Yet at other times, when we think the matter out, it seems strange that
the equitable should be praiseworthy if it is something other than the just. If they are
different, either the just or the equitable is not good; if both are good, they are the
@@ -4071,8 +4071,8 @@ convert to P3
which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary.
For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by
an indefinite standard, like the leaden ruleExplained
- either as used in building with polygonal stones (but this was not peculiar to
- Lesbos), or in making the Lesbian
+ either as used in building with polygonal stones (but this was not peculiar to
+ Lesbos), or in making the Lesbian
form of moulding, which had a double curve. used by Lesbian builders; just as
that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance
is made to fit the circumstances of the case.
@@ -4083,62 +4083,62 @@ convert to P3
disposition described is Equity; it is a special kind of Justice, not a different quality
altogether.
The foregoing discussion has indicated the answer to the question, Is it possible or not
- for a man to commit injustice against himself? (1) One class of just
+ for a man to commit injustice against himself? (1) One class of just
actions consists of those acts, in accordance with any virtue, which are ordained by
law.The argument seems to be, that suicide does not
- prove the possibility of a man's committing ‘injustice,’ in the
+ prove the possibility of a man's committing ‘injustice,’ in the
wider sense of any illegal injury, against himself. Suicide is an act of injustice in
this sense, since it is the voluntary infliction of bodily harm not in retaliation and
therefore contrary to law; but it is an offense not against oneself but against the
State, since it is punished as such. For instance, the law does not sanction
- suicide (and whatOr perhaps ‘and
- any form of homicide that it does not expressly permit.’ it does not
- expressly sanction, it forbids). Further, when a
- man voluntarily (which means with knowledge of the person affected and the
- instrument employed) does an injury (not in retaliation) that
+ suicide (and whatOr perhaps ‘and
+ any form of homicide that it does not expressly permit.’ it does not
+ expressly sanction, it forbids). Further, when a
+ man voluntarily (which means with knowledge of the person affected and the
+ instrument employed) does an injury (not in retaliation) that
is against the law, he commits injustice. But he who kills himself in a fit of passion,
- voluntarily does an injury (against the right principlei.e., the principle of retaliation.) which the law does
+ voluntarily does an injury (against the right principlei.e., the principle of retaliation.) which the law does
not allow. Therefore the suicide commits injustice; but
against whom? It seems to be against the state rather than against himself; for he suffers
voluntarily, and nobody suffers injustice voluntarily. This is why the state exacts a
penalty; suicide is punished by certain marks of dishonor,At Athens a suicide's hand was
buried apart from the body; Aeschin. 3.244. as
being an offense against the state.
- (2) Moreover, it is not possible to act unjustly towards oneself in the
+
(2) Moreover, it is not possible to act unjustly towards oneself in the
sense in which a man is unjust who is a doer of injustice only and not universally wicked.
- (This case is distinct from the former, because Injustice in one sense is a
+ (This case is distinct from the former, because Injustice in one sense is a
special form of wickedness, like Cowardice, and does not imply universal wickedness; hence
it is necessary further to show that a man cannot commit injustice against himself in this
- sense either.) For (a) if it were, it would be possible for the
+ sense either.) For (a) if it were, it would be possible for the
same thing to have been taken away from and added to the same thing at the same time. But
this is impossible: justice and injustice always
necessarily imply more than one person. Again
- (b) an act of injustice must be voluntary and done from choice, and also
+ (b) an act of injustice must be voluntary and done from choice, and also
unprovoked; we do not think that a man acts unjustly if having suffered he retaliates, and
gives what he got. But when a man injures himself, he both does and suffers the same thing
- at the same time. Again (c) if a man could act unjustly towards himself,
- it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. Furthermore (d) no one is guilty of injustice without committing some
+ at the same time. Again (c) if a man could act unjustly towards himself,
+ it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. Furthermore (d) no one is guilty of injustice without committing some
particular unjust act; but a man cannot commit adultery with his own wife, or burglary on
his own premises, or theft of his own property.
- (3) And generally, the question, Can a man act unjustly towards
+
(3) And generally, the question, Can a man act unjustly towards
himself? is solved by our decision upon the question, Can a man suffer injustice
voluntarily?
- (It is further manifest that, though both to suffer and to do injustice are
- evils—for the former is to have less and the latter to have more than the mean,
+
(It is further manifest that, though both to suffer and to do injustice are
+ evils—for the former is to have less and the latter to have more than the mean,
correspondingThis clause has no grammatical
connection with the rest of the sentence; Ramsauer brackets it, Rassow supplies before
- it to\ de\ dikaiopragei=n me/son, ‘whereas
- just conduct is a mean.’ to what is health-giving in medicine and
- conducive to fitness in athletic training—nevertheless to do injustice is the
+ it to\ de\ dikaiopragei=n me/son, ‘whereas
+ just conduct is a mean.’
to what is health-giving in medicine and
+ conducive to fitness in athletic training—nevertheless to do injustice is the
worse evil, for it is reprehensible, implying vice in the agent, and vice utter and
- absolute—or nearly so, for it is true that not every unjust act voluntarily
- committed implies vice—, whereas to suffer injustice does not necessarily imply
+ absolute—or nearly so, for it is true that not every unjust act voluntarily
+ committed implies vice—, whereas to suffer injustice does not necessarily imply
vice or injustice in the victim. Thus in itself to suffer
injustice is the lesser evil, though accidentally it may be the greater. With this however science
is not concerned; science pronounces pIeurisy a more serious disorder than a sprain, in
spite of the fact that in certain circumstances a sprain may be accidentally worse than
pleurisy, as for instance if it should happen that owing to a sprain you fell and in
- consequence of falling were taken by the enemy and killed.)
+ consequence of falling were taken by the enemy and killed.)
In a metaphorical and analogical sense however there is such a thing as justice, not
towards oneself but between different parts of one's nature; not, it is true, justice in
the full sense of the term, but such justice as subsists between master and slave, or
@@ -4177,9 +4177,9 @@ convert to P3
it is not enough merely to have established the truth of the above formula; we also have
to define exactly what the right principle is, and what is the standard that determines
it.Book 6 thus purports to explain further the
- definition of Moral Virtue (2.615), while at the same time
- (1.4) continuing the analysis of the definition of Happiness
- (1.7.15) by examining the Intellectual Virtues.
+ definition of Moral Virtue (2.615), while at the same time
+ (1.4) continuing the analysis of the definition of Happiness
+ (1.7.15) by examining the Intellectual Virtues.
Now we have divided the Virtues of the Soul into two groups, the Virtues of the Character
and the Virtues of the Intellect. The former, the Moral Virtues, we have already
@@ -4203,18 +4203,18 @@ convert to P3
performs. Now there are
three elements in the soul which control action and the attainment of truth: namely,
Sensation, Intellect,nou=s here bears its usual philosophic sense of the intellect, or rational
- part of the ‘soul,’ as a whole, whose function is dia/noia, thought in general. In chap. 6 it is given a special
+ part of the ‘soul,’ as a whole, whose function is dia/noia, thought in general. In chap. 6 it is given a special
and restricted meaning, and this in chap. 9 is related to the popular use of the word to
- denote ‘good sense’ or practical intelligence. and
+ denote ‘good sense’ or practical intelligence. and
Desire.
Of these, Sensation never originates action, as is shown by the fact that animals have sensation but are not capable of action.pra=cis means rational
action, conduct. The movements of animals, Aristotle appears to think, are mere
reactions to the stimuli of sensation.
Greenwood
- points out that the passage would be clearer if 2.2 mid.-3, ‘Pursuit . . .
- right desire,’ and 2.5, ‘Thought by itself . . . desire
- aims,’ came lower down, after the verse-quotation in 2.6. The earlier part of
+ points out that the passage would be clearer if 2.2 mid.-3, ‘Pursuit . . .
+ right desire,’ and 2.5, ‘Thought by itself . . . desire
+ aims,’ came lower down, after the verse-quotation in 2.6. The earlier part of
6 is a parenthetical note.Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of Desire
correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the Intellect. Hence inasmuch as
moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to choice,2.6.15. and choice is deliberate desire,3.3.19. it follows that, if the choice is to be good, both the
@@ -4227,32 +4227,32 @@ convert to P3
practical intelligence is the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire.i.e., truth about the means to the attainment of the
rightly desired End.
- Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is
+
Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is
choice,Cf. 3.2.1 note. Here again proai/resis seems to mean choice of means, not of ends.
and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning directed to some end. Hence choice
necessarily involves both intellect or thought and a certain disposition of character
- [This clause must be rejected as
+ [This clause must be rejected as
superfluous and logically unsound: the nature of action is explained by that of
- ‘choice,’ not vice versa. for
+ ‘choice,’ not vice versa. for
doing well and the reverse in the sphere of action necessarily involve thought and
- character].
+ character].
Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing
with action. This indeed is the moving cause of productive activityFor this distinction between making and doing, production and action or
conduct, see 1.1.2, 5. also, since he who makes some thing always has some
further end in view: the act of making is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and
belongs to something else. Whereas a thing done is an end in itself: since doing well
- (welfareSee second note on 1.4.
- 2.) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims.
+ (welfareSee second note on 1.4.
+ 2.) is the End, and it is at this that desire aims.
Hence Choice may be called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought;
and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect.
- (Choice is not concerned with what has happened already: for example, no one
+
(Choice is not concerned with what has happened already: for example, no one
chooses to have sacked Troy; for neither does one
deliberate about what has happened in the past, but about what still lies in the future
and may happen or not; what has happened cannot be made not to have happened. Hence
Agathon is right in saying
This only is denied even to God,
- The power to make what has been done undone.)
+ The power to make what has been done undone.)
The attainment of truth is then the function of both the intellectual parts of
the soul. Therefore their respective virtues are those dispositions which will best
@@ -4263,8 +4263,8 @@ convert to P3
includes skill in fine art, but is not limited to it. Scientific Knowledge,
Prudence, Wisdom, and Intelligence. Conception and Opinion are capable of error.
- The nature of Scientific Knowledge (employing the term in its exact sense and
- disregarding its analogous uses) may be made clear as follows. We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically cannot
+
The nature of Scientific Knowledge (employing the term in its exact sense and
+ disregarding its analogous uses) may be made clear as follows. We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically cannot
vary; when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of our observation, we do not know
whether it exists or not. An object of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of
necessity. It is therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute necessity is
@@ -4282,14 +4282,14 @@ convert to P3
Analytics,See Aristot. Post. Anal. 1, 71b 9 ff. namely, that
a man knows a thing scientifically when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain
way, and when the first principles on which that conviction rests are known to him with
- certainty—for unless he is more certain of his first principles than of the
+ certainty—for unless he is more certain of his first principles than of the
conclusion drawn from them he will only possess the knowledge in question
accidentally.i.e., the conviction may happen to be
true, but he will not hold it as Scientific Knowledge in the proper sense of the
term. Let this stand as our definition of Scientific Knowledge.
The class of things that admit of variation includes both things made and actions done.
- But making is different from doing (a
- distinction we may accept from extraneous discoursesSee note on 1.13.9.). Hence the rational quality concerned with doing
+ But making is different from doing (a
+ distinction we may accept from extraneous discoursesSee note on 1.13.9.). Hence the rational quality concerned with doing
is different from the rational quality concerned with making; nor is one of them a part of
the other, for doing is not a form of making, nor making a form of doing. Now architectural skill, for instance, is an art, and it is also a
rational quality concerned with making; nor is there any art which is not a rational
@@ -4317,8 +4317,8 @@ convert to P3
what is good for his health or strength, but what is advantageous as a means to the good
life in general. This is proved by the fact that we also
speak of people as prudent or wise in some particular thing, when they calculate well with
- a view to attaining some particular end of value (other than those ends which are
- the object of an art); so that the prudent man in general will be the man who is
+ a view to attaining some particular end of value (other than those ends which are
+ the object of an art); so that the prudent man in general will be the man who is
good at deliberating in general.
But no one deliberates about things that cannot vary, nor about things not within his
power to do. Hence inasmuch as scientific knowledge involves demonstration, whereas things
@@ -4327,8 +4327,8 @@ convert to P3
necessity, it follows that Prudence is not the same as Science. Nor can it be the same as
Art. It is not Science, because matters of conduct admit of variation; and not Art,
because doing and making are generically different,The
- words ‘since . . . itself the end’ in the mss. follow 5.4
- ‘for human beings.’ since making aims at an end distinct from
+ words ‘since . . . itself the end’ in the mss. follow 5.4
+ ‘for human beings.’ since making aims at an end distinct from
the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the act itself: doing
wellSee note on 1.4.2. is in itself the end.
It remains therefore that it is a truth-attaining
@@ -4337,24 +4337,24 @@ convert to P3
Hence men like Pericles are deemed prudent, because they possess a faculty of discerning
what things are good for themselves and for mankind and that is our conception of an
expert in Domestic Economy or Political Science.
- (This also accounts for the word Temperance,swfrosu/nh, the quality of the sw/frwn ( sw=s-frh/n) or
- ‘sound-minded’ man, Aristotle derives from sw/zein and fro/nhsis. Cf. 8.8.4.
- which signifies ‘preserving prudence.’ And Temperance does in fact preserve our belief as to our own good; for pleasure and
+
(This also accounts for the word Temperance,swfrosu/nh, the quality of the sw/frwn ( sw=s-frh/n) or
+ ‘sound-minded’ man, Aristotle derives from sw/zein and fro/nhsis. Cf. 8.8.4.
+ which signifies ‘preserving prudence.’ And Temperance does in fact preserve our belief as to our own good; for pleasure and
pain do not destroy or pervert all beliefs, for instance, the belief that the three angles
of a triangle are, or are not, together equal to two right angles, but only beliefs
concerning action. The first principles of action are the end to which our acts are means;
but a man corrupted by a love of pleasure or fear of pain, entirely fails to discern any
- first principle,Or ‘to one corrupted by
+ first principle,Or ‘to one corrupted by
pleasure or pain this end does not seem to be a first principle at
- all.’ and cannot see that he ought to choose and do everything as a means
+ all.’ and cannot see that he ought to choose and do everything as a means
to this end, and for its sake; for vice tends to destroy the sense of principle.i.e., to
destroy our perception of the true end of life, which constitutes the major premise of
- the practical syllogism.)
+ the practical syllogism.)
It therefore follows that Prudence is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with
action in relation to the things that are good for human beings.
- Moreover, we can speak of excellence in Art,te/xnh, Art, is here (as in 7.1) used in a
+ Moreover, we can speak of excellence in Art,te/xnh, Art, is here (as in 7.1) used in a
neutral sense of a systematic procedure for making something, or a body of principles
- for such a procedure—one may be good at it or bad; whereas fro/nhsis, Prudence or practical wisdom, itself denotes an
+ for such a procedure—one may be good at it or bad; whereas fro/nhsis, Prudence or practical wisdom, itself denotes an
excellence, not a neutral sphere in which one may excel or the reverse. Elsewhere in the
book te/xnh has the positive sense of artistic
excellence or technical skill. but not of excellence in Prudence. Also in Art
@@ -4370,8 +4370,8 @@ convert to P3
a moral lapse, which shows that it is not a purely intellectual quality.
Scientific Knowledge is a mode of conception dealing with universals and things that are
- of necessity; and demonstrated truths and all scientific knowledge (since this
- involves reasoning) are derived from first principles. Consequently the first
+ of necessity; and demonstrated truths and all scientific knowledge (since this
+ involves reasoning) are derived from first principles. Consequently the first
principles from which scientific truths are derived cannot themselves be reached by
Science; nor yet are they apprehended by Art, nor by Prudence. To be matter of Scientific
Knowledge a truth must be demonstrated by deduction from other truths; while Art and
@@ -4386,17 +4386,17 @@ convert to P3
and Intelligence, and if the quality which enables us to apprehend first principles cannot
be any one among three of these, namely Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, and Wisdom, it
remains that first principles must be apprehended by Intelligence.nou=s now receives its special sense
- (see 2.1, note) of a particular virtue of the intellect, viz. that
- faculty of rational intuition whereby it correctly apprehends (by process of
- induction, see 3.3) undemonstrable first principles. It is thus a part of
- sofi/a (7.3,5).
+ (see 2.1, note) of a particular virtue of the intellect, viz. that
+ faculty of rational intuition whereby it correctly apprehends (by process of
+ induction, see 3.3) undemonstrable first principles. It is thus a part of
+ sofi/a (7.3,5).
The term Wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men who are the most perfect
masters of their art, for instance, it is applied to Pheidias as a sculptor and to
Polycleitus as a statuary. In this use then Wisdom merely signifies artistic excellence.
But we also think that some people are wise in general
- and not in one department, not ‘wise in something else,’The sense rather requires ‘wise in some
- particular thing,’ but the expression is assimilated to the quotation.
+ and not in one department, not ‘wise in something else,’The sense rather requires ‘wise in some
+ particular thing,’ but the expression is assimilated to the quotation.
as Homer says in the
Margites:
Neither a delver nor a ploughman him
@@ -4407,15 +4407,15 @@ convert to P3
conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of
those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and
Scientific KnowledgeSee 6.1, 2.: it must be a
- consummated knowledgeLiterally ‘knowledge
- having as it were a head,’ a phrase copied from Plato, Plat. Gorg. 505d.
+ consummated knowledgeLiterally ‘knowledge
+ having as it were a head,’ a phrase copied from Plato, Plat. Gorg. 505d.
of the most exaltedSee 7.4, 5, and, for the technical sense of ti/mios, Bk. 1.12. objects. For it is absurd to think that Political
Science or Prudence is the loftiest kind of knowledge, inasmuch as man is not the highest
thing in the world. And as
- ‘wholesome’ and ‘good’ mean one thing for men and
- another for fishes, whereas ‘white’ and ‘straight’
+ ‘wholesome’ and ‘good’ mean one thing for men and
+ another for fishes, whereas ‘white’ and ‘straight’
mean the same thing always, so everybody would denote the same thing by
- ‘wise,’ but not by ‘prudent’; for each kind of
+ ‘wise,’ but not by ‘prudent’; for each kind of
beings will describe as prudent, and will entrust itself to, one who can discern its own
particular welfare; hence even some of the lower animals are said to be prudent, namely
those which display a capacity for forethought as regards their own lives.
@@ -4428,16 +4428,16 @@ convert to P3
for
instance, to mention the most visible, the thingsThis
means apparently the sun, stars, and planets, elsewhere referred to by Aristotle as
- ‘the divine bodies that move through the heaven,’ ‘the
- visible divine things,’ ‘the heaven and the most divine of visible
- things’ (Aristot. Met. 1074a
- 30, Aristot. Met. 1026a 18, Aristot. Phys. 196a 33). of which the
+ ‘the divine bodies that move through the heaven,’ ‘the
+ visible divine things,’ ‘the heaven and the most divine of visible
+ things’ (Aristot. Met. 1074a
+ 30, Aristot. Met. 1026a 18, Aristot. Phys. 196a 33). of which the
celestial system is composed.
These considerations therefore show that Wisdom is both Scientific Knowledge and
Intuitive Intelligence as regards the things of the most exaltedSee 7.3, third note. nature. This is why people say that men like
Anaxagoras and ThalesThales was the first of the
- Seven Wise Men: Anaxagoras belonged to a later generation. ‘may be wise
- but are not prudent,’ when they see them display ignorance of their own
+ Seven Wise Men: Anaxagoras belonged to a later generation. ‘may be wise
+ but are not prudent,’ when they see them display ignorance of their own
interests; and while admitting them to possess a knowledge that is rare, marvellous,
difficult and even superhuman, they yet declare this knowledge to be useless, because
these sages do not seek to know the things that are good for human beings. Prudence on the other hand is concerned with the affairs of men,
@@ -4450,20 +4450,20 @@ convert to P3
particular facts, since it is concerned with action, and action deals with particular
things. This is why men who are ignorant of general principles are sometimes more
successful in action than others who know them: The
- words ‘for instance . . . chicken is wholesome’ in the mss. come
- after ‘theorists.’ for instance, if a man knows that light
+ words ‘for instance . . . chicken is wholesome’ in the mss. come
+ after ‘theorists.’ for instance, if a man knows that light
meat is easily digested and therefore wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are
light, he will not be so likely to restore you to health as a man who merely knows that chicken is wholesome; and in other
matters men of experience are more successful than theorists. And Prudence is concerned
with action, so one requires both forms of it, or indeed knowledge of particular facts
even more than knowledge of general principles. Though here too there must be some supreme
- directing faculty.i.e., politikh/, Political Science or Statesmanship (cf. Bk. 1.1,
- 2), the relation of which to Prudence is next considered.
+ directing faculty.i.e., politikh/, Political Science or Statesmanship (cf. Bk. 1.1,
+ 2), the relation of which to Prudence is next considered.
Prudence is indeed the same quality of mind as Political Science, though their essence is
different.Cf. 5.1.20. Political Wisdom is not a
special sort of Prudence but a special application of it, for though the term
- ‘Prudence’ is in ordinary usage confined to practical wisdom in
+ ‘Prudence’ is in ordinary usage confined to practical wisdom in
one's private affairs, it really extends to the affairs of one's family and of the
community.
Of Prudence as regards the state, one kind, as supreme
@@ -4472,10 +4472,10 @@ convert to P3
of a founder or reformer of the constitution, or of a special legislative
commission.; the other, as dealing with particular occurrences, has the name,
Political Science, that really belongs to both kinds. The latter is concerned with action
- and deliberation (for a parliamentary enactment is a thing to be done, being the
+ and deliberation (for a parliamentary enactment is a thing to be done, being the
last stepCf. 3.3.12. in a deliberative
- process), and this is why it is only those persons who deal with particular facts
- who are spoken of as ‘taking part in politics,’ because it is only
+ process), and this is why it is only those persons who deal with particular facts
+ who are spoken of as ‘taking part in politics,’ because it is only
they who perform actions, like the workmen in an industry.In contrast with the law-giver and the master-craftsman respectively.
Prudence also is commonly understood to mean especially
that kind of wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this is given the
@@ -4484,7 +4484,7 @@ convert to P3
Deliberative Science and Judicial Science. Now knowledge
of one's own interest will certainly be one kind of Prudence; though it is very different
from the other kinds, and people think that the man who knows and minds his own business
- is prudent, and that politicians are busybodies: thus Euripides writes—
+ is prudent, and that politicians are busybodies: thus Euripides writes—
Would that be prudent? when I might have lived
A quiet life, a cipher in the crowd,
@@ -4492,11 +4492,11 @@ convert to P3
Restless, aspiring, busy men of action. . .
From the lost Philoctetes of
- Euripides, frr. 785, 786 Dindorf. The third line went on ‘with the wisest. . .
+ Euripides, frr. 785, 786 Dindorf. The third line went on ‘with the wisest. . .
. For there is naught so foolish as a man! Restless, aspiring, busy men of action We
- honor and esteem as men of mark. . .’ For people seek their own good,
+ honor and esteem as men of mark. . .’ For people seek their own good,
and suppose that it is right to do so. Hence this belief has caused the word
- ‘prudent’ to mean those who are wise in their own interest. Yet
+ ‘prudent’ to mean those who are wise in their own interest. Yet
probably as a matter of fact a man cannot pursue his own welfare without Domestic Economy
and even Politics. Moreover, even the proper conduct of one's own affairs is a difficult
problem, and requires consideration.
@@ -4509,14 +4509,14 @@ convert to P3
Prudence includes a knowledge of particular facts, and this is derived from experience,
which a young man does not a possess; for experience is
the fruit of years.The Greek looks like a buried verse
- quotation. (One might indeed further enquire why it is that, though a
+ quotation. (One might indeed further enquire why it is that, though a
boy may be a mathematician, he cannot be a metaphysician or a natural philosopher.The three divisions of the subject matter of
Wisdom. Perhaps the answer is that Mathematics deals with abstractions, whereas the
first principles of Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy are derived from experience: the
young can only repeat them without conviction of
their truth,Immelmann's emendation gives
- ‘can only take them on credit from others.’ whereas the
- formal concepts of Mathematics are easily understood.) Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may
+ ‘can only take them on credit from others.’ whereas the
+ formal concepts of Mathematics are easily understood.) Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may
go wrong either in your general principle or in your particular fact: for instance, either
in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or that the particular water in question
is heavy.
@@ -4528,27 +4528,27 @@ convert to P3
science. apprehends definitions, which cannot be proved by reasoning, while
Prudence deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended by
Scientific Knowledge, but only by perception: not the perception of the special
- senses,Literally ‘of the objects peculiar
- to the special senses.’ Shape was one of the ‘common
- sensibles,’ perceived through the medium of more than one of the special
- senses, by the ‘common sense.’ but the sort of intuition
+ senses,Literally ‘of the objects peculiar
+ to the special senses.’ Shape was one of the ‘common
+ sensibles,’ perceived through the medium of more than one of the special
+ senses, by the ‘common sense.’ but the sort of intuition
whereby we perceive that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangleA triangle is the last form into which a rectilinear
figure can be divided: two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Or the words may
- possibly mean ‘whereby we perceive that a particular mathematical figure is
- [for example] a triangle.’ But this would rather be
+ possibly mean ‘whereby we perceive that a particular mathematical figure is
+ [for example] a triangle.’ But this would rather be
expressed by todi\ to\ e)/sxaton, or todi/ alone.; for there, too, there will be a stop.That is, we reach the limit of analysis just as much when
we descend to particulars as when we ascend to first principles or definitions
- (Burnet). Or the words may
- mean ‘in mathematics as in problems of conduct there is a point where analysis
- must stop.’ But the term perception applies in a fuller sense to
+ (Burnet). Or the words may
+ mean ‘in mathematics as in problems of conduct there is a point where analysis
+ must stop.’ But the term perception applies in a fuller sense to
mathematical intuition than to Prudence; the practical intuition of the latter belongs to
a different species.The intuition of particular facts
which is a part of Prudence also belongs to the genus perception, but it is
- intellectual, not sensuous. The Greek may however conceivably mean, ‘But the
+ intellectual, not sensuous. The Greek may however conceivably mean, ‘But the
intuition of the ultimate particular in problems of conduct approximates more to
sensation than to prudence, though it is a different species from the perception of the
- separate senses.’In the mss. the
- chapter begins with the sentence ‘But deliberation,’ etc., here
+ separate senses.’In the mss. the
+ chapter begins with the sentence ‘But deliberation,’ etc., here
transferred to the middle of 9.2.
We ought also to
ascertain the nature of Deliberative Excellence, and to discover whether it is a species
@@ -4565,35 +4565,35 @@ convert to P3
rapidly, whereas deliberating takes a long time, and there is a proverb that execution
should be swift but deliberation slow. Again,
Deliberative Excellence is not the same as Quickness of mind,a)gxi/noia appears from Aristot. Post. Anal. 1.33, 89b 10, to denote the faculty
- of guessing immediately the ‘middle term’ or fact which explains the
+ of guessing immediately the ‘middle term’ or fact which explains the
relation observed between two objects. which is a form of skill in Conjecture.
Nor yet is Deliberative Excellence any form of Opinion.
But inasmuch as a bad deliberator makes mistakes and a good deliberator deliberates
correctly,Perhaps the text should be emended to read
`inasmuch as one who deliberates badly goes wrong and one who deliberates well acts
- rightly.’ it is clear that Deliberative Excellence is some form of
+ rightly.’ it is clear that Deliberative Excellence is some form of
correctness; though it is not correctness of Knowledge, nor of Opinion. Correctness cannot
be predicated of Knowledge,i.e., correct knowledge is
a redundant expression; knowledge means correct notions; erroneous notions
are not knowledge. any more than can error, and correctness of Opinion is truth;
and also any matter about which one has an opinion has been settled already;
- [then again Deliberative Excellence necessarily involves conscious calculation.
+ [then again Deliberative Excellence necessarily involves conscious calculation.
It remains therefore that Deliberative Excellence is correctness in thinking, for thought
- has not reached the stage of affirmation;]The
+ has not reached the stage of affirmation;]The
two sentences bracketed interrupt the argument. The rest seems to belong to 9.2, though
it does not fit in there exactly. The second is altogether irrelevant, and employs the
term dia/noia of the intellect as enquiring, not as
contemplating the results of enquiry, a Platonic use not found elsewhere in
- Aristotle: ‘correctness in thinking’
- here is in fact equivalent to ‘correctness in deliberation’ in
+ Aristotle: ‘correctness in thinking’
+ here is in fact equivalent to ‘correctness in deliberation’ in
9.4. for Opinion has passed beyond the stage of investigation and is a form of
affirmation, whereas a man deliberating, whether he deliberates well or badly, is
investigating and calculating something.
- But Deliberative Excellence is a form of correctness in deliberation [so that we
+
But Deliberative Excellence is a form of correctness in deliberation [so that we
have first to investigate what deliberation is, and what object it deals
- with].The sentence bracketed interrupts the
+ with].The sentence bracketed interrupts the
argument; and no examination of deliberation follows. However,
- ‘correctness’ in this connection is ambiguous, and plainly it is not
+ ‘correctness’ in this connection is ambiguous, and plainly it is not
every kind of correctness in deliberation that constitutes Deliberative Excellence. A man
of deficient self-restraint or a bad man may as a result of calculation arrive at the
object he proposes as the right thing to do, so that he will have deliberated correctly,
@@ -4625,8 +4625,8 @@ convert to P3
If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative
Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means
to the end, a true conception of whichThe antecedent
- of ‘which’ is probably not ‘the end’ but
- ‘what is expedient as a means to the end,’ since it is indicated
+ of ‘which’ is probably not ‘the end’ but
+ ‘what is expedient as a means to the end,’ since it is indicated
below that Prudence deals with means, not ends. The difference therefore between
Deliberative Excellence and Prudence seems to that the former is the intellectual
quality displayed in the process of correctly investigation a problem of conduct, the
@@ -4634,10 +4634,10 @@ convert to P3
results of such investigations. Or perhaps more strictly both these qualities are
included in Prudence, of which Deliberative Excellence is therefore one aspect or
species. constitutes Prudence.
- Understanding, or Good Understanding, the quality in virtue of which we call men ‘persons
- of understanding’ or ‘of good understanding,’ is not the
- same thing as Scientific Knowledge in general (nor yet is it the same as Opinion,
- for in that case everybody would have understanding), nor is it any one of the
+
Understanding, or Good Understanding, the quality in virtue of which we call men ‘persons
+ of understanding’ or ‘of good understanding,’ is not the
+ same thing as Scientific Knowledge in general (nor yet is it the same as Opinion,
+ for in that case everybody would have understanding), nor is it any one of the
particular sciences, as medicine is the science of what pertains to health and geometry
the science concerned with magnitudes. For Understanding
does not deal with the things that exist for ever and are immutable, nor yet with all of
@@ -4645,89 +4645,89 @@ convert to P3
may deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same objects as Prudence. Understanding is
not however the same thing as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands, since its end is a
statement of what we ought to do or not to do, whereas Understanding merely makes
- judgements. (For Understanding is the same as Good Understanding; a
- ‘man of understanding’ means a man of good
- understanding.)This parenthesis would come
- better in the first section, after the words ‘of good
- understanding.’ It merely points out that the qualification
- ‘good’ need not be repeated.
+ judgements. (For Understanding is the same as Good Understanding; a
+ ‘man of understanding’ means a man of good
+ understanding.)This parenthesis would come
+ better in the first section, after the words ‘of good
+ understanding.’ It merely points out that the qualification
+ ‘good’ need not be repeated.
Thus Understanding does not mean either the possession or the acquisition of Prudence;
but when we employ the faculty of Opinion to judge what another person says
about matters that are in the sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand
- (that is, to judge rightly for right judgement is the same as
- good understanding), in the same way as learning a thing is termed
+ (that is, to judge rightly for right judgement is the same as
+ good understanding), in the same way as learning a thing is termed
understanding it when we are employing the faculty of Scientific Knowledge.
In fact, the use of the term Understanding to denote
- the quality that makes men ‘persons of good understanding’ is derived
- from understanding as shown in learning; in fact we often use ‘to
- learn’ in the sense of ‘to understand.’manqa/nein is idiomatically used of
+ the quality that makes men ‘persons of good understanding’ is derived
+ from understanding as shown in learning; in fact we often use ‘to
+ learn’ in the sense of ‘to understand.’manqa/nein is idiomatically used of
understanding what another person says.
The quality termed Consideration,The writer here
- strains the meaning of words by connecting under one sense (1)
+ strains the meaning of words by connecting under one sense (1)
gnw/mh, judgement in general or good judgement in
- particular, and its derivatives (2) eu)gnw/mwn, ‘well-judging’ in the sense of considerate
- and kindly, and (3) suggnw/mh,
- literally ‘judgement with’ or on the side of others, and hence,
+ particular, and its derivatives (2) eu)gnw/mwn, ‘well-judging’ in the sense of considerate
+ and kindly, and (3) suggnw/mh,
+ literally ‘judgement with’ or on the side of others, and hence,
sympathy, lenience, forgiveness. in virtue of which men are said to be
considerate, or to show consideration for others
- (forgiveness), is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable.
+ (forgiveness), is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable.
This is indicated by our saying that the equitable man is specially considerate for others
- (forgiving), and that it is equitable to show consideration for others
- (forgiveness) in certain cases; but consideration for others is that
+ (forgiving), and that it is equitable to show consideration for others
+ (forgiveness) in certain cases; but consideration for others is that
consideration which judges rightly what is equitable, judging rightly meaning
judging what is truly equitable.
All these qualities, it is reasonable to say, refer to the same thing; indeed we
attribute Considerateness, Understanding, Prudence, and Intelligence to the same persons
- when we say of people that they ‘are old enough to show consideration and
- intelligence,’i.e., ‘have
- reached years of discretion’; cf. 11.6 and 8.12.2. and are prudent and
+ when we say of people that they ‘are old enough to show consideration and
+ intelligence,’i.e., ‘have
+ reached years of discretion’; cf. 11.6 and 8.12.2. and are prudent and
understanding persons. For all these faculties deal with ultimate and particular things;
and a man has understanding and is considerate, or considerate for others, when he is a
- good judge of the matters in regard to which Prudence is displayedThis has been proved for ‘understanding’ and
- ‘the sensible man’ in chap. 10; it is extended to
- ‘considerateness’ in the words that follow: considerateness judges
+ good judge of the matters in regard to which Prudence is displayedThis has been proved for ‘understanding’ and
+ ‘the sensible man’ in chap. 10; it is extended to
+ ‘considerateness’ in the words that follow: considerateness judges
correctly what is equitable, equity is an element in all virtuous conduct towards
others, and all virtuous conduct is determined by Prudence.; because equitable
actions are common to all good meni.e., the possessors
of each of the moral virtues. in their behavior towards others, while on the other hand all matters of conduct belong to the class of
- particular and ultimate things (since the prudent man admittedly has to take
- cognizance of these things), and Understanding and Consideration deal with
+ particular and ultimate things (since the prudent man admittedly has to take
+ cognizance of these things), and Understanding and Consideration deal with
matters of conduct, which are ultimate.Also Intelligence
- apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary
+ apprehends the ultimates in both aspects—since ultimates as well as primary
definitionsSee 8.9.
are grasped
by Intelligence and not reached by reasoning: in demonstrations, Intelligence apprehends
- the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences,The substantive to be understood may be prota/sesi, ‘propositions’; but the reference seems to be
- not to the practical syllogism in the ordinary sense (see 7.3.9), but
+ the immutable and primary definitions, in practical inferences,The substantive to be understood may be prota/sesi, ‘propositions’; but the reference seems to be
+ not to the practical syllogism in the ordinary sense (see 7.3.9), but
to the establishment of ethical a)rxai/ by induction,
- which is the proper method of Ethics (1.4.5-7). This induction is
- conceived as a syllogism (cf. Aristot. Pr. Anal.
- 2.23.): Actions A, B, C . . . are desirable; Actions A, B, C . .
+ which is the proper method of Ethics (1.4.5-7). This induction is
+ conceived as a syllogism (cf. Aristot. Pr. Anal.
+ 2.23.): Actions A, B, C . . . are desirable; Actions A, B, C . .
.possess the quality Z; therefore all actions possessing the quality Z are desirable.
Here both the major and the minor premise are sets of particular propositions
intuitively seen to be true: nou=s is tw=n e)sxa/twn e)p' a)mfo/tera. it apprehends the
ultimate and contingent fact, and the minor, premise, since these are the first principles
from which the end is inferred, as general rules are based on particular cases; hence we
must have perception of particulars, and this immediate perception is Intelligence.Here the intuitive element in Prudence, as well as in
- Wisdom (chaps. 5, 6.), is termed Intelligence: at 8.9 it was called
+ Wisdom (chaps. 5, 6.), is termed Intelligence: at 8.9 it was called
merely Prudence, in contrast with Intelligence, which was limited to intuition of the
first principles of science. Here then nou=s
- approximates to its popular sense (see 12.3, note).
+ approximates to its popular sense (see 12.3, note).
This is why it is thought that these qualities are a natural gift, and that a man is
considerate, understanding and intelligent by nature, though no one is a wise man by
nature. That this is so is indicated by our thinking of
them as going with certain ages: we say that at such and such an age a man must have got
intelligence and considerateness, which implies that they come by nature.
- [Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both
- the starting-point and the subject matter of demonstration.]This sentence seems irrelevant here. It might come in after 11.4.
+
[Hence Intelligence is both a beginning and an end, for these things are both
+ the starting-point and the subject matter of demonstration.]This sentence seems irrelevant here. It might come in after 11.4.
Consequently the unproved assertions and opinions of experienced and elderly people, or
of prudent men,This addition is auspicious: no one can
- become prudent merely by getting old (
- Burnet). are as much deserving of attention as those which
+ become prudent merely by getting old (
+ Burnet).
are as much deserving of attention as those which
they support by proof; for experience has given them an eye for things, and so they see
correctly.
We have now discussed the nature and respective spheres of Prudence and Wisdom, and have
@@ -4738,7 +4738,7 @@ convert to P3
which is just and noble and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by
nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing them, since the
virtues are qualities of character; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is
- healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and
+ healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and
vigor but resulting from them: we are not rendered any more capable of healthy and
vigorous action by knowing the science of medicine or of physical training.
If on the other hand we are to say that Prudence is useful not in helping us to act
@@ -4763,20 +4763,20 @@ convert to P3
Also Prudence as well as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man's proper
function: Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the
rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end.
- (The fourth partThe other three are the
+ (The fourth partThe other three are the
scientific, calculative, and appetitive parts, see 1.5,6, whose virtues have now been
considered in Books 2-6. Sensation is here omitted, since it is not peculiar to man: cf.
1.7.12. of the soul on the other hand, the nutritive faculty, has no virtue
contributing to the proper function of man, since it has no power to act or not to
act.Digestion and growth function automatically, not
- voluntarily; so they form no part of conduct.)
+ voluntarily; so they form no part of conduct.)
But we must go a little deeper into the objection that Prudence does not render men more
capable of performing noble and just actions. Let us start with the following
consideration. As some people, we maintain, perform just acts and yet are not just men
- (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in
+ (for instance, those who do what the law enjoins but do it unwillingly, or in
ignorance, or for some ulterior object, and not for the sake of the actions themselves,
although they are as a matter of fact doing what they ought to do and all that a good man
- should), on the other hand it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man
+ should), on the other hand it appears, there is a state of mind in which a man
may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he
does them from choice, and for the sake of the acts
themselves. Now rightness in our choice of an end is
@@ -4792,9 +4792,9 @@ convert to P3
of which we spokeSee 11.6 and cf. 1.6.12.
cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue. This we have said
before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct
- always have a major premise of the form ‘Since the End or Supreme Good is so and
- so’ (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for
- the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good
+ always have a major premise of the form ‘Since the End or Supreme Good is so and
+ so’ (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for
+ the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good
man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles
of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good.
We have therefore also
@@ -4829,30 +4829,30 @@ convert to P3
Prudence. This formula however requires a slight
modification. Virtue is not merely a disposition conforming to right principle, but one
cooperating with right principle; and Prudence is right principlei.e., prudence is the knowledge of right principle, the presence of the
- o)rqo\s lo/gos in the yuxh/ of the fro/nimos (see 2.2.2,
- 2.6.15). in matters of conduct.
+ o)rqo\s lo/gos in the yuxh/ of the fro/nimos (see 2.2.2,
+ 2.6.15). in matters of conduct.
Socrates then thought that the virtues are principles, for he
said that they are all of them forms of knowledge. We on the other hand say that the
virtues cooperate with principle.
These considerations therefore show that it is not possible to be good in the true sense
without Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral Virtue.
- (Moreover, this might supply an answer to the dialectical argument that might be
+
(Moreover, this might supply an answer to the dialectical argument that might be
put forward to prove that the virtues can exist in isolation from each other, on the
ground that the same man does not possess the greatest natural capacity for all of them,
so that he may have already attained one when he has not yet attained another. In regard
to the natural virtues this is possible; but it is not possible in regard to those virtues
which entitle a man to be called good without qualification. For if a man have the one
virtue of Prudence he will also have all the Moral Virtues together with
- it.)
+ it.)
It is therefore clearThe writer recapitulates the
solution reached in the last two chapters of the difficulty stated in 12.1. that,
even if Prudence had no bearing on conduct, it would still be needed, because it is the
virtue ofThe text should probably be emended
- ‘of one of the two parts of the intellect’: see 12.4. that
+ ‘of one of the two parts of the intellect’: see 12.4. that
part of the intellect to which it belongs; and also that our choice of actions will not be
right without Prudence any more than without Moral Virtue, since, while Moral Virtue
enables us to achieveAt 12.6 Aristotle says more
- precisely that Virtue ‘makes the End right,’ i.e., makes us choose
+ precisely that Virtue ‘makes the End right,’ i.e., makes us choose
the right End; strictly speaking, to achieve the End requires also Prudence
in the choice of the right means. the end, Prudence makes us adopt the right
means to the end.
@@ -4870,15 +4870,15 @@ convert to P3
Let us next begin a fresh part of the subject by laying down that the states of moral
- character to be avoided are of three kinds—Vice, Unrestraint, and
+ character to be avoided are of three kinds—Vice, Unrestraint, and
Bestiality.Or Brutality: the two English words have
acquired slightly different shades of meaning, which are combined in the Greek.
The opposite dispositions in the case of two of the three are obvious: one we call Virtue,
the other Self-restraint. As the opposite of Bestiality it will be most suitable to speak
of Superhuman Virtue, or goodness on a heroic or
- divine scale; just as HomerHom. Il. 24.258. The preceding words are, ‘
- Hector, who was a god.’ has represented
- Priam as saying of Hector, on account of his surpassing valor—
+ divine scale; just as HomerHom. Il. 24.258. The preceding words are, ‘
+ Hector, who was a god.’ has represented
+ Priam as saying of Hector, on account of his surpassing valor—
nor seemed to be
The son of mortal man, but of a god.
@@ -4891,12 +4891,12 @@ convert to P3
divine goodness is something more exalted than Virtue, and bestial badness is different in
kind from Vice. And
inasmuch as it is rare for a man to be divine, in the sense in which that word is commonly
- used by the Lacedaemonians as a term of extreme admiration—‘Yon mon's
- divine,’they say—, so a bestial character is rare among human beings;
+ used by the Lacedaemonians as a term of extreme admiration—‘Yon mon's
+ divine,’they say—, so a bestial character is rare among human beings;
it is found most frequently among barbarians, and some cases also occur as a result of
- disease or arrested development. We sometimes also use ‘bestial’ as a
- term of opprobrium for a surpassing degree of human vice.Lit. ‘for those who surpass (the rest of) men
- in Vice’ (i.e., human, not bestial wickedness).
+ disease or arrested development. We sometimes also use ‘bestial’ as a
+ term of opprobrium for a surpassing degree of human vice.Lit. ‘for those who surpass (the rest of) men
+ in Vice’ (i.e., human, not bestial wickedness).
But the nature of the bestial disposition will have to be touched on later; and of Vice
we have spoken already. We must however discuss Unrestraint and Softness or Luxury, and
@@ -4908,55 +4908,55 @@ convert to P3
opinions generally held with respect to these states of mind; since if the discrepancies
can be solved, and a residuum of current opinion left standing, the true view will have
been sufficiently established.Aristotle holds
- (1.8.7) that the opinions of the mass of mankind, and of philosophers,
+ (1.8.7) that the opinions of the mass of mankind, and of philosophers,
on matters of conduct are likely to be substantially true; although being stated from
different points of view, and sometimes in ambiguous language, they often seem mutually
contradictory. The business of Ethics is to state them clearly, examine their apparent
contradictions, discard such parts of them as really refute each other, and elicit the
common residuum of truth: see infra, 2.12.
- Now the following opinions are held: (a) that Self-restraint and
+
Now the following opinions are held: (a) that Self-restraint and
Endurance are good and praiseworthy dispositions, Unrestraint and Softness bad and
- blameworthy; (b) that the self-restrained man is the man who abides by
+ blameworthy; (b) that the self-restrained man is the man who abides by
the results of his calculations, the unrestrained, one who readily abandons the conclusion
- he has reached; (c) that the unrestrained man does things that he knows
+ he has reached; (c) that the unrestrained man does things that he knows
to be evil, under the influence of passion, whereas the self-restrained man, knowing that
- his desires are evil, refuses to follow them on principle; (d) that the
+ his desires are evil, refuses to follow them on principle; (d) that the
temperate man is always self-restrained and enduring; but that the converse is invariably
the case some deny, although others affirm it: the latter identify the unrestrained with
the profligate and the profligate with the unrestrained promiscuously, the former
- distinguish between them. (e) Sometimes it is said that the prudent man cannot be unrestrained,
- sometimes that some prudent and clever men are unrestrained. (f)Again,
+ distinguish between them. (e) Sometimes it is said that the prudent man cannot be unrestrained,
+ sometimes that some prudent and clever men are unrestrained. (f)Again,
men are spoken of as unrestrained in anger, and in
the pursuit of honor and of gain. These then are the opinions advanced.
- The difficulties that may be raised are the following. (c) How can a
+
The difficulties that may be raised are the following. (c) How can a
man fail in self-restraint when believing correctly that what he does is wrong? Some
people say that he cannot do so when he knows the act to be wrong; since, as
Socrates held, it would be strange if, when a man
- possessed Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and ‘drag it about
- like a slave.’A quotation from Plat. Prot. 352b In fact
+ possessed Knowledge, some other thing should overpower it, and ‘drag it about
+ like a slave.’A quotation from Plat. Prot. 352b In fact
Socrates used to combat the viewViz., that a man may know the right and do the wrong. altogether,
implying that there is no such thing as Unrestraint, since no one, he held, acts contrary
to what is best, believing what he does to be bad, but only through ignorance. Now this theory is manifestly at
variance with plain facts; and we ought to investigate the state of mind in question more
closely. If failure of self-restraint is caused by ignorance, we must examine what sort of
ignorance it is. For it is clear that the man who fails in self-restraint does not think
- the action right before he comes under the influence of passion.— But some thinkers accept the
+ the action right before he comes under the influence of passion.— But some thinkers accept the
doctrine in a modified form. They allow that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but
they do not allow that no one acts contrary to what he opines to be the better course; and
they therefore maintain that the unrestrained man when he succumbs to the temptations of
pleasure possesses not Knowledge but only Opinion. And yet if it is really Opinion and not
- Knowledge—not a strong belief that offers resistance but only a weak one
- (like that of persons in two minds about something)—, we could
+ Knowledge—not a strong belief that offers resistance but only a weak one
+ (like that of persons in two minds about something)—, we could
forgive a man for not keeping to his opinions in opposition to strong desires; but we do
- not forgive vice, nor any other blameworthy quality.—(e) Is it
+ not forgive vice, nor any other blameworthy quality.—(e) Is it
then when desire is opposed by Prudence that we blame a man for yielding? for Prudence is extremely strong. But
this is strange, for it means that the same person can be at once prudent and
unrestrained; yet no one could possibly maintain that the prudent man is capable of doing
voluntarily the basest actions. And furthermore it has already been shownCf. 6.7. 7, 6.12.10. that Prudence displays itself
- in action (for it is concerned with ultimate particulars), and implies
+ in action (for it is concerned with ultimate particulars), and implies
the possession of the other Virtues as well.
- Again (d) if Self-restraint implies having strong and evil desires, the
+
Again (d) if Self-restraint implies having strong and evil desires, the
temperate man cannot be self-restrained, nor the self-restrained man temperate; for the
temperate man does not have excessive or evil desires. But a self-restrained man must
necessarily have strong and evil desires; since if a man's desires are good, the
@@ -4964,7 +4964,7 @@ convert to P3
not always be good; while if his desires are weak and not evil, there is nothing to be
proud of in resisting them; nor is it anything remarkable if they are evil and weak.
- Again (a, b) if Self-restraint makes a man steadfast in
+
Again (a, b) if Self-restraint makes a man steadfast in
all his opinions, it may be bad, namely, if it makes him persist even in a
false opinion. And if Unrestraint makes him liable to abandon any opinion, in
some cases Unrestraint will be good. Take the instance of Neoptolemus in the
@@ -4972,7 +4972,7 @@ convert to P3
Sophocles. Neoptolemus abandons a resolution that
he has been persuaded by Odysseus to adopt, because of the pain that it gives him to tell
a lie: in this case inconstancy is praiseworthy.
- Again (a, c) there is the difficulty raised by the argument of the
+
Again (a, c) there is the difficulty raised by the argument of the
sophists. The sophists wish to show their cleverness by entrapping their adversary into a
paradox, and when they are successful, the resultant chain of reasoning ends in a
deadlock: the mind is fettered, being unwilling to stand still because it cannot approve
@@ -4982,39 +4982,39 @@ convert to P3
follows: if a man is foolish and also unrestrained, owing to his unrestraint he does the
opposite of what he believes that he ought to do; but he believesSc., because he is foolish. that good things are bad, and that he
ought not to do them; therefore he will do good things and not bad ones.
- Again (b, d) one who does and pursues what is pleasant from conviction
+
Again (b, d) one who does and pursues what is pleasant from conviction
and choice,i.e., a profligate. This is another
- sophistic paradox based on the contradiction between (1) the
- identification of the unrestrained man with the profligate, and (2)
- the view (2.6) that the former acts contrary to his deliberate
- conviction (so
- Burnet). might be held to be a better man than one who acts
+ sophistic paradox based on the contradiction between (1) the
+ identification of the unrestrained man with the profligate, and (2)
+ the view (2.6) that the former acts contrary to his deliberate
+ conviction (so
+ Burnet). might be held to be a better man than one who acts
in the same way not from calculation but from unrestraint, because he is more easy to
cure, since he may be persuaded to alter his conviction; whereas the unrestrained man
- comes under the proverb that says ‘when water chokes you, what are you to drink
- to wash it down?’ Had he been convinced that what he does is right, a change of
+ comes under the proverb that says ‘when water chokes you, what are you to drink
+ to wash it down?’ Had he been convinced that what he does is right, a change of
conviction might have caused him to desist; but as it is he is convinced that he ought to
do one thing and nevertheless does another thing.A
variant ou) pepeisme/nos . . .
- [a)lla\] gives ‘but as it is he is convinced it is
- wrong but nevertheless does it.’
+ [a)lla\] gives ‘but as it is he is convinced it is
+ wrong but nevertheless does it.’
- Again (f) if Self-restraint and Unrestraint can be displayed with
+
Again (f) if Self-restraint and Unrestraint can be displayed with
reference to anything, what is the meaning of the epithet
- ‘unrestrained’ without qualification? No one has every form of
- unrestraint, yet we speak of some men as simply ‘unrestrained.’
+ ‘unrestrained’ without qualification? No one has every form of
+ unrestraint, yet we speak of some men as simply ‘unrestrained.’
Such, more or less, are the difficulties that arise. Part of the conflicting opinions we
have to clear out of the way, but part to leave standing; for to solve a difficulty is to
find the answer to a problem.See 1.5, note.
- We have then to consider, first (i) whether men fail in self-restraint
+
We have then to consider, first (i) whether men fail in self-restraint
knowing what they do is wrong, or not knowing, and if knowing, knowing in what sense; and
- next (ii) what are to be set down as the objects with which
+ next (ii) what are to be set down as the objects with which
Self-restraint and Unrestraint are concerned: I mean, are they concerned with pleasure and
pain of all sorts, or only with certain special pleasures and pains? and
- (iii) is Self-restraint the same as Endurance or distinct from it? and
- so on with (iv) the other questions akin to this subject.
+ (iii) is Self-restraint the same as Endurance or distinct from it? and
+ so on with (iv) the other questions akin to this subject.
A starting-point for our investigation is to askThis
question is not pursued below; indeed the contents of the following chapters are
correctly outlined in 3.1, and 3.2 is superfluous. whether the differentiaNot the difference between the
@@ -5025,15 +5025,15 @@ convert to P3
restrain himself with reference to certain things, or rather because he has a certain
disposition, or rather for both reasons combined. A second question is, can Self-restraint
and Unrestraint be displayed in regard to everything, or not? When a man is said to be
- ‘unrestrained’ without further qualification, it does not mean that he
+ ‘unrestrained’ without further qualification, it does not mean that he
is so in relation to everything, but to those
things in regard to which a man can be profligate; and also it does not mean merely that
- he is concerned with these things (for in that case Unrestraint would be the same
- thing as Profligacy), but that he is concerned with them in a particular manner.
+ he is concerned with these things (for in that case Unrestraint would be the same
+ thing as Profligacy), but that he is concerned with them in a particular manner.
The profligate yields to his appetites from choice, considering it right always to pursue
the pleasure that offers, whereas the man of defective self-restraint does not think so,
but pursues it all the same.
- (i) Now the suggestion that it is not Knowledge, but True Opinion,
+
(i) Now the suggestion that it is not Knowledge, but True Opinion,
against which unrestrained men act, is of no importance for our argument. Some men hold
their opinions with absolute certainty, and take them for positive knowledge; so that if weakness of conviction
be the criterion for deciding that men who act against their conception of what is right
@@ -5042,30 +5042,30 @@ convert to P3
what they opine as others are of what they know: witness Heracleitus.This seems to refer to the dogmatic tone of Heracleitus's teaching in
general.
- (1) But the word know is used in two senses. A man who has
+
(1) But the word know is used in two senses. A man who has
knowledge but is not exercising it is said to know, and so is a man who is actually
exercising his knowledge. It will make a difference whether a man does wrong having the
knowledge that it is wrong but not consciously thinking of his knowledge, or with the
knowledge consciously present to his mind. The latter would be felt to be surprising; but
it is not surprising that a man should do what he knows to be wrong if he is not conscious
of the knowledge at the time.
- (2) Again, reasoning on matters of conduct employs premises of two
+
(2) Again, reasoning on matters of conduct employs premises of two
forms.The major premise of a practical syllogism is
universal, a general rule; the minor is particular, the application of the rule to the
case in hand. The next sentence points out that this application really requires two
syllogisms; in the first, the personal term of the major premise is predicated in the
- minor of the particular person concerned (Dry food is good for all men: I am a
- man: therefore dry food is good for me) ; in the second, the other universal
+ minor of the particular person concerned (Dry food is good for all men: I am a
+ man: therefore dry food is good for me) ; in the second, the other universal
term is predicated in the minor of a particular thing about which the person is
- deliberating (Dry food is good for me: this stale loaf is dry food: therefore
- this stale loaf is good for me). It is the minor premise of the second
+ deliberating (Dry food is good for me: this stale loaf is dry food: therefore
+ this stale loaf is good for me). It is the minor premise of the second
syllogism, viz. the application of the general rule not to himself but to the thing in
question, that the unrestrained man seems not to know, or not to think of, at the time.
This illustration is confused in the text by the insertion of another minor premise
- h)\ o(/ti chro\n to\ toio/nde, ‘or that food
- of a certain kind [e.g. stale bread] is dry.’ It would have
+ h)\ o(/ti chro\n to\ toio/nde, ‘or that food
+ of a certain kind [e.g. stale bread] is dry.’ It would have
been enough to write a)ll' ei) to/de chro/n,
- ‘but whether this [stale loaf] is dry.’ Now
+ ‘but whether this [stale loaf] is dry.’ Now
it is quite possible for a man to act against knowledge when he knows both premises but is
only exercising his knowledge of the universal premise and not of the particular; for
action has to do with particular things. Moreover, there is a distinction as regards the
@@ -5075,16 +5075,16 @@ convert to P3
not possess or not be actualizing the knowledge whether the particular food before him is
food of that kind. Now clearly the distinction between these two ways of knowing will make
all the difference in the world. It will not seem at all strange that the unrestrained man
- should ‘know’ in one way, but it would be astonishing if he knew in
+ should ‘know’ in one way, but it would be astonishing if he knew in
another way.
- (3) Again, it is possible for men to ‘have
- knowledge’ in yet another way besides those just discussed; for even in the
+
(3) Again, it is possible for men to ‘have
+ knowledge’ in yet another way besides those just discussed; for even in the
state of having knowledge without exercising it we can observe a distinction: a man may in
a sense both have it and not have it; for instance, when he is asleep, or mad, or drunk.
But persons under the influence of passion are in the same condition; for it is evident
that anger, sexual desire, and certain other passions, actually alter the state of the
body, and in some cases even cause madness. It is clear therefore that we must pronounce
- the unrestrained to ‘have knowledge’ only in the same way as men who
+ the unrestrained to ‘have knowledge’ only in the same way as men who
are asleep or mad or drunk. Their using the language of knowledgeThe reference is to persons of weak will uttering sound moral maxims almost at the very
moment of yielding to temptation. is no proof that they possess it. Persons in the states mentionedViz., asleep or drunk. It may have been some Falstaff of Attic comedy
that quoted the moral maxims of Empedocles in his cups. repeat propositions of
@@ -5092,28 +5092,28 @@ convert to P3
formulae, though they do not yet know their meaning, for knowledge has to become part of
the tissue of the mind, and this takes time. Hence we must conceive that men who fail in
self-restraint talk in the same way as actors speaking a part.
- (4) Again, one may also study the cause of Unrestraint
+
(4) Again, one may also study the cause of Unrestraint
scientifically,i.e., in this case, psychologically:
- lit. ‘with reference to its nature.’ Cf. 8.1.6, 9.7.2, 9.9.7.
+ lit. ‘with reference to its nature.’ Cf. 8.1.6, 9.7.2, 9.9.7.
thus: In a practical syllogism, the major premise is an opinion, while the minor premise
deals with particular things, which are the province of perception. Now when the two
premises are combined, just as in theoretic reasoning the mind is compelled to affirm the
resulting conclusion, so in the case of practical premises you are forced at once to do
- it. For example, given the premises ‘All sweet things ought to be
- tasted’ and ‘Yonder thing is sweet’—a particular
- instance of the general class—, you are bound, if able and not prevented,
+ it. For example, given the premises ‘All sweet things ought to be
+ tasted’ and ‘Yonder thing is sweet’—a particular
+ instance of the general class—, you are bound, if able and not prevented,
immediately to taste the thing. When therefore there is present in the mind on the one hand a universal
judgement forbidding you to taste and on the other hand a universal judgement saying
- ‘All sweet things are pleasant,’ and a minor premise ‘Yonder
- thing is sweet’ (and it is this minor premise that is activei.e., determines action (
- Ross).) , and when desire is
+ ‘All sweet things are pleasant,’ and a minor premise ‘Yonder
+ thing is sweet’ (and it is this minor premise that is activei.e., determines action (
+ Ross).) , and when desire is
present at the same time, then, though the former universal judgement says
- ‘Avoid that thing,’ the desire leads you to it (since desire
- can put the various parts of the body in motion). Thus it comes about that when
+ ‘Avoid that thing,’ the desire leads you to it (since desire
+ can put the various parts of the body in motion). Thus it comes about that when
men fail in self-restraint, they act in a sense under the influence of a principle or
opinion, but an opinion not in itself but only accidentally opposed to the right principle
- (for it is
- the desire, and not the opinion, that is really opposed). Hence the lower animals
+ (for it is
+ the desire, and not the opinion, that is really opposed). Hence the lower animals
cannot be called unrestrained, if only for the reason that they have no power of forming
universal concepts, but only mental images and memories of particular things.
If we ask how the unrestrained man's ignorance is dissipated and he returns to a state of
@@ -5127,15 +5127,15 @@ convert to P3
be an object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is, we do seem to
be led to the conclusionCf. 2.1. which
Socrates sought to establish. For the knowledge which is present
- when failure of self-restraintHere to\ pa/qos means a)krateu/esqai, cf. 2.2, 3.12, 4.6; but in the following line (cf.
- 2.1) it probably means e)piqumi/a or qumo/s, as 3.7, 5.5, 7.8. occurs is not what is held to
+ when failure of self-restraintHere to\ pa/qos means a)krateu/esqai, cf. 2.2, 3.12, 4.6; but in the following line (cf.
+ 2.1) it probably means e)piqumi/a or qumo/s, as 3.7, 5.5, 7.8. occurs is not what is held to
be Knowledge in the true sense, nor is it true Knowledge which is dragged about by
passion, but knowledge derived from sense-perception.
So much for the question whether failure of self-restraint can go with knowledge or not,
and with knowledge in what sense.
- (ii) We must next discuss whether any man can be called
- ‘unrestrained’ without qualification, or whether it must always be in
+
(ii) We must next discuss whether any man can be called
+ ‘unrestrained’ without qualification, or whether it must always be in
relation to certain particular things, and if so, to what sort of things. Now it is plain
that men are self-restrained and enduring, unrestrained and soft, in regard to Pleasures
and Pains. But the things that give pleasure are of two
@@ -5148,12 +5148,12 @@ convert to P3
honor, wealth, and the other good and pleasant things of the same sort. Now those who
against the right principle within them exceed in regard to the latter class of pleasant
things, we do not call unrestrained simply, but with a
- qualification—unrestrained as to money, gain, honor or angerCf. 1.7: qumo/s,
- ‘spirit,’ aims at victory, and so is brought into this discussion of
- ‘pleasures and desires’ ( 4.5); but in chap. 6 it
+ qualification—unrestrained as to money, gain, honor or angerCf. 1.7: qumo/s,
+ ‘spirit,’ aims at victory, and so is brought into this discussion of
+ ‘pleasures and desires’ ( 4.5); but in chap. 6 it
is contrasted with desire, and its indulgence in the form of anger is seen to be painful
- rather than pleasant (6.4). —not merely
- ‘unrestrained’ ; because we regard them as distinct from the
+ rather than pleasant (6.4). —not merely
+ ‘unrestrained’ ; because we regard them as distinct from the
unrestrained in the strict sense, and only so called by analogy, like our familiar
exampleThis seems to be the meaning of the imperfect
tenses. An inscription records that a boxer named *)/anqrwpos won at Olympia in 456 B.C. and the Greek commentators say that he is referred to
@@ -5161,28 +5161,28 @@ convert to P3
the analogical use of words. of Man the Olympic winner, whose special definition is not
very differenti.e., it requires the addition of three
words. Strictly speaking, however, it is impossible to define an individual; moreover,
- the Olympic victor (a) was a man not merely by analogy but as a member
- of the species, and (b) was named Man not even by analogy but only
+ the Olympic victor (a) was a man not merely by analogy but as a member
+ of the species, and (b) was named Man not even by analogy but only
homonymously. But a humorous illustration need not be precise. from the general
- definition of ‘man,’ though nevertheless he is really quite distinct
+ definition of ‘man,’ though nevertheless he is really quite distinct
from men in general.Perhaps Man had some personal
- peculiarity which somewhat belied his name. (That such persons are only
+ peculiarity which somewhat belied his name. (That such persons are only
called unrestrained by analogy is proved by our blaming unrestraint, whether unqualified
or with reference to some particular bodily pleasure, as a vice and not merely an error,
whereas we do not regard those unrestrained in regard to money, etc. as guilty of
- vice.) But of those who exceed in relation to
+ vice.) But of those who exceed in relation to
the bodily enjoyments with regard to which we speak of men as temperate or profligate, he
- who pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids the extremesProbably this should be amended to ‘moderate bodily pains,’ cf.
+ who pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids the extremesProbably this should be amended to ‘moderate bodily pains,’ cf.
4.4. of bodily pains such as hunger, heat, cold, and the various pains of touch
and taste, not from choice but against his own choice and reason, is described as
- unrestrained not with a qualification—unrestrained as regards these pleasures
- and pains—as is one who yields to anger, but just simply as unrestrained.
- (A proof that
- ‘unrestrained’ unqualified denotes unrestraint as regards bodily
- pleasures and pains, is that we speak of men as ‘soft’ who yield to
- these, but not those who yield to anger or the like.) And hence we class the
- unrestrained man with the profligate (and the self-restrained with the
- temperate)This parenthesis may be an
+ unrestrained not with a qualification—unrestrained as regards these pleasures
+ and pains—as is one who yields to anger, but just simply as unrestrained.
+ (A proof that
+ ‘unrestrained’ unqualified denotes unrestraint as regards bodily
+ pleasures and pains, is that we speak of men as ‘soft’ who yield to
+ these, but not those who yield to anger or the like.) And hence we class the
+ unrestrained man with the profligate (and the self-restrained with the
+ temperate)This parenthesis may be an
interpolation. , but not those who yield to anger or the like, because
Unrestraint and Profligacy are related to the same pleasures and pains. But as a matter of
fact, although they are related to the same things, they are not related to them in the
@@ -5191,50 +5191,50 @@ convert to P3
only weak desires or none at all, to be more profligate than one who does so owing to
intense desires; for what would the former do if
he possessed the ardent desires of youth, and felt violent pain when debarred from the
- ‘necessary’ pleasures?
+ ‘necessary’ pleasures?
And inasmuch as some desires and pleasures relate to things that are noble and good in
- kind (for some pleasant things are desirable by nature, others the opposite,
- while others again are neutral—compare the classification we gave aboveSee 4.2: a third class is now added, pleasures bad in
- themselves and not only in excess; and the ‘necessary’ pleasures are
- now classed as ‘intermediate,’ neither good nor bad in themselves,
- though good as a means of life, and bad in excess.) : for instance
+ kind (for some pleasant things are desirable by nature, others the opposite,
+ while others again are neutral—compare the classification we gave aboveSee 4.2: a third class is now added, pleasures bad in
+ themselves and not only in excess; and the ‘necessary’ pleasures are
+ now classed as ‘intermediate,’ neither good nor bad in themselves,
+ though good as a means of life, and bad in excess.) : for instance
money, gain, victory, honor: and inasmuch as in relation to all these naturally desirable
things, as well as to the neutral ones, men are not blamed merely for regarding or
desiring or liking them, but for doing so in a certain way, namely to excess
- (hence thoseThis subject is left without its
- verb, which apparently would be ‘are not wicked, nor yet unrestrained in the
- proper sense.’ Though this clause here begins as a parenthesis, it is resumed
- below at ‘well then’ as a fresh sentence, which really, however,
+ (hence thoseThis subject is left without its
+ verb, which apparently would be ‘are not wicked, nor yet unrestrained in the
+ proper sense.’ Though this clause here begins as a parenthesis, it is resumed
+ below at ‘well then’ as a fresh sentence, which really, however,
constitutes the apodosis of the protasis that began at the beginning of the section,
- ‘And inasmuch.’ who yield to or pursue, contrary to
+ ‘And inasmuch.’ who yield to or pursue, contrary to
principle, anything naturally noble and good, for example those who care too much for
- honor, or for their children and their parents—for parents and children are good
+ honor, or for their children and their parents—for parents and children are good
things and people are praised who care for them, but nevertheless it is possible even in
their case to go to excess, by vying even with the gods like Niobe,Niobe vaunted her children as more beautiful than those of Leto.
or as Satyrus did,The Greek commentators tell stories
of a certain Satyrus who, when his father died, committed suicide for grief. But
Heliodorus appears to have read e)pikalou/menos to\n
- pate/ra without peri/, ‘or like
- Satyrus the Filial invoking his father as a god’ : there were kings of
+ pate/ra without peri/, ‘or like
+ Satyrus the Filial invoking his father as a god’ : there were kings of
Bosphorus named Satyrus in the 4th century, and one may have borne the surname
Philopator.
who was
nicknamed the filial for his devotion to his father, for he was thought to carry it to the
- point of infatuation—) : well then, there cannot be any actual Vice in
+ point of infatuation—) : well then, there cannot be any actual Vice in
relation to these things, because, as has been said, each of them is in itself desirable
by nature, although excessive devotion to them is bad and to be avoided. And similarly there cannot be Unrestraint either, since that is not
merely to be avoided, but actually blameworthy; though people do use the term in these
- matters with a qualification— ‘unrestraint in’ whatever it
- may be—because the affection does resemble Unrestraint proper; just as they
+ matters with a qualification— ‘unrestraint in’ whatever it
+ may be—because the affection does resemble Unrestraint proper; just as they
speak of someone as a bad doctor or bad actor whom they would not call simply
- ‘bad.’ As therefore we do not call bad doctors and actors bad men,
+ ‘bad.’ As therefore we do not call bad doctors and actors bad men,
because neither kind of incapacity is actually a vice, but only resembles Vice by analogy,
so in the former case it is clear that only self-restraint and lack of restraint in regard
to the same things as are the objects of Temperance and Profligacy are to be deemed
Self-restraint and Unrestraint proper, and that these terms are applied to anger only by
- analogy; and so we add a qualification, ‘unrestrained in anger,’ just
- as we say ‘unrestrained in the pursuit of honor’ or
- ‘gain.’
+ analogy; and so we add a qualification, ‘unrestrained in anger,’ just
+ as we say ‘unrestrained in the pursuit of honor’ or
+ ‘gain.’
Besides those things however which are naturally pleasant, of which some are pleasant
generally and others pleasant to particular races of animals and of men, there are other
things, not naturally pleasant, which become pleasant either as a result of arrested
@@ -5246,8 +5246,8 @@ convert to P3
tribes on the coasts of the Black Sea, who are alleged to delight in raw meat or in human
flesh, and others among whom each in turn provides a child for the common banquetThe version follows
Williams, and seems to require the emendation given in the critical note.
- The mss. give ‘who lend their children to each other for
- feasting.’; or the reported depravity of Phalaris.See below, 5.7, note.
+ The mss. give ‘who lend their children to each other for
+ feasting.’; or the reported depravity of Phalaris.See below, 5.7, note.
These are instances of Bestiality. Other unnatural
propensities are due to disease, and sometimes to insanity, as in the case of the madman
that offered up his mother to the gods and partook of the sacrifice, or the one that ate
@@ -5260,19 +5260,19 @@ convert to P3
state brought about by habitual indulgence.
Now these various morbid dispositions in themselves do not fall within the limits
of Vice, nor yet does Bestiality; and to conquer or yield to them does not constitute
- UnrestraintWe must understand ‘does not
- constitute restraint or unrestraint’ unless we amend ‘and to fail to
- conquer, or to be conquered by, them does not constitute unrestraint.’
+ UnrestraintWe must understand ‘does not
+ constitute restraint or unrestraint’ unless we amend ‘and to fail to
+ conquer, or to be conquered by, them does not constitute unrestraint.’
in the strict sense, but only the state so called by analogy; just as a man who cannot
- control his anger must be described as ‘unrestrained in’ that passion,
- not ‘unrestrained.’
- (Indeed folly, cowardice, profligacy, and ill-temper, whenever they run to
+ control his anger must be described as ‘unrestrained in’ that passion,
+ not ‘unrestrained.’
+ (Indeed folly, cowardice, profligacy, and ill-temper, whenever they run to
excess, are either bestial or morbid conditions. One so
constituted by nature as to be frightened by everything, even the sound of a mouse, shows
the cowardice of a lower animal; the man who was afraid of a weasel was a case of disease.
So with folly: people irrational by nature and living solely by sensation, like certain
remote tribes of barbarians, belong to the bestial class; those who lose their reason
- owing to some disease, such as epilepsy, or through insanity, to the morbid.)
+ owing to some disease, such as epilepsy, or through insanity, to the morbid.)
With these unnatural propensities it is possible in some cases merely to have the
disposition and not to yield to it: I mean, for instance, PhalarisNo such stories about Phalaris are alluded to elsewhere; so
@@ -5291,7 +5291,7 @@ convert to P3
Temperance and Profligacy are related, and that unrestraint in relation to anything else
is of another kind, which is only so called metaphorically and with a
qualification.
- Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger ‘Lack of control of the spirit’ : see 4.2, third
+ Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger ‘Lack of control of the spirit’ : see 4.2, third
note is less disgraceful than Unrestraint in the desires.
Now it appears that anger does to some extent hear reason, but hears it wrong, just as
hasty servants hurry out of the room before they have heard the whole of what you are
@@ -5300,36 +5300,36 @@ convert to P3
of its nature, hears, but does not hear the order given, and rushes off to take vengeance.
When reason or imagination suggests that an insult or slight has been received, anger
flares up at once, but after reasoning as it were that you ought to make war on anybody
- who insults you. Desire on the other hand, at a mere hint from [the reason
+ who insults you. Desire on the other hand, at a mere hint from [the reason
orThese words are surely an
- interpolation.] the senses that a thing is pleasant, rushes off to enjoy
+ interpolation.
] the senses that a thing is pleasant, rushes off to enjoy
it. Hence
anger follows reason in a manner, but desire does not. Therefore yielding to desire is
more disgraceful than yielding to anger, for he that fails to restrain his anger is in a
way controlled by reason, but the otherViz., the man
- who is ‘unrestrained’ in the strict sense, i.e., cannot restrain his
+ who is ‘unrestrained’ in the strict sense, i.e., cannot restrain his
desires. is controlled not by reason but by desire.
Again, when impulses are natural, it is more excusable to follow them, since even with
the desires it is more excusable to follow those that are common to all men, and in so far
as they are common. But anger and bad temper are more natural than desire for excessive
and unnecessary pleasures; witness the man who was had up for beating his father and who
- said in his defence, “Well, my father used to beat his father, and he used to
- beat his, and (pointing to his little boy) so will my son here beat me
- when he grows up; it runs in our family”; and the man who, when his son was
+ said in his defence, “Well, my father used to beat his father, and he used to
+ beat his, and (pointing to his little boy) so will my son here beat me
+ when he grows up; it runs in our family”; and the man who, when his son was
throwing him out of the house, used to beg him to stop when he got to the door,
- ‘because he only used to drag his father as far as that.’This story is developed in Robert Browning's poem
- ‘Halbert and Hob’ ; it is said also to occur in a German
+ ‘because he only used to drag his father as far as that.’This story is developed in Robert Browning's poem
+ ‘Halbert and Hob’ ; it is said also to occur in a German
Volkslied.
Again, the craftier men are, the more Unjust they are. Now the hot-tempered man is not crafty, nor is anger, but open; whereas desire is
crafty, as they say of Aphrodite:
- Weaver of wiles in Cyprus bornThe line seems to have ended *kuproge/neos pro/polon (Bergk, cf. Hesych., K. p. proag<w>go/n) , ‘for
- the servant of the wile-weaving Cyprus-born,’ viz., Peitho, Persuasion.
+ Weaver of wiles in Cyprus bornThe line seems to have ended *kuproge/neos pro/polon (Bergk, cf. Hesych., K. p. proag<w>go/n) , ‘for
+ the servant of the wile-weaving Cyprus-born,’ viz., Peitho, Persuasion.
It is ascribed by Wilamowitz to Sappho, and the same epithet is applied to
Aphrodite in Sappho, 1.2.
-
and Homer writes of her ‘broidered girdle’
+
and Homer writes of her ‘broidered girdle’
CajoleryOne of the emblematic figures
embroidered on the girdle of Aphrodite, Hom. Il.
@@ -5346,8 +5346,8 @@ convert to P3
painful feeling, does not show wantonness or insolence, for wanton acts are pleasant to
the doer. An injury done in anger therefore arouses less anger in return, less
resentment in the victim, than does wanton outrage due to unrestrained desire. Therefore
- it is less ‘unjust,’ less of an injury. Cf. Aristot. Rh. 1380a 34(anger is not so much
- resented, because it does not show contempt for its victim). gives
+ it is less ‘unjust,’ less of an injury. Cf. Aristot. Rh. 1380a 34(anger is not so much
+ resented, because it does not show contempt for its victim). gives
pleasure to the doer, never pain, whereas an act done in anger always causes him a feeling
of pain. If then things are unjust in proportion to the justice of the anger they arouse
in the victim, unrestraint arising from desire is more unjust than that arising from
@@ -5365,28 +5365,28 @@ convert to P3
have neither the faculty of choice nor of calculation: they are aberrations from
nature,The writer here seems to regard all animals
as unnatural, in the sense of imperfectly developed, because irrational. The order
- precludes our taking this clause of the exceptional species (asses, wild boars,
- and pigs according to Greek zoology) just alluded to; moreover, as the
+ precludes our taking this clause of the exceptional species (asses, wild boars,
+ and pigs according to Greek zoology) just alluded to; moreover, as the
excessive appetites of these are analogous to Profligacy in men, they are not
aberrations from animal nature any more than profligates are from human nature.
like men who are insane. BestialityNo two commentators read the same sense into this section, which is
- ‘little more than a series of jottings’ (
- Burnet). The version given largely follows
+ ‘little more than a series of jottings’ (
+ Burnet). The version given largely follows
Peters. The insertions in brackets indicate
what may possibly have been in the writer's mind. is less <evil>
than vice, though more horrible: for <in a bestial man as in an animal> the
highest part <i.e. the intellect> is not corrupted, as it is in a man
<who is wicked in a human way>, but entirely lacking. So that it is like
comparing an inanimate with an animate thing, and asking which is the more evil; for the
- badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a
- principle—is always less capable of mischief.The relevance of this parenthesis is obscure; its meaning, in the light of other
+ badness of a thing which has no originating principle—and intelligence is such a
+ principle—is always less capable of mischief.The relevance of this parenthesis is obscure; its meaning, in the light of other
passages in Aristotle, may be that injustice is worse in the sense that it is evil
- per se (whereas the unjust man is evil per accidens) , but the unjust man is worse in the sense
- that he is productive of evil. (It is therefore like comparing Injustice
- with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad
+ per se (whereas the unjust man is evil per accidens) , but the unjust man is worse in the sense
+ that he is productive of evil. (It is therefore like comparing Injustice
+ with an unjust man: one is worse in one way and the other in another). For a bad
man can do ten thousand times more harm than an animal <or a bestial
man>.
- (iii) But in relation to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste,
+
(iii) But in relation to the pleasures and pains of touch and taste,
and the corresponding desires and acts of avoidance, which have alreadyBk. 3.10. been defined as the sphere in which
Profligacy and Temperance are displayed, it is possible on the one hand to have such a
disposition as to succumb even to those temptations to which most men are superior, or on
@@ -5399,7 +5399,7 @@ convert to P3
necessary within certain limits, excessive indulgence in them not being necessary, nor yet
deficient indulgenceThis addition is illogically
expressed, but it is a reminder that to take too little of certain
- ‘necessary’ pleasures is as wrong as to take too much: see 4.5,
+ ‘necessary’ pleasures is as wrong as to take too much: see 4.5,
first note. either, and inasmuch as the same holds good also of desires and of
pains, one who pursues excessive pleasures, or pursues thingsi.e., necessary things; see the tripartite classification of 4.5.
to excess and from choice, for their own sakes and
@@ -5407,18 +5407,18 @@ convert to P3
character is certain to feel no regret for his excesses afterwards, and this being so, he
is incurable,Incurable, and therefore profligate,
a)ko/lastos, which means literally either
- ‘incorrigible’ or ‘unchastized’ : see note on
+ ‘incorrigible’ or ‘unchastized’ : see note on
3.12.5. since there is no cure for one who does not regret his error. The man
deficient in the enjoyment of pleasures is the opposite of the profligate; and the middle
character is the temperate man. And similarly, he who avoids bodily pains not because his
- will is overpowered but of deliberate choice, is also profligate. (Those on the other hand who yield not from choice, are
+ will is overpowered but of deliberate choice, is also profligate. (Those on the other hand who yield not from choice, are
prompted either by the pleasure of indulgence, or by the impulse to avoid the pain of
unsatisfied desire. Hence there is a difference between deliberate and non-deliberate
indulgence. Everyone would think a man worse if he did something disgraceful when he felt
only a slight desire, or none at all, than if he acted from a strong desire, or if he
struck another in cold blood than if he did so in anger; for what would he have done had
his passions been aroused? Hence the profligate man is worse than the
- unrestrained.)
+ unrestrained.)
Of the dispositions described above, the deliberate avoidance of pain is rather a
kindNot Softness strictly, which ranges with
Unrestraint and is not deliberate. of Softness; the deliberate pursuit of
@@ -5428,7 +5428,7 @@ convert to P3
matter: victory is more glorious than the mere avoidance of defeat. Hence self-restraint
is a more valuable quality than Endurance. One who is
deficient in resistance to pains that most men withstand with success, is soft or
- luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness) : such a man lets his cloak
+ luxurious (for Luxury is a kind of Softness) : such a man lets his cloak
trail on the ground to escape the fatigue and trouble of lifting it, or feigns sickness,
not seeing that to counterfeit misery is to be miserable. The same holds good of Self-restraint and Unrestraint. It is not surprising that a man
should be overcome by violent and excessive pleasures or pains: indeed it is excusable if
@@ -5436,15 +5436,15 @@ convert to P3
Kerkyon in the
Alope of Karkinos, or as men who try to restrain their
laughter explode in one great guffaw, as happened to Xenophantus.Seneca, De ira,
2.2, says that Xenophantus's martial music made Alexander put out his hand to grasp his
- weapons (the story is told by Suidas of a Theban flute-player Timotheus, cf.
+ weapons (the story is told by Suidas of a Theban flute-player Timotheus, cf.
Dryden, Alexander's
- Feast) ; apparently Alexander's music had a different effect on
+ Feast) ; apparently Alexander's music had a different effect on
Xenophantus! But we are surprised when a man is overcome by pleasures and pains
which most men are able to withstand, except when his failure to resist is due to some
innate tendency, or to disease: instances of the former being the hereditary
effeminacyHdt. 1.105,
- says that certain Scythians who robbed the temple of Uranian Aphrodite at Askalon were smitten with the ‘feminine
- disease,’ which affected their descendants ever after; but Hippocrates,
+ says that certain Scythians who robbed the temple of Uranian Aphrodite at Askalon were smitten with the ‘feminine
+ disease,’ which affected their descendants ever after; but Hippocrates,
*peri\ a)e/rwn22, describes effeminate symptoms
prevalent among wealthy and high-born Scythians, due to being too much on
horseback. of the royal family of Scythia,
@@ -5459,9 +5459,9 @@ convert to P3
deliberate: since some people withstand the attacks of passion, whether pleasant or
painful, by feeling or seeing them coming, and rousing themselves, that is, their
reasoning faculty, in advance, just as one is proof against tickling if one has just been
- tickled already.The variant ‘can avoid being
- tickled by tickling the other person first’ seems less likely, but either
- reading may be doubted: see critical note. Aristotle elsewhere (Aristot. Prob. 965a 11) remarks that one is
+ tickled already.The variant ‘can avoid being
+ tickled by tickling the other person first’ seems less likely, but either
+ reading may be doubted: see critical note. Aristotle elsewhere (Aristot. Prob. 965a 11) remarks that one is
less sensitive to tickling if one is not taken unawares, and that is why one cannot
tickle oneself. It is the quick and the excitable who are most liable to the
impetuous form of Unrestraint, because the former are too hasty and the latter too
@@ -5474,17 +5474,17 @@ convert to P3
Unrestraint an intermittent evil. Indeed Unrestraint and Vice are entirely different in
kind, for Vice is unconscious, whereas the unrestrained man is aware of his infirmity.
- Among the unrestrained themselves, the impulsivee)kstatiko/s is here used as equivalent to propeth/s, ‘impetuous,’ in 7.8; whereas
+ Among the unrestrained themselves, the impulsivee)kstatiko/s is here used as equivalent to propeth/s, ‘impetuous,’ in 7.8; whereas
below, 8.5, as in 1.6 and 2.7, it denotes the quality with which it is here
contrasted. sort are better than those who know the right principle but do not keep
to it; for these succumb to smaller temptations, and they do not yield without
deliberation, as do the impulsive; the unrestrainedi.e., the feeble sort who stop to think and yet succumb; the impulsive man is not the
typical unrestrained man. man is like people who get drunk quickly, and with a
small amount of wine, or with less than most men. That
- Unrestraint is not strictly a vice (though it is perhaps vice in a
- sense), is clear; for Unrestraint acts against deliberate choice, Vice in
+ Unrestraint is not strictly a vice (though it is perhaps vice in a
+ sense), is clear; for Unrestraint acts against deliberate choice, Vice in
accordance with it. But nevertheless in the actions that result from it it resembles Vice:
- just as Demodocus wrote of the people of Miletus—
+ just as Demodocus wrote of the people of Miletus—
Milesians are no fools, 'tis true
But yet they act as fools would do.
@@ -5525,12 +5525,12 @@ convert to P3
essentially it is the true principle and the right choice that the one stands by and the
other does not; in the sense that if a man chooses or pursues b as a means to
a, a is essentially, b only accidentally, his
- object and his choice. And by ‘essentially’ we mean
- ‘absolutely’ ; hence while in a sense it is any sort of opinion,
+ object and his choice. And by ‘essentially’ we mean
+ ‘absolutely’ ; hence while in a sense it is any sort of opinion,
speaking absolutely it is the true opinion that the one stands by and the other
abandons.
But there are some persons who stand by their opinion whom we call
- ‘obstinate,’ meaning that they are hard to convince, and not easily
+ ‘obstinate,’ meaning that they are hard to convince, and not easily
persuaded to change their convictions. These bear some resemblance to the self-restrained
man, as the prodigal does to the liberal, and the reckless to the brave; but they are
really different in many respects. The self-restrained man stands firm against passion and
@@ -5546,7 +5546,7 @@ convert to P3
2.7.
in the
PhiIoctetesof Sophocles. It is true that his motive for
changing was pleasure, though a noble pleasure,
since it was pleasantThe mss., instead of
- ‘pleasant,’ repeat ‘noble’ by a slip. for
+ ‘pleasant,’ repeat ‘noble’ by a slip. for
him to speak the truth, and he had only told a lie at the instigation of Odysseus. In
fact, not everyone whose conduct is guided by pleasure is either profligate and base, or
unrestrained, but only those who yield to disgraceful pleasures.
@@ -5562,7 +5562,7 @@ convert to P3
to be the sole opposite of Self-restraint, just as Profligacy is thought to be the sole
opposite of Temperance.
Many terms are used in an analogical sense, and so we have come to speak by analogy of
- the ‘self-restraint’ of the temperate man, because the temperate man,
+ the ‘self-restraint’ of the temperate man, because the temperate man,
as well as the self-restrained, is so constituted as never to be led by the pleasures of
the body to act against principle. But whereas the self-restrained man has evil desires,Though he conquers them. the temperate man has
none; he is so constituted as to take no pleasure in things that are contrary to
@@ -5576,24 +5576,24 @@ convert to P3
from Moral Virtue. Also, Prudence does not consist only
in knowing what is right, but also in doing it; but the unrestrained man does not do the
right.This parenthesis would come better before the
- preceding sentence. (Cleverness on the other hand is not incompatible
- with Unrestraint—which is why it is sometimes thought that some people are
- prudent and yet unrestrained—because Cleverness differs from Prudence in the
+ preceding sentence. (Cleverness on the other hand is not incompatible
+ with Unrestraint—which is why it is sometimes thought that some people are
+ prudent and yet unrestrained—because Cleverness differs from Prudence in the
manner explained in our first discourseCf.
6.12.9.: as being intellectual facultiesOr
perhaps, with the Aldine scholiast,
- ‘in definition.’ they are closely akin, but they differ in
- that Prudence involves deliberate choice.) Nor
+ ‘in definition.’ they are closely akin, but they differ in
+ that Prudence involves deliberate choice.) Nor
indeed does the unrestrained man even know the right in the sense of one who consciously
exercises his knowledge, but only as a man asleep or drunk can be said to know something.
- Also, although he errs willingly (for he knows in a sense both what he is doing
- and what end he is aiming at) , yet he is not wicked, for his moral choice is
+ Also, although he errs willingly (for he knows in a sense both what he is doing
+ and what end he is aiming at) , yet he is not wicked, for his moral choice is
sound, so that he is only half-wicked. And he is not unjust, for he does not deliberately
design to do harm,Cf. 6.3. since the one type
of unrestrained person does not keep to the resolve he has formed after deliberation, and
the other, the excitable type, does not deliberate at all. In fact the unrestrained man resembles a state which passes all the
proper enactments, and has good laws, but which never keeps its laws: the condition of
- things satirized by Anaxandrides—
+ things satirized by Anaxandrides—
The state, that recks not of the laws, would fain . .
@@ -5610,8 +5610,8 @@ convert to P3
is easier to change than nature; for even habit is hard to change, precisely because it is
a sort of nature, as Evenus says:
- Mark me, my friend, 'tisi.e., ‘habit
- is’ : the subject of e)/menai seems to
+ Mark me, my friend, 'tisi.e., ‘habit
+ is’ : the subject of e)/menai seems to
have been e)/qos in the preceding verse.
long-continued training,
And training in the end becomes men's nature.
@@ -5626,62 +5626,62 @@ convert to P3
things good or bad in the absolute sense. Moreover this
investigation is fundamental for our study, because we have established2.3.1. that Moral Virtue and Vice are concerned
with pleasures and pains, and most people hold that pleasure is a necessary adjunct of
- Happiness, which is why the word denoting ‘supreme bliss’ is derived
- from the verb meaning ‘to enjoy.’maka/rios from ma/la
+ Happiness, which is why the word denoting ‘supreme bliss’ is derived
+ from the verb meaning ‘to enjoy.’maka/rios from ma/la
xai/rein: cf. 5.4.9.
- Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether
+
Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good thing, whether
essentially or accidentally. They argue that Good and Pleasure are two distinct things.
- (2) Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.
- (3) There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good,
+
(2) Others hold that though some pleasures are good, most are bad.
+ (3) There is also a third view, that even if all pleasures are good,
nevertheless pleasure cannot be the Supreme Good.Of
these three views, the first is that of Speusippus, Plato's successor as head of the
Academy; the second is that of Plato's Philebus; the third, which appears
at the end of the Philebus, is that of Aristotle in Book 10 below.
- (1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that
- (a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but
+
(1) To prove that pleasure is not a good at all, it is argued that
+ (a) Every pleasure is a conscious process towards a natural state; but
a process can in no case belong to the same order of things as its end; for example, the
process of building cannot be a thing of the same sort as the house built.
- (b) The temperate man avoids pleasures.
- (c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure.
- (d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so
+
(b) The temperate man avoids pleasures.
+ (c) The prudent man pursues freedom from pain, not pleasure.
+ (d) Pleasures are a hindrance to prudent deliberation, and the more so
the more enjoyable they are; for instance, sexual pleasure: no one could think of anything
while indulging in it.
- (e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an
+
(e) There is no art of pleasure; yet with every good thing there is an
art which produces it.
- (f) Children and animals pursue
+
(f) Children and animals pursue
pleasures.
- (2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that
- (a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges
+
(2) To prove that not all pleasures are good, it is argued that
+ (a) Some pleasures are disgraceful, and discredit the man who indulges
in them.
- (b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause
+
(b) Some pleasures are harmful, for certain pleasant things cause
disease.
- (3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that
+
(3) To prove that pleasure is not the Supreme Good, it is argued that
it is not an end but a process.
These then, more or less, are the current views.
But the following considerations will show that these arguments are not conclusive to
- prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3)
+ prove (1) that pleasure is not a good at all, nor (3)
that it is not the Supreme Good.
- (1) (a) In the first place (i.)
- ‘the good’ has two meanings: it means both that which is good
+
(1) (a) In the first place (i.)
+ ‘the good’ has two meanings: it means both that which is good
absolutely, and that which is good for somebody, or relatively. Consequently the term
- ‘good’ has the same double meaning when applied to men's natures and
+ ‘good’ has the same double meaning when applied to men's natures and
dispositions; and therefore also when applied to movements and to processes. Also those
processes which are thought to be bad will in some cases, though bad absolutely, be not
bad relatively, but in fact desirable for a particular person, or in other cases, though
not even desirable generally for the particular person, nevertheless desirable for him in
particular circumstances and for a short time, although not really desirable. And some
- such processesCertain ‘felt processes
- towards a natural state’ (9.4) , which are obviously not
+ such processesCertain ‘felt processes
+ towards a natural state’ (9.4) , which are obviously not
good, are not really pleasant either. are not really pleasures at all, but only
seem to be so: I mean the painful processes that are undergone for their curative effects,
for instance, treatment applied to the sick.
- Again (ii.) , the good is either an activity or a
+
Again (ii.) , the good is either an activity or a
state. Now the pleasures that restore us to our natural state
are only accidentally pleasant; while the activity of desire is the activity
of that part of us which has remained in the natural stateCf. 14.7.: for that matter, there are some pleasures which do not
- involve pain or desire at all (for instance, the pleasure of contemplation),
+ involve pain or desire at all (for instance, the pleasure of contemplation),
being experienced without any deficiency from the normal having occurred. That restorative
pleasures are only accidentally pleasant is indicated by the fact that we do not enjoy the
same things while the natural state is being replenished as we do after it has been
@@ -5691,62 +5691,62 @@ convert to P3
pleasures we get from them are not naturally or absolutely pleasant either, since there is
the same distinction between various pleasures as there is between the pleasant things
from which they arise.
- Again (iii.) , it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is
+
Again (iii.) , it does not follow, as some argue, that as the end is
better than the process towards it, so there must be something better than pleasure. For
pleasures are not really processes, nor are they all incidental to a process: they are
activities, and therefore an end; nor do they result from the process of acquiring our
faculties, but from their exercise; nor have they all of them some end other than
themselves: this is only true of the pleasures of progress towards the perfection of our
- nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as a ‘conscious
- process’ ; the term should rather be ‘activity of our natural
- state,’ and for ‘conscious’ we must substitute
- ‘unimpeded.’ Some thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the
+ nature. Hence it is not correct to define pleasure as a ‘conscious
+ process’ ; the term should rather be ‘activity of our natural
+ state,’ and for ‘conscious’ we must substitute
+ ‘unimpeded.’ Some thinkers hold that pleasure is a process on the
ground that it is good in the fullest sense, because in their view an activity is a
process; but really an activity is different from a process.
- To argue (2) (b) that pleasures are bad because some
+
To argue (2) (b) that pleasures are bad because some
pleasant things are detrimental to health is the same as to argue that health is bad
because some healthy things are bad for the pocket. Both pleasant things and healthy
things can be bad in a relative sense, but that does not make them really bad; even contemplation may on occasion be injurious to
health.
- (1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is
+
(1) (d) Neither prudence nor any other quality is
hampered by its own pleasure, but only by alien pleasuresi.e., the pleasures arising from the exercise of other qualities.;
the pleasures of contemplation and study will enable us to contemplate and study
better.
- (1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the
+
(1) (e) That there should be no art devoted to the
production of any form of pleasure is only natural; an art never produces an activity, but
the capacity for an activity. Though in point of fact the arts of perfumery and cookery
are generally considered to be arts of pleasure.
- The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids
- pleasure, and (1) (c) that the prudent man pursues
- freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that animals and
+
The arguments (1) (b) that the temperate man avoids
+ pleasure, and (1) (c) that the prudent man pursues
+ freedom from pain, and (1) (f) that animals and
children pursue pleasure, are all met by the same reply. It has been explainedCf. 4.5. how some pleasures are absolutely good,
and how not all pleasures are good.i.e., not good
- absolutely or in themselves, though good (in moderation) as means to
- life: the ‘necessary’ and ‘neutral’ pleasures of
+ absolutely or in themselves, though good (in moderation) as means to
+ life: the ‘necessary’ and ‘neutral’ pleasures of
4.2,5. Now it is those pleasures which are not absolutely good that both animals
and children pursue, and it is freedom from pain arising from the want of those pleasures
that the prudent man pursuesi.e., the prudent man both
satisfies his natural desire for the bodily pleasures in moderation, and trains himself
not to mind their absence; but does both not for the sake of pleasure, but to avoid the
disturbance of pain.: that is, the pleasures that involve desire and pain, namely
- the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature) , or their excessive
+ the bodily pleasures (for these are of that nature) , or their excessive
forms, in regard to which Profligacy is displayed. That is why the temperate man avoids
excessive bodily pleasures: for even the temperate man has pleasures.
That pain moreover is
an evil and to be avoided is admitted; since all pain is either absolutely evil, or evil
as being some way an impediment to activity. But that which is the opposite of something
- to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be
+ to be avoided—opposed to it as a thing to be avoided and evil—must be
good. It follows therefore that pleasure is a good. Speusippus attempted to refute this
argumentSee more fully, 10.2.5. by saying
that, as the greater is opposed to the equal as well as to the less, so pleasure is
opposed to a neutral state of feeling as well as to pain. But this refutation does not
hold good; for Speusippus would not maintain that pleasure is essentially evil.
- But granting (2) that some pleasures are bad, it does not therefore
- follow (3) that a certain pleasure may not nevertheless be the Supreme
+
But granting (2) that some pleasures are bad, it does not therefore
+ follow (3) that a certain pleasure may not nevertheless be the Supreme
Good; just as a certain form of knowledge may be supremely good, although some forms of
- knowledge are bad. On the contrary (i) since every faculty has its
+ knowledge are bad. On the contrary (i) since every faculty has its
unimpeded activity, the activity of all the faculties, or of one of them
- (whichever constitutes Happiness) , when unimpeded, must probably be the
+ (whichever constitutes Happiness) , when unimpeded, must probably be the
most desirable thing there is; but an unimpeded activity is a pleasure; so that on this
showing the Supreme Good will be a particular kind of pleasure, even though most pleasures
are bad, and, it may be, bad absolutely. This is why everybody thinks that the happy life
@@ -5754,21 +5754,21 @@ convert to P3
with good reason, since no impeded activity is perfect, whereas Happiness is essentially
perfect; so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the body, external goods
and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of
- them. (Consequently those who sayProbably the Cynics. that, if a man be good,
+ them. (Consequently those who sayProbably the Cynics. that, if a man be good,
he will be happy even when on the rack, or when
fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking
- nonsense.) But because Happiness requires the
+ nonsense.) But because Happiness requires the
gifts of fortune in addition, some people think that it is the same thing as good fortune;
but this is not so, since even good fortune itself when excessive is an impediment to
activity, and perhaps indeed no longer deserves to be called good fortune, since good
fortune can only be defined in relation to Happiness.
- (ii.) Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure
+
(ii.) Moreover, that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure
is some indication that it is in a sense the Supreme Good:
No rumor noised abroad by many peoples
Comes utterly to naught.Hes. WD 763; the couplet ends, polloi\ fhmi/zousi:
- qeo/s nu/ tis e)sti\ kai\ au)th/ (vox
- populi vox dei).
+ qeo/s nu/ tis e)sti\ kai\ au)th/ (vox
+ populi vox dei).
@@ -5780,9 +5780,9 @@ convert to P3
pleasures of the body are the ones which we most often meet with, and as all men are
capable of these, these have usurped the family title; and so men think these are the only
pleasures that exist, because they are the only ones which they know.
- (iii.) Moreover, it is clear that if
+
(iii.) Moreover, it is clear that if
pleasure is not good and activity is not pleasure,The
- mss. give ‘if pleasure and activity are not good.’ the life
+ mss. give ‘if pleasure and activity are not good.’ the life
of the happy man will not necessarily be pleasant. For why should he need pleasure if it
is not good? On the contrary, his life may even be painful; for if pleasure is neither
good nor evil, no more is pain either, so why should he avoid it? And if the good man's
@@ -5810,37 +5810,37 @@ convert to P3
truth.
We have then to explain why it is that bodily pleasures appear to be more desirable than
others.
- (1) Now the first reason is that pleasure drives out pain; and
+
(1) Now the first reason is that pleasure drives out pain; and
excessive pain leads men to seek excessive pleasure, and bodily pleasure generally, as a
restorative. And these restorative pleasures are intense, and therefore sought for,
- because they are seen in contrast with their opposite. (The view that pleasure is
+ because they are seen in contrast with their opposite. (The view that pleasure is
not a good at all is also due to these two facts, as has been said,The reference is presumably to 12.1, but the two passages do not
- correspond very closely. (a) that some pleasures are actions
+ correspond very closely. (a) that some pleasures are actions
indicative of an evil nature, whether it be depraved from birth, like the nature of an
animal,Cf. 6.6, second note. or corrupted by
- habit, as is the case with evil men, and (b) that others are
+ habit, as is the case with evil men, and (b) that others are
restoratives of a defective state,Or possibly
- ‘that the restorative pleasures imply a defective state.’ and
+ ‘that the restorative pleasures imply a defective state.’ and
to be in the natural state is better than to be in process of returning to it. But as a matter of
fact the latter sort of pleasures accompany a process towards perfection, so that
- accidentally they are good.)
- (2) Another reason is that bodily pleasures are sought for, just
- because of their intensity, by people who are incapable of enjoying others (for
- instance, some deliberately take steps to make themselves thirsty) : not that
+ accidentally they are good.)
+ (2) Another reason is that bodily pleasures are sought for, just
+ because of their intensity, by people who are incapable of enjoying others (for
+ instance, some deliberately take steps to make themselves thirsty) : not that
there is any objection to this if the pleasures are innocuous, but it is bad if they are
productive of harmful results. The fact is that some men have no other sources of
enjoyment; and also many are so constituted that a neutral state of feeling is to them
- positively painful. (This is because a state of strain is the normal condition of
+ positively painful. (This is because a state of strain is the normal condition of
an animal organism, as physiology testifies; it tells us that sight and hearing are in
- fact painful, but we have got used to them in course of time—such is the
- theory.) Similarly the young are in a condition
+ fact painful, but we have got used to them in course of time—such is the
+ theory.) Similarly the young are in a condition
resembling intoxication, because they are growing, and youth is pleasant in itself; but
persons of an excitable nature need a restorative perpetually, because their temperament
keeps their bodies in a constant state of irritation, and their appetites are continually
active; and any pleasure, if strong, drives out pain, not only the opposite pleasure. This
is why excitable men become profligate and vicious.
- Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand—and these are those derived
- from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant—do not admit of excess. By
+
Pleasures unaccompanied by pain, on the other hand—and these are those derived
+ from things naturally and not accidentally pleasant—do not admit of excess. By
things accidentally pleasant I mean things taken as restoratives; really their restorative
effect is produced by the operationIt is this which is
really pleasant: see 12.2. of that part of the system which has remained sound,
@@ -5851,8 +5851,8 @@ convert to P3
restoration of a faculty to its natural state.
Nothing however can continue to give us pleasure always, because our nature is not
- simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes us perishable
- beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its
+ simple, but contains a second element (which is what makes us perishable
+ beings), and consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its
activity runs counter to the nature of the other, while when the two are balanced, their
action feels neither painful nor pleasant. Since if any man had a simple nature, the same
activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. Hence God enjoys a single simple
@@ -5872,14 +5872,14 @@ convert to P3
Book 8
- Our next business after this will be to discuss Friendship.fili/a, ‘friendship,’
+ Our next business after this will be to discuss Friendship.fili/a, ‘friendship,’
sometimes rises to the meaning of affection or love, but also includes any sort of
kindly feeling, even that existing between business associates, or fellow-citizens. The
- corresponding verb means both ‘to like’ and ‘to
- love’; the adjective is generally passive, ‘loved,’
- ‘liked,’ ‘dear,’ but sometimes active
- ‘loving,’ ‘liking,’ and so on, as a noun
- ‘a friend.’ For friendship is a virtue,That is, the social grace of friendliness described in Bk. 4.6.; it is
+ corresponding verb means both ‘to like’ and ‘to
+ love’; the adjective is generally passive, ‘loved,’
+ ‘liked,’ ‘dear,’ but sometimes active
+ ‘loving,’ ‘liking,’ and so on, as a noun
+ ‘a friend.’ For friendship is a virtue,That is, the social grace of friendliness described in Bk. 4.6.; it is
there said to be nameless, but it is called fili/a at
2.7.13. or involves virtue; and also it is one of the most indispensable
requirements of life. For no one would choose to live without friends, but possessing all
@@ -5890,48 +5890,48 @@ convert to P3
greater it is, the greater is its insecurity. And in poverty or any other misfortune men think friends are their
only resource. Friends are an aid to the young, to guard them from error; to the elderly,
to tend them, and to supplement their failing powers of action; to those in the prime of
- life, to assist them in noble deeds—
+ life, to assist them in noble deeds—
When twain together go
Hom. Il. 10.224
- —
+
—
for two are better able both to plan and to execute. And the affection of parent for
offspring and of offspring for parent seems to be a natural instinct, not only in man but
also in birds and in most animals; as also is friendship between members of the same
species; and this is especially strong in the human
race; for which reason we praise those who love their fellow men.fila/nqrwpos means
- ‘humane,’ ‘kindly.’ Even when travelling
+ ‘humane,’ ‘kindly.’ Even when travelling
abroad one can observe that a natural affinity and friendship exist between man and man
universally. Moreover,
as friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store by
it than they do by justice, for to promote concord, which seems akin to friendship, is
their chief aim, while faction, which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish.
And if men are friends, there is no need of justice between them; whereas merely to be
- just is not enough—a feeling of friendship also is necessary. Indeed the highest
- form of justice seems to have an element of friendly feeling in it.Or possibly, ‘And the just are thought to possess friendliness
- in its highest form.’
+ just is not enough—a feeling of friendship also is necessary. Indeed the highest
+ form of justice seems to have an element of friendly feeling in it.Or possibly, ‘And the just are thought to possess friendliness
+ in its highest form.’
And friendship is not only indispensable as a means, it is also noble in itself. We
praise those who love their friends, and it is counted a noble thing to have many friends;
and some people think that a true friend must be a good man.
But there is much difference of opinion as to the nature of friendship. Some define it as
a matter of similarity; they say that we love those who are like ourselves: whence the
- proverbs ‘Like finds his like,’ ‘Birds of a feather flock
- together,’Literally ‘Jackdaw to
- jackdaw.’ and so on. Others on the contrary say that with men who are
- alike it is always a case of ‘two of a trade.’Literally, ‘all such men are potters to each other,’
+ proverbs ‘Like finds his like,’ ‘Birds of a feather flock
+ together,’Literally ‘Jackdaw to
+ jackdaw.’ and so on. Others on the contrary say that with men who are
+ alike it is always a case of ‘two of a trade.’Literally, ‘all such men are potters to each other,’
an allusion to Hes. WD 25, kai\
- kerameu\s keramei= kote/ei kai\ te/ktoni te/ktwn—‘Potter
- with potter contends, and joiner quarrels with joiner.’
+ kerameu\s keramei= kote/ei kai\ te/ktoni te/ktwn—‘Potter
+ with potter contends, and joiner quarrels with joiner.’
Some try to
find a more profound and scientific explanation of the nature of affection. EuripidesFr. 890 Dindorf, from an unknown play. writes that
- ‘Earth yearneth for the rain’ when dried up, ‘And the
- majestic Heaven when filled with rain Yearneth to fall to Earth.’ Heracleitus
- says, ‘Opposition unites,’ and ‘The fairest harmony springs
- from difference,’ and ‘'Tis strife that makes the world go
- on.’ Others maintain the opposite view, notably Empedocles, who declares that
- ‘Like seeks after like.’
+ ‘Earth yearneth for the rain’ when dried up, ‘And the
+ majestic Heaven when filled with rain Yearneth to fall to Earth.’ Heracleitus
+ says, ‘Opposition unites,’ and ‘The fairest harmony springs
+ from difference,’ and ‘'Tis strife that makes the world go
+ on.’ Others maintain the opposite view, notably Empedocles, who declares that
+ ‘Like seeks after like.’
Dismissing then these scientific speculations as not germane to our present enquiry, let
us investigate the human aspect of the matter, and examine the questions that relate to
man's character and emotions: for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship, or
@@ -5951,11 +5951,11 @@ convert to P3
himself, and that while what is really good is lovable absolutely, what is good for a
particular person is lovable for that person. Further, each person loves not what is
really good for himself, but what appears to him to be so; however, this will not affect
- our argument, for ‘lovable’ will mean ‘what appears
- lovable.’
+ our argument, for ‘lovable’ will mean ‘what appears
+ lovable.’
There being then three motives of love, the term Friendship is not applied to love for
inanimate objects, since here there is no return of affection, and also no wish for the
- good of the object—for instance, it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle
+ good of the object—for instance, it would be ridiculous to wish well to a bottle
of wine: at the most one wishes that it may keep well in order that one may have it
oneself; whereas we are told that we ought to wish our friend well for his own sake. But
persons who wish another good for his own sake, if the feeling is not reciprocated, are
@@ -5966,9 +5966,9 @@ convert to P3
be good or useful, and one of these persons may also entertain the same feeling towards
him. Here then we have a case of two people mutually well-disposed, whom nevertheless we
cannot speak of as friends, because they are not aware of each other's regard. To be
- friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is,
- wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and
- (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities
+ friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is,
+ wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, and
+ (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities
mentioned above.
Now these qualities differ in kind; hence the affection or friendship they occasion may
differ in kind also. There are accordingly three kinds of friendship, corresponding in
@@ -6019,20 +6019,20 @@ convert to P3
are both good absolutely and profitable to each other. And each is pleasant in both ways
also, since good men are pleasant both absolutely and to each other; for everyone is
pleased by his own actions, and therefore by actions that resemble his own, and the
- actions of all good men are the same or similar.— Such friendship is naturally permanent,
+ actions of all good men are the same or similar.— Such friendship is naturally permanent,
since it combines in itself all the attributes that friends ought to possess. All
affection is based on good or on pleasure, either
absolute or relative to the person who feels it, and is prompted by similarityThere is some uncertainty here and elsewhere in these
- chapters whether ‘similarity’ refers to resemblance between the
- friends (as 3.6, and cf. 1139a 10, kaq' o(moio/thta/
- tina), or between the different forms of friendship (as
- kaq' o(moio/thta, 1157a 32, 1158b 6) ,
- friendships based on pleasure or profit being only so called ‘by way of
- resemblance,’ i.e. in an analogical and secondary sense. But the latter
+ chapters whether ‘similarity’ refers to resemblance between the
+ friends (as 3.6, and cf. 1139a 10, kaq' o(moio/thta/
+ tina), or between the different forms of friendship (as
+ kaq' o(moio/thta, 1157a 32, 1158b 6) ,
+ friendships based on pleasure or profit being only so called ‘by way of
+ resemblance,’ i.e. in an analogical and secondary sense. But the latter
consideration seems irrelevant here, and is first developed in the next chapter
- (sects. 1, 4). It is true that whether similarity between the parties
- is an element in all friendship (although this is implied by the words
- ‘who resemble each other in virtue’ in 3.6) is nowhere
+ (sects. 1, 4). It is true that whether similarity between the parties
+ is an element in all friendship (although this is implied by the words
+ ‘who resemble each other in virtue’ in 3.6) is nowhere
clearly decided, and it can hardly be predicated of some friendships considered
below. of some sort; but this friendship possesses all these attributes in the
friends themselves, for they are alike, et cetera,i.e., absolutely and relatively good and pleasant: cf.
@@ -6043,8 +6043,8 @@ convert to P3
Such friendships are of course rare, because such men are few. Moreover they require time
and intimacy: as the saying goes, you cannot get to know a man till you have consumed the
proverbial amount of saltCf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1238a 2, dio\ e)is paroimi/an e)lh/luqen o( me/dimnos tw=n a(lw=n,
- ‘hence “the peck of salt” has passed into a
- proverb.’ in his company; and so you cannot admit him to friendship or
+ ‘hence “the peck of salt” has passed into a
+ proverb.’
in his company; and so you cannot admit him to friendship or
really be friends, before each has shown the other that he is worthy of friendship and has
won his confidence. People who enter into friendly relations quickly have the wish to be friends, but cannot
really be friends without being worthy of friendship, and also knowing each other to be
@@ -6077,27 +6077,27 @@ convert to P3
and with them there is the mutual confidence, the incapacity ever to do each other wrong,
and all the other characteristics that are required in true friendship. Whereas the other
forms of friendship are liable to be dissolved by calumny and suspicion.
- But since people do apply the term ‘friends’ to persons whose regard
- for each other is based on utility, just as states can be ‘friends’
- (since expediency is generally recognized as the motive of international
- alliances), or on pleasure, as children make friends, perhaps we too must call
+
But since people do apply the term ‘friends’ to persons whose regard
+ for each other is based on utility, just as states can be ‘friends’
+ (since expediency is generally recognized as the motive of international
+ alliances), or on pleasure, as children make friends, perhaps we too must call
such relationships friendships; but then we must say that there are several sorts of
friendship, that between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper
- meaning of the term, while the other kinds are friendships in an analogical sense,Literally, ‘by way of resemblance to true
- friendship’ : see 3.7, note. since such friends are friends in virtue
+ meaning of the term, while the other kinds are friendships in an analogical sense,Literally, ‘by way of resemblance to true
+ friendship’ : see 3.7, note. since such friends are friends in virtue
of a sort of goodness and of likenessPerhaps the words
- ‘and of likeness’ are interpolated; the following clause explains
- ‘goodness’ only. That utility is ‘a sort of
- goodness’ is assumed. in them: insomuch as pleasure is good in the eyes
+ ‘and of likeness’ are interpolated; the following clause explains
+ ‘goodness’ only. That utility is ‘a sort of
+ goodness’ is assumed. in them: insomuch as pleasure is good in the eyes
of pleasure-lovers. But these two secondary forms of
friendship are not very likely to coincide: men do not make friends with each other both
for utility and for pleasure at the same time, since accidental qualities are rarely found
in combination.
Friendship then being divided into these species, inferior people will make friends for
- pleasure or for use, if they are alike in that respect,i.e., in being pleasant or useful to each other; or possibly ‘since they are
- alike in loving pleasure or profit.’ while good men will be friends for
- each other's own sake, since they are alike in being good.Or possibly ‘since they like each other as being
- good.’ The latter therefore are friends in an absolute sense, the
+ pleasure or for use, if they are alike in that respect,i.e., in being pleasant or useful to each other; or possibly ‘since they are
+ alike in loving pleasure or profit.’ while good men will be friends for
+ each other's own sake, since they are alike in being good.Or possibly ‘since they like each other as being
+ good.’ The latter therefore are friends in an absolute sense, the
former accidentally, and through their similarity to the latter.
It is with friendship as it is with the virtues; men are called good in two senses,
either as having a virtuous disposition or as realizing virtue in action, and similarly
@@ -6121,7 +6121,7 @@ convert to P3
goodwill rather than friendship. Nothing is more characteristic of friends than that they
seek each other's society: poor men desire their
friends' assistance, and even the most prosperous wish for their companionship
- (indeed they are the last people to adopt the life of a recluse); but it
+ (indeed they are the last people to adopt the life of a recluse); but it
is impossible for men to spend their time together unless they give each other pleasure,
or have common tastes. The latter seems to be the bond between the members of a
comradeship.The e(tairei=ai, or Comradeships, at Athens were associations of men of the same age and social standing. In the
@@ -6146,7 +6146,7 @@ convert to P3
they love their own good, for the good man in becoming dear to another becomes that
other's good. Each party therefore both loves his own good and also makes an equivalent
return by wishing the other's good, and by affording him pleasure; for there is a saying,
- ‘Amity is equality,’ and this is most fully realized in the
+ ‘Amity is equality,’ and this is most fully realized in the
friendships of the good.
Morose and elderly people rarely make friends, as they are inclined to be surly, and do
not take much pleasure in society; good temper and sociability appear to be the chief
@@ -6158,9 +6158,9 @@ convert to P3
society nor enjoy it, and these are thought to be the chief marks of friendship.
It is not possible to have many friends in the full meaning of the word friendship, any
- more than it is to be in love with many people at once (love indeed seems to be
+ more than it is to be in love with many people at once (love indeed seems to be
an excessive state of emotion, such as is naturally felt towards one person
- only); and it is not easy for the same person to like a number of people at once,
+ only); and it is not easy for the same person to like a number of people at once,
nor indeed perhaps can good men be found in large numbers. Also for perfect friendship you must get to know a man thoroughly, and become intimate
with him, which is a very difficult thing to do. But it is possible to like a number of
persons for their utility and pleasantness, for useful and pleasant people are plentiful,
@@ -6185,7 +6185,7 @@ convert to P3
pleasant, but the good man does not become the friend of a superior, unless his superior
in rank be also his superior in virtue; otherwise the good man as the inferior party
cannot make matters proportionally equal.For this
- ‘proportional equalization’ of the parties to an unequal friendship
+ ‘proportional equalization’ of the parties to an unequal friendship
see 7.2, 13.1. It would appear that the meaning here is, that unless the great man is
also better than the good man, the good man cannot give more love or respect to the
great man than the great man gives to him, which is the only way in which the good man
@@ -6196,9 +6196,9 @@ convert to P3
equality, for both parties render the same benefit and wish the same good to each other,
or else exchangei.e., equivalent amounts of two
different things. two different benefits, for instance pleasure and profit.
- (Thesei.e., friendships based on pleasure
+ (Thesei.e., friendships based on pleasure
or utility or both, in contrast to those based on virtue; although the latter also are,
- of course, ‘friendships of equality.’ The parenthesis breaks the
+ of course, ‘friendships of equality.’ The parenthesis breaks the
flow of the argument. are less truly friendships, and less permanent, as we have
said; and opinions differ as to whether they are really friendships at all, owing to their
being both like and unlike the same thing. In view of their likeness to friendship based
@@ -6206,7 +6206,7 @@ convert to P3
utility, and these are attributes of that form of friendship too; but in that friendship
based on virtue is proof against calumny, and permanent, while the others quickly change,
besides differing in many other respects, they appear not to be real friendships, owing to
- their unlikeness to it.)
+ their unlikeness to it.)
But there is a different kind of friendship, which involves superiority of one party over
the other, for example, the friendship between father and son, and generally between an
older person and a younger, and that between husband and wife, and between any ruler and
@@ -6227,10 +6227,10 @@ convert to P3
rendered is proportionate to desert, this produces equality in a sense between the
parties, and equality is felt to be an essential element of friendship.
Equality in friendship, however, does not seem to be like equality in matters of justice.
- In the sphere of justice, ‘equal’ (fair) means
- primarily proportionate to desert, and ‘equal in quantity’ is only a
- secondary sense; whereas in friendship ‘equal in quantity’ is the
- primary meaning, and ‘proportionate to desert’ only secondary.
+ In the sphere of justice, ‘equal’ (fair) means
+ primarily proportionate to desert, and ‘equal in quantity’ is only a
+ secondary sense; whereas in friendship ‘equal in quantity’ is the
+ primary meaning, and ‘proportionate to desert’ only secondary.
This is clearly seen when a wide disparity arises
between two friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else; they no
longer remain nor indeed expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of
@@ -6239,9 +6239,9 @@ convert to P3
friends, nor do persons of no particular merit expect to be the friends of men of
distinguished excellence or wisdom. It is true that we
cannot fix a precise limit in such cases, up to which two men can still be friends; the
- gap may go on widening and the friendship still remainLit. ‘though many things are taken away, (friendship) still
- remains’; apparently an allusion to the Sorites fallacy (ratio ruentis acervi, Hor. Ep.
- 2.1.47) , How many grains can be taken from a heap of corn for it still
+ gap may go on widening and the friendship still remainLit. ‘though many things are taken away, (friendship) still
+ remains’; apparently an allusion to the Sorites fallacy (ratio ruentis acervi, Hor. Ep.
+ 2.1.47) , How many grains can be taken from a heap of corn for it still
to be in a heap?; but when one becomes very remote from the other, as God is
remote from man, it can continue no longer. This gives
rise to the question, is it not after all untrue that we wish our friends the greatest of
@@ -6265,7 +6265,7 @@ convert to P3
so they enjoy being honored by him as a token of benefits to come. Those on the other hand
who covet being honored by good men, and by persons who know them, do so from a desire to
confirm their own opinion of themselves; soOr possibly
- ‘so what they really enjoy is being assured,’ etc. these like
+ ‘so what they really enjoy is being assured,’ etc. these like
honor because they are assured of their worth by their confidence in the judgement of
those who assert it. Affection on the other hand men like for its own sake; from which we
infer that it is more valuable than honor, and that friendship is desirable in itself.
@@ -6299,7 +6299,7 @@ convert to P3
reasonable demand, but it is ridiculous if they have nothing attractive about them.
But perhaps there is no real attraction between opposites as such, but only accidentally, and what they actually desire is
- the mean between them (since this is the Good); the dry for instance
+ the mean between them (since this is the Good); the dry for instance
striving not to become wet, but to reach an intermediate state, and so with the hot, and
everything else. Let us however dismiss this question, as being indeed somewhat foreign to
our subject.
@@ -6307,10 +6307,10 @@ convert to P3
was said at the outset,1.4. to be the same as
those which are the sphere of justice. For in every partnership we find mutual rights of
some sort, and also friendly feeling: one notes that shipmates and fellow-soldiers speak
- of each other as ‘my friend,’ and so in fact do the partners in any
+ of each other as ‘my friend,’ and so in fact do the partners in any
joint undertaking. But their friendship is limited to the extent of their association in
their common business, for so also are their mutual rights as associates. Again, the
- proverb says ‘Friends' goods are common property,’ and this is
+ proverb says ‘Friends' goods are common property,’ and this is
correct, since community is the essence of friendship. Brothers have all things in common, and so do members of a comradeshipSee 5.3, note.; other friends hold special
possessions in common, more or fewer in different cases, inasmuch as friendships vary in
degree. The claims of justice also differ in different relationships. The mutual rights of parents
@@ -6332,16 +6332,16 @@ convert to P3
advantage. Thus the other associations aim at some
particular advantage; for example sailors combine to seek the profits of seafaring in the
way of trade or the like, comrades in arms the gains of warfare, their aim being either
- plunder, or victory over the enemy or the capture of a cityLiterally ‘plunder or victory or a city’; the last
+ plunder, or victory over the enemy or the capture of a cityLiterally ‘plunder or victory or a city’; the last
words may refer either to colonists or exiles who obtain a new abode by conquest, or to
civil war; but the expression is improbable, and perhaps should be emended to
- ‘or to defend the city.’; and similarly the members of a
+ ‘or to defend the city.’; and similarly the members of a
tribe or parishThe bracketed sentences, as Cook Wilson
points out, look like an interpolated fragment of a parallel version.
- [And some associations appear to be formed for the sake of pleasure, for example religious guilds and dining-clubs, which are
+ [And some associations appear to be formed for the sake of pleasure, for example religious guilds and dining-clubs, which are
unions for sacrifice and social intercourse. But all these associations seem to be
subordinate to the association of the State, which aims not at a temporary advantage but
- at one covering the whole of life.] combine to perform sacrifices and hold
+ at one covering the whole of life.] combine to perform sacrifices and hold
festivals in connection with them, thereby both paying honor to the gods and providing
pleasant holidays for themselves. For it may be noticed that the sacrifices and festivals
of ancient origin take place after harvest, being in fact harvest-festivals; this is
@@ -6355,14 +6355,14 @@ convert to P3
government or Republic. The best of these constitutions
is Kingship, and the worst Timocracy. The perversion of Kingship is Tyranny. Both are monarchies,
but there is a very wide difference between them: a tyrant studies his own advantage, a
- king that of his subjects. For a monarch is not a kingProbably the text should read ‘a king is not a king at all
- unless—’ if he does not possess independent resources, and is
+ king that of his subjects. For a monarch is not a kingProbably the text should read ‘a king is not a king at all
+ unless—’ if he does not possess independent resources, and is
not better supplied with goods of every kind than his subjects; but a ruler so situated
lacks nothing, and therefore will not study his own interests but those of his subjects.
- (A king who is not independent of his subjects will be merely a sort of titular
- king.Literally, ‘a king elected by
- lot,’ like the annual archon at Athens, who had the title of king, but retained only certain religious
- functions from the primitive monarchy.) Tyranny is the exact opposite in
+ (A king who is not independent of his subjects will be merely a sort of titular
+ king.Literally, ‘a king elected by
+ lot,’ like the annual archon at Athens, who had the title of king, but retained only certain religious
+ functions from the primitive monarchy.) Tyranny is the exact opposite in
this respect, for the tyrant pursues his own good. The inferiority of Tyranny among the
perversions is more evident than that of Timocracy among the constitutions, for the
opposite of the best must be the worst.
@@ -6381,7 +6381,7 @@ convert to P3
One may find likenesses and so to speak models of these various forms of constitution in
the household. The relationship of father to sons is regal in type, since a father's first
care is for his children's welfare. This is why Homer styles Zeus
- ‘father,’ for the ideal of kingship is paternal government. Among the
+ ‘father,’ for the ideal of kingship is paternal government. Among the
Persians paternal rule is tyrannical, for the Persians use their sons as slaves. The
relation of master to slaves is also tyrannic, since in it the master's interest is aimed
at. The autocracy of a master appears to be right, that of the Persian father wrong; for
@@ -6401,10 +6401,10 @@ convert to P3
ruled, to the same extent as justice. The friendship of a king for his subjects is one of
superiority in beneficence; for a king does good to his subjects, inasmuch as being good
he studies to promote their welfare, as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep; hence
- Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the people.’ The friendship of a father for his child is of the same kind
- (only here the benefits bestowed are greater, for the father is the source of the
+ Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the people.’ The friendship of a father for his child is of the same kind
+ (only here the benefits bestowed are greater, for the father is the source of the
child's existence, which seems to be the greatest of all boons, and of its nurture and
- education; and we also ascribe the same benefits to our forefathers). For it is
+ education; and we also ascribe the same benefits to our forefathers). For it is
as natural for a father to rule his children, and forefathers those descended from them,
as for a king to rule his subjects.
These friendships then involve a superiority of benefits
@@ -6413,11 +6413,11 @@ convert to P3
both sides, but proportionate to desert, as is the affection bestowed.
The friendship between husband and wife again is the same as that which prevails between
rulers and subjects in an aristocracy; for it is in proportion to excellence, and the
- better party receives the larger share [of good],The word ‘good’ looks like an interpolation. The
- sense seems to require ‘a larger share of affection’ (
+ better party receives the larger share [of good],The word ‘good’ looks like an interpolation. The
+ sense seems to require ‘a larger share of affection’ (
fili/as, or filh/sews,
- understood); it is clear throughout that in an unequal friendship the superior
- party receives not more but less benefit (though more affection) than
+ understood); it is clear throughout that in an unequal friendship the superior
+ party receives not more but less benefit (though more affection) than
the inferior. In 10.5 the conjugal association is compared to the aristocratic polity in
virtue of the fact that the superior party has more power, not more benefit; and from
10.3 it appears that when the ruling class takes all or most of the benefits for itself,
@@ -6435,8 +6435,8 @@ convert to P3
subjects in a tyranny. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there
can be no friendship between them either, any more than there can be justice. It is like
the relation between a craftsman and his tool, or between the soul and the body
- [or between master and slaveThese words are
- better omitted, as they anticipate what comes below.]: all these instruments
+ [or between master and slaveThese words are
+ better omitted, as they anticipate what comes below.]: all these instruments
it is true are benefited by the persons who use them, but there can be no friendship, nor
justice, towards inanimate things; indeed not even towards a horse or an ox, nor yet
towards a slave as slave. For master and slave have nothing in common: a slave is a living
@@ -6459,28 +6459,28 @@ convert to P3
Also parents know their offspring with more
certainty than children know their parentage; and progenitor is more attached to progeny
than progeny to progenitor, since that which springs from a thing belongs to the thing
- from which it springs—for instance, a tooth or hair or what not to its
- owner—whereas the thing it springs from does not belong to it at all, or only in
+ from which it springs—for instance, a tooth or hair or what not to its
+ owner—whereas the thing it springs from does not belong to it at all, or only in
a less degree. The affection of the parent exceeds that of the child in duration also;
parents love their children as soon as they are born, children their parents only when
time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding,Cf. 6.11.2 and note. or at least perception. These considerationsThat is, greater certainty of
parentage, closer affinity and earlier commencement of affection. also explain
why parental affection is stronger in the mother. Parents then love their children as
- themselves (one's offspring being as it were another self—other because
- separateOr ‘a second self produced by
- separation from oneself.’); children love their parents as the
+ themselves (one's offspring being as it were another self—other because
+ separateOr ‘a second self produced by
+ separation from oneself.’); children love their parents as the
source of their being; brothers love each other as being from the same source, since the
identity of their relations to that source identifies them with one another, which is why
- we speak of ‘being of the same blood’ or ‘of the same
- stock’ or the like; brothers are therefore in a manner the same being, though
+ we speak of ‘being of the same blood’ or ‘of the same
+ stock’ or the like; brothers are therefore in a manner the same being, though
embodied in separate persons. But friendship between
brothers is also greatly fostered by their common upbringing and similarity of age;
- ‘two of an age agree,’h(=lic h(/lika sc. te/rpeI,
- Aristot. Rh. 1371b 15. ‘Crabbed age
- and youth cannot live together.’ In its fuller form the proverb continues,
- ‘the old get on with the old,’ h(=lic h(/lika
+ ‘two of an age agree,’h(=lic h(/lika sc. te/rpeI,
+ Aristot. Rh. 1371b 15. ‘Crabbed age
+ and youth cannot live together.’ In its fuller form the proverb continues,
+ ‘the old get on with the old,’ h(=lic h(/lika
te/rpe, ge/rwn de/ te te/rpe ge/ronta schol. ad Plat. Plat. Phaedrus 240c. The next phrase appears to be a
- proverb as well. and ‘familiarity breeds fellowship,’ which
+ proverb as well. and ‘familiarity breeds fellowship,’ which
is why the friendship between brothers resembles that between members of a comradeship.
Cousins
and other relatives derive their attachment from the fraternal relationship, since it is
@@ -6528,7 +6528,7 @@ convert to P3
pleasant friends and with those who are friends for the sake of utility, who may be equal
or may differ in the amount of the benefitsi.e., the
pleasure or utility as the case may be. which they confer. Those who are equals
- must make matters equal by loving each other, etc.,i.e., ‘and by being good or pleasant and useful.’ equally;
+ must make matters equal by loving each other, etc.,i.e., ‘and by being good or pleasant and useful.’ equally;
those who are unequal by making a returnThe one who is
less good or pleasant or useful must give more affection: see 6.6, note, 7.2.
proportionate to the superiority of whatever kind on the one side.
@@ -6551,13 +6551,13 @@ convert to P3
grievance that they do not get as much as they want and deserve; and the one who is doing a service can never supply all that the
one receiving it wants.
It appears that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other defined by law,
- so the friendship based on utility may be either morali.e., either a ‘moral obligation’ or a contract enforceable by law.
- It is noteworthy that the term ‘friendship’ is stretched to include
+ so the friendship based on utility may be either morali.e., either a ‘moral obligation’ or a contract enforceable by law.
+ It is noteworthy that the term ‘friendship’ is stretched to include
the latter. or legal. Hence occasions for complaint chiefly occur when the type
of friendship in view at the conclusion of the transaction is not the same as when the a
relationship was formed. Such a connection when on stated
terms is one of the legal type, whether it be a purely business matter of exchange on the
- spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment,Or ‘more liberal in point of time.’ though
+ spot, or a more liberal accommodation for future repayment,Or ‘more liberal in point of time.’ though
still with an agreement as to the quid pro quo; and in the
latter case the obligation is clear and cannot cause dispute, though there is an element
of friendliness in the delay allowed, for which reason in some states there is no action
@@ -6573,15 +6573,15 @@ convert to P3
with an eye to receiving one in return, it is profitable to receive one. One ought therefore, if one can, to return the equivalent of services
received, and to do so willingly; for one ought not to make a man one's friend if one is
unwilling to return his favors. Recognizing therefore that one has made a mistake at the
- beginning and accepted a service from a wrong person—that is, a person who was
+ beginning and accepted a service from a wrong person—that is, a person who was
not a friend, and was not acting disinterestedlyLit.,
- ‘was not doing the service for its own sake,’ or perhaps
- ‘for the sake of friendship.’ But probably the text should be
- corrected to read ‘was not doing the service for one's own sake’:
- cf. 9.1.7, 10.6 fin. —one should accordingly end the transaction as if
+ ‘was not doing the service for its own sake,’ or perhaps
+ ‘for the sake of friendship.’ But probably the text should be
+ corrected to read ‘was not doing the service for one's own sake’:
+ cf. 9.1.7, 10.6 fin. —one should accordingly end the transaction as if
one had accepted the service on stated terms. Also, one would agreei.e., in any case of the sort, if at the outset the question of repayment
- were raised. to repay a service if able to do so (and if one were not
- able, the giver on his side too would not have expected repayment); hence, if
+ were raised. to repay a service if able to do so (and if one were not
+ able, the giver on his side too would not have expected repayment); hence, if
possible, one ought to make a return. But one ought to consider at the beginning from whom
one is receiving the service, and on what terms, so that one may accept it on those terms
or else decline it.
@@ -6600,7 +6600,7 @@ convert to P3
be more noble.
In friendships based on virtue, complaints do not arise, but the measure of the benefit
seems to be the intentionLit.,
- ‘choice’ in Aristotle's technical sense. of the giver; for
+ ‘choice’ in Aristotle's technical sense. of the giver; for
intention is the predominant factor in virtue and in character.
Differences also arise in friendships where there is disparity between the parties. Each
claims to get more than the other, and this inevitably leads to a rupture. If one is a
@@ -6611,7 +6611,7 @@ convert to P3
men think that it ought to be in a friendship as it is in a business partnership, where
those who contribute more capital take more of the profits. On the other hand the needy or
inferior person takes the opposite view: he maintains that it is the part of a good friend
- to assist those in need; what is the use (he argues) of being friends
+ to assist those in need; what is the use (he argues) of being friends
with the good and great if one is to get nothing out of it?
Now it appears that each of these rival claims is right. Both parties should receive a
larger share from the friendship, but not a larger share of the same thing: the superior
@@ -6628,7 +6628,7 @@ convert to P3
the preservative of friendship,i.e., the friendly
feeling between the citizens as such, see 9.1. But that this is maintained by to\ kat' a)ci/an has not been said before: indeed the phrase is
an odd description of what precedes, and its applicability to private friendship is
- denied just below. Perhaps ‘since requital . . . above’ is an
+ denied just below. Perhaps ‘since requital . . . above’ is an
interpolation. as has been said above.
This principle therefore should also regulate the intercourse of friends who are unequal:
the one who is benefited in purse or character must repay what he can, namely honor.
@@ -6655,20 +6655,20 @@ convert to P3
In all dissimilarOr
- ‘heterogeneous,’ i.e., friendships between dissimilar people, e.g.
+ ‘heterogeneous,’ i.e., friendships between dissimilar people, e.g.
one pleasant and the other useful, so that the benefits they confer on each other are
different in kind. This class of friendship has not been named before, thought it has
been recognized, e.g. 8.4.1, 2. It is however incorrectly stated here that the notion of
proportion has been applied to it; for the benefits exchanged in such friendships,
- though different in kind, are not ‘proportional,’ but actually equal
+ though different in kind, are not ‘proportional,’ but actually equal
in amount or value, just as much as in the friendships where they are the same in kind;
- see 8.6.7. The term ‘proportion’ has hitherto been used of
- ‘unequal’ friendships, where the superior party bestows more benefit
- (of whatever kind) than he receives, and equality is only restored by
- his receiving more affection than he bestows: see 8.7.2, 13.1 (and also 14.3,
- to which at first sight this passage might be taken to refer). No doubt a
- friendship might be both ‘dissimilar’ and
- ‘unequal.’ That between a good man and a superior in rank who also
+ see 8.6.7. The term ‘proportion’ has hitherto been used of
+ ‘unequal’ friendships, where the superior party bestows more benefit
+ (of whatever kind) than he receives, and equality is only restored by
+ his receiving more affection than he bestows: see 8.7.2, 13.1 (and also 14.3,
+ to which at first sight this passage might be taken to refer). No doubt a
+ friendship might be both ‘dissimilar’ and
+ ‘unequal.’ That between a good man and a superior in rank who also
surpasses him in goodness, which seems to be contemplated at 8.6.6, is a complex example
of this nature; the great man confers both material benefit and moral edification, the
good man returns moral edification only, but makes up the deficit by the greater regard
@@ -6696,9 +6696,9 @@ convert to P3
he played the more he would pay him; but next morning, when the harper asked him to fulfil
his promise, he said that he had already paid for the pleasure he had received by the
pleasure he had given.Plutarch, Plut. De Alexandri fortuna 2.1, tells the
- story of the tyrant Dionysius, who promised the musician a talent (there seems
+ story of the tyrant Dionysius, who promised the musician a talent (there seems
no particular point in the sliding scale of payment which Aristotle's version
- introduces) , but next day told him that he had already been sufficiently paid
+ introduces) , but next day told him that he had already been sufficiently paid
by the pleasure of anticipation. This would have been all right if both had
wanted pleasure; but when one wants amusement and the other gain, and one gets what he
wants and the other does not, it would not be a
@@ -6706,15 +6706,15 @@ convert to P3
and only to get that is he ready to give what he does.
Which party's business is it to decide the amount of the return due? Should it be
assessed by the one who proffers the initial service? Or rather by the one who
- receivesLit. ‘the one who receives
- first,’ and now has to give a service in return. it, since the other by
+ receivesLit. ‘the one who receives
+ first,’ and now has to give a service in return. it, since the other by
proffering it seems to leave the matter to him? This we are told was the practice of
ProtagorasCf. Plat. Prot.
328b.; when he gave lessons in any subject, he used to tell his pupil to
estimate the value he set upon his knowledge, and accepted a fee of that amount.
In such matters
- however some people prefer the principle of ‘the wage stated.’Hes. WD 370, misqo\s d' a)ndri\ fi/lw| ei)rhme/nos a)/krios e)/stw,
- ‘let the wage stated to a friend stand good.’ But people who
+ however some people prefer the principle of ‘the wage stated.’Hes. WD 370, misqo\s d' a)ndri\ fi/lw| ei)rhme/nos a)/krios e)/stw,
+ ‘let the wage stated to a friend stand good.’ But people who
take the money in advance, and then, having made extravagant professions, fail to perform
what they undertook, naturally meet with complaints because they have not fulfilled their
bargain. Perhaps however
@@ -6743,7 +6743,7 @@ convert to P3
buyer is willing to pay.; and in some countries the law does not allow actions
for the enforcement of voluntary covenants,Cf. 8.13.6.
The phrase occurs in Plat. Rep. 556a: cf. the
- ‘voluntary private transactions’ of 5.2.13. on the ground
+ ‘voluntary private transactions’ of 5.2.13. on the ground
that when you have trusted a man you ought to conclude the transaction as you began it.
For it is thought fairer for the price to be fixed by the person who received credit than
by the one who gave credit.This sentence seems to come
@@ -6766,21 +6766,21 @@ convert to P3
that no one person is entitled to unlimited consideration. As a general rule one ought to
return services rendered rather than do favors to one's comrades, just as one ought to pay
back a loan to a creditor rather than give the money to a friend. Yet perhaps even this rule is not
- without exceptions. For example, (a) suppose one has been ransomed from
- brigands; ought one to ransom one's ransomer in turn, whoever he may be—or even
+ without exceptions. For example, (a) suppose one has been ransomed from
+ brigands; ought one to ransom one's ransomer in turn, whoever he may be—or even
if he has not been captured himself but asks for his money back, ought one to repay
- him— or ought one to ransom one's own father? for it might be thought to
+ him— or ought one to ransom one's own father? for it might be thought to
be a man's duty to ransom his father even before himself. As a general rule then, as has been said, one ought
to pay back a debt, but if the balance of nobility or urgency is on the side of employing
the money for a gift, then one ought to decide in favor of the gift. For
- (b) there are occasions when it would be actually unfair to return the
+ (b) there are occasions when it would be actually unfair to return the
original service; as for instance when A has done B a service knowing him to be a good
man, and B is called upon to return the service to A whom he believes to be a bad man. For
even when A has lent B a loan, B is not always bound to lend A a loan in turn: A may have
lent money to B, who is an honest man, expecting to get his money back, while B would have
no hope of recovering from A, who is a rascal. If A is really a rascal, the return he asks
- for is not a fair one; and even if A is not a rascal, but people thinkPerhaps the text should be emended to ‘but B thinks he
- is.’ he is, it would not be deemed unreasonable for B to refuse.
+ for is not a fair one; and even if A is not a rascal, but people thinkPerhaps the text should be emended to ‘but B thinks he
+ is.’ he is, it would not be deemed unreasonable for B to refuse.
Hence, as has been frequently remarked already,See.
1.3.4, 2.2.3. discussions about our emotions and actions only admit of such
@@ -6801,7 +6801,7 @@ convert to P3
mother that appropriate to her. Again, we should pay to all our seniors the honor due to their age, by
rising when they enter, offering them a seat, and so on. Towards comrades and brothers on
the other hand we should use frankness of speech, and share all our possessions with them.
- Kinsmen also, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and the rest—to all we must
+ Kinsmen also, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and the rest—to all we must
always endeavor to render their due, comparing their several claims in respect of
relationship and of virtue or utility. Between persons of the same kind discrimination is comparatively easy;
but it is a harder matter when they are differently related to us. Nevertheless we must
@@ -6850,69 +6850,69 @@ convert to P3
The forms which friendly feeling
for our neighbors takes, and the marks by which the different forms of friendship are
defined, seem to be derived from the feelings of regard which we entertain for ourselves.
- A friend is defined as (a) one who wishes, and promotes by action, the
- real or apparent good of another for that other's sake; or (b) one who
- wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend's sake. (This
+ A friend is defined as (a) one who wishes, and promotes by action, the
+ real or apparent good of another for that other's sake; or (b) one who
+ wishes the existence and preservation of his friend for the friend's sake. (This
is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of former friends who have
quarrelled.i.e., have had a difference which keeps
- them from meeting, but still leaves them well disposed to each other.)
- Others say that a friend is (c) one who frequents another's society, and
- (d) who desires the same things as he does, or (e) one
- who shares his friend's joys and sorrows. (This too is very characteristic of
- mothers.) Friendship also is defined by one or other of these marks.These five notes of friendship are taken seriatim in
+ them from meeting, but still leaves them well disposed to each other.)
+ Others say that a friend is (c) one who frequents another's society, and
+ (d) who desires the same things as he does, or (e) one
+ who shares his friend's joys and sorrows. (This too is very characteristic of
+ mothers.) Friendship also is defined by one or other of these marks.These five notes of friendship are taken seriatim in
sects. 2-5, and again in sects. 8, 9, but in both cases the fourth is dealt with first.
But each of them is also found in a good man's feelings
- towards himself (and in those of all other men as well, in so far as they believe
+ towards himself (and in those of all other men as well, in so far as they believe
themselves to be good; but, as has been said, virtue and the virtuous man seem to be the
- standard in everything). For
- (d) the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same
- things with every part of his nature. Also (a) he wishes his own good,
- real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a good man
- to exert himself actively for the good) ; and he does so for his own sake
- (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears
- to be a man's real self). Also (b) he desires his own life and
+ standard in everything). For
+ (d) the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same
+ things with every part of his nature. Also (a) he wishes his own good,
+ real as well as apparent, and seeks it by action (for it is a mark of a good man
+ to exert himself actively for the good) ; and he does so for his own sake
+ (for he does it on account of the intellectual part of himself, and this appears
+ to be a man's real self). Also (b) he desires his own life and
security, and especially that of his rational part. For
existence is good for the virtuous man; and everyone wishes his own good: no one would choose to possess every good in the world on
- condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good even as it
- is),The parenthesis seems to mean that as
+ condition of becoming somebody else (for God possesses the good even as it
+ is),The parenthesis seems to mean that as
no one gains by God's now having the good, he would not gain if a new person which was
- no longer himself were to possess it (
- Ross). But ‘and every one . . . whatever he may
- be’ should perhaps be rejected as interpolated. but only while
+ no longer himself were to possess it (
+ Ross). But ‘and every one . . . whatever he may
+ be’ should perhaps be rejected as interpolated. but only while
remaining himself, whatever he may be; and it would appear that the thinking part is the
real self, or is so more than anything else. And
- (c) the good man desires his own company; for he enjoys being by
+ (c) the good man desires his own company; for he enjoys being by
himself, since he has agreeable memories of the past, and good hopes for the future, which
are pleasant too; also his mind is stored with subjects for contemplation. And
- (e) he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows; for the same
+ (e) he is keenly conscious of his own joys and sorrows; for the same
things give him pleasure or pain at all times, and not different things at different
times, since he is not apt to change his mind.
It is therefore because the good man has these various feelings towards himself, and
- because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a
- friend is another self) , that friendship also is thought to consist in one or
+ because he feels towards his friend in the same way as towards himself (for a
+ friend is another self) , that friendship also is thought to consist in one or
other of these feelings, and the possession of them is thought to be the test of a friend.
Whether a man can be said actually to feel friendship for himself is a question that may
- be dismissed for the present; though it may be held that he can do so in so farThe MSS. give ‘in so far as two or more of the
- characteristics specified are present,’ which hardly gives a sense. The words
- ‘though it may be held . . . self-regard,’ have been suspected as an
+ be dismissed for the present; though it may be held that he can do so in so farThe MSS. give ‘in so far as two or more of the
+ characteristics specified are present,’ which hardly gives a sense. The words
+ ‘though it may be held . . . self-regard,’ have been suspected as an
interpolation. as he is a dual or composite being, and because very intense
friendship resembles self regard.
As a matter of fact, the feelings of self-regard described appear to be found in most
people, even though they are of inferior moral worth. Perhaps men share them in so far as
they have their own approval and believe in their own virtue; since the utterly worthless
and criminal never possess them, or even have the appearance of doing so. Indeed it may almost be said that no morally inferior persons possess
- them. For (d) such persons are at variance with themselves, desiring one
+ them. For (d) such persons are at variance with themselves, desiring one
thing and wishing another: this is the mark of the unrestrained, who choose what is
pleasant but harmful instead of what they themselves think to be good.
- (a) Others again, out of cowardice and idleness, neglect to do what they
- think best for their own interests. And (b) men who have committed a
+ (a) Others again, out of cowardice and idleness, neglect to do what they
+ think best for their own interests. And (b) men who have committed a
number of crimes, and are hated for their wickedness, actually flee from life and make
- away with themselves. Also (c) bad men
+ away with themselves. Also (c) bad men
constantly seek the society of others and shun their own company, because when they are by
themselves they recall much that was unpleasant in the past and anticipate the same in the
future, whereas with other people they can forget. Moreover they feel no affection for
- themselves, because they have no lovable qualities. Hence (e) such men
+ themselves, because they have no lovable qualities. Hence (e) such men
do not enter into their own joys and sorrows, as there is civil war in their souls;
one part of their nature, owing to depravity, is
pained by abstinence from certain indulgences while another part is pleased by it; one
@@ -6944,7 +6944,7 @@ convert to P3
and would not actively assist them to attain it, nor be put to any trouble on their
behalf. Hence extending the meaning of the term friendship we may say that goodwill is
inoperative friendship, which when it continues and reaches the point of intimacy may
- become friendship proper—not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or
+ become friendship proper—not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or
pleasure, for these do not arouse goodwill. Goodwill is indeed rendered in return for
favors received, but this is merely the payment of a due; and that desire for an other's
welfare which springs from the anticipation of favors to come does not seem really to show
@@ -6963,15 +6963,15 @@ convert to P3
the parties: for instance, there is concord in the state when the citizens unanimously
decree that the offices of state shall be elective, or that an alliance shall be made with
Sparta, or that Pittacus shall be dictator
- (when Pittacus was himself willing to be dictatorPittacus was elected dictator of Mitylene early in the sixth century B.C.; he ruled for fourteen years, and
+ (when Pittacus was himself willing to be dictatorPittacus was elected dictator of Mitylene early in the sixth century B.C.; he ruled for fourteen years, and
then laid down his office. All the citizens wished him to continue, but this was not
strictly unanimity or Concord, since there was one dissentient, Pittacus
- himself.). When each of two persons wishes himself to rule, like the
+ himself.). When each of two persons wishes himself to rule, like the
rivalsEteocles and Polyneices. in the
Phoenissae,
Eur. Phoen. 558 ff.
there is discord; since men are not of one mind merely when each thinks the same
- thing (whatever this may be) , but when each thinks the same thing in
+ thing (whatever this may be) , but when each thinks the same thing in
relation to the same person: for instance, when both the common people and the upper classes
wish that the best people shall rule; for only so can all parties get what they desire.
Concord appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, which indeed is the
@@ -6993,9 +6993,9 @@ convert to P3
have his creditor out of the way, the lender actually watches over his debtor's safety, so
it is thought that the conferrer of a benefit wishes the recipient to live in order that
he may receive a return, but the recipient is not particularly anxious to make a return.
- Epicharmus no doubt would say that people who give this explanation are ‘looking
- at the seamy side’This half-line of verse
- (Epicharmus doubtless wrote qame/nous)
+ Epicharmus no doubt would say that people who give this explanation are ‘looking
+ at the seamy side’This half-line of verse
+ (Epicharmus doubtless wrote qame/nous)
is otherwise unknown. of life; but all the same it appears to be not untrue to
human nature, for most men have short memories, and are more desirous of receiving
benefits than of bestowing them.
@@ -7012,10 +7012,10 @@ convert to P3
therefore loves him more than his handiwork loves its maker. The reason of this is that
all things desire and love existence; but we exist in activity, since we exist by living
and doing; and in a senseIn a sense he exists
- ‘actually’ as long as his work lasts, though strictly speaking he
+ ‘actually’ as long as his work lasts, though strictly speaking he
exists as an actual maker only while the act of making is going on. A possible variant
- rendering is ‘and in a sense the work is its maker
- actualized.’ one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves
+ rendering is ‘and in a sense the work is its maker
+ actualized.’ one who has made something exists actively, and so he loves
his handiwork because he loves existence. This is in fact a fundamental principle of
nature: what a thing is potentially, that its work reveals in actuality.
Moreover for the benefactor there is an element of nobility in the act, and so he feels
@@ -7033,16 +7033,16 @@ convert to P3
naturally found in the more active party to the relationship.
Again, everybody loves a thing more if it has cost him trouble: for instance those who
have made money love money more than those who have inherited it. Now to receive a benefit
- seems to involve no labor, but to confer one is an effort. (This is why mothers
+ seems to involve no labor, but to confer one is an effort. (This is why mothers
love their children more than fathers, because parenthood costs the mother more trouble
- [and the mother is more certain that the child is her own].This seems an irrelevant insertion from 8.12.2
- f.) This also then would seem to be a characteristic of benefactors.
+ [and the mother is more certain that the child is her own].This seems an irrelevant insertion from 8.12.2
+ f.) This also then would seem to be a characteristic of benefactors.
The question is also raised whether one ought to love oneself or someone else most. We
- censure those who put themselves first, and ‘lover of self’ is used as
+ censure those who put themselves first, and ‘lover of self’ is used as
a term of reproach. And it is thought that a bad man considers himself in all he does, and
- the more so the worse he is—so it is a complaint against him for instance that
- ‘he never does a thing unless you make him’ —whereas a good
+ the more so the worse he is—so it is a complaint against him for instance that
+ ‘he never does a thing unless you make him’ —whereas a good
man acts from a sense of what is noble, and the better he is the more he so acts, and he
considers his friend's interest, disregarding his own.
But the facts do not accord with these theories; nor is this surprising. For we admit that one
@@ -7052,28 +7052,28 @@ convert to P3
all the other attributes that make up the definition of a friend; for it has been said
alreadySee chap. 4. that all the feelings
that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. Moreover, all
- the proverbs agree with this; for example, ‘Friends have one soul between
- them,’Eur.
- Orest. 1046. ‘Friends' goods are common property,’
- ‘Amity is equality,’ ‘The knee is nearer than the
- shin.’ ‘Charity begins at
- home’ (
- Ross). All of these sayings will apply most fully to oneself;
+ the proverbs agree with this; for example, ‘Friends have one soul between
+ them,’Eur.
+ Orest. 1046. ‘Friends' goods are common property,’
+ ‘Amity is equality,’ ‘The knee is nearer than the
+ shin.’ ‘Charity begins at
+ home’ (
+ Ross). All of these sayings will apply most fully to oneself;
for a man is his own best friend. Therefore he ought to love himself most.
So it is naturally debated which of these two views we ought to adopt, since each of them
has some plausibility.
Now where there is a conflict of opinion the proper course is doubtless to get the two
views clearly distinguished, and to define how far and in what way each of them is true.
So probably the matter may become clear if we ascertain what meaning each side attaches to
- the term ‘self-love.’
+ the term ‘self-love.’
Those then who make it a term of reproach call men lovers of self when they assign to
themselves the larger share of money, honors, or bodily pleasures; since these are the
things which most men desire and set their hearts on as being the greatest goods, and
which accordingly they compete with each other to obtain. Now those who take more than
their share of these things are men who indulge
their appetites, and generally their passions and the irrational part of their souls. But
- most men are of this kind. Accordingly the use of the term ‘lover of
- self’ as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind
+ most men are of this kind. Accordingly the use of the term ‘lover of
+ self’ as a reproach has arisen from the fact that self-love of the ordinary kind
is bad. Hence self-love is rightly censured in those who are lovers of self in this sense.
And that it is those who take too large a share of
things of this sort whom most people usually mean when they speak of lovers of self, is
@@ -7083,14 +7083,14 @@ convert to P3
any fault with him. Yet as a matter of fact such a man
might be held to be a lover of self in an exceptional degree. At all events he takes for
himself the things that are noblest and most truly good. Also it is the most dominant part
- of himself that he indulges and obeys in everything. But (a) as in the
+ of himself that he indulges and obeys in everything. But (a) as in the
state it is the sovereign that is held in the fullest sense to be the state, and in any
other composite whole it is the dominant part that is deemed especially to be that whole,
so it is with man. He therefore who loves and indulges the dominant part of himself is a
- lover of self in the fullest degree. Again (b) , the terms
- ‘self-restrained’ and ‘unrestrained’ denote being
+ lover of self in the fullest degree. Again (b) , the terms
+ ‘self-restrained’ and ‘unrestrained’ denote being
restrained or not by one's intellect, and thus imply that the intellect is the man
- himself. Also (c) it is our reasoned acts that are felt to be in the fullest
+ himself. Also (c) it is our reasoned acts that are felt to be in the fullest
sense our own acts, voluntary acts. It is therefore clear that a man is or is chiefly the
dominant part of himself, and that a good man values this part of himself most. Hence the
good man will be a lover of self in the fullest degree, though in another sense than the
@@ -7162,13 +7162,13 @@ convert to P3
has no need of adventitious pleasure. And as he does not need useful or pleasant friends,
it is assumed that he does not require friends at all.
But perhaps this inference is really untrue. For as we said at the beginning,1.7.15. The argument for friendship from the definition of
- happiness as virtuous and therefore pleasant activity is threefold: ( a) the virtuous actions of our friends give us
- (by sympathy) the same pleasure as our own; ( b) good activities (e.g. study) can
- be carried on longer (because less liable to fatigue) ; (
- g) virtuous friends increase our own virtue
- (as we unconsciously imitate their acts). Hence friends useful and
- pleasant because virtuous (though not useful or pleasant friends in the
- ordinary sense) are necessary adjuncts of happiness. happiness is a form
+ happiness as virtuous and therefore pleasant activity is threefold: ( a) the virtuous actions of our friends give us
+ (by sympathy) the same pleasure as our own; ( b) good activities (e.g. study) can
+ be carried on longer (because less liable to fatigue) ; (
+ g) virtuous friends increase our own virtue
+ (as we unconsciously imitate their acts). Hence friends useful and
+ pleasant because virtuous (though not useful or pleasant friends in the
+ ordinary sense) are necessary adjuncts of happiness. happiness is a form
of activity, and an activity clearly is something that comes into being, not a thing that
we possess all the time, like a piece of property. But if happiness consists in life and
activity, and the activity of a good man, as was said at the beginning,1.8.13. is good and so pleasant in itself, and if
@@ -7185,11 +7185,11 @@ convert to P3
will be more continuous if practised with friendsThe
last four words are implied by the context.; and the life of the supremely happy
should be continuously pleasantThis parenthesis comes
- better in 9.5 above, after the words, ‘the activity of a good man . . . is
- good and pleasant in itself.’ (for a good man, in virtue of
+ better in 9.5 above, after the words, ‘the activity of a good man . . . is
+ good and pleasant in itself.’ (for a good man, in virtue of
his goodness, enjoys actions that conform with virtue and dislikes those that spring from
wickedness, just as a skilled musician is pleased by good music and pained by
- bad). Moreover the society of the good may
+ bad). Moreover the society of the good may
supply a sort of training in goodness, as TheognisTheognis 35 e)sqlw=n me\n ga\r a)/p' e)sqla\
maqh/seai. remarks.
Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally, it appears that a virtuous friend is
@@ -7202,31 +7202,31 @@ convert to P3
itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and
what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all
men. We must not argue from a vicious and corrupt life,
- or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes.i.e., vice and pain. (The point as to pain
+ or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes.i.e., vice and pain. (The point as to pain
will be clearer in the sequel.Bk.
- 10.1-5.) But if life itself is good and
- pleasant (as it appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and
+ 10.1-5.) But if life itself is good and
+ pleasant (as it appears to be, because all men desire it, and virtuous and
supremely happy men most of all, since their way of life is most desirable and their
- existence the most blissful) ; and if one who sees is consciousai)sqa/nesqai is used
- throughout to denote ‘consciousness’ (as well as, where
- needed, ‘sensation). At 1170b 11 sunaisqa/nesqai expresses sympathetic consciousness of another's thoughts
+ existence the most blissful) ; and if one who sees is consciousai)sqa/nesqai is used
+ throughout to denote ‘consciousness’ (as well as, where
+ needed, ‘sensation). At 1170b 11 sunaisqa/nesqai expresses sympathetic consciousness of another's thoughts
and feelings; it is probable therefore that in l.4 the compound verb is a copyist's
mistake. that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks,
and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of
their exercise, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and
whenever we think, we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are
- perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we
- saw, is sense-perception or thought); and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant
- thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that
- one possesses a good thing is pleasant) ; and if life is desirable, and
+ perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we
+ saw, is sense-perception or thought); and if to be conscious one is alive is a pleasant
+ thing in itself (for life is a thing essentially good, and to be conscious that
+ one possesses a good thing is pleasant) ; and if life is desirable, and
especially so for good men, because existence is good for them, and so pleasant
- (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically
- good) ; and if the virtuous man feels towards
- his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a
- second self) —then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him,
+ (because they are pleased by the perception of what is intrinsically
+ good) ; and if the virtuous man feels towards
+ his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a
+ second self) —then, just as a man's own existence is desirable for him,
so, or nearly so, is his friend's existence also desirable. But, as we saw, it is the
consciousness of oneself as goodPerhaps to be emended
- ‘of its goodness,’ cf. l. 5 of the Greek. It is consciousness of
+ ‘of its goodness,’ cf. l. 5 of the Greek. It is consciousness of
life as good that makes it pleasant and desirable. that makes existence
desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought also to
share his friend's consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living
@@ -7240,13 +7240,13 @@ convert to P3
Therefore to be happy a man needs virtuous friends.
Ought we then to make as many friends as possible? or, just as it seems a wise saying
- about hospitality—
+ about hospitality—
Neither with troops of guests nor yet with none
Hes. WD 715
- — so also with friendship perhaps it will be fitting neither to be
+ — so also with friendship perhaps it will be fitting neither to be
without friends nor yet to make friends in excessive numbers. This rule would certainly seem applicable to those friends whom we
choose for their utilityBut cf. 8.6.3.; for it
is troublesome to have to repay the services of a large number of people, and life is not
@@ -7277,8 +7277,8 @@ convert to P3
Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Pirithous. It is not quite clear whether
they are quoted as examples of comradeship or friendship in general. are pairs of
friends. Persons of many friendships, who are hail-fellow-well-met with everybody, are
- thought to be real friends of nobody (otherwise than as fellow-citizens are
- friends) : I mean the sort of people we call obsequious. It is true that one may
+ thought to be real friends of nobody (otherwise than as fellow-citizens are
+ friends) : I mean the sort of people we call obsequious. It is true that one may
be friendly with many fellow-citizens and not be obsequious, but a model of excellence;
but it is not possible to have many friends whom we love for their virtue and for
themselves. We may be glad to find even a few
@@ -7312,52 +7312,52 @@ convert to P3
In prosperity again the company of friends sweetens our hours of leisure, and also
affords the pleasure of being conscious of their pleasure in our welfare.
Hence it may be thought that we ought to be eager to invite our friends to share our good
- fortune (since it is noble to wish to bestow benefits), but reluctant to
- ask them to come to us in misfortune (since we should impart to others as little
- as possible of what is evil: whence the proverb ‘My own misfortune is
- enough’). We should summon our friends to our aid chiefly when they
+ fortune (since it is noble to wish to bestow benefits), but reluctant to
+ ask them to come to us in misfortune (since we should impart to others as little
+ as possible of what is evil: whence the proverb ‘My own misfortune is
+ enough’). We should summon our friends to our aid chiefly when they
will be of great service to us at the cost of little trouble to themselves.
So, conversely, it is perhaps fitting that we should go uninvited and readily to those in
- misfortune (for it is the part of a friend to render service, and especially to
+ misfortune (for it is the part of a friend to render service, and especially to
those in need, and without being asked, since assistance so rendered is more noble and
- more pleasant for both parties); but to the prosperous, though we should go
- readily to help them (for even prosperity needs the cooperation of
- friends),Cf. 8.1.1 fin., 2 fin. we
- should be slow in going when it is a question of enjoying their good things (for
- it is not noble to be eager to receive benefits). But doubtless we should be
+ more pleasant for both parties); but to the prosperous, though we should go
+ readily to help them (for even prosperity needs the cooperation of
+ friends),Cf. 8.1.1 fin., 2 fin. we
+ should be slow in going when it is a question of enjoying their good things (for
+ it is not noble to be eager to receive benefits). But doubtless we should be
careful to avoid seeming churlish in repulsing their advances, a thing that does sometimes
occur.
It appears therefore that the company of friends is desirable in all circumstances.
As then lovers find their greatest delight in seeing those they love, and prefer the
gratification of the sense of sight to that of all the other senses, that sense being the
- chief seat and source of love, so likewise for friends (may we not say?)
- the society of each other is the most desirable thing there is. For (i)
- friendship is essentially a partnership. And (ii) a man stands in the
+ chief seat and source of love, so likewise for friends (may we not say?)
+ the society of each other is the most desirable thing there is. For (i)
+ friendship is essentially a partnership. And (ii) a man stands in the
same relation to a friend as to himselfSee chap. 4 and
9.5.; but the consciousness of his own existence is a good; so also therefore is
- the consciousness of his friend's existence; but thisOr possibly, ‘and friendship is realized in intercourse,’ a
+ the consciousness of his friend's existence; but thisOr possibly, ‘and friendship is realized in intercourse,’ a
separate reason for the thesis of the first sentence. consciousness is actualized
- in intercourse; hence friends naturally desire each other's society. And (iii) whatever pursuit it is that
+ in intercourse; hence friends naturally desire each other's society. And (iii) whatever pursuit it is that
constitutes existence for a man or that makes his life worth living, he desires to share
that pursuit with his friends. Hence some friends drink or dice together, others practise
athletic sports and hunt, or study philosophy, in each other's company; each sort spending
their time together in the occupation that they love best of everything in life; for
- wishing to live in their friends’ society, they pursue and take part with them
+ wishing to live in their friends’ society, they pursue and take part with them
in these occupations as best they can.The text is
- doubtful; most MSS. give, ‘by which they think they live in their
- society.’
+ doubtful; most MSS. give, ‘by which they think they live in their
+ society.’
Thus the friendship of inferior people is evil, for they take part together in inferior
- pursuits [being unstable,]It seems
+ pursuits [being unstable,]It seems
best to excise these words as an inapposite reminiscence of 4.10. and by becoming
like each other are made positively evil. But the friendship of the good is good, and
grows with their intercourse. And they seem actually to become better by putting their
- friendship into practice,For e)nergei=n (sc. filikw=s)
+ friendship into practice,For e)nergei=n (sc. filikw=s)
= suzh=n cf. 8.5.1. and because they correct each
other's faults, for each takes the impress from the other of those traits in him that give
- him pleasure—whence the saying: "Noble deeds from noble men."Cf. 9.7.
+ him pleasure—whence the saying: "Noble deeds from noble men."Cf. 9.7.
So much for our treatment of Friendship. Our next business will be to discuss
Pleasure.
@@ -7381,7 +7381,7 @@ convert to P3
Good. Others on the contrary say that it is altogether bad: some of them perhaps from a
conviction that it is really so, but others because they think it to be in the interests
of morality to make out that pleasure is bad, even if it is not, since most men
- (they argue) have a bias towards it, and are the slaves of their
+ (they argue) have a bias towards it, and are the slaves of their
pleasures, so that they have to be driven in the opposite direction in order to arrive at
the due mean.
@@ -7399,13 +7399,13 @@ convert to P3
That pleasure is the Good was held by Eudoxus, on the following grounds. He saw that all
creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it; but in every case
- (he argued) that which is desirable is good, and that which is most
- desirable is the best; therefore the fact that all creatures ‘move in the
- direction of’As we should say,
- ‘gravitate towards.’ Eudoxus, an unorthodox pupil of Plato, was a
+ (he argued) that which is desirable is good, and that which is most
+ desirable is the best; therefore the fact that all creatures ‘move in the
+ direction of’As we should say,
+ ‘gravitate towards.’ Eudoxus, an unorthodox pupil of Plato, was a
astronomer, and seems to have imported physical terminology into Ethics. the same
- thing indicates that this thing is the Supreme Good for all (since everything
- finds its own particular good, just as it finds its own proper food); but that
+ thing indicates that this thing is the Supreme Good for all (since everything
+ finds its own particular good, just as it finds its own proper food); but that
which is good for all, and which all seek to obtain, is the Good.
His arguments owed their acceptance however more to the excellence of his character than
to their own merit. He had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and
@@ -7417,9 +7417,9 @@ convert to P3
therefore its opposite must be intrinsically an object of desire to all.
Again, he argued that that thing is most desirable which we choose not as a means to or
for the sake of something else; but such admittedly is pleasure: we never ask a man for
- what purpose he indulges in pleasure—we assume it to be desirable in itself.
- He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good—for instance, just or
- temperate conduct—makes that good more desirable; but only the good can enhance
+ what purpose he indulges in pleasure—we assume it to be desirable in itself.
+ He also said that the addition of pleasure to any good—for instance, just or
+ temperate conduct—makes that good more desirable; but only the good can enhance
the good.
Now as for the last argument, it seems only to prove that pleasure is a good, and not
@@ -7464,21 +7464,21 @@ convert to P3
Again they arguePlat.
Phileb. 24e, Plat. Phileb. 31a. that
good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite, because it admits of degrees. Now
- (a) if they base this judgement on the fact that one can be more or less
+ (a) if they base this judgement on the fact that one can be more or less
pleased, the same argument will apply to Justice and the other virtues, the possessors of
which are clearly spoken of as being more or less
virtuous; for example, A may be more just or brave, and may act more, or less, justly or
- temperately, than B. If on the other hand (b) they judge by the nature
+ temperately, than B. If on the other hand (b) they judge by the nature
of the pleasures themselves, I am afraid they do not state the right ground for their
conclusion, if it be true that there are two kinds of pleasures, unmixed as well as
mixed.i.e., when they attribute
- ‘indefiniteness’ to pleasure, they are really thinking of the
- ‘mixed’ pleasures only; it does not apply to the
- ‘pure’ pleasures, in which there is no admixture of pain; and the
+ ‘indefiniteness’ to pleasure, they are really thinking of the
+ ‘mixed’ pleasures only; it does not apply to the
+ ‘pure’ pleasures, in which there is no admixture of pain; and the
distinction between these two kinds of pleasure is Plato's own.
- Again, (c) why should not pleasure be like health, which is definite
+
Again, (c) why should not pleasure be like health, which is definite
although it admits of degrees? For health is not constituted by the same proportion of
elements in all persons; nor yet by one particular proportion in the same person always,
but when it is in process of dissolution it still lasts for a certain time, and therefore
@@ -7487,21 +7487,21 @@ convert to P3
Again, they postulatePlat. Phileb. 53c-54d. that the Good is perfect, whereas a motion or
process of generation is imperfect, and then they attempt to prove that pleasure is a
- motion or process. This appears to be a mistake. (a) It would seem that
+ motion or process. This appears to be a mistake. (a) It would seem that
pleasure is not a motion; for we hold it to be a property of all motion to be quick or
- slow—if (as with the motionThis
+ slow—if (as with the motionThis
motion being uniform, it can only be spoken of as quick or slow in comparison with some
other motion. not absolutely, i.e. in comparison with itself at some other time.
- of the firmament) not absolutely, then relatively to some other moving body. But
+ of the firmament) not absolutely, then relatively to some other moving body. But
pleasure possesses neither absolute nor relative velocity. You can become pleased quickly,
just as you can get angry quickly: but you cannot be pleased quickly, nor yet more quickly than
somebody else, as you can walk, grow, etc., more quickly than somebody else. It is
possible to pass into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly, but not to function in that
- state—i.e. to feel pleasure—quickly. And (b) in what sense can pleasure
+ state—i.e. to feel pleasure—quickly. And (b) in what sense can pleasure
be a process of generation? We do not think that any chance thing can be generated from
any other chance thing, but that a thing at its dissolution is resolved into that from
which it is generated; and if pleasure is the generation of something, pain is the
- destruction of that thing. Also (c) they sayPlat. Phileb. 31e-32b, Plat. Phileb. 42c. that pain is a deficiency of
+ destruction of that thing. Also (c) they sayPlat. Phileb. 31e-32b, Plat. Phileb. 42c. that pain is a deficiency of
the natural state and pleasure is its replenishment. But these are bodily experiences. Now
if pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the pleasure will be felt by the
thing in which the replenishment takes place. Therefore it is the body that feels
@@ -7518,27 +7518,27 @@ convert to P3
occurred that may be replenished.
In reply to those who bring forward the disreputable pleasures, one may
- (a) deny that these are really pleasant: for granted they are pleasant
+ (a) deny that these are really pleasant: for granted they are pleasant
to ill-conditioned people, it cannot therefore be assumed that they are actually pleasant,
except to them, any more than things healthy or sweet or bitter to invalids are really so,
or any more than things that seem white to people with a disease of the eyes are really
white. Or
- (b) one may take the line that, though the pleasures themselves are
+ (b) one may take the line that, though the pleasures themselves are
desirable, they are not desirable when derived from those sources; just as wealth is
desirable, but not if won by treachery, or health, but not at the cost of eating anything
and everything. Or
- (c) we may say that pleasures differ in specific quality; since
- (a) those derived from noble sources are not the same as those derived
+ (c) we may say that pleasures differ in specific quality; since
+ (a) those derived from noble sources are not the same as those derived
from base sources, and it is impossible to feel the pleasures of a just man without being
- just, or the pleasures of a musician without being musical, and so on. And also ( b) the distinction between a friend and a flatterer
+ just, or the pleasures of a musician without being musical, and so on. And also ( b) the distinction between a friend and a flatterer
seems to show that pleasure is not a good, or else that pleasures are specifically
different; since a friend is thought to aim at doing good to his companion, a flatterer at
giving pleasure; to be a flatterer is a reproach, whereas a friend is praised because in
- his intercourse he aims at other things. And ( a) no one
+ his intercourse he aims at other things. And ( a) no one
would choose to retain the mind of a child throughout his life, even though he continued
- to enjoy the pleasures of childhood with undiminished zest; nor ( d) would anyone choose to find enjoyment in doing some
- extremely shameful act, although it would entail no painful consequences. Also (
- e) there are many things which we should be
+ to enjoy the pleasures of childhood with undiminished zest; nor ( d) would anyone choose to find enjoyment in doing some
+ extremely shameful act, although it would entail no painful consequences. Also (
+ e) there are many things which we should be
eager to possess even if they brought us no pleasure, for instance sight, memory,
knowledge, virtue. It may be the case that these things are necessarily attended by
pleasure, but that makes no difference; for we should desire them even if no pleasure
@@ -7576,16 +7576,16 @@ convert to P3
And the same is true of walking and the other forms of locomotion. For if locomotion is
motion from one point in space to another, and if this is of different kinds, flying,
walking, leaping and the like, and not only so, but if there are also differences in
- walking itself (for the terminal points of a race course are not the same as
+ walking itself (for the terminal points of a race course are not the same as
those of a portion of the course, nor are those of one portion the same as those of
another; nor is traversing this line the same as traversing that one,The lecturer appears to draw a line representing a racecourse, and divide
- it into two parts, representing two sections of the course (not two lines
- across the course). The motion of traversing one section is not the same as
+ it into two parts, representing two sections of the course (not two lines
+ across the course). The motion of traversing one section is not the same as
that of traversing the others, if only because they are in different places.
for the
runner does not merely travel along a certain line but travels along a line that is in a
certain place, and this line is in a different place from
- that)—however, for a full treatment of the subject of motion I must
+ that)—however, for a full treatment of the subject of motion I must
refer to another work,Physics,
6-8. but it appears that a motion is not perfect at every moment, but the many
movements which make up the whole are imperfect; and different from each other in kind,
@@ -7599,14 +7599,14 @@ convert to P3
a motion or of a process of generation. For we cannot so describe everything, but only
such things as are divided into parts and are not wholes. Thus an act of sight, a
geometrical point, an arithmetical unit are not the result of a process of generation
- (nor is any of them a motion or processThis
- parenthesis is perhaps an interpolation.). Pleasure therefore also is
+ (nor is any of them a motion or processThis
+ parenthesis is perhaps an interpolation.). Pleasure therefore also is
not the result of a motion or process; for pleasure is a whole.
Again, inasmuch as each of the senses acts in relation to its object, and acts perfectly
when it is in good condition and directed to the finest of the and objects that belong to
- it (for this seems to be the best description of perfect activity, it being
+ it (for this seems to be the best description of perfect activity, it being
assumed to make no difference whether it be the sense itself that acts or the organ in
- which the sense resides), it follows that the activity of any of the senses is at
+ which the sense resides), it follows that the activity of any of the senses is at
its best when the sense-organ being in the best condition is directed to the best of its
objects; and this activity will be the most perfect
and the pleasantest. For each sense has a corresponding pleasure, as also have thought and
@@ -7616,13 +7616,13 @@ convert to P3
pleasure does not however perfect the activity in the same way as the object perceived and
the sensory faculty, if good, perfect it; just as health and the physician are not in the
same way the cause of being healthy.
- (It is clear that each of the senses is accompanied by pleasure, since we apply
+
(It is clear that each of the senses is accompanied by pleasure, since we apply
the term pleasant to sights and soundsAs well as to
tastes, scents, and contacts, which are more obviously pleasant.; and it is also
clear that the pleasure is greatest when the sensory faculty is both in the best condition
and acting in relation to the best object; and given excellence in the perceived object
and the percipient organ, there will always be pleasure when an object to cause it and a
- subject to feel it are both present.)
+ subject to feel it are both present.)
But the pleasure perfects the activity, not as the fixed disposition does, by being
already present in the agent, but as a supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in
the young and vigorous.
@@ -7656,13 +7656,13 @@ convert to P3
perfects one kind of activity must differ in kind from that which perfects another kind.
Now the activities of the intellect differ from those
of the senses, and fromA variant reading gives
- ‘and these [sc. the activities of the senses] from one
- another.’ one another, in kind: so also therefore do the pleasures that
+ ‘and these [sc. the activities of the senses] from one
+ another.’ one another, in kind: so also therefore do the pleasures that
perfect them.
This may also be seen from the affinity which exists between the various pleasures and
the activities which they perfect. For an activity is augmented by the pleasure that
belongs to it; since those who work with pleasure always work with more discernment and
- with greater accuracy—for instance, students who are fond of geometry become
+ with greater accuracy—for instance, students who are fond of geometry become
proficient in it, and grasp its various problems better, and similarly lovers of music,
architecture or the other arts make progress in their favorite pursuit because they enjoy
it. An activity then is augmented by its pleasure; and that which augments a thing must be
@@ -7697,7 +7697,7 @@ convert to P3
separate in time and distinct in its nature from the activity, whereas the pleasure is
closely linked to the activity, indeed so inseparable from it as to raise a doubt whether
the activity is not the same thing as the pleasure. However, we must not regard pleasure as really being a thought or a
- sensation—indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem
+ sensation—indeed this is absurd, though because they are inseparable they seem
to some people to be the same.
As then activities are diverse, so also are their pleasures. Sight excels touch in purity,
and hearing and smell excel taste; and similarly the pleasures of the intellect excel in
@@ -7706,7 +7706,7 @@ convert to P3
And it is thought that every animal has its own special pleasure, just as it has its own
special function: namely, the pleasure of exercising that function. This will also appear
if we consider the different animals one by one: the horse, the dog, man, have different
- pleasures—as Heracleitus says, an ass would prefer chaff to gold, since to asses
+ pleasures—as Heracleitus says, an ass would prefer chaff to gold, since to asses
food gives more pleasure than gold. Different species therefore have different kinds of
pleasures. On the other hand it might be supposed that there is no variety among the
pleasures of the same species. But as a matter of fact in
@@ -7760,7 +7760,7 @@ convert to P3
supplying what their patrons desire, and what they want is amusement. So it is supposed
that amusements are a component part of happiness, because princes and potentates devote
their leisure to them.
- But (i) perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue
+
But (i) perhaps princes and potentates are not good evidence. Virtue
and intelligence, which are the sources of man's higher activities, do not depend on the
possession of power; and if these persons, having no taste fo pure and liberal pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the
body, we must not on that account suppose that bodily pleasures are the more desirable.
@@ -7771,26 +7771,26 @@ convert to P3
suits his particular disposition, and there fore the good a man thinks virtuous activity
most desirable. It follows therefore that happiness is
not to be found in amusements.
- (ii)Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be our
- End—that we should toil and moil all our life long in order that we may amuse
+
(ii)Indeed it would be strange that amusement should be our
+ End—that we should toil and moil all our life long in order that we may amuse
ourselves. For virtually every object we adopt is pursued as a means to something else,
excepting happiness, which is an end in itself; to make amusement the object of our
serious pursuits and our work seems foolish and childish to excess: Anacharsis's motto,
Play in order that you may work, is felt to be the right rule. For amusement is a form of
rest; but we need rest because we are not able to go on working without a break, and
therefore it is not an end, since we take it as a means to further activity.
- (iii) And the life that conforms with virtue is thought to be a happy
+ (iii) And the life that conforms with virtue is thought to be a happy
life; but virtuous life involves serious purpose, and does not consist in amusement.
- (iv) Also we pronounce serious things to be superior to things that are
+
(iv) Also we pronounce serious things to be superior to things that are
funny and amusing; and the nobler a faculty or a person is, the more serious, we think,
are their activities; therefore, the activity of the nobler faculty or person is itself
superior, and therefore more productive of happiness.
- (v) Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a slave no less
+
(v) Also anybody can enjoy the pleasures of the body, a slave no less
than the noblest of mankind; but no one allows a slave any measure of happiness, any more
- than a life of his own.Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1280a 32 ‘Slaves and lower
+ than a life of his own.Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1280a 32 ‘Slaves and lower
animals are not members of the state, because they do not participate in happiness nor
- in purposeful life.’ Therefore happiness does not consist in pastimes
+ in purposeful life.’ Therefore happiness does not consist in pastimes
and amusements, but in activities in accordance with virtue, as has been said already.
But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it
@@ -7800,13 +7800,13 @@ convert to P3
either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of
us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that
will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated alreadyThis does not appear to have been stated exactly, but in Book 6
- (see esp. 5.3, 13.8) it was shown that sofi/a, the virtue of the higher part of the intellect, is the highest of the
+ (see esp. 5.3, 13.8) it was shown that sofi/a, the virtue of the higher part of the intellect, is the highest of the
virtues. that this activity is the activity of contemplation.
And that happiness consists in contemplation may be accepted as agreeing both with the
results already reached and with the truth. For contemplation is at once the highest form
- of activity (since the intellect is the
+ of activity (since the intellect is the
highest thing in us, and the objects with which the intellect deals are the highest things
- that can be known) , and also it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more
+ that can be known) , and also it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more
continuously than we can carry on any form of action. And
again we suppose that happiness must contain an element of pleasure; now activity in
accordance with wisdom is admittedly the most pleasant of the activities in accordance
@@ -7826,27 +7826,27 @@ convert to P3
Also happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do
business in order that we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may have
peace. Now the practical virtues are exercised in politics or in warfare; but the pursuits
- of politics and war seem to be unleisured—those of war indeed entirely so, for
+ of politics and war seem to be unleisured—those of war indeed entirely so, for
no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war, nor deliberately takes steps to
cause a war: a man would be thought an utterly bloodthirsty character if he declared war
on a friendly state for the sake of causing battles and massacres. But the activity of the
politician also is unleisured, and aims at securing something beyond the mere
- participation in politics—positions of authority and honor, or, if the happiness
+ participation in politics—positions of authority and honor, or, if the happiness
of the politician himself and of his fellow-citizens, this happiness conceived as
- something distinct from political activity (indeed we are clearly investigating
- it as so distinct).Probably the sentence
- should be curtailed to run ‘or in fact the happiness of himself and his
+ something distinct from political activity (indeed we are clearly investigating
+ it as so distinct).Probably the sentence
+ should be curtailed to run ‘or in fact the happiness of himself and his
fellow-citizens; and happiness we are clearly investigating as something distinct from
- the art of politics [whose object it is].’
+ the art of politics [whose object it is].’
If then among practical pursuits displaying the virtues,
politics and war stand out preeminent in nobility and grandeur, and yet they are
unleisured, and directed to some further end, not chosen for their own sakes: whereas the
- activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth,This should almost certainly be emended to ‘excel in
- leisuredness.’ consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a
+ activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious worth,This should almost certainly be emended to ‘excel in
+ leisuredness.’ consisting as it does in contemplation, and to aim at no end beyond itself, and also to contain a
pleasure peculiar to itself, and therefore augmenting its activityA reminder of 5.2.: and if accordingly the attributes of this
activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such freedom from fatigue as is
possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness: it follows that it is the
- activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness—provided it
+ activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness—provided it
be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be
incomplete.
Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level:This section and 8.7 and 13 interpret 1.9.3. not in virtue of his
@@ -7881,18 +7881,18 @@ convert to P3
human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and the happiness that
belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that belongs to the intellect is separateIn Aristot. De anima
3.5 Aristotle distinguishes the active from the passive intellect, and pronounces
- the former to be ‘separate or separable (from matter, or the
- body), unmixed and impassible.’: so much may be said about it
+ the former to be ‘separate or separable (from matter, or the
+ body), unmixed and impassible.’: so much may be said about it
here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our present purpose.
And such happiness would appear to need but little
external equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue.Cf. 7.4, 8.9, 10, and 1.8.15-17. Both, it may be granted, require
- the mere necessaries of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician
+ the mere necessaries of life, and that in an equal degree (though the politician
does as a matter of fact take more trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the
- philosopher) ; for in this respect there may be little difference between them.
+ philosopher) ; for in this respect there may be little difference between them.
But for the purpose of their special activities their requirements will differ widely. The
liberal man will need wealth in order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just
- man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible,
- and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need
+ man in order to discharge his obligations (since mere intentions are invisible,
+ and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly); and the brave man will need
strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the temperate man
opportunity for indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the possessor of any other virtue,
show that he is virtuous? It is disputed also whether
@@ -7909,10 +7909,10 @@ convert to P3
contemplative activity. The gods, as we conceive them, enjoy supreme felicity and
happiness. But what sort of actions can we attribute to them? Just actions? but will it
not seem ridiculous to think of them as making contracts, restoring deposits and the like?
- Then brave actions—enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so
+ Then brave actions—enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so
doing? Or liberal actions? but to whom will they give? Besides, it would be absurd to
suppose that they actually have a coinage or currency of some sort! And temperate
- actions—what will these mean in their case? surely it would be derogatory to
+ actions—what will these mean in their case? surely it would be derogatory to
praise them for not having evil desires! If we go through the list we shall find that all
forms of virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods. Yet nevertheless they
have always been conceived as, at all events, living, and therefore living actively, for
@@ -7931,8 +7931,8 @@ convert to P3
it enjoys happiness, not as an accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in
it, since contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some form of
contemplation.
- But the philosopher being a man will also need external well—being, since man's
- nature is not self—sufficient for the activity of contemplation, but he must
+
But the philosopher being a man will also need external well—being, since man's
+ nature is not self—sufficient for the activity of contemplation, but he must
also have bodily health and a supply of food and other requirements. Yet if supreme blessedness is
not possible without external goods, it must not be supposed that happiness will demand
many or great possessions; for self-sufficiency does not depend on excessive abundance,
@@ -7942,7 +7942,7 @@ convert to P3
seem to be less but more given to doing virtuous actions than princes and potentates. It
is sufficient then if moderate resources are forthcoming; for a life of virtuous activity
will be essentially a happy life.
- Solon also doubtless gave a good description of happiness,Solon in his conversation with Croesus (Hdt.1.30-32, see 1.10.1, note) says that Tellus the Athenian was the
+ Solon also doubtless gave a good description of happiness,Solon in his conversation with Croesus (Hdt.1.30-32, see 1.10.1, note) says that Tellus the Athenian was the
happiest man he ever knew. Tellus was well off, he lived to see his children's children,
and he died gloriously in battle. when he said that in his opinion those men were
happy who, being moderately equipped with external goods, had performed noble exploits and
@@ -7979,12 +7979,12 @@ convert to P3
know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavor to possess and to practice it, or in
some other manner actually ourselves to become good.
Now if discourses on ethics were sufficient in themselves to make men virtuous,
- ‘large fees and many’ (as TheognisTheognis, 432 ff.
+ ‘large fees and many’ (as TheognisTheognis, 432 ff.
ei)= d' *)asklhpia/dais tou=to g' e)/dwke qeo/s, i)a=sqai
kako/thta kai\ a)thra\s fre/nas a)ndrw=n, pollou\s a)\n misqou\s kai\ mega/lous
e)/feron If to physicians God had given The power to cure mankind of sin,
- Large fees and many they would win. says) ‘would they
- win,’ quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all that is wanted.
+ Large fees and many they would win. says) ‘would they
+ win,’ quite rightly, and to provide such discourses would be all that is wanted.
But as it is, we see that although theories have power to stimulate and encourage generous
youths, and, given an inborn nobility of character and a genuine love of what is noble,
can make them susceptible to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to stimulate
@@ -8027,7 +8027,7 @@ convert to P3
respond, yet he is bound to impose chastisement and penalties on the disobedient and
ill-conditioned, and to banish the incorrigible out of the state altogether.
Plat. Prot. 325a
- For (they argue) although the virtuous man, who guides his life
+
For (they argue) although the virtuous man, who guides his life
by moral ideals, will be obedient to reason, the base, whose desires are fixed on
pleasure, must be chastised by pain, like a beast of burden. This indeed is the ground for
the view that the pains and penalties for transgressors should be such as are most opposed
@@ -8045,15 +8045,15 @@ convert to P3
the only or almost the only state in which the lawgiver has paid attention to the nurture
and exercises of the citizens; in most states such matters have been entirely neglected,
and every man lives as he likes, in Cyclops
- fashion ‘laying down the law For children and for spouse.’Hom. Od. 9.114 f.,
+ fashion ‘laying down the law For children and for spouse.’Hom. Od. 9.114 f.,
quoted in Aristot. Pol. 1252b 22.
The best thing is then that there should be a proper system of public regulation; but
when the matter is neglected by the community, it would seem to be the duty of the
individual to assist his own children and friends to attain virtue, or even if not able to
do so successfully,This clause, literally
- ‘and to be able to do it,’ Bywater would place here; it comes in the
- mss. after ‘public regulation’ above. at all events to make
+ ‘and to be able to do it,’ Bywater would place here; it comes in the
+ mss. after ‘public regulation’ above. at all events to make
this his aim. But it would seem to follow from what has been said before, that he will be
more likely to be successful in this if he has acquired the science of legislation. Public
regulations in any case must clearly be established by law, and only good laws will
@@ -8073,8 +8073,8 @@ convert to P3
any other director can best treat a particular person if he has a general knowledge of
what is good for everybody, or for other people of the same kind: for the sciences deal
with what is universal, as their namese.g., medicine
- is ‘the science of healing,’ not the ‘science of healing
- Brown or Jones.’ imply. Not but what
+ is ‘the science of healing,’ not the ‘science of healing
+ Brown or Jones.’ imply. Not but what
it is possible no doubt for a particular individual to be successfully treated by someone
who is not a scientific expert, but has an empirical knowledge based on careful
observation of the effects of various forms of treatment upon the person in question; just
@@ -8083,10 +8083,10 @@ convert to P3
doubtless be agreed that anyone who wishes to make himself a professional and a man of
science must advance to general principles, and acquaint himself with these by the proper
method: for science, as we said, deals with the universal. So presumably a man who wishes to make other people better
- (whether few or many) by discipline, must endeavor to acquire the
- science of legislation—assuming that it is possible to make us good by laws. For
+ (whether few or many) by discipline, must endeavor to acquire the
+ science of legislation—assuming that it is possible to make us good by laws. For
to mold aright the character of any and every person that presents himself is not a task
- that can be done by anybody, but only (if at all) by the man with
+ that can be done by anybody, but only (if at all) by the man with
scientific knowledge, just as is the case in medicine and the other professions involving
a system of treatment and the exercise of prudence.
Is not then the next question to consider from whom or how the science of legislation can
@@ -8098,8 +8098,8 @@ convert to P3
politics the sophists, who profess to teach the science, never practice it. It is
practiced by the politicians, who would appear to rely more upon a sort of empirical skill
than on the exercise of abstract intelligence; for we do not see them writing or lecturing
- about political principles (though this might be a more honorable employment than
- composing forensic and parliamentary speeches), nor yet do we notice that they
+ about political principles (though this might be a more honorable employment than
+ composing forensic and parliamentary speeches), nor yet do we notice that they
have made their own sons or any others of their friends into statesmen. Yet we should expect them to have done so had they been able, for they
could have bequeathed no more valuable legacy to their countries, nor is there any quality
they would choose for themselves, and therefore for those nearest to them, to possess, in
@@ -8137,9 +8137,9 @@ convert to P3
the constitution of the State, in order to complete as far as possible our philosophy of
human affairs.
WeThis section roughly gives the contents of
- Aristotle's Politics, excepting Book 1; ‘a review,’
- etc., is Book 2, ‘then,’ etc., Books 3-4, ‘what is the
- best constitution,’ etc., Books 7 and 8. will begin then by attempting
+ Aristotle's
Politics, excepting Book 1; ‘a review,’
+ etc., is Book 2, ‘then,’ etc., Books 3-4, ‘what is the
+ best constitution,’ etc., Books 7 and 8. will begin then by attempting
a review of any pronouncements of value contributed by our predecessors in this or that
branch of the subject; and then on the basis of our collection of constitutionsAristotle compiled, or caused to be compiled, descriptions
of the constitutions of 158 Greek states: of these the Constitution of Athens alone survives. we will
diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg025/tlg0086.tlg025.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg025/tlg0086.tlg025.perseus-eng1.xml
index 86d0187f7..a003a4e26 100644
--- a/data/tlg0086/tlg025/tlg0086.tlg025.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg025/tlg0086.tlg025.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>Most of the earliest philosophers conceived only of material
principles as underlying all things. That of which all things consist, from which they
first come and into which on their destruction they are ultimately resolved, of which the
- essence persists although modified by its affections—this, they say, is an element
+ essence persists although modified by its affections—this, they say, is an element
and principle of existing things. Hence they believe that nothing is either generated or
destroyed, since this kind of primary entity always persists. Similarly we do not say that
Socrates comes into being absolutely when he becomes handsome or cultured,
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@
gods, also held this same opinion about the primary entity. For theycf. Hom. Il. 14. 201,
Hom. Il. 14.246. represented Oceanus and
- Tethys to be the parents of creation, and the oath of the gods to be by water—
+ Tethys to be the parents of creation, and the oath of the gods to be by water—
Styx,Cf. Hom. Il.
2.755, Hom. Il. 14.271, Hom. Il.15.37. as they call it. Now what is most
@@ -362,13 +362,13 @@
anchored="yes">Fl. about 500 B.C. of Ephesus hold this of fire; and EmpedoclesOf Acragas; fl. 450
- B.C.—adding earth as a fourth to those already mentioned—takes all
+ B.C.—adding earth as a fourth to those already mentioned—takes all
four. These, he says, always persist, and are only generated in respect of multitude and
paucity, according as they are combined into unity or differentiated out of unity.Cf. Empedocles, Fr. 17 (Diels),
R.P. 166; Burnet, E.G.P. 108-109. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae—prior to
- Empedocles in point of age, but posterior in his activities—says that the first
+ />Anaxagoras of Clazomenae—prior to
+ Empedocles in point of age, but posterior in his activities—says that the first
principles are infinite in number. For he says that as a general rule all things which
are, like fire and water,This is Aristotle's
illustration; apparently Anaxagoras did not regard the "elements" as homoeomerous (i.e.
@@ -448,11 +448,11 @@
things than there are good and beautiful: in view of this another thinker introduced Love
and StrifeEmpedocles Fr. 17,
26 (Diels); R.P. 166. Cf. Burnet, E.G.P. 108 ff. as the respective
- causes of these things— because if one
+ causes of these things— because if one
follows up and appreciates the statements of Empedocles with a view to his real meaning
and not to his obscure language, it will be found that Love is the cause of good, and
Strife of evil. Thus it would perhaps be correct to say that Empedocles in a sense spoke
- of evil and good as first principles, and was the first to do so—that is, if the
+ of evil and good as first principles, and was the first to do so—that is, if the
cause of all good things is absolute good. These thinkers then, as I say, down to the time of
Empedocles, seem to have grasped two of the causes which we have defined in the
@@ -478,9 +478,9 @@
his predecessors in that he first introduced the division of this cause, making the source
of motion not one but two contrary forces. Further, he was the first to maintain that the so-called material elements are
- four—not that he uses them as four, but as two only, treating fire on the one hand
- by itself, and the elements opposed to it—earth, air and water—on the other,
+ by itself, and the elements opposed to it—earth, air and water—on the other,
as a single nature.Cf. 3.14. This can be
seen from a study of his writings.e.g. Empedocles, Fr. 62 (Diels). however, and his disciple DemocritusOf Abdera;
fl. circa 420 B.C. E.G.P loc. cit. hold that the
- elements are the Full and the Void—calling the one "what is" and the other "what is
+ elements are the Full and the Void—calling the one "what is" and the other "what is
not." Of these they identify the full or solid with "what is," and the void or rare with
"what is not" (hence they hold that what is not is no less real than what is,For the probable connection between the Atomists and
@@ -524,13 +524,13 @@
principles, and they fancied that they could detect in numbers, to a greater extent than
in fire and earth and water, many analoguesCf.
Aristot. Met. 14.6ff.. of what is and
- comes into being—such and such a property of number being justice
+ comes into being—such and such a property of number being justice
,Apparently (cf. infra, Aristot. Met. 1.17) they identified these not only
with properties of number but with numbers themselves. Thus justice
(properly=squareness)=4, the first square number; soul or mind=1, opportunity=7
(Alexander). and such and such soul or mind , another
- opportunity , and similarly, more or less, with all the rest—and
+ opportunity , and similarly, more or less, with all the rest—and
since they saw further that the properties and ratios of the musical scales are based on
numbers,Pythagoras himself is credited with
having discovered the ratios of the octave (2 : 1), the fifth (3 : 2) and the fourth (4
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@
anchored="yes">The Pythagoreans; so called because Pythagoras founded his society at
Croton. philosophers the other
thinkers have expressed themselves vaguely on the subject, except that, as we have said,
- they actually employ two causes, and one of these—the source of motion —some
+ they actually employ two causes, and one of these—the source of motion —some
regard as one and others as two. The Pythagoreans, while they likewise spoke of two
principles, made this further addition, which is peculiar to them: they believed, not that
the Limited and the Unlimited are separate entities, like fire or water or some other such
@@ -659,10 +659,10 @@
nature of their pronouncements on this subject. They also began to discuss and define the
"what" of things; but their procedure was far too simple. They defined superficially, and
supposed that the essence of a thing is that to which the term under consideration first
- applies—e.g. as if it were to be thought that "double" and "2" are the same, because
+ applies—e.g. as if it were to be thought that "double" and "2" are the same, because
2 is the first number which is double another. But presumably "to be double a number" is not the same as "to be the number 2."
- Otherwise, one thing will be many—a consequence which actually followed in their
+ Otherwise, one thing will be many—a consequence which actually followed in their
system.i.e., the same number might be the first
to which each of several definitions applied; then that number would be each of the
concepts so defined. This much, then, can be learned from other and earlier
@@ -674,9 +674,9 @@
Italians. In his youth Plato first became
acquainted with CratylusCf. Aristot. Met. 4.5.18. and the Heraclitean
- doctrines—that the whole sensible world is always in a state of flux,Plat. Crat. 402a (fr.
- 41 Bywater). and that there is no scientific knowledge of it—and
+ 41 Bywater). and that there is no scientific knowledge of it—and
in after years he still held these opinions. And when Socrates, disregarding the physical
universe and confining his study to moral questions, sought in this sphere for the
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@
things which bear the same name as the Forms exist by participation in them. (With regard
to the "participation," it was only the term that he changed; for whereas the Pythagoreans
say that things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they exist by
- participation—merely a change of term. As
+ participation—merely a change of term. As
to what this "participation" or "imitation" may be, they left this an open
question.) Further, he states that besides sensible things
and the Forms there exists an intermediate class, the objects of
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@
points out (note ad loc.), we may keep prw/twn in the
sense of "prime" if we suppose Aristotle to be referring either (a) to the numbers
within the decad (Aristot. Met. 13.8.17) and
- forgetting 9—the other odd numbers being primes; or (b) to numbers in general, and
+ forgetting 9—the other odd numbers being primes; or (b) to numbers in general, and
forgetting the entire class of compound odd numbers. Neither of these alternatives is
very satisfactory, but it seems better to keep the traditional text. can be
readily generated from it, as from a matrix.For a
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@
the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it
in the Forms. He also tells us what the
material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things,
- and the One in that of the Forms—that it is this the duality, the "Great and Small."
+ and the One in that of the Forms—that it is this the duality, the "Great and Small."
Further, he assigned to these two elements respectively the causation of goodCf. Plat. Phil.
25e-26b. and of evil; a problem which, as we have said,(for some have so described the primary element).
These, then, apprehended this cause only, but others apprehended the source of
- motion—e.g. all such as make Love and Strife, or Mind, or Desire a first
+ motion—e.g. all such as make Love and Strife, or Mind, or Desire a first
principle. As for the essence or
essential nature, nobody has definitely introduced it; but the inventors of the Forms
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@
generation and destruction, and investigate the nature of everything; and at the same time
do away with the cause of motion. Then there is
their failure to regard the essence or formula as a cause of anything; and
- further their readiness to call any one of the simple bodies—except earth—a
+ further their readiness to call any one of the simple bodies—except earth—a
first principle, without inquiring how their reciprocal generation is effected. I refer to
fire, water, earth and air. Of these some are generated from each other by combination and
others by differentiation; and this difference
@@ -843,15 +843,15 @@
particles. Hence all who posit Fire as first
principle will be in the closest agreement with this theory. However, even among the other
thinkers everyone agrees that the primary corporeal element is of this kind. At any rate
- none of the Monists thought earth likely to be an element—obviously on account of
- the size of its particles— but each of
+ none of the Monists thought earth likely to be an element—obviously on account of
+ the size of its particles— but each of
the other three has had an advocate; for some name fire as the primary element, others
water, and others air.Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.5, 8. And yet why do they not
suggest earth too, as common opinion does? for people say "Everything is earth." And Hesiod too saysCf. Aristot. Met. 4.1. that
- earth was generated first of corporeal things—so ancient and popular is the
+ earth was generated first of corporeal things—so ancient and popular is the
conception found to be. Thus according to this theory anyone who suggests any of these
bodies other than fire, or who assumes something "denser than air but rarer than
water,"Cf. If one were to infer that
Anaxagoras recognized twoMind, and the "mixture" of
homoeomerous particles. elements, the inference would accord closely with a view
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@
be separated). At the same time, if one were to follow his doctrine carefully and
interpret its meaning, perhaps it would be seen to be more up-to-date; because when nothing was yet differentiated, obviously nothing
- could be truly predicated of that substance—e.g. that it was white or black or buff
+ could be truly predicated of that substance—e.g. that it was white or black or buff
or any other color. It must necessarily have been colorless, since otherwise it would have
had one of these colors. Similarly by the same
argument it had no taste or any other such attribute; for it cannot have had any quality
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@
and
observe what happens in respect of its parts and affections and activities, and they use
up their principles and causes in this connection, as though they agreed with the
- others—the physicists—that reality is just so much as is sensible and is
+ others—the physicists—that reality is just so much as is sensible and is
contained in the so-called "heavens." All the
same, as we have said,Aristot. Met. 1.8.17. the causes and principles
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@
and a little above or below them Injustice and Separation or Mixture, and when they state
as proof of this that each of these abstractions is a number; and that also in this region
there is already a plurality of the magnitudes composed of number, inasmuch as these
- modifications of number correspond to these several regions,—is the number which we
+ modifications of number correspond to these several regions,—is the number which we
must understand each of these abstractions to be the same number which is present in the
sensible universe, or another kind of number?The
point seems to be this. The Pythagoreans say that Opinion is a number, 3 (or 2,
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@
n="Aristot. Met. 1.990a">Aristot. Met. 9.1-15 cf. Aristot. Met. 13.4.6-5. in the first place in
their attempt to find the causes of things in our sensible world, they introduced an equal
- number of other entities—as though a man who wishes to count things should suppose
+ number of other entities—as though a man who wishes to count things should suppose
that it would be impossible when they are few, and should attempt to count them when he
has added to them. For the Forms are as many as, or not fewer than, the things in search
of whose causes these thinkers were led to the Forms; because corresponding to each thing
@@ -1139,7 +1139,7 @@
number <of units>, taken together, be one thing? And further, in addition to the
above objections, if the units are unlike, they should be treated as the thinkers who
assume two or four elements treat those elements; for not one of them applies the term
- "element" to the common substrate, e.g. body, but to fire and earth—whether there is
+ "element" to the common substrate, e.g. body, but to fire and earth—whether there is
a common substrate (i.e. body) or not.In the Aristot. De Gen. et Corr. 320b 23Aristotle says that
there is not. As it is, the One is
@@ -1182,13 +1182,13 @@
n="Aristot. Met. 1.981a">Aristot. Met. 1.9. and in the belief that we
are accounting for their substance we assert the existence of other substances; but as to
how the latter are the substances of the former, our explanation is
- worthless—for "participation," as we have said before,Aristot. Met. 1.12. means
nothing. And as for that which we can see to
- be the cause in the sciences, and through which all mind and all nature works—this
+ be the cause in the sciences, and through which all mind and all nature works—this
causeThe final cause. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.9-10. which we hold to be one
- of the first principles—the Forms have not the slightest bearing upon it either.
+ of the first principles—the Forms have not the slightest bearing upon it either.
Philosophy has become mathematics for modern thinkers,e.g. Speusippus, for whom see Aristot.
Met. 7.2.4. although they profess it does not
follow, even if you grant them all their assumptions that everything is One, but only that
- there is an absolute One— and not even
+ there is an absolute One— and not even
this, unless you grant that the universal is a class; which is impossible in some
cases.Probably those of relative or negative
terms. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.3. Nor is there
@@ -1237,7 +1237,7 @@
embraces everythinge.g. Plato's
Dialectic.(as some say), the student of it can have no previous
knowledge at all. But all learning proceeds, wholly or in part, from what is already
- known; whether it is through demonstration or through definition—since the parts of
+ known; whether it is through demonstration or through definition—since the parts of
the definition must be already known and familiar. The same is true of induction.
On the other hand, assuming that this knowledge should
@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@
how is one to know of what elements things consist? how is it to be
established? Even this presents a
difficulty, because the facts might be disputed, as happens in the case of certain
- syllables—for some say that ZA is composed of S, D and A, while others say that it
+ syllables—for some say that ZA is composed of S, D and A, while others say that it
is a distinct sound and not any one of those which are familiar to us.stoixei=on means both
"an element" and "a letter of the alphabet"; hence letters are often used as analogues
@@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@
cause, but did not apply it generally. which is the definition or essence of a
thing. But by similar reasoning both flesh
and every other thing, or else nothing at all,
- must be ratio; for it must be because of this, and not because of their matter—which
- he calls fire, earth, water and air—that flesh and bone and every other thing
+ must be ratio; for it must be because of this, and not because of their matter—which
+ he calls fire, earth, water and air—that flesh and bone and every other thing
exists. If anyone else had stated this, he
would necessarily have agreed, but his own statement was not clear. These and similar points have been explained already. We will now return to
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@
rather superficial opinions. They too have contributed something; by their preliminary
work they have formed our mental experience. If
there had been no Timotheus,Of Miletus, 446 (?)—357
+ key="perseus,Miletus">Miletus, 446 (?)—357
B.C. we should not possess much of our music; and if there had been no
Phrynis,Of Mytilene; he is referred to as still alive in Therefore in
every case the first principles of things must necessarily be true above everything
- else—since they are not merely sometimes true, nor is anything the
+ else—since they are not merely sometimes true, nor is anything the
cause of their existence, but they are the cause of the existence of other
- things,—and so as each thing is in respect of existence, so it is in respect of
+ things,—and so as each thing is in respect of existence, so it is in respect of
truth. Moreover,
it is obvious that there is some first principle, and that the causes of things are not
@@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@
be moved by air, air by the sun, the sun by Strife,Aristotle is evidently thinking of Empedocles' system. with no limit to the
series). In the same way neither can the
- Final Cause recede to infinity—walking having health for its object, and health
+ Final Cause recede to infinity—walking having health for its object, and health
happiness, and happiness something else: one thing always being done for the sake of
another. And it is just the same with the
Formal Cause. For in the case of all intermediate terms of a series which are contained
@@ -1356,13 +1356,13 @@
downwards (where there is a beginning in the
upper direction) such that from fire comes water, and from water earth, and in this way
some other kind of thing is always being produced. There are two senses in which one thing
- "comes from" another—apart from that in which one thing is said to come
+ "comes from" another—apart from that in which one thing is said to come
after another, e.g. the Olympian "from"e)k means not only "from" but "after";
Aristotle dismisses this latter meaning. The Isthmian fell alternatively in the same
year as the Olympian festival; when this happened the former was held in the spring and
the latter in the summer. Cf. Aristot. Met.
- 5.24.5. the Isthmian games—either as a man comes from a child as
+ 5.24.5. the Isthmian games—either as a man comes from a child as
it develops, or as air comes from water. Now we
say that a man "comes from" a child in the sense that that which has become
something comes from that which is becoming: i.e. the perfect from the
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@
discussed Aristot. Met. 3.2.1-10, and answered
Aristot. Met. 4.1.(2.) Has that science
only to contemplate the first principles of substance, or is it also concerned with the
- principles which all use for demonstration—e.g. whether it is possible at the same
+ principles which all use for demonstration—e.g. whether it is possible at the same
time to assert and deny one and the same thing, and other similar principles?Discussed Aristot. Met.
3.2.10-15; answered Aristot. Met.
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@
(vi.) whether the first principles and elements of things are the genera under which they
fall or the pre-existent parts into which each thing is divided; and if the genera,
whether they are those which are predicated ultimately of individuals, or the primary
- genera—e.g., whether "animal" or "man" is the first principle and the more
+ genera—e.g., whether "animal" or "man" is the first principle and the more
independent of the individual.DiscussedAristot. Met. 3.3; answered Aristot. Met. 7.10, 12-13 Discussed Aristot. Met. 3.4.8-10; answered Aristot. Met. 12.4-5, Aristot. Met. 13.10.—both those in the
- definitions and those in the substrate—and (ix.) whether the principles of
+ n="Aristot. Met. 13.1086b">Aristot. Met. 13.10.—both those in the
+ definitions and those in the substrate—and (ix.) whether the principles of
perishable and of imperishable things are the same or different; and whether all are
imperishable, or those of perishable things are perishable.Discussed Aristot. Met. 3.4.11-23;
@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@
there is not one, with what sort of substance must we assume that this science is
concerned? On the other hand, it is not
probable that there is one science of all substances; for then there would be one
- demonstrative of all attributes—assuming that every demonstrative science proceeds from accepted beliefs and studies the essential
attributes concerned with some definite subject matter. Thus to study the essential attributes connected with the same genus
@@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@
n="999b" unit="section"/>If nothing exists apart from individual things, nothing will be
intelligible; everything will be sensible, and there will be no knowledge of
- anything—unless it be maintained that sense-perception is knowledge. Nor again will
+ anything—unless it be maintained that sense-perception is knowledge. Nor again will
anything be eternal or immovable, since sensible things are all perishable and in
motion. Again, if nothing is eternal, even
generation is impossible; for there must be something which becomes something, i.e. out of
@@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@
they are numerically one, and each of the principles is one, and not, as in the case of
sensible things, different in different instances (e.g. since a given syllable is always
the same in kind, its first principles are always the same in kind, but only in kind,
- since they are essentially different in number)—if the first principles are one, not
+ since they are essentially different in number)—if the first principles are one, not
in this sense, but numerically, there will be nothing else apart from the elements; for
"numerically one" and "individual" are identical in meaning. This is what we mean by
"individual": the numerically one; but by "universal" we mean what is predicable of
@@ -1897,7 +1897,7 @@
/>Hence just as, if the elements of
languageOr "letters of the alphabet." Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.9.36n. were limited in number,
- the whole of literature would be no more than those elements—that is, if there were
+ the whole of literature would be no more than those elements—that is, if there were
not two nor more than two of the same <so it would be in the case of existing things
and their principles>.For the answer to the
problem see Aristot. Met. 12.4-5, The school of Hesiod, and all the cosmologists, considered only what was convincing to
themselves, and gave no consideration to us. For they make the first principles Gods or
generated from Gods, and say that whatever did not taste of the nectar and ambrosia became
- mortal—clearly using these terms in a sense significant to themselves; but as regards the actual applications of these causes
their statements are beyond our comprehension. For if it is for pleasure that the Gods
partake of them, the nectar and ambrosia are in no sense causes of their existence; but if
@@ -1945,8 +1945,8 @@
earth perceive, by water water, By air bright air, by fire
consuming fire, Love too by love, and strife by grievous
strife.Empedocles, Fr.
- 109. But—and this is the point from
- which we started—thus much is clear: that it follows on his theory that Strife is no
+ 109. But—and this is the point from
+ which we started—thus much is clear: that it follows on his theory that Strife is no
more the cause of destruction than it is of Being. Nor, similarly, is Love the cause of
Being; for in combining things into one it destroys everything else.Cf. Aristot. Met.
@@ -1992,7 +1992,7 @@
Pythagoreans hold that neither Being nor Unity is anything else than itself, and that this
is their nature, their essence being simply Being and Unity. But the physicists, e.g. Empedocles, explain what Unity is by reducing
- it to something, as it were, more intelligible—or it would seem that by Love
+ it to something, as it were, more intelligible—or it would seem that by Love
Empedocles means Unity; at any rate Love is the cause of Unity in all things. Others
identify fire and others air with this Unity and Being of which things consist and from
which they have been generated. Those who
@@ -2034,7 +2034,7 @@
indivisible in such a way that it can be defended even against his argument (for such a
thinge.g., a point is indivisible and has no
magnitude, yet added to other points it increases their number. when added will
- increase a thing in number though not in size)—still how can a
+ increase a thing in number though not in size)—still how can a
magnitude be composed of one or more such indivisible things? It is like
saying that the line is composed of points. Moreover, even if one supposes the case to be As for those things
- which might be especially supposed to indicate substance—water, earth, fire and air,
- of which composite bodies are composed— their heat and cold and the like are
modifications, not substances; and it is only the body which undergoes these modifications
that persists as something real and a kind of substance. or sound,
- for the principles of these are determinate in number too— and similarly with the Intermediates, for in their case too there is
an infinity of objects similar in form), then if there is not another set of objects apart
from sensible and mathematical objects, such as the Forms are said to be, there will be no
@@ -2148,7 +2148,7 @@
term denotes an individual thing, but a type; and substance is an individual
thing. But if the common predicate be
hypostatized as an individual thing, Socrates will be several beings: himself, and Man,
- and Animal—that is, if each predicate denotes one particular thing. These then are the consequences if the principles are
universal. If on the other hand they are not universal but like particulars, they will not
be knowable; for the knowledge of everything is universal. Hence there will have to be
@@ -2177,8 +2177,8 @@
producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it), and as "medical" relates to the art of medicine (either as possessing
- it or as naturally adapted for it or as being a function of medicine)—and we shall
- find other terms used similarly to these— so "being " is used in various senses, but always with reference to one principle. For
some things are said to "be" because they are substances; others because they are
modifications of substance; others because they are a process towards substance, or
@@ -2211,9 +2211,9 @@
these phrases has the same significance, and Unity is nothing distinct from
Being; and further if the substance of each
thing is one in no accidental sense, and similarly is of its very nature something which
- is—then there are just as many species of Being as of Unity. And to study the
+ is—then there are just as many species of Being as of Unity. And to study the
essence of these species (I mean, e.g., the study of Same and Other and all the other
- similar concepts— roughly speaking all
+ similar concepts— roughly speaking all
the "contraries" are reducible to this first principle; but we may consider that they
have been sufficiently studied in the "Selection of Contraries"For Being and Unity at once entail
genera, and so the sciences will correspond to these genera. The term "philosopher" is
- like the term "mathematician" in its uses; for mathematics too has divisions—there
+ like the term "mathematician" in its uses; for mathematics too has divisions—there
is a primary and a secondary science, and others successively, in the realm of
mathematics. Now since it is the province of one science to study opposites, and the opposite of
@@ -2233,10 +2233,10 @@
form that it is not present in a particular class; in the latter case Unity is modified by
the differentia, apart from the content of the negation (for the negation of Unity is its
absence); but in privation there is a substrate of which the privation is
- predicated.— The opposite of Unity,
- then, is Plurality; and so the opposites of the above-mentioned concepts—Otherness,
+ predicated.— The opposite of Unity,
+ then, is Plurality; and so the opposites of the above-mentioned concepts—Otherness,
Dissimilarity, Inequality and everything else which is derived from these or from
- Plurality or Unity— fall under the
+ Plurality or Unity— fall under the
cognizance of the aforesaid science. And one of them is Oppositeness; for this is a form
of Difference, and Difference is a form of Otherness. Hence since the term "one" is used in various senses, so too will
@@ -2288,7 +2288,7 @@
is reducible to Being and Not being, and Unity and Plurality; e.g. Rest falls under Unity
and Motion under Plurality. And nearly everyone agrees that substance and existing things
are composed of contraries; at any rate all speak of the first principles as
- contraries— some as Odd and Even,some as Odd and Even,The Pythagoreans. some as Hot and Cold,Perhaps Parmenides. some as Limit and
Unlimited,The Platonists. some as Love and
@@ -2302,7 +2302,7 @@
the contraries are Unity and Plurality. And these belong to one science, whether they have
reference to one common notion or not. Probably the truth is that they have not; but
nevertheless even if the term "one" is used in various senses, the others will be related
- to the primary sense (and similarly with the contraries)— even if Being or Unity is not a universal and the same in all cases,
or is not separable from particulars (as it presumably is not; the unity is in some cases
one of reference and in others one of succession). For this very reason it is not the
@@ -2318,15 +2318,15 @@
axioms in mathematics and substance, or to different sciences. It is obvious that the
investigation of these axioms too pertains to one science, namely the science of the
philosopher; for they apply to all existing things, and not to a particular class separate
- and distinct from the rest. Moreover all thinkers employ them—because they are
+ and distinct from the rest. Moreover all thinkers employ them—because they are
axioms of Being qua Being, and every genus possesses
- Being— but employ them only in so far
+ Being— but employ them only in so far
as their purposes require; i.e., so far as the genus extends about which they are carrying
out their proofs. Hence since these axioms apply to all things qua
Being (for this is what is common to them), it is the function of him who studies Being
qua Being to investigate them as well. For this reason no one who is pursuing a particular
- inquiry—neither a geometrician nor an arithmetician—attempts to state whether
+ inquiry—neither a geometrician nor an arithmetician—attempts to state whether
they are true or false; but some of the physicists did so, quite naturally; for they alone
professed to investigate nature as a whole, and Being. But inasmuch as there is a more ultimate type of thinker than the
@@ -2359,7 +2359,7 @@
anyone to suppose that the same thing is and is not, as some imagine that Heraclitus
saysFor examples of Heraclitus's paradoxes cf.
Heraclitus Fr. 36, 57, 59 (Bywater); and for their
- meaning see Burnet, E.G.P. 80.—for what a man says does not necessarily
+ meaning see Burnet, E.G.P. 80.—for what a man says does not necessarily
represent what he believes. And if it is
impossible for contrary attributes to belong at the same time to the same subject (the
usual qualifications must be added to this premiss also), and an opinion which contradicts
@@ -2481,8 +2481,8 @@
not even more than two accidents can be combined in predication. An accident cannot be an
accident of an accident unless both are accidents of the same thing. I mean, e.g., that "white" is "cultured" and "cultured" "white"
- merely because both are accidents of a man. But it is not in this sense—that both
- terms are accidents of something else—that Socrates is cultured. Therefore since
+ merely because both are accidents of a man. But it is not in this sense—that both
+ terms are accidents of something else—that Socrates is cultured. Therefore since
some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in the former sense, such as are
predicated in the way that "white" is of Socrates cannot be an infinite series in the
upper direction; e.g. there cannot be another accident of "white Socrates," for the sum of
@@ -2622,7 +2622,7 @@
(1.) The belief that contradictions and contraries can be true at the same time comes to
them from seeing the contraries generated from the same thing. Then if what is not cannot be generated, the thing must have existed
- before as both contraries equally—just as Anaxagoras saysCf. Aristot. Met. 4.4.28.
that everything is mixed in everything; and also Democritus, for he too saysCf. Aristot. Met.
@@ -2675,7 +2675,7 @@
he made Hector,The only passage in our text of
Homer to which this reference could apply isHom. Il.
23.698; but there the subject is Euryalus, not Hector. when he was
- stunned by the blow, lie with thoughts deranged—thus implying that even those who
+ stunned by the blow, lie with thoughts deranged—thus implying that even those who
are "out of their minds" still think, although not the same thoughts. Clearly then, if
both are kinds of thought, reality also will be "both so and not so." It is along this path that the consequences are most difficult;
@@ -2738,7 +2738,7 @@
the healthy or to the diseased; and whether heavy things are as they appear to the weak or
to the strong; and whether truth is as it appears to the waking or to the
sleeping. For clearly they do not really
- believe the latter alternative—at any rate no one, if in the night he thinks that he
+ believe the latter alternative—at any rate no one, if in the night he thinks that he
is at Athens whereas he is really in
Africa, starts off to the Odeum.A concert-hall (used also for other purposes) built by
@@ -2834,7 +2834,7 @@
since the contradiction of a statement cannot be true at the same time of the same thing,
it is obvious that contraries cannot apply at the same time to the same thing. For in each pair of contraries one is a privation no
- less than it is a contrary—a privation of substance. And privation is the negation
+ less than it is a contrary—a privation of substance. And privation is the negation
of a predicate to some defined genus. Therefore
if it is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny a thing truly, it is also
impossible for contraries to apply to a thing at the same time; either both must apply in
@@ -2898,7 +2898,7 @@
the mixture is neither good nor not-good; and so no statement is true. It is obvious from this
analysis that the one-sided and sweeping statements which some people make cannot be
- substantially true—some maintaining that nothing is true (for they say that there is
+ substantially true—some maintaining that nothing is true (for they say that there is
no reason why the same rule should not apply to everything as applies to the
commensurability of the diagonal of a squareA stock
example of impossibility and falsity; see Index.), and some that everything is
@@ -2974,14 +2974,14 @@
comes into being or becomes known; and some beginnings are originally inherent in things,
while others are not. Hence "nature" is a
beginning, and so is "element" and "understanding" and "choice" and "essence" and "final
- cause"—for in many cases the Good and the Beautiful are the beginning both of
+ cause"—for in many cases the Good and the Beautiful are the beginning both of
knowledge and of motion. "Cause" means: (a) in one sense, that as the result of whose presence
- something comes into being—e.g. the bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup, and
- the classessc. of material—metal, wood,
+ something comes into being—e.g. the bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup, and
+ the classessc. of material—metal, wood,
etc. which contain these; (b) in another sense, the form or pattern;
- that is, the essential formula and the classes which contain it—e.g. the ratio 2:1
- and number in general is the cause of the octave—and the parts of the
+ that is, the essential formula and the classes which contain it—e.g. the ratio 2:1
+ and number in general is the cause of the octave—and the parts of the
formula. (c) The source of the first
beginning of change or rest; e.g. the man who plans is a cause, and the father is the
cause of the child, and in general that which produces is the cause of that which is
@@ -3000,11 +3000,11 @@
different connections, but qua statue. However, they are not causes
in the same way, but the one as material and the other as the source of
motion. And things are causes of each other; as e.g. labor of vigor, and vigor of
- labor—but not in the same way; the one as an end , and the other as
+ labor—but not in the same way; the one as an end , and the other as
source of motion . And again the same thing is sometimes the cause of contrary results; because that which
by its presence is the cause of so-and-so we sometimes accuse of being, by its absence,
- the cause of the contrary—as, e.g., we say that the absence of the pilot is the
+ the cause of the contrary—as, e.g., we say that the absence of the pilot is the
cause of a capsize, whereas his presence was the cause of safety. And both, presence and privation, are moving
causes. Now there are four senses which are most obvious
@@ -3081,7 +3081,7 @@
metaphorically to any small unity which is useful for various purposes; and so that which
is small or simple or indivisible is called an "element." (e) Hence it comes that the most universal things are elements;
- because each of them, being a simple unity, is present in many things—either in all
+ because each of them, being a simple unity, is present in many things—either in all
or in as many as possible. Some too think that unity and the point are first
principles. (f) Therefore since what are
called generaThis must refer to the highest genera,
@@ -3094,9 +3094,9 @@
ed="P" unit="para"/>"Nature"On the meaning of fu/sis cf. Burnet, E.G.P. pp. 10-12, 363-364. means: (a) in one
- sense, the genesis of growing things—as would be suggested by pronouncing the
+ sense, the genesis of growing things—as would be suggested by pronouncing the
u of fu/sis
- long—and (b) in another, that immanent thingProbably the seed (Bonitz). from which a growing thing first begins to grow. (c)
The source from which the primary motion in every natural object is induced in that object
as such. All things are said to grow which gain
@@ -3127,7 +3127,7 @@
e.g. animals and their parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two
senses: either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g., in bronze
articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is bronze, but in general it is
- perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or
+ perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or
essence, i.e. the end of the process, of generation. Indeed from this sense of "nature,"
by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called "nature," because the
nature of anything is a kind of essence. "Necessary" means: (a) That without which, as a concomitant condition,
life is impossible; e.g. respiration and food are necessary for an animal, because it
cannot exist without them. (b) The conditions without which good cannot be or come to be,
- or without which one cannot get rid or keep free of evil—e.g., drinking medicine is
+ or without which one cannot get rid or keep free of evil—e.g., drinking medicine is
necessary to escape from ill-health, and sailing to Aegina is necessary to recover one's money. (c) The compulsory and compulsion; i.e. that which hinders and
@@ -3230,7 +3230,7 @@
all animals); and that in a way very similar to that in which the matter is one. Sometimes these things are said to be "one" in this
sense, and sometimes their higher genus is said to be one and the same (if they are final
- species of their genus)—the genus, that is, which is above the genera of which their
+ species of their genus)—the genus, that is, which is above the genera of which their
proximate genus is one; e.g., the isosceles and equilateral triangles are one and the same
figure (because they are both triangles), but not the same triangles. (d) Again, things are said to
@@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@
unit="Loeb chap"/>Again, in one sense we call anything whatever "one" if it is
quantitative and continuous; and in another sense we say that it is not "one" unless it is
a whole of some kind, i.e. unless it is one in form (e.g., if we saw the
- parts of a shoe put together anyhow, we should not say that they were one — except
+ parts of a shoe put together anyhow, we should not say that they were one — except
in virtue of their continuity; but only if they were so put together as to be a shoe, and
to possess already some one form). Hence the
circumference of a circle is of all lines the most truly one, because it is whole and
@@ -3517,11 +3517,11 @@
happen, or because they might do so well . Even in inanimate things this kind
of potency is found; e.g. in instruments; for they say that one lyre "can" be played, and
another not at all, if it has not a good tone. "Impotence" is a privation of potency—a kind of
- abolition of the principle which has been described—either in general or in
+ n="12.8" ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>"Impotence" is a privation of potency—a kind of
+ abolition of the principle which has been described—either in general or in
something which would naturally possess that principle, or even at a time when it would
- naturally already possess it (for we should not use "impotence"—in respect of
- begetting—in the same sense of a boy, a man and a eunuch). Again, there is an "impotence" corresponding to each kind of
potency; both to the kinetic and to the successfully kinetic. Some things are said to be "impotent" in
@@ -3566,15 +3566,15 @@
of the former class some are quantitative in virtue of their substance, e.g. the fine
(because the definition which describes it is quantitative in some form); and others are attributes and conditions of a substance of this
- kind— e.g., "much" and "little," "long" and "short," "broad" and "narrow," "deep"
+ kind— e.g., "much" and "little," "long" and "short," "broad" and "narrow," "deep"
and "shallow," "heavy" and "light," etc. Moreover, "great" and "small," and "greater" and "smaller," whether used absolutely or
relatively to one another, are essential attributes of quantity; by an extension of
meaning, however, these terms are also applied to other things. Of things called quantitative in an accidental sense, one kind is so
called in the sense in which we said above that "cultured" or "white" is
- quantitative—because the subject to which they belong is quantitative; and others in
- the sense that motion and time are so called—for these too are said in a sense to be
+ quantitative—because the subject to which they belong is quantitative; and others in
+ the sense that motion and time are so called—for these too are said in a sense to be
quantitative and continuous, since the subjects of which they are attributes are
divisible. I mean, not the thing moved, but that through or along which the motion has
taken place; for it is because the latter is quantitative that the motion is quantitative,
@@ -3586,14 +3586,14 @@
/>which shows that the essential differentia
is quality. In this one sense, then, "quality"
means differentia of essence; but (b) in another it is used as of immovable and
- mathematical objects, in the sense that numbers are in a way qualitative—e.g. such
+ mathematical objects, in the sense that numbers are in a way qualitative—e.g. such
as are composite and are represented geometrically not by a line but by a plane or solid
- (these are products respectively of two and of three factors)—and in general means
+ (these are products respectively of two and of three factors)—and in general means
that which is present besides quantity in the essence. For the essence of each number is
that which goes into it once; e.g. that of 6 is not what goes twice or three times, but
what goes once; for 6 is once 6. (c) All
affections of substance in motion in respect of which bodies become different when they
- (the affections) change—e.g. heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and
+ (the affections) change—e.g. heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and
lightness, etc. (d) The term is used with reference to goodness and badness, and in
general to good and bad. Thus there are, roughly speaking, two meanings which the term
@@ -3660,9 +3660,9 @@
there is a thought which thinks it; but thought is not relative to that of which it is the
thought (for then the same thing would have been said twice). And similarly sight is the
sight of something; not of that of which it is the sight, although this is of course
- true—it is relative to some color or other similar thing. To describe it in the other way—"the sight of the object of
- sight"—would be to say the same thing twice. To describe it in the other way—"the sight of the object of
+ sight"—would be to say the same thing twice. Things, then, which are called relative of
their own nature are so called, some in these senses, and others because the classes which
contain them are of this kind. E.g., medicine is reckoned as relative because its genus,
@@ -3680,7 +3680,7 @@
are "perfect" when they have no deficiency in respect of the form of their peculiar
excellence. And thus by an extension of the
meaning we use the term in a bad connection, and speak of a "perfect" humbug and a
- "perfect" thief; since indeed we call them "good"— e.g. a "good" thief and a "good" humbug. (c) And goodness is a kind of perfection. For each thing, and every
substance, is perfect when, and only when, in respect of the form of its peculiar
@@ -3792,7 +3792,7 @@
so); and "invisible" either because it has no color at all or because it has only a faint
one; and "footless" either because it has no feet at all or because it has rudimentary
feet. Again, a negative affix may mean
- "having something in a small degree"—e.g. "stoneless"— that is, having it in some
rudimentary manner. Again, it may mean having it "not easily" or "not well"; e.g.,
"uncutable" means not only that which cannot be cut, but that which cannot be cut easily
@@ -3850,7 +3850,7 @@
in honor of Apollo and Artemis) at the end of May. "Part" means: (a) That into which a
quantity can be in any way divided; for that which is taken from a quantity qua quantity is always called a part of that quantity—e.g., we
+ rend="Italic">qua quantity is always called a part of that quantity—e.g., we
call 2 part (in a sense) of 3. (b) In another sense the term is only applied to those
"parts" in sense (a) which measure the whole; hence in one sense we call 2 part of 3, and
in another not. Again, (c) those divisions
@@ -3888,13 +3888,13 @@
singular qua one; all this number, all these units. We do not describe any
chance quantity as "mutilated"; it must have parts, and must be a whole. The number 2 is
- not mutilated if one of its 1's is taken away—because the part lost by mutilation is
- never equal to the remainder—nor in general is any number mutilated; because the
+ not mutilated if one of its 1's is taken away—because the part lost by mutilation is
+ never equal to the remainder—nor in general is any number mutilated; because the
essence must persist. If a cup is mutilated, it must still be a cup; but the number is no
longer the same. Moreover, not even all things
which have dissimilar parts are mutilated; for a number has in a sense dissimilar as well
- as similar parts—e.g. 2, 3. But in general of things whose position makes no
- difference, e.g. water or fire, none is mutilated;— to be mutilated, things must be such as have their position according to
their essence. Further, they must be
continuous; for a musical scale is composed of dissimilar parts, and has position; but it
@@ -3923,7 +3923,7 @@
or a particular solid); i.e., that which underlies the differentiae. (d) In the sense that in formulae the first component, which is
stated as part of the essence, is the genus, and the qualities are said to be its
- differentiae. The term "genus," then, is used in all these senses—(a) in respect of
+ differentiae. The term "genus," then, is used in all these senses—(a) in respect of
continuous generation of the same type; (b) in respect of the first mover of the same type
as the things which it moves; (c) in the sense of material. For that to which the
differentia or quality belongs is the substrate, which we call material. Cf. Plat. Euthyd. 283e-284c, 286c, d. nearly so. But
it is possible to describe everything not only by its own definition but by that of
- something else; quite falsely, and yet also in a sense truly—e.g., 8 may be
+ something else; quite falsely, and yet also in a sense truly—e.g., 8 may be
described as "double" by the definition of 2. Such are the meanings of "false" in these cases. (3.)
A false man is one who readily and deliberately makes such statements, for the sake of
- doing so and for no other reason; and one who induces such statements in others—just
+ doing so and for no other reason; and one who induces such statements in others—just
as we call things false which induce a false impression. Hence the proof in the
HippiasPlat. Hipp. Min 365-375. that the same
@@ -3998,7 +3998,7 @@
his course by a storm, or captured by pirates. The accident has happened or exists, but in virtue not of itself but of something else;
for it was the storm which was the cause of his coming to a place for which he was not
- sailing—i.e. Aegina. Aegina. "Accident" has also another sense,i.e. "property." namely, whatever belongs to each thing in virtue
of itself, but is not in its essence; e.g. as having the sum of its angles equal to two
@@ -4030,7 +4030,7 @@
principle of motion and rest), obviously it is neither a practical nor a productive
science. For in the case of things produced
the principle of motion (either mind or art or some kind of potency) is in the producer;
- and in the case of things done the will is the agent—for the thing done and the
+ and in the case of things done the will is the agent—for the thing done and the
thing willed are the same. Thus if every intellectual activity is either practical or
productive or speculative, physics will be a speculative science; but speculative about
that kind of Being which can be moved, and about formulated substance for the most part
@@ -4042,9 +4042,9 @@
form with matter; because the "snub" is a concave nose , whereas concavity is
independent of sensible matter. Now if all physical
- terms are used in the same sense as "snub"—e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and in
+ terms are used in the same sense as "snub"—e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and in
general animal; leaf, root, bark, and in general vegetable (for not one of these has a
- definition without motion; the definition invariably includes matter)—it is clear
+ definition without motion; the definition invariably includes matter)—it is clear
how we should look for and define the essence in physical things, and why it is the
province of the physicist to study even some aspects of the soul, so far as it is not
independent of matter. Now all causes must
be eternal, but these especially; since they are the causes of what is visible of things
divine. Hence there will be three speculative philosophies: mathematics, physics, and
- theology— since it is obvious that if
+ theology— since it is obvious that if
the divine is present anywhere, it is present in this kind of entity; and also the most
honorable science must deal with the most honorable class of subject. The speculative sciences,
then, are to be preferred to the other sciences, and "theology" to the other speculative
sciences. One might indeed raise the question whether the primary philosophy is universal
or deals with some one genus or entity; because even the mathematical sciences differ in
- this respect—geometry and astronomy deal with a particular kind of entity, whereas
+ this respect—geometry and astronomy deal with a particular kind of entity, whereas
universal mathematics applies to all kinds alike. Then if there is not some other substance besides those which are
naturally composed, physics will be the primary science; but if there is a substance which
@@ -4099,7 +4099,7 @@
n="Plat. Soph. 254a">Plat. Soph. 254a. was not far wrong in making
sophistry deal with what is nonexistent; because the sophists discuss the accident more, perhaps, than any other
- people—whether "cultured" and "grammatical,"i.e. able to read and write. The sophistic argument is given by Alexander as follows: A
is grammatical; therefore grammatical A=A. A is cultured; therefore cultured A=A.
Therefore grammatical=cultured, and he who is grammatical must be cultured. But B,
@@ -4121,7 +4121,7 @@
considerations as the following: of things which are in other senses there is
generation and destruction, but of things which are accidentally there is
not.i.e., the process of becoming or change takes
- place in the subject—the man , who is accidentally cultured, becomes
+ place in the subject—the man , who is accidentally cultured, becomes
grammatical, and when the process is complete "the cultured" is
accidentally grammatical; but it does not become so. Nevertheless we
must state further, so far as it is possible, with regard to the accidental, what its
@@ -4163,11 +4163,11 @@
questions must be inquired into laterCf. Aristot. Met. 12.6-8.; but it is clear that there is no science of the
- accidental—because all scientific knowledge is of that which is always
+ accidental—because all scientific knowledge is of that which is always
or usually so. How else indeed can one learn it or teach it to another? For a
fact must be defined by being so always or usually; e.g., honey-water is usually
beneficial in case of fever. But science will
- not be able to state the exception to the rule: when it is not beneficial—e.g. at
+ not be able to state the exception to the rule: when it is not beneficial—e.g. at
the new moon; because that which happens at the new moon also happens either always or
usually; but the accidental is contrary to this. We have now explained the nature and
cause of the accidental, and that there is no science of it. Thus of necessity he will either die or
not die. And similarly if one jumps over to the past, the principle is the same; for
- this—I mean that which has just happened—is already present in something.
+ this—I mean that which has just happened—is already present in something.
Everything, then, which is to be, will be of necessity; e.g., he who is alive must
- die—for some stage of the process has been reached already; e.g., the contraries are
- present in the same body—but whether by disease or violence is not yet determined;
+ die—for some stage of the process has been reached already; e.g., the contraries are
+ present in the same body—but whether by disease or violence is not yet determined;
it depends upon whether so-and-so happens. Clearly, then, the series goes back to some starting-point, which does not go back to
something else. This, therefore, will be the starting-point of the fortuitous, and nothing
@@ -4207,10 +4207,10 @@
thought" I mean thinking them not as a succession but as a unitysc., "or not as a unity but as a succession" (this is
separating in thought).); for "falsity" and "truth" are not in
- things —the good, for example, being true, and the bad
- false—but in thought ; and with regard to simple concepts and essences
+ things —the good, for example, being true, and the bad
+ false—but in thought ; and with regard to simple concepts and essences
there is no truth or falsity even in thought; —what points we must study in connection with being and not-being in this sense,
+ />—what points we must study in connection with being and not-being in this sense,
we must consider later. But since the combination and separation exists in thought and not
in things, and this sense of "being" is different from the proper senses (since thought
attaches or detaches essence or quality or quantity or some other category), we may
@@ -4258,11 +4258,11 @@
alone; and it is primary also in definition,
because in the formula of each thing the formula of substance must be inherent; and we
assume that we know each particular thing most truly when we know what "man"
- or "fire" is— rather than its quality or quantity or position; because we know each of
these points too when we know what the quantity or quality is. Indeed, the question which was raised long ago, is
- still and always will be, and which always baffles us—"What is Being?"—is in
+ still and always will be, and which always baffles us—"What is Being?"—is in
other words "What is substance?" Some say that it is oneThe Milesians and Eleatics.; others, more than one; some,
finiteThe Pythagoreans and Empedocles.;
@@ -4277,8 +4277,8 @@
n="2.2" ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>We must consider whether (a) these are the only
substances, or (b) these and some others, or (c) some of these, or (d) some of these and
some others, or (e) none of these, but certain others. SomeThe Pythagoreans. hold that the bounds of body—i.e. the
- surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in a truer sense than body or the
+ anchored="yes">The Pythagoreans. hold that the bounds of body—i.e. the
+ surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in a truer sense than body or the
solid. Again, someThe pre-Socratics. believe that there is nothing of this kind
besides sensible things, while others believe in eternal entities more numerous and more
@@ -4291,7 +4291,7 @@
then another for the soul. In this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. SomeThe followers of Xenocrates, successor to
Speusippus. again hold that the Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that
- other things—lines and planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to the
+ other things—lines and planes—are dependent upon them; and soon back to the
substance of the visible universe and sensible things. We must consider, then, with regard to these matters, which of the
views expressed is right and which wrong; and what things are substances; and whether
@@ -4312,7 +4312,7 @@
two, the concrete thing: the statue. Thus if the form is prior to the matter and more
truly existent, by the same argument it will also be prior to the combination. We have now stated in
- outline the nature of substance—that it is not that which is predicated of a
+ outline the nature of substance—that it is not that which is predicated of a
subject, but that of which the other things are predicated. But we must not merely define
it so, for it is not enough. Not only is the statement itself obscure, but also it makes
matter substance; for if matter is not substance, it is beyond our power to say what else
@@ -4335,8 +4335,8 @@
substance. But this is impossible; for it is accepted that separability and individuality
belong especially to substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the combination of
form and matter are more truly substance than matter is. The substance, then, which consists of both—I mean of matter and
- form—may be dismissed, since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense
+ unit="Loeb chap"/>The substance, then, which consists of both—I mean of matter and
+ form—may be dismissed, since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense
evident. We must consider the third type, for this is the most perplexing. Now it is agreed that some sensible things are substances, and so we
should begin our inquiry in connection with these. Hence essence will belong to nothing except species of
a genus, but to these only; for in these the predicate is not considered to be related to
the subject by participation or affection, nor as an accident. But of everything else as
- well, if it has a name, there will be a formula of what it means—that X
- belongs to Y; or instead of a simple formula one more exact—but no definition, nor
+ well, if it has a name, there will be a formula of what it means—that X
+ belongs to Y; or instead of a simple formula one more exact—but no definition, nor
essence. Or
perhaps "definition," like the "what," has more than one sense. For the "what" in one
sense means the substance and the individual, Now
although we must also consider how we should express ourselves in each particular case, it
is still more important to consider what the facts are. Hence now, since the language
@@ -4442,7 +4442,7 @@
they belong equally to other things too, but not primarily . For if we assume
this, it does not necessarily follow that there is a definition of anything which means
the same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of formula, i.e. the
- formula of one thing— one not by
+ formula of one thing— one not by
continuity like the Iliad, or things which are arbitrarily combined, but in
one of the proper senses of "one." And "one" has the same variety of senses as "being."
"Being" means sometimes the individual thing, sometimes the quantity, sometimes the
@@ -4619,7 +4619,7 @@
art of medicine or of building is the form of health or the house). By
substance without matter I mean the essence. In generations and motions part of the process is
- called cogitation, and part production—that which proceeds from the starting-point
+ called cogitation, and part production—that which proceeds from the starting-point
and the form is cogitation, and that which proceeds from the conclusion of the cogitation
is production. Each of the other intermediate measures is carried out in the same way. I
mean, e.g., that if A is to be healthy, his physical condition will have to be made
@@ -4633,7 +4633,7 @@
starting-point is, perhaps, the heating of the patient; and this the doctor produces by
friction. Heat in the body, then, is either a part of health, or is followed (directly or
through several intermediaries) by something similar which is a part of health. This is
- the ultimate thing, namely that produces, and in this sense is a part of, health—or
+ the ultimate thing, namely that produces, and in this sense is a part of, health—or
of the house (in the form of stones)There is no real analogy between the casual
relationship of heat to health and of stones to a house. The former is both material and
@@ -4654,9 +4654,9 @@
invalid" become healthy), but it is more
properly said to proceed from the privation; e.g., a man becomes healthy from being an
invalid rather than from being a man. Hence a healthy person is not called an invalid, but
- a man, and a healthy man. But where the privation is obscure and has no name—e.g. in
+ a man, and a healthy man. But where the privation is obscure and has no name—e.g. in
bronze the privation of any given shape, or in bricks and wood the privation of the shape
- of a house—the generation is considered to proceed from these materials, as in the
+ of a house—the generation is considered to proceed from these materials, as in the
former case from the invalid. Hence just as in
the former case the subject is not called that from which it is generated, so in this case
the statue is not called wood, but is called by a verbal change not wood, but wooden; not
@@ -4682,8 +4682,8 @@
unit="Loeb chap"/>If, then, we make the spherical form itself, clearly we shall have to
make it in the same way; and the processes of generation will continue to
infinity. It is therefore obvious that the form (or
- whatever we should call the shape in the sensible thing) is not generated—generation
- does not apply to it— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which is
+ whatever we should call the shape in the sensible thing) is not generated—generation
+ does not apply to it— nor is the essence generated; for this is that which is
induced in something else either by art or by nature or by potency. But we do cause a bronze sphere to be, for we produce it from
bronze and a sphere; we induce the form into this particular matter, and the result is a
@@ -4715,8 +4715,8 @@
generation and destruction, is useless; nor, for this reason at any rate, should they be
regarded as self-subsistent substances. Indeed
in some cases it is even obvious that that which generates is of the same kind as that
- which is generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one with it, but
- formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for man begets man), unless something
+ which is generated—not however identical with it, nor numerically one with it, but
+ formally one—e.g. in natural productions (for man begets man), unless something
happens contrary to nature, as when a horse sires a mule. And even these cases are
similar; for that which would be common to both horse and ass, the genus immediately above
them, has no name; but it would probably be both, just as the mule is both.The question might be raised
- why some things are generated both artificially and spontaneously—e.g.
- health—and others not; e.g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the
- matter—which is the starting-point of the process in the production and generation
- of artificial things, and in which some part of the result is already existent—is
+ why some things are generated both artificially and spontaneously—e.g.
+ health—and others not; e.g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the
+ matter—which is the starting-point of the process in the production and generation
+ of artificial things, and in which some part of the result is already existent—is
such that it can initiate its own motion, and in other cases it is not; and of the former
kind some can initiate motion in a particular way, and some cannot. For many things can
move themselves, but not in a particular way, e.g. so as to dance. and that from which the seed comes has in
some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expect that all should have the
- same name in the sense that "man" is produced by "man"—since woman is also produced
+ same name in the sense that "man" is produced by "man"—since woman is also produced
by man); unless the product is a freak. This is why a mule is not produced by a
mule. Those
natural objects which are produced, like artificial objects, spontaneously, are those
@@ -4837,7 +4837,7 @@
ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>All things which are concrete combinations of form and matter
(e.g. "the snub" or the bronze circle) can be resolved into form and matter, and the
matter is a part of them; but such as are not concrete combinations with matter, but are
- without matter—whose formulae refer to the form only—cannot be resolved;
+ without matter—whose formulae refer to the form only—cannot be resolved;
either not at all, or at least not in this way. Thus these material components are principles and parts of the
concrete objects, but they are neither parts nor principles of the form. For this reason
@@ -4849,7 +4849,7 @@
unit="para"/>We have now stated the truth;
nevertheless let us recapitulate and state it more clearly. All constituents which are
parts of the formula, and into which the formula can be divided, are prior to their
- wholes—either all or some of them. But the formula of the right angle is not
+ wholes—either all or some of them. But the formula of the right angle is not
divisible into the formula of an acute angle, but vice versa; since in defining the acute
angle we use the right angle, because "the acute angle is less than a right
angle." It is the same with the circle and
@@ -4885,11 +4885,11 @@
formula refers to the universal; for "circle" is the same as "essence of circle," and "soul" the
same as "essence of soul." But when we come
- to the concrete thing, e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, either
+ to the concrete thing, e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, either
sensible or intelligible (by intelligible circles I mean those of mathematics,i.e., something very similar to the Platonic
"intermediates." Cf. Introduction. and by sensible those which are of bronze or
- wood)—of these individuals there is no definition; we apprehend them by intelligence or perception; and when they have
passed from the sphere of actuality it is uncertain whether they exist or not, but they
are always spoken of and apprehended by the universal formula. But the matter is in itself
@@ -4899,9 +4899,9 @@
resp="Tredennick" anchored="yes">See Aristot. Met.
13.2, 3. We have now discussed the case of the whole and part, and of prior and
- posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are asked which is prior—the
+ posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are asked which is prior—the
right angle and circle and animal, or that into which they are resolved and of which they
- are composed, i.e. their parts—by saying that neither is absolutely
+ are composed, i.e. their parts—by saying that neither is absolutely
prior. For if the soul also is
the animal or living thing, or the soul of the individual is the individual,
and "being a circle" is the circle, and "being a right angle" or the essence
@@ -4974,7 +4974,7 @@
which is not essence or form considered independently, but a particular thing. Thus the
semicircles will be parts not of the universal circle but of the particular circles, as we
said beforeAristot.
- Met. 7.10.17.—for some matter is sensible, and some
+ Met. 7.10.17.—for some matter is sensible, and some
intelligible. It is clear also that the
soul is the primary substance, and the body matter; and "man" or "animal" is the
combination of both taken universally. And " Socrates" or "Coriscus" has a double sense,
@@ -5006,7 +5006,7 @@
substance, e.g., in the case of a man, the formula of the soul; because the substance is
the indwelling form, of which and of the matter the so called concrete substance is
composed. E.g., concavity is such a form, since from this and "nose" is derived "snub
- nose" and "snubness"—for "nose" will be present twice over in these
+ nose" and "snubness"—for "nose" will be present twice over in these
expressions); but in the concrete
substance, e.g. snub nose or Callias, matter will be present too.Chapters. 10-11; and cf. Aristot. Met.
@@ -5076,7 +5076,7 @@
differentiae. If, then, we keep on taking a differentia of a differentia, one of them, the last, will
be the form and the substance. But if we proceed with reference to accidental
- qualities—e.g. if we divide "that which has feet" into white and black—there
+ qualities—e.g. if we divide "that which has feet" into white and black—there
will be as many differentiae as there are divisions. It is therefore obvious that the
definition is the formula derived from the differentiae, and strictly speaking from the
last of them. This will be clear if we change
@@ -5091,7 +5091,7 @@
of these are called substance, so too is the universal. With two of these we have already
dealt, i.e. with the essenceChs. 4-5.,10-12.
and the substrateCh. 3.; of the latter we
- have said that it underlies in two senses—either being an individual thing (as the
+ have said that it underlies in two senses—either being an individual thing (as the
animal underlies its attributes), or as matter underlies the actuality. The universal also is thought by someThe Platonists. to be in the truest sense a cause and a principle.
@@ -5136,7 +5136,7 @@
unit="Loeb chap"/>Again, it is clear in this way too. Substance can not consist of
substances actually present in it; for that which is actually two can never be actually
one, whereas if it is potentially two it can be one. E.g., the double consists of two
- halves—that is, potentially; for the actualization separates the halves. Thus if substance is one, it cannot consist of
substances present in it even in this sense, as Democritus rightly observes; he says that
it is impossible for two to come from one, or one from two, because he identifies
@@ -5211,7 +5211,7 @@
requires scientific knowledge, and if, just as knowledge cannot be sometimes knowledge and
sometimes ignorance (it is opinion that is of this nature), so too demonstration and
definition cannot vary (it is opinion that is concerned with that which can be otherwise
- than it is)— then clearly there can be neither definition nor demonstration of
individual sensible substances. For (a) things
which perish are obscure to those who have knowledge of them when they are removed from
@@ -5233,7 +5233,7 @@
to "two-footed" (and in the case of eternal elements this is even necessarily so; since
they are prior to the compound, and parts of it. Indeed they are also separable, if the term "man" is
- separable—for either neither can be separable, or both are so. If neither, the genus will not exist apart from the species, or
if it is so to exist, so will the differentia); (2.) that "animal" and "two-footed" are
prior in being to "two-footed animal," and that which is prior to something else is not
@@ -5249,10 +5249,10 @@
defining individuals is hard to realize when we are dealing with eternal entities,
especially in the case of such as are unique, e.g. the sun and moon. For people go wrong
not only by including in the definition attributes on whose removal it will still be
- sun—e.g., "that which goes round the earth," or "night-hidden " (for they suppose
+ sun—e.g., "that which goes round the earth," or "night-hidden " (for they suppose
that if it stops or becomes visiblesc. in the
night. it will no longer be sun; but it is absurd that this should be so, since
- "the sun "denotes a definite substance)—they also mention attributes which may apply
+ "the sun "denotes a definite substance)—they also mention attributes which may apply
to something else; e.g., if another thing with those attributes comes into being, clearly
it will be a sun. The formula, then, is general; but the sun was supposed to be an
@@ -5263,7 +5263,7 @@
which are thought to be substances the majority are potentialities; both the parts of
living things (for none of them has a separate substantial existence; and when they are
separated, although they still exist, they exist as matter), and earth, fire and air; for
- none of these is one thing —they are a mere aggregate before they are
+ none of these is one thing —they are a mere aggregate before they are
digested and some one thing is generated from them. It might be supposed very reasonably that the parts of living things
and the corresponding parts of their vital principle are both, i.e. exist both actually
@@ -5335,7 +5335,7 @@
predicated in this way of another. Or again,
"why are these things, e.g. bricks and stones, a house?" Clearly then we are inquiring for
the cause (i.e., to speak abstractly, the essence); which is in the case of some things,
- e.g. house or bed, the end , and in others the prime mover—for this
+ e.g. house or bed, the end , and in others the prime mover—for this
also is a cause. We look for the latter kind of cause in the case of generation and
destruction, but for the former also in the case of existence. What we are now looking for is
@@ -5358,7 +5358,7 @@
unit="Loeb chap"/>Now since that which is composed of something in such a way that the
whole is a unity; not as an aggregate is a unity, but as a syllable isThis sentence is not finished; the parenthesis which
- follows lasts until the end of the chapter.—the syllable is not the
+ follows lasts until the end of the chapter.—the syllable is not the
letters, nor is BA the same as B and A; nor is flesh fire and earth; because after
dissolution the compounds, e.g. flesh or the syllable, no longer exist; but the letters
exist, and so do fire and earth. Therefore the
@@ -5428,7 +5428,7 @@
separable); and thirdly there is the combination of the two, which alone admits of
generation and destruction,Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.8. and is separable in an
- unqualified sense—for of substances in the sense of formula some are separableIn point of fact the only form which is absolutely
separable is Mind or Reason. Cf. Aristot. Met.
12.7, 9. and some are not. We must therefore comprehend
- the various kinds of differences—for these will be principles of being—i.e.
+ the various kinds of differences—for these will be principles of being—i.e.
the differences in degree, or in density and rarity, and in other such modifications, for
they are all instances of excess and defect. And if anything differs in shape or in smoothness or roughness, all these are
@@ -5520,7 +5520,7 @@
substance is, and in what sense it exists; either as matter, or as form and actuality, or
thirdly as the combination of the two. We must not fail to realize that sometimes it is doubtful
- whether a name denotes the composite substance or the actuality and the form—e.g.
+ whether a name denotes the composite substance or the actuality and the form—e.g.
whether "house" denotes the composite thing, "a covering made of bricks and stones
arranged in such-and-such a way," or the actuality and form, "a covering"; and whether
"line" means "duality in length" or "duality"Cf.
@@ -5607,7 +5607,7 @@
matter or the four elements.; i.e. even if all things that are generated have the
same matter for their first principle, nevertheless each thing has some matter peculiar to
it; e.g., "the sweet" or "the viscous" is the proximate matter of mucus, and "the bitter"
- or some such thing is that of bile— although probably mucus and bile are derived from the same ultimate matter. The result is that there is more than one matter of the
same thing, when one thing is the matter of the other; e.g., mucus is derived from "the
@@ -5652,11 +5652,11 @@
/>Since some things both are and are not,
without being liable to generation and destructionCf. Aristot. Met. 6.3.1, Aristot. Met. 7.8.3.—e.g. points,Aristot. Met. 7.8.3.—e.g. points,Cf. Aristot. Met.
3.5.8, 9. if they exist at all; and in general the forms and shapes of
things (because white does not come to be, but the wood becomes white, since everything
- which comes into being comes from something and becomes something)—not all the
+ which comes into being comes from something and becomes something)—not all the
contrariesi.e., we must distinguish "contraries"
in the sense of "contrary qualities" from "contraries" in the sense of "things
characterized by contrary qualities." can be generated from each other. White is
@@ -5696,11 +5696,11 @@
"two-footed"? Why are not these Ideas "man,"
and why should not man exist by participation, not in any "man," but in two Ideas, those
of "animal" and "two-footed"? And in general
- "man" will be not one, but two things—"animal" and "two-footed." Evidently if we
+ "man" will be not one, but two things—"animal" and "two-footed." Evidently if we
proceed in this way, as it is usual to define and explain, it will be impossible to answer
and solve the difficulty. But if, as we
- maintain, man is part matter and part form—the matter being potentially, and the
- form actually man—, the point which we are investigating will no longer seem to be a
+ maintain, man is part matter and part form—the matter being potentially, and the
+ form actually man—, the point which we are investigating will no longer seem to be a
difficulty. For this difficulty is just the same as we should have if the definition of
XLiterally "cloak"; cf. Aristot. Met. 7.4.7 n. were "round bronze";
@@ -5762,7 +5762,7 @@
or quality or quantity, but also in accordance with potentiality and actuality and
function, let us also gain a clear understanding about potentiality and actuality; and
first about potentiality in the sense which is most proper to the word, but not most
- useful for our present purpose— for potentiality and actuality extend beyond the sphere
of terms which only refer to motion. When we
have discussed this sense of potentiality we will, in the course of our definitions of
@@ -5782,7 +5782,7 @@
by the action of some other thing, or of itself qua other. Another
is a positive state of impassivity in respect of deterioration or destruction by something
else or by itself qua something else; i.e. by a transformatory
- principle—for all these definitions contain the formula of the primary sense of
+ principle—for all these definitions contain the formula of the primary sense of
potentiality. Again, all these potentialities
are so called either because they merely act or are acted upon in a particular way, or
because they do so well . Hence in their formulae also the formulae of
@@ -5795,7 +5795,7 @@
a certain principle, and because even the matter is a kind of principle, that the patient
is acted upon; i.e., one thing is acted upon by another: oily stuff is inflammable, and
stuff which yields in a certain way is breakable, and similarly in other
- cases)— and partly in the agent; e.g.
+ cases)— and partly in the agent; e.g.
heat and the art of building: the former in that which produces heat, and the latter in
that which builds. Hence in so far as it is a natural unity, nothing is acted upon by
itself; because it is one, and not a separate thing. Privation has several sensesCf.
- Aristot. Met. 5.22.—it is applied
+ Aristot. Met. 5.22.—it is applied
(1.) to anything which does not possess a certain attribute; (2.) to that which would
naturally possess it, but does not; either (a) in general, or (b) when it would naturally
possess it; and either (1) in a particular way, e.g. entirely, or (2) in any way at all.
@@ -5822,7 +5822,7 @@
rational account, and the same account explains both the thing and its privation, though
not in the same way; and in one sense it applies to both, and in another sense rather to
the actual fact. Therefore such sciences must
- treat of contraries—essentially of the one, and non-essentially of the other; for
+ treat of contraries—essentially of the one, and non-essentially of the other; for
the rational account also applies essentially to the one, but to the other in a kind of
accidental way, since it is by negation and removal that it throws light on the contrary.
For the contrary is the primary privation,Cf. is or will
be, will be in error, for this is what "incapable" meant.i.e., we have just said that that which is incapable is deprived of its
- potency—in this case, of its potency for happening. Thus these theories do away with both motion and generation;
for that which is standing will always stand, and that which is sitting will always sit;
because if it is sitting it will not get up, since it is impossible that anything which is
@@ -5908,8 +5908,8 @@
it cannot be true to say that so-and-so is possible, but will not be, this view entirely
loses sight of the instances of impossibility.If it
is true to say that a thing which is possible will not be, anything may be possible, and
- nothing impossible. I mean, suppose that someone—i.e. the sort of man who
- does not take the impossible into account—were to say that it is possible to measure
+ nothing impossible. I mean, suppose that someone—i.e. the sort of man who
+ does not take the impossible into account—were to say that it is possible to measure
the diagonal of a square, but that it will not be measured, because there is nothing to
prevent a thing which is capable of being or coming to be from neither being nor being
likely ever to be. But from our premisses this
@@ -5935,7 +5935,7 @@
real, then B must be real at that time and in that way. Since all potencies are either innate,
like the senses, or acquired by practice, like flute-playing, or by study, as in the arts,
- some—such as are acquired by practice or a rational formula—we can only
+ some—such as are acquired by practice or a rational formula—we can only
possess when we have first exercised themCf. Aristot. Met. 9.8.6, 7.; in the case of others
which are not of this kind and which imply passivity, this is not necessary. Let actuality be defined by one
member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by
- analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of
+ analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of
motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter. Infinity and void and other
concepts of this kind are said to "be" potentially or actually in a different sense from
@@ -6020,8 +6020,8 @@
time, like the thinning-process; but it has not ceased at the present moment; we both are
living and have lived. Now of these processes we should call
the one type motions, and the other actualizations. Every motion is incomplete—the processes of thinning, learning,
- walking, building—these are motions, and incomplete at that. For it is not the same
+ unit="Loeb chap"/>Every motion is incomplete—the processes of thinning, learning,
+ walking, building—these are motions, and incomplete at that. For it is not the same
thing which at the same time is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or
is becoming and has become, or is being moved and has been moved, but two different
things; and that which is causing motion is different from that which has caused
@@ -6064,10 +6064,10 @@
n="Aristot. Met. 7.1033a">Aristot. Met. 7.7.10-12. and wood is not earth, but earthen material; and earth also is
an illustration of our point if it is similarly not some other thing, but a definite
- material—it is always the latter term in this series which is, in the fullest sense,
+ material—it is always the latter term in this series which is, in the fullest sense,
potentially something else. E.g., a box is not
earth, nor earthen, but wooden; for it is this that is potentially a box, and this is the
- matter of the box—that is, wooden material in general is the matter of "box" in
+ matter of the box—that is, wooden material in general is the matter of "box" in
general, whereas the matter of a particular box is a particular piece of wood. If there is some primary stuff, which is not further called the
material of some other thing, this is primary matter. E.g., if earth is "made of air," and
@@ -6112,7 +6112,7 @@
already exist in actuality. But prior in time
to these potential entities are other actual entities from which the former are generated;
for the actually existent is always generated from the potentially existent by something
- which is actually existent—e.g., man by man, cultured by cultured—there is
+ which is actually existent—e.g., man by man, cultured by cultured—there is
always some prime mover; and that which initiates motion exists already in
actuality. We have saidAristot. Met. 7.7, 8. in
@@ -6142,7 +6142,7 @@
they may see. Similarly men possess the art of
building in order that they may build, and the power of speculation that they may
speculate; they do not speculate in order that they may have the power of
- speculation—except those who are learning by practice; and they do not really
+ speculation—except those who are learning by practice; and they do not really
speculate, but only in a limited sense, or about a subject about which they have no desire
to speculate. Further, matter exists potentially, because it
may attain to the form; but when it exists actually, it is then in the form.
@@ -6199,7 +6199,7 @@
is it potentially in motion (except in respect of some starting-point or destination), and
there is no reason why the matter of such a thing should not exist. Hence the sun and stars and the whole visible heaven are always
- active, and there is no fear that they will ever stop—a fear which the writerse.g. Empedocles; cf. Aristot. Met. 5.23.3 n. on physics entertain. Nor do the heavenly
bodies tire in their activity; for motion does not imply for them, as it does for
@@ -6256,7 +6256,7 @@
n="Plat. Laws 896e">Plat. Laws 896e, Plat. Laws
898c). Nor is there in things
which are original and eternal any evil or error, or anything which has been
- destroyed—for destruction is an evil. Geometrical constructions, too, are discovered by an
actualization, because it is by dividing that we discover them. If the division were
already done, they would be obvious; but as it is the division is only there potentially.
@@ -6327,7 +6327,7 @@
does not exist in that way, it does not exist at all. Truth means to think these objects, and there is no falsity or deception, but only
- ignorance—not, however, ignorance such as blindness is; for blindness is like a
+ ignorance—not, however, ignorance such as blindness is; for blindness is like a
total absence of the power of thinking. And it is obvious that with regard to immovable
things also, if one assumes that there are immovable things, there is no deception in
respect of time. E.g., if we suppose that the
@@ -6395,7 +6395,7 @@
is known by unity, and that by which quantities are primarily known is absolute
unity. Thus unity is the starting point of
number qua number. Hence in other cases too "measure" means that by
- which each thing is primarily known, and the measure of each thing is a unit—in
+ which each thing is primarily known, and the measure of each thing is a unit—in
length, breadth, depth, weight and speed. (The
terms "weight" and "speed" are common to both contraries, for each of them has a double
meaning; e.g., "weight" applies to that which has the least amount of gravity and also to
@@ -6419,7 +6419,7 @@
kind is the starting point and measure; for they assume that the motion of the heavens is
uniform and the most rapid, and by it they judge the others. In music the measure is the
quarter tone, because it is the smallest interval; and in language the letter. All these
- are examples of units in this sense—not in the sense that unity is something common
+ are examples of units in this sense—not in the sense that unity is something common
to them all, but in the sense which we have described. The measure is not always numerically one, but sometimes more than
one; e.g., there are two quarter tones, distinguished not by our hearing but by their
@@ -6437,14 +6437,14 @@
n="20" ed="Bekker" unit="line"/>in respect of either quantity or form. Hence unity is indivisible, because that which is
primary in each class of things is indivisible. But not every unit is indivisible in the
- same sense—e.g. the foot and the arithmetical unit; but the latter is absolutely
+ same sense—e.g. the foot and the arithmetical unit; but the latter is absolutely
indivisible, and the former must be classed as indivisible with respect to our power of
perception, as we have already stated; since presumably everything which is continuous is
divisible. The measure is always akin to the thing measured. The measure of magnitude is magnitude,
and in particular the measure of length is a length; of breadth, a breadth; of sounds, a
sound; of weight, a weight; of units, a unit; for this is the view that we must take, and
not that the measure of numbers is a number. The latter, indeed, would necessarily be
- true, if the analogy held good; but the supposition is not analogous—it is as though
+ true, if the analogy held good; but the supposition is not analogous—it is as though
one were to suppose that the measure of units is units, and not a unit; for number is a
plurality of units. We also speak of knowledge or sense perception as a measure of things
@@ -6470,8 +6470,8 @@
which we approached in our discussion of difficultiesAristot. Met. 3.4.24-27.:
what unity is, and what view we are to take of it; whether that unity
- itself is a kind of substance—as first the Pythagoreans, and later Plato, both
- maintain—or whether rather some nature underlies it, and we should give a more
+ itself is a kind of substance—as first the Pythagoreans, and later Plato, both
+ maintain—or whether rather some nature underlies it, and we should give a more
intelligible account of it, and more after the manner of the physicists; for of them
oneEmpedocles. holds that the One is Love,
anotherAnaximenes. Air, and anotherClearly of colors. And unity would be some one color, e.g. white.
- Similarly if all existing things were tunes, there would be a number—of
+ Similarly if all existing things were tunes, there would be a number—of
quarter-tones; but their substance would not be a number; and unity would be something
whose substance is not unity but a quarter-tone. Similarly in the case of sounds, existing
@@ -6514,7 +6514,7 @@
so too in the sphere of substance the One-itself is one substance. And that in a sense unity means the same as being is clear (a)
from the fact that it has a meaning corresponding to each of the categories, and is
- contained in none of them—e.g., it is contained neither in substance nor in quality,
+ contained in none of them—e.g., it is contained neither in substance nor in quality,
but is related to them exactly as being is; (b) from the fact that in "one man" nothing
more is predicated than in "man"Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.2.6-8.(just as Being too does
@@ -6526,8 +6526,8 @@
undivided is called one. Then since opposition is of four kinds, and one of the present
pairs of opposites is used in a privative sense, they must be contraries, and neither
contradictories nor relative terms. Unity is
- described and explained by its contrary—the indivisible by the
- divisible—because plurality, i.e. the divisible, is more easily perceptible than the
+ described and explained by its contrary—the indivisible by the
+ divisible—because plurality, i.e. the divisible, is more easily perceptible than the
indivisible; and so in formula plurality is prior to the indivisible, on account of our
powers of perception. To Unity belong (as we showed by
tabulation in our distinction of the contrariesCf.
@@ -6548,7 +6548,7 @@
straight lines are similar. These are similar, but not absolutely the same. (b) If, having
the same form, and being capable of difference in degree, they have no difference of
degree. (c) If things have an attribute which
- is the same and one in form—e.g. white—in different degrees, we say that they
+ is the same and one in form—e.g. white—in different degrees, we say that they
are similar because their form is one. (d) If the respects in which they are the same are
more than those in which they differ, either in general or as regards their more prominent
qualities; e.g., tin is similar to silver, as being white; and gold to fire, as being
@@ -6574,7 +6574,7 @@
either "other" or "the same." But that which is different from something is different in
some particular respect, so that that in which they differ must be the same sort of thing;
i.e. the same genus or species. For everything
- which is different differs either in genus or in species—in genus, such things as
+ which is different differs either in genus or in species—in genus, such things as
have not common matter and cannot be generated into or out of each other, e.g. things
which belong to different categories; and in species, such things as are of the same genus
(genus meaning that which is predicated of both the different things alike in respect of
@@ -6621,7 +6621,7 @@
most different things which come under the same faculty are contraries; for one science
treats of one class of things, in which complete difference is the greatest. "Positive state" and
- "Privation" constitute primary contrariety—not every form of privation (for it has
+ "Privation" constitute primary contrariety—not every form of privation (for it has
several senses), but any form which is complete. All other contraries must be so called
with respect to these; some because they possess these, others because they produce them
or are productive of them, and others because they are acquisitions or losses of these or
@@ -6634,7 +6634,7 @@
which is totally incapable of possessing some attribute,This is not a proper example of privation. Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.22. or that which would
- naturally possess some attribute but does not, that suffers privation—either
+ naturally possess some attribute but does not, that suffers privation—either
absolutely or in some specified way. Here we already have several meanings, which we have
distinguished elsewhere. Thus privation is a kind of contradiction or incapacity which is
determinate or associated with the receptive material. And the differences are as we have stated: one case is, if a
thing is merely deprived; another, if it is deprived at a certain time or in a certain
- part—e.g. at a certain age or in the important part—or entirely. Hence in some
+ part—e.g. at a certain age or in the important part—or entirely. Hence in some
cases there is an intermediate (there are men who are neither good nor bad), and in others
- there is not—a thing must be either odd or even. Again, some have a determinate subject, and others have not. Thus it
is evident that one of a pair of contraries always has a privative sense; but it is enough
if this is true of the primary or generic contraries, e.g. unity and plurality; for the
others can be reduced to them. Since one thing has one contrary, it might be asked in what sense
unity is opposed to plurality, and the equal to the great and to the small. For if we
- always use the word "whether" in an antithesis—e.g., "whether it is white or black,"
+ always use the word "whether" in an antithesis—e.g., "whether it is white or black,"
or "whether it is white or not" (but we do not ask "whether it is a man or white," unless
we are proceeding upon some assumption, and asking, for instance, whether it was Cleon who
came or Socrates. This is not a necessary
disjunction in any class of things, but is derived from the use in the case of
- opposites—for it is only opposites that cannot be true at the same time—and we
+ opposites—for it is only opposites that cannot be true at the same time—and we
have this same use here in the question "which of the two came?" for if both alternatives were
possible, the question would be absurd; but even so the question falls into an antithesis:
- that of "one" or "many"—i.e., "whether both came, or one")— if, then, the question "whether" is always concerned with
opposites, and we can ask "whether it is greater or smaller, or equal," what is the nature
of the antithesis between "equal" and "greater or smaller"? It is contrary neither to one
@@ -6691,7 +6691,7 @@
negation or as privation. Now it cannot be so opposed to one of the two, for it is no more
opposed to the great than to the small. Therefore it is a privative negation of both. For this reason we say "whether" with
- reference to both, and not to one of the two—e.g., "whether it is greater or equal,"
+ reference to both, and not to one of the two—e.g., "whether it is greater or equal,"
or "whether it is equal or smaller"; there are
always three alternatives. But it is not a necessary privation; for not everything is
equal which is not greater or smaller, but only things which would naturally have these
@@ -6706,7 +6706,7 @@
unit="para"/>Therefore those persons are
wrong in their criticism who imagine that all terms are used analogously, so that that
which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate between "shoe" and "hand," because
- that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between good and bad—as though
+ that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between good and bad—as though
there must be an intermediate in all cases; but this does not necessarily
follow. For the one is a joint negation of
opposites where there is an intermediate and a natural interval; sc. "and then the absurdity of his view would have been
apparent, for," etc. Aristotle assumes the Anaxagoras meant "smallness" (MIKRO/THS) to be the opposite of "multitude" (PLH=QOS); but he meant just what he said—that the
+ lang="greek">PLH=QOS); but he meant just what he said—that the
particles of which things consist are infinitely many and infinitely small. See Bowman
in Classical Review 30, 42-44. for things cannot be infinite in fewness), since
fewness is constituted not by one, as some hold, but by two. Aristot. Met. 5.15.8, 9.
- that things are called relative in two senses—either as being contraries, or as
+ that things are called relative in two senses—either as being contraries, or as
knowledge is related to the knowable, A being related to B because B is described in
relation to A. There is no reason why one should not be fewer than something, e.g. two; for if it is
@@ -6763,7 +6763,7 @@
is a plurality measurable by one. And in a sense one and number are opposed; not, however,
as being contrary, but as we have said some relative terms to be; for it is qua measure and measurable that they are opposed. (Hence not everything which is one is a number—e.g., a
+ ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>(Hence not everything which is one is a number—e.g., a
thing which is indivisible.) But although the relation between knowledge and the knowable
is said to be similar to this, it turns out not to be similar. For it would seem that
knowledge is a measure, and the knowable that which is measurable by it; but it happens
@@ -6796,9 +6796,9 @@
intermediate term); of the remaining types of opposites some are relative, others
privative, and others contrary. Those relative
opposites which are not contrary have no intermediate. The reason for this is that they
- are not in the same genus— for what is intermediate between knowledge and the
- knowable?—but between great and small there is an intermediate. Now since
+ knowable?—but between great and small there is an intermediate. Now since
intermediates are in the same genus, as has been shown, and are between contraries, they
must be composed of those contraries. For the contraries must either belong to a genus or
not. And if there is a genus in such a way that
@@ -7157,7 +7157,7 @@
permanent or temporary state or motion or some other such affection of Being qua Being. And since
everything that is can be referred to some one common concept, each of the contrarieties
- too can be referred to the primary differentiae and contrarieties of Being—whether
+ too can be referred to the primary differentiae and contrarieties of Being—whether
the primary differentiae of Being are plurality and unity, or similarity and
dissimilarity, or something else; for we may take them as already discussed.Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.2.9
@@ -7169,7 +7169,7 @@
contraries pertains to one and the same science, and each contrary is so called in virtue of privation (although indeed one might wonder
in what sense they can be called contraries in virtue of privation when they admit of a
- middle term—e.g. "unjust" and "just"), in all such cases we must regard the
+ middle term—e.g. "unjust" and "just"), in all such cases we must regard the
privation as being not of the whole definition but of the ultimate species. E.g., if the
just man is "one who is obedient to the laws in virtue of some volitional state," the
unjust man will not be entirely deprived of the whole definition, but will be "one who is
@@ -7178,8 +7178,8 @@
cases). And just as the mathematician makes a
study of abstractions (for in his investigations he first abstracts everything that is
sensible, such as weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold
- and all other sensible contrarieties, leaving only quantity and continuity—sometimes
- in one, sometimes in two and sometimes in three dimensions—and their affections qua quantitative and continuous, and does not study them with respect
to any other thing; and in some cases investigates the relative positions of things and
the properties of these, Aristot. Met.
11.1.1. may be regarded as solvedAlso the problem stated in ch. i. 3.—I mean the problem as to how there
+ >Also the problem stated in ch. i. 3.—I mean the problem as to how there
can be one science of several things which are different in genus. Since even the mathematician
uses the common axioms only in a particular application, it will be the province of
@@ -7227,7 +7227,7 @@
is a principle in existing things about which we cannot make a mistakeThis chapter corresponds to Aristot. Met. 4.3.7-4.31.; of which, on the
- contrary, we must always realize the truth—viz. that the same thing cannot at one
+ contrary, we must always realize the truth—viz. that the same thing cannot at one
and the same time be and not be, nor admit of any other similar pair of opposites. Of such
axioms although there is a proof ad hominem, there is no absolute proof; And
- further, if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very statement—that there is no
- such thing as a true affirmation—will be false. But if there is such a thing, the
+ further, if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very statement—that there is no
+ such thing as a true affirmation—will be false. But if there is such a thing, the
contentions of those who raise objections of this kind and utterly destroy rational
discourse may be considered to be refuted.Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.8.4, 5. And since every
science must have some knowledge of the essence and must use it as a starting-point, we must be careful to observe how the natural
- philosopher should define, and how he should regard the formula of essence—whether
+ philosopher should define, and how he should regard the formula of essence—whether
in the same way as the term "snub," or rather as the term "concave." For of these the formula of "snub" is stated in conjunction
with the matter of the object, whereas that of "concave" is stated apart from the matter;
@@ -7446,7 +7446,7 @@
permanent things, but not with things which can exist separately. Hence there is a science distinct from both of these, which deals with
that which exists separately and is immovable; that is, if there really is a substance of
- this kind—I mean separately existent and immovable—as we shall endeavor to
+ this kind—I mean separately existent and immovable—as we shall endeavor to
prove.Aristot.
Met. 12.6, 7. And if there is an entity of this kind in the world of
reality, here surely must be the Divine, and this must be the first and most fundamental
@@ -7481,7 +7481,7 @@
cultured, when he has become lettered, will be both at once although he was not before;
but that which is but was not always so must have come to be; therefore he must have
become at the same time cultured and lettered" —none of the recognized sciences considers this, except sophistry. This is the
+ />—none of the recognized sciences considers this, except sophistry. This is the
only science which concerns itself with the accidental, and hence Plato was not far wrong
in sayingPlat. Sop.
254a. that the sophist spends his time in the study of unreality. But
@@ -7551,11 +7551,11 @@
(generation and destruction); quantitative (increase and decrease); qualitative
(alteration); spatial (locomotion). Cf. Aristot. Met.
11.12.1, 2.; and there is nothing which is common to these and in no one
- category. Each category belongs to all its members in two ways—e.g. substance, for
+ category. Each category belongs to all its members in two ways—e.g. substance, for
this is sometimes the form of the thing and sometimes its privation; and as regards quality there is white and black; and as regards
quantity, complete and incomplete; and as regards spatial motion there is up and down or
- light and heavy—so that there are as many forms of motion and change as there are of
+ light and heavy—so that there are as many forms of motion and change as there are of
Being.This is inaccurate; see previous
note. Now since every kind of thing is divided into
the potential and the real, I call the actualization of the potential as such,(This is obvious in the case of
contraries; for the potentiality for health and the potentiality for illness are not the
- same—for if they were, health and illness would be the same too—but the
+ same—for if they were, health and illness would be the same too—but the
substrate which becomes healthy or ill, whether it is moisture or blood, is one and the
same.) And since it is not the same, just as "color" and "visible" are not the same, it is
the complete reality of the potential qua potential that is
@@ -7593,8 +7593,8 @@
everything may sometimes be actual, and sometimes not; e.g. the "buildable" qua "buildable"; and the actualization of the "buildable" qua "buildable" is the act of building. For the actualization is either this—the act of
- building—or a house. But when the house exists, it will no longer be buildable; the
+ unit="Loeb chap"/>For the actualization is either this—the act of
+ building—or a house. But when the house exists, it will no longer be buildable; the
buildable is that which is being built. Hence the actualization must be the
act of building, and the act of building is a kind of motion. The same argument applies to
the other kinds of motion. The region proper to the body which
is homogeneous with the clod is infinite. Then will the clod occupy the whole of that
region? How can it? Then what of its rest or motion? It will either rest
- everywhere—in which case it cannot move—or move everywhere; in which case it
+ everywhere—in which case it cannot move—or move everywhere; in which case it
cannot rest.If earth is an infinite body, its
region must be infinite. But the infinite has no center (cf. sect. 13). Therefore a
clod, which cannot occupy the whole region proper to earth, will have no region proper
@@ -7746,8 +7746,8 @@
whole must be finite. In general, there cannot be an infinite body and a place
for bodies if every body which is sensible has either weight or lightness; for it will
- have to move either towards the center or upwards, and the infinite—either the whole
- or the half—cannot do either; for how can you divide it? How can the infinite be
+ have to move either towards the center or upwards, and the infinite—either the whole
+ or the half—cannot do either; for how can you divide it? How can the infinite be
part up and part down, or part extreme and part center? Further, every sensible body is in some place, and of place there are
six kinds,i.e., above and below, before and behind,
@@ -7780,9 +7780,9 @@
affirmation. Thus there must be three forms of change; for that which is from negative into negative is not change, because they
are neither contraries nor contradictories, since they entail no opposition. The change
- from the negative into its contradictory positive is generation—absolute change
+ from the negative into its contradictory positive is generation—absolute change
absolute generation, and qualified change qualified generation; and the change from the
- positive to the negative is destruction—absolute change absolute destruction, and
+ positive to the negative is destruction—absolute change absolute destruction, and
qualified change qualified destruction.The change
from positive to positive is omitted here (but cf. sect. 7). Aristotle no doubt intended
to use it as an example of non-substantial change, e.g. from "poor man" to "rich man";
@@ -7809,7 +7809,7 @@
3. and of these those which relate to generation and destruction are not motions,
and these are the changes between contradictories, the change from positive to positive
must alone be motion. The subjects are either contraries or intermediates (for privative
- terms may also be regarded as contraries) and are denoted by a positive term—e.g.
+ terms may also be regarded as contraries) and are denoted by a positive term—e.g.
"naked" or "toothless" or "black." Now since the categories are distinguished as substance,
quality, place, activity or passivity, relation and quantity,the last belongs to some other science, if there is no
principle common to all three. Sensible substance is liable to change. Now if change proceeds from
- opposites or intermediates—not however from all opposites (for speech is not white),
+ opposites or intermediates—not however from all opposites (for speech is not white),
but only from the contraryCf. Aristot. Met. 10.7.—then there must be
+ n="Aristot. Met. 10.1057a">Aristot. Met. 10.7.—then there must be
something underlying which changes into the opposite contrary; for the contrariesi.e., contrary qualities. Cf. Aristot. Met. 8.5.1. do not change. these are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in the
strictest sense); (2.) the "nature"i.e.,
- form.(existing individually)—i.e. a kind of positive state which is the
+ form.(existing individually)—i.e. a kind of positive state which is the
terminus of motion; and (3.) the particular combination of these, e.g. Socrates or
Callias. In some cases the individuality does not exist apart from the composite substance
(e.g., the form of a house does not exist separately, except as the art of
@@ -8229,8 +8229,8 @@
or the doctrine of the physicists that "all things were together,"Cf. Aristot. Met. 12.2.3.
we have the same impossibility; for how can there be motion if there is no actual cause?
- Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the
- earth move themselves—the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the
+ Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the
+ earth move themselves—the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the
menses. Hence some, e.g. LeucippusCf. Aristot. Met.
1.4.12, Aristot. De Caelo 300b 8, and
@@ -8255,7 +8255,7 @@
Empedocles with his theory of Love and Strife, and by those who hold that motion is
eternal, e.g. Leucippus. Therefore Chaos or Night did not
endure for an unlimited time, but the same things have always existed, either passing
- through a cycle or in accordance with some other principle—that is, if actuality is
+ through a cycle or in accordance with some other principle—that is, if actuality is
prior to potentiality. Now if there is a
regular cycle, there must be somethingThe sphere of
the fixed stars, Aristot. Met. 12.8.9; cf. For the primary kind of change is locomotion,Proved in Aristot. Physics 8.7.
@@ -8345,7 +8345,7 @@
concerned with that which is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that
which is in the highest sense best.Since the prime
mover is pure actuality, and has or rather is the highest form of life, Aristotle
- identifies it with the highest activity—pure thinking. And thought thinks
itself through participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought
by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the
@@ -8373,7 +8373,7 @@
n="7.11" ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>For seed comes from prior creatures which are perfect,
and that which is first is not the seed but the perfect creature. E.g., one might say that prior
- to the seed is the man—not he who is produced from the seed, but another man from
+ to the seed is the man—not he who is produced from the seed, but another man from
whom the seed comes.Cf. Aristot. Met. 9.8.4, 5. Thus it is evident from the
@@ -8408,8 +8408,8 @@
and since we can see that besides the simple spatial motion of the universei.e., the (apparent) diurnal revolution of the
heavens.(which we hold to be excited by the primary immovable substance) there
- are other spatial motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (because a
- body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest—this has been proved in
+ are other spatial motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (because a
+ body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at rest—this has been proved in
our physical treatisesAristot. Physics 8.8, 9, Aristot. De Caelo 1.2,
2.3-8.); then each of these spatial motions must also be excited by a
@@ -8495,7 +8495,7 @@
in calculation see Ross ad loc. spheres in all. This, then, may be taken to be the number of the spheres; and thus it is reasonable to
suppose that there are as many immovable substances and principles,i.e., the movers of the spheres.—the statement of logical
+ anchored="yes">i.e., the movers of the spheres.—the statement of logical
necessity may be left to more competent thinkers. If there can be no spatial motion which is not
conducive to the motion of a star, and if
@@ -8645,7 +8645,7 @@
resp="Tredennick" anchored="yes">See Aristot. Met.
12.7.10 does not even regard the Good and the Bad as principles; yet the
Good is in the truest sense a principle in all things. The former school is right in
- holding that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a principle—
+ holding that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a principle—
whether
as an end or as a moving cause or as form. Empedocles theory is also absurd, for he identifies
@@ -8663,7 +8663,7 @@
moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be some other
GoodMotion presupposes a final cause, which was
not what Anaxagoras meant by "Mind." Cf. Aristot. Met.
- 1.7.5.—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine
+ 1.7.5.—unless it is as we say; for on our view the art of medicine
is in a sense health.Aristotle identifies the
efficient cause, in a sense, with the final cause. Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.9.3. It is absurd also not to provide a contrary for
@@ -8745,19 +8745,19 @@
Ideas are substances. Now since someThis was the orthodox Platonist view; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.4. recognize these as two
- classes— the Ideas and the mathematical
- numbers—and othersXenocrates and his
+ classes— the Ideas and the mathematical
+ numbers—and othersXenocrates and his
followers. regard both as having one nature, and yet othersThe Pythagoreans and Speusippus. hold that only
the mathematical substances are substances, we must first consider the mathematical
- objects, without imputing to them any other characteristic—e.g. by asking whether
+ objects, without imputing to them any other characteristic—e.g. by asking whether
they are really Ideas or not, or whether they are principles and substances of existing
- things or not—and merely inquire whether as mathematical objects they exist or not,
+ things or not—and merely inquire whether as mathematical objects they exist or not,
and if they do, in what sense; then after this we must separately consider the Ideas
themselves, simply and in so far as the accepted procedure requires; for most of the
arguments have been made familiar already by the criticisms of other thinkers. And further, the greater part of our discussion must
- bear directly upon this second question—viz. when we are considering whether the
+ bear directly upon this second question—viz. when we are considering whether the
substances and first principles of existing things are numbers and Ideas; for after we
have dealt with the Ideas there remains this third question. Now if the objects of mathematics exist,
@@ -8769,7 +8769,7 @@
that they are is a fabrication, has been observed already in our discussion of
difficultiesCf. Aristot. Met. 3.2.23-30.
- —the
+ —the
reasons being (a) that two solids cannot occupy the same space, and (b) that on this same
theory all other potentialities and characteristics would exist in sensible things, and
none of them would exist separately. This, then, has been already stated; Now the accumulation becomes absurd; because whereas we get
only one class of solids besides sensible solids, we get three classes of planes besides
- sensible planes—those which exist separately from sensible planes, those which exist
+ sensible planes—those which exist separately from sensible planes, those which exist
in the mathematical solids, and those which exist separately from those in the
- mathematical solids—four classes of lines, and five of points; with which of these, then, will the mathematical sciences deal?
Not, surely, with the planes, lines and points in the immovable solid; for knowledge is
always concerned with that which is prior. And the same argument applies to numbers; for
@@ -8860,9 +8860,9 @@
indissociable. For if attributes, such as
"moving" or "white," do not exist apart from their substances, "white" will be prior in
formula to "white man," but not in substantiality; for it cannot exist in separation, but
- always exists conjointly with the concrete whole—by which I mean "white
+ always exists conjointly with the concrete whole—by which I mean "white
man." Thus it is obvious that neither is the
- result of abstraction prior, nor the result of adding a determinant posterior—for
+ result of abstraction prior, nor the result of adding a determinant posterior—for
the expression "white man" is the result of adding a determinant to "white." Thus we have sufficiently shown (a) that the objects of mathematics
are not more substantial than corporeal objects; (b) that they are not prior in point of
@@ -8893,14 +8893,14 @@
say in a general sense that mathematical objects exist, and in such a form as
mathematicians describe them. And just as it is
true to say generally of the other sciences that they deal with a particular
- subject—not with that which is accidental to it (e.g. not with "white" if "the
+ subject—not with that which is accidental to it (e.g. not with "white" if "the
healthy" is white, and the subject of the science is "the healthy"), but with that which
is the subject of the particular science; with the healthy if it treats of things qua healthy, and with man if qua man—so this is also
+ >qua healthy, and with man if qua man—so this is also
true of geometry. If the things of which it treats are accidentally sensible although it
does not treat of them qua sensible, it does not follow that the
- mathematical sciences treat of sensible things—nor, on the other hand, that they
+ mathematical sciences treat of sensible things—nor, on the other hand, that they
treat of other things which exist independently apart from these. Many attributes are essential
properties of things as possessing a particular characteristic; e.g., there are attributes
@@ -8979,8 +8979,8 @@
>Aristot. De Part. Anim. 642a 24. and defined, after a fashion, "the
hot" and "the cold"; while the PythagoreansCf.
Aristot. Met. 1.5.2, 16. at an earlier
- date had arrived at definitions of some few things—whose formulae they connected
- with numbers—e.g., what "opportunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he
+ date had arrived at definitions of some few things—whose formulae they connected
+ with numbers—e.g., what "opportunity" is, or "justice" or "marriage"); and he
naturally inquired into the essence of things; for he was trying to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical reasoning
is the essence. At that time there was as yet no such proficiency in Dialectic that men
@@ -9114,7 +9114,7 @@
Confusion (or textual inaccuracy) is further suggested by the fact that Aristotle offers
no alternative statement of the nature of number in general, such as we should expect
from his language. In any case the classification is arbitrary and
- incomplete.— and this applies
+ incomplete.— and this applies
directly to units, and any given unit is inaddible to any other given unit; or (b) theyThe
units. are all directly successive, and any units can be added to any other
@@ -9139,7 +9139,7 @@
resp="Tredennick" anchored="yes">In Aristot. Met.
13.2.1-3. but in the sense that sensible things are composed of numbers
which are present in themThe Pythagorean
- number-atomist view; See Introduction.)—either some of them and not others,
+ number-atomist view; See Introduction.)—either some of them and not others,
or all of them.i.e., either all numbers are
material elements of things, or some are and others are not. These are of necessity the only ways in which the numbers can
@@ -9157,10 +9157,10 @@
n="Aristot. Met. 12.1075b">Aristot. Met. 12.10.14. being the primary
reality and separate from sensible things. The Pythagoreans also believe in one kind of
- number—the mathematical; only they maintain that it is not separate, but that
+ number—the mathematical; only they maintain that it is not separate, but that
sensible substances are composed of it. For they construct the whole universe of numbers,
but not of numbers consisting of abstract units; they suppose the units to be extended—but as for how the first extended unit was
+ />they suppose the units to be extended—but as for how the first extended unit was
formed they appear to be at a loss.Cf. Aristot. Met. 13.8.9, 10, Aristot. Met. 14.3.15, Aristot. Met. 1.9.30.; and of those who
treat the subject in a different manner someSpeusippus; cf. sect. 7 above. speak of the mathematical objects and in a
- mathematical way—viz. those who do not regard the Ideas as numbers, nor indeed hold
- that the Ideas exist—and othersXenocrates.
+ mathematical way—viz. those who do not regard the Ideas as numbers, nor indeed hold
+ that the Ideas exist—and othersXenocrates.
For his belief in indivisible lines see Ritter and Preller 362. Aristotle ascribes the
doctrine to Plato in Aristot. Met.
1.9.25. speak of the mathematical objects, but not in a mathematical way;
@@ -9236,7 +9236,7 @@
>i.e., the Great-and-Small, which Aristotle wrongly understands as two unequal things.
It is practically certain that Plato used the term (as he did that of "Indeterminate
Dyad") to describe indeterminate quantity. See Introduction.(coming into being
- when these were equalized), or otherwise— since if we regard the one unit as prior to the other,This is a necessary implication of the theory of inaddible units (cf.
Aristot. Met. 13.6.1, 2). it will be
@@ -9301,7 +9301,7 @@
10 is not a chance number,I think Ross's
interpretation of this passage must be right. The Ideal 10 is a unique number, and the
numbers contained in it must be ideal and unique; therefore the two 5's must be
- specifically different, and so must their units—which contradicts the view under
+ specifically different, and so must their units—which contradicts the view under
discussion. and is not composed of chance 5's, any more than of chance units, the
units in this number 10 must be different; for
if they are not different, the 5's of which the 10 is composed will not be different; but
@@ -9343,7 +9343,7 @@
unit="Loeb chap"/>In general, to regard units as different in any way whatsoever is
absurd and fictitious (by "fictitious" I mean "dragged in to support a hypothesis"). For
we can see that one unit differs from another neither in quantity nor in quality; and a
- number must be either equal or unequal—this applies to all numbers, but especially
+ number must be either equal or unequal—this applies to all numbers, but especially
to numbers consisting of abstract units. Thus
if a number is neither more nor less, it is equal; and things which are equal and entirely
without difference we assume, in the sphere of number, to be identical. Otherwise even the
@@ -9351,7 +9351,7 @@
that they are not different, what reason will he be able to allege? Again, if every unit plus
another unit makes 2, a unit from the Ideal 2 plus one from the Ideal 3 will make
- 2—a 2 composed of different unitsWhich
+ 2—a 2 composed of different unitsWhich
conflicts with the view under discussion.; will this be prior or posterior to 3?
It rather seems that it must be prior, because one of the units is contemporaneous with 3,
and the other with 2.The implication seems to be,
@@ -9430,8 +9430,8 @@
abstract existence. From these considerations it is also clear that the third
alternativeCf. Aristot. Met. 13.6.7.—that Ideal number and mathematical number
- are the same—is the worst; for two errors have to be combined to make one theory.
+ >Aristot. Met. 13.6.7.—that Ideal number and mathematical number
+ are the same—is the worst; for two errors have to be combined to make one theory.
(1.) Mathematical number cannot be of this nature, but the propounder of this view has to
spin it out by making peculiar assumptions; (2.) his theory must admit all the
difficulties which confront those who speak of Ideal number. Aristot. Met.
1.6.10. Proportion alone of the "derivatives" here mentioned appears to be
derived from number. As Syrianus says, the three types of proportion can be illustrated
- by numbers from within the decad—arithmetical 1. 2. 3, geometrical 1. 2. 4,
+ by numbers from within the decad—arithmetical 1. 2. 3, geometrical 1. 2. 4,
harmonic 2. 3. 6. Hence they
identify the odd with Unity; because if oddness depended on 3, how could 5 be odd?sc. because (on their theory) 3 is not contained in 5.
Thus oddness had to be referred to not a number but a
- principle—unity. Again, they hold that
+ principle—unity. Again, they hold that
spatial magnitudes and the like have a certain limit; e.g. the first or indivisible line, then the
2, and so on; these too extending up to 10.The
@@ -9544,8 +9544,8 @@
unit="Loeb chap"/>Now if we regard number as composite, Unity is prior; but if we regard
the universal or form as prior, number is prior, because each unit is a material part of
number, while number is the form of the units. And there is a sense in which the right
- angle is prior to the acute angle—since it is definite and is involved in the
- definition of the acute angle—and another sense in which the acute angle is prior,
+ angle is prior to the acute angle—since it is definite and is involved in the
+ definition of the acute angle—and another sense in which the acute angle is prior,
because it is a part of the other, i.e., the right angle is divided into acute
angles. Thus regarded as matter the acute
angle and element and unit are prior; but with respect to form and substance in the sense
@@ -9563,15 +9563,15 @@
impossible; for in one sense it is the One qua form or
essence, and in the other the One qua part or matter, that is primary. There is a sense in which both
- number and unit are one; they are so in truth potentially—that is, if a number is
+ number and unit are one; they are so in truth potentially—that is, if a number is
not an aggregate but a unity consisting of units distinct from those of other numbers, as
- the Platonists hold— but each of the
+ the Platonists hold— but each of the
twoAristotle takes the number two as an example,
but the principle is of course universal. In a sense both number and unit are one; but
if the number exists as an actual unity, the unit can only exist potentially.
units is not one in complete reality. The cause of the error which befell the Platonists
- was that they were pursuing their inquiry from two points of view—that of
- mathematics and that of general definition—at the same time. Hence as a result of
+ was that they were pursuing their inquiry from two points of view—that of
+ mathematics and that of general definition—at the same time. Hence as a result of
the former they conceived of the One or first principle as a point, for the unit is a
point without position. (Thus they too, just like certain others, represented existing things as composed of that which is
@@ -9596,13 +9596,13 @@
Further, if
2 itself and 3 itself are each one thing, both together make 2. From what, then, does this
2 come? Since
- there is no contact in numbers, but units which have nothing between them—e.g. those
- in 2 or 3—are successive, the question might be raised whether or not they are
+ there is no contact in numbers, but units which have nothing between them—e.g. those
+ in 2 or 3—are successive, the question might be raised whether or not they are
successive to Unity itself, and whether of the numbers which succeed it 2 or one of the
units in 2 is prior. We find similar difficulties in the case of the genera posterior to
numberCf. Aristot. Met. 13.6.10.—the line, plane and solid. Some derive
+ >Aristot. Met. 13.6.10.—the line, plane and solid. Some derive
these from the species of the Great and Small; viz. lines from the Long and Short, planes
from the Broad and Narrow, and solids from the Deep and Shallow. These are species of the
Great and Small. As for the geometrical first
@@ -9620,7 +9620,7 @@
from the Straight and Crooked, or solids from the Smooth and Rough. Common to all these Platonic
theories is the same problem which presents itself in the case of species of a genus when
- we posit universals—viz. whether it is the Ideal animal that is present in the
+ we posit universals—viz. whether it is the Ideal animal that is present in the
particular animal, or some other "animal" distinct from the Ideal animal. This question
will cause no difficulty if the universal is not separable; but if, as the Platonists say,
Unity and the numbers exist separately, then it is not easy to solve (if we should apply
@@ -9637,7 +9637,7 @@
if the matter is one, line, plane and solid will be the same; because the product of the
same elements must be one and the same. If on the other hand there is more than one kind of
- matter—one of the line, another of the plane, and another of the solid—either
+ matter—one of the line, another of the plane, and another of the solid—either
the kinds are associated with each other, or they are not. Thus the same result will
follow in this case also; for either the plane will not contain a line, or it will be a
line. Further, no attempt is made to explain how number can be generated from unity and
@@ -9658,12 +9658,12 @@
indivisible; otherwise it will be a plurality and the unit will be divisible, and unity and plurality will not be its elements,
because each unit will not be generated from pluralitysc. but from an indivisible part of plurality—which is not a
+ anchored="yes">sc. but from an indivisible part of plurality—which is not a
plurality but a unity. and unity. (b)
The exponent of this theory merely introduces another number; because plurality is a
number of indivisible parts.i.e., to say that
number is derived from plurality is to say that number is derived from
- number—which explains nothing. Again, we must
+ number—which explains nothing. Again, we must
inquire from the exponent of this theory whether the numbersc. which plurality has been shown to be. is infinite or
finite. There was, it appears, a finite
@@ -9696,7 +9696,7 @@
posits theseUnity and the indeterminate dyad; for
the difficulty see Aristot. Met. 13.7.3,
4. as first principles, mathematical number can exist besides Ideal
- number, identified Ideal with mathematical number,—but only in theory, since
+ number, identified Ideal with mathematical number,—but only in theory, since
actually mathematical number is done away with, because the hypotheses which they state
are peculiar to them and not mathematical.Cf. Aristot. Met. 13.6.10. Cf. previous note. in all), are the elements of
numbers; the two former as matter, and Unity as form. Others speak of the Many and Few,
because the Great and the Small are in their nature more suited to be the principles of
- magnitude; and others use the more general term which covers these—"the exceeding"
+ magnitude; and others use the more general term which covers these—"the exceeding"
and "the exceeded." But none of these
variations makes any appreciable difference with respect to some of the consequences of
the theory; they only affect the abstract
@@ -9872,7 +9872,7 @@
and if there is either no contrary to unity, or if there is to be any contrary it is
plurality; and if the unequal is contrary to the equal, and the different to the same, and
the other to the thing itself then those who oppose unity to plurality have the best claim
- to credibility—but even their theory is inadequate, because then unity will be few.
+ to credibility—but even their theory is inadequate, because then unity will be few.
For plurality is opposed to paucity, and many to few. That "unity" denotes a measureCf. Aristot. Met.
@@ -9900,8 +9900,8 @@
regard the unequal as a unity, and the dyad as an indeterminate compound of great and
small, hold theories which are very far from being probable or possible. For these terms
represent affections and attributes, rather than substrates, of numbers and
- magnitudes—"many" and "few" applying to number, and "great" and "small" to
- magnitude— just as odd and even, smooth
+ magnitudes—"many" and "few" applying to number, and "great" and "small" to
+ magnitude— just as odd and even, smooth
and rough, straight and crooked, are attributes. Further, in addition to this error, "great" and "small" and all other
such terms must be relative. And the relative is of all the categories in the least degree
@@ -9955,7 +9955,7 @@
have had occasion to say elsewhere.Aristot. Met. 9.8.15-17, Aristot. De Caelo 1.12. Now if what we have just
- been saying—that no substance is eternal unless it is actuality—is true
+ been saying—that no substance is eternal unless it is actuality—is true
universally, and the elements are the matter of substance, an eternal substance can have
no elements of which, as inherent in it, it consists. There are some who, while making the
@@ -9973,8 +9973,8 @@
they encountered and refuted Parmenides' dictum: It will
ne'er be proved that things which are not, are,Parmenides Fr. 7 (Diels). i.e., that they must show that that which is not, is; for only so—of
- that which is, and of something else—could existing things be composed, if they are
+ unit="para"/>i.e., that they must show that that which is not, is; for only so—of
+ that which is, and of something else—could existing things be composed, if they are
more than one.Cf. Plat.
Soph. 237a, 241d, 256e. However, (i) in the first place, if "being" has several
@@ -10006,7 +10006,7 @@
generated from or resolved into not-being in this sense. But not only has "not-being" in
its various cases as many meanings as there are categories, but moreover the false and the
potential are called "not-being"; and it is from the latter that generation takes
- place—man comes to be from that which is not man but is potentially man, and white
+ place—man comes to be from that which is not man but is potentially man, and white
from that which is not white but is potentially white; no matter whether one thing is
generated or many. Clearly the point at issue is how "being" in the sense of the
@@ -10038,7 +10038,7 @@
ed="P" unit="Loeb chap"/>We must, then, as I say, presuppose in the case of each thing
that which is it potentially. The authorPlato. of this theory further explained what it is that is potentially a
- particular thing or substance, but is not per se existent—that it is the relative
+ particular thing or substance, but is not per se existent—that it is the relative
(he might as well have said "quality"); which is neither potentially unity or Being, nor a
negation of unity or Being, but just a
particular kind of Being. And it was still
@@ -10123,7 +10123,7 @@
has to face the question why sensible things exhibit numerical attributes. can
make out a case for the contrary view, and that those who hold this theory must find a
solution for the difficulty which was recently raisedsect. 3.—why it is that while numbers are in no way present
+ anchored="yes">sect. 3.—why it is that while numbers are in no way present
in sensible things, their attributes are present in sensible things. There are someProbably Pythagoreans.
Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.2.2, like a poorly constructed drama. ThoseXenocrates
(that the reference is not to Plato is clear from sect. 11). who posit the Ideas
escape this difficulty, because they construct spatial magnitudes out of matter and a
- number—2 in the case of lines, and 3, presumably, in that of planes, and 4 in that
+ number—2 in the case of lines, and 3, presumably, in that of planes, and 4 in that
of solids; or out of other numbers, for it makes no difference. But are we to regard these magnitudes as Ideas, or what is their mode
of existence? and what contribution do they make to reality? They contribute nothing; just
@@ -10197,8 +10197,8 @@
this theory, to introduce generation of things which are eternal. There is no reason to doubt whether the Pythagoreans do or do
not introduce it; for they clearly state that when the One had been
- constituted—whether out of planes or superficies or seed or out of something that
- they cannot explain—immediately the nearest part of the Infinite began to be drawn
+ constituted—whether out of planes or superficies or seed or out of something that
+ they cannot explain—immediately the nearest part of the Infinite began to be drawn
in and limited by the Limit.Cf. Aristot. Physics 3.4, Aristot. Physics 4.6, and Burnet, E.G.P. sect. 53. which clearly
implies that there is generation of even ones; and some hold that the even is constructed
- first out of unequals—the Great and Small—when they are equalized.Cf. Aristot. Met.
13.7.5. Therefore the inequality must apply to them before they are
equalized. If they had always been equalized they would not have been unequal before; for
@@ -10237,14 +10237,14 @@
goodness to the first principle as an attribute, but from treating unity as a principle,
and a principle in the sense of an element, and then deriving number from unity. The early
poets agree with this view in so far as they assert that it was not the original
- forces—such as Night, Heaven, Chaos or Ocean—but Zeus who was king and
+ forces—such as Night, Heaven, Chaos or Ocean—but Zeus who was king and
ruler. It was, however, on the ground of the
changing of the rulers of the world that the poets were led to state these theories;
because those of them who compromise by not describing everything in mythological
- language—e.g. PherecydesOf Of Syros (circa 600-525 B.C.). He made Zeus one of the three primary beings
- (Diels,Vorsokratiker201, 202). and certain others—make the
+ (Diels,Vorsokratiker201, 202). and certain others—make the
primary generator the Supreme Good; and so do the Magi,The Zoroastrian priestly caste. and some of the later philosophers
such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras: the one making Love an element,mathematical number). For on this view all units become identical with
some good, and we get a great abundance of goods.If
unity is goodness, and every unit is a kind of unity, every unit must be a kind of
- goodness—which is absurd. Further, if the Forms are numbers, all Forms become identical with some good. Again, let
+ goodness—which is absurd. Further, if the Forms are numbers, all Forms become identical with some good. Again, let
us assume that there are Ideas of anything that we choose. If there are Ideas only of
goods, the Ideas will not be substancesBecause they
are Ideas not of substances but of qualities.; and if there are Ideas of
@@ -10283,7 +10283,7 @@
contraries, the nature of plurality would then necessarily be bad. OthersPlato and
Xenocrates. hold that inequality is the nature of the bad. It follows, then, that
- all things partake of the Bad except one—absolute unity; and that numbers partake of
+ all things partake of the Bad except one—absolute unity; and that numbers partake of
it in a more unmitigated form than do spatial magnitudesAs being more directly derived from the first principles. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.9.23 n.; And if, as we said,Aristot. Met. 14.1.17. the matter of each
- thing is that which is it potentially—e.g., the matter of actual fire is that which
- is potentially fire—then the Bad will be simply the potentially Good. Thus all these objections follow because (1.) they make every
principle an element; (2.) they make contraries principles; (3.) they make unity a
principle; and (4.) they make numbers the primary substances, and separable, and
@@ -10312,7 +10312,7 @@
objects that the imperfect does not really exist, and so Speusippus deprives his first
principle of reality. He is wrong;
for even in the natural world the principles from which these things are derived are
- perfect and complete—for it is man that begets man; the seed does not come
+ perfect and complete—for it is man that begets man; the seed does not come
first.Cf. Aristot. Met. 9.8.5. It is absurd also to generate space simultaneously
with the mathematical solids (for space is peculiar to particular things, which is why
@@ -10333,7 +10333,7 @@
as they intend it to be. Is it by composition,
as we hold of the syllable? But (a) this necessarily implies position; (b) in thinking of
unity and plurality we shall think of them separately. This, then, is what number will
- be—a unit plus plurality, or unity plus the
+ be—a unit plus plurality, or unity plus the
Unequal. And since a thing is derived from elements either
as inherent or as not inherent in it, in which way is number so derived? Derivation from
inherent elements is only possible for things which admit of generation. and as EurytusDisciple of Philolaus;
he "flourished" in the early fourth century B.C. determined which number belongs
- to which thing—e.g. this number to man, and this to horse—by using pebbles to
+ to which thing—e.g. this number to man, and this to horse—by using pebbles to
copy the shape of natural objects, like those who arrange numbers in the form of
geometrical figures, the triangle and the square.cf. Burnet, E.G.P. sect. 47. Or is
it because harmony is a ratio of numbers, and so too is man and everything else? But in
- what sense are attributes—white, and sweet, and hot—numbers?This is an objection to the view that numbers are
causes as bounds. And clearly numbers are not the essence of things, nor are they
causes of the form; for the ratioOr
@@ -10391,7 +10391,7 @@
particles of fire or earth, or of units. But the essence is the proportion of one quantity
to another in the mixture; i.e. no longer a number, but a ratio of the mixture of numbers,
either of corporeal particles or of any other kind. Thus number is not an efficient
- cause—neither number in general, nor that which consists of abstract units—nor
+ cause—neither number in general, nor that which consists of abstract units—nor
is it the matter, nor the formula or form of things. Nor again is it a final
cause. The
question might also be raised as to what the good is which things derive from numbers
@@ -10448,7 +10448,7 @@
C with the fifth, and Y with the octave. and that because there are three concords, there
are three double consonants. They ignore the fact that there might be thousands of double
- consonants—because there might be one symbol for *G*R. But if they say that each of these letters is double any of the others,
whereas no other is,Q,
F, and X are aspirated, not double,
@@ -10456,7 +10456,7 @@
resp="Tredennick" anchored="yes">Palate, lips, and teeth. of the mouth, and that
one consonant is combined with S in each region, it is for
this reason that there are only three double consonants, and not because there are three
- concords—because there are really more than three; but there cannot be more than
+ concords—because there are really more than three; but there cannot be more than
three double consonants. Thus these thinkers are like the ancient Homeric scholars, who see
minor similarities but overlook important ones. Some say
@@ -10500,7 +10500,7 @@
the same force. Hence they would seem to be
mere coincidences, for they are accidental; but all the examples are appropriate to each
other, and they are one by analogy. For there is analogy between all the categories of
- Being—as "straight" is in length, so is
+ Being—as "straight" is in length, so is
"level" in breadth, perhaps "odd" in number, and "white" in color. Again, it is not the Ideal
numbers that are the causes of harmonic relations, etc. (for Ideal numbers, even when they
diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg029/tlg0086.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg029/tlg0086.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml
index bc15cb087..a88a1fcae 100644
--- a/data/tlg0086/tlg029/tlg0086.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg029/tlg0086.tlg029.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
between the two kinds of community over which they severally preside. There is,
however, this further difference: that whereas the government of a nation is in
many hands, a household has but a single ruler.Now some arts are divided into two separate branches, one concerned with the
- making of an object—for example a lyre or a flute—and the
+ making of an object—for example a lyre or a flute—and the
other with its use when made. Statecraft on the other hand shows us how to build
up a nation from its beginning, as well as how to order rightly a nation that
already exists; from which we infer that Housecraft also tells us first how to
@@ -218,8 +218,8 @@
should be given to those who are doing more of a freeman's work, and abundance
of food to those who are laboring with their hands. And whereas the use of wine
renders even free men insolent, so that in many countries they too refrain from
- it—as, for instance, the Carthaginians do when they are on
- campaign—it follows that we must either deny wine to slaves
+ it—as, for instance, the Carthaginians do when they are on
+ campaign—it follows that we must either deny wine to slaves
altogether, or reserve it for rare occasions. We may apportion to our
slaves (1) work, (2) chastisement, and (3) food. If men are given food, but no
chastisement nor any work, they become insolent. If they are made
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@
suggesting that silver formed the entire load; and so continued his march. The
soldiers, beholding the plate and supposing that they convoyed a full load of
silver, were cheered by the expectation of their pay. They were informed however
- by Didales that they would have to take it to Amisus to be coined—a journey of many days, and in
+ by Didales that they would have to take it to Amisus to be coined—a journey of many days, and in
the winter season. And during all this time, he continued to employ the army
without giving it more than its necessary rations.Moreover, all the craftsmen in the army, and the hucksters who traded with the
soldiers by barter, were under his personal control, and enjoyed a complete
diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg034/tlg0086.tlg034.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg034/tlg0086.tlg034.perseus-eng1.xml
index ab8eb233b..70aa7ca47 100644
--- a/data/tlg0086/tlg034/tlg0086.tlg034.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg034/tlg0086.tlg034.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -128,13 +128,13 @@ added cvs log keyword
Poetics
LetThe text here printed is based on Vahlen's
- third edition(Leipzig,
- 1885), and the chief deviations from it are noted at the foot of each
+ third edition(Leipzig,
+ 1885), and the chief deviations from it are noted at the foot of each
page. The prime source of all existing texts of the Poetics is the eleventh
century Paris manuscript, No. 1741, designated as Ac. To the manuscripts of the
Renaissance few, except Dr. Margoliouth, now assign any independent value, but
they contain useful suggestions for the correction of obvious errors and defects
- in Ac. These are here designated “copies.”V. stands for
+ in Ac. These are here designated “copies.”V. stands for
Vahlen's third edition, and By. for the late Professor Ingram Bywater, who has
earned the gratitude and admiration of all students of the Poetics by his
services both to the text and to its interpretation. Then there is the Arabic
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
first with first principles. Epic poetry, then, and the poetry of tragic drama, and,
moreover, comedy and dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and harp-playing,
these, speaking generally, may all be said to be "representations of life."The explanation of MI/MHSIS, as Aristotle uses the word, demands a treatise; all
- that a footnote can say is this:—Life "presents" to the artist the
+ that a footnote can say is this:—Life "presents" to the artist the
phenomena of sense, which the artist "re-presents" in his own medium, giving
coherence, designing a pattern. That this is true not only of drama and fiction
but also of instrumental music ("most flute-playing and harp-playing") was more
@@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
in representing different objects or in representing objects not in the same way but
in a different manner. For just as by
the use both of color and form people represent many objects, making likenesses of
- them—some having a
- knowledge of art and some working empirically—and just as others use the
+ them—some having a
+ knowledge of art and some working empirically—and just as others use the
human voice; so is it also in the arts which we have mentioned, they all make their
representations in rhythm and language and tune, using these means either separately
or in combination. For tune and rhythm
@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
similar to the mimes of Herondas and the fifteenth Idyll of Theocritus, but in
prose. There was a tradition that their mimes suggested to Plato the use of
dialogue. and to the Socratic dialogues: nor again supposing a poet were to make his representation in
- iambics or elegiacs or any other such metre—except that people attach the
- word poet(maker)to the name of the metre and speak of elegiac
+ iambics or elegiacs or any other such metre—except that people attach the
+ word poet(maker)to the name of the metre and speak of elegiac
poets and of others as epic poets.
Thus they do not call them poets in virtue of their representation but apply the
name indiscriminately in virtue of the metre. For if people publish medical or scientific treatises in
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
as either drama or epic. Cf. Aristot. Poet.
24.11. On this point the distinctions thus made may
suffice. There are certain arts which employ all the means which I
- have mentioned, such as rhythm and tune and metre—dithyrambic and "nomic"
+ have mentioned, such as rhythm and tune and metre—dithyrambic and "nomic"
poetry,The traditional definition is that the
Dithyramb was sung to a flute accompaniment by a chorus in honor of Dionysus;
and that the Nome was a solo sung to a harp accompaniment in honor of Apollo,
@@ -217,13 +217,13 @@ added cvs log keyword
These differences then in the
various arts I call the means of representation. Since living personsLiterally "men doing or experiencing
something." are the objects of representation, these must necessarily be
- either good men or inferior—thus only are characters normally
- distinguished, since ethical differences depend upon vice and virtue—that
+ either good men or inferior—thus only are characters normally
+ distinguished, since ethical differences depend upon vice and virtue—that
is to say either better than ourselves or worse or much what we are. It is the same
with painters. Polygnotus depicted men
as better than they are and Pauson worse, while Dionysius made likenesses.Polygnotus's portraits were in the grand style and
- yet expressive of character(cf. Aristot.
- Poet. 6.15): Aristophanes aIludes to a Pauson as a
+ yet expressive of character(cf. Aristot.
+ Poet. 6.15): Aristophanes aIludes to a Pauson as a
"perfectly wicked caricaturist": Dionysius of Colophon earned the name of "the man-painter" because he always
painted men and presumably made "good likenesses."
Clearly each of the above mentioned
@@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
to-day, the former as better. A third difference in these arts is the manner in
which one may represent each of these objects. For in representing
the same objects by the same means it is possible to proceed either partly by
- narrative and partly by assuming a character other than your own—this is
- Homer's method—or by remaining yourself without any such change, or else
+ narrative and partly by assuming a character other than your own—this is
+ Homer's method—or by remaining yourself without any such change, or else
to represent the characters as carrying out the whole action themselves. These, as we
said above, are the three differences which form the several species of the art of
representation, the means, the objects, and the manner. It follows that in one respect
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
in action and doing things. And that according to some is the reason why they are
called "dramas," because they present people as doing"Drama" being derived from DRA=N "to
do." things. And for this
- reason the Dorians claim as their own both tragedy and comedy—comedy is
+ reason the Dorians claim as their own both tragedy and comedy—comedy is
claimed both by the Megarians here in Greece, who say that it originated in the days of their democracy,
and by the Megarians in Sicily,The inhabitants of Megara Hyblaea. for it was
from there the poet EpicharmusEpicharmus of Cos
@@ -268,9 +268,9 @@ added cvs log keyword
fifth century B.C. came, who was much earlier than Chionides and Magnes;
and tragedy some of the Peloponnesians claim. Their evidence is the two names.
Their name, they say, for suburb
- villages is KW=MAI—the Athenians call them
- "Demes"—and comedians are so called not from KWMA/ZEIN, "to revel," but because they were turned out of the towns
- and went strolling round the villages( KW=MAI). Their word for action, they add, is DRA=N, whereas the Athenian word is PRA/TTEIN. So much then for the differences, their number, and their
+ villages is KW=MAI—the Athenians call them
+ "Demes"—and comedians are so called not from KWMA/ZEIN, "to revel," but because they were turned out of the towns
+ and went strolling round the villages( KW=MAI). Their word for action, they add, is DRA=N, whereas the Athenian word is PRA/TTEIN. So much then for the differences, their number, and their
nature. Speaking generally, poetry seems to owe its origin to two particular causes, both
natural. From childhood men have an
instinct for representation, and in this respect, differs from the other animals
@@ -288,9 +288,9 @@ added cvs log keyword
for imitation, (2) the natural enjoyment of mimicry by others; or whether these
two are combined into one and the second cause is the instinct for tune and
rhythm. Obviously this last is an essential cause of
- poetry.—for the metres are obviously sections of rhythmse.g., the rhythm of the blacksmith's hammer or of a
+ poetry.—for the metres are obviously sections of rhythmse.g., the rhythm of the blacksmith's hammer or of a
trotting horse is dactylic, but the hexameter is a "section" or slice of that
- rhythm; it is cut up into sixes.—and starting with these
+ rhythm; it is cut up into sixes.—and starting with these
instincts men very gradually developed them until they produced poetry out of their
improvisations. Poetry then split into
two kinds according to the poet's nature. For the more serious poets represented
@@ -322,9 +322,9 @@ added cvs log keyword
whether tragedy is fully developed by now in all its various species or not, and to
criticize it both in itself and in relation to the stage, that is another question.
At any rate it originated in
- improvisation—both tragedy itself and comedy. The one came from the
- preludeBefore the chorus began (or in
- pauses between their songs) the leader of the performance would
+ improvisation—both tragedy itself and comedy. The one came from the
+ preludeBefore the chorus began (or in
+ pauses between their songs) the leader of the performance would
improvise some appropriate tale or state the theme which they were to elaborate.
Thus he was called O( E)CA/RXWN or "the
starter," and became in time the first "actor." to the dithyramb and the
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
probably be a long task to go through them in detail. Comedy, as we have said, is a
representation of inferior people, not indeed in the full sense of the word bad, but
the laughable is a species of the base or ugly."Ugly" was to a Greek an equivalent of "bad." The persons in Comedy are
- "inferior" (see chapter 2.), but have only one of the many
+ "inferior" (see chapter 2.), but have only one of the many
qualities which make up Ugliness or Badness, viz. the quality of being ludicrous
and therefore in some degree contemptible.
It consists in some blunder or ugliness
@@ -373,8 +373,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
themselves paid for and produced their plays.
Comedy had already taken certain forms
before there is any mention of those who are called its poets. Who introduced masks
- or prologues, the number of actors, and so on, is not known. Plot making [Epicharmus and
- Phormis]Epicharmus and Phormis, being
+ or prologues, the number of actors, and so on, is not known. Plot making [Epicharmus and
+ Phormis]Epicharmus and Phormis, being
both early Sicilian "comedians", are appropriate here. Either part of a sentence
is lost or an explanatory note has got into the text. originally came
from Sicily, and of the Athenian poets CratesFragments of his comedies survive, dating about the middle of the
@@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
of an actionMargoliouth's phrase "a chapter of
life," illuminates the meaning, since PRA=CIS
includes what the hero does and what happens to him. (Cf. Aristot. Poet. 2.1 and note.) that is
- heroic and complete and of a certain magnitude—by means of language
+ heroic and complete and of a certain magnitude—by means of language
enriched with all kinds of ornament, each used separately in the different parts of
the play: it represents men in action and does not use narrative, and through pity
and fear it effects relief to these and similar emotions.The sense of "the pity of it "and fear lest such disasters might
@@ -413,10 +413,10 @@ added cvs log keyword
here the metrical arrangement of the words; and "song making" I use in the full,
obvious sense of the word. And since
tragedy represents action and is acted by living persons, who must of necessity have
- certain qualities of character and thought—for it is these which determine
+ certain qualities of character and thought—for it is these which determine
the quality of an action; indeed thought and character are the natural causes of
any action and it is in virtue of these that all men succeed or
- fail— it follows then that
+ fail— it follows then that
it is the plot which represents the action. By "plot" I mean here the arrangement of
the incidents: "character" is that which determines the quality of the agents, and
"thought" appears wherever in the dialogue they put forward an argument or deliver
@@ -501,18 +501,18 @@ added cvs log keyword
parts must not only be orderly arranged but must also have a certain magnitude of
their own; for beauty consists in
magnitude and ordered arrangement. From which it follows that neither would a very
- small creature be beautiful—for our view of it is almost instantaneous and
+ small creature be beautiful—for our view of it is almost instantaneous and
therefore confusedWith a very small object the
duration of our vision is, as it were, so rapid that the parts are invisible;
we, therefore, cannot appreciate their proportion and arrangement, in which
- beauty consists.—nor a very large one, since being unable to
+ beauty consists.—nor a very large one, since being unable to
view it all at once, we lose the effect of a single whole; for instance, suppose a
creature a thousand miles long. As
then creatures and other organic structures must have a certain magnitude and yet be
easily taken in by the eye, so too with plots: they must have length but must be
easily taken in by the memory. The limit of length considered in relation to
competitions and productionAI)/SQHSIS is the play's "perception" by an
- audience—how much an audience will stand. before an audience
+ audience—how much an audience will stand. before an audience
does not concern this treatise. Had it been the rule to produce a hundred tragedies,
the performance would have been regulated by the water clock, as it is said they did
once in other days. But as for the
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
single piece of action. It seems therefore that all those poets are wrong who
have written a Heracleid or Theseid or other such
poems.Aristotle condemns them all,
- assuming—or perhaps assured by experience—that their sole
+ assuming—or perhaps assured by experience—that their sole
claim to unity lay in the fact that all the stories in the poem had a common
hero. They think that because Heracles was a single individual the plot
must for that reason have unity. But
@@ -535,8 +535,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
either by instinct or from knowledge of his art. For in writing an
Odyssey he did not put in all that ever happened to Odysseus, his
being wounded on Parnassus, for instance,
- or his feigned madness when the host was gathered(these being events
- neither of which necessarily or probably led to the other), but he
+ or his feigned madness when the host was gathered(these being events
+ neither of which necessarily or probably led to the other), but he
constructed his Odyssey round a single action in our sense of the
phrase. And the Iliad the same. As then in the other arts of representation a single
representation means a representation of a single object, so too the plot being a
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
poet's object is not to tell what actually happened but what could and would happen
either probably or inevitably. The
difference between a historian and a poet is not that one writes in prose and the
- other in verse— indeed the writings of Herodotus could be put into
+ other in verse— indeed the writings of Herodotus could be put into
verse and yet would still be a kind of history, whether written in metre or not. The
real difference is this, that one tells what happened and the other what might
happen. For this reason poetry is
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
is to be found of course in its religious origin. It was the function of tragedy
to interpret and embroider myths. Aristotle never gives this reason, but offers
instead tbe unconvincing explanation that tragedians adhered to certain "real"
- stories to gain verisimilitude—and yet he has to admit that, since to
+ stories to gain verisimilitude—and yet he has to admit that, since to
many of the auditors these stories were unfamiliar and none the less attractive,
dramatists might just as well invent new themes. It is clear, then,
from what we have said that the poet must be a "maker" not of verses but of stories,
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
inevitably happen, and it is in virtue of that that he is their "maker." Of
"simple"This term is defined in the next
chapter. It seems odd to use it before its meaning is explained. Perhaps we
- should read A)/LLWN(Tyrwhitt)and translate "of all
+ should read A)/LLWN(Tyrwhitt)and translate "of all
plots." plots and actions the worst are those which are "episodic." By
this I mean a plot in which the episodes do not follow each other probably or
inevitably. Bad poets write such
@@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
pity, and this happens most of all when the incidents are unexpected and yet one is
a consequence of the other.The logic suffers from
ellipse. Plays which fail to exhibit the sequence of cause and effect are
- condemned (1) because they lack the unity which befits
- tragedy, (2) because they miss that supreme effect of fear or
+ condemned (1) because they lack the unity which befits
+ tragedy, (2) because they miss that supreme effect of fear or
pity produced by incidents which, though unexpected, are seen to be no mere
accident but the inevitable result of what has gone before.
For in that way the incidents will
@@ -628,16 +628,16 @@ added cvs log keyword
difference between what happens propter hoc and post hoc. A "reversal" is a
change of the situation into the opposite, as described above,At the end of chapter 7. Vahlen and many other exponents of the
Politics confine the meaning of
- “reversal” to the situation in which the hero's action has
+ “reversal” to the situation in which the hero's action has
consequences directly opposite to his intention and expectation. There is much
to be said for this interpretation, which stresses the irony at the heart of all
tragedy. But it is too narrow for Aristotle's theory. All tragedy involves a
- change of fortune ( META/BASIS). In a “simple” plot this is
- gradual; in a “complex” plot it is catastrophic, a sudden
+ change of fortune ( META/BASIS). In a “simple” plot this is
+ gradual; in a “complex” plot it is catastrophic, a sudden
revolution of fortune's wheel. In some of the greatest tragedies, but not in
all, this is the result of action designed to produce the opposite
effect. this change being, moreover, as we are saying, probable or
- inevitable— like the man
+ inevitable— like the man
in the
Oedipus who came to cheer Oedipus and rid him of his anxiety
about his mother by revealing his parentage and changed the whole situation.
The messenger for Corinth announces the death of Polybus and Oedipus's succession
to the throne. Oedipus, feeling now safe from the prophecy that he would murder
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
the letter, but a separate discovery was needed to make him known to
Iphigeneia.Euripides' Iphigeneia in
- Tauris—Orestes and Pylades arriving among the
+ Tauris—Orestes and Pylades arriving among the
Tauri are by the custom of the country to be sacrificed to Artemis by her
priestess, Iphigeneia. It is agreed that Pylades shall be spared to carry a
letter from Iphigeneia to Orestes, whom she supposes to be in Argos. In order that Pylades may deliver the
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
in the construction of a plot, and the means by which the object of tragedy may be
achieved. Since then the structure of
the best tragedy should be not simple but complexSee chapter 10. and one that represents incidents arousing fear and
- pity—for that is peculiar to this form of art—it is obvious to
+ pity—for that is peculiar to this form of art—it is obvious to
begin with that one should not show worthy men passing from good fortune to bad.
That does not arouse fear or pity but shocks our feelings. Nor again wicked people passing from bad fortune to
good. That is the most untragic of all, having none of the requisite qualities,
@@ -714,19 +714,19 @@ added cvs log keyword
preference for "poetic justice." or arouse pity or fear. Nor again the passing of a thoroughly bad man
from good fortune to bad fortune. Such a structure might satisfy our feelings but it
arouses neither pity nor fear, the one being for the man who does not deserve his
- misfortune and the other for the man who is like ourselves—pity for the
- undeserved misfortune, fear for the man like ourselves—so that the result
+ misfortune and the other for the man who is like ourselves—pity for the
+ undeserved misfortune, fear for the man like ourselves—so that the result
will arouse neither pity nor fear. There remains then the mean between these. This is the
sort of man who is not pre-eminently virtous and just, and yet it is through no
badness or villainy of his own that he falls into the fortune, but rather through
some flaw in him,Whether Aristotle regards the
- “flaw” as intellectual or moral has been hotly discussed. It
+ “flaw” as intellectual or moral has been hotly discussed. It
may cover both senses. The hero must not deserve his misfortune, but he must
cause it by making a fatal mistake, an error of judgement, which may well
involve some imperfection of character but not such as to make us regard him as
- “morally responsible” for the disasters although they are
+ “morally responsible” for the disasters although they are
nevertheless the consequences of the flaw in him, and his wrong decision at a
- crisis is the inevitable outcome of his character(cf. Aristot. Poet. 6.24.). he
+ crisis is the inevitable outcome of his character(cf. Aristot. Poet. 6.24.). he
being one of those who are in high station and good fortune, like Oedipus and
Thyestes and the famous men of such families as those.
The successful plot must then have a single
A(PLOU=S elsewhere in
the Poetics means "simple" as opposed to PEPLEGME/NOS, "complex"; here it is opposed to DIPLOU=S, which describes a double denouement,
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
great flaw in such a man as we have described, or of one who is better rather than
worse. This can be seen also in actual
practice. For at first poets accepted any plots, but to-day the best tragedies are
- written about a few families—Alcmaeon for instance and Oedipus and Orestes and Meleager and Thyestes and
+ written about a few families—Alcmaeon for instance and Oedipus and Orestes and Meleager and Thyestes and
Telephus and all the others whom it befell to suffer or inflict terrible
disasters. Judged then by the theory of the art, the bestThis is modified by 19 in the following chapter,
where he finds an even better formula for the tragic effect. tragedy is
@@ -746,13 +746,13 @@ added cvs log keyword
That is, as we have shown, correct. And there is very good evidence of this, for on
the stage and in competitions such plays appear the most tragic of all, if they are
successful, and even if Euripides is in other respects a bad manager,Against Euripides Aristotle makes the following
- criticisms: (1)his choruses are often irrelevant;
- (2)the character of the heroine in his Iphigeneia in
+ criticisms: (1)his choruses are often irrelevant;
+ (2)the character of the heroine in his Iphigeneia in
Tauris is inconsistent;
- (3)in the Medea the deliberate killing of the
+ (3)in the Medea the deliberate killing of the
children is ineffective and the play is inartistically ended by the machina;
- (4)the character of Menelaus in the Orestes is
- needlessly depraved; (5)Melanippe is too philosophical for a
+ (4)the character of Menelaus in the Orestes is
+ needlessly depraved; (5)Melanippe is too philosophical for a
woman. yet he is certainly the most tragic of the poets. Next in order comes
the structure which some put first, that which has a double issue, like the
Odyssey, and ends in opposite ways for the good characters and
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
To produce this effect by means of
an appeal to the eye is inartistic and needs adventitious aid, while those who by such means produce an effect which
is not fearful but merely monstrous have nothing in common with tragedy.that here were plays which relied for their effect on
- the scenery and "make up" is clear from chapter 17:—"The Phorcides and
+ the scenery and "make up" is clear from chapter 17:—"The Phorcides and
Prometheus and Scenes laid in Hades." It was even possible to produce the
Eumenides so badly as to bring it into this category. But
Aristotle's criticism here includes the more important point that the poignancy
@@ -789,16 +789,16 @@ added cvs log keyword
actual calamity goes. Nor would there
be if they were neither friends nor enemies. But when these calamities happen among
friends,when for instance brother
- kills brother, or son father, or mother son, or son mother—either kills or
+ kills brother, or son father, or mother son, or son mother—either kills or
intends to kill, or does something of the kind, that is what we must look
for. Now it is not right to break up the traditional stories, I mean, for instance,
Clytaemnestra being killed by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon, but the poet must show invention and make a skilful
use of the tradition.But we must state more clearly
what is meant by "skilful." The
action may happen in the way in which the old dramatists made their characters
- act—consciously and knowing the facts, as EuripidesThis does not necessarily imply that Aristotle reckons Euripides
- “a modern,” since the Greek can equally mean
- “Euripides as well as other old dramatists.” also
+ act—consciously and knowing the facts, as EuripidesThis does not necessarily imply that Aristotle reckons Euripides
+ “a modern,” since the Greek can equally mean
+ “Euripides as well as other old dramatists.” also
made his Medea kill her children. Or
they may do the deed but without realizing the horror of it and then discover the
relationship afterwards, like Oedipus in Sophocles. That indeed lies outside the
@@ -855,8 +855,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
of Odysseus in the ScyllaA dithyramb
by Timotheus. Cf. Aristot. Poet.
26.3. and Melanippe's speechA
- fragment survives (Eur. Fr. 484
- (Nauck)). Euripides seems to have given her a knowledge of
+ fragment survives (Eur. Fr. 484
+ (Nauck)). Euripides seems to have given her a knowledge of
science and philosophy inappropriate to a woman.; of inconsistent character Iphigeneia in Aulis, for the suppliant Iphigeneia is not at
all like her later character. In character-drawing just as much as in the
arrangement of the incidents one should always seek what is inevitable or probable,
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
the distinctive form and making a likeness, yet paint people better than they are.
It is the same with the poet. When representing people who are hot-tempered or lazy,
or have other such traits of character, he should make them such, yet men of worth
- [an example of hardness]Apparently a note on Achilles which has been copied by mistake into the
+ [an example of hardness]Apparently a note on Achilles which has been copied by mistake into the
text.; take the way in which Agathon and Homer portray
Achilles. Keep, then, a careful eye on these rules and also on the
appeal to the eyei.e., stage-craft rather than
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
discussed in the published treatises.As distinct
from the body of "esoteric" doctrine circulated by oral teaching among
Aristotle's pupils. What a "Discovery" is has been already stated.In chapter 11.As for kinds of Discovery, first comes the least artistic kind,
- which is largely used owing to incompetence—discovery by tokens.
+ which is largely used owing to incompetence—discovery by tokens.
These may be congenital, like "the
spear the Earth-born bear" or stars, like those which CarcinusA prolific tragedian of the early fourth century. The family are
agreeably ridiculed in Aristophanes' Wasps. uses in his
@@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
stories, of misleading the audience by false clues in order to make the final
revelation more effective. Best of all is the discovery which is
brought about directly by the incidents, the surprise being produced by means of
- what is likely—take the scene in Sophocles' Oedipus or in
- the Iphigeneia—for it is likely enough that she should want
+ what is likely—take the scene in Sophocles' Oedipus or in
+ the Iphigeneia—for it is likely enough that she should want
to send a letter. These are the only discovery scenes which dispense with artificial
tokens, like necklaces.The classical example of
these tokens in English drama is "the strawberry mark on the left arm" in
@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
Margoliouth suggests that if Amphiaraus were a god he should come down, and if a
mere hero, he sould not have a temple. In The Master of
Ballantrae Mrs. Henry cleans a
- sword by thrusting it up to the hilt in the ground—which is iron-bound
+ sword by thrusting it up to the hilt in the ground—which is iron-bound
by frost. The would be noticed on the stage: a reader may miss the
incongruity.
The poet should also, as far as
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
and has disappeared beyond the ken of those who sacrificed her and has been
established in another country, where it is a custom to sacrifice strangers to the
goddess; and this priesthood she holds. Some time afterwards it happens that the
- brother of the priestess arrives there—the fact that the god told him to
+ brother of the priestess arrives there—the fact that the god told him to
go there, and why, and the object of his journey, lie outside the outline-plot. He
arrives, is seized, and is on the point of being sacrificed, when he reveals his
identity either by Euripides' method or according to Polyidos, by making the very
@@ -1062,14 +1062,14 @@ added cvs log keyword
different mainly in virtue of the plot, that is to say those that have the same
entanglement and denouement. Many who entangle well are bad at the denouement. Both
should always be mastered.There are four varieties of
- tragedy—the same as the number given for the "elements"Apparently the reference here is to the four elements
+ tragedy—the same as the number given for the "elements"Apparently the reference here is to the four elements
into which in the course of chapters 10-15. Plot has been analysed, "Reversal,"
"Discovery," "Calamity," and "Character." But the symmetry is spoilt by the fact
that his first species, "the complex play," corresponds to the first two of
these four elements, viz. to "Reversal" and "Discovery." Thus his fourth species
is left in the air and he hurriedly introduces "Spectacle" as the fourth
corresponding element. Other explanations seem even sillier than
- this.— first the
+ this.— first the
complex kind, which all turns on reversal and discovery; the "calamity play" like the stories of Ajax and Ixion;
the "character play" like the
Phthian WomenBy
@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
been good poets in each style, to demand that a single author should surpass the
peculiar merits of each. One must remember, as we have often said, not to make a
tragedy an epic structure: by epic I
- mean made up of many stories—suppose, for instance, one were to dramatize
+ mean made up of many stories—suppose, for instance, one were to dramatize
the IIiad as a whole.
The length of the IIiad allows to the parts their proper size, but in
plays the result is full of disappointment. And the proof is that all who have dramatized the Sack of
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
"simple" storiesi.e., those that have no
"Discovery" or "Reversal." See chapter 10. too,they admirably achieve their end, which is a tragic
effect that also satisfies your feelings. This is achieved when the wise man, who is, however,
- unscrupulous, is deceived—like Sisyphus—and the man who is brave
+ unscrupulous, is deceived—like Sisyphus—and the man who is brave
but wicked is worsted. And this, as
Agathon says, is a likely result, since it is likely that many quite unlikely things
should happen. The chorus too must be regarded as one of the actors. It must
@@ -1108,8 +1108,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
have been already discussed. It remains to speak of "Diction" and "Thought."
All that concerns Thought may be
left to the treatise on Rhetoric, for the subject is more proper to that
- inquiry."Thought"—no English word
- exactly corresponds with DIA/NOIA—is
+ inquiry."Thought"—no English word
+ exactly corresponds with DIA/NOIA—is
all that which is expressed or effected by the words (cf. Aristot. Poet. 6.22, 23, and 25). Thus the
student is rightly referred to the Art of Rhetoric, where he
learns "what to say in every case." Aristotle adds that the rules there given
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
which is proper to elocution or to the man who knows the master artRhetoric is a "master art" in relation to elocution,
since it decides the effects to be produced, and elocution decides how to
produce them. So the doctor's art is "master" to that of the dispenser, and the
- art of riding to that of the maker of bridles.—I mean for
+ art of riding to that of the maker of bridles.—I mean for
instance, what is a command, a prayer, a statement, a threat, question, answer, and
so on. The knowledge or ignorance of
such matters brings upon the poet no censure worth serious consideration. For who
@@ -1174,11 +1174,11 @@ added cvs log keyword
a cause of despair. Bywater's notes suggest a restoration. A noun is a
composite sound with a meaning, not indicative of time, no part of which has a
meaning by itself; for in compounds we do not use each part as having a meaning of
- its own, for instance, in "Theodorus," there is no meaning of DW=RON (gift). A verb is a composite sound with
+ its own, for instance, in "Theodorus," there is no meaning of DW=RON (gift). A verb is a composite sound with
a meaning, indicative of time, no part of which has a meaning by
- itself—just as in nouns. "Man" or "white" does not signify time, but
+ itself—just as in nouns. "Man" or "white" does not signify time, but
"walks" and "has walked" connote present and past time respectively. A
- case(or inflection)of a noun or verb is that which signifies
+ case(or inflection)of a noun or verb is that which signifies
either "of" or "to" a thing and the like;or gives the sense of "one or many" e.g. men and man; or else it may depend on the
delivery, for example question and command. "Walked?" and "Walk!" are verbal "cases"
of this kind. A phraseThere is no exact
@@ -1196,8 +1196,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
kinds. There is the simple noun, by which I mean one made up of parts that have no
meaning, like GH=, and there is the compound noun.
These may be made up either of a
- part which has no meaning and a part which has a meaning—though it does
- not have its meaning in the compound—or of two parts both having a
+ part which has no meaning and a part which has a meaning—though it does
+ not have its meaning in the compound—or of two parts both having a
meaning. A compound noun may be triple
and quadruple and multiple, e.g. many of the bombastic names like
Hermocaicoxanthus.A compound of the names of
@@ -1228,9 +1228,9 @@ added cvs log keyword
that to which the term supplanted by the metaphor is relative.This may claim to be one of Aristotle's least lucid sentences. It
means this: If Old Age: Life:: Evening: Day, then we may call old age " the
Evening of Life." In that case "old age" is the "term supplanted by the
- metaphor," and it is relative to " Life"; therefore "Life" (i.e., "that
- to which the term supplanted by the metaphor is relative")is added to
- the metaphorical (or "transferred") term
+ metaphor," and it is relative to " Life"; therefore "Life" (i.e., "that
+ to which the term supplanted by the metaphor is relative")is added to
+ the metaphorical (or "transferred") term
"Evening."For instance, a cup
is to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares; so he will call the cup "Dionysus's shield" and the shield
"Ares' cup." Or old age is to life as evening is to day; so he will call the evening
@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
to the seed, and so you have the phrase "sowing the god-created fire." Besides this
another way of employing metaphor is to call a thing by the strange name and then to
deny it some attribute of that name. For instance, suppose you call the shield not
- "Ares' cup" but a “wineless cup.” . . .Or you might call Love "Venus's bloodless War." At this point a few
+ "Ares' cup" but a “wineless cup.” . . .Or you might call Love "Venus's bloodless War." At this point a few
lines on "Ornament" have evidently been lost, since this is its place in the
catalogue of nouns above. By "ornament" he seems to mean an embellishing epithet
or synonym. In the Rhetoric he quotes "Our lady the fig-tree" as
@@ -1394,14 +1394,14 @@ added cvs log keyword
time, and used well. Of his poems he made the one, the
Iliad
, a "simple" story turning on "calamity," and the Odyssey a
- "complex" story—it is full of "discoveries"—turning on
+ "complex" story—it is full of "discoveries"—turning on
character. Besides this they surpass all other poems in diction and
thought. Epic differs from tragedy in the length of the composition
and in metre. The limit of length
- already givenSee Aristot. Poet. 7.12. will suffice—it must be
+ already givenSee Aristot. Poet. 7.12. will suffice—it must be
possible to embrace the beginning and the end in one view,which would be the case if the compositions were
shorter than the ancient epics but reached to the length of the tragedies presented
- at a single entertainment.“Entertainment” must mean a festival. At the City Dionysia
+ at a single entertainment.“Entertainment” must mean a festival. At the City Dionysia
three poets competed, each with three tragedies. By the end of the fifth century
only one Satyr play was performed at each festival. But the tragedies were
longer than those we possess. It is therefore likely that the nine tragedies
@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
than his own. Both these "manners" come under the head of "Imitation." When
Aristotle says "the poet speaks himself" and "plays a part himself" he refers
not to narrative, of which there is a great deal in Homer, but to the "preludes"
- (cf. FROIMIASA/MENOS below) in
+ (cf. FROIMIASA/MENOS below) in
which the poet, invoking the Muse, speaks in his own person.
Ridgeway points out that in the whole of the
Iliad
@@ -1448,10 +1448,10 @@ added cvs log keyword
dramatically, but Homer after a brief prelude at once brings in a man or a woman or
some other character, never without character, but all having character of their
own. Now the marvellous should certainly be portrayed in tragedy, but epic affords
- greater scope for the inexplicable(which is the chief element in what is
- marvellous), because we do not actually see the persons of the story.
+ greater scope for the inexplicable(which is the chief element in what is
+ marvellous), because we do not actually see the persons of the story.
The incident of
- Hector's pursuitIliad, xxii. 205. sq. “And to the host divine Achilles nodded with his head a sign and let them not launch their bitter darts at Hector, lest another should win glory by shooting him and Achilles himself come second.” would look ridiculous
+ Hector's pursuitIliad, xxii. 205. sq. “And to the host divine Achilles nodded with his head a sign and let them not launch their bitter darts at Hector, lest another should win glory by shooting him and Achilles himself come second.” would look ridiculous
on the stage, the people standing still and not pursuing and Achilles waving them
back, but in epic that is not noticed. But that the marvellous causes pleasure is shown by the fact that people always
tell a piece of news with additions by way of being agreeable. Above all, Homer has
@@ -1465,18 +1465,18 @@ added cvs log keyword
O. on his voyage to Troy. As evidence,
he describes O.'s dress and his companions (Hom. Od.
19.164-260). P. commits the fallacy of inferring the truth of the
- antecedent from the truth of the consequent: “If his story were true,
+ antecedent from the truth of the consequent: “If his story were true,
he would know these details; But he does know them; Therefore his story is
- true.” The artist in fiction uses the same fallacy, e.g.:
- “If chessmen could come to life the white knight would be a duffer;
- But he is a most awful duffer (look at him!); Therefore
- chessmen can come to life.” He makes his deductions so convincing that
+ true.” The artist in fiction uses the same fallacy, e.g.:
+ “If chessmen could come to life the white knight would be a duffer;
+ But he is a most awful duffer (look at him!); Therefore
+ chessmen can come to life.” He makes his deductions so convincing that
we falsely infer the truth of his hypothesis. What is convincing
though impossible should always be preferred to what is possible and unconvincing.
Stories should not be made up of
inexplicable details; so far as possible there should be nothing inexplicable, or,
- if there is, it should lie outside the story—as, for instance, Oedipus not
- knowing how Laius died—and not in the play; for example, in the
+ if there is, it should lie outside the story—as, for instance, Oedipus not
+ knowing how Laius died—and not in the play; for example, in the
Electra the news of the Pythian games,In Sophocles'Electrathe plot hinges on a false story
of Orestes' death by an accident at the Pythian games. Presumably the
anachronism shocked Aristotle. or in the Mysians the man who came from
@@ -1508,7 +1508,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if
we look at them like this. Since the
poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of likenesses, he must
- always represent one of three things—either things as they were or are; or
+ always represent one of three things—either things as they were or are; or
things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be. These are expressed in diction with or
without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of
which we allow the poet to use.
@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not an essential error. These considerations must, then, be kept in
view in meeting the charges contained in these objections.Let us first take the charges against the art of poetry itself. If
an impossibility has been portrayed, an error has been made. But it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the
- object of poetry—what that is has been already stated—and makes
+ object of poetry—what that is has been already stated—and makes
that part or some other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of
Hector is an example of this.See Aristot. Poet. 24.16 and
note.
@@ -1539,7 +1539,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
do, then say, "Such is the tale"; for instance, tales about gods. Very likely there is no advantage in telling
them, and they are not true either, but may well be what Xenophanes declaredi.e., immoral and therefore untrue. He opened the
assault on Homeric theology at the end of the sixth or the beginning of the
- fifth century B.C.—all the same such is the tale. In another case, perhaps, there is no
+ fifth century B.C.—all the same such is the tale. In another case, perhaps, there is no
advantage but "such was the fact," e.g. the case of the arms, "Their spears erect on
butt-spikes stood,"Hom.
Il. 10.152. Problem: "Surely a bad stance: they might so easily fall
@@ -1593,8 +1593,8 @@ added cvs log keyword
Zeus is instructing the Dream, whom he is sending to lure Agamemnon to disaster.
Problem: "The last statement is a lie." Solution: "Change the accent and the
statement DI/DOMEN DE/ OI( becomes a command
- (the infinitive DIDO/MENAI written in a
- shortened form and used as an imperative). The lie will then be told by
+ (the infinitive DIDO/MENAI written in a
+ shortened form and used as an imperative). The lie will then be told by
the Dream and not by Zeus, who may thus save his reputation for
veracity." and TO\ ME\N OU(= KATAPU/QETAI
O)/MBRW|Hom. Il. 23.327: "A fathom high from the earth there rises a stump
@@ -1611,7 +1611,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
spent and at hand is the dawning, Far across are the stars and more than two
parts of the night-time Are gone, but a third is still left us." Problem: If
"more than two parts" are gone, a third cannot be left. Solution: PLE/W here means "full," i.e., " the full night of
- two-thirds"="full two-thirds of the night is gone," and so Homer's
+ two-thirds"="full two-thirds of the night is gone," and so Homer's
arithmetic is saved. Others
according to the habitual use of the phrase, e.g. wine and water is called "wine" so
you get the phrase "greaves of new-wrought tin";Problem: "Greaves are made not of tin but of an alloy of tin and copper."
@@ -1664,7 +1664,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
made of the improbability.An example is
Euripides' intro duction of AegeusEur. Medea 663. In Aristotle's opinion there is no
good reason for Aegeus's appearance and no good use is made of it.
- or(of depravity)the character of Menelans in the
+ or(of depravity)the character of Menelans in the
Orestes. The censures they bring are of five kinds; that things
are either impossible or irrational or harmful or inconsistent or contrary to
artistic correctness. The solutions must be studied under the heads specified above,
@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ added cvs log keyword
function even without acting, just as much as epic, and its quality can be gauged by
reading aloud. So, if it is in other respects superior, this disadvantage is not
necessarily inherent. Secondly, tragedy has all the elements of the
- epic—it can even use the hexameter— and in addition a considerable element of its own in the
+ epic—it can even use the hexameter— and in addition a considerable element of its own in the
spectacle and the music, which make the pleasure all the more vivid; and this vividness can be felt whether it is
read or acted. Another point is
that it attains its end with greater economy of length. What is concentrated is
@@ -1721,14 +1721,14 @@ added cvs log keyword
less unity I mean an epic made up of several separate actions. The Iliad has many such parts and so
has the Odyssey, and each by itself has a certain magnitude. And yet
the composition of these poems is as perfect as can be and each of them
- is—as far as an epic may be—a representation of a single action.
+ is—as far as an epic may be—a representation of a single action.
If then tragedy is superior in
- these respects and also in fulfilling its artistic function—for tragedies
+ these respects and also in fulfilling its artistic function—for tragedies
and epics should produce not any form of pleasure but the pleasure we have
describedi.e., the pleasure felt when by the
- representation of life in art “relief is given” to pity,
+ representation of life in art “relief is given” to pity,
fear, and other such emotions, or, to use a term now prevalent, when such
- emotions are “released.”Cf. Aristot. Poet. 14.3.—then obviously, since it
+ emotions are “released.”Cf. Aristot. Poet. 14.3.—then obviously, since it
attains its object better than the epic, the better of the two is tragedy. This must
suffice for our treatment of tragedy and epic, their characteristics, their species,
their constituent parts, and their number and attributes; for the causes of success
diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml
index 261e98d55..1e0746d86 100644
--- a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -151,19 +151,19 @@
a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the
strophe in a choral ode. of Dialectic; for both have to do with
matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not
- confinedOr “and they
- (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not
- confined.” to any special science. Hence all men in a manner
+ confinedOr “and they
+ (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not
+ confined.” to any special science. Hence all men in a manner
have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point, endeavor to criticize or
uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a
familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is
clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine the
reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance; and such
an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art.The special characteristic of an art is the
- discovery of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack (
- e)mpeiri/a).
+ discovery of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack (
+ e)mpeiri/a).
Now, previous compilers of
- “Arts”Manuals or
+ “Arts”Manuals or
handbooks treating of the rules of any art or science. of Rhetoric
have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only
things in it that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an
@@ -210,11 +210,11 @@
or the narrative, or of the other parts of the discourse, are bringing under the
rules of art what is outside the subject; for the only thing to which their
attention is devoted
is how to put the judge into a
- certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs,Systematic logical proofs (enthymeme,
- for example), including testimony as to character and appeals to
- the emotions (2.3), which the rhetorician has to invent
- ( eu(rei=n, inventio) for use in particular cases. They are
- contrasted with “inartificial” proofs, which have
+ certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs,Systematic logical proofs (enthymeme,
+ for example), including testimony as to character and appeals to
+ the emotions (2.3), which the rhetorician has to invent
+ ( eu(rei=n, inventio) for use in particular cases. They are
+ contrasted with “inartificial” proofs, which have
nothing to do with the rules of the art, but are already in existence, and
only need to be made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. 4-14, the
latter in ch. 15 of this book. which make a man a master of
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@
The reason of this is that in public speaking it is less worth while to talk of
what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to
trickery less than forensic, because it is of more general interest.koino/teron:
- or, “more intelligible to the ordinary man.” For
+ or, “more intelligible to the ordinary man.” For
in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing
necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a
measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient; there it is useful to win
@@ -243,14 +243,14 @@
It is obvious, therefore, that a system
arranged according to the rules of art is only concerned with proofs; that proof
is a sort of demonstration,Exact scientific
- proof ( a)po/deicis),
- which probable proof ( pi/stis) only to a certain extent resembles.
+ proof ( a)po/deicis),
+ which probable proof ( pi/stis) only to a certain extent resembles.
since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been
demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally
speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs and lastly, that the enthymeme
is a kind of syllogism. Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or
of one of its parts,Dialectic here apparently
- includes logic generally, the “part” being either the
+ includes logic generally, the “part” being either the
Analytica Priori, which deals with the syllogism, or the
Sophistici Elenchi, on Fallacies. to consider
every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most
@@ -261,13 +261,13 @@
purview of the same faculty, and at the same time men have a sufficient natural
capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it; wherefore one who
divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard
- to probabilities.e)/ndoca, “resting on opinion”; defined
- in the Topics (1.1) as “things
+ to probabilities.e)/ndoca, “resting on opinion”; defined
+ in the Topics (1.1) as “things
generally admitted by all, or by most men, or by the wise, and by all or
- most of these, or by the most notable and esteemed.”
+ most of these, or by the most notable and esteemed.”
It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what
- is outside the subject,
anddio/ti either = o(/ti, “that”; or,
- (it is clear) “why.” have
+ is outside the subject,
anddio/ti either = o(/ti, “that”; or,
+ (it is clear) “why.” have
rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are
naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly
made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible.
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@
eight books on Dialectic and drawing conclusions from probabilities.
when speaking of converse with the multitude. Further, the orator should be able
to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; not that we should do both
- (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong),
+ (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong),
but that the real state of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may
be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them.
Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are
@@ -298,11 +298,11 @@
wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit,
so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.
It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal
- with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of
- general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its
+ with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of
+ general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its
function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing
means of persuasion.The early sophistical
- definition was “the art of persuasion.” The same
+ definition was “the art of persuasion.”
The same
holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the
function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this
end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be
@@ -348,20 +348,20 @@
room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to
the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character; for
it is not the case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down in their
- “Art,” that the worth of the orator in no way contributes to
+ “Art,” that the worth of the orator in no way contributes to
his powers of persuasion; on the contrary, moral character, so to say,
constitutes the most effective means of proof. The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion
by his speech; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are
influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone that, as we
have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavor to devote their
- attention. (We will discuss these matters in detail when we come to
- speak of the emotions.) Lastly,
+ attention. (We will discuss these matters in detail when we come to
+ speak of the emotions.) Lastly,
persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the true
or apparently true from the means of persuasion
applicable to each individual subject.
Now, since proofs are effected by these means,
it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical
reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the
- emotions—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner
+ emotions—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner
in which it is produced. Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot
of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called
Politics.Rhetoric, as dealing with human
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@
important factor in the training and education of the individual citizen and
of the members of the State as a whole, may be described as an offshoot of
Politics, with which the sophistical rhetoricians identified
- it. That is why Rhetoric assumesOr, “slips into the garb of” (Jebb).
+ it. That is why Rhetoric assumesOr, “slips into the garb of” (Jebb).
Probably a stage metaphor. the character of Politics, and those who
claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly
from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset,
@@ -389,15 +389,15 @@
rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs
either examples or enthymemes and nothing else; so that if, generally speaking,
it is necessary to prove any fact whatever either by syllogism or by
- induction—and that this is so is clear from the
+ induction—and that this is so is clear from the
AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23; Aristot. Post. Anal.
- 1.1.—each of the two former must be identical with each
+ 1.1.—each of the two former must be identical with each
of the two latter.That is, enthymeme and
example must be the same as syllogism and induction.
The difference between example and enthymeme is
evident from the Topics,From
- the definitions of syllogism (1.1) and induction
- (1.12). No particular passage, however, explains the
+ the definitions of syllogism (1.1) and induction
+ (1.12). No particular passage, however, explains the
difference here mentioned. where, in discussing syllogism and
induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of
particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in
@@ -409,14 +409,14 @@
advantagesThe employment of syllogism and
induction, to\ ei)=dos th=s r(htorikh=s
being taken as simply = h( r(htorikh/.
- Another rendering is: “that each kind of Rhetoric (that
- which depends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special
- advantage.”—
for what has
+ Another rendering is: “that each kind of Rhetoric (that
+ which depends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special
+ advantage.”—
for what has
been said in the MethodicaA
lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his Life of
Aristotle, 24, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first letter to Ammaeus, 6. It is
supposed to have dealt with some branch of Logic. holds good also in
- this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by
+ this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by
examples and sometimes by enthymemes, and orators themselves may be similarly
distinguished by their fondness for one or the other. Now arguments that depend
on examples are not less calculated to persuade, but those which depend upon
@@ -425,16 +425,16 @@
more clearly these proofs themselves.
Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one, and is
persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it
- appears to be proved by propositions that are convincingOr, “by persons which are so”
- (Jebb).; further, no art has the particular in
+ appears to be proved by propositions that are convincingOr, “by persons which are so”
+ (Jebb).; further, no art has the particular in
view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of
- persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art,
+ persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art,
whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true
- science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems
+ science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems
probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or
that class of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw
- conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some
- fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned
+ conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some
+ fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned
discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of
deliberation.
The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with
@@ -463,8 +463,8 @@
Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his
father celebrated for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He
played a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support of the
- Spartans (412-407
- B.C.) whom he afterwards offended, and by whom he is said to have
+ Spartans (412-407
+ B.C.) whom he afterwards offended, and by whom he is said to have
been put to death.
was the victor in a contest at which the prize was
a crown,
it is enough to say that he won a victory at the
Olympic games; there is no need to add that the prize at the Olympic games is a
@@ -475,8 +475,8 @@
deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally
speaking, none of them necessary; since, further, facts which only generally
happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the
- same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this
- is so is clear from the
AnalyticsAristot. APr. 1.8.13.), it is evident that the materials
+ same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this
+ is so is clear from the
AnalyticsAristot. APr. 1.8.13.), it is evident that the materials
from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most
part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it
follows that these two elements must correspond to these two kinds of
@@ -492,12 +492,12 @@
called
tekmeria; those which are not necessary have
no distinguishing name.
I call those necessary
signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign
- is called
tekmērion; for when people think
+ is called
tekmērion; for when people think
that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward
- a
tekmērion, something as it were proved
+ a
tekmērion, something as it were proved
and concluded; for in the old language
tekmar and
-
peras have the same meaning (limit,
- conclusion).
+
peras have the same meaning (limit,
+ conclusion).
Among signs, some are related as the particular
to the universal; for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just,
because Socrates was both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though the
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@
syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill,
because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk,
this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a
- tekmērion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is
+ tekmērion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is
the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the
particular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has
a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true,
this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for a man to
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@
they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and Dialectic. But this will be clearer
if stated at greater length.
I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms
- those which are concerned with what we call “topics,” which
+ those which are concerned with what we call “topics,” which
may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics, and many other sciences that
differ in kind, such as the topic of the more or less, which will furnish
syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law, Physics, or any other science
@@ -553,13 +553,13 @@
Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon first principles, it will no longer be
Dialectic or Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has arrived at.The common topics do not deal with particular
subject matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter, the
- “better” (that is, in regard to a special
- science) the propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without
+ “better” (that is, in regard to a special
+ science) the propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without
knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and become a professor
of that special science whose first principles he has hit upon.
Most enthymemes are constructed from these
specific topics, which are called particular and special, fewer from those that
- are common or universal. As then we have done in the
TopicsAristot. Sophist. Elenchi (Fallacies) 9. This
+ are common or universal. As then we have done in the TopicsAristot. Sophist. Elenchi (Fallacies) 9. This
treatise is really the ninth and concluding part of the
Topics., so here we must distinguish the specific and
universal topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed. By specific topics I
@@ -567,11 +567,11 @@
common to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific topics, but before
doing so let us ascertain the different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having
determined their number, we may separately ascertain their elements and
- propositions.Propositions (or
- premises), the name given to the two first statements in a
+ propositions.Propositions (or
+ premises), the name given to the two first statements in a
syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn: All men are mortal
- (major premise); Socrates is a man (minor
- premise); therefore Socrates is mortal.
+ (major premise); Socrates is a man (minor
+ premise); therefore Socrates is mortal.
The kinds of
Rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For
every speech is composed of three parts: the speaker,
the subject of which he treats, and the person to
@@ -579,8 +579,8 @@
refers. Now the hearer must necessarily be
either a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of
things to come.All three kinds of hearers are
- regarded as judges (the mere spectator as a
- “critic”), although strictly krith/s should be limited to the law
+ regarded as judges (the mere spectator as a
+ “critic”), although strictly krith/s should be limited to the law
courts. For instance, a member of the general assembly is a judge of
things to come; the dicast, of things past; the mere spectator, of the ability
of the speaker. Therefore there are necessarily
@@ -620,16 +620,16 @@
that the enslavement of neighboring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is
not an act of injustice.The omission of
ou)k before a)/dikon has been suggested. The sense would then be:
- “As to the injustice of enslaving . . . he is quite
- indifferent.” There is no doubt a reference to the cruel treatment
+ “As to the injustice of enslaving . . . he is quite
+ indifferent.” There is no doubt a reference to the cruel treatment
by Athens of the inhabitants of
- the island of Melos (416 B.C.) for its loyalty to the Spartans
- during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc.
- 5.84-116). The Athenian envoys declined to discuss the
+ the island of Melos (416 B.C.) for its loyalty to the Spartans
+ during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc.
+ 5.84-116). The Athenian envoys declined to discuss the
question of right or wrong, which they said was only possible between equal
powers, and asserted that expediency was the only thing that
- had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice (in the
- Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken into account,
+ had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice (in the
+ Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken into account,
was merely accessory and intended to serve as a specious justification for
the policy of might. Similarly, those who praise or blame do not
consider
whether a man has
@@ -637,8 +637,8 @@
that, disregarding his own interest, he performed some deed of honor. For
example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade
Patroclus,To protect his body and avenge
- his death (Hom. Il.
- 18.). knowing that he was fated to die, although he might
+ his death (Hom. Il.
+ 18.).
knowing that he was fated to die, although he might
have lived. To him such a death was more honorable, although life was more
expedient.
From what has been said it is evident that the
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
honorable, and their contraries. Now, necessary signs, probabilities,
and signs are the propositions of the rhetorician; for the syllogism
universallyo(/lws: or, reading o(/los,
- “the syllogism as a whole.” consists of
+ “the syllogism as a whole.” consists of
propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions
above mentioned. Again, since what is
impossible can neither have been done nor will be done, but only what is
@@ -699,8 +699,8 @@
sciencesTaking ei)s
e)pisth/mas with metabai/nein.
If taken with e)piskeua/zwn, the sense will
- be: “by changing his ground ( metabai/nein being used absolutely) while altering
- their characters from faculties to sciences.”, whose
+ be: “by changing his ground ( metabai/nein being used absolutely) while altering
+ their characters from faculties to sciences.”, whose
subjects are certain definite things, not merely words. Nevertheless, even at present we may mention such
matters as it is worth while to analyze, while still leaving much for political
science to investigate.
@@ -734,8 +734,8 @@
Again, in regard to the defense of the country,
he should not be ignorant how it is carried on; he should know both the strength
of the guard, its character, and the positions of the guard-houses
- (which is impossible for one who is unacquainted with the
- country), so that if any guard is insufficient it may be increased, or
+ (which is impossible for one who is unacquainted with the
+ country), so that if any guard is insufficient it may be increased, or
if any is superfluous it may be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to
suitable positions.
Again, in regard to food, he should know what
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@
in order that contracts and agreements may be made with thosetou/tous: those who will
receive exports and send imports. who can furnish them; for it is
necessary to keep the citizens free from reproach in their relations with two
- classes of people—those who are stronger and those who are useful for
+ classes of people—those who are stronger and those who are useful for
commercial purposes.
With a view to the safety of the State, it is
necessary that the orator should be able to judge of all these questions, but an
@@ -765,9 +765,9 @@
are suitable to what kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for
legislation books of travel are useful, since they help us to understand the
laws of other nations, and for political debates historical works.This rendering, although convenient, hardly
- represents the Greek, which, literally translated, is “the
+ represents the Greek, which, literally translated, is “the
investigations of those who write about human
- actions” (cf. i(storiko/s, 4.8). All these things, however,
+ actions” (cf. i(storiko/s, 4.8). All these things, however,
belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric.
Such, then, are the most important questions upon which the would-be deliberative
orator
must be well informed.
@@ -786,10 +786,10 @@
Let us then define happiness as well-being
combined with virtue, or independence of life, or the life that is most
agreeable combined with security, or abundance of possessions and slaves,This is the usual rendering, although it is
- hardly satisfactory. Jebb translates “a flourishing state . . . of
- body.” combined with power to protect and make use of
- themOr, “bring
- about,” “effect them.”; for nearly all
+ hardly satisfactory. Jebb translates “a flourishing state . . . of
+ body.” combined with power to protect and make use of
+ themOr, “bring
+ about,” “effect them.”; for nearly all
men admit that one or more of these things constitutes happiness. If, then, such is the nature of happiness, its
component parts must necessarily be:
noble birth,
numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good
@@ -798,8 +798,8 @@
a man would be entirely independent, provided he possessed all internal and
external goods; for there are no others. Internal goods are those of mind and
body; external goods are noble birth, friends, wealth, honor. To these we think
- should be added certain capacitiesi.e. of mind and body; or duna/meis may mean “positions of authority and
- influence.” and good luck; for on these conditions life
+ should be added certain capacitiesi.e. of mind and body; or duna/meis may mean “positions of authority and
+ influence.” and good luck; for on these conditions life
will be perfectly secure. Let us now in the same way define each of these in
detail.
Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State,
@@ -824,24 +824,24 @@
sordid. The object of both the individual and of the community should
be to secure the existence of each of these qualities in both men and women; for
all those States in which the character of women is unsatisfactory, as in
- Lacedaemon,A similar charge against the Spartan woman is made in Aristot. Pol. 2.9.5: “Further
- the looseness ( a)/nesis)
+ Lacedaemon,A similar charge against the Spartan woman is made in Aristot. Pol. 2.9.5: “Further
+ the looseness ( a)/nesis)
of the Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the constitution
and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one of absolute luxury
- and intemperance” (compare Eur. Andr. 595-596 “even if she wished it, a Spartan
- girl could not be chaste”). The opinion of Xenophon and
+ and intemperance” (compare Eur. Andr. 595-596 “even if she wished it, a Spartan
+ girl could not be chaste”). The opinion of Xenophon and
Plutarch is much more favorable. may be considered only half-happy.
Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership
of land and properties, and further of movables, cattle, and slaves, remarkable
for number, size, and beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful.
Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has enjoyment for its
object is more liberal. By productive I mean that which is a source of income,
- by enjoyable that which offers no advantage beyond the use of it—at
+ by enjoyable that which offers no advantage beyond the use of it—at
least, none worth mentioning. Security may be defined
as
possession of property in such places and on such conditions that the use of it
is in our own hands; and ownership as the right of alienation or noth)\ mh/: in the
MS. readings these words follow tou= oi)kei=a
- ei)=nai: “ownership or non-ownership.” The
+ ei)=nai: “ownership or non-ownership.” The
alteration is Spengel's., by which I mean giving the property away or
selling it. In a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in possession;
for the actualizatione)ne/rgeia: realization in action or fact. and use of
@@ -866,10 +866,10 @@
Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind
that when exercising the body we are free from sickness; for many are healthy in
the way HerodicusOf Selymbria, physician and teacher of
- hygienic gymnastics (c. 420
- B.C.). He is said to have made his patients walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. He was
+ hygienic gymnastics (c. 420
+ B.C.). He is said to have made his patients walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. He was
satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippocrates as one who killed those
- for whom he prescribed (cf. 2.23.29). is said to
+ for whom he prescribed (cf. 2.23.29). is said to
have been, whom no one would consider happy in the matter of health, because
they are obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human enjoyments.
Beauty varies with each age. In a young man, it
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@
of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at the same time awe-inspiring. In an
old man, beauty consists in being naturally adapted to contend with unavoidable
labors and in not causing annoyanceOr simply,
- “freedom from pain” (5.15). to
+ “freedom from pain” (5.15). to
others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable accompaniments of old age.
Strength consists in the power of moving
another as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to pull or push, to
@@ -918,20 +918,20 @@
the most, or the most important of those goods of which fortune is the cause.
Now fortune is the cause of some things with which the arts also are concerned,
and also of many which have nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are
- due to nature (though it is possible that the results of fortune may be
- contrary to nature); for art is a cause of health, but nature of beauty
+ due to nature (though it is possible that the results of fortune may be
+ contrary to nature); for art is a cause of health, but nature of beauty
and stature.The results of art and the
- results due to nature are often assisted (or hindered) by
+ results due to nature are often assisted (or hindered) by
the interference of the irregular operations of fortune or chance. Health
- may be the result of fortune, as well as art (a sick man may be
+ may be the result of fortune, as well as art (a sick man may be
cured by a drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the
- physician); beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It
+ physician); beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It
is parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce unnatural
monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and the substitution of a comma
for the colon after fu/sis have been
- suggested. The meaning would then be: “for instance, such as are
+ suggested. The meaning would then be: “for instance, such as are
due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary to
- nature.” Speaking generally, the goods which come from fortune
+ nature.” Speaking generally, the goods which come from fortune
are such as excite envy. Fortune is also a cause of those goods which are beyond
calculation; for instance, a man's brothers are all ugly, while he is handsome;
they did not see the treasure, while he found it; the arrow hit one who stood by
@@ -960,7 +960,7 @@
which such things follow, or all that is likely to prevent or destroy their
opposites.
Now things follow in two
- ways—simultaneously or subsequently; for instance, knowledge is
+ ways—simultaneously or subsequently; for instance, knowledge is
subsequent to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. Things which
produce act in three ways; thus, healthiness produces health; and so does food;
and exercise as a rule. This being laid down,
@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@
one and a loss of the other. The virtues also
must be a good thing; for those who possess them are in a sound condition, and
they are also productive of good things and practical. However, we must speak
- separately concerning each—what it is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good; for all living creatures
+ separately concerning each—what it is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good; for all living creatures
naturally desire it. Hence it follows that both agreeable and beautiful things
must be good; for the former produce pleasure, while among beautiful things some
are pleasant and others are desirable in themselves.
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@
acquisition
The excellence of anything is
proportionate to its success in the performance of its proper function. The
function of acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and its
- “excellence” may be judges by the amount of wealth
+ “excellence” may be judges by the amount of wealth
obtained. and productive of many things.
A friend and friendship, since a friend
is desirable in himself and produces many advantages.
Honor and good repute, since they are agreeable and produce many
advantages, and are generally accompanied by the possession of those things for
@@ -1020,15 +1020,15 @@
common danger threatens them.
That which is not in excessReading o(/. The ordinary
reading ou(= is taken to mean
- “that which does not permit excess,” that which is
+ “that which does not permit excess,” that which is
midway between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested rendering is,
- “that of which one cannot have too much.” is
+ “that of which one cannot have too much.” is
good, whereas that which is greater than it should be, is bad. And that which has cost much labor and expense, for
it at once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a thing is regarded as an
end, and an end of many efforts; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was said:
- And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the
- Trojans] to boast of,Hom. Il. 2.160. Addressed
+ And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the
+ Trojans] to boast of,Hom. Il. 2.160. Addressed
by Hera to Athene, begging her to prevent the Greeks departing
from Troy and leaving
Helen behind.
@@ -1037,18 +1037,18 @@
It is disgraceful to tarry long,Hom. Il. 2.298. Spoken by
Odysseus. While sympathizing with the desire of the army to
- leave, he points out that it would be “disgraceful
- after waiting so long” to return unsuccessful, and
+ leave, he points out that it would be “disgraceful
+ after waiting so long” to return unsuccessful, and
exhorts them to hold out.
-
and the proverb, “[to break] the pitcher at
- the door.”Proverbial for
- “lost labor.” Cf. French “faire naufrage
- au port,” and the English “there's many a
- slip 'twixt cup and lip.”
+ and the proverb, “[to break] the pitcher at
+ the door.”
Proverbial for
+ “lost labor.” Cf. French “faire naufrage
+ au port,” and the English “there's many a
+ slip 'twixt cup and lip.”
And that which many aim at and which is seen to
be competed for by many; for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and
- the majority may almost stand for “all.” And that which is the object of praise, for no one
+ the majority may almost stand for “all.” And that which is the object of praise, for no one
praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies; for if
even those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, this amounts to a
universal recognition of it; for it is because of its goodness being evident
@@ -1057,8 +1057,8 @@
done their duty against their enemies, who would then have blamed them.
Another suggested reading is ou(\s oi( fi/loi ye/gousi
kai\ ou(\s oi( e)xqroi\ mh\ ye/gousi
- (“those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies
- do not blame.”) Wherefore the Corinthians imagined
+ (“those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies
+ do not blame.”) Wherefore the Corinthians imagined
themselves insulted by Simonides, when he wrote,
Ilium does not blame the
@@ -1067,9 +1067,9 @@
an ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the
Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were meant
satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed by
- Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos (Frag. 50,
+ Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos (Frag. 50,
P.L.G. 3, where the line is differently
- given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as
+ given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as
he often does, although not always accurately.
@@ -1082,14 +1082,14 @@
and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. The last are of two kinds: things which might
happen,geno/mena
a)/n: Spengel omits a)/n: i.e.
- “things which have happened.” and
+ “things which have happened.” and
things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without
labor or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labor or length of time.
And anything that happens as men wish is good; and what they wish is either what
is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for
instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light. And things that are peculiar to them, or which no one
- else possesses, “Or which no one
- else has done” (Jebb). or which are out
+ else possesses, “Or which no one
+ else has done” (Jebb). or which are out
of the common; for thus the honor is greater. And things which are appropriate
to them; such are all things befitting them in respect of birth and power. And
things which they think they lack, however unimportant; for none the less they
@@ -1110,14 +1110,14 @@
But since men
often agree that both of two things are useful, but dispute which is the more
so, we must next speak of the greater good and the more expedient. Let one thing, then, be said to exceed another, when
- it is as great and something more—and to be exceeded when it is
- contained in the other. “Greater” and
- “more” always imply a relation with less;
- “great” and “small,”
- “much” and “little” with the general
- size of things; the “great” is that which exceeds, and that
- which falls short of it is “small”; and similarly
- “much” and “little.” Since, besides, we call good that which is desirable
+ it is as great and something more—and to be exceeded when it is
+ contained in the other. “Greater” and
+ “more” always imply a relation with less;
+ “great” and “small,”
+ “much” and “little” with the general
+ size of things; the “great” is that which exceeds, and that
+ which falls short of it is “small”; and similarly
+ “much” and “little.” Since, besides, we call good that which is desirable
for its own sake and not for anything else, and that which all things aim at and
which they would choose if they possessed reason and practical wisdom; and that
which is productive or protective of good, or on which such things follow; and
@@ -1138,17 +1138,17 @@
men in general are bigger than women, the biggest man will be bigger than the
biggest woman; for the superiority of classes and of the greatest things
contained in them are proportionate. And when
- this follows on that, but not that on this [then
- “that” is the greater good];If B (life) follows on, is the consequent
- of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is
+ this follows on that, but not that on this [then
+ “that” is the greater good];If B (life) follows on, is the consequent
+ of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is
a greater good than B. for the enjoyment of that which follows is
contained in that of the other. Now, things follow simultaneously, or
successively, or potentially; thus, life follows simultaneously on health, but
- not health on life; knowledge follows subsequently on learning [but not
- learning on knowledge]; and simple theft potentially on sacrilege, for
+ not health on life; knowledge follows subsequently on learning [but not
+ learning on knowledge]; and simple theft potentially on sacrilege, for
one who commits sacrilege will also steal. And
- things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount [than something
- else] are greater, for they must also exceed the greater.Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is
+ things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount [than something
+ else] are greater, for they must also exceed the greater.Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is
greater than 2.
And things which produce a greater good are
greater; for this we agreed was the meaning of productive of greater. And
@@ -1163,8 +1163,8 @@
for instance, exercise is only a means for the acquirement of a good
constitution. And that which has less need of
one or several other things in addition is a greater good, for it is more
- independent (and “having less need” means needing
- fewer or easier additions). And when
+ independent (and “having less need” means needing
+ fewer or easier additions). And when
one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into existence without the aid of
another, but that other can, then that which needs no aid is more independent,
and accordingly is seen to be a greater good.
@@ -1177,24 +1177,24 @@
It is clear then, from what has been said,
that a thing may be greater in two ways; for if it is a first principle but
another is not, it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a first principle
- [but an end], while another is; for the end is greater and not
+ [but an end], while another is; for the end is greater and not
a first principle.
A thing may be of greater
- importance in two ways: (a) that which is a first
- principle is superior to that which is not; (b) that which
+ importance in two ways: (a) that which is a first
+ principle is superior to that which is not; (b) that which
is not a first principle, but an end, is superior to that which is a first
principle; for the end is superior to the means. In the illustration that
- follows: (a) the first principle (suggesting the
- plot) is said to be of more importance (worse)
- than the end or result (carrying out the plot);
- (b) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than
+ follows: (a) the first principle (suggesting the
+ plot) is said to be of more importance (worse)
+ than the end or result (carrying out the plot);
+ (b) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than
the first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus the
question of the amount of guilt can be argued both ways. Thus,
Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus,
Oropus,
a frontier-town of Boeotia and
Attica, had been occupied by
- the Thebans (366 B.C.).
+ the Thebans (366 B.C.).
Callistratus suggested an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by
- Chabrias—that the town should remain in Theban possession for the
+ Chabrias—that the town should remain in Theban possession for the
time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and the Thebans refused to
leave, whereupon Chabrias and Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas
was an Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his political
@@ -1209,7 +1209,7 @@
the possession of it is more valuable, since it is more difficult of
acquisition. From another point of view, that which is abundant is to be
preferred to that which is scarce, because the use of it is greater, for
- “often” exceeds “seldom,”; whence the
+ “often” exceeds “seldom,”; whence the
saying:
Water is best.Pind. O. 1.1.
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@
that which is more difficult; for its nature is as we wish. And that, the contrary or the deprivation of which is
greater, is the greater good.e.g. it is worse
to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is better than hearing
- (Schrader). And virtue is greater than non-virtue,
+ (Schrader).
And virtue is greater than non-virtue,
and vice than non-vice; for virtues and vices are ends, the others not.
And those things whose works are nobler or
more disgraceful are themselves greater; and the works of those things, the
@@ -1267,10 +1267,10 @@
are safe.
And things in all cases follow the relations
between coordinates and similar inflections; for instance, if
- “courageously” is nobler than and preferable to
- “temperately,” then “courage” is
- preferable to “temperance,” and it is better to be
- “courageous” than “temperate.”
+ “courageously” is nobler than and preferable to
+ “temperately,” then “courage” is
+ preferable to “temperance,” and it is better to be
+ “courageous” than “temperate.”
And that which is chosen by all is better
than that which is not; and that which the majority choose than that which the
minority choose;
for, as we
@@ -1281,23 +1281,23 @@
that of those who are acknowledged authorities and experts. And sometimes a good is greater in which all
participate, for it is a disgrace not to participate in it; sometimes when none
or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer. And things which are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler. And
- in the same way things which are more highly honored,“Things of which the prices are greater, price
- being a sort of worth” (Jebb). for honor
+ in the same way things which are more highly honored,“Things of which the prices are greater, price
+ being a sort of worth” (Jebb). for honor
is a sort of measure of worth; and conversely those things are greater evils,
the punishment for which is greater. And those
things which are greater than what is acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are
greater. And the same whole when divided into parts appears greater, for there
- appears to be superiority in a greater number of things.Or, “superiority over a greater number of
- things.” Whence the poet says that Meleager was persuaded
+ appears to be superiority in a greater number of things.Or, “superiority over a greater number of
+ things.” Whence the poet says that Meleager was persuaded
to rise up and fight by the recital ofAfter
pei=sai all the MSS. except A
Paris have
le/gousan. If this is retained, it must
- refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra, who “persuaded him . . . by
- quoting.” As the text stands, the literal rendering is:
- “the poet says that (the recital of the three
- verses) persuaded.” The passage is from Hom. Il. 9.592-594 (slightly
- different).
+ refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra, who “persuaded him . . . by
+ quoting.” As the text stands, the literal rendering is:
+ “the poet says that (the recital of the three
+ verses) persuaded.” The passage is from Hom. Il. 9.592-594 (slightly
+ different).
All the ills that befall those whose city is taken; the people
@@ -1305,13 +1305,13 @@
the children.
-
Combination and building up, as employed by Epicharmus,Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.) writer of comedies and Pythagorean
+ Combination and building up, as employed by Epicharmus,Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.) writer of comedies and Pythagorean
philosopher, was born at Megara
- in Sicily (according to
- others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, written in the Doric
+ in Sicily (according to
+ others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, written in the Doric
dialect, and without a chorus, were either mythological or comedies of
- manners, as extant titles show. Plato speaks of him as “the prince
- of comedy” and Horace states definitely that he was imitated by
+ manners, as extant titles show. Plato speaks of him as “the prince
+ of comedy” and Horace states definitely that he was imitated by
Plautus. produce the same effect as division, and for the same
reason; for combination is an exhibition of great superiority and appears to be
the origin and cause of great things. And
@@ -1319,16 +1319,16 @@
produce great effects; for if a man does things beyond his powers, beyond his
age, and beyond what his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner, in
such a place, and at such a time, they will possess importance in actions that
- are noble, good, or just, or the opposite. Hence the epigramSimonides, Frag. 163 (P.L.G.
- 3.). on the Olympian victor:
+ are noble, good, or just, or the opposite. Hence the epigramSimonides, Frag. 163 (P.L.G.
+ 3.). on the Olympian victor:
Formerly, with a rough basketOr,
the yoke to which the basket, like our milk-pails long ago, was
attached. on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from
Argos to Tegea.
-
And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, “Look what I started
- from!” And that which is natural is
+
And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, “Look what I started
+ from!” And that which is natural is
a greater good than that which is acquired, because it is harder. Whence the
poet says:
@@ -1345,9 +1345,9 @@
greater need, as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And of two things
that which is nearer the end proposed is preferable. And that which is useful
for the individual is preferable to that which is useful absolutely;Or, reading kai\
- a(plw=s: “that which is useful both to the individual
- and absolutely is a greater good” (than that which is
- only useful in one way), but this necessitates a considerable
+ a(plw=s: “that which is useful both to the individual
+ and absolutely is a greater good” (than that which is
+ only useful in one way), but this necessitates a considerable
ellipse. that which is possible to that which is impossible; for it
is the possible that is useful to us, not the impossible. And those things which
are at the end of life; for things near the end are more like ends.
@@ -1372,12 +1372,12 @@
which pass unnoticed, because they appear more real; whence being wealthy would
appear to be a greater good than the appearance of it.It is difficult to see the connection here. Munro's
suggestion, tw=| dokei=n for tou= dokei=n, adopted by Roemer, would mean
- “by the show of it,” that is, by its attracting notice.
+ “by the show of it,” that is, by its attracting notice.
And that which is held most dear, sometimes
alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a greater good. Wherefore he
who puts out the eye of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of another
who has two, does not do equal injury;Or,
- “is not punished equally.” for in the former
+ “is not punished equally.” for in the former
case, a man has been deprived of that which he held most dear.
These are
nearly all the topics from which arguments
may be drawn
@@ -1404,14 +1404,14 @@
Nor should the end of each form of government be
neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the end. Now, the
end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating
- to education and what the law prescribes, . . . ,The “end” of monarchy is wanting
+ to education and what the law prescribes, . . . ,The “end” of monarchy is wanting
here. of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then that we must
distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each form of
government, since it is in reference to this that men make their choice.
But as proofs are established not only by
- demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—since we have confidence
+ demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—since we have confidence
in an orator who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or
- both—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of
+ both—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of
each form of government; for, in reference to each, the character most likely to
persuade must be that which is characteristic of it. These characters will be
understood by the same means; for characters reveal themselves in accordance
@@ -1438,9 +1438,9 @@
pleasant because it is good. If this is the noble, then virtue must of necessity
be noble, for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good
things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things
- in all cases.Or, “a faculty of
- doing many and great benefits to all men in all cases”
- (Jebb).
+ in all cases.Or, “a faculty of
+ doing many and great benefits to all men in all cases”
+ (Jebb).
The components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control,
magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, practical and speculative
wisdom. The greatest virtues are necessarily
@@ -1460,20 +1460,20 @@
Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason,
which enables men to come to a wise decision in regard to good and evil things,
which have been mentioned as connected with happiness.Or, taking ei)s eu)daimoni/an
- with bouleu/esqai, “come to a wise
- decision conducive to their happiness.”
+ with
bouleu/esqai, “come to a wise
+ decision conducive to their happiness.”
Concerning virtue and vice in general and their
separate parts, enough has been said for the moment. To discern the resti.e. the causes and results of virtue
- (Cope); or, the noble and the disgraceful
- (Jebb). presents no difficulty; for it is evident
+ (Cope); or, the noble and the disgraceful
+ (Jebb). presents no difficulty; for it is evident
that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to it, must be noble, and so also
must be what comes from virtue; for such are its signs and works. But since the signs of virtue and such things as are
the works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it necessarily follows that
all the works and signs of courage and all courageous acts are also noble. The
- same may be said of just things and of just actions; (but not of what
+ same may be said of just things and of just actions; (but not of what
one suffers justly; for in this alone amongst the virtues that which is justly
done is not always noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful than an
- unjust punishment). The same applies equally to the other virtues.
+ unjust punishment). The same applies equally to the other virtues.
Those things of which the reward is honor
are noble; also those which are done for honor rather than money. Also, those
desirable things which a man does not do for his own sake; things which are absolutely good, which a man has
@@ -1490,14 +1490,14 @@
when Alcaeus said:
I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,Frag. 55
- (P.L.G. 3.).
+ (P.L.G. 3.).
Sappho rejoined:
Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue
stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine
eyes; but thou would'st have spoken of what is right.Frag. 28
- (P.L.G. 3.).
+ (P.L.G. 3.).
Those things also are noble for which men
@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@
esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or
philosophers,Thus, the Scythians may be
assumed to be brave and great hunters; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and
- brief in speech; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should
+ brief in speech; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should
be praised accordingly. as actually existing there. And, generally
speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed as noble, since there seems
to be a close resemblance between the two.That is, to\ ti/mion looks as if it were
@@ -1556,11 +1556,11 @@
and nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected; for instance, if a man is
moderate in good fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when he becomes
greater, he is better and more forgiving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates,
- “Look what I started from !”Cp. 7.32 above. and of the Olympian victor:
+ “Look what I started from !”Cp. 7.32 above. and of the Olympian victor:
Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish
- from Argos to Tegea.Frag. 111 (P.L.G.
- 3.).
+ from Argos to Tegea.Frag. 111 (P.L.G.
+ 3.).
and of Simonides:
@@ -1579,7 +1579,7 @@
of virtue and moral purpose.
Now praise is language that sets forth
greatness of virtue; hence it is necessary to show that a man's actions are
- virtuous. But encomium deals with achievements—all attendant
+ virtuous. But encomium deals with achievements—all attendant
circumstances, such as noble birth and education, merely conduce to persuasion;
for it is probable that virtuous parents will have virtuous offspring and that a
man will turn out as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce an encomium upon
@@ -1592,11 +1592,11 @@
what you might suggest in counseling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase.
Accordingly, when we know what we ought to do and the qualities we
ought to possess, we ought to make a change in the phrase and turn it, employing
- this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that “one
+ this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that “one
ought not to pride oneself on goods which are due to fortune, but on those which
- are due to oneself alone,” when expressed in this way, has the force
- of a suggestion; but expressed thus, “he was proud, not of goods which
- were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone,” it
+ are due to oneself alone,” when expressed in this way, has the force
+ of a suggestion; but expressed thus, “he was proud, not of goods which
+ were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone,” it
becomes praise. Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would
suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise. The form of the expression will necessarily be
opposite, when the prohibitive has been changed into the non-prohibitive.In the first sentence, the statement is
@@ -1654,20 +1654,20 @@
they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done
voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is done with
premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he
- does with a purpose.proai/resis (premeditation, deliberate or moral
- choice) is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not
+ does with a purpose.proai/resis (premeditation, deliberate or moral
+ choice) is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not
premeditated; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. Choice is a
voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, including the use of reason
and knowledge. In Aristot. Nic. Eth.
- 11 Aristotle defines proai/resis as “a deliberate appetition of
- (longing for, o)/recis)
- things in our power,” as to which we should necessarily be
+ 11 Aristotle defines proai/resis as “a deliberate appetition of
+ (longing for, o)/recis)
+ things in our power,” as to which we should necessarily be
well-informed.
The motives which lead men to do injury and
commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more
vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust; for
example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily
- pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,Or, “in the matter of ease,” taking
+ pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,Or, “in the matter of ease,” taking
ta\ r(a/quma as = r(aqumi/a. the coward in regard to dangers, for fright
makes him desert his comrades in peril;
the ambitious in
his desire for honor, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer
@@ -1690,7 +1690,7 @@
which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause,
some are the result of habit, others of
longing, and of the latter some are due to rational, others to irrational
longing. Now wish is a
- [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything
+ [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything
unless he thinks it is good; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all
the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature,
compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.
@@ -1698,13 +1698,13 @@
distinctions of men's acts based upon age, moral habits, or anything else. For
if the young happen to be
In the cases of the
young, the poor, and the rich, their youth etc. are only
- “accidents,” accidental not real causes. Aristotle
- defines to\ sumbebhko/s (Aristot. Met. 4.30) as
- “that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it
+ “accidents,” accidental not real causes. Aristotle
+ defines to\ sumbebhko/s (Aristot. Met. 4.30) as
+ “that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it
as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for instance, if a man,
- when digging a hole for a plant, finds a treasure.” The color of a
- man's eyes is an “inseparable” accident, the fact that a
- man is a lawyer is a “separabIe” accident.
+ when digging a hole for a plant, finds a treasure.” The color of a
+ man's eyes is an “inseparable” accident, the fact that a
+ man is a lawyer is a “separabIe” accident.
irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not because of their youth
that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of
wealth or poverty; but the poor happen to desire wealth because of their lack of
@@ -1734,8 +1734,8 @@
regular;
for they turn out
always, or generally, in the same way. As for those which happen contrary to
nature there is no need to investigate minutely whether their occurrence is due
- to a certain force of nature or some other cause
(it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to
- chance). Those things are the result of compulsion which are done by
+ to a certain force of nature or some other cause
(it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to
+ chance). Those things are the result of compulsion which are done by
the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation.
Things are the result of habit, when they are done
because they have often been done.
Things are
the result of calculation which are done because, of the goods already
@@ -1770,34 +1770,34 @@
If such is the nature of pleasure,
it is evident that that which
produces the disposition we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that which
destroys it or produces the contrary settling down is painful.
Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant
- to enter into a normal state (especially when what is done in
- accordance with that state has come into its own again)
The true nature of the “normal
- state” was lost during the period of disturbance and
+ to enter into a normal state (especially when what is done in
+ accordance with that state has come into its own again)The true nature of the “normal
+ state” was lost during the period of disturbance and
unsettlement.; and the same with habits. For that which has become
habitual becomes as it were natural; in fact, habit is something like nature,
- for the distance between “often” and
- “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of
- “always,” habit to that of “often.”
+ for the distance between “often” and
+ “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of
+ “always,” habit to that of “often.”
That which is not compulsory is also
pleasant, for compulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is necessary is
painful, and it was rightly said,
- For every act of necessity is disagreeable.From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G.
- 2.): see Introd.
+ For every act of necessity is disagreeable.From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G.
+ 2.): see Introd.
Application, study, and intense effort are also painful, for these
involve necessity and compulsion, if they have not become habitual; for then
habit makes them pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant; wherefore
- states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation,Or “rest”
- (bodily). and sleep are among pleasant things,
+ states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation,Or “rest”
+ (bodily). and sleep are among pleasant things,
because none of these is in any way compulsory. Everything of which we have in us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a
longing for the pleasant.
Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those
that are not the result of any
assumption.There is no consideration or
- “definite theory” (Jebb, Welldon) of
+ “definite theory” (Jebb, Welldon) of
the results that may follow. The desires arise without anything of the kind;
they simply come. Such are all those which are called natural; for
- instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the
+ instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the
desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular;
the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch,
smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our
@@ -1807,33 +1807,33 @@
certain emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, then both the man who
remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he
remembers or hopes.The passage e)pei\ d' e)sti\ . . . ai)/sqhsis has been
- punctuated in two ways. (1) With a full stop at e)lpi/zei (Roemer, Jebb). The
+ punctuated in two ways. (1) With a full stop at e)lpi/zei (Roemer, Jebb). The
conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are accompanied by imagination
of what is remembered or hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle
really wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of pleasure.
- (2) With a comma at e)lpi/zei (Cope, Victorius). The steps in the
+ (2) With a comma at e)lpi/zei (Cope, Victorius). The steps in the
argument will then be: if pleasure is the sensation of a certain emotion; if
- imagination is a weakened (faded) sensation; if one who
+ imagination is a weakened (faded) sensation; if one who
remembers or hopes is attended by an imagination of what he remembers or
hopes; then, this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or hopes,
since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and a kind of movement
- (sect. 1). fantasi/a, the
- faculty of forming mental images (variously translated
- “imagination,” “mental impression,”
- “fantasy”) is defined by Aristotle
- (Aristot. De Anima
- 3.3.11) as a kind of movement, which cannot
+ (sect. 1). fantasi/a, the
+ faculty of forming mental images (variously translated
+ “imagination,” “mental impression,”
+ “fantasy”) is defined by Aristotle
+ (Aristot. De Anima
+ 3.3.11) as a kind of movement, which cannot
arise apart from sensation, and the movement produced must resemble the
sensation which produced it. But fantasi/a
is more than this; it is not merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place
midway between sense and intellect; while imagination has need of the
senses, the intellect has need of imagination. If fantasi/a is referred to an earlier perception of which the
sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination carries the sense images
- ( fanta/smata) to the seat
- of memory. They are then transformed into memory (of something
- past) or hope (of something future) and are
- handed on to the intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his
- edition of the De Anima.) This being so, it
+ ( fanta/smata) to the seat
+ of memory. They are then transformed into memory (of something
+ past) or hope (of something future) and are
+ handed on to the intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his
+ edition of the
De Anima.) This being so, it
is evident that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who
hope, since there is sensation.
Therefore all
pleasant things must either be present in sensation, or past in recollection, or
@@ -1844,7 +1844,7 @@
whence the saying:
Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it,Euripides, Andromeda
- (Frag. 133, T.G.F.).
+ (Frag. 133, T.G.F.).
and,
@@ -1874,8 +1874,8 @@
fever and tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of having drunk and the hope
that they will drink again. The lovesick
always take pleasure in talking, writing,
or composing
- versesOr “doing something that
- has to do with the beloved.” about the beloved; for it
+ versesOr “doing something that
+ has to do with the beloved.” about the beloved; for it
seems to them that in all this recollection makes the object of their affection
perceptible. Love always begins in this manner, when men are happy not only in
the presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when they recall him to
@@ -1900,8 +1900,8 @@
superiority, which all with more or less eagerness desire. And since victory is pleasant, competitive and
disputatiousControversiae or
school rhetorical exercises, as well as arguing in the law courts; unless
- e)ristika/s means simply “in
- which there is rivalry.” amusements must be so too,
for victories are often gained
+ e)ristika/s means simply “in
+ which there is rivalry.” amusements must be so too,
for victories are often gained
in them; among these we may include games with knuckle-bones, ball-games,
dicing, and draughts. It is the same with serious sports; for some become
pleasant when one is familiar with them, while others are so from the outset,
@@ -1920,8 +1920,8 @@
A friend also is among pleasant things, for it
is pleasant to loveFor the meaning of
fili/a, filei=n cf. Book
- 2.4.—for no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in
- it—just as it is pleasant to be loved; for in this case also a man has
+ 2.4.—for no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in
+ it—just as it is pleasant to be loved; for in this case also a man has
an impression that he is really endowed
with good
qualities, a thing desired by all who perceive it; and to be loved is to be
cherished for one's own sake. And it is
@@ -1940,12 +1940,12 @@
admiration is to be desired, and learning implies a return to the normal.True knowledge or philosophy, which is the
result of learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal or
settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure, which is defined
- (11.1) as a settling down of the soul into its natural
+ (11.1) as a settling down of the soul into its natural
state after a period of disturbance.
It is pleasant to bestow and to receive
benefits; the latter is the attainment of what we desire,
the former the possession of more than
- sufficient means,Or, “larger means
- than the person benefited.” both of them things that men
+ sufficient means,Or, “larger means
+ than the person benefited.” both of them things that men
desire. Since it is pleasant to do good, it must also be pleasant for men to set
their neighbors on their feet, and to supply their deficiencies. And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all
things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of
@@ -1962,8 +1962,8 @@
young,
Like to like,Hom. Od. 17.218
w(s ai)ei\ to\n o(moi=on a)/gei qeo\s w(s to\n
o(moi=on.
Beast knows
- beast,
Birds of a feather flock together,Literally, “ever jackdaw to
- jackdaw.”
and all similar sayings.
+ beast,
Birds of a feather flock together,Literally, “ever jackdaw to
+ jackdaw.”
and all similar sayings.
And since things which are akin and like are
always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this
in regard to himself, it must needs be
that all men are
@@ -1982,16 +1982,16 @@
And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens
to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.Antiope
- (Frag. 183, T.G.F.).
+ (Frag. 183, T.G.F.).
Similarly, since amusement, every kind of
- relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words,
- or deeds—must also be pleasant.
The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the
+ relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words,
+ or deeds—must also be pleasant.
The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the
Poetics.
Only the
- definition appears in the existing text; “The ridiculous is an
- error, painless and non-destructive ugliness (Aristot. Poet.
- 5).” Let this suffice for things that are
+ definition appears in the existing text; “The ridiculous is an
+ error, painless and non-destructive ugliness (
Aristot. Poet.
+ 5).” Let this suffice for things that are
pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.
Such are the
motives of injustice; let us now state the frame of mind of those who commit it,
@@ -2031,7 +2031,7 @@
would never have attempted it. And, those who
have ways or places of concealment for stolen property, or abundant
opportunities of disposing of it.Or, a
- “resourceful mind.” And those who, even if they
+ “resourceful mind.” And those who, even if they
do not remain undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the
judges. And those who, if a fine be imposed, can get payment in full set aside
or put off for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have nothing to
@@ -2054,8 +2054,8 @@
And all who hope for pleasure and profit
at once, while the pain and the loss come later; such are the intemperate,
intemperance being concerned with all things that men long for. And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is
- immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting“More distant”
- (Jebb).; for temperate and wiser men pursue such
+ immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting“More distant”
+ (Jebb).; for temperate and wiser men pursue such
aims. And those who may possibly be thought to
have acted by chance or from necessity, from some natural impulse or from habit,
in a word, to have committed an error rather than a crime. And those who hope to obtain indulgence; and all
@@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@
wrong, and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and circumstances of the
following kind.With a comma or colon after
ta\ toiau=ta; without these render:
- “those who possess such things as they . . .”
+ “those who possess such things as they . . .”
Those who possess what they themselves lack, things either necessary, or
superfluous, or enjoyable; both those who are
far off and those who are near, for in the one case the gain is speedy, in the
@@ -2080,9 +2080,9 @@
unawares. And those who are indolent; for it requires a man who takes pains to
prosecute. And those who are bashful; for they are not likely to fight about
money. And those who have often been wronged
- but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, “Mysian
- booty.”A proverb meaning
- “an easy prey.” The Mysians were regarded as cowardly
+ but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, “Mysian
+ booty.”A proverb meaning
+ “an easy prey.” The Mysians were regarded as cowardly
and unwarlike.
And those who have never, or those who have
often, suffered wrong; for both are off their guard, the one because they have
@@ -2094,7 +2094,7 @@
pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, or their friends, have
either committed, or intended to commit, wrong either against himself, or his
ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard; for, as the proverb says,
- “evil-doing only needs an excuse.” And both enemies and friends; for it is easy to injure the latter,
+ “evil-doing only needs an excuse.” And both enemies and friends; for it is easy to injure the latter,
and pleasant to injure the former. And those who are friendless. And those who
are unskilled in speech or action; for either they make no attempt to prosecute,
or come to terms, or accomplish nothing. And
@@ -2105,19 +2105,19 @@
are suffering; for it seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer a
wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer; if, for instance,
one were to assault a man who was in the habit of outraging others.ai)ki/a
- (assault) was a less serious offence than u(/bris (wanton outrage).
+ (assault) was a less serious offence than u(/bris (wanton outrage).
And those who have already injured us, or
intended, or intend, or are about to do so; for in such a case vengeance is both
- pleasant and honorable, and seems to be almost an act of justice. And those whom we wrongoi(=s i.e. supplying a)dikoume/nois, “by whose being
- wronged.” ou(\s has been
+ pleasant and honorable, and seems to be almost an act of justice. And those whom we wrongoi(=s i.e. supplying a)dikoume/nois, “by whose being
+ wronged.” ou(\s has been
suggested, i.e. supplying a)dikou=ntes,
- “wronging whom.” in order to ingratiate ourselves
+ “wronging whom.” in order to ingratiate ourselves
with our friends, or persons whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word,
those by whom our life is ruled. And those in
reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining merciful consideration.In our relations with whom, almost = from whom.
- Another interpretation is: “In reference to whom there is a chance
- . . . consideration from others, meaning the judges”
- (Welldon). And those against whom we have a
+ Another interpretation is: “In reference to whom there is a chance
+ . . . consideration from others, meaning the judges”
+ (Welldon). And those against whom we have a
complaint, or with whom we have had a previous difference, as Callippus acted in
the matter of
DionCallipus was a friend of
Dion, who freed Syracuse from
@@ -2129,8 +2129,8 @@
Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to
Gelon,Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini,
being anticipated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neighboring state, sent
- him the cottabus prize, as a compliment for having “played the
- game” so skilfully. The cottabus was originally a Sicilian
+ him the cottabus prize, as a compliment for having “played the
+ game” so skilfully. The cottabus was originally a Sicilian
game. who, having reduced a town to slavery, had anticipated him by doing
what he had intended to do himself. And those
to whom, after having injured them, we shall be enabled to do many acts of
@@ -2174,8 +2174,8 @@
AlcidamasOf Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is
not extant, but the scholiast supplies his words: e)leuqe/rous a)fh=ke pa/ntas qeo/s: ou)de/na dou=lon h( fu/sis
- pepoi/hken (“God has left all men free;
- Nature has made none a slave”). The Messenians had
+ pepoi/hken (“God has left all men free;
+ Nature has made none a slave”). The Messenians had
revolted from Sparta.
also speaks of this precept in his Messeniacus. . . . And in relation to persons, there is a twofold
division of law; for what one ought to do or ought not to do is concerned
with the community generally, or one of its members.
@@ -2198,13 +2198,13 @@
stated
Book 1.11, 12. in what
circumstances and with what dispositions men act with deliberate purpose.
But since a man, while admitting the fact,
often denies the description
- of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that
+ of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that
he took something, but did not steal it; that he was the first to strike, but
committed no outrage; that he had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a
woman; or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege, since the
object in question was not consecrated; or that he trespassed, but not on public
land; or that he held converse with the enemy, but was not guilty of
- treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should
+ treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should
be given of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we desire to prove
that an offence has or has not been committed, we may be able to put the case in
a true light. In all such instances the
@@ -2216,25 +2216,25 @@
upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by
stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he
has taken it to injure anotherRoemer reads,
- after Dittmeyer, ei) e)pi\ bla/bh| [tou/tou
- a)f' ou(= e)/labe] kai\ . . . from the old Latin
+ after Dittmeyer, ei) e)pi\ bla/bh| [tou/tou
+ a)f' ou(= e)/labe] kai\ . . . from the old Latin
translation or to get something for himself. It is the same in all
other cases as in these.
We have said that there are two kinds of just
- and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are
- unwritten),
and have spoken of those
+ and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are
+ unwritten),
and have spoken of those
concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are
two kinds. One kind arises from an excess of
virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honor or dishonor, and
rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good,
to help one's friends, and the like;Laws are
special and general, the former being written or unwritten. The unwritten
- law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general;
- (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general
- law (not the same as the general law “based upon
- nature” sect. 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal
+ law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general;
+ (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general
+ law (not the same as the general law “based upon
+ nature” sect. 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal
standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by a remarkable
- degree ( kaq' u(perbolh/n)
+ degree ( kaq' u(perbolh/n)
of virtue or the opposite. For these laws do not prescribe any special
reward or punishment, but acts are praised or blamed, honored or dishonored,
rewarded or punished, in accordance with the general feeling of
@@ -2245,8 +2245,8 @@
involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when, being unable
to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal statement, which
is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult
- to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,“Inexperience”
- (Jebb). as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron
+ to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,“Inexperience”
+ (Jebb). as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron
instrument used in wounding; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the
possibilities. If then no exact definition is
possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms;
@@ -2266,9 +2266,9 @@
the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or
generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received
rather than those conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to
- appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence;“To be willing that a judicial sentence should be
- nominal rather than real”
- (Jebb).to
+ appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence;“To be willing that a judicial sentence should be
+ nominal rather than real”
+ (Jebb).to
prefer
arbitration to the law court, for the
arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks only to the law, and
the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. Let
@@ -2286,7 +2286,7 @@
Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of
the injury done. A wrong act is greater when
there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is
- no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it;Understanding i)a=sqai. Or “to punish adequately,”
+ no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it;Understanding i)a=sqai. Or “to punish adequately,”
supplying ou(= mh\ i)/sh timwri/a.
and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction, since it is
irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedies. And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has
@@ -2295,14 +2295,14 @@
not the tragic poet. when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had
committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered,
declared that he would not assess the punishment at
less than the victim had assessed it for himself. A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of
- its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices“Or has been seldom paralleled”
- (Cope, but cp. 1.9.38).; and when it has been
+ its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices“Or has been seldom paralleled”
+ (Cope, but cp. 1.9.38).; and when it has been
frequently committed; or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have
been sought and found: thus, at Argos
the citizen owing to whom a new law has been passed, is punished, as well as
those on whose account a new prison had to be built. The crime is greater, the more brutal it is; or when it has been for
a long time premeditated; when the recital of it inspires terror rather than
- pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used:—the
+ pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used:—the
statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles
of justice, for example, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted word, the
sanctity of marriage; for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime. Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very
@@ -2335,19 +2335,19 @@
judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws;
that equity is ever constant and never
changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written
- laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself
+ laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself
for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to
the unwritten law:
For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . . this I
- was not likely [to infringe through fear of the
- pride] of any man);The first line is quoted 1.13.2. The second
+ was not likely [to infringe through fear of the
+ pride] of any man);The first line is quoted 1.13.2. The second
differs somewhat from Soph. Ant.
458, where the passage runs, tou/twn e)gw\ ou)k e)/mellon, a)ndro\s ou)deno\s fro/nhma
dei/sas', e)n qeoi=si th\n di/khn dw/sein
- (“I was not likely, through fear of the pride
+ (“I was not likely, through fear of the pride
of any man, to incur the penalty for violating these statutes at
- the bar of heaven”).
+ the bar of heaven”).
and further, that justice is real and
@@ -2368,8 +2368,8 @@
to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself remains, one
must endeavor to make this clear and to combat the law by this argument.
But if the written law favors our case, we
- must say that the oath of the dicast “to decide to the best of his
- judgement” does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but
+ must say that the oath of the dicast “to decide to the best of his
+ judgement” does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but
is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of
the meaning of the law; that no one chooses that which is good absolutely, but
that which is good for himself;
that there is no
@@ -2397,12 +2397,12 @@
Critias, to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness,
otherwise Solon would never have written:
- Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.(Frag. 22,
+ Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.(Frag. 22,
P.L.G. 2, where the line runs, ei)pe/menai *kriti/a| canqo/trixi patro\s
- a)kou/ein). The Critias attacked by
+ a)kou/ein). The Critias attacked by
Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the first.
- Cleophon argued from the phrase “bid him listen to his
- father” that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a
+ Cleophon argued from the phrase “bid him listen to his
+ father” that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a
degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the family,
and probably meant to praise the father.
@@ -2412,16 +2412,16 @@
of oracles for the future; thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the
wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.Hdt. 7.141. Further,
proverbs, as stated,They have not been
- mentioned before. Spengel would therefore omit ei)/rhtai, and remove the commas: “proverbs are, as
- it were, evidence.” are evidence; for instance, if one man
+ mentioned before. Spengel would therefore omit ei)/rhtai, and remove the commas: “proverbs are, as
+ it were, evidence.” are evidence; for instance, if one man
advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the
proverb, Never do good to an old man.
And if he advises another
to kill the children, after having killed the fathers, he can say,
Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the children to
live.From the
- Cypria of Stasinus, of the “epic
- cycle.”
+ Cypria of Stasinus, of the “epic
+ cycle.”
By recent witnesses I mean all well-known
@@ -2429,19 +2429,19 @@
to those who are arguing about similar cases. Thus for instance, Eubulus,Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian
commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known of Archibius. Plato is
probably the comic poet. when attacking Chares in the law courts,
- made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, “that the open
- confession of wickedness had increased in the city.” And those who share the risk of the trial, if they
+ made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, “that the open
+ confession of wickedness had increased in the city.” And those who share the risk of the trial, if they
are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only serve to establish whether an
act has taken place or not, whether it is or is not the case; but if it is a
question of the quality of the act, for instance, whether it is just or unjust,
expedient or inexpedient, they are not
- competent witnesses; but witnesses from a distanceOr, “witnesses wholly unconnected with the
- case.” are very trustworthy even in regard to this. But
+ competent witnesses; but witnesses from a distanceOr, “witnesses wholly unconnected with the
+ case.” are very trustworthy even in regard to this. But
ancient witnesses are the most trustworthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted.
In regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man has no witnesses, he can
say that the decision should be given in accordance with probabilities, and that
- this is the meaning of the oath “according to the best of one's
- judgement”; that probabilities cannot
be bribed
+ this is the meaning of the oath “according to the best of one's
+ judgement”; that probabilities cannot
be bribed
to deceive, and that they cannot be convicted of bearing false witness. But if a
man has witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that probabilities
incur no responsibility, and that there would have been no need of evidence, if
@@ -2486,7 +2486,7 @@
countries, or to any general law, or to other previous or subsequent contracts.
For either the latter are valid and the former not, or the former are right and
the latter fraudulent; we may put it in whichever way it seems fit. We must also
- consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way
+ consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way
opposed to the interest of the judges. There are a number of other arguments of
the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.
Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears
@@ -2505,11 +2505,11 @@
stout-hearted heroically hold out under sufferings, while the cowardly and
cautious, before they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough; wherefore
evidence from torture may be considered utterly untrustworthy.
-
As to oathsIn Attic legal procedure, the challenge ( pro/klhsis) to take an oath on the question at issue
+ As to oathsIn Attic legal procedure, the challenge ( pro/klhsis) to take an oath on the question at issue
was one method of deciding it. One party offered the other something to
- swear by ( di/dwsi
- o(/rkon), this being the real meaning of o(/rkos, and the other party either accepted
- ( lamba/nei, de/xetai) it
+ swear by ( di/dwsi
+ o(/rkon), this being the real meaning of o(/rkos, and the other party either accepted
+ ( lamba/nei, de/xetai) it
or refused it. Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take the
oath. four divisions may be made; for either we tender an oath and
accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we
@@ -2520,11 +2520,11 @@
has taken the oath, he will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does not
take the oath, you think that the dicasts will condemn him; and also because the
risk incurred in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, for you have
- confidence in them, but not in your adversary.There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1)
+ confidence in them, but not in your adversary.There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1)
men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are likely to benefit by
- doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the oath, he will
+ doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the oath, he will
decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted, whereas, if he is not on
- his oath, he will probably be condemned; (3) there is less
+ his oath, he will probably be condemned; (3) there is less
risk in leaving the decision to the dicasts, who can be trusted.
If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you
may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money; that, if you had
@@ -2533,7 +2533,7 @@
your case, if not, you will probably lose it; consequently, your refusal to take
it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the
apophthegm of XenophanesBorn at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of
- philosophy. is apposite— that “it is unfair
for an impious man to challenge a pious one,”
+ philosophy. is apposite— that “it is unfair
for an impious man to challenge a pious one,”
for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit.
If you accept the oath, you may say that
you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the
@@ -2553,14 +2553,14 @@
already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is
not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing,
what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury
- consists in the intention, not in what is said.The defence in such cases is: (1) that the
+ consists in the intention, not in what is said.The defence in such cases is: (1) that the
previous oath was taken as a result of fraud or compulsion;
- (2) that you did not mean what you said. But if the
+ (2) that you did not mean what you said. But if the
opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what
be has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an
- oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]:
- “They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they
- themselves do not abide by theirs.” Further, we should employ all
+ oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]:
+ “They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they
+ themselves do not abide by theirs.” Further, we should employ all
means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.
@@ -2571,17 +2571,17 @@
blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the opinions and propositions that
are useful to produce conviction in these circumstances; for they are the
subject and source of enthymemes,
which are specially
- suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.This is Cope's interpretation. Jebb renders:
- “If we take each branch of Rhetoric by itself.” The
+ suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.This is Cope's interpretation. Jebb renders:
+ “If we take each branch of Rhetoric by itself.” The
classes are of course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.
But since the object of Rhetoric is
- judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and
- judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to
+ judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and
+ judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to
consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also
that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should
know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. For it makes a great difference with regard to
- producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this,
- in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be
+ producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this,
+ in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be
possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is
disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should
be disposed in a certain way towards him.The
@@ -2590,11 +2590,11 @@
and its end is a judgement; and since an appeal to the speaker's own
character and to the passions of those who are to give the judgement is
bound to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with rules for
- ethical and “pathetic” (emotional)
+ ethical and “pathetic” (emotional)
proofs. In Book 1.5 Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with
disapproval, but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those
- which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (e.g. stirring up
- envy, hatred, a desire for revenge).
+ which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (e.g. stirring up
+ envy, hatred, a desire for revenge).
In deliberative oratory, it is more useful that
the orator should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, that the
hearer should be disposed in a certain way; for opinions vary, according as men
@@ -2605,15 +2605,15 @@
if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come
is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good; but if
a man is unemotional or not hopefulOpposed to
- eu)e/lpidi. Others render “in
- a bad humor.” it is quite the reverse.
+
eu)e/lpidi. Others render “in
+ a bad humor.” it is quite the reverse.
For the orator to produce conviction three
qualities are necessary; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which
induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and
goodwill; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they
give, because they lack either all three or one of them. For either through want of sense they form incorrect
opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say
- what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,e)pieikh/s and spoudai=os both = a)gaqo/s. In a restricted sense e)pieikh/s is “respectable,” spoudai=os “serious.”
+ what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,e)pieikh/s and spoudai=os both = a)gaqo/s. In a restricted sense e)pieikh/s is “respectable,” spoudai=os “serious.”
they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best
advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are
necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily
@@ -2632,20 +2632,20 @@
even two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse
that emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, we have given a list
of propositionsIn Book 1 generally
- (cp. 1.2.22). in what we have previously said, we
+ (cp. 1.2.22). in what we have previously said, we
will do the same here and divide the emotions in the same manner.
Let us then
define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge
for a real or apparent slight,Gomperz
- translates fainome/nhs “real or
- apparent”; Jebb omits fainome/nhs
+ translates fainome/nhs “real or
+ apparent”; Jebb omits fainome/nhs
and translates fainome/nhn
- “apparent”; Cope confines both to the meaning
- “manifest.” affecting a man himself or one of his
+ “apparent”; Cope confines both to the meaning
+ “manifest.” affecting a man himself or one of his
friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If
this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular
- individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men
- generally),
and
+ individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men
+ generally),
and
because this individual has done, or was on the point of doing, something
against him or one of his friends; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a
certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to
@@ -2654,8 +2654,8 @@
possible for himself. Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that
Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men's
- hearts.Hom. Il. 18.109 (cp.
- 1.11.9).
+ hearts.Hom. Il. 18.109 (cp.
+ 1.11.9).
for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this reason
first,The thought of revenge in the
@@ -2666,8 +2666,8 @@
regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or
good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are
of no importance or triflingOr,
- “those in which this tendency does not exist, or is
- trifling.” we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight:
+ “those in which this tendency does not exist, or is
+ trifling.” we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight:
disdain, spitefulness, and insult. For he who
disdains, slights, since men disdain those things which they consider valueless
and slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man appears to show disdain;
@@ -2678,16 +2678,16 @@
has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be
afraid of him instead of slighting him; nor that he will be of any use to him
worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his
- friend.Or, “how to make him his
- friend,” fi/los being for fi/lon by attraction.
+ friend.
Or, “how to make him his
+ friend,” fi/los being for fi/lon by attraction.
Similarly, he who insults another also slights
- him; for insultIn Attic law u(/bris (insulting, degrading
- treatment) was a more serious offence than ai)ki/a (bodily ill-treatment). It was the
- subject of a State criminal prosecution ( grafh/), ai)ki/a of
- a private action ( di/kh)
+ him; for insultIn Attic law u(/bris (insulting, degrading
+ treatment) was a more serious offence than ai)ki/a (bodily ill-treatment). It was the
+ subject of a State criminal prosecution ( grafh/), ai)ki/a of
+ a private action ( di/kh)
for damages. The penalty was assessed in court, and might even be death. It
had to be proved that the defendant struck the first blow
- (2.24.9). One of the best known instances is the action
+ (2.24.9). One of the best known instances is the action
brought by Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on himself,
when choregus of his tribe and responsible for the equipment of
a chorus for musical competitions at public festivals. consists in
@@ -2706,9 +2706,9 @@
and
- [has treated me] like a dishonored vagrant,Hom. Il.
+ [has treated me] like a dishonored vagrant,Hom. Il.
9.648. metana/sths,
- lit. “one who changes his home,” used as a
+ lit. “one who changes his home,” used as a
term of reproach.
@@ -2744,17 +2744,17 @@
just the same; and if anyone goes against him or refuses to assist him, or
troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with
all such persons. Wherefore the sick, the
- necessitous, [those at war], the lovesick, the thirsty, in a
+ necessitous, [those at war], the lovesick, the thirsty, in a
word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and
easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present
condition; for instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his
illness,toi=s pro\s
- th\n no/son: lit. “the sick man [is angry
- with those who slight him] in regard to his illness,”
+ th\n no/son: lit. “the sick man [is angry
+ with those who slight him] in regard to his illness,”
that is, by making light of it. the necessitous in regard to his
poverty, the warrior in regard
to warlike affairs, the
- lover in regard to love affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passionOr, “his suffering at the
- moment.” present in his mind in each case paves the way for
+ lover in regard to love affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passionOr, “his suffering at the
+ moment.” present in his mind in each case paves the way for
his anger. Again, men are angry when the event
is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more
it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they
@@ -2798,10 +2798,10 @@
want something from them, as PlexippusPlexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is obscure. It may refer
to Meleager giving the skin of the Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his
uncle wanted. One of Antiphon's tragedies was named Meleager
- (T.G.F. p.792). in Antiphon's
+ (T.G.F. p.792). in Antiphon's
tragedy reproached Meleager; for failure to perceive this is a sign of slight;
- since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.Literally, “for the things which (= the
- persons whom) one respects, do not escape notice.”
+ since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.Literally, “for the things which (= the
+ persons whom) one respects, do not escape notice.”
And they are angry with those who rejoice, or
in a general way are cheerful when they are unfortunate; for this is an
indication of enmity or slight. And with those who do not care if they pain
@@ -2817,12 +2817,12 @@
They are also angry with those who slight
such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not to defend, for instance,
parents, children, wives, and dependents.Cope
- translates “rulers and governors”; but can a)/rxesqai be used in a middle sense? And
+ translates “rulers and governors”; but can a)/rxesqai be used in a middle sense? And
with those who are ungrateful,To avoid the
- apparent tautology ( 2.17), Roemer
- (Rhein.
- Mus. 39 p. 503) boldly conjectures xai/rein: “not to return another's
- greeting.” for the slight is contrary to all sense of
+ apparent tautology ( 2.17), Roemer
+ (
Rhein.
+ Mus. 39 p. 503) boldly conjectures
xai/rein: “not to return another's
+ greeting.” for the slight is contrary to all sense of
obligation.
And with those who employ irony,
when they themselves are in earnest;
for irony
shows contempt. And with those who do good to others, but not to them; for not
@@ -2860,7 +2860,7 @@
ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit
down.
e)capi/nhs d'
*o)dush=a i)/don ku/nes u(lako/mwpoi: oi( me\n keklh/gontes e)pe/dramon:
- au)ta\r *o)dusseu/s e(/zeto kerdosu/nh| (Hom. Od. 14.29-31).
+ au)ta\r *o)dusseu/s e(/zeto kerdosu/nh| (
Hom. Od. 14.29-31).
And men are mild towards those who are serious
with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated
seriously, not with contempt.
And towards those
@@ -2880,28 +2880,28 @@
regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.
It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which
excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in
- success, in abundance,plh/rwsis: lit. “filling up.” The
- reference may be to the “fulfillment” of one's desires,
- or to “repletion” in the matter of food (L. and
- S.), which seems less likely; “in fulness of
- content” (Jebb). and, in general, in
+ success, in abundance,plh/rwsis: lit. “filling up.” The
+ reference may be to the “fulfillment” of one's desires,
+ or to “repletion” in the matter of food (L. and
+ S.), which seems less likely; “in fulness of
+ content” (Jebb). and, in general, in
freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope.
Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for
time appeases anger. Again, vengeance
previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it
be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,Opponent of
Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in
- the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into
+ the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into
exile and was condemned to death during his absence. when someone
asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him,
- made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When
- then?” “When I see someone accused of the same
- offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon
+ made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When
+ then?” “When I see someone accused of the same
+ offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon
another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, while Callisthenes concluded a
premature peace with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia. For although the Athenians were more
indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had
condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day. Men also grow mild towards those whom they pityAnother reading is e)a\n
- e(/lwsi, “if they have convicted him.” This is
+ e(/lwsi, “if they have convicted him.” This is
adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plat. Rep.
558a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under
a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of
@@ -2925,13 +2925,13 @@
Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,Hom. Od.
9.504.
- as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,Or, “as if Odysseus would not have considered
- himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . .” had he
+ as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,Or, “as if Odysseus would not have considered
+ himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . .” had he
remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry
- either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,Or, “with any who can no longer feel their
- anger.” Cope translates: “with all the rest
- (besides those actually within reach) who are out of
- sight.” or with the dead, since they have paid the last
+ either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,Or, “with any who can no longer feel their
+ anger.” Cope translates: “with all the rest
+ (besides those actually within reach) who are out of
+ sight.” or with the dead, since they have paid the last
penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those
who are angry.To make the offender
feel pain as part of the punishment. So then, in regard
@@ -2949,10 +2949,10 @@
great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they
have done.
Let us now
- state who are the persons that men lovefilei=n may be translated “to
- love” or “to like”; fili/a by “love,”
- “liking,” or “friendship”; for
- fi/los “friend”
+ state who are the persons that men lovefilei=n may be translated “to
+ love” or “to like”; fili/a by “love,”
+ “liking,” or “friendship”; for
+ fi/los “friend”
alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of aimer in French, and lieben in
German. or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving.
Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for
@@ -2992,11 +2992,11 @@
bear arms. On the other hand, it claims so much of a man's time that he is
unable to devote proper attention to political duties, and should be
excluded from holding office. He further says that husbandmen, if possible,
- should be slaves (neither of the same race nor hot-tempered, for
- they will work better and are less likely to revolt); or, as the
+ should be slaves (neither of the same race nor hot-tempered, for
+ they will work better and are less likely to revolt); or, as the
next best alternative, barbarians or serfs. The favorable view taken by
- Aristotle here and in the Oeconomics (probably not
- his) does not agree with that put forward in the
+ Aristotle here and in the Oeconomics (probably not
+ his) does not agree with that put forward in the
Politics.
And the self-controlled, because they are not
likely to commit injustice; and those who are
@@ -3004,8 +3004,8 @@
if they also seem to wish it; such are those who excel in virtue and enjoy a
good reputation, either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst those who are
admired by us or by whom we are admired.Spengel reads h)\ e)n oi(=s qauma/zousin
- au)toi/ and brackets [ h)\ e)n
- toi=s qaumazome/nois u(f' au(tw=n]. a(/pasin,
+ au)toi/ and brackets [ h)\ e)n
+ toi=s qaumazome/nois u(f' au(tw=n]. a(/pasin,
belti/stois, and oi(=s will then
all be neuter.
Further, those who are agreeable to live or
@@ -3032,9 +3032,9 @@
with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way; for then it
becomes a case of
- Potter [being jealous] of potter.Two of a trade never agree
- (Hes. WD
- 25).
+ Potter [being jealous] of potter.Two of a trade never agree
+ (Hes. WD
+ 25).
And those who desire the same things, provided
@@ -3043,10 +3043,10 @@
terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned by
public opinion, provided that this is not due to
contempt; and those before whom we do blush
for faults that are really bad. And those whose rivals we are,Those with whom we are ambitious of entering
- into competition “in the race for distinction”
- (Cope). There is no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces
+ into competition “in the race for distinction”
+ (Cope). There is no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces
it. or by whom we wish to be emulated, but not
- envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them.
+ envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them.
And those whom we are ready to assist in
obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves.
And those who show equal fondness for
@@ -3056,9 +3056,9 @@
leave them in the lurch; for among good men they chiefly like those who are good
friends. And those who do not dissemble with
them; such are those who do not fear to mention even their faults.
- (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely
+ (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely
condemned by public opinion; if then he who blushes for such faults is not a
- friend, he who does not is likely to be one).A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is not
+ friend, he who does not is likely to be one).A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is not
thinking of merely conventional faults; if, then, one who is
ashamed of these is no friend, then one who is not . . .
And men like those who are not formidable, and in whom they have confidence; for
@@ -3129,8 +3129,8 @@
And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals,we should fear
not the hot-tempered or
outspoken, but those who are
mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals; for it is uncertain whether they are on
- the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.Or simply, “near . . . far from
- us.”
+ the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.Or simply, “near . . . far from
+ us.”
All things that are to be feared are more so
when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it,
either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in
@@ -3220,7 +3220,7 @@
illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is
due to licentiousness. And making profit out of
what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead;
- whence the proverb, “to rob even a corpse,” for this is due
+ whence the proverb, “to rob even a corpse,” for this is due
to base love of gain and stinginess. And to
refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give
less than we can; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than
@@ -3253,8 +3253,8 @@
things which tend to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting one's person
or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these
actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or
- involuntary (the latter being those that are done under
- compulsion),
since meek endurance and the
+ involuntary (the latter being those that are done under
+ compulsion),
since meek endurance and the
absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice.
These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed. And since shame is an impression about dishonor, and
that for its own sake and not for its results; and since no one heeds the
@@ -3271,8 +3271,8 @@
before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, The eyes are the
abode of shame.Euripides,
Cresphontes: ai)dw\s e)n o)fqalmoi=si
- gi/gnetai, te/knon (T.G.F. frag.
- 457). That is why they feel more ashamed before those who
+ gi/gnetai, te/knon (
T.G.F. frag.
+ 457). That is why they feel more ashamed before those who
are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them,
because in both cases they are under the
eyes of others.
Men are also ashamed before those who are not
@@ -3288,17 +3288,17 @@
And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbors' faults,
for instance, mockers and comic poets; for they are also in a manner slanderers
and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in
- vain,Jebb translates, “who have
- never seen us break down.” for they feel as if they were
+ vain,Jebb translates, “who have
+ never seen us break down.” for they feel as if they were
greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them
for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion.
- Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have
+ Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have
only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to
- the Syracusans),The Greek scholiast
- says: “Euripides, having been sent as ambassador to the
+ the Syracusans),The Greek scholiast
+ says: “Euripides, having been sent as ambassador to the
Syracusans, to ask for peace and friendship, when they refused said: O
Syracusans, if for no other reason than that we are just feeling the need of
- your friendship, you ought to respect our admiration.” Nothing is
+ your friendship, you ought to respect our admiration.” Nothing is
known of this embassy. Hyperides has been suggested instead of
Euripides. or old acquaintances who know nothing against us. And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful
things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not
@@ -3308,8 +3308,8 @@
have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them,
such as their servants or friends. In a word,
they are not ashamed either before those whose opinion in regard to the truth
- they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children
- or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them
+ they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children
+ or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them
and those who are not; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear
really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by
convention.
@@ -3319,18 +3319,18 @@
admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from
whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their
reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on
- (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the
+ (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the
territory of
Samos, begged the
Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and
- would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or
+ would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or
neighbors; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men
do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals,
for rivalry presumes
admiration.
Men also feel shame when they are
connected with actions or things which entail disgrace,
This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural verb.
- Others take the actions or things in a good sense, “deeds and
+ Others take the actions or things in a good sense, “deeds and
fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which they are likely
- to disgrace.” for which either they themselves, or their
+ to disgrace.” for which either they themselves, or their
ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible.
In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect;
i.e. when they have done anything
disgraceful. such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to
@@ -3340,19 +3340,19 @@
associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the
tragic poet Antiphon,
When on an embassy to
Syracuse, he was asked by
- Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying, “that
+ Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying, “that
from which the Athenians made their statues of Harmodius and
- Aristogiton,” Dionysius ordered him to be put to death.
+ Aristogiton,” Dionysius ordered him to be put to death.
when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that
those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the
- gates, said, “Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that
- one of the crowd should see you tomorrow?” Let this account of shame
+ gates, said, “Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that
+ one of the crowd should see you tomorrow?” Let this account of shame
suffice; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain
ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.
The persons
- towards whom men feel benevolent,xa/ris may mean (1)
- benevolence, the feeling which prompts a favor; (2) an
- actual favor conferred; (3) gratitude. and for what
+ towards whom men feel benevolent,xa/ris may mean (1)
+ benevolence, the feeling which prompts a favor; (2) an
+ actual favor conferred; (3) gratitude. and for what
reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what
favor is. Let it then be taken to be the
feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to
@@ -3369,17 +3369,17 @@
for instance, the man who gave the matProbably given to a beggar or vagrant who had nothing to sleep on.
to another in the Lyceum. It is necessary then,
if possible, that the service should be in the same directionThat is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent wants
- and desires (Cope).; if not, that it should apply
+ and desires (Cope).; if not, that it should apply
to cases of similar or greater need.
-
Since then it is evident on what occasions,Reading o(/te; others read oi(=s, “by whom.” for
+
Since then it is evident on what occasions,Reading o(/te; others read oi(=s, “by whom.” for
what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is
- clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one
+ clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one
side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has
rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to
make out that there is no favor at all, or that those who render it are not
actuated by benevolencea)xari/stous: the word generally means
- “ungrateful,” and so Jebb takes it here: “and
- to make men ungrateful.”;
for it can either be said that they do, or have done so,
+ “ungrateful,” and so Jebb takes it here: “and
+ to make men ungrateful.”;
for it can either be said that they do, or have done so,
for their own sake, in which case there is no favor; or that it was mere chance;
or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a
gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return,
@@ -3431,8 +3431,8 @@
and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries,
old age, disease, and lack of food. The evils
for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends
- (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and
- intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to
+ (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and
+ intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to
pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good;
and if this happens often; and if good
fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents
@@ -3446,10 +3446,10 @@
to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a
friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The
terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often
- serves to produce the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity.Jebb renders: “Again men pity when the danger is
- near themselves,” which may mean when they see something terrible
+ serves to produce the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity.Jebb renders: “Again men pity when the danger is
+ near themselves,” which may mean when they see something terrible
happening to others and likely soon to befall themselves. Vahlen inserts
- ou) ga\r before e)/ti: “for men cease to pity when the terrible
+ ou) ga\r before e)/ti: “for men cease to pity when the terrible
comes close to themselves. Men also pity those who resemble them in
age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man
more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in
@@ -3465,8 +3465,8 @@
same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs and
actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and
the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering,
- for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undaunted“When the men, who are in such
- crises, are good men” (Jebb). If they were not,
+ for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undaunted“When the men, who are in such
+ crises, are good men” (Jebb). If they were not,
their misfortune would appear deserved. at such critical times it is
specially pitiable; for all these things,The
signs and actions, and the demeanor of the sufferer. because they
@@ -3474,8 +3474,8 @@
because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the
suffering is before our eyes.
Now what is
- called indignationnemesa=n: “the nobler brother of envy”
- (Nietzsche). is the antithesis to pity; for the
+ called indignationnemesa=n: “the nobler brother of envy”
+ (Nietzsche). is the antithesis to pity; for the
being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained
at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions
show good character, for if we sympathize with
@@ -3511,23 +3511,23 @@
being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the
first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good
things; for no one will be indignant with a man
- who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not
- feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities),Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is
+ who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not
+ feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities),Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is
only felt for what is undeserved. but men are indignant at wealth,
power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy.
- [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty,
- and all such things.]The first part
+ [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty,
+ and all such things.]The first part
of the sentence is clear: men are indignant when what good men deserve is
possessed by those who are not good. The literal translation o the text as
- it stands is: “Men are indignant . . . at all the advantages of
+ it stands is: “Men are indignant . . . at all the advantages of
which good men and those who possess natural advantages are
- worthy”; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in
+ worthy”; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in
natural advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no
question of their being deserved or undeserved. Something may have fallen
- out like “but they will not be indignant with those who possess
- natural advantages.” Roemer (Rhein. Mus. 39 p.
- 504) suggests ou)d' ei) ta\ fu/sei e)/xousin
- a)gaqa/ (understanding nemesh/sei tou/tois).
+ out like “but they will not be indignant with those who possess
+ natural advantages.” Roemer (Rhein. Mus. 39 p.
+ 504) suggests ou)d' ei) ta\ fu/sei e)/xousin
+ a)gaqa/ (understanding nemesh/sei tou/tois).
And since that which is old seems closely to
resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same
good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes
@@ -3547,11 +3547,11 @@
regarded as his by right.
And since every kind of good is not suitable
to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary
- (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to
+ (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to
the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the
- nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him,
+ nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him,
we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior,
- especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying
+ especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying
of the poet,
He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,Hom. Il. 11.542.
@@ -3569,12 +3569,12 @@
prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest
advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be
deemed worthy of the same advantages; secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy,It has been suggested to insert mh\ before tugxa/nwsi:
- “if, although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess
- such advantages.” for they both judge correctly and hate
+ “if, although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess
+ such advantages.” for they both judge correctly and hate
what is unjust. And those who are ambitious
and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others,
although unworthy, have obtained.Or,
- “of which others happen to be unworthy.”
+ “of which others happen to be unworthy.”
And, in general, those who think themselves
worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be
indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the
@@ -3582,15 +3582,15 @@
is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill
fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel
no pain; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the
- speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that
those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do
- so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve that it should be refused
+ speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that
those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do
+ so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve that it should be refused
them, then pity will be impossible.
It is equally
clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious,
if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods
mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man
getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be
- envious who have, or seem to have, others “like” them.
+ envious who have, or seem to have, others “like” them.
I mean like in birth, relationship, age,
moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess
all but one of these advantagesIf some one
@@ -3626,13 +3626,13 @@
and the people and things which one envies are on the same footing.That is, no one will attempt to compete with
them in their special branch of study. Roemer reads kai\ pro\s tou\s peri\ ta\ toiau=ta, translated by Jebb as if
there were a full stop at u(pere/xein.
- “In like manner we vie with those engaged in such or such
- pursuits.”
+ “In like manner we vie with those engaged in such or such
+ pursuits.”
And since men strive for honor with those who
are competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those who aim at the same
things, they are bound to feel most envious of these; whence the saying,
- Potter [being jealous] of potter.2.4.21.
+ Potter [being jealous] of potter.2.4.21.
And those who have succeeded with difficulty or
@@ -3645,15 +3645,15 @@
have only spent little to obtain the same thing. And it is clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, and
in what frame of mind; for, as when they do not possess certain things, they are
pained, so when they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite
- circumstances.“The same state
+ circumstances.“The same state
of mind which is absent in the painful feeling will be present in the joy
- excited by the opposite occasions,” meaning that, if one set of
+ excited by the opposite occasions,” meaning that, if one set of
circumstances produces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure
- (Cope). Or, omitting ou)k
- before e)/xontes, “For in the same
- frame of mind as they are pained (at another's good
- fortune) they will rejoice in the contrary state of
- things” (at another's bad fortune). So
+ (Cope). Or, omitting ou)k
+ before e)/xontes, “For in the same
+ frame of mind as they are pained (at another's good
+ fortune) they will rejoice in the contrary state of
+ things” (at another's bad fortune). So
that if the judges are brought into that frame of mind, and those who claim
their pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, it is plain that they
will not obtain pity from those with whom the decision rests.
@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@
be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a
feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are
possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble
- us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the
+ us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the
fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and
characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base
men; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while
@@ -3670,7 +3670,7 @@
them.
Necessarily, then, those
are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not
possess;
Something like
- “although they are within their grasp” is needed to
+ “although they are within their grasp” is needed to
complete the sense. for no one claims what seems impossible.
Hence the young and high-minded are
emulous. And so are those who possess such advantages as are worthy of honorable
@@ -3693,22 +3693,22 @@
already been spoken of, for instance, courage, wisdom, authority; for those in
authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have similar powers, can do
good to many.
And those whom many desire to be
- like, or to be their acquaintances
or friends;
“Who have many acquaintances or
- friends” (Jebb). those whom many or
+ like, or to be their acquaintances
or friends;
“Who have many acquaintances or
+ friends” (Jebb). those whom many or
ourselves admire;
those who are praised or
eulogized either by poets or by prose writers.
logogra/foi means either the oldest
- Greek historians (or rather
- “chroniclers”), or the writers of speeches for
+ Greek historians (or rather
+ “chroniclers”), or the writers of speeches for
use in the law courts, or of panegyrics. The opposite characters we
despise; for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the idea of emulation of
the idea of contempt. And those who are in a condition which makes them emulate,
or be emulated by, others, must be inclined to despise those persons
kai\ e)pi\
tou/tois. According to Cope, an unnecessary parenthetical note
- (“and on such occasions”). Jebb refers
- both tou/twn and tou/tois to persons: “tend to show contempt to or
- about those who.” The “reason” in the
- translation above is that they suffer from the want of “the highly
- valued goods.” (and for that reason) who
+ (“and on such occasions”). Jebb refers
+ both
tou/twn and
tou/tois to persons: “tend to show contempt to or
+ about those who.” The “reason” in the
+ translation above is that they suffer from the want of “the highly
+ valued goods.” (and for that reason) who
suffer from defects contrary to the good things which excite emulation. That is
why we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever their good fortune is not
accompanied by highly valued goods. The means of producing and destroying the
@@ -3740,8 +3740,8 @@
Greece. said in his
pithy remark on Amphiaraus.
They are not
ill-natured but simple-natured,
Or,
- “they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a
- good,” i.e., they are not always ready to suspect. because
+ “they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a
+ good,” i.e., they are not always ready to suspect. because
they have never yet witnessed much depravity; confiding, because they have as
yet not been often deceived;
full of hope, for
they are naturally as hot-blooded as those who are drunken with wine, and
@@ -3763,10 +3763,10 @@
there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling
which belongs to one who is full of hope.
In their actions, they prefer the noble to the
- useful; their life is guided by their characterh)=qos “in the
+ useful; their life is guided by their characterh)=qos “in the
widest sense, includes all that is habitual and characteristic; in a limited
- sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition”
- (Twining). rather than by calculation, for the
+ sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition”
+ (Twining). rather than by calculation, for the
latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble. At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions
because they take pleasure
in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their
@@ -3777,8 +3777,8 @@
think they know everything, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause of
their excess in everything. If they do wrong,
it is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity,
- because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselvesOr, “better than they really
- are.”; for they measure their neighbors by their own
+ because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselvesOr, “better than they really
+ are.”; for they measure their neighbors by their own
inoffensiveness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly. And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty;
for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the character of the young.
Older men and
@@ -3787,9 +3787,9 @@
more often deceived by others or made more mistakes themselves, and since most
human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything
they show an excessive lack of energy. They
- always “think,” but “know” nothing; and
- in their hesitation they always add “perhaps,” or
- “maybe”; all their
statements are of
+ always “think,” but “know” nothing; and
+ in their hesitation they always add “perhaps,” or
+ “maybe”; all their
statements are of
this kind, never unqualified. They are
malicious; for malice consists in looking upon the worse side of everything.
Further, they are always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful owing to
@@ -3835,8 +3835,8 @@
why the old are querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter; for a
querulous disposition is the opposite of a love of laughter. Such are the characters of the young and older men.
Wherefore, since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with
- their own character and to speakers who resemble them,Or, “speeches which resemble (or
- reflect) it” (their character).
+ their own character and to speakers who resemble them,Or, “speeches which resemble (or
+ reflect) it” (their character).
it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our
speeches may appear to be of such and such a character.
It is evident
@@ -3887,11 +3887,11 @@
men's emulation. At the same time this feeling is not unreasonable; for those
who have need of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the answer of Simonides
to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and the rich, when she asked which was
- preferable, to be wise or to be rich. “Rich,” he answered,
- “for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the
- rich.” And the rich think they are
- worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so.“What makes power worth
- having” (Cope). In a word, the character
+ preferable, to be wise or to be rich. “Rich,” he answered,
+ “for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the
+ rich.” And the rich think they are
+ worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so.“What makes power worth
+ having” (Cope). In a word, the character
of the rich man is that of a fool favored by fortune. At the same time there is a difference between the character of the
newly rich and of those whose wealth is of long standing, because the former
have the vices of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so to say, they have
@@ -3906,19 +3906,19 @@
performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying
out. And they are more energetic; for being
obliged to look after their power, they are always on the watch.e)n
- e)pimelei/a|: “because they are
- administrators” (Jebb).
+ e)pimelei/a|: “because they are
+ administrators” (Jebb).
And they are dignified rather than heavily
pompous; for their rank renders them more conspicuous, so that they avoid
excess; and this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrongdoings
are never petty, but great.
Good fortune in its divisionsThe three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power. The
meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend or converge to these
- (i.e., to noble birth, wealth, and power). kata\ ta\ mo/ria might also mean “in
- part.” Hobbes, in his Brief of the Art of
- Rhetorick, paraphrases: “the manners of men that prosper,
+ (i.e., to noble birth, wealth, and power). kata\ ta\ mo/ria might also mean “in
+ part.” Hobbes, in his Brief of the Art of
+ Rhetorick, paraphrases: “the manners of men that prosper,
are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are
- in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains.”
+ in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains.”
exhibits characters corresponding to those which have just been mentioned; for
those which appear to be the most important kinds of good fortune tend in their
direction; further, good fortune furnishes advantages over others in the
@@ -3935,20 +3935,20 @@
three kinds of Rhetoric. The difficulty in the Greek lies in
the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence beginning e)pei\ de\ h( tw=n piqanw=n. Grammatically, it
might be w(/ste diwrisme/non a)\n ei)/h, but
- it by no means follows that “since the employment of persuasive
+ it by no means follows that “since the employment of persuasive
speeches is directed towards a judgement . . . therefore it has
- been determined how . . . we must make our speeches ethical.”
+ been determined how . . . we must make our speeches ethical.”
Spengel, regarding e)pei\ de\ . . .
bouleu/ontai merely as an enlargement of Book 2.1, 2, brackets the
- passage. Cope suggests that something has fallen out after bouleu/ontai: “Since in all the three
- kinds of Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, [I have
+ passage. Cope suggests that something has fallen out after bouleu/ontai: “Since in all the three
+ kinds of Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, [I have
shown how to put the judges into a certain frame of mind in the discussion
- of the characters and emotions]. I have also spoken of the
+ of the characters and emotions]. I have also spoken of the
characters of the forms of government; so that this part of the subject need
- no longer detain us.” It is generally agreed that we have not the
+ no longer detain us.” It is generally agreed that we have not the
chapter as originally arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of
- it is non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb's
- translation). the employment of persuasive speeches is
+ it is non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb's
+ translation). the employment of persuasive speeches is
directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no
longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses
himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or
@@ -3963,9 +3963,9 @@
controversiesBoth forensic and
deliberative. is a judge in the proper sense of the word, for in
judicial cases the point at issue is the state of the case, in deliberative the
- subjects of deliberation.Or, “for
+ subjects of deliberation.Or, “for
in both forensic and deliberative arguments the issue is the state of the
- case.” We have already spoken of the characters of forms of
+ case.” We have already spoken of the characters of forms of
government in treating
of deliberative rhetoric,Book 1.8. so that it has been determined
how and by what means we must make our speeches conform to those characters.
Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was
@@ -4000,7 +4000,7 @@
as contraries, although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man is
ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases certain qualities may
make him more liable to one or the other, e.g. he may suffer from an
- incurable disease (Schrader). Similarly, if of two
+ incurable disease (Schrader). Similarly, if of two
like things the one is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier.
And if it is possible for a thing to be
made excellent or beautiful, it is possible for
@@ -4043,8 +4043,8 @@
And if a thing is possible for those who are
inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so for those
whose qualities are the opposite; as Isocrates said, it would be very strange if
- he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with
- the help of others]. As for the
+ he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with
+ the help of others]. As for the
impossible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments to be derived from
the opposite of what has been said about the possible.
The question whether a thing has or has not
@@ -4096,15 +4096,15 @@
It remains to
speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular
proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and
- enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme). Let us then first speak of the example; for the
+ enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme). Let us then first speak of the example; for the
example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning.As a starting-point and first principle of knowledge.
There are two kinds of examples; namely, one which consists in relating things
that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are
subdivided into comparisons or fables, such as
those of Aesop and the Libyan.The Libyan
fables were of African origin. They are mentioned by Quintilian
- (Quint. Inst. Orat.
- 5.11.20) and belonged to the class of animal
+ (Quint. Inst. Orat.
+ 5.11.20) and belonged to the class of animal
fables. It would be an instance of the historical kind of example, if one
were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and
not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for
@@ -4127,35 +4127,35 @@
Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue.
For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were
on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to
- them: “A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come
+ them: “A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come
and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the
stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man
consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to
mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted
him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time
- became the man's slave. So then,” said he, “do you take care
+ became the man's slave. So then,” said he, “do you take care
lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy,
you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen
a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at
- once be the slaves of Phalaris.” Aesop, when defending at Samos a
+ once be the slaves of Phalaris.” Aesop, when defending at Samos a
demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote.
- “A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable
+ “A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable
to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas
clung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with
compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when
- the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of
+ the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of
me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are
- hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O
+ hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O
Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you
put him to death,
others will
- come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds.”
+ come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds.”
Fables are suitable for public speaking,
and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things
that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they
must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy;
- and this is easy if one studies philosophy.“Literary knowledge” (Jebb);
- “literature” (Cope, Introd. p. 256, who,
- however, in his annotated ed. explains: “intellectual study and
- mental exercises in general”).
+ and this is easy if one studies philosophy.“Literary knowledge” (Jebb);
+ “literature” (Cope, Introd. p. 256, who,
+ however, in his annotated ed. explains: “intellectual study and
+ mental exercises in general”).
Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are
easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative
oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.
@@ -4165,8 +4165,8 @@
enthymemes.
If we have no enthymemes, we
must use examples instead of them; for they are useful for persuasion,
although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we have enthymemes, we
- must use examples in corroboration of them (see 21.3
- note). For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and
+ must use examples in corroboration of them (see 21.3
+ note). For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and
induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases; if
they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to
induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if
@@ -4193,16 +4193,16 @@
makes an enthymeme; for instance,
for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against
- them,“The idle
- habits which they contract”
- (Cope). they earn jealous hostility from
+ them,“The idle
+ habits which they contract”
+ (Cope). they earn jealous hostility from
the citizens.
Another example:
There is no man who is happy in everything;Euripides, Stheneboea
- (frag. 661, T.G.F.).
+ (frag. 661, T.G.F.).
or,
@@ -4218,9 +4218,9 @@
Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it
follows that maxims are of four kinds; for they are either accompanied by an
epilogue or not.Maxims with an epilogue are
- (1) imperfect enthymemes, or (2)
+ (1) imperfect enthymemes, or (2)
enthymematic in character, but not in form; those without an epilogue are
- (1) such as are well known, or (2) such
+ (1) such as are well known, or (2) such
as are clear as soon as they are uttered.
Now all those that state anything that is
contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative
@@ -4252,11 +4252,11 @@
esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent:
for instance,
- Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;Author unknown (T.G.F. p.
- 854).
+ Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;Author unknown (T.G.F. p.
+ 854).
to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim,
- but the addition “being a mortal” states the reason. It is
+ but the addition “being a mortal” states the reason. It is
the same with
A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.According to Bentley, from
@@ -4268,8 +4268,8 @@
them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to
the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be
put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to
- say, “As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy
- nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated”; or put
+ say, “As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy
+ nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated”; or put
the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made,
although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely
as possible. In such cases Laconic apophthegms
@@ -4307,31 +4307,31 @@
Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for
- example,
“An Attic
- neighbor.”Cf. Thuc. 1.70, where the Corinthians complain of the
+ example,
“An Attic
+ neighbor.”Cf. Thuc. 1.70, where the Corinthians complain of the
lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared with their own restless
and troublesome neighbors, the Athenians.
Maxims should also be used even when contrary
- to the most popular sayings, such as “Know thyself” and
- “Nothing in excess,” either when one's character is thereby
+ to the most popular sayings, such as “Know thyself” and
+ “Nothing in excess,” either when one's character is thereby
likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It
- would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, “It
+ would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, “It
is not true that a man should know himself; at any rate, such a man as this, if
- he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command.” And
+ he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command.” And
one's character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as
men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were
bound to love. The moral purpose also should
be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason; for example,
- either by saying “that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if
+ either by saying “that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if
one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply
- treachery”; or thus, “The maxim does not please me, for the
+ treachery”; or thus, “The maxim does not please me, for the
true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve
- the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the
- wicked too much.”
+ the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the
+ wicked too much.”
Further, maxims are of great assistance to
- speakers, first, because of the vulgarity“Want of cultivation and intelligence”
- (Cope). “Amour-propre”
- (St. Hilaire). of the hearers, who are pleased if
+ speakers, first, because of the vulgarity“Want of cultivation and intelligence”
+ (Cope). “Amour-propre”
+ (St. Hilaire). of the hearers, who are pleased if
an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially
hold.In reference to their own particular
case. What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one
@@ -4358,14 +4358,14 @@
drawn from too far backThe conclusion must
not be reached by means of a long series of arguments, as it were strung
together in a chain: cp. 1.2.12, where the hearers are spoken of as unable
- to take in at a glance a long series of arguments or “to follow a
- long chain of reasoning” ( ou)de\
- logi/zesqai po/rrwqen). nor should it include
+ to take in at a glance a long series of arguments or “to follow a
+ long chain of reasoning” ( ou)de\
+ logi/zesqai po/rrwqen). nor should it include
all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in
the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is
obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in
- the presence of crowds; as the poets say, “the ignorant are more
- skilled at speaking before a mob.”Eur. Hipp. 989. For the educated
+ the presence of crowds; as the poets say, “the ignorant are more
+ skilled at speaking before a mob.”Eur. Hipp. 989. For the educated
use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know
and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from
all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for
@@ -4403,14 +4403,14 @@
or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in
justice or the good.
Therefore, since it is evident that all men
- follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly
or loosely—since
+ follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly
or loosely—since
they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from
what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it
- is impossible to prove anything in any other wayOr, “by means of the speech it is
- impossible to prove anything otherwise”
- (Cope).—it is evidently necessary, as has
- been stated in the
Topics,Aristot. Top. 1.14. prw=ton: i.e. “the speaker's chief care
- should be . . .” to have first on each subject a selection
+ is impossible to prove anything in any other wayOr, “by means of the speech it is
+ impossible to prove anything otherwise”
+ (Cope).—it is evidently necessary, as has
+ been stated in the Topics,Aristot. Top. 1.14. prw=ton: i.e. “the speaker's chief care
+ should be . . .” to have first on each subject a selection
of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable. As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the
same method of inquiry must be adopted; we must look, not at what is indefinite
but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as
@@ -4430,8 +4430,8 @@
such things.
One method of selection then, and this the
first, is the topical.
Let us now speak of the elements
- of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same
- thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one
+ of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same
+ thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one
demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative,
the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from
admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the
@@ -4446,9 +4446,9 @@
of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits.
Let us now endeavor to find topics about enthymemes in general in
another way, noting in passingOr,
- “noting in addition” (Victorius); or,
- “pointing out, side by side”
- (Jebb). those which are refutative and those which are
+ “noting in addition” (Victorius); or,
+ “pointing out, side by side”
+ (Jebb). those which are refutative and those which are
demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really
enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we
will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be
@@ -4458,7 +4458,7 @@
consider whether one opposite is predicable of the other, as a means of
destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it
is;Assuming that self-control is good,
- then if the opposite of good (that is, bad) can be
+ then if the opposite of good (that is, bad) can be
predicated of lack of self-control, this proves the truth of the first
proposition; otherwise, it may be refuted. for instance, self-control
is good, for lack of self-control is harmful; or as in the
@@ -4477,8 +4477,8 @@
If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you
must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is
true.Euripides,
- Thyestes (Frag. 396,
- T.G.F.).
+
Thyestes (Frag. 396,
+ T.G.F.).
@@ -4491,8 +4491,8 @@
For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have
suffered similarly may be predicated of the other; there is the same relation
between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said
- about the taxes, “If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is
- buying disgraceful for us.”
The
+ about the taxes, “If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is
+ buying disgraceful for us.”The
argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling the right of farming
the taxes, there could be none in purchasing this right. And if
rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be
@@ -4502,18 +4502,18 @@
must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer,
and whether he who inflicts
suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either
way; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents
- [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of
+ [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of
TheodectesPupil of Plato and Isocrates,
great friend of Aristotle, the author of fifty tragedies and also of an
- “Art” of Rhetoric. Alcmaeon murdered his mother
+ “Art” of Rhetoric. Alcmaeon murdered his mother
Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated? To
this he replied, Yes, but there is a distinction; they said she deserved to
die, but not at my hands.:
And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother?
-
Alcmaeon replied: “We must make a division before we examine
- the matter.” And when Alphesiboea asked “How?”, he
+ Alcmaeon replied: “We must make a division before we examine
+ the matter.” And when Alphesiboea asked “How?”, he
rejoined,
Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to
@@ -4540,11 +4540,11 @@
this argument has an explanatory addition to this effect, inserting after
u(pa/rxei the words tou\s ga\r pate/ras h(=tton tu/ptousin h)\ tou\s
plhsi/on. In a similar passage in Aristot. Top. 2.10
- ei)ko/s (or dokou=n) is inserted after ma=llon and h(=tton. Welldon
+ ei)ko/s (or dokou=n) is inserted after ma=llon and h(=tton. Welldon
suggests that here also the reading should be to\
h(=tton ei)ko/s and to\ ma=llon
- ei)ko/s (Grote, Aristotle, p.
- 294).
Either of these arguments may be used, according as it
+ ei)ko/s (Grote,
Aristotle, p.
+ 294). Either of these arguments may be used, according as it
is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not.
Further, if
there is
no question of greater or less; whence it was said,
@@ -4553,7 +4553,7 @@
Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious
offspring?From the
Meleager of Antiphon
- (T.G.F. p. 885).
+ (T.G.F. p. 885).
Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong,
In carrying off Helen. neither did Alexander
Paris; if the
@@ -4561,40 +4561,40 @@
wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles; if no
other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers; if
generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated,
The Paris ms. has qanatou=ntai,
- “are put to death.” neither are the sophists; or,
+ “are put to death.” neither are the sophists; or,
if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty
to take care of that of
Greece.
Another topic is derived from the consideration
- of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: “If,
+ of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: “If,
before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the event
of my success, you would have granted it; will you then refuse it, now that I
have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and
- break it when you have received it.”Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to put up a statue to the
+ break it when you have received it.”Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to put up a statue to the
famous Athenian general Iphicrates in honor of his defeat of the Spartans
- (393 B.C.). This was later
+ (393 B.C.). This was later
opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the tyrannicide. The speech,
which is considered spurious, was called h( peri\ th=s
ei)ko/nos. Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow
Philip to pass through their territory into Attica,
they were
- told that “if he had made this request before helping them against the
+ told that “if he had made this request before helping them against the
Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they
refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and
- had trusted them.”
+ had trusted them.”
Another topic consists in turning upon the
opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent
- method.Or, “the ways of doing
- this are various” (Jebb). For instance,
+ method.Or, “the ways of doing
+ this are various” (Jebb). For instance,
in the
TeucerThe illustration
is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as well known. The
Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles. . . . and
Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would
have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no,
- “Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you, Aristophon,
- would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?” But
+ “Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you, Aristophon,
+ would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?” But
the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime;
otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an
argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as Aristides
It would be absurd to use such an argument
- against the accusation of a “just man” like Aristides,
+ against the accusation of a “just man” like Aristides,
and to pretend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It must
only be used when the opponent's character is suspect, and lends itself to
such a retort.; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For
@@ -4605,8 +4605,8 @@
Another topic is derived from definition. For
instance, that the daimonionThe
reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that a
- daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as
- his internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When
+ daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as
+ his internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When
accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, by his
definition of the daimonion, that he was no atheist. Similarly,
Iphicrates, by his definition of gennai=os
@@ -4621,27 +4621,27 @@
thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is
the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and
Aristogiton, before they did something
noble; and,
- “I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are
- more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the
+ “I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are
+ more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the
AlexanderOf Polycrates. that it
would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied
with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates
refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a
- position to return a favor as well as an injury.“Just as it is to requite them with evil”
- (Jebb). In all these cases, it is by definition and
+ position to return a favor as well as an injury.“Just as it is to requite them with evil”
+ (Jebb). In all these cases, it is by definition and
the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the
subject in question.
Another topic is derived from the different
significations of a word, as explained in the
Topics, where the
- correct use of these terms has been discussed.
Supplying [lele/ktai] peri\ tou=
- o)rqw=s [xrh=sqai au)toi=s]. Others render
- “in reference to the use of the word o)rqw=s” (but o)rqw=s does not occur in the passage in Aristot. Top. 1.15). A suggested
+ correct use of these terms has been discussed.Supplying [lele/ktai] peri\ tou=
+ o)rqw=s [xrh=sqai au)toi=s]. Others render
+ “in reference to the use of the word o)rqw=s” (but o)rqw=s does not occur in the passage in Aristot. Top. 1.15). A suggested
reading is peri\ tou/tou o)rqw=s
ei)/rhtai.
Another, from division. For example,
- “There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from
+ “There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from
consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert
- it.”
+ it.”
Another, from induction. For instance, from the
case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women
always discern the truth;
similarly, at Athens, when Mantias
@@ -4650,20 +4650,20 @@
acknowledge the latter as his sons, until the mother declared they
were.
and again, at
Thebes,
when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis
The name of the mother; or simply,
- “the woman of Dodona,” like “the woman of
- Peparethus.” declared that Ismenias was its father,
+ “the woman of
Dodona,” like “the woman of
+ Peparethus.” declared that Ismenias was its father,
Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is
- another instance in the “law” of Theodectes: “If
+ another instance in the “law” of Theodectes: “If
we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of
others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this
is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed
- to preserve the safety of others.” Similarly, in order to prove that
- men of talent are everywhere honored, Alcidamas said: “The Parians
+ to preserve the safety of others.” Similarly, in order to prove that
+ men of talent are everywhere honored, Alcidamas said: “The Parians
honored Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians Homer, although
he had rendered no public services;
Others
- read poli/thn, “although he was
- not their fellow-citizen” (but Chios was one of the claimants to his
- birthplace). the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a
+ read
poli/thn, “although he was
+ not their fellow-citizen” (but
Chios was one of the claimants to his
+ birthplace). the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a
woman; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon
one of their senators; the Italiotes honored Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes
buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honor. .
@@ -4672,8 +4672,8 @@
philosophers. The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under
the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at
Thebes, as soon as those who had
- the conduct of affairs became philosophers,
Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, “as soon as
- philosophers had the conduct of affairs.”
the city flourished.”
+ the conduct of affairs became philosophers,
Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, “as soon as
+ philosophers had the conduct of affairs.”
the city flourished.”
Another topic is that from a previous judgement
in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the
judgement was unanimous or the same at all times; if not, when it was at least
@@ -4683,29 +4683,29 @@
of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a
father, or instructors; as AutoclesAthenian
ambassador to Sparta
- (371 B.C.), whose aggressive
+ (371 B.C.), whose aggressive
policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the Eumenides could agree
without any loss of dignity to stand their trial before the Areopagus, as
described in Aeschylus, surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is
known of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit his case to
it, when charged with some offense. said in his attack on
- Mixidemides, “If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial
- before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides?” Or Sappho,
- “Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would
- die.” Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed
- himself too presumptuously, said, “Our friend at any rate never spoke
- like that,” referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read
- here) in Xen. Hell. 4.7.2. The
+ Mixidemides, “If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial
+ before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides?” Or Sappho,
+ “Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would
+ die.” Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed
+ himself too presumptuously, said, “Our friend at any rate never spoke
+ like that,” referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read
+ here) in Xen. Hell. 4.7.2. The
Argives, when a Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory,
were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when there should
be a holy truce. This obviously left the door open to fraud, so Agesipolis
- (one of the Spartan kings) consulted the oracle of Zeus at
+ (one of the Spartan kings) consulted the oracle of Zeus at
Olympia to ask whether he
was to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that he might
decline a truce fraudulently demanded. To confirm this, Agesipolis put the
- same question to Apollo: “Is your opinion as to the truce the same
- as that of your father (Zeus)?”
- “Certainly,” answered Apollo. Agesipolis thereupon
+ same question to Apollo: “Is your opinion as to the truce the same
+ as that of your father (Zeus)?”
+ “Certainly,” answered Apollo. Agesipolis thereupon
invaded Argos. The point is that
really Apollo had little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for
the son to contradict the father. after having first consulted the
@@ -4715,9 +4715,9 @@
woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged; the same applies to Alexander
Paris, whom the
goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates says, for at
- any rate Conon.After his defeat at Aegospotami (405
- B.C.) the Athenian general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with Evagoras, king of
- Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle, of the goodness of the
+ any rate Conon.After his defeat at Aegospotami (405
+ B.C.) the Athenian general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with Evagoras, king of
+ Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle, of the goodness of the
latter. in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his
assistance.
Another topic is that from enumerating the
@@ -4726,19 +4726,19 @@
affirmed of any subject, then one or other of the species, which make up the
genus, must also be predicable of it. If the proposition to be maintained
is, the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any of the
- different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, change of
- place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of the soul. If
+ different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, change of
+ place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of the soul. If
not, the generic predicate is not applicable, and the proposition is
refuted. There is an instance of this in the
Socrates
- of Theodectes: “What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods
- recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?”
+ of Theodectes: “What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods
+ recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?”
Again, since in most human affairs the same
thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in
employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or
blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by
the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid
being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be
- wise. This topic is identical with the “Art” of Callippus,
+ wise. This topic is identical with the “Art” of Callippus,
when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have
been mentioned.
Another topic may be employed when it is
@@ -4746,12 +4746,12 @@
opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of
both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind
whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused
- to allow her son to speak in public; “For if,” said she,
- “you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust,
- the gods will.” On the other hand, “you should
+ to allow her son to speak in public; “For if,” said she,
+ “you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust,
+ the gods will.” On the other hand, “you should
speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say
- what is unjust, men will.” This is the same as the proverb,
- “To buy the swamp with the salt”The bad with the good. The exact meaning of blai/swsis has not been satisfactorily explained.
+ what is unjust, men will.” This is the same as the proverb,
+ “To buy the swamp with the salt”The bad with the good. The exact meaning of blai/swsis has not been satisfactorily explained.
In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two opposite
things would be speaking truth or untruth; the two opposite consequences,
pleasing men and pleasing God.; and retorting a dilemma on its
@@ -4764,53 +4764,53 @@
statements.e.g. a man may
say that an honorable death should be preferred to a pleasant
life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired wealth, whereas really he
- wishes the opposite. “If then his words are in
+ wishes the opposite. “If then his words are in
accordance with his real wishes, he must be confronted with his public
statements; if they are in accordance with the latter, he must be confronted
with his secret wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and
- contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions.”
- (Aristot. Sophist.
- Elenchi 2.12, Poste's translation). This topic is
+ contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions.”
+ (Aristot. Sophist.
+ Elenchi 2.12, Poste's translation). This topic is
the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.
Another topic is derived from analogy in
things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform
public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said:
- “If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are
- boys.”
Similarly,
- Theodectes in his “law,”This “law” (already mentioned in
- 23.11) is said to have been an oration on the legal position of
- mercenaries. says: “Since you bestow the rights of
+ “If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are
+ boys.”
Similarly,
+ Theodectes in his “law,”This “law” (already mentioned in
+ 23.11) is said to have been an oration on the legal position of
+ mercenaries. says: “Since you bestow the rights of
citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their
merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable
- misfortunes?”
+ misfortunes?”
Another topic consists in concluding the
identity of antecedents from the identity of results.Cause and effect. Thus Xenophanes said:
- “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in
+ “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in
saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other
- they did not exist.” And, generally speaking, one may always regard as
- identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: “You
+ they did not exist.” And, generally speaking, one may always regard as
+ identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: “You
are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally,
- whether it is right to study philosophy.”Isoc. 15.173. And,
- “to give earth and water is slavery,” and “to be
+ whether it is right to study philosophy.”Isoc. 15.173. And,
+ “to give earth and water is slavery,” and “to be
included in the common peaceThe peace
- concluded between the Greeks (although the Lacedaemonians held
- aloof) and Alexander the Great after the death of Philip of
- Macedon (336 B.C.). implies obeying
- orders.” Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.
+ concluded between the Greeks (although the Lacedaemonians held
+ aloof) and Alexander the Great after the death of Philip of
+
Macedon (
336 B.C.). implies obeying
+ orders.” Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.
Another topic is derived from the fact that the
same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary.
- The following enthymeme is an example: “If, when in exile, we fought
- to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that
- we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting”!Lys. 34.11.
+ The following enthymeme is an example: “If, when in exile, we fought
+ to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that
+ we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting”!Lys. 34.11.
This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at
the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of not
remaining.i.e., after their return, they
preferred to leave the city rather than fight. This is Cope's explanation,
but the meaning of the clause o(te\ me\n . . .
h(|rou=nto is then somewhat obscure. A more suitable
- interpretation would be: “At one time they preferred to return
+ interpretation would be: “At one time they preferred to return
from exile at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price
- of being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire),”
+ of being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire),”
but one does not see how this can be got out of the Greek.
Another topic consists in maintaining that the
@@ -4829,7 +4829,7 @@
Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to
Greece of the valor of
Meleager.Frag. 2
- (T.G.F. p. 792).
+ (
T.G.F. p. 792).
And the following remark from the
Ajax of Theodectes,
that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others,
Hom. Il. 10.218; cp.
@@ -4844,7 +4844,7 @@
these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries.
It is on the same grounds that we accuse
and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence,By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from committing
a crime, and vice versa. what persuades, for accusation.
- This topic comprises the whole “Art” of Pamphilus and
+ This topic comprises the whole “Art” of Pamphilus and
Callippus.
Another topic is derived from things which are
thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought
@@ -4857,24 +4857,24 @@
unless it was true.
Thus, Androcles
Athenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for whose banishment he was
chiefly responsible. When the Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death.
Pitthus was an Athenian deme or parish. of Pitthus, speaking against
- the law, being shouted at when he said “the laws need a law to correct
- them,” went on, “and fishes need salt, although it is
+ the law, being shouted at when he said “the laws need a law to correct
+ them,” went on, “and fishes need salt, although it is
neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine;
similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces
- oil should itself need oil.”
+ oil should itself need oil.”
Another topic, appropriate to refutation,
consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words,
- first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, “he says
- that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty;” next,
- separately in your own case, “he says that I am litigious, but he
+ first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, “he says
+ that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty;” next,
+ separately in your own case, “he says that I am litigious, but he
cannot
prove that I have ever brought an action
- against anyone”; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and
- yourself together: “he has never yet lent anything, but I have
- ransomed many of you.”
+ against anyone”; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and
+ yourself together: “he has never yet lent anything, but I have
+ ransomed many of you.”
Another topic, when men or things have been
attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,Understanding diabeblh=sqai.
- Others read mh\ (for h)\) dokou=si, “when there seems no reason to suspect
- them.” consists in stating the reason for the false
+ Others read mh\ (for h)\) dokou=si, “when there seems no reason to suspect
+ them.” consists in stating the reason for the false
opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a
woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with
him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the
@@ -4914,58 +4914,58 @@
Another topic consists in making use of errors
committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the
Medea of Carcinus,
Tragic
- poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (T.G.F. p.
- 798). some accuse Medea of having killed her
- children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the
+ poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (
T.G.F. p.
+ 798). some accuse Medea of having killed her
+ children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the
mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself pleads that she would have
slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake
on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and
kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first
- “Art” of Theodorus.
An
+ “Art” of Theodorus.An
early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have contained something more
- than the topic of “errors” to be of any use.
+ than the topic of “errors” to be of any use.
Another topic is derived from the meaning of a
name. For instance, Sophocles says,
Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.Sophocles, Tyro, Frag. 597
- (T.G.F.). The reference is
- to Sidero ( si/dhros,
- iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro.
+ (T.G.F.). The reference is
+ to Sidero ( si/dhros,
+ iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro.
This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods.
Conon used to
- call Thrasybulus “the man bold in counsel,” and Herodicus
- said of Thrasymachus, “Thou art ever bold in fight,” and of
- Polus, “Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt
- by nature,”Thompson's rendering (Introd. to
- his edition of Plato's Gorgias p. 5).
- “Colt” refers to Polus's skittishness and frisking from
+ call Thrasybulus “the man bold in counsel,” and Herodicus
+ said of Thrasymachus, “Thou art ever bold in fight,” and of
+ Polus, “Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt
+ by nature,”Thompson's rendering (Introd. to
+ his edition of Plato's Gorgias p. 5).
+ “Colt” refers to Polus's skittishness and frisking from
one subject to another. and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of
a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in EuripidesEur. Tro. 990. speaks
thus of Aphro-dite:
And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word
- aphro-syne (folly);
+ aphro-syne (folly);
and ChaeremonFrag. 4
- (T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from
+ (T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from
pe/nqos
- (sorrow). of Pentheus,
+ (sorrow).
of Pentheus,
Pentheus named after his unhappy future.
Enthymemes that serve to refute are more
popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion
- of opposites“Admitting the apparent
+ of opposites“Admitting the apparent
correctness of the opposing argument, we may prove the contradictory of its
conclusion by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then called an
- elenchus” (Thomson, Laws of Thought, section
- 127). in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always
+ elenchus” (Thomson, Laws of Thought, section
+ 127). in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always
clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or
demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers
foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial
- (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the
- conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind
+ (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the
+ conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind
that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.
But as it is
possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only
@@ -4974,27 +4974,27 @@
Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is
that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in
ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no
- syllogistic process, “therefore it is neither this nor
- that,” “so it must be this or that”; and similarly
+ syllogistic process, “therefore it is neither this nor
+ that,” “so it must be this or that”; and similarly
in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be
an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy
appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the
diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state
- the heads of several syllogisms: “He saved some, avenged others, and
- freed the Greeks”;Isoc. 9.65-69. for each of these
+ the heads of several syllogisms: “He saved some, avenged others, and
+ freed the Greeks”;Isoc. 9.65-69. for each of these
propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a
fresh conclusion.
The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy.Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double
meaning. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important
animal, since from it is derived the most honored of all religious festivals,
- namely, the mysteriesDeriving musth/ria ( mu/ein, to close the lips) from mu=s (mouse).; or if, in praising
- the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or
+ namely, the mysteriesDeriving musth/ria ( mu/ein, to close the lips) from mu=s (mouse).; or if, in praising
+ the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or
Pan, because Pindar said,A fragment from the
- Parthenia (songs sung by maidens to the
- accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called “the dog of
- Cybele,” the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being always
+ Parthenia (songs sung by maidens to the
+ accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called “the dog of
+ Cybele,” the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being always
in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god. The fact that Pindar calls
- Pan “dog” is taken as a glorification of that animal.
+ Pan “dog” is taken as a glorification of that animal.
O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother,
@@ -5004,14 +5004,14 @@
or were to say that the dog is an honorable animal,
since to be without a dog is most dishonorable. And to say that Hermes is the
most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common;koino\s *e(rmh=s is an
- expression meaning “halves!” When anyone had a stroke of
+ expression meaning “halves!” When anyone had a stroke of
luck, such as finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with him
expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck, and such a find was
called e(rmai=on. koinwniko/s is taken to
- mean (1) liberal to others, or (2)
+ mean (1) liberal to others, or (2)
sociable. and that words are most excellent, since good men are
- considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for lo/gou a)/cios has a double meaning.lo/gos: (1)
- speech; (2) account, esteem.
+ considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for
lo/gou a)/cios has a double meaning.
lo/gos: (1)
+ speech; (2) account, esteem.
Another fallacy consists in combining what is
divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as
another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient
@@ -5019,16 +5019,16 @@
man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the existence of two things, the
Piraeus and the trireme;Very obscure and no explanation is
satisfactory. The parallel passage in Aristot. Sophist. Elenchi 20.6
- is: “Do you being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the Piraeus?” The ambiguity lies
- in the position of “now,” whether it is to be taken with
- “in Sicily” or
- with “in the Piraeus.” At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot know that there are at
+ is: “Do you being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the Piraeus?” The ambiguity lies
+ in the position of “now,” whether it is to be taken with
+ “in Sicily” or
+ with “in the Piraeus.” At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot know that there are at
this time triremes in the Piraeus; but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the Piraeus, which should be there, but
are now in Sicily
- (Kirchmann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses
+ (Kirchmann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses
are: Do you now, being in Sicily,
see the triremes which are in the Piraeus? and, Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes which are now in the Piraeus? The fallacy consists in the
- two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes in Sicily), true separately, being
+ two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes in Sicily), true separately, being
untrue combined. or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows
the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since
twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount
@@ -5041,8 +5041,8 @@
having put down thirty tyrannies. for here he combines them; or the
example of the fallacy of division in the
Orestes of
Theodectes:
Frag. 5
- (T.G.F.). “It is just
- that a woman who has killed her husband” should be put to death, and
+ (
T.G.F.). “It is just
+ that a woman who has killed her husband” should be put to death, and
that the son should avenge the father;
and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are
combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as
an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put
@@ -5065,7 +5065,7 @@
gnawing the bowstrings.
Hdt. 2.141. The story was that, when Sennacherib invaded
Egypt, a host of field-mice
devoured all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the
- Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus ( smi/nqos, mouse) and was represented on coins with a
+ Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus ( smi/nqos, mouse) and was represented on coins with a
mouse in his hand, either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or
because the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to elsewhere, was
of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar panegyrics on ridiculous things or
@@ -5075,7 +5075,7 @@
Achilles was angry with the Achaeans at Tenedos; whereas he was really angry because he had been treated
with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been
invited.Sophocles, The Gathering
- of the Greeks (T.G.F. p. 161),
+ of the Greeks (T.G.F. p. 161),
a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident of the
disrespect.
@@ -5103,8 +5103,8 @@
by the war.
Another fallacy is the omission of when and how.
For instance, Alexander Paris had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a
- husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a
- fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only
+ husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a
+ fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only
for the first time; for the father's authority only lasts till then.
Or, if one should say that it
is wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only
when the assailant gives the first blow.
@@ -5113,8 +5113,8 @@
and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in
Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which
is not is that which is notThe
- first “is” means “has a real, absolute
- existence”; the second “is” merely expresses
+ first “is” means “has a real, absolute
+ existence”; the second “is” merely expresses
the identity of the terms of the proposition, and is particular; but the
sophistical reasoner takes it in the same sense as the first. The same
applies to the argument about the unknown.; also, that the unknown
@@ -5132,7 +5132,7 @@
sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the
circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so
owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular
- cases. The “Art” of Corax
+ cases. The “Art” of Corax
is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is
accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery,
his defence will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be
@@ -5141,14 +5141,14 @@
appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to
have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally
probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only
- in the conditions mentioned. And this is what “making the worse appear
- the better argument” means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with
+ in the conditions mentioned. And this is what “making the worse appear
+ the better argument” means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with
the promise of ProtagorasThis utterance of
Protagoras gave particular offense as apparently implying that the weaker
cause was really identical with the worse, so that to support it was to
support injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed to
Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as a statement of the
- aim of all ancient orators—how to overcome stronger arguments by
+ aim of all ancient orators—how to overcome stronger arguments by
arguments weaker in themselves.; for it is a lie, not a real but an
apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So
much for real or apparent enthymemes.
@@ -5170,11 +5170,11 @@
unless some forms of love had been bad. An
objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is
that the good man does good to all his friends; it may be objected: But the bad
- man does not do harm [to all his friends].The contrary of “good men do good to all their
- friends” is “bad men do harm to all their
- friends,” but this is not always true. Jebb gives the objection
- as: “No, the bad man does not do evil to all his
- enemies.”
+ man does not do harm [to all his friends].The contrary of “good men do good to all their
+ friends” is “bad men do harm to all their
+ friends,” but this is not always true. Jebb gives the objection
+ as: “No, the bad man does not do evil to all his
+ enemies.”
An objection from what is similar is brought,
if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing
that those who have been benefited do not always love. The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of
@@ -5183,7 +5183,7 @@
objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not
have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.
Now the material of enthymemes is derived from
- four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs.
+ four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs.
Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most
commonly occur or seem to occur; from examples, when they are the result of
induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and
@@ -5201,10 +5201,10 @@
latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing
to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary,
and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection
- (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and
- necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made
+ (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and
+ necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made
in this manner,That is, if the argument is
- shown to be not “necessary.” either that the
+ shown to be not “necessary.”
either that the
argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide,
The important point in the conclusion drawn is
that the judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the argument
is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not about things that are
@@ -5220,15 +5220,15 @@
taken to mean the date, there are the following alternatives. The date may
be questioned, the facts admitted; both date and facts may be questioned;
both date and facts may be admitted, but circumstances may have altered
- (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take
+ (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take
xro/nw| to mean the greater number of
times the same fact has occurred, pra/gmasi
- the more numerous facts that increase probability. But xro/nw| can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's
- note). The strongest objections are those in which both are
+ the more numerous facts that increase probability. But
xro/nw| can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's
+ note). The strongest objections are those in which both are
combined;
for a thing is more
probable, the greater the number of similar cases.
Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if
- true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated1.2.18; or, “at the beginning,” i.e., of
+ true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated1.2.18; or, “at the beginning,” i.e., of
this book.; for it is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr.
Anal. 2.27. that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion.
As for enthymemes derived from examples,
@@ -5245,12 +5245,12 @@
2.27.; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing
alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a
necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of
- demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.That is, “when the tekmērion
- is converted into a syllogism.” For
- tekmērion see 1.2.16.
+ demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.
That is, “when the tekmērion
+ is converted into a syllogism.” For
+ tekmērion see 1.2.16.
Amplification
- and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element
- and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is
+ and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element
+ and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is
a head under which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes
which serve to show that a thing is great or small,
just
as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything
@@ -5270,13 +5270,13 @@
some false premise. Now, since there are three
things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let
what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns
- the intelligence“Intellectual
- capacity, as evinced in language (or actions), and seen
+ the intelligence“Intellectual
+ capacity, as evinced in language (or actions), and seen
when the actors argue or make an appeal to the feelings of others, in other
words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis
- personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do”
- (Bywater on Aristot. Poet. 1450a
- 6, where the text is speaking of the dia/noia of the actors in a play). generally;
for the sources of a supply of
+ personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do”
+ (Bywater on Aristot. Poet. 1450a
+ 6, where the text is speaking of the dia/noia of the actors in a play). generally;
for the sources of a supply of
arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and
arrangement.
@@ -5290,13 +5290,13 @@
persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a
certain manner, or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain
character, or because something has been demonstrated. We have also stated the
- sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being
+ sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being
special, the others general commonplaces.
We have therefore next to speak of style; for it
is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to
say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain
character. In the first place, following the
- natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what
+ natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what
gives things themselves their persuasiveness;
in the
second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery,
which is of the greatest importance but has not yet been treated of by anyone.
@@ -5304,7 +5304,7 @@
the poets themselves acted their tragedies.Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays, there was no need for
professional actors, nor for instruction in the art of delivery or acting.
This explains why no attempt had been made to deal with the question.
- Similarly, the rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were
+ Similarly, the rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were
at first as a rule the composers of the poems themselves. It is
clear, therefore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in
poetry, and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others. Now
@@ -5312,7 +5312,7 @@
each particular emotion; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate;
and how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used; and
what rhythms are adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are
- considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly
+ considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly
nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present
day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same In
politicalIn the law courts and public
@@ -5321,9 +5321,9 @@
composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into
notice;
and rightly considered
it is thought vulgar.Cope prefers:
- “is thought vulgar, and rightly so considered.”
- But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion,Or, “is concerned with
- appearance.” we must pay attention to it, not as being
+ “is thought vulgar, and rightly so considered.”
+ But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion,Or, “is concerned with
+ appearance.” we must pay attention to it, not as being
right, but necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more
in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should
consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that
@@ -5346,8 +5346,8 @@
all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of
the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense,
appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical
- style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician (see
- Introduction). Even now the majority of the uneducated think
+ style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician (see
+ Introduction). Even now the majority of the uneducated think
that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the
case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result
proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same
@@ -5369,22 +5369,22 @@
function; neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of the subject, but
appropriate to it; for the poetic style may be is not mean, but it is not
appropriate to prose. Of nouns and verbs it is
- the proper ones that make style perspicuous“Nouns and verbs” is a conventional expression for all
+ the proper ones that make style perspicuous“Nouns and verbs” is a conventional expression for all
the parts of speech. Cp. Hor. AP 240
- “non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum verbaque,”
+ “non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum verbaque,”
where dominantia is a literal adaptation of ku/ria, the usual Latin equivalent for which is
propria.; all the others which have been spoken of
in the PoeticsAristot. Poet. 21. elevate and make
it ornate; for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In
this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and
fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should give our
- language a “foreignIt is impossible
+ language a “foreignIt is impossible
to find a satisfactory English equivalent for the terms ce/nos, ceniko/s, to\ ceni/zon, as applied to
- style. “Foreign” does not really convey the idea, which
+ style. “Foreign” does not really convey the idea, which
is rather that of something opposed to
- “home-like,”—out-of-the-way, as if from
- “abroad.” Jebb suggests
- “distinctive.” air”; for men admire
+ “home-like,”—out-of-the-way, as if from
+ “abroad.” Jebb suggests
+ “distinctive.” air”; for men admire
what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant. In poetry many
things conduce to this and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons
spoken of are more out of the common. But in prose such methods are appropriate
@@ -5401,8 +5401,8 @@
else. Art is cleverly concealed when the
speaker chooses his words from ordinary languageCp. Hor. AP. 46, where it is
said that the choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in
- making an old word new by clever combination (callida
- iunctura) being especially praised. and puts them
+ making an old word new by clever combination (callida
+ iunctura) being especially praised. and puts them
together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way.
Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, and nouns being of the different
kinds which have been considered in the
Poetics, of these we
@@ -5414,21 +5414,21 @@
be employed in the style of prose; this is shown by the fact that no one employs
anything but these. For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as proper and
appropriate words; wherefore it is clear that, if a speaker manages well, there
- will be some thing “foreign” about his speech, while
+ will be some thing “foreign” about his speech, while
possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this,
- as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language.
(In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful
+ as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language.
(In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful
to the sophist, for it is by their aid that he employs captious arguments, and
synonyms to the poet.
Instances of words that are both proper and synonymous are
- “going” and “walking”: for these two
- words are proper and have the same meaning.)
This is a parenthetical note.
+ “going” and “walking”: for these two
+ words are proper and have the same meaning.)
This is a parenthetical note.
It has already been stated, as we have said, in the
Poetics,
Aristot. Poet.
21, 22. what each of these things
The different kinds of words. is, how many kinds of
metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose.
But the orator must devote the greater
attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It
is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and
- it cannot be learnt from anyone else;
Aristot. Poet. 22.9: “for this
- alone cannot be borrowed from another.”
+ it cannot be learnt from anyone else;
Aristot. Poet. 22.9: “for this
+ alone cannot be borrowed from another.”
but we must make use of metaphors and epithets
that are appropriate. This will be secured by observing due proportion;
otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because it is when placed in
@@ -5436,11 +5436,11 @@
suits a young man, what suits an old one;
for
the same garment is not suitable for both. And if we wish to ornament our
subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same
- genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have
- two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays,
- or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of
- asking)
Begging (as a
- beggar does) and praying (as a priest might) are
+ genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have
+ two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays,
+ or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of
+ asking)Begging (as a
+ beggar does) and praying (as a priest might) are
both forms of asking, and by substituting one for the other, you can amplify
or depreciate. is an instance of doing this; as, when IphicratesSee 1.7.32. called CalliasHead of a distinguished Athenian family which
held the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A man of
@@ -5450,22 +5450,22 @@
torch-bearer ranked next to the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to
holding the torch during the sacrifices, he took part in the recitation of
the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The mhtragu/rtai or mendicant priests collected alms on behalf of
- various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence their
- name). They included both men and women of profligate character,
+ various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence their
+ name). They included both men and women of profligate character,
addicted to every kind of lewdness.; both titles indeed have to do
with a divinity, but the one is honorable, the other dishonorable. And some call
actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they call themselves
- “artists.” Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a
+ “artists.” Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a
term of abuse, the other the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves
purveyorsCf.
- “‘convey’ the wise it call”
- (Merry Wives, I. iii.). Either the
+ “‘convey’ the wise it call”
+ (Merry Wives, I. iii.). Either the
euphemistic or unfavorable application of the term may be adopted.;
and so it is allowable to say that the man who has committed a crime has
- “made a mistake,” that the man who has “made a
- mistake” is “guilty of crime”, and that one who
- has committed a theft has either “taken” or
- “ravaged.” The saying in the Telephus of
+ “made a mistake,” that the man who has “made a
+ mistake” is “guilty of crime”, and that one who
+ has committed a theft has either “taken” or
+ “ravaged.” The saying in the Telephus of
Euripides,
Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia,
@@ -5510,94 +5510,94 @@
do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived
from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to
some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says
- “rosy-fingered morn,” rather than
- “purple-fingered,”
or, what is
- still worse, “red-fingered.”
+ “rosy-fingered morn,” rather than
+ “purple-fingered,”
or, what is
+ still worse, “red-fingered.”
As for epithets, they may be applied from what
- is vile or disgraceful, for instance, “the matricide,” or
- from what is more honorable, for instance, “the avenger of his
- father.”Eur. Orest. 1588. In the preceding line
+ is vile or disgraceful, for instance, “the matricide,” or
+ from what is more honorable, for instance, “the avenger of his
+ father.”Eur. Orest. 1588. In the preceding line
Menelaus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to heap murder on murder,
to which Orestes replies, you should rather call me the avenger of my father
Agamemnon, who had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother of
- Orestes. “Matricide” and “avenger of his
- father” show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes.
+ Orestes. “Matricide” and “avenger of his
+ father” show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes.
When the winner in a mule-race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to
write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to write on half-asses; but when
he gave him a sufficient amount, he wrote,
- Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!Frag. 7 (P.L.G. 3, p.
- 39O). The winner of the mule race was Anaxilaus of
+ Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!Frag. 7 (P.L.G. 3, p.
+ 39O). The winner of the mule race was Anaxilaus of
Rhegium.
and yet they were also the daughters of asses. Further, the use of
diminutives amounts to the same. It is the
diminutive which makes the good and the bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the
-
Babylonians jestingly uses “goldlet, cloaklet,
- affrontlet, diseaselet” instead of “gold, cloak, affront,
- disease.” But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use
+ Babylonians jestingly uses “goldlet, cloaklet,
+ affrontlet, diseaselet” instead of “gold, cloak, affront,
+ disease.” But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use
as well as in that of epithets.
Frigidity of
style arises from four causes: first, the use of compound words, as when
LycophronA sophist, not the poet
- (author of the obscure Alexander or
- Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle.
- speaks of the “many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth,”
- “narrow-passaged shore”; and Gorgias of “a
- begging-poet flatterer,”
“those who commit perjury and those who swear right
- solemnly.Lobeck conjectured katepiorkh/santas, “who commit
- out-and-out perjury.”” And as Alcidamas says,
- “the soul full of anger and the face fire-colored,”
- “he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing,”
- “he made persuasive words end-accomplishing,” and
- “the azure-colored floor of the sea,” for all these appear
+ (author of the obscure
Alexander or
+ Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle.
+ speaks of the “many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth,”
+ “narrow-passaged shore”; and Gorgias of “a
+ begging-poet flatterer,”
“those who commit perjury and those who swear right
+ solemnly.
Lobeck conjectured katepiorkh/santas, “who commit
+ out-and-out perjury.”” And as Alcidamas says,
+ “the soul full of anger and the face fire-colored,”
+ “he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing,”
+ “he made persuasive words end-accomplishing,” and
+ “the azure-colored floor of the sea,” for all these appear
poetical because they are compound.
This is one cause of frigidity; another is the
- use of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes “a monster of a
- man,” Sciron “a human scourgeSciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, by
+ use of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes “a monster of a
+ man,” Sciron “a human scourgeSciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, by
Lycophron turns Sinnis into a glw=tta, using
- it adjectivally = “destructive”; cf. si=nos, “harm”; si/nths = si/nnis.”; and Alcidamas says
- “plaything in poetry,” “the audaciousness of
- nature,” “whetted with unmitigated wrath of
- thought.”
+ it adjectivally = “destructive”; cf.
si=nos, “harm”;
si/nths =
si/nnis.”; and Alcidamas says
+ “plaything in poetry,” “the audaciousness of
+ nature,” “whetted with unmitigated wrath of
+ thought.”
A third cause is the use of epithets that are
either long or unseasonable or too crowded; thus, in poetry it is appropriate to
speak of white milk, but in prose it is less so; and if epithets are employed to
excess, they reveal the art and make it evident that it is poetry. And yet such
may be used to a certain extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary
- and gives a “foreign” air. But one must aim at the mean, for
+ and gives a “foreign” air. But one must aim at the mean, for
neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random; for a random style
lacks merit, but excess is vicious. That is why the style of Alcidamas appears
frigid; for he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so
crowded,
so long, and so glaring are they. For
- instance, he does not say “sweat” but “damp
- sweat”; not “to the Isthmian games” but
- “to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games”; not
- “laws”, but “the laws, the rulers of
- states”; not “running”, but “with a
- race-like impulse of the soul”; not “museum”, but
- “having taken up the museum of nature”The meaning of paralabw/n is
- quite obscure: various renderings are “having taken to
- himself,” “received,”
- “grasped,” “inherited.” The word
+ instance, he does not say “sweat” but “damp
+ sweat”; not “to the Isthmian games” but
+ “to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games”; not
+ “laws”, but “the laws, the rulers of
+ states”; not “running”, but “with a
+ race-like impulse of the soul”; not “museum”, but
+ “having taken up the museum of nature”The meaning of paralabw/n is
+ quite obscure: various renderings are “having taken to
+ himself,” “received,”
+ “grasped,” “inherited.” The word
mousei=on, originally a haunt of the
Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature. The fault appears to
consist in the addition of th=s fu/sews, but
it is difficult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to understand the
- passage. Jebb translates: “he does not say, ‘having
- taken to himself a school of the Muses,’ but ‘to
- Nature's school of the Muses.’”;
- and “the scowling anxiety of the soul”;
- “creator”, not “of favor”, but
- “all-popular favor”; and “dispenser of the
- pleasure of the hearers”; “he hid,” not
- “with branches,” but “with the branches of the
- forest”; “he covered,” not “his
- body,” but “the nakedness of his body.” He also
- calls desire “counter-initiative of the soul”—an
+ passage. Jebb translates: “he does not say, ‘having
+ taken to himself a school of the Muses,’ but ‘to
+ Nature's school of the Muses.’”;
+ and “the scowling anxiety of the soul”;
+ “creator”, not “of favor”, but
+ “all-popular favor”; and “dispenser of the
+ pleasure of the hearers”; “he hid,” not
+ “with branches,” but “with the branches of the
+ forest”; “he covered,” not “his
+ body,” but “the nakedness of his body.” He also
+ calls desire “counter-initiative of the soul”—an
expression which is at once compound and an epithet, so that it becomes
- poetry—and “the excess of his depravity so beyond all
- bounds.” Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste
+ poetry—and “the excess of his depravity so beyond all
+ bounds.” Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste
make the style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter produces obscurity;
for when words are piled upon one who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by
a cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, when a thing has no name and the
@@ -5609,33 +5609,33 @@
writers of iambics, who now employ them, as we have stated.
The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be
found in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are
- ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others
+ ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others
because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic; and if they are farfetched,
- they are obscure, as when Gorgias says: “Affairs pale and
- bloodless”On this passage
+ they are obscure, as when Gorgias says: “Affairs pale and
+ bloodless”On this passage
Thompson
- (Gorgias, p. 179) says: “The
+ (Gorgias, p. 179) says: “The
metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere commonplace . . . but
- ‘pallid and bloodless affairs’ is a phrase which would
- need apology even from a modern.” On the other hand, it is
+ ‘pallid and bloodless affairs’ is a phrase which would
+ need apology even from a modern.” On the other hand, it is
difficult to see what objection there is to calling the
- Odyssey “a beautiful mirror of human
- life.” Another reading is e)/naima, which Cope translates “events fresh with the
- blood in them.” If the two extracts are taken together, it is
- suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's notes) that
- the sense may be: “things green and unripe (flushed with
- sap), and this was the crop which you . . .,” the
+ Odyssey “a beautiful mirror of human
+ life.” Another reading is e)/naima, which Cope translates “events fresh with the
+ blood in them.” If the two extracts are taken together, it is
+ suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's notes) that
+ the sense may be: “things green and unripe (flushed with
+ sap), and this was the crop which you . . .,” the
adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn.;
- “you have sown shame and reaped misfortune”; for this is too
- much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy “a bulwark of the
- laws,”Or, “a barrier
- against the laws.” This is the general meaning of e)pitei/xisma, a border fortress commanding an
- enemy's country. and the Odyssey “a
- beautiful mirror of human life,” and “introducing no such
- plaything in poetry.” All these expressions fail to produce
+ “you have sown shame and reaped misfortune”; for this is too
+ much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy “a bulwark of the
+ laws,”Or, “a barrier
+ against the laws.” This is the general meaning of e)pitei/xisma, a border fortress commanding an
+ enemy's country. and the Odyssey “a
+ beautiful mirror of human life,” and “introducing no such
+ plaything in poetry.” All these expressions fail to produce
persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow
which, flying over his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best
- tragic style. He exclaimed, “Fie, for shame, Philomela!”;
+ tragic style. He exclaimed, “Fie, for shame, Philomela!”;
for there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it
would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate,
addressing her as she was, not as she is.
@@ -5647,7 +5647,7 @@
he rushed on like a lion,
- it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,”
+ it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,”
it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and
calls Achilles a lion.
The simile is also
useful in prose, but should be less frequently used, for there is something
@@ -5662,9 +5662,9 @@
difference between Euxenus without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus
with a knowledge of geometry. The proportion of geometrical knowledge will
remain the same, so that Archidamus can be called an ungeometrical Euxenus,
- and Euxenus a geometrical Archidamus (see 4.4, note for
- “by proportion”). for Euxenus
- “will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry.” Again, Plato
+ and Euxenus a geometrical Archidamus (see 4.4, note for
+ “by proportion”). for Euxenus
+ “will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry.” Again, Plato
in the
RepublicPlat. Rep. 469d. compares those who
strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, but do not touch those who throw
them; he also says that the people is like a ship's captain who is vigorous, but
@@ -5678,11 +5678,11 @@
Pericles said that the Samians were like children who cry while they accept the
scraps.
Meaning that they did not
appreciate the benefits received from the Athenians, who conquered the
- islands (440 B.C.). He
+ islands (
440 B.C.). He
also compared the Boeotians to holm-oaks; for just as these are beaten down by
knocking against each other,
Or,
- “are cut down by axes, the handles of which are made of their own
- wood.” so are the Boeotians by their civil strife.
+ “are cut down by axes, the handles of which are made of their own
+ wood.” so are the Boeotians by their civil strife.
Demosthenes compared the people to passengers who are seasick.
It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the
orator or the Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of the
comparison is that in a democracy the general instability of political
@@ -5696,9 +5696,9 @@
be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for
instance, if the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly
be called the goblet of Ares.As the shield is
- to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. Proportion is defined (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 5.3.8)
- as “an equality of ratios, implying four terms at the
- least,” and the proportional metaphor is one in which the second
+ to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. Proportion is defined (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 5.3.8)
+ as “an equality of ratios, implying four terms at the
+ least,” and the proportional metaphor is one in which the second
term is to the first as the fourth is to the third; for then one can by
metaphor substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth.
Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield. Then by the definition,
@@ -5708,8 +5708,8 @@
sense, and the goblet may be described as the shield of Dionysus and the
shield as the goblet of Ares. The shield and the goblet both come under the
same genus, being characteristics of a deity, and can therefore be
- reciprocally transferred (Aristot.
- Poet. 21.4).
+ reciprocally transferred (Aristot.
+ Poet. 21.4).
Such then are
the elements of speech. But purity,
which is the
foundation of style, depends upon five rules. First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order,
@@ -5722,17 +5722,17 @@
apodosis. a)podido/nai is used in the sense
of introducing a clause answering to the pro/tasis, and a)po/dosis for
this answering clause.; for this is rarely appropriate. For instance,
- “As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging
- and praying—set out, taking them with me.” For in this
+ “As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging
+ and praying—set out, taking them with me.” For in this
phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to
- furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between “I” and
- “set out” is too great, the result is obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of
+ furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between “I” and
+ “set out” is too great, the result is obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of
connecting particles; the second, to employ special, not generic terms.
The third consists in avoiding ambiguous
terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having
nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the
- use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles.Of Agrigentum (c.
- 490-430), poet, philosopher, and physician. Among other legends
+ use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles.Of Agrigentum (c.
+ 490-430), poet, philosopher, and physician. Among other legends
connected with him, he is said to have thrown himself into the crater of
Etna, so that by suddenly
disappearing he might be thought to be a god. His chief work was a poem
@@ -5755,56 +5755,56 @@
And as there is less chance of
making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general
terms on the question of fact; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely
- to be right if he says “even” or “odd”
- than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says “it
- will be” than if he states “when.” This is why
+ to be right if he says “even” or “odd”
+ than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says “it
+ will be” than if he states “when.” This is why
soothsayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are
alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason.The deliberate intention to mislead.
The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders
- distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter,skeu/h, “inanimate
- things,” the classification probably being male, female, and
+ distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter,skeu/h, “inanimate
+ things,” the classification probably being male, female, and
inanimate, not the grammatical one of masculine, feminine, and
neuter. as laid down by Protagoras; these also must be properly
- introduced: “She, having come
- (fem.) and having conversed
- (fem.) with me, went away.” The
+ introduced: “She, having come
+ (fem.) and having conversed
+ (fem.) with me, went away.” The
fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are
- referred to: “They, having come (pl.),
- began to beat (pl.) me.”
+ referred to: “They, having come (
pl.),
+ began to beat (
pl.) me.”
Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to
utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number
of connecting particles, or when the punctuation is hard, as in the writings of
- Heraclitus.Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475).
+ Heraclitus.Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475).
His chief work was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and the
carelessness of his style he was called o(
- skoteino/s (the obscure). According to him, fire
+ skoteino/s (the obscure). According to him, fire
was the origin of all things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes
all other things. All things are in a constant state of flux; all is the
same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded upon sensual perception, but
only the gods possess knowledge in perfection. For it is hard, since
it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or
that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says:
- “Of this reason which existsOr,
- “although this reason exists for ever men are born . . . without
- understanding” (Welldon). always men are
- ignorant,” where it is uncertain whether “always”
- should go with “which exists” or with “are
- ignorant.” Further, a solecism
+ “Of this reason which existsOr,
+ “although this reason exists for ever men are born . . . without
+ understanding” (Welldon). always men are
+ ignorant,” where it is uncertain whether “always”
+ should go with “which exists” or with “are
+ ignorant.” Further, a solecism
results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which
is equally suitable to both.
For instance, in speaking of
- “sound” and “color”, the word
- “seeing” should not be used, for it is not suitable to both,
- whereas “perceiving” is. It also causes obscurity, if you do
+ “sound” and “color”, the word
+ “seeing” should not be used, for it is not suitable to both,
+ whereas “perceiving” is. It also causes obscurity, if you do
not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of
- details in the middle; for instance, if you say: “I intended after
- having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead
- of “I intended to set out after having spoken to him,” and
+ details in the middle; for instance, if you say: “I intended after
+ having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead
+ of “I intended to set out after having spoken to him,” and
then this or that happened, in this or that manner.
The following
rules contribute to loftiness of style. Use of the description instead of the
- name of a thing; for instance, do not say “circle,” but
- “a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the
- center.” But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use
+ name of a thing; for instance, do not say “circle,” but
+ “a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the
+ center.” But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use
the name instead of the description. You should
do the same to express anything foul or indecent; if the foulness is in the
description, use the name; if in the name, the description. Use metaphors and epithets by way of illustration,
@@ -5823,13 +5823,13 @@
should have its own article: th=s gunaiko\s th=s
h(mete/ras. But for conciseness, the reverse: th=s h(mete/ras gunaiko/s. Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit it, but avoid
destroying the connection;
for
- instance “having gone and having conversed with him,” or,
- “having gone, I conversed with him.”Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of
+ instance “having gone and having conversed with him,” or,
+ “having gone, I conversed with him.”Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of
describing a thing by the qualities it does not possess; thus, in speaking of
the hill Teumessus,In Boeotia. The quotation is from the
Thebaid
- of Antimachus of Claros (c. 450
- B.C.). The Alexandrians placed him next to Homer among the epic
+ of Antimachus of Claros (c. 450
+ B.C.). The Alexandrians placed him next to Homer among the epic
poets. In his eulogy of the little hill, he went on to attribute to it all
the good qualities it did not possess, a process which could
obviously be carried on ad infinitum. he says,
@@ -5839,8 +5839,8 @@
for in this way amplification may be carried on ad
infinitum. This method may be applied to things good and bad, in
whichever way it may be useful. Poets also make use of this in inventing words,
- as a melody “without strings” or “without the
- lyre”; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is
+ as a melody “without strings” or “without the
+ lyre”; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is
approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of
the trumpet is a melody without the lyre.
Propriety of
@@ -5855,40 +5855,40 @@
ridiculous owing to its being out of harmony with the subject. Others
consider that he was not a poet at all but an orator. po/tnia was a title of respect, applied to females, whether
they were goddesses or ordinary women. who used certain expressions
- that reminded one of saying “madam fig.” Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger
+ that reminded one of saying “madam fig.” Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger
of wanton outrage; with indignation and reserve, even in mentioning them, of
things foul or impious; with admiration of things praiseworthy; with lowliness
of things pitiable; and so in all other cases. Appropriate style
also makes the fact appear credible;
for the mind of the hearer is imposed uponOr,
- “draws a wrong conclusion.” under the impression
+ “draws a wrong conclusion.” under the impression
that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his
- feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as
- the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the
+ feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as
+ the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the
hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really
says nothing. This is why speakers often
confound their hearers by mere noise.
Character also may be expressed by the proof
from signs, because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I
- mean class in reference to age—child, man, or old man; to
- sex—man or woman; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I
+ mean class in reference to age—child, man, or old man; to
+ sex—man or woman; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I
call habits those moral states which form a man's character in life; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the
language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character; for the
uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated. But
the hearers also are impressed in a certain way by a device employed ad
- nauseam by writers of speeches:Alluding to Isocrates. “Who does not know?”
- “Everybody knows”; for the hearer agrees, because he is
+ nauseam by writers of speeches:Alluding to Isocrates. “Who does not know?”
+ “Everybody knows”; for the hearer agrees, because he is
ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge.
The opportune or inopportune use of these
devices
applies to all kinds
- of Rhetoric.Or, “to all the special
- rules given above.”
+ of Rhetoric.Or, “to all the special
+ rules given above.”
But whenever one has gone too far, the remedy
- may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke
+ may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke
himself in advance;The exaggeration should be
brought forward first, by way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied
- by some limiting phrase. Quintilian (Quint. Inst. Orat. 8.3.37)
- gives as examples: “so to say,” “if I may be
- allowed to say so.” then the excess seems true, since the
+ by some limiting phrase. Quintilian (Quint. Inst. Orat. 8.3.37)
+ gives as examples: “so to say,” “if I may be
+ allowed to say so.” then the excess seems true, since the
orator is obviously aware of what he is doing. Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of correspondenceAdaptation of voice, features, etc., to the
subject. together; for in this manner the hearer is deceived. I mean,
for instance, if the language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things
@@ -5897,16 +5897,16 @@
notice, although the result is the same. If mild sentiments are harshly
expressed or harsh sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.
Compound words, a number of epithets, and
- “foreign” words especially, are appropriate to an emotional
+ “foreign” words especially, are appropriate to an emotional
speaker; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil
- “high-as-heaven” or “stupendous.” He may
+ “high-as-heaven” or “stupendous.” He may
do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm,
either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of
- his
PanegyricusIsoc. 4.186, where mnh/mh is the reading, translated “name”
- above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also
+ his PanegyricusIsoc. 4.186, where mnh/mh is the reading, translated “name”
+ above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also
appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the Mss. of Aristotle give gnw/mhn here, which shows that it is a
- misquotation.: “Oh, the fame and the name!” and
- “In that they endured.” For such is the language of
+ misquotation.: “Oh, the fame and the name!” and
+ “In that they endured.” For such is the language of
enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a
sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry; for there is
something inspired in poetry. It should therefore be used either in this way
@@ -5916,38 +5916,38 @@
of these passages
Socrates attributes his unusual flow of words to the
inspiration of the nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to
be in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into dithyrambs. An
- example of the irony (a term implying a certain amount of contempt
- (2.2.25)) of Gorgias is given in
Aristot. Pol. 3.1. When asked how a person
- comes to be a citizen, he answers: “as those are mortars which
+ example of the irony (a term implying a certain amount of contempt
+ (2.2.25)) of Gorgias is given in
Aristot. Pol. 3.1. When asked how a person
+ comes to be a citizen, he answers: “as those are mortars which
have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made
- by artisans (
dhmiourgou/s); for some of these were
Larissa-makers (
larisopoiou/s).” There is a
+ by artisans (
dhmiourgou/s); for some of these were
Larissa-makers (
larisopoiou/s).” There is a
play on the double meaning of
dhmiourgo/s,
- (1) artisan, (2) magistrate,
+ (1) artisan, (2) magistrate,
lit. people-maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans
in such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of Larissa itself. It
has also been suggested that
larisopoiou/s
- may mean “kettle-makers,” from
la/risa “a kettle,” so called from having
+ may mean “kettle-makers,” from
la/risa “a kettle,” so called from having
been first made at Larissa, but this seems unnecessary. The point is that
Gorgias maintained that all were citizens who were made so by the
- magistrates, that citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L.
+ magistrates, that citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L.
Newman's note on the passage, and W. H. Thompson's Appendix to his edition
- of Plato's
Gorgias).
+ of Plato's
Gorgias).
The form of
diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it
lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it
distracts the hearer's attention, since it sets him on the watch for the
recurrence of such and such a cadence; just as, when the public criers ask,
- “Whom does the emancipatedHe did
+ “Whom does the emancipatedHe did
not generally possess full rights of citizenship. The point of the
illustration is that the hearer looks for the cadence just as confidently
as, when a freedman is asked what patron he selects, every one expects him
- to say “Cleon.” choose for his patron?”
- the children shout “Cleon.” If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited
- (but not by meter); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant
+ to say “Cleon.” choose for his patron?”
+ the children shout “Cleon.” If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited
+ (but not by meter); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant
and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging
to the form of diction is rhythm, of which the meters are divisions.Bywater's emendation for tmhta/ of the Mss. Aristotle seems to be referring to the
- Pythagorean theory that “number” is the regulating force
- in all things, and in giving shape to language “number”
+ Pythagorean theory that “number” is the regulating force
+ in all things, and in giving shape to language “number”
is rhythm, which reduces a formless mass of words to order.
Wherefore prose must be rhythmical, but not
metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously
@@ -5961,10 +5961,10 @@
they could not define it.
The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related to those already mentioned;
for its proportion is 3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with both of
- which the paean, whose proportion is 1 1/2 to 1, is connected.The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees,
- and anapests) is as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one
+ which the paean, whose proportion is 1 1/2 to 1, is connected.The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees,
+ and anapests) is as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one
long; trochaic and iambic 2 to 1 on the same principle; paean, 3 to 2
- (three shorts and one long), being the mean between the
+ (three shorts and one long), being the mean between the
other two.
All the other meters then are to be disregarded
for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical; but the paean should
@@ -5977,27 +5977,27 @@
appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long
syllable and ends with three short:
- *da¯lo˘ge˘ne˘s ei)/te
- *lu˘ki˘an, (“O
- Delos-born, or it may be Lycia”),
+ *da¯lo˘ge˘ne˘s ei)/te
+ *lu˘ki˘an, (“O
+ Delos-born, or it may be Lycia”),
and
- *xru¯se˘o˘ko/˘ma¯
- *(/e˘ka˘te˘ pai=
- *dio/˘s (“Golden-haired
- far-darter, son of Zeus”).
+ *xru¯se˘o˘ko/˘ma¯
+ *(/e˘ka˘te˘ pai=
+ *dio/˘s (“Golden-haired
+ far-darter, son of Zeus”).
The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends
with one long one:
- me˘ta\˘ de˘ ga=n
- u(/˘da˘ta/˘ t'
- w)ke˘a˘no\n
- h)fa/˘ni˘se˘nu/cAll three attributed to Simonides
- (Frag. 26 B: P.L.G.).
- (“after earth and waters, night obscured
- ocean”).
+ me˘ta\˘ de˘ ga=n
+ u(/˘da˘ta/˘ t'
+ w)ke˘a˘no\n
+ h)fa/˘ni˘se˘nu/cAll three attributed to Simonides
+ (Frag. 26 B: P.L.G.).
+ (“after earth and waters, night obscured
+ ocean”).
This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete,
mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable
@@ -6010,8 +6010,8 @@
The style must
be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic
preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The
- continuous style is the ancient one; for example, “This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus
- of Thurii.” It was
+ continuous style is the ancient one; for example, “This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus
+ of Thurii.” It was
formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I
mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete.
It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight.
@@ -6030,17 +6030,17 @@
style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember; that explains
why all learn verse with greater facility than prose,tw=n xu/dhn: lit. what is
poured fourth promiscuously: in flowing, unfettered language
- (Liddell and Scott). for it has number by which it can be
+ (Liddell and Scott).
for it has number by which it can be
measured. But the period must be completed with
the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,Really from the Meleager of Euripides, Frag.
- 515 (T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes
+ 515 (T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes
after gai=a, *pelopi/as xqono/s really
belonging to the next line: e)n a)ntipo/rqmois pe/di'
e)/xous' eu)dai/mona. As it stands in the text, the line
implies that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was not. The meaning then is:
- “This is the land of Calydon, with its fertile plains in the
- country over against Peloponnesus” (on the opposite side of the
- strait, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf).
+ “This is the land of Calydon, with its fertile plains in the
+ country over against Peloponnesus” (on the opposite side of the
+ strait, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf).
This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops;
@@ -6080,52 +6080,52 @@
Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the
hearer himself is carried away headlong.
The clauses of the periodic style are divided or
- opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: “I have often wondered
+ opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: “I have often wondered
at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the
- gymnastic contests”;The beginning
+ gymnastic contests”;The beginning
of Isoc. 4. opposed, in which, in each of
the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is
- coupled with both contraries;
for instance, “They were useful to both, both those who stayed and
+ coupled with both contraries;
for instance, “They were useful to both, both those who stayed and
those who followed; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions
than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own
- country.” Here “staying behind,”
- “following,” “sufficient,”
- “more” are contraries. Again: “to those who need
- money and those who wish to enjoy it”; where
- “enjoying” is contrary to “acquiring.”
- Again: “It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are
- unsuccessful, while fools succeed”: “At once they were
+ country.” Here “staying behind,”
+ “following,” “sufficient,”
+ “more” are contraries. Again: “to those who need
+ money and those who wish to enjoy it”; where
+ “enjoying” is contrary to “acquiring.”
+ Again: “It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are
+ unsuccessful, while fools succeed”: “At once they were
deemed worthy of the prize of valor and not long after won the command of the
- sea”: “To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the
+ sea”: “To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the
sea, bridging over the Hellespont and
- digging through Athos”:
- “And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights
- of citizenship by law”: “For some of them perished
- miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully”:
- “Privately to employ barbarians as servants,“To dwell with us”
- (Jebb). The point seems to be that the barbarian domestics
+ digging through Athos”:
+ “And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights
+ of citizenship by law”: “For some of them perished
+ miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully”:
+ “Privately to employ barbarians as servants,“To dwell with us”
+ (Jebb). The point seems to be that the barbarian domestics
were in a comfortable position as compared with those of the allies who were
reduced to slavery; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting
servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting public life
indifference was shown. but publicly to view with indifference many
- of the allies reduced to slavery”: “Either to possess it
- while living or to leave it behind when dead.”All the above quotations are from Isoc. 4.1, 35, 41,
+ of the allies reduced to slavery”: “Either to possess it
+ while living or to leave it behind when dead.”All the above quotations are from Isoc. 4.1, 35, 41,
48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations. The last
quotation is part of the sentence of which the beginning appears in 7.11
- above. The whole runs: “And how great must we consider the fame
+ above. The whole runs: “And how great must we consider the fame
and the name and the glory which those who have highly distinguished
themselves in such deeds of valor will either have when living or will leave
- behind after their death.” And what some one said against
+ behind after their death.” And what some one said against
Pitholaus and LycophronThey murdered
Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being instigated by their sister, his wife.
Nothing is known of the case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is:
- “When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, but
- now they have come to buy you” (referring to bribery in
- court). Others take w)nei=sqai in a
- passive sense: “they have been bought,” i.e. have had to
- sell themselves to you. in the lawcourt: “These men, who
+ “When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, but
+ now they have come to buy you” (referring to bribery in
+ court). Others take w)nei=sqai in a
+ passive sense: “they have been bought,” i.e. have had to
+ sell themselves to you. in the lawcourt: “These men, who
used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought
- you.”
All these passages are examples of
+ you.”
All these passages are examples of
antithesis. This kind of style is pleasing,
because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by
side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a
@@ -6137,37 +6137,37 @@
last syllables, or the inflections of one and the same word, or the repetition
of the same word. For instance, at the beginning: *)agro\n
ga\r e)/laben a)rgo\n par' au)tou=,Aristoph. frag. 649
- (Kock, Com.
- Att. Frag. 1.1880).
- “for he received from him land untilled”;
+ (Kock, Com.
+ Att. Frag. 1.1880).
+ “for he received from him land untilled”;
dwrhtoi/ t' e)pe/lonto para/rrhtoi/ t'
e)pe/essin,Hom. Il. 9.526.
- “they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by
- words;”
+ “they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by
+ words;”
at the end: w)|h/qhsan au)to\n paidi/on
- tetoke/nai, a)ll' au)tou= ai)/tion gegone/nai,The text is obviously corrupt. “they thought
- that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it”;
+ tetoke/nai, a)ll' au)tou= ai)/tion gegone/nai,The text is obviously corrupt. “they thought
+ that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it”;
e)n plei/stais de\ fronti/si kai\ e)n e)laxi/stais
- e)lpi/sin, “in the greatest anxiety and the smallest
- hopes.” Inflections of the same word: a)/cios
+ e)lpi/sin, “in the greatest anxiety and the smallest
+ hopes.” Inflections of the same word: a)/cios
de\ staqh=nai xalkou=s, ou)k a)/cios w)\n xalkou=,
- “worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass
- farthing.” Repetition of a word: su\ d' au)to\n
+ “worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass
+ farthing.” Repetition of a word: su\ d' au)to\n
kai\ zw=nta e)/leges kakw=s kai\ nu=n gra/feis kakw=s,
- “while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of
- him.” Resemblance of one syllable: ti/ a)\n
- e)/paqes deino/n, ei) a)/ndr' ei)=des a)rgo/n, “what ill
- would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man?” All these
- figures may be found in the same sentence at once—
antithesis, equality of clauses, and
- similarity of endings. In the TheodecteaSee Introduction. nearly all the beginningsRoemer's text has a)retai/ (excellences). of periods
+ “while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of
+ him.” Resemblance of one syllable: ti/ a)\n
+ e)/paqes deino/n, ei) a)/ndr' ei)=des a)rgo/n, “what ill
+ would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man?” All these
+ figures may be found in the same sentence at once—
antithesis, equality of clauses, and
+ similarity of endings. In the TheodecteaSee Introduction. nearly all the beginningsRoemer's text has a)retai/ (excellences). of periods
have been enumerated. There are also false
antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus:
to/ka me\n e)n th/nwn e)gw\n h)=n, to/ka de\
- para\ th/nois e)gw/n, “at one time I was in
- their house, at another I was with them.”There is no real antithesis, the
+ para\ th/nois e)gw/n
, “at one time I was in
+ their house, at another I was with them.”There is no real antithesis, the
sense of both clauses being the same.
@@ -6187,12 +6187,12 @@
and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom.
The similes of the poets also have the same effect;
wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced.
For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of
- a word,
prosqe/sei: the addition of the particle of comparison w(s. proqe/sei (the reading of the
- Paris ms.) would mean,
- (1) “manner of setting forth”
- (Cope), or (2) “a metaphor,
- with a preface” (Jebb) (but the meaning
- of this is not clear). The simile only says that one thing
+ a word,prosqe/sei: the addition of the particle of comparison w(s. proqe/sei (the reading of the
+ Paris ms.) would mean,
+ (1) “manner of setting forth”
+ (Cope), or (2) “a metaphor,
+ with a preface” (Jebb) (but the meaning
+ of this is not clear). The simile only says that one thing
resembles another, not, like the metaphor, that it
is another; since the speaker does not say this, the result is
that the mind of the hearer does not go into the matter, and so the chance
@@ -6212,32 +6212,32 @@
when reflection has made the meaning clear.
In regard to the meaning of what is said, then,
such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to
- antithetical statement; for instance, “accounting the peace that all
- shared to be a war against their private interests,”Isoc. 5.73.
- where “war” is opposed to “peace”;
+ antithetical statement; for instance, “accounting the peace that all
+ shared to be a war against their private interests,”Isoc. 5.73.
+ where “war” is opposed to “peace”;
as to words, they are popular if they
contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to
take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer;
- further, if they set things “before the eyes”; for we ought
+ further, if they set things “before the eyes”; for we ought
to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought
- therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.
+ therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.
Of the four kinds of metaphorIn Aristot. Poet. 21
- metaphor and its four classes are defined: “Metaphor consists in
+ metaphor and its four classes are defined: “Metaphor consists in
assigning to a thing the name of something else; and this may take place
either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to
species, or proportionally. An instance of a metaphor from genus to species
- is ‘here stands my ship,’ for
- ‘standing’ is a genus, ‘being
- moored’ a species; from species to genus: ‘Odysseus
- truly has wrought a myriad good deeds,’ for
- ‘myriad’ is a specific large number, used for the
- generic ‘multitude’; from species to species:
- ‘having drawn off the life with the bronze’ and
- ‘having cut it with the unyielding bronze,’ where
- ‘drawn off’ is used in the sense of
- ‘cut,’ and ‘cut’ in the sense of
- ‘drawn off,’ both being species of ‘taking
- away.’” For the proportional metaphor see note on 4.4
+ is ‘here stands my ship,’ for
+ ‘standing’ is a genus, ‘being
+ moored’ a species; from species to genus: ‘Odysseus
+ truly has wrought a myriad good deeds,’ for
+ ‘myriad’ is a specific large number, used for the
+ generic ‘multitude’; from species to species:
+ ‘having drawn off the life with the bronze’ and
+ ‘having cut it with the unyielding bronze,’ where
+ ‘drawn off’ is used in the sense of
+ ‘cut,’ and ‘cut’ in the sense of
+ ‘drawn off,’ both being species of ‘taking
+ away.’” For the proportional metaphor see note on 4.4
above.
the most popular are those
based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during
@@ -6250,80 +6250,80 @@
throat, he was trying to get his accounts examinedeu)/quna was the technical
term for the examination of accounts to which all public officers had to
submit when their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were both
- Athenian generals. “Having the people by the throat” may
+ Athenian generals. “Having the people by the throat” may
refer to the condition of Athens
financially and his unsatisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase
ei)s pni=gma to\n dh=mon e)/xonta is
objected to by Cope, who reads a)gago/nta
- and translates: “that he drove the people into a fit of choking by
- his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way,” i.e.
+ and translates: “that he drove the people into a fit of choking by
+ his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way,” i.e.
he tried to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them.
Another reading suggested is a)/gxonta
- (throttling so as to choke).; on another occasion
- also he exhorted the Athenians to set out for Euboea without delay “and provision themselves there,
+ (throttling so as to choke).
; on another occasion
+ also he exhorted the Athenians to set out for
Euboea without delay “and provision themselves there,
like the decree of Miltiades.
This may refer
to a decree of Miltiades which was so speedily carried out that it became
- proverbial. The expedition was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes.” After the
+ proverbial. The expedition was undertaken to assist
Euboea against
Thebes.” After the
Athenians had made peace with
Epidaurus
- and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared “that they
- had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.”
By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians had
+ and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared “that they
+ had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.”By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians had
deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and plundering a weak
maritime city, and so securing provisions for the war. The word e)fo/dia properly means provisions for a journey
and travelling expenses. Pitholaus called the ParalusThe Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred
- galleys which conveyed state prisoners. “the bludgeon of
- the people,” and Sestos
- “the corn-chestIt commanded the
- trade of the Euxine. of the Piraeus.” Pericles recommended that Aegina, “the eyesore of the
- Piraeus,” should be
- removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very “respectable” person
+ galleys which conveyed state prisoners. “the bludgeon of
+ the people,” and
Sestos
+ “the corn-chest
It commanded the
+ trade of the Euxine. of the
Piraeus.” Pericles recommended that
Aegina, “the eyesore of the
+
Piraeus,” should be
+ removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very “respectable” person
by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that
honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was satisfied with 10
per cent.
Moerocles was a contemporary of
Demosthenes, and an anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a
money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The degree of the
- respectability (or rather, the swindling practices) of
+ respectability (or rather, the swindling practices) of
each is calculated by their respective profits. And the iambic of
Anaxandrides,
Poet of the Middle Comedy:
- Frag. 68 (Kock,
- Com. Att. Frag. 2.). The metaphor in u(perh/menoi is from those who failed to keep the
- term of payment of a fine or debt. Cope translates: “I find
- ( moi) the young ladies
- are . . .” on girls who were
slow to
+ Frag. 68 (
Kock,
+
Com. Att. Frag. 2.). The metaphor in
u(perh/menoi is from those who failed to keep the
+ term of payment of a fine or debt. Cope translates: “I find
+ (
moi) the young ladies
+ are . . .” on girls who were
slow to
marry,
- My daughters are “past the time” of marriage.
+ My daughters are “past the time” of marriage.
And the saying of Polyeuctus
Athenian
orator, contemporary of Demosthenes upon a certain paralytic named
- Speusippus, “that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound
- him in a five-holed pillory of disease.” Cephisodotus called the
- triremes “parti-colored mills,”
As grinding down the tributary states. They differed from
+ Speusippus, “that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound
+ him in a five-holed pillory of disease.” Cephisodotus called the
+ triremes “parti-colored mills,”As grinding down the tributary states. They differed from
ordinary mills in being gaily painted. and
- [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the tavernsContrasted with the Spartan
- “messes,” which were of a plain and simple character, at
+ [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the tavernsContrasted with the Spartan
+ “messes,” which were of a plain and simple character, at
which all the citizens dined together. The tavern orgies, according to
- Diogenes, represented these at Athens. were “the messes” of
+ Diogenes, represented these at Athens. were “the messes” of
Attica. AesionAthenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes. used to say
- that they had “drained” the State into Sicily,Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition. which is a metaphor
- and sets the thing before the eyes. His words “so that Greece uttered a cry” are also in a
+ that they had “drained” the State into Sicily,Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition. which is a metaphor
+ and sets the thing before the eyes. His words “so that Greece uttered a cry” are also in a
manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians
- take care not to hold their “concourses” too often; and in
- the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those “who rush
- together” in the assemblies.Isoc. 5.12. Both sundroma/s and suntre/xontas
+ take care not to hold their “concourses” too often; and in
+ the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those “who rush
+ together” in the assemblies.Isoc. 5.12. Both sundroma/s and suntre/xontas
refer to the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement. And as
Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of
those who fell at Salamis, since her
freedom was buried along with their valor. If the speaker had said that it was
fitting that Greece should weep, her
valor being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one,
whereas
- “freedom” by the side of “valor”
- produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, “The path of my
- words leads through the center of the deeds of Chares”; here the
- metaphor is proportional and the words “through the center”
- create vividness. Also, to say that one “calls upon dangers to help
- against dangers” is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of
- Chabrias said, “not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his
- statue of bronze,”The statue of
+ “freedom” by the side of “valor”
+ produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, “The path of my
+ words leads through the center of the deeds of Chares”; here the
+ metaphor is proportional and the words “through the center”
+ create vividness. Also, to say that one “calls upon dangers to help
+ against dangers” is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of
+ Chabrias said, “not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his
+ statue of bronze,”The statue of
Chabrias, erected after one of his victories, represented him as kneeling on
the ground, the position which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when
awaiting the enemy. The statue was in the agora and could be seen from the
@@ -6331,41 +6331,41 @@
attitude. a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still
vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the
inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And
- “in every way studying poorness of spirit,”Isoc.
- 4.151. for “studying” a thing implies to
+ “in every way studying poorness of spirit,”Isoc.
+ 4.151. for “studying” a thing implies to
increase it.Metaphor from species to genus
- (10.7, first note.), “studying” being
- a species of “increasing.” As a rule one studies to
- increase some good quality, not a bad one. And that “reason
- is a light that God has kindled in the soul,” for both the words
- reason and light make something clear. “For we do not put an end to
- wars, but put them off,”Isoc. 4.172. for both ideas refer to the
- future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a
- metaphor to say that such a treaty is “a trophy far more splendid than
+ (10.7, first note.), “studying” being
+ a species of “increasing.” As a rule one studies to
+ increase some good quality, not a bad one. And that “reason
+ is a light that God has kindled in the soul,” for both the words
+ reason and light make something clear. “For we do not put an end to
+ wars, but put them off,”Isoc. 4.172. for both ideas refer to the
+ future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a
+ metaphor to say that such a treaty is “a trophy far more splendid than
those gained in war; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages
and a single favor of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole
- war”;Isoc. 4.180 (apparently from memory).
+ war”;Isoc. 4.180 (apparently from memory).
for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also
render
a heavy account to the censure of men; for
- rendering an accounteu)/quna (see 10.7, third note) further
+ rendering an accounteu)/quna (see 10.7, third note) further
implies the punishment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts.
is a sort of just punishment.
We have said
that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which
- set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of “before
- the eyes,” and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words
+ set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of “before
+ the eyes,” and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words
that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is
- “four-square”Simonides, frag. 5 (P.L.G. 2.). Both a
+ “four-square”Simonides, frag. 5 (P.L.G. 2.). Both a
good man and a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not
express actuality. is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but
- the phrase does not express actuality, whereas “of one having the
- prime of his life in full bloom”Isoc. 5.10. does; similarly,
- “thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will”Isoc. 5.127. This
+ the phrase does not express actuality, whereas “of one having the
+ prime of his life in full bloom”Isoc. 5.10. does; similarly,
+ “thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will”Isoc. 5.127. This
speech is an appeal to Philip to lead the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam
where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip could claim
the whole of Greece as his
- fatherland, while other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates
- calls the author of Philip's line) were tied down and their outlook
+ fatherland, while other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates
+ calls the author of Philip's line) were tied down and their outlook
narrowed by the laws and constitution of the city in which they
dwelt. expresses actuality, and in
@@ -6373,7 +6373,7 @@
80, with dori/ for
posi/n.
- the word “shooting” contains both actuality and
+ the word “shooting” contains both actuality and
metaphor. And as Homer often, by making use of
metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is to
creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the
@@ -6392,13 +6392,13 @@
- [The arrow] eager to fly [towards the
- crowd].Hom. Il. 4.126.
+ [The arrow] eager to fly [towards the
+ crowd].Hom. Il. 4.126.
- [The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to
+ [The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to
take their fill of flesh.Hom. Il. 11.574.
@@ -6408,16 +6408,16 @@
15.541.
. For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the
- objects are represented as animate: “the shameless stone,”
- “the eager spear-point,” and the rest express actuality.
+ objects are represented as animate: “the shameless stone,”
+ “the eager spear-point,” and the rest express actuality.
Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional
metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one
who is shamelessly treated. In his popular
similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things:
Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind;Hom. Il.
- 13.799. The reference is to the “boiling
- waves of the loud-roaring sea.”
+ 13.799. The reference is to the “boiling
+ waves of the loud-roaring sea.”
for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality is movement.
As we have said before, metaphors should be
@@ -6427,134 +6427,134 @@
arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other.
Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were
identical; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in
- this—that one is hung up above and the other below.The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot
+ this—that one is hung up above and the other below.The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot
hook is above, and the pot hangs down from it. And if
- one were to say “the cities have been reduced to the same
- level,” this amounts to the same in the case of things far
- apart—the equality of “levelling” in regard to
+ one were to say “the cities have been reduced to the same
+ level,” this amounts to the same in the case of things far
+ apart—the equality of “levelling” in regard to
superficies and resources.Cope, retaining
- a)nwmali/sqai (as if from
+ a)nwmali/sqai (as if from
a)nomali/zein, aequalitatem
- restituere Bonitz, cf. a)noma/lwsis) says: “the widely dissimilar
+ restituere Bonitz, cf. a)noma/lwsis) says: “the widely dissimilar
things here compared are the areas of properties and the state offices and
- privileges, which are to be alike equalized,” translating:
- “And the re-equalization of cities, when the same principle is
+ privileges, which are to be alike equalized,” translating:
+ “And the re-equalization of cities, when the same principle is
applied to things standing wide apart, viz. to surface
- (area) and powers (functions,
- offices).” ( a)n- is not negative, but = re.) But the passage quoted
- by Victorius from Isoc. 5.40: “for I
+ (area) and powers (functions,
+ offices).” ( a)n- is not negative, but = re.) But the passage quoted
+ by Victorius from Isoc. 5.40: “for I
know that all the cities of Greece
- have been placed on the same level ( w(mali/sqai) by misfortunes” suggests this
+ have been placed on the same level ( w(mali/sqai) by misfortunes” suggests this
as a preferable reading here, w(mali/sqai
- meaning (1) have been levelled to the ground
- (although the Lexica give no instance of this use),
- (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.
+ meaning (1) have been levelled to the ground
+ (although the Lexica give no instance of this use),
+ (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.
Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor,
and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.proecapata=n.
- Or, reading prosecapata=n, “by
- adding deception.” For it becomes more evident to him that
+ Or, reading prosecapata=n, “by
+ adding deception.”
For it becomes more evident to him that
he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his
- expectation, and the mind seems to say, “How true it is! but I missed
- it.” And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in
- the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that “the grasshoppers will sing to
- themselves from the ground.”
See
+ expectation, and the mind seems to say, “How true it is! but I missed
+ it.” And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in
+ the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that “the grasshoppers will sing to
+ themselves from the ground.”See
2.21.8. And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for
something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus
- calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is
+ calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is
paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous
expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same
effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are
deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance,
the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected:
- And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,
+ And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,
whereas the hearer thought he was going to say
- “sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from the moment
+ “sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from the moment
of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the
proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to
- Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled”
- ( qra/ttei); for while
- pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us;
+ Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled”
+ ( qra/ttei); for while
+ pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us;
for he means something else.According to
- Cope, *qra=|tt' ei)=, “you are no
- better than a Thracian slave-girl.”
+ Cope, *qra=|tt' ei)=, “you are no
+ better than a Thracian slave-girl.”
Therefore the joke is only
agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon
- is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it.
Similarly, “you wish to destroy him (
pe/rsai).”
There is obviously a play on pe/rsai
- (aor. 1 infin. of pe/rqw)
- and *pe/rsai (Persians),
+ is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it. Similarly, “you wish to destroy him ( pe/rsai).”There is obviously a play on pe/rsai
+ (aor. 1 infin. of pe/rqw)
+ and *pe/rsai (Persians),
but no satisfactory interpretation of the joke has been suggested.
Jokes of both these kindsThe paradoxical and
- verbal. “Suitably” may refer to the manner of delivery;
+ verbal. “Suitably” may refer to the manner of delivery;
to being used at the proper time; or to taking care that the word is one
that may be used in the two senses. must be suitably expressed.
- Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that “the empire of
- the sea” was not “the beginning of misfortunes”
+ Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that “the empire of
+ the sea” was not “the beginning of misfortunes”
for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates,Isoc. 5.61; Isoc. 8.101. The point in the illustrations lies
in the use of a)rxh/, first in the sense of
- “empire,” then in that of
- “beginning.” It could be said that the
- “empire” of the sea was or was not “the
- beginning of misfortunes” for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to them, but
+ “empire,” then in that of
+ “beginning.” It could be said that the
+ “empire” of the sea was or was not “the
+ beginning of misfortunes” for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to them, but
in the end brought disaster, and thus was the
- “beginning” of evil. that
- “empire” was “the beginning of misfortunes for the
- city”; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said
+ “beginning” of evil. that
+ “empire” was “the beginning of misfortunes for the
+ city”; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said
is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that
- “empire is empire” shows no cleverness, but this is not what
+ “empire is empire” shows no cleverness, but this is not what
he means, but something else; in the first, the
a)rxh/ which is negatived is used in a different sense.
In all these cases, success is attained when a word is
appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the
- phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,
Usually translated, “There is no bearing
- Baring.” there is a contradiction of the homonym, which is
- only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, “Thou
- shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger,” or “not
- more than you should be,” which is the same thing. And again,
+ phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,Usually translated, “There is no bearing
+ Baring.” there is a contradiction of the homonym, which is
+ only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, “Thou
+ shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger,” or “not
+ more than you should be,” which is the same thing. And again,
The stranger must not always be a stranger,
for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense.Kock,
C.A.F. 3.209, p. 448. In the two first examples
- “stranger” refers to a distant and reserved manner, as
- we say “don't make yourself a stranger”; in the third
+ “stranger” refers to a distant and reserved manner, as
+ we say “don't make yourself a stranger”; in the third
ce/nos is apparently to be taken in the
- sense of “alien.” Cope translates: “for that
- too is of a different kind” (foreign, alien to the two
+ sense of “alien.” Cope translates: “for that
+ too is of a different kind” (foreign, alien to the two
others; a)llo/trion, belonging to something
- or somebody else, opposed to oi)kei=on). But the whole passage is obscure. It
+ or somebody else, opposed to oi)kei=on). But the whole passage is obscure. It
is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides,
It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death;Kock, C.A.F. 2. Frag. 64, p.
163.
-
for this is the same as saying that “it is worthy to die when
- one does not
deserve to die,” or, that
- “it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death,” or,
- “when one does nothing that is worthy of death.” Now the form of expression of these sayings is the
+
for this is the same as saying that “it is worthy to die when
+ one does not
deserve to die,” or, that
+ “it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death,” or,
+ “when one does nothing that is worthy of death.”
Now the form of expression of these sayings is the
same; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater
is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and
conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly.
Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must
always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is
possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance,
- “One ought to die guiltless of any offence,” “The
- worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife.” There is no smartness
+ “One ought to die guiltless of any offence,” “The
+ worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife.” There is no smartness
in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are
- fulfilled: “It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of
- death.” The more special qualities the expression possesses, the
+ fulfilled: “It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of
+ death.” The more special qualities the expression possesses, the
smarter it appears; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a
metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.
Similes also, as said above, are always in a
manner approved metaphors;Or, reading
- ai( for a)ei\, “approved similes are . . .”
+ ai( for a)ei\, “approved similes are . . .”
since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when
we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre
without strings.
But such an
expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a
goblet, it is.In the simple metaphor
- “goblet” is substituted for
- “shield,” but sometimes additions are made to the word
- as differently applied, such as “of Ares” and
- “without strings.” These additions, besides involving
- greater detail (a characteristic of the simile),
+ “goblet” is substituted for
+ “shield,” but sometimes additions are made to the word
+ as differently applied, such as “of Ares” and
+ “without strings.” These additions, besides involving
+ greater detail (a characteristic of the simile),
distinctly bring out the contrast of the two terms and make a simile,
whereas the metaphor simply transfers the meaning.
And similes may be formed as follows: a
@@ -6571,8 +6571,8 @@
snake. It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail,
but applauded if they succeed. I mean, for instance, when they introduce an
answering clause:When the concluding
- corresponds with the introductory expression. This “answering
- clause” is called apodosis (5.2), not
+ corresponds with the introductory expression. This “answering
+ clause” is called apodosis (5.2), not
restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion of a conditional sentence.
@@ -6587,29 +6587,29 @@
Proverbs also are metaphors from species to
species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which
he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as
- the CarpathianOr, “he says it is a
- case of the Carpathian and the hare.” An inhabitant of the island
+ the CarpathianOr, “he says it is a
+ case of the Carpathian and the hare.” An inhabitant of the island
of Carpathus introduced a brace of
hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all the crops and ruined the
- farmers (like the rabbits in Australia). says of the hare; for both have
experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all
+ farmers (like the rabbits in Australia). says of the hare; for both have
experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all
that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them
so.
Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For
- instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, “you
- would have thought he was a basket of mulberries,” because the black
+ instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, “you
+ would have thought he was a basket of mulberries,” because the black
eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole.
- Again, when one says “like this or that” there is a
+ Again, when one says “like this or that” there is a
hyperbole differing only in the wording:
Like Philammon punching the leather sack,
-
or, “you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting
- the sack”;
+
or, “you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting
+ the sack”;
Carrying his legs twisted like parsley,
-
or, “you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley,
- they being so twisted.” There is something youthful about hyperboles;
+
or, “you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley,
+ they being so twisted.” There is something youthful about hyperboles;
for they show vehemence. Wherefore those
who are in a passion most frequently make use of them:
@@ -6619,10 +6619,10 @@
in accomplishments.Hom. Il. 9.385.
-
(Attic orators are
+
(Attic orators are
especially fond of hyperbole.This must be
taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is Aristotle's at
- all.) WhereforeBecause they
+ all.) WhereforeBecause they
are boyish. it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.
But we must
not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of
@@ -6646,40 +6646,40 @@
acting.What follows, to the end of sect.
3, is of the nature of a parenthesis, not immediately connected with the
subject of the chapter.
- (But one must vary the expression
+ (But one must vary the expression
when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for
declamation:The variation in the form of
the expression suggests a similar variation in the form of the delivery or
- declamation. as, “This is he who robbed you, this is he who
- deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you.” This is
+ declamation. as, “This is he who robbed you, this is he who
+ deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you.” This is
what Philemon the actor did in
The Old Man's Folly of
- Anaxandrides, when he says “Rhadamanthus and Palamedes,” and
- when he repeats the word “I” in the prologue to
The
+ Anaxandrides, when he says “Rhadamanthus and Palamedes,” and
+ when he repeats the word “I” in the prologue to The
Pious.The meaning of this has not
been satisfactorily explained. On the face of it, it seems to mean that the
excellence of Philemon's delivery consisted in his way of declaiming
passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon is not to be
confused with the writer of the New Comedy, the rival and contemporary of
Menander. For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a
- case of “the man who carries the beam”Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker. in the
- proverb.)
- It is the same with asyndeta: “I came,
- I met, I entreated.” For here delivery is needed, and the words should
+ case of “the man who carries the beam”Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker. in the
+ proverb.)
+ It is the same with asyndeta: “I came,
+ I met, I entreated.” For here delivery is needed, and the words should
not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one
clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space
of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes
many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will
be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces
- amplification: thus, in “I came, I conversed, I besought,”
+ amplification: thus, in “I came, I conversed, I besought,”
the hearer seems to be
surveying many things, all that the speaker said.Spengel's reading here is: polla\
- dokei=: “u(perei=den o(/sa ei)=pon,” polla\
+ dokei=: “u(perei=den o(/sa ei)=pon,” polla\
dokei= being parenthetical, and u(perei=don
o(/sa ei)=pon part of the quotation. Jebb translates:
- “I came, I spoke to him, I besought” (these
- seem many things); “he disregarded all I
- said” (which certainly gives a more natural sense to
- u(perei=don). This also
+ “I came, I spoke to him, I besought” (these
+ seem many things); “he disregarded all I
+ said” (which certainly gives a more natural sense to
+ u(perei=don). This also
is Homer's intention in the passage
Nireus, again, from Syme . .
@@ -6691,10 +6691,10 @@
for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often
mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been
- saidCope translates: “they
+ saidCope translates: “they
think that, if the name is often repeated, there must be a great deal
- to say about its owner”; but can this be got out of the
- Greek ( ei)rh=sqai)?; so that, by means of this fallacy,
+ to say about its owner”; but can this be got out of the
+ Greek ( ei)rh=sqai)?; so that, by means of this fallacy,
Homer has increased the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one
passage; he has perpetuated his memory, though he never speaks of him again.
The deliberative style is exactly like a rough
@@ -6708,14 +6708,14 @@
there is no discussion,The meaning apparently
is that there is no discussion, as might be the case when there were several
judges, so that the decision is clear and unbiased. a)gw/n and a)gwnistikh\
- le/cis are terms used for debate (e.g. in the law
- courts) and the style suited to it (cf sect. 1).
+ le/cis are terms used for debate (e.g. in the law
+ courts) and the style suited to it (cf sect. 1).
Cope's editor refers to Cic. Ad Att.
- 1.16.8 “remoto illo studio contentionis, quem vos
- [you Athenians] a)gw=na
- appellatis.” Jebb translates: “the turmoil is absent, so
- that the judgement is serene” (in a note,
- “unclouded”). so the judgement is clear.
+ 1.16.8 “remoto illo studio contentionis, quem vos
+ [you Athenians] a)gw=na
+ appellatis.” Jebb translates: “the turmoil is absent, so
+ that the judgement is serene” (in a note,
+ “unclouded”). so the judgement is clear.
This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles; where action is
most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which
voice, especially a loud one, is needed.
@@ -6733,7 +6733,7 @@
appropriate? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be clear; but it
is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style
pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and
- “foreign” words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting
+ “foreign” words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting
from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style; of all the three
kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains
to speak of arrangement.
@@ -6748,14 +6748,14 @@
defined, or a refutation;
or
an epilogue in demonstrative speeches?The
generally accepted divisions are: prooi/mion
- (exordium), dih/ghsis
- (narrative), pi/stis
- (proof), e)pi/logos
- (peroration). ( dih/ghsis is a species of pro/qesis, which is used instead of it just before.)
- Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the forensic
+ (exordium), dih/ghsis
+ (narrative), pi/stis
+ (proof), e)pi/logos
+ (peroration). ( dih/ghsis is a species of pro/qesis, which is used instead of it just before.)
+ Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the forensic
speech which requires a regular dih/ghsis, a
full and detailed statement of what has happened before. In epideictic and
- demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the object of which
+ demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the object of which
is to prove something, there is no need of another existing division called
the refutation of the adversary, and in the demonstrative there can be no
room for an epilogue, which is not a summary of proofs and
@@ -6767,27 +6767,27 @@
epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is
short, or the matter is easy to recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is
that there is a reduction of length.i.e. its
- use is to recall the main facts briefly (sect. 4 end),
+ use is to recall the main facts briefly (sect. 4 end),
which in a short speech is needless.
So then the necessary parts of a speech are the
statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every
- speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium,
+ speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium,
statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs,
and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of
the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the
epilogue are merely aids to memory. Therefore,
if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following TheodorusPlat. Phaedrus
266d, where the additional kinds of narrative are omitted, and
- their place taken by pi/stwsis and e)pipi/stwsis (confirmation of the
- proof). and his school, who distinguished narrative,
+ their place taken by pi/stwsis and e)pipi/stwsis (confirmation of the
+ proof).
and his school, who distinguished narrative,
additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional
refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a
real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms
- introduced by Licymnius in his “Art,” where he speaks of
- “being wafted along,” “wandering from the
- subject,”Or,
- “diverting the judge's attention.” and
- “ramifications.”
+ introduced by Licymnius in his “Art,” where he speaks of
+ “being wafted along,” “wandering from the
+ subject,”Or,
+ “diverting the judge's attention.” and
+ “ramifications.”
The exordium
is the beginning of a speech, as
the prologue in poetry
and the prelude in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a
@@ -6806,8 +6806,8 @@
appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous.
In epideictic speeches, the sources of the
exordia are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the
Olympiacus,
- says, “Men of Greece, you are
- worthy to be admired by many,” where he is praising those who
+ says, “Men of Greece, you are
+ worthy to be admired by many,” where he is praising those who
instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand blames them
because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of
wisdom. Exordia may also be derived from
@@ -6820,19 +6820,19 @@
He complains that whereas the poets of olden times had plenty to write
about, the field of poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all
apportioned, and he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find
- “a new chariot for the race-course of his song.
- ”:
+ “a new chariot for the race-course of his song.
+ ”:
But now when all has been allotted.
-
These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise,
+
These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise,
blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer. And these exordiae)ndo/sima =
prooi/mia. may be either foreign
or intimately connected with the speech.
As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it
must be noted that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic
- exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia:
- For thee and thy presents or spoils).A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic
+ exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia:
+ For thee and thy presents or spoils).A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic
exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like prologues and
epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, which may be wild,
high-flown, as in the example given from an unknown author.
@@ -6854,8 +6854,8 @@
Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into
- Europe.From Choerilus (sect.
- 4).
+ Europe.From Choerilus (sect.
+ 4).
Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not
at the outset,
like Euripides, at least somewhere in the
@@ -6869,9 +6869,9 @@
speech; wherefore it should not be employed, if the subject is quite clear or
unimportant. All the other forms of exordia in
use are only remedies,That is, special
- remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from “inattention,
- unfavorable disposition, and the like”
- (Cope). and are common to all three branches of
+ remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from “inattention,
+ unfavorable disposition, and the like”
+ (Cope). and are common to all three branches of
Rhetoric. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the
opponent. From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create
prejudice. But this must not be done in the same way; for the defendant must
@@ -6903,9 +6903,9 @@
hearer's attention at the beginning, for every one is keen to listen then,
but later on attention slackens. at the beginning, at a time when all
listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one
- must say, “And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as
- myself”; and, “I will tell you such a thing as you have
- never yet” heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus
+ must say, “And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as
+ myself”; and, “I will tell you such a thing as you have
+ never yet” heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus
used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his
fifty-drachma lecture. But it is clear that
one does not speak thus to the hearer qua hearer;The hearer qua hearer should be
@@ -6914,8 +6914,8 @@
their exordia endeavor either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own
apprehensions:
- O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come
- breathless].Soph. Ant. 223.
+ O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come
+ breathless].Soph. Ant. 223.
@@ -6934,9 +6934,9 @@
the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.
In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the
praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some
- way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it
+ way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it
is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the
- presence of Lacedaemonians.”See
+ presence of Lacedaemonians.”See
1.9.30.
Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from
forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers
@@ -6947,14 +6947,14 @@
importance of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia; or else they merely
serve the purpose of ornament,
since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium
on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements,
- starts off at once, “Elis,
- happy city.”
+ starts off at once, “Elis,
+ happy city.”
One way of
removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear
oneself from disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference whether this
suspicion has been openly expressed or not; and so this may be taken as a
general rule. Another wayAnother reading is to/pos
- (topic) and so throughout. consists in contesting
+ (topic) and so throughout. consists in contesting
the disputed points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, at least to
the plaintiff; or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated; or that it is
not unjust at all, or only slightly so; or neither disgraceful nor important.
@@ -6970,18 +6970,18 @@
for it was against his wish that he was eighty years of age.Sophocles had two sons, Iophon and Ariston, by different
wives; the latter had a son named Sophocles. Iophon, jealous of the
affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson, summoned him before the
- phratores (a body which had some jurisdiction in
- family affairs) on the ground that his age rendered him incapable
+ phratores (a body which had some jurisdiction in
+ family affairs) on the ground that his age rendered him incapable
of managing his affairs. In reply to the charge, Sophocles read the famous
choric ode on Attica from the
- Oedipus Coloneus, beginning *eu)i/ppou, ce/ne, ta=sde xw/ras (Soph. OC 668 ff.), and was
+ Oedipus Coloneus, beginning *eu)i/ppou, ce/ne, ta=sde xw/ras (Soph. OC 668 ff.), and was
acquitted. The story in this form is probably derived from some comedy,
- which introduced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the
- tragedy). One may also substitute one motive for another,
+ which introduced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the
+ tragedy). One may also substitute one motive for another,
and say that one did not mean to injure but to do something else, not that of
- which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental: “I
+ which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental: “I
should deserve
your hatred, had I acted so as to bring
- this about.”
+ this about.”
Another method may be employed if the accuser,
either himself or one closely related to him, has been involved in a similar
charge, either now or formerly; or, if others
@@ -6991,8 +6991,8 @@
Again, if the accuser has already similarly
accused others, or himself been accused by others;In the reading in the text, au)tou/s must apparently refer to the defendant, and one would
rather expect au)to/n. Spengel suggested
- h)\ a)/llos h)\ au)to/s for h)\ a)/llos au)tou/s: if he (i.e. the
- adversary) or another has similarly accused others. or if
+ h)\ a)/llos h)\ au)to/s for h)\ a)/llos au)tou/s: if he (i.e. the
+ adversary) or another has similarly accused others. or if
others, without being formally accused, have been suspected as you are now, and
their innocence has been proved.
Another method consists in counter-attacking the
@@ -7000,25 +7000,25 @@
unworthy of belief.
Another method is to appeal to a verdict already
given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange of property;When a citizen was called upon to perform a
- “liturgy” or public service (e.g. the equipment
- of a chorus), if he thought that one richer than himself had been
+ “liturgy” or public service (e.g. the equipment
+ of a chorus), if he thought that one richer than himself had been
passed over he could summon him and compel him to exchange
properties. when Hygiaenon accused him of impiety as having advised
perjury in the verse,
My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,Eur. Hipp. 612.
This well-known verse is three times parodied in Aristophanes
- (Aristoph. Thes.
+ (Aristoph. Thes.
275; Aristoph. Frogs
101, Aristoph.
- Frogs1471). In the first passage, the sense is
+ Frogs1471). In the first passage, the sense is
reversed: Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a
woman in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly.
Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he
will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides takes
an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says to
- Euripides: “Remember that it was your mind that swore,
- but not your tongue.” When Euripides was engaged in a
+ Euripides: “Remember that it was your mind that swore,
+ but not your tongue.” When Euripides was engaged in a
lawsuit, his adversary quoted the line, implying that even on
oath Euripides could not be believed; Euripides replied that his
adversary had no right to bring before the law courts a matter
@@ -7031,10 +7031,10 @@
adversary desired to accuse him.
Another method consists in attacking slander,
showing how great an evil it is, and this because it alters the nature of
- judgements,Or, “makes
- extraneous points the subject of decision”
- (Cope), “raises false issues”
- (Jebb). and that it does not rely on the real facts
+ judgements,Or, “makes
+ extraneous points the subject of decision”
+ (Cope), “raises false issues”
+ (Jebb). and that it does not rely on the real facts
of the case.
Common to both parties is the topic of tokens,
as in the
Teucer,Of Sophocles. Odysseus reproaches Teucer with being a
relative of Priam, whose sister his mother Hesione was; to which Teucer replied
@@ -7049,7 +7049,7 @@
praise something unimportant at great length, and to condemn something important
concisely; or, putting forward several things that are praiseworthy in the
opponent, to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing upon the case.
- Such methodsJebb refers toiou=toi to the accusers, translating texnikoi/ “artistic,” certainly the
+ Such methodsJebb refers toiou=toi to the accusers, translating texnikoi/ “artistic,” certainly the
commoner meaning. are most artful and unfair; for by their use men
endeavor to make what is good in a man injurious to him, by mixing it up with
what is bad.
@@ -7064,9 +7064,9 @@
In the
epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive, but disjointed; for it
is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech. For
- a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being
+ a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being
in no way the author
of the actions which he
- relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists
+ relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists
in showing that the action did take place, if it be incredible, or that it is of
a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together. This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all
the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kindInvolving a continuous succession of proofs. is
@@ -7074,34 +7074,34 @@
others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the
other is intricate and not plain. It is only
necessary to recall famous actions; wherefore most people have no need of
- narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles; for everybody
+ narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles; for everybody
knows what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you wish
to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did
. . .Something has been lost here, as is
shown by the transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss.
have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing the passage
e)/sti d' e)/painos . . . metateqh|=
- (1.9.33-37).
+ (1.9.33-37).
But at the present day it is absurdly laid down
that the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man said to the baker when
- he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, “What! is it
- impossible to knead it well?” so it is in this case; for the narrative
+ he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, “What! is it
+ impossible to knead it well?” so it is in this case; for the narrative
must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either. For in this case also
propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a due mean;
that is, one must say all that will make the facts clear,
or create the belief that they have
happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish
to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite. And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your
- own virtue, for instance, “I always recommended him to act rightly,
- not to forsake his children”; or the wickedness of your opponent, for
- instance, “but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always
- find other children,” an answer attributed by HerodotusHdt. 2.30. The story
+ own virtue, for instance, “I always recommended him to act rightly,
+ not to forsake his children”; or the wickedness of your opponent, for
+ instance, “but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always
+ find other children,” an answer attributed by HerodotusHdt. 2.30. The story
was that a number of Egyptian soldiers had revolted and left in a body for
Ethiopia. Their king
Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives and children, to which
- one of them made answer ( tw=n de/ tina
+ one of them made answer ( tw=n de/ tina
le/getai de/canta to\ ai)doi=on ei)pei=n, e)/nqa a)\n tou=to h)=|,
e)/sesqai au)toi=si e)nqau=ta kai\ te/kna kai\
- gunai=kas). to the Egyptian rebels; or anything
+ gunai=kas). to the Egyptian rebels; or anything
which is likely to please the dicasts.
In defence, the narrative need not be so long;
for the points at issue are either that the fact has not happened or that it was
@@ -7123,11 +7123,11 @@
mathematical treatises have no
moral character, because
neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end. But the Socratic
dialogues have; for they discuss such questions. Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each
- individual character; for instance, “He was talking and walking on at
- the same time,” which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should
+ individual character; for instance, “He was talking and walking on at
+ the same time,” which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should
we speak as if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day orators; but
- from moral purpose: “But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if
- I profited nothing, it is better.” The first statement indicates
+ from moral purpose: “But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if
+ I profited nothing, it is better.” The first statement indicates
prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is
useful, virtue in that of what is honorable. If anything of the kind seems
incredible, then the reason must be added; of this Sophocles gives an example,
@@ -7148,7 +7148,7 @@
Further, the narrative should draw upon what is
emotional by the introduction of such of its accompaniments as are well known,
and of what is specially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary:
- “And he went off looking grimly at me”;
and as AeschinesSupposed to be Aeschines called Socraticus from his intimate
+ “And he went off looking grimly at me”;
and as AeschinesSupposed to be Aeschines called Socraticus from his intimate
friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and writer of speeches for the law
courts, he had a great reputation as an orator. says of Cratylus,
that he hissed violently and violently shook his fists. Such details produce
@@ -7161,8 +7161,8 @@
for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on their eyes. And you
should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as being of a certain
character, that the hearers may regard you or him as such; but do not let it be
- seen. That this is easy is perfectly cleardei= (omitted by
- others) = “one cannot help seeing.” from
+ seen. That this is easy is perfectly cleardei= (omitted by
+ others) = “one cannot help seeing.” from
the example of messengers; we do not yet know what they are going to say, but
nevertheless we have an inkling of it.
Again, the narrative should be introduced in
@@ -7175,20 +7175,20 @@
incredible, you should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once
and to submit it to the judgement of any whom the hearers approve;Omitting te.
The difficulty is diata/ttein, which can
- apparently only mean “arrange.” Jebb retains te, and reads w(s
- for oi(=s: “the speaker must make
+ apparently only mean “arrange.” Jebb retains te, and reads w(s
+ for oi(=s: “the speaker must make
himself responsible for the fact . . . and marshal his reasons in a way
- acceptable to the hearers.” The old Latin translation vadiare quibus volunt suggested to Roemer diaithtai=s, “to the arbitrators they
- approve.” as, for instance, Jocasta in the
+ acceptable to the hearers.” The old Latin translation vadiare quibus volunt suggested to Roemer diaithtai=s, “to the arbitrators they
+ approve.” as, for instance, Jocasta in the
Oedipus of CarcinusAccording
to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible things about her son, and
- pledges her word for the facts. Cope says: “promises (to
- do something or other to satisfy him).” is always
+ pledges her word for the facts. Cope says: “promises (to
+ do something or other to satisfy him).” is always
promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiries
of her; and similarly Haemon in Sophocles.Soph. Ant.
- 683-723. On this Cope remarks: “This last example must be
+ 683-723. On this Cope remarks: “This last example must be
given up as hopeless; there is nothing in the extant play which could be
- interpreted as required here.” According to Jebb, the
- “incredibility” consists in the fact that Haemon,
+ interpreted as required here.” According to Jebb, the
+ “incredibility” consists in the fact that Haemon,
although in love with Antigone, and strongly opposed to the sentence
pronounced upon her by his father Creon, still remains loyal to the latter.
Haemon explains the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his
@@ -7205,16 +7205,16 @@
of fact that one of the two parties must necessarilyAristotle's argument is as follows. But it must not be
forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of fact that one
of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. For ignorance is not the
- cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. “you
- hit me,” “no, I didn't,” where both know the
- truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so
- that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (i.e.
- because here you can prove or disprove that A is ponhro/s). The passage is generally taken to mean
+ cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. “you
+ hit me,” “no, I didn't,” where both know the
+ truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so
+ that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (i.e.
+ because here you can prove or disprove that A is ponhro/s). The passage is generally taken to mean
that when it is a question of fact it is universally true that one of the
disputants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes any comment. In
- his note he says: “all that is meant is that there is a certain
+ his note he says: “all that is meant is that there is a certain
class of cases which fall under this issue, in which this topic may be
- safely used.” For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B
+ safely used.” For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B
with theft; B denies it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is
strongly against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is necessarily
ponhro/s. be a rogue; for
@@ -7224,8 +7224,8 @@
In epideictic speeches, amplification is
employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honorable or useful; for the facts
must be taken on trust, since proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they
- are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.Or, reading a)/llws, “if there is some other
- reason.”
+ are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.Or, reading a)/llws, “if there is some other
+ reason.”
In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained
either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary
recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so
@@ -7247,7 +7247,7 @@
4.204.
- where Homer does not say toiau=ta (such things as), but to/sa (as many things as). Nor
+ where Homer does not say toiau=ta (such things as), but to/sa (as many things as). Nor
should you try to find enthymemes about everything; otherwise you will be
imitating certain philosophers, who draw conclusions that are better known and
more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.For this passage see 1.2.12-13. The meaning is that it is
@@ -7260,10 +7260,10 @@
involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.
Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used
in both narrative and proof; for they express moral character; for instance,
- “I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to
- trust.” Or, to arouse emotion:
“I do
+ “I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to
+ trust.” Or, to arouse emotion:
“I do
not regret it, although I have been wronged; his is the profit, mine the
- right.”
+ right.”
Deliberative speaking is more difficult than
forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future; whereas
forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known, even by
@@ -7271,11 +7271,11 @@
but only things that were past but obscure.The remark of Epimenides is by many editors interpreted as a sarcasm upon
the fraternity of soothsayers, who pretended to be able to foretell
the future. But how is this to be got out of the Greek? The point
- is perhaps something like: “it is easy enough to talk about the
- past, for even soothsayers know it.” What Aristotle says here is
+ is perhaps something like: “it is easy enough to talk about the
+ past, for even soothsayers know it.” What Aristotle says here is
that Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating to the
obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an instance. After the
- followers of Cylon, who tried to make himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had
+ followers of Cylon, who tried to make himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had
been put to death by the Alcmaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the
terms of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was devastated by a
pestilence. On the advice of the oracle, Epimenides was summoned from
@@ -7283,14 +7283,14 @@
sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence.
Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a
starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative
- speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance,
+ speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance,
attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion.
In this branch of Rhetoric there is less room for these than in any other,
unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for
topics, one must do as the orators at Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating, he
brings accusations against the Lacedaemonians, for instance, in the
Panegyricus,Isoc. 4.110-114. and against Chares in
- the Symmachikos (On the Peace).Isoc. 8.27.
+ the Symmachikos (On the Peace).Isoc. 8.27.
Epideictic speeches should be varied with
laudatory episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always bringing
somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant when he said that he was never at a loss
@@ -7310,19 +7310,19 @@
form between the demonstrative and refutative enthymeme, but the latter
draws opposite conclusions; and opposites are always more striking when they
are brought together, and a parallel drawn between them. It is then easy to
- see where the fallacy lies. Cf. 2.23.30: “Refutative enthymemes
- are more effective (popular) than demonstrative, because
+ see where the fallacy lies. Cf. 2.23.30: “Refutative enthymemes
+ are more effective (popular) than demonstrative, because
they bring opposites together in a small compass, which are more striking
- (clearer) to the hearer from being put side by
- side.”
+ (clearer) to the hearer from being put side by
+ side.”
The refutation of the opponent is not a
particular kind of proof; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection,
partly by counter-syllogism.In the
translation tw=n pi/stewn is taken with
e)/sti: it is the business of, the
proper function of, proofs. Others take it with ta\
- me\n . . . ta\ de/: some . . . other (of the
- opponent's arguments). In both deliberative and forensic
+ me\n . . . ta\ de/: some . . . other (of the
+ opponent's arguments). In both deliberative and forensic
rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own proofs and afterwards meet the
arguments of the opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if
the opposition is varied,If the opponent's
@@ -7341,8 +7341,8 @@
the most important, or those which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that
you should substantiate your own case:
- I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not
- think] that Hera . . .Eur. Tro. 969-971.
+ I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not
+ think] that Hera . . .Eur. Tro. 969-971.
Hecuba had advised Menelaus to put Helen to death; she defends
herself at length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which
these words form part. Her argument is that none of the three
@@ -7365,7 +7365,7 @@
There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be sworn
impossible,Archilochus
- (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule, the daughter of
+ (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule, the daughter of
Lycambes. Her father broke off the engagement, whereupon
Archilochus pursued father and daughter with furious and
scurrilous abuse. It is here said that, instead of attacking the
@@ -7373,14 +7373,14 @@
father. The meaning of a)/elpton
is not clear. It may be a general statement: the unexpected
often happens; or, there is nothing so bad that you may not
- expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates: “There is
- nothing that money cannot procure,” meaning that the
- father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag.
- 74).
+ expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates: “There is
+ nothing that money cannot procure,” meaning that the
+ father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag.
+ 74).
and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse beginning
- I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges;The line ends: tou= poluxru/sou me/lei. Archilochus
+ I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges;The line ends: tou= poluxru/sou me/lei. Archilochus
represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own
disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused by
others possessing it.
@@ -7391,25 +7391,25 @@
rumor. introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as
if quoting the opinion of others. One should
also sometimes change enthymemes into moral maxims; for instance,
- “Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous; for
- in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages,” which is
- equivalent to the enthymeme “If men should become reconciled whenever
+ “Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous; for
+ in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages,” which is
+ equivalent to the enthymeme “If men should become reconciled whenever
it is most useful and advantageous, they should be reconciled in a time of
- prosperity.”
+ prosperity.”
In regard to
interrogation, its employment is especially opportune,
when the opponent has already stated the opposite,
so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdityThe words o(/tan . . .
- h)=| have been variously translated: (1)
+ h)=| have been variously translated: (1)
when one of the two alternatives has already been stated;
- (2) when the opponent has stated what is different from
- the fact; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so
- much, “made one admission”
- (Jebb).; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated
+ (2) when the opponent has stated what is different from
+ the fact; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so
+ much, “made one admission”
+ (Jebb).
; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated
Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the savior goddess. On Lampon
replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about
them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when
- he said yes, Pericles further asked, “How can that be, seeing that you
- are uninitiated?” Again,
+ he said yes, Pericles further asked, “How can that be, seeing that you
+ are uninitiated?” Again,
interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident,
and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the
interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should
@@ -7418,33 +7418,33 @@
the gods, askedReading h)/reto. whether he did not say that there was a
divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine
beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus
- again said yes, Socrates rejoined, “Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods
- exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist?”
+ again said yes, Socrates rejoined, “Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods
+ exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist?”
Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts
himself or puts forward a paradox. Further,
when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical
- solution; for if he answers, “Partly yes, and partly no,”
- “Some are, but some are not,” “In one sense it is
- so, in another not,” the hearers cry out against him as being in a
+ solution; for if he answers, “Partly yes, and partly no,”
+ “Some are, but some are not,” “In one sense it is
+ so, in another not,” the hearers cry out against him as being in a
difficulty.For the first of the quibbles
Sandys refers to Aristoph. Ach. 396,
where Cephisophon, being asked if Euripides was indoors, replies,
- “Yes and no, if you understand me”; and he gives the
+ “Yes and no, if you understand me”; and he gives the
explanation, his mind is outside, collecting scraps of poetry, while he
- himself is upstairs ( a)naba/dhn,
- unless it means “with his legs up”) composing a
+ himself is upstairs ( a)naba/dhn,
+ unless it means “with his legs up”) composing a
tragedy. The reference in the second instance is to the adversary being
reduced to such a position that he cannot answer without having recourse to
sophistical divisions and distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty.
- Aristotle himself is fond of such “cautiously limited
- judgements” (Gomperz). The translation is that
+ Aristotle himself is fond of such “cautiously limited
+ judgements” (Gomperz). The translation is that
of the reading a)porou=ntos, a conjecture of
Spengel's. The audience will be ready to express its disapproval of his
shuffling answers, which are evidence of his perplexity. The ordinary
reading a)porou=ntes attributes the
- “perplexity” to the hearers. Or, “the hearers,
- thinking he is puzzled, applaud us [the
- interrogator]” (Jebb). In other
+ “perplexity” to the hearers. Or, “the hearers,
+ thinking he is puzzled, applaud us [the
+ interrogator]” (Jebb). In other
cases interrogation should not be attempted; for if the adversary raises an
objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated; for it is impossible to ask a
number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. Wherefore also we should
@@ -7460,25 +7460,25 @@
question, we should state the reason for our answer. For instance,
SophoclesCp. 1.14.3. being asked
by Pisander whether he, like the rest of the Committee of Ten, had approved the
- setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. “What then?”
- asked Pisander, “did not this appear to you to be a wicked
- thing?” Sophocles admitted it. “So then you did what was
- wicked?” “Yes, for there was nothing better to be
- done.” The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephoralty,
+ setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. “What then?”
+ asked Pisander, “did not this appear to you to be a wicked
+ thing?” Sophocles admitted it. “So then you did what was
+ wicked?” “Yes, for there was nothing better to be
+ done.” The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephoralty,
being asked if he did not think that the rest of his colleagues had been justly
- put to death, answered yes. “But did not you pass the same measures as
- they did?” “Yes.” “Would not you, then,
- also be justly put to death?” “No; for my colleagues did
- this for money; I did not, but acted according to my conscience.” For
+ put to death, answered yes. “But did not you pass the same measures as
+ they did?” “Yes.” “Would not you, then,
+ also be justly put to death?” “No; for my colleagues did
+ this for money; I did not, but acted according to my conscience.” For
this reason we should not ask any further questions after drawing the
conclusion,
nor put the
conclusion itself as a question, unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in
our favor.
As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful
- in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents'
+ in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents'
earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the
PoeticsThe chapters are
- lost (cp. 1.11.29). how many kinds of jests there
+ lost (cp. 1.11.29). how many kinds of jests there
are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose
the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the
first is employed on one's own account, the second on that of another.
@@ -7487,8 +7487,8 @@
unfavorably towards the adversary; to amplify and depreciate; to excite the
emotions of the hearer; to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you are
truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to
- praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.Or, “mould the hearers to one's will”
- (L. and S.). One of two things should be aimed at,
+ praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.Or, “mould the hearers to one's will”
+ (L. and S.). One of two things should be aimed at,
to show that you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary
either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which serve to represent men as
good or bad have already been stated.Book
@@ -7500,7 +7500,7 @@
previously existing. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been
previously set forth.Book 2.19.
Next, when the nature and importance of the
- facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity,
+ facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity,
indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The topics
of these also have been previously stated,Book 2.1-11.
so that all that remains is to recapitulate
@@ -7513,20 +7513,20 @@
We should begin by saying that we have kept our
promise, and then state what we have said and why. Our case may also be closely
compared with our opponent's; and we may either compare what both of us have
- said on the same point, or without direct comparison: “My opponent
- said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point
and for these reasons.” Or ironically, as
- for instance, “He said this and I answered that; what would he have
- done, if he had proved this, and not simply that?” Or by
- interrogation: “What is there that has not been proved?” or,
- “What has my opponent proved?” We may, therefore, either sum
+ said on the same point, or without direct comparison: “My opponent
+ said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point
and for these reasons.” Or ironically, as
+ for instance, “He said this and I answered that; what would he have
+ done, if he had proved this, and not simply that?” Or by
+ interrogation: “What is there that has not been proved?” or,
+ “What has my opponent proved?” We may, therefore, either sum
up by comparison, or in the natural order of the statements, just as they were
made, our own first, and then again, separately, if we so desire, what has been
said by our opponent. To the conclusion of the
- speechReading teleuth=|, a conjecture of Victorius. With teleuth/, the sense will be: “as a
- conclusion, the asyndectic style is appropriate.” the most
+ speechReading teleuth=|, a conjecture of Victorius. With teleuth/, the sense will be: “as a
+ conclusion, the asyndectic style is appropriate.” the most
appropriate style is that which has no connecting particles, in order that it
- may be a peroration, but not an oration: “I have spoken; you have
- heard; you know the facts; now give your decision.”It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable
+ may be a peroration, but not an oration: “I have spoken; you have
+ heard; you know the facts; now give your decision.”It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable
peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of Lysias
Against Eratosthenes.
diff --git a/data/tlg0094/tlg001/tlg0094.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0094/tlg001/tlg0094.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml
index e912cdc89..a6db5e37d 100644
--- a/data/tlg0094/tlg001/tlg0094.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0094/tlg001/tlg0094.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@
having so said, he presently died. Which when Porus
understood, afraid of Alexander, he fell at his feet and
sued for peace. Which when he had obtained, he called
- the mountain Elephas;—as Dercyllus testifies in his Third
+ the mountain Elephas;—as Dercyllus testifies in his Third
Book of Mountains.
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@
name of Cadmus's foot.
Some time after, Ismenus, the son of Amphion and Niobe,
being wounded by Apollo and in great pain, threw himself into the said river, which was then from his name
- called Ismenus;—as Sostratus relates in his Second Book
+ called Ismenus;—as Sostratus relates in his Second Book
of Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Cithaeron, formerly
called Asterion for this reason. Boeotus the son of Neptune was desirous, of two noble ladies, to marry her that
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
a letter, to which he would not return any answer. Whereupon the Fury, missing her design, pulled one of the serpents from her locks, and flung it upon the young lad as he
was keeping his sheep on the top of the mountain Asterion; where the serpent twining about his neck choked
him to death. And thereupon by the will of the Gods
- the mountain was called Cithaeron;—as Leo of Byzantium writes in his History of Boeotia.
+ the mountain was called Cithaeron;—as Leo of Byzantium writes in his History of Boeotia.
But Hermesianax of Cyprus tells the story quite otherwise. For he says, that Helicon and Cithaeron were two
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@
sought to defile his father's bed. Upon which the son,
finding he could no way escape his father's wrath, threw
himself into the river Rhombus, which was afterwards
- called Hebrus from the name of the young man;—as
+ called Hebrus from the name of the young man;—as
Timotheus testifies in his Eleventh Book of Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Pangaeus, so called
upon this occasion. Pangaeus, the son of Mars and Critobule,
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@
When wisdom all in vain must be,
- Then be not wise at all;—
+ Then be not wise at all;—
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@
this juice in the dead of the night they go and besprinkle
the tigers' dens; the virtue of which is such, that the
tigers, not being able to stir forth by reason of the strong
- scent of the juice, are starved to death;—as Callisthenes
+ scent of the juice, are starved to death;—as Callisthenes
reports in his Third Book of Hunting.
Upon the banks of this river lies the mountain called
the Anatole for this reason. The Sun, beholding the
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@
the heels, not knowing what was become of his beloved,
overwhelmed with grief, rose in that very place. And
from this accident it was that the natives called the top of
- that mountain Anatole, or the rising of the Sun;—as Caemaron reports in his Tenth Book of the Affairs of India.
+ that mountain Anatole, or the rising of the Sun;—as Caemaron reports in his Tenth Book of the Affairs of India.
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@
well. This after thirty days empties the body into the
Lake Maeotis, that is full of worms; where of a sudden
the body is seized and torn to pieces by several vultures
- unseen before, nor is it known from whence they come;—
+ unseen before, nor is it known from whence they come;—
as Ctesippus relates in his Second Book of Scythian Relations.
Near to this river lies the mountain Caucasus, which was
before called Boreas's Bed, upon this occasion. Boreas in
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@
Then changing the name of the mountain in honor of the
shepherd Caucasus, he chained Prometheus to it, and
caused him to be tormented by an eagle that fed upon his
- entrails, because he was the first that found out the inspection of bowels, which Jupiter deemed a great cruelty;—
+ entrails, because he was the first that found out the inspection of bowels, which Jupiter deemed a great cruelty;—
as Cleanthes relates in his Third Book of the Wars of the
Gods.
Upon this mountain grows an herb which is called Prometheus, which Medea gathering and bruising made use
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@
applied to the left parts of the body when the moon is in
- the wane, cures quartan agues;—as Callisthenes the
+ the wane, cures quartan agues;—as Callisthenes the
Sybarite tells us in the Thirteenth Book of Gallic Relations, from whom Timagenes the Syrian borrowed his
argument.
Near to this river stands a mountain called Lugdunum,
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@
city Lugdunum. For lugdon in their language signifies a
crow, and dunum
Whence probably our English word down.
- any spacious hill.—This Clitophon
+
any spacious hill.—This Clitophon
reports, in his Thirteenth Book of the Building of Cities.
@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@
touch it with this herb; at what time, if it be pure and
unmixed, the leaves of the herb will be tinctured with the
gold and preserve the substance of the matter; but if it
- be adulterated, they will not admit the discoloring moisture;—as Chrysermus relates in his Third Book of
+ be adulterated, they will not admit the discoloring moisture;—as Chrysermus relates in his Third Book of
Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Tmolus, full of all
manner of wild beasts, formerly called Carmanorion, from
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@
resolved to vitiate her by force. She, seeing she could by
no means escape his fury otherwise, fled to the temple of
Diana, where the tyrant, contemning all religion, ravished
- her,—an infamy which the nymph not being able to survive immediately hanged herself. But Diana would not
+ her,—an infamy which the nymph not being able to survive immediately hanged herself. But Diana would not
pass by so great a crime; and therefore, to be revenged
upon the king for his irreligious insolence, she set a mad
bull upon him, by which the king being tossed up in the
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
its color four times a day; and is to be seen only by- virgins that are not arrived at the years of understanding.
But if marriageable virgins happen to see it, they can
never receive any injury from those that attempt their
- chastity;—as Clitophon reports.
+ chastity;—as Clitophon reports.
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@
called Evenus.
In this river grows an herb which is called sarissa, because it resembles a spear, of excellent use for those that
- are troubled with dim sight;—as Archelaus relates in his
+ are troubled with dim sight;—as Archelaus relates in his
First Book of Rivers.
Near to this river lies Myenus, from Myenus the son of
Telestor and Alphesiboea; who, being beloved by his
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
of the mountain, which for that reason was afterwards
called Myenus.
Upon this mountain grows a flower called the white violet, which, if you do but name the word step-dame, presently
- dies away;—as Dercyllus reports in his Third Book of
+ dies away;—as Dercyllus reports in his Third Book of
Mountains.
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
related to him, he offered in sacrifice to the satisfaction of
his vow. But then no less grieved for what he had done,
he cast himself into the river, which from this accident
- was afterwards called by his own name Maeander;—as
+ was afterwards called by his own name Maeander;—as
Timolaus tells us in his First Book of Phrygian Relations.
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@
In this river there is a certain stone, which by Antiphrasis is called sophron, or the sober-stone; which if you
drop into the bosom of any man, it presently makes him
mad to that degree as to murder his nearest relations, but
- having once atoned the Mother of the Gods, he is presently restored to his wits;—as Damaratus testifies in his
+ having once atoned the Mother of the Gods, he is presently restored to his wits;—as Damaratus testifies in his
Third Book of Rivers. And Archelaus makes mention of
the same in his First Book of Stones.
Near to this river lies the mountain Sipylus, so called
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@
parents find, they lay it up in the temple of the Mother
of the Gods. Nor do they ever transgress out of impiety;
but reverence their parents, and are obedient to their
- superior relations;—as Agatharchides the Samian relates
+ superior relations;—as Agatharchides the Samian relates
in his Fourth Book of Stones, and Demaratus in his
Fourth Book of Phrygia.
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@
it was called Marsyas, upon this occasion.
Marsyas being overcome and flayed by Apollo, certain
Satyrs are said to have sprung from the stream of his
- blood; as also a river bearing the name of Marsyas;—as
+ blood; as also a river bearing the name of Marsyas;—as
Alexander Cornelius recites in his Third Book of Phrygian
Relations.
But Euemeridas the Cnidian tells the story after this
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
having built a fair city, called it Noricum, which in the
Phrygian language signifies a wine-bag.
In this river grows an herb called the pipe, which being
- moved in the wind yields a melodious sound;—as Dercyllus reports in his First Book of Satyrics.
+ moved in the wind yields a melodious sound;—as Dercyllus reports in his First Book of Satyrics.
Near to this river also lies the mountain Berecyntus,
deriving its name from Berecyntus, the first priest to the
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@
stone which is called machaera, very much resembling
iron; which if any one happens to light upon while the
solemnities of the Mother of the Gods are performing, he
- presently runs mad;—as Agatharchides reports in his
+ presently runs mad;—as Agatharchides reports in his
Phrygian Relations.
@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
In this river grows a stone which is called pausilypus,
or the grief-easing stone. This stone if any one find who
is oppressed with grief, he shall presently be eased of his
- sorrow;—as Jason of Byzantium relates in his Thracian
+ sorrow;—as Jason of Byzantium relates in his Thracian
Histories.
Near to this river lie the mountains Rhodope and Haemus. These being brother and sister, and both falling in
love with each other, the one was so presumptuous as to
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@
are of a crow-color, and resembling human shape, and if
they chance to be named when they are separated one
from another, they presently and separately, as they lie,
- dissolve and waste away;—as Thrasyllus the Mendesian
+ dissolve and waste away;—as Thrasyllus the Mendesian
testifies in his Third Book of Stones, but more accurately
in his Thracian Histories.
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@
of the Gods by nature engraved upon it. This stone,
which is rarely to be found, if any of the Galli or gelded
priests happen to light upon, he makes no wonder at it,
- but undauntedly brooks the sight of a preternatural action;—as Aretazes reports in his Phrygian Relations.
+ but undauntedly brooks the sight of a preternatural action;—as Aretazes reports in his Phrygian Relations.
Near to this river lies the mountain Ballenaeus, which
in the Phrygian language signifies royal; so called from
Ballenaeus, the son of Ganymede and Medesigiste, who
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@
It is called in the language of the natives ballen, which
- being interpreted signifies a king;—as Hermesianax the
+ being interpreted signifies a king;—as Hermesianax the
Cyprian affirms in his Second Book of his Phrygian Relations.
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@
cod with berries rattling in it when they are ripe; whence
it derived the name of sistrum, or the rattle; whoever
has this herb in possession fears no apparition nor the
- sight of any God;—as Demostratus writes in his. Second
+ sight of any God;—as Demostratus writes in his. Second
Book of Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Ida, formerly Gargarus; on the top of which stand the altars of Jupiter
and of the Mother of the Gods. But it was called Ida
@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@
priests of the Mother of the Gods. After which, Ida
running mad in the temple of Rhea, Aegesthius, in remembrance of the love which he bare her, called the mountain by her name.
In this mountain grows a stone called cryphius, as being never to be found but when the mysteries of the Gods
- are solemnizing;—as Heraclitus the Sicyonian writes in
+ are solemnizing;—as Heraclitus the Sicyonian writes in
his Second Book of Stones.
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@
ready against the time that the people meet upon the
banks of the river to choose a new sovereign, is presently
elected king, and receives the sceptre of the deceased
- prince;—as Ctesiphon relates in his Third Book of
+ prince;—as Ctesiphon relates in his Third Book of
Plants; and Aristobulus gives us the same account in his
First Book of Stones.
Near to this river also lies a mountain, in the language
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@
than snow. But if any step-dame be forming a design
against her son-in-law, it sets itself on fire and sends forth
a bright flame. By which means they who are thus warned
- avoid the danger they are in;—as Agatho the Samian
+ avoid the danger they are in;—as Agatho the Samian
testifies in his Second Book of Scythian Relations.
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@
a suitable return to the queen for the piety which she
expressed in her reception, persuaded Osiris to bring back
her son from the subterranean regions. When Osiris undertook to do this, at the importunity of his wife, Cerberus
- —whom some call the Terrible—barked so loud, that
+ —whom some call the Terrible—barked so loud, that
Nilus, Garmathone's husband, struck with a sudden frenzy,
threw himself into the river Aegyptus, which from thence
was afterwards called Nilus.
@@ -781,7 +781,7 @@
the water and will not suffer the country to be injured
- by the fury of the flood;—as Thrasyllus tells us in his
+ by the fury of the flood;—as Thrasyllus tells us in his
Relation of Egypt.
Upon this river lies the mountain Argyllus, so called for
this reason.
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@
Indian's, and then subduing Spain, left Pan behind him
there, the chief commander and governor of those places.
Pan by his own name called that country Pania, which was
- afterward by his posterity called Spania;—as Sosthenes
+ afterward by his posterity called Spania;—as Sosthenes
relates in the Thirteenth Book of Iberian Relations.
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@
river; but if you do but name the Athenians, it presently
sinks to the bottom of the water. Of these stones there
are not a few which are consecrated and laid up in the
- temple of Minerva of the Brazen House;—as Nicanor
+ temple of Minerva of the Brazen House;—as Nicanor
the Samian relates in his Second Book of Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Taygetus, deriving
its name from the nymph Taygete; who, after Jupiter had
@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@
Upon this mountain grows a plant called Charisia, which
the women at the beginning of the spring tied about their
necks, to make themselves more passionately beloved by
- men;—as Cleanthes reports in his First Book of Mountains. But Sosthenes the Cnidian is more accurate in the
+ men;—as Cleanthes reports in his First Book of Mountains. But Sosthenes the Cnidian is more accurate in the
relation of these things, from whom Hermogenes borrowed
the subject of his writing.
@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@
There is also found in this river a certain stone, not
unlike a beryl, which in the hands of those who intend to
bear false witness will grow black. Of these stones there
- are many laid up in the temple of Juno Prosymnaea;—as
+ are many laid up in the temple of Juno Prosymnaea;—as
Timotheus relates in his Argolica, and Agatho the Samian
in his Second Book of Rivers.
Agathocles the Milesian, in his History of Rivers, also
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@
which sprang an immense lion; which Iris binding with
her own girdle carried to the mountain Opheltium, where
the lion killed and tore in pieces Apesantus, one of the
- shepherds belonging to that place. And from that accident, by the will of the Gods, the hill was called Apesantus;—as Demodocus writes in his First Book of the History of Hercules.
+ shepherds belonging to that place. And from that accident, by the will of the Gods, the hill was called Apesantus;—as Demodocus writes in his First Book of the History of Hercules.
In this river grows an herb called selene, with the froth
of which, being gathered in the spring, the shepherds
anoint their feet, and keep them from being bit or stung
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@
But coming to this hill and despairing to overtake him, out
of that extreme love which they had for their sister they
made such a bellowing (mukhqmo/s), that the natives from
- thence called the top of the mountain Mycenae;—as Ctesias
+ thence called the top of the mountain Mycenae;—as Ctesias
the Ephesian relates in his First Book of the Acts of Perseus. But Chrysermus the Corinthian relates the story
thus in the First Book of his Peloponnesiacs. For he says
that, when Perseus was carried aloft in the air and lit upon
@@ -914,19 +914,19 @@
The mountain Coccygium derived its name from this
accident. Jupiter falling desperately in love with his sister Juno, and having vanquished her by his importunity,
begat a male child. From whence the mountain, before
- called Lyrceum, was named Coccygium;—as Agathonymus
+ called Lyrceum, was named Coccygium;—as Agathonymus
relates in his Persis.
In this mountain grows a tree, which is called paliurus;
upon the boughs of which whatever fowl happens to perch,
it is presently entangled as it were with bird-lime, and cannot stir; only the cuckoo it lets go free, without any harm;
- —as Ctesiphon testifies in his First Book of Trees.
+ —as Ctesiphon testifies in his First Book of Trees.
As for the mountain Athenaeum, it derives its name
from Minerva. For after the destruction of Troy, Diomede returning to Argos, ascended the mountain Ceraunius,
and there erecting a temple to Minerva, called the mountain Athenaeum from her name Athena.
Upon the top of this mountain grows a root like to that
of rue, which if any woman unwarily taste of, she presently
- runs mad. This root is called Adrastea;—as Plesimachus
+ runs mad. This root is called Adrastea;—as Plesimachus
writes in his Second Book of the Returns of the Heroes.
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@
In this river grows a plant which is called cenchritis,
resembling a honey-comb, the decoction of which, being
given by the physicians to those that are mad, cures them
- of their frenzy;–as Ctesias relates in his First Book of
+ of their frenzy;–as Ctesias relates in his First Book of
Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Cronium, so called
upon this occasion. After the Giants' war, Saturn, to avoid
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@
In this mountain is found a stone, which is called the
cylinder, upon this occasion. For as oft as Jupiter either
thunders or lightens, so often this stone through fear rolls
- down from the top of the mountain;—as Dercyllus writes
+ down from the top of the mountain;—as Dercyllus writes
in his First Book of Stones.
@@ -987,13 +987,13 @@
In the same river also there grows an herb which is
called axalla, which signifies heat. This herb they that
are troubled with quartan-agues apply to their breasts,
- and are presently delivered from the fit;—as Chrysermus
+ and are presently delivered from the fit;—as Chrysermus
writes in his Thirteenth Book of Rivers.
Near this river lies the mountain Drimylus, where grows
a stone not unlike a sardonyx, worn by kings and princes
upon their diadems, and greatly available against dimness
- of sight;–as Nicias Mallotes writes in his Book of
+ of sight;–as Nicias Mallotes writes in his Book of
Stones.
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@
In the same river also grows an herb which is called
elipharmacus, which the physicians apply to such as are
troubled with immoderate fluxes of blood, as having a
- peculiar virtue to stop the orifices of the veins;—according to the relation of Timagoras in his First Book of
+ peculiar virtue to stop the orifices of the veins;—according to the relation of Timagoras in his First Book of
Rivers.
Adjoining to the banks of this river lies the mountain
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@
health, called the mountain by his own name Teuthras.
In this mountain grows a stone called antipathes (or the
resister), which is of excellent virtue to cure scabs and
- leprosies, being powdered and mixed with wine;—as
+ leprosies, being powdered and mixed with wine;—as
Ctesias the Cnidian tells us in his Second Book of Mountains.
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@
mixed black and lead color, called linurgus from the
effect; for if you throw it upon a linen cloth, by a certain
affectionate union it assumes the form of the linen, and
- turns white;—as Antisthenes relates in the Third Book
+ turns white;—as Antisthenes relates in the Third Book
of his Meleagris, though Diocles the Rhodian more accurately tells us the same thing in his Aetolics.
Near to this river lies the mountain Calydon, so called
from Calydon, the son of Mars and Astynome; for that
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@
Upon this mountain grows an herb called myops. This
if any one steep in water and wash his face with it, he
shall lose his sight, but upon his atoning Diana, he shall
- recover it again;—as Dercyllus writes in his Third Book
+ recover it again;—as Dercyllus writes in his Third Book
of Aetolics.
@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@
ARAXES is a river in Armenia, so called from Araxus the
son of Pylus. For he, contending with his grandfather Arbelus for the empire, shot him with an arrow. For which
being haunted by the Furies, he threw himself into the
- river Bactros, for that reason called Araxes;—as Ctesiphon testifies in his First Book of the Persian Affairs.
+ river Bactros, for that reason called Araxes;—as Ctesiphon testifies in his First Book of the Persian Affairs.
Araxes, king of the Armenians, being at war with his
neighbors the Persians, before they came to a battle, was
told by the oracle that he should win the victory if he
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@
the priest touch it with his knife, but it sends forth a
stream of blood; at what time the superstitious sacrificers
retire, and with howlings and loud ohoning carry the stone
- to the temple;—as Dorotheus the Chaldaean relates in
+ to the temple;—as Dorotheus the Chaldaean relates in
his Second Book of Stones.
Near to this river lies the mountain Diorphus, so called
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@
In this mountain grows a tree, not unlike a pomegranate-tree, which yields plenty of apples, in taste like grapes.
Now if any one gather the ripest of this fruit, and do but
name Mars while he holds it in his hand, it will presently
- grow green again;—as Ctesiphon witnesses in his Thirteenth Book of Trees.
+ grow green again;—as Ctesiphon witnesses in his Thirteenth Book of Trees.
@@ -1162,8 +1162,8 @@
to pass the river before-mentioned, he called upon Jupiter;
who, listening to his prayers, sent him a tiger that carried
him safely over the water. In remembrance of which
- accident, he called the river Tigris;—as Theophilus relates in his First Book of Stones. But Hermesianax the
- Cyprian tells the story thus:—
+ accident, he called the river Tigris;—as Theophilus relates in his First Book of Stones. But Hermesianax the
+ Cyprian tells the story thus:—
Bacchus falling in love with the Nymph Alphesiboea,
and being able to vanquish her neither with presents nor
entreaties, turned himself into the shape of the river Tigris,
@@ -1173,11 +1173,11 @@
and overcoming his beloved by fear, took her away,
and carrying her over the river, begat a son whom he called
Medus; who growing up in years, in remembrance of the
- accident he called the river by the name of Tigris;—as
+ accident he called the river by the name of Tigris;—as
Aristonymus relates in his Third Book . . .
In this river a stone is to be found, called myndan, very
white; which whoever possesses shall never be hurt by
- wild beasts;—as Leo of Byzantium relates in his Third
+ wild beasts;—as Leo of Byzantium relates in his Third
Book of Rivers.
Near to this river lies the mountain Gauran; so called
from Gauran the son of the satrap Roxanes; who, being
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@
In this mountain grows an herb, which is like to wild
barley. This herb the natives heat over the fire, and
anointing themselves with the oil of it, are never sick, till
- the necessity of dying overtakes them;—as Sostratus
+ the necessity of dying overtakes them;—as Sostratus
writes in his First Collection of Fabulous History.
@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@
a virgin carry about her, she need never be afraid of being
deflowered.
In the same river also grows an herb, not unlike to
- bugloss. Which is an excellent remedy against the king's evil, being administered to the patient in warm water;—
+ bugloss. Which is an excellent remedy against the king's evil, being administered to the patient in warm water;—
as Clitophon the Rhodian reports in his First Book of Indian Relations.
Near to this mountain lies the mountain Lilaeus, so
called from Lilaeus a shepherd; who, being very superstitious and a worshipper of the Moon alone, always performed her mysteries in the dead time of the night. Which
@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@
the Moon turned her adorer into a mountain of the same
name.
In this mountain a stone is found which is called clitoris,
- of a very black color, which the natives wear for ornament's sake in their ears;—as Aristotle witnesses in his
+ of a very black color, which the natives wear for ornament's sake in their ears;—as Aristotle witnesses in his
Fourth Book of Rivers.