Evenus ofFor all necessity doth cause - distress— + distress—
@@ -1961,7 +1961,7 @@ to be bravest, as Homer says Hector faced the danger of encountering Achilles: Source unknownAnd shame on Hector - seized— + seized—Not in our @@ -1982,7 +1982,7 @@ forces to protect him, for in that case he will not think that there is really anything to be afraid of. But, since indeed all goodness involves purposive choice (it has been said before what we mean by - this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of + this—goodness makes a man choose everything for the sake of some object, and that object is what is fine), it is clear that courage being a form of goodness will make a man face formidable things for some object, so that he does not do it through ignorance @@ -1998,7 +1998,7 @@ include both one capable of the process and one not capable of it: 'undivided' means both that which cannot be divided and that which though it can be has not been; and similarly with - 'unchaste'—it denotes both that which is by nature incapable + 'unchaste'—it denotes both that which is by nature incapable of chastening and that which, though capable, has not actually been chastened in respect of the errors as regards which the temperate man acts rightly, as is the case with children; for of them it is in this @@ -2021,7 +2021,7 @@ more in the other direction, and susceptibility and sensitiveness to pleasures of this sort are natural to everybody. It specially attaches to persons like the boors who are a stock character in - comedy— people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary + comedy— people who steer clear of pleasures even in moderate and necessary indulgences. And since the temperate character is shown in connection with pleasures, it follows that it is also related to certain desires. We must, therefore, ascertain what @@ -2035,17 +2035,17 @@ conveyed through the medium of hearing, nor yet with the pleasures and pains of smell, derived from good and bad scents; for neither is anyone termed profligate because of being sensitive or not sensitive - to sensations of that sort— for example, a man would not be considered + to sensations of that sort— for example, a man would not be considered profligate if when looking at a beautiful statue or horse or person, or listening to someone singing, he did not wish for food or drink or sexual indulgence but only wished to look at the beautiful objects or - listen to the music,—any more than the persons held + listen to the music,—any more than the persons held spell-bound in the abode of the Sirens. Temperance and profligacy have to do with those two sorts of sensory objects in relation to which alone the lower animals also happen to be sensitive and to feel pleasure and - pain—the objects of taste and of touch, whereas about virtually all + pain—the objects of taste and of touch, whereas about virtually all the pleasures of the other senses alike animals are clearly so - constituted as to be insensitive— e.g. + constituted as to be insensitive— e.g. harmonious sound, or beauty; for clearly they are not affected in any degree worth speaking of by the mere sight of beautiful objects or by listening to musical sounds, except possibly in the case of some @@ -2068,7 +2068,7 @@ throat, the sensation of which seems more like touch than taste; so that gourmands do not pray that they may have a long tongue but a crane's gullet, like Philoxenus son of Eryxis. Mr. Hospitable, son of Mistress - Belch—presumably a character in + Belch—presumably a character in comedy. It follows that broadly speaking profligacy must be considered to be related to the objects of touch, and likewise it is with pleasures of @@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ on. And also the nature of Gentleness and Harshness must be ascertained in the same way. For we see that the term 'gentle' is concerned with the pain that arises from - passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way + passion—a man is gentle by being disposed in a certain way towards that pain. And in our diagram See we opposed to the irascible and harsh and fierce @@ -2166,7 +2166,7 @@ And of these classes themselves there are species designated as exceeding or deficient in respect of parts of the matter concerned: for example, the stingy man, the skinflint and the profiteer are - mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in + mean—the stingy in not parting with money, the profiteer in accepting anything, the skinflint is he who is very excited about small sums; also the man who offends by way of meanness is a false reckoner and a cheat.Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220b 38 ,Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1221b 12-15 .@@ -2245,8 +2245,8 @@ great things and to claim them as one's desert; and there are small things and a man may deserve and claim things of that size; and as regards each of these two classes of things the reverse is - possible—one man may be of such a character that although - deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held + possible—one man may be of such a character that although + deserving small things he claims great ones—the goods held in high honor, and another man though deserving great things may claim small ones. Now the man worthy of small things but claiming great ones is blameworthy, for it @@ -2292,7 +2292,7 @@ he might become great-spirited, for he will claim the things that he is worthy of; whereas the small-spirited man, who when great goods corresponding to his worth are available does not think himself worthy - of them—what would he have done if his deserts were small? + of them—what would he have done if his deserts were small? For either he would have conceitedly thought himself worthy of great things, or of still less. The Ms. reading hardly gives a sense. An emendation gives 'for if he @@ -2330,10 +2330,10 @@ is magnificent, for the fitting is the suitable, as nothing is fitting that is unsuitable. —But it must be fitting in each particular, that is, in suitability to the - agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, + agent and to the recipient and to the occasion—for example, what is fitting at the wedding of a servant is not what is fitting at that of a favorite; and it is fitting for the agent himself, if it is - of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people + of an amount or quality suitable to him—for example people thought that the mission that Themistocles conducted to Olympia was not fitting for him, because of his former low station, but would have been for Cimon.The story of @@ -2347,12 +2347,12 @@ illiberal. ; - “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow - wolf.”Generally speaking the other praiseworthy and blameworthy states of character also are excesses or deficiencies or middle states, but in respect of an emotion: for instance, the - envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of - character after which they are named— Envy means being pained at people who are + envious man and the malicious. For—to take the states of + character after which they are named— Envy means being pained at people who are deservedly prosperous, while the emotion of the malicious man is itself nameless, but the possessor of it is shown by his feeling joy at undeserved adversities; and midway between them is the righteously indignant man, and what - the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at + the ancients called Righteous Indignation—feeling pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities and pleasure at those that are deserved; hence the idea that Nemesis is a deity. Modesty is a middle state between Shamelessness and Bashfulness: the man who pays regard to nobody's opinion is shameless, he who regards @@ -2382,10 +2382,10 @@ squeamish man differs from the omnivorous in that the former takes nothing or little, and that reluctantly, and the latter accepts everything readily, so the boor stands in relation to the vulgar man - or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty, + or buffoon—the former takes no joke except with difficulty, the latter accepts everything easily and with pleasure. Neither course is right: one should allow some things and not others, and on - principle,—that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is + principle,—that constitutes the witty man. The proof of the formula is the same as in the other cases: wittiness of this kind (not the quality Viz. to which we apply the term in a transferred sense) is a very becoming sort of @@ -2399,7 +2399,7 @@ even though the laugh is against himself will be midway between the vulgar man and the frigid. This is a better definition than that the thing said must not be painful to the victim whatever sort of man he - may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the + may be—rather, it must give pleasure to the man in the middle position, since his judgement is good.BWMOLOXI/A , 'buffoonery,'Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1128a 15 .All these middle states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite states vices, for they do not involve purposive choice; they are all in the classification of the emotions, for each @@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ combination with either extreme, whereas the extremes often do occur in combination with one another, and sometimes the same men are venturesome cowards, or extravagant in some things and illiberal in - others, and in general not uniform in a bad way— for when men lack uniformity + others, and in general not uniform in a bad way— for when men lack uniformity in a good way, this results in men of the middle characters, since the mean contains both extremes. The opposition existing between the mean and the extremes does not seem to @@ -2441,11 +2441,11 @@ -
Friendship—its nature + Friendship—its nature and qualities, what constitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship has one or several meanings, and if several, how many, and also what is our duty towards a friend and what are the just claims of - friendship—is a matter that calls for investigation no less + friendship—is a matter that calls for investigation no less than any of the things that are fine and desirable in men's characters. For to promote friendship is thought to be the special task of political @@ -2467,7 +2467,7 @@ rights in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men are established by law and do not depend on us. Many questions are raised about - friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider + friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider considerations and extend the term. For some hold that like is friend to like, whence the sayings: KOLOIO\N POTI\ KOLOIO/N Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1155a 35 , where the dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).'Set a thief + “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow + wolf.” 'Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is unknown. And the natural philosophers even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first @@ -2499,14 +2499,14 @@ have gone on to infer protective mimicry. Some people then give this account of a friend; but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the - wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain," Quoted as from Euripides, rebukes the poet who wrote—Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1154a 34 ; the play is not + wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain,"Quoted as from Euripides, and "In all things change is - sweet—"Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1154a 34 ; the play is not known.change being transition to + sweet—" Eur. Orest. 234 .change being transition to the opposite), whereas like hates like, for "Potter against potter has a grudge," Eur. Orest. 234 .and animals that live on the same food are hostile to one another. Hes. WD 25 ('Two of a trade never agree').These opinions, therefore, are thus widely - variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe— + variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe— The less is rooted enemy to the more For ever, and begins the day of hate, @@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends, and HeracleitusThe natural philosopher of rebukes the poet who wrote—Ephesus , - fl. end of 6th cent. B.C.+ fl. end of 6th cent. B.C. Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth, @@ -2535,7 +2535,7 @@ observation. Some persons think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends, but only for the good. Others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children(and maternal affection we see existing even - among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their + among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their young). Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own @@ -2544,7 +2544,7 @@ to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body itself, when it dies, as a corpse is - useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in + useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt .Now all these factors i.e. likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon). seem to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest @@ -2583,7 +2583,7 @@ good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body - absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example + absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example doses of medicine and surgical operations;and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, for example to live in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse @@ -2601,7 +2601,7 @@ that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and - apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may + apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another @@ -2612,7 +2612,7 @@ termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is - primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical + primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical operation, but we apply the term properly to that which is primarily so called. @@ -2633,11 +2633,11 @@ in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the things said already, ll. 7-17. as we have distinguished three senses of the term - friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, + friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, another on utility, another on pleasure.Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are - and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a + and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a friend, as long as he our battle fights, A friend in need is a friend indeed. and@@ -2671,7 +2671,7 @@ injure a bad man, and those who suffer injury from one another do not feel affection for one another. Athens no longer knowsMegara .But as a matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one another, though not according to the primary form of - friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being + friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being friends under the other forms, since for the sake of pleasure they put up with one another although they are being harmed, so long as they are lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held, when people look into the @@ -2711,7 +2711,7 @@ a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature things that are absolutely good are good to him), and similarly a man rather than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one; but the road is - through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be + through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet perfectly good; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the @@ -2720,11 +2720,11 @@ sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because of being useful, but in another manner. For good for a given person and good absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of - character as with profitableness—what is profitable + character as with profitableness—what is profitable absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two - kinds— + kinds— for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only @@ -2732,7 +2732,7 @@ therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure, and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which exactly of the two things Goodness and pleasantness. the affection - depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is + depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'or not, but because he is pleasant.' Then, affection having two meanings,Potential and actual @@ -2759,7 +2759,7 @@ For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other's sake;Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an - activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only + activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate thing also, for even inanimate things are loved. And since to love actively is to treat the loved object qualoved,and the friend is an object of love to the friend quadear to him but notquamusician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the @@ -2769,11 +2769,11 @@Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people - cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not + cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society! This then is the primary friendship, which all people recognize. It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their - claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing + claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement right. And there is no @@ -2804,17 +2804,17 @@ unless as a result of trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things; and so they are not friends, for the proverbial 'common property as - between friends' is not realized in this way—the friend is + between friends' is not realized in this way—the friend is made an appendage of the things, not the things of the friends. Therefore the first kind of friendship does not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test - many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor + many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same way as about a coat; although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one - ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old + ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man. For a friend is not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the @@ -2832,7 +2832,7 @@ just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been rightly said : "Nature is permanent, but wealth is - not—" although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship' + not—" although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship' than 'Nature.' Eur. El. 941 .Or, emending the text, 'that friendship is goodness of nature.' And it is proverbial that time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For @@ -2843,20 +2843,20 @@ latter; and misfortune shows those who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility. And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown - quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is + quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the End it effects and the time it lasts. And even the multitude would agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a - drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant + drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous, although at first it quite takes one in. The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked - people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other + people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other gladden" and "Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad." Eur. Bellerophontes Fr. 298 (Nauck) .And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or neutral, i.e. neither good @@ -2869,11 +2869,11 @@ the good man for his purpose at the time-and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for the purpose natural to him; and he will wish his friend what is - good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a + good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink - medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it + medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it for the given purpose. The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary.Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant @@ -2903,7 +2903,7 @@ reasonable. And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different - from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as + from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous if @@ -2916,7 +2916,7 @@ them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same. And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for - pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of + pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure. i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit @@ -2955,7 +2955,7 @@ that of others because of its remoteness small); how one has those qualities - voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's + voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly.but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved - alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love + alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God. It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek @@ -3019,7 +3019,7 @@ opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant and desirable as useful, not - as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a + as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry. But in a way love of the opposite is also @@ -3066,7 +3066,7 @@ of which may control the other; and similarly self-love implies that one part of the personality can have a certain feeling in regard to another part. For all these relations involve @@ -3080,8 +3080,8 @@ (Stock). and in another way when a man wishes another's - existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone - existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he + existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone + existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other; and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake @@ -3091,13 +3091,13 @@ friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society. Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior - motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters + motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other's pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same - pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his - thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same + pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his + thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is @@ -3111,8 +3111,8 @@ exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and 'being one spirit' Cf. 1. 3: and being unable even to live without one another but dying - together—for this is the case with the single individual, - and he associates with himself in this way,—all these + together—for this is the case with the single individual, + and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself.DH/ marks a quotation.In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is @@ -3129,13 +3129,13 @@ by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his - former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as + former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'John Styles' is related to 'good John Styles' See ; for it is clear that the same amount of 'John Styles' is good as of - 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they + 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said,Sophistici Elenchi 175b 15ff. 'Coriscus' is used for any imaginary person, cf.Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220a 19 f. ll. @@ -3188,7 +3188,7 @@ lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire also. —Agreement occurs in - the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and + the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for @@ -3199,7 +3199,7 @@ possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel. Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice - as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to + as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling. The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have @@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@ utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not this alone; it is also a law - of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and + of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and @@ -3239,7 +3239,7 @@ exist. For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave. The other partnerships are a constituent - part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of + part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or with business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same @@ -3249,7 +3249,7 @@ PARAKEXRWSME/NA, 'those harmonies and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in coloration (i.e. divergent from the regular scale in having smaller intervals) - are deviations.' paternal authority being royal, the + are deviations.' paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of @@ -3267,18 +3267,18 @@ one as between brothers, another as of father and son These two clauses look like an interpolation. : it may be proportional, for example paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of - brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in + brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of seniority.Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack of self-sufficiency that - makes these unions permanent—since they would have been + makes these unions permanent—since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority. The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of - a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it + a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them. It does indeed @@ -3302,7 +3302,7 @@ the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership; and justice of a sort, even if there were no state. And a household - is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of + is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of master and slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but something analogous, just as health Perhaps the text is corrupt. is not justice but @@ -3312,10 +3312,10 @@ benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject.That between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being - on a footing of equality— + on a footing of equality—For never did he make me out a bastard, But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire -Of both— +Of both— Soph. Fr. 755 (Jebb and Pearson; 684 Nauck) . The third line is completed in a quotation by Philo,QNHTW=N D' OU)DEI/S . (ForTW=|DE dative of agent see Kuhner-Gerth, i. @@ -3328,12 +3328,12 @@ superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party - claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the + claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude being that of ruler to subject;or if not that, at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in fact it - happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the + happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally @@ -3370,15 +3370,15 @@ Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1262b 26 .Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a - ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules + ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality. But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers - do—hence the saying -Unto a friend his wage— + do—hence the saying+.Unto a friend his wage— ); since clearly God is in need of nothing. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1164a 28 .Hes. WD 371 MISQO\S D' A)NDRI\ FI/LW| @@ -3390,7 +3390,7 @@ of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to - have it both ways at once—they associate together for the + have it both ways at once—they associate together for the sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between good men, and so represent it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter of trust. For in general, @@ -3403,12 +3403,12 @@ of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this - sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, + sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to law, Or, adopting another conjectural emendation, 'since it is natural for good men to be just of their own accord.' and these men make their contracts as good men and as dealing with trustworthy people.And in fact in this sort of friendship the - recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of + recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a moral kind and not merely legal. Solomon renders 'It is uncertain how either will recriminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not in a limited @@ -3417,7 +3417,7 @@ question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for - it may be as Theognis says— + it may be as Theognis says—,Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me ;— Theog. @@ -3434,16 +3434,16 @@ much it was to the donor and not bow much it was to himself. And at other times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of - it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for + it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money - loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to + loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to be repaid the value that the money had when lent,the other claims to repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the contract. Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the - intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly + intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice. The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on @@ -3461,7 +3461,7 @@ another, it is not honorable, when an active return is due, merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in the other case i.e. in a moral friendship it is not honorable to insist on a return on a business - footing. ;—but since they did not provide for this in the + footing. but since they did not provide for this in the contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention, @@ -3504,7 +3504,7 @@ a number. For we must measure by proportion, as also the civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoemaker to be partner with a farmer unless their products are equalized by proportion? Therefore the measure for - partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for + partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for example if one party complains that he has given wisdom and the other says he has given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom to being rich? and then, what is the amount given for each? for if one @@ -3560,8 +3560,8 @@ with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it does not: for instance, the desire for the friend's - existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes - existence to belong to his own work i.e. the beneficiary. —and to him who gave one + existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes + existence to belong to his own worki.e. the beneficiary. —and to him who gave one existenceThis also means the beneficiary, who is the cause of the benefactor's being a benefactor; so the benefactor ought to repay him in kind by @@ -3628,13 +3628,13 @@ class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the 'determined' nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be - of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of + of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives, 'another Hercules'—another self; but the characteristics are scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend in body and another in @@ -3680,7 +3680,7 @@ live well oneself and for one's friend also to live well, and if living together involves working together, surely their partnership will be pre-eminently in things included in the End. Hence we should - study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of + study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to be real social intercourse but mere enjoyment),i.e. perception of something outside oneself causes consciousness of self. in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing - one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to + one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known.To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the @@ -3646,11 +3646,11 @@ receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is - friendship)— but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it + friendship)— but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasanter to share good things with our friends, as far as these fall to each, - and the best that each can— but among these, it falls to one to share + and the best that each can— but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another - philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend + philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend (whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are' This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a line of verse. ), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, @@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@ the truth from the following consideration: 'friend' really denotes, in the language of the proverb,Quoted elsewhere in the same connection, but one may conjecture that the phrase originally meant 'as strong as - Hercules.' 'another Hercules'—another self; but the + Hercules.'but each really wishes to share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or @@ -3771,20 +3771,20 @@ possible to use any given thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise, and in the latter case to use it quaitself or on the contrary incidentally: for instance, with an eyequaeye, to see, or also just to see wrong, - by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses + by squinting so that one object appears two—both these uses of the eye, then, use it because it is an eye, but it would be possible to make use of an eye but to use it in another way, incidentally, for example, if it were possible to sell it or to eat it.And similarly with the use of knowledge: one can use it truly, and one can use it - wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on + wrongly—for instance, when one spells a word incorrectly on purpose, then at the time one is using knowledge as ignorance, just as dancing-girls sometimes interchange the hand and the foot and use foot as hand and hand as foot. i.e. stand on their hands and wave their feet in the air. If then all the virtues are forms of knowledge, it would be possible to use - even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be + even justice as injustice—in that case a man will be behaving unjustly by doing unjust acts as a result of justice, as when one makes ignorant mistakes from knowledge; but if this is impossible, it is clear that the virtues cannot be branches of knowledge. @@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ Who then is there in whom this occurs? or is it in the same way as the vice of the irrational part of the spirit is termed lack of control, and the uncontrolled man is in a manner - profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite + profligate—possessing reason, but ultimately if his appetite is powerful it will turn him round, and he will draw the opposite inference? Or is it manifest that also if there is goodness in the irrational part but folly in the reason, goodness and folly are @@ -3820,12 +3820,12 @@ there is folly in the rational should not convert the folly and make it form wise and proper judgements, and again wisdom in the rational part should not make profligacy in the irrational act - temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially + temperately—which seems to be what self-control essentially is. So that there will actually be wise action arising from folly. But these consequences are absurd, especially that of using wisdom wisely as a result of folly; for that is a thing which we certainly do not see in - other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical + other cases—for instance profligacy perverts one's medical knowledge or scholarship, but it does not pervert one's ignorance if it be opposed to it, because it does not contain superiority, but rather it is goodness in general that stands in this relation to @@ -3845,7 +3845,7 @@ that some men are fortunate we see, since many though foolish succeed in things in which luck is paramount, and some even in things which involve skill although also containing a large element of - luck—for example strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men fortunate + luck—for example strategy and navigation. Are, then, these men fortunate as a result of a certain state of character, or are they enabled to achieve fortunate results not by reason of a certain quality in themselves? As it is, people think the latter, holding that some men @@ -3856,9 +3856,9 @@ For it is clear that they do not succeed by means of wisdom, because wisdom is not irrational but can give reason why it acts as it does, whereas they - could not say why they succeed—for that would be science; + could not say why they succeed—for that would be science; and moreover it is - manifest that they succeed in spite of being unwise—not + manifest that they succeed in spite of being unwise—not unwise about other matters (for that would not be anything strange, for example Hippocrates A Pythagorean philosopher of have a natural aptitude for it—and without the aid of reason have an impulse in the direction of the natural order of things and desire the right thing in the right way at the right time, these men will succeed even although they are in fact foolish and irrational, just as the others will sing well although unable to teach singing. And men of this sort obviously are - fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually + fortunate—men who without the aid of reason are usually successful. Hence it will follow that the fortunate are so by nature.Chios , fl.460 @@ -3886,7 +3886,7 @@ fortune is the opposite. If, then, unexpected achievement seems a matter of fortune, but, if a man is fortunate owing to fortune, it would seem that the cause is not of such a sort as to produce the same - result always or generally—further, if a man's succeeding or not + result always or generally— further, if a man's succeeding or not succeeding is due to his being of a certain sort, as a man does not see clearly because he has blue eyes, not fortune but nature is the cause; therefore he is not a man who has good fortune but one who has @@ -3899,7 +3899,7 @@ certain persons; whereas if fortune is to be eliminated altogether, then nothing must be said to come about from fortune, in spite of the fact that, although there is another cause, because we do not see it - we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it + we say that fortune is a cause—owing to which people give it as a definition of fortune that it is a cause incalculable to human reasoning, implying that it is a real natural principle. This, then, would be a matter for another inquiry. But since we see that some @@ -3920,17 +3920,17 @@ appetition? and are not the latter prior? because if the impulse caused by desire for what is pleasant exists by nature, appetition also would merely by nature proceed towards what is good in every case. If, therefore, some men have - good natures—just as musical people though they have not + good natures—just as musical people though they have not learnt to sing Or, with Jackson's additions, 'just as untaught musical geniuses, without professional knowledge of - singing.' have a natural aptitude for it—and + singing.'Or has the term 'good fortune' more than one meaning? For some things are done from impulse and as a result of the @@ -3969,9 +3969,9 @@ nor does it prove that there is no such thing as fortune, nor that fortune is not the cause of anything, but that it is not the cause of all the things of which it seems to be the cause. Yet someone may raise the question whether fortune is the cause of - precisely this—forming a desire for the right thing at the + precisely this—forming a desire for the right thing at the right time. Or, on that showing, will not fortune be the cause of - everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not + everything—even of thought and deliberation? since it is not the case, that one only deliberates when one has deliberated even previously to that deliberation, nor does one only think when one has previously thought before thinking, and so on to infinity, but there is some @@ -3982,7 +3982,7 @@ there is no other, and that this, merely owing to its being of such and such a nature, can produce a result of such and such a nature? But this is what - we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in + we are investigating—what is the starting-point of motion in the spirit? The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for in a manner the divine element in us is the cause of all our motions. And the starting-point of reason is not reason but @@ -3997,7 +3997,7 @@ (whereas the others have reason but have not this): they have inspiration, but they cannot deliberate. For although irrational they attain even what - belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination: + belongs to the prudent and wise—swiftness of divination: only the divination that is based on reason we must not specify, but some of them attain it by experience and others by practice in the use of observation; and these men use the divine. The Ms. reading gives 'and experience and habit @@ -4011,14 +4011,14 @@ also have it whose reason is disengaged in the manner described.' This is why the melancholic even have dreams that are true; for it seems that when the reason is disengaged - principle has more strength—just as the + principle has more strength— just as the blind remember better, being released from having their faculty of memory engaged with objects of sight. Jackson (with some hints from the Latin version) emends to give 'just as blind men, who are released from attention to visibles, remember better than others, because the faculty of memory is thus more earnestly addressed to what has been said.' It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good - fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's + fortune—one divine, owing to which the fortunate man's success is thought to be due to the aid of God, and this is the man who is successful in accordance with his impulse, while the other is he who succeeds against his impulse. Both persons are irrational. The @@ -4033,7 +4033,7 @@ 'gentleman.' Now it is manifest that one who is to obtain this appellation truly must possess the particular virtues; for it is impossible for it to be - otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for + otherwise in the case of any other matter either—for instance, no one is healthy in his whole body but not in any part of it, but all the parts, or most of them and the most important, must necessarily be in the same condition as the whole. Now being good and being noble @@ -4042,10 +4042,10 @@ themselves. Of these, all those are fine which are laudable as existing for their own sakes, for these are the Ends which are both the motives of laudable actions and laudable - themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate + themselves—justice itself and its actions, and temperate actions, for temperance also is laudable; but health is not laudable, for its effect is not, nor is vigorous action laudable, for strength - is not—these things are good but they are not laudable. + is not—these things are good but they are not laudable. And similarly induction makes this clear in the other cases also. Therefore a man is good for whom the things good by nature are good. For the things men @@ -4073,7 +4073,7 @@ the noble man the things good by nature are fine; for what is just is fine, and what is according to worth is just, and he is worthy of these things; and what is - befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth, + befitting is fine, and these things befit him—wealth, birth, power. Hence for the noble man the same things are both advantageous and fine; but for the multitude these things do not coincide, for things absolutely good are not also good for them, whereas they are @@ -4119,13 +4119,13 @@ (Solomon). Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by - nature—whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the - other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God, that + nature—whether goods of body or wealth or friends or the + other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God, that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest; and any mode of choice and acquisition that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from - serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one. + serving and from contemplating God—that is a bad one. This is how it is - for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to + for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual standard—to be as far as possible unconscious of the irrational part of the spirit, as such. Let this, then, be our statement of what is the standard of nobility and what is the aim of