diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/__cts__.xml index 832497a08..14ff00da6 100644 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Κατὰ Δημοσθένους - Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + Against Demosthenes + Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 56084c8d6..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0082", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Dinarchus/opensource/din_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=1", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 6c30be714..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1545 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - - - Against Demosthenes - Dinarchus - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - Dinarchus - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - - - -
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This popular leader of yours, Athenians, who has - imposed on himself a sentence of death should he be proved to have taken even - the smallest sum from Harpalus, has been clearly convicted of taking bribes from - those very men whom he formerly professed to oppose. Much has already been said - by StratoclesStratocles the orator, who - proposed that special honors should be paid to Lycurgus after his death - (Plut. Vit. Lyc. 852 A), may possibly - be the same man as the general of that name who served at Chaeronea. and most of the charges - have now been made; as regards the report itself the Areopagus has expressed - opinions which are both just and true, while with events succeeding this - Stratocles has already dealt and read the decrees relating to them.

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It remains for us, Athenians, especially when contesting a case never paralleled - in the experience of the city, to make a general exhortation to you all. May we - ask you first to pardon those of us who have still to speak if there are certain - points which we raise again; our aim is not to weary you by alluding twice to - the same matters but to arouse your anger all the more. Secondly, may we ask you - not to surrender the rights enjoyed by the whole city or to barter away our - common security in exchange for the arguments of the defendant.

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You are aware, Athenians, that whereas this man Demosthenes is here for judgement - before you, you are on trial before your fellows. For they are waiting to see - what kind of conclusion you will reach about your country's interests: are you - going to welcome into your midst the private venality and corruption of these - people, or will you make it universally known that you hate men who accept - bribes against their city and that, in ordering the Areopagus to make its - inquiry, your intention was not to acquit the culprits but rather, when the - councillors had made their report, to exact punishment in a manner appropriate - to the crimes? This decision then rests with you now.

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For when the people passed a lawful decree and every citizen wished to discover - which of the politicians had dared to accept money from Harpalus to the - discredit and danger of the city; when, moreover, you, Demosthenes, and many - others had proposed in a decree that the Areopagus, according to its traditional - right, should hold an inquiry to discover if any of them had received gold from - Harpalus, the Areopagus began its investigation.

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In reaching a just decision it paid no heed to your challenges, Demosthenes, nor - did it wish to pervert the truth or destroy its own reputation on your account. - On the contrary, gentlemen, although, as the Areopagites themselves said, the - council realized beforehand the strength of these men and their influence as - orators and statesmen, it did not consider that if incrimination or danger was - threatening its country it ought to be influenced by any misrepresentation - likely to be published about itself.

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Though this investigation has been conducted, in the people's opinion, both - fairly and profitably, accusations, challenges, and calumnies are proceeding - from Demosthenes, since he has been listed as the holder of twenty talents of - gold. Will that council then which, in cases of willful] murder, is trustworthy - enough to arrive at truth and justice and is empowered to pass judgement in - matters of life and death on each of the citizens, to take up the cause of those - who have met a violent end and banish or execute any in the city who have broken - the law,After the restoration of the democracy - in 403 B.C. the Areopagus played a more important - part in public affairs than in the preceding half-century. It dealt with all - cases of voluntary homicide and sometimes with political cases also, when it - could act either on its own initiative (cf. Din. - 1.63 and Dem. 18.133) or in response - to the people's request, as in the present instance. See Din. 1.50. be powerless now to administer justice over - the money credited to Demosthenes?

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It will; for the council has told lies against - Demosthenes. This is the crowning argument in his case. It has told lies, has - it, against you and Demades: men against whom it is evidently not even safe to - speak the truth; though you previously instructed the Areopagus to investigate - many public matters and expressed approval of it for the inquiries which it had - held? Are the indictments which the council has made against these men false - when the whole city cannot compel them to do right? Great Heavens!

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Then why, Demosthenes, did you agree in the Assembly to a penalty of death for - yourself, if the report of the council should turn out against you? And why have - you yourself ruined many others by insisting on the findings of the council? To - what authority should the people now refer, or to whom should it entrust the - inquiry in the event of mysterious or momentous crimes, if it is to discover the - truth?

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For the council which formerly commanded confidence is being discredited by you, - who claim to be the people's man, though it is a body to which the people gave - in trust the protection of their lives, to whose charge they have often - committed their constitution and democracy, a council which, destined though you - were to malign it, has safeguarded your life, according to your own account so - often threatened, and which keeps the mystic depositsThe exact nature of these mystic deposits, on which the - welfare of the community was thought to depend, is not known; they were - probably oracles. whereby the safety of the city is preserved.

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Now in one respect—for I shall speak my mind—the - Areopagus fully deserves this treatment. It was faced with two alternatives. One - would have been, in accordance with the people's instructions, to conduct the - previous investigation over the three hundred talents which came from the - Persian kingAfter Alexander's accession Darius - subsidized several Greek states to oppose him. Three hundred talents offered - by him to Athens and officially - refused were said to have been accepted by Demosthenes to be used in the - king's interest. Cf. Din. 1.18; Aeschin. 3.239 (who gives the sum which - Demosthenes appropriated as seventy talents); Dio. Sic. - 17.4.; in which case this monster would have been - convicted and the names of those who shared the money published; the betrayal of - Thebes, for which Demosthenes - was responsible,In 335 B.C., owing to a report that Alexander, who was fighting the - Triballi, had been killed, Thebes revolted against Macedonian domination encouraged by - Demosthenes and others who assisted them to procure arms. When they applied - for assistance to the Peloponnese - and Athens, the Peloponnesians - sent an army as far as the Isthmus, while Athens voted help but awaited the turn of events. Meanwhile - Thebes was taken by - Alexander and destroyed. Dinarchus, who goes into greater detail later - (Din. 1.18-22), maintains that for ten - talents of the Persian money Demosthenes could have secured the help of the - Peloponnesian army but was too miserly to do so. Cf. Dio. Sic. 17.8; Aeschin. - 3.239-240. would have been exposed, and we, exacting from - this demagogue the punishment he deserved, would have been rid of him.

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Alternatively, if it was your wish to forgive Demosthenes for these offences and - to have in the city a large number of people who would take bribes against you, - the council ought, having tested your wishes in the previous cases, to have - refused to undertake an investigation over the payments of money recently - reported. For despite the excellence and the justice of this recent report, - which incriminates Demosthenes and the rest of them, and despite the fact that - the Areopagus has not deferred to the power of Demosthenes or Demades but has - regarded justice and truth as more important,

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Demosthenes goes round none the less maligning the council and telling the same - stories about himself with which he will probably try to mislead you presently. - “I made the Thebans your allies.”In making - this claim Demosthenes was referring to events just before the battle of - Chaeronea when he won - Thebes over to Athens by offering her more liberal - terms than Philip. For his defence of this policy see Dem. 18.153 sq. No, Demosthenes, you impaired the common - interest of both our states. “I brought everyone into line at Chaeronea.” On the contrary you yourself were - the only one to leave the line at Chaeronea.The charge of - cowardice in battle is often brought against Demosthenes by Aeschines (e.g. - Aeschin. 3.175); it is mentioned by - Plutarch (Plut. Dem. 855 A) and in the - Lives of the Ten Orators (Plut. Vit. 845 F). “I served on many embassies on your - behalf.”

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One wonders what he would have done or what he would have said if the course that - he had recommended on these missions had proved successful, when, after touring - the whole Greek world to negotiate such disasters and mistakes, he still claims - to have been granted the greatest privileges, namely those of accepting bribes - against his country and saying and doing whatever he wishes against the public - interest.

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You made no allowance for Timotheus,The - following passage is repeated almost word for word in the speech against - Philocles (Din. 3.17). Timotheus, an Athenian - general and a friend of Isocrates, who recounts his exploits (Isoc. 15.107-113), sailed round the Peloponnese and gained a victory at - Corcyra in 375 B.C. In 365 he took Samos, which was occupied by a Persian garrison, after a - ten months' siege (Dem. 15.9). Thence he moved to - Thrace and mastered several - Chalcidian cities, of which Dinarchus here mentions three. In 356 he was - sent out with two others to reinforce the fleet of Chares who was trying to - crush an allied revolt; but in a sea battle near Chios he failed to help Chares, owing to - stormy weather, and was therefore prosecuted by him for bribery. Timotheus - was not popular owing to his haughty behavior; and being fined the - unprecedented amount of a hundred talents, which he could not pay, he went - into exile in Chalcis. Cf. - Isoc. 15.131. Athenians, although - he sailed round the Peloponnese and - defeated the Lacedaemonians in a naval battle at Corcyra, and was the son of CononConon, a general in the - Peloponnesian war who fought at Aegospotami, was later joint commander of the Persian - fleet. In this capacity he rendered a service to Athens by defeating the Spartan - Pisander in a naval battle off Cnidus in 394 B.C. too who - liberated Greece. Though he captured - Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and - twenty other cities besides, you did not permit such services to outweigh the - trial which you were then conducting or the oaths that governed your vote; - instead you fined him a hundred talents because Aristophon said that he had - accepted money from the Chians and Rhodians.

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Will you then absolve this abominable wretch, this Scythian,—really I cannot - contain myself,—whom no mere individual but the whole Areopagus has shown, after - inquiry, to be in possession of money to your detriment, whose bribery and - corruption against the city have been revealed and established beyond doubt? - Will you not punish him and make him an example to others? He is known not only - to have taken gold from the royal treasuriesSee note on Din. 1.10 but also to have - enriched himself at the city's own expense, since he did not even withhold his - hand from the money lately brought to her by Harpalus.

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Yet the embassies to Thebes which - Demosthenes undertook are equivalent to a mere fraction of Timotheus' services; - and which of you, contrasting with the exploits on which Demosthenes prides - himself those which Timotheus and Conon - performed on your behalf, would not laugh to scorn all who consented to listen - to this man? But then there should be no comparison made between this outcast - and the men who in your interests acted worthily of the city and your ancestors. - I will therefore cite the decree which was passed concerning Timotheus and then - return to my review of the defendant. Read. - Decree - -

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This citizen, Demosthenes, of such a character, - who might well have gained the pardon and gratitude of his colleagues in the - public life of those days, since he had rendered great services to the city, not - in word only but in deed, and had always remained true to the same policy rather - than changing to and fro as you have done, met his death without begging the - people for such extensive favors as would set him above the laws or thinking - that men who had sworn to vote in accordance with the law should consider - anything more important than their word; he was ready even for condemnation, if - the jury decided upon it, and did not plead the inclemency of circumstance or - express in public opinions which he did not hold.

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Will you not execute this accursed wretch, - Athenians, who, in addition to many other crucial blunders, stood by while the - Thebans' city was destroyed, though he had accepted three hundred talents from - the Persian King for their protection though the Arcadians,See note on Din. 1.10 - arriving at the Isthmus, had dismissed with a rebuff the envoys of Antipater and - welcomed those from the unhappy Thebans who had reached them with difficulty by - sea, bearing a suppliant's staff and heralds' wands, plaited, they said, from - olive shoots?

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They came to assure the Arcadians that no wish to break their friendship with the - Greeks had led the Thebans to a revolution, nor did they intend to do anything - to the detriment of Greece; but they - were no longer able to countenance at home the behavior of the Macedonians in - the city, to endure slavery, or to witness the outrages perpetrated against the - persons of free men.

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The Arcadians were ready to help them and, sympathizing with their misfortunes, - explained that, though they were compelled through force of circumstance to - serve Alexander with their persons, in spirit they sided always with the Thebans - and the cause of Greek liberty. Since their leader, Astylus, was open to - bribery, as Stratocles said, and wanted ten talents as the price of helping the - Thebans, the envoys approached Demosthenes who, as they knew, held the King's - gold and earnestly begged him to spend the money to save their city.

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But this hard-hearted and impious miser could not bring himself to expend, from - his great resources, ten paltry talents, though he saw such high hopes dawning - for the salvation of Thebes. - Instead, as Stratocles said, he allowed others to provide this sum to induce - those of the Arcadians who had marched out to return home and deny their help to - Thebes.

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Do you consider that the evils for which Demosthenes and his avarice have been - responsible are trivial or of little import for the whole of Greece? Do you think that he deserves any pity - at your hands after committing such offences? Should he not rather suffer the - extreme penalty to atone for his crimes, both past and present? The verdict - given by you today, Athenians, will be heard by all mankind, who will observe - how you, the judges, treat the man with such a record.

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You are the people who, for crimes far smaller than those Demosthenes has - committed, have inflicted on men severe and irrevocable penalties. It was you - who killed Menon the miller, because he kept a free boy from Pellene in his mill. You punished with - death Themistius of Aphidna, - because he assaulted the Rhodian lyre-player at the Eleusinian festival, and - Euthymachus, because he put the Olynthian girl in a brothel.

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But through this traitor children and women, the wives of the Thebans, were - distributed among the tents of the barbarians, a neighboring and allied city has - been torn up from the midst of Greece - and the site of Thebes is being - ploughed and sown, the city of men who shared with you the war against Philip. - Yes, it is being ploughed and sown. And this unfeeling wretch showed no - compassion for a city thus lamentably destroyed, though he visited it as an - envoy representing you and has often shared the meat and drink of its citizens, - claiming himself that he made it our ally. But those to whom he often resorted - in their prosperity he has betrayed in their misfortune.

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The Thebans, so our elders tell us, when the democracy in our city had been - overthrown and Thrasybulus was assembling the exiles in Thebes ready for the seizure of Phyle,Thrasybulus and Anytus, exiled by the Thirty, were received in Thebes. After seizing and holding the - fortress of Phyle in Attica in 404 - B.C., they subsequently occupied the Piraeus and, with the intervention of Sparta, brought about the restoration - of democracy in Athens. - although the Spartans were strong and forbade them to admit or let out any - Athenian, helped the democrats to return and passed that decree which has so - often been read before you, stating that they would turn a blind eye if any - Athenian marched through their territory bearing arms.

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This man who fraternizes, as he will presently tell you, with our allies, behaved - very differently; he would not part with any of the money which he had received - for their protection. Remember these things, gentlemen; consider the disasters - caused by traitors in the downfall of Olynthus and of Thebes; decide wisely now in your interest; destroy those who - are ready to take bribes against their country and so rest your hopes of safety - on yourselves and on the gods.

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For there is only one way, Athenians, in which you will reform the rest of - mankind, only one way: to expose those criminals who are notable men and punish - them as their crimes deserve. In the case of the average defendant no one knows - or troubles to inquire, when he is convicted, what has been his sentence. But - with men of note everyone hears the news and praises the jury, when they have - not sacrificed the interests of justice in deference to the reputation of the - defendants. Read the Theban decree. Cite the evidence. Read the letters. - Decree - - Evidence - - Letters - -

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This man is a hireling, Athenians, a hireling of - long standing. It was he who summoned from Thebes the embassy coming to us from Philip and was responsible - for finishing the first war.The first war with - Macedon (349-346 B.C.) was undertaken by Athens and Olynthus against Philip. Even before - Olynthus was taken the - king made overtures of peace, and it was Philocrates who proposed in - Athens that these - negotiations should begin. However, after the fall of Olynthus in 348, the Athenians tried - to unite other Greek states against Philip, and it was not until this - attempt had failed that Demosthenes acquiesced in peace proposals. In 347 he - defended Philocrates, who was accused of illegality in making his first - peace proposals, and himself served on an embassy to Macedon. The final peace was signed in - 346, when Antipater and Parmenio came to Athens as Philip's envoys. Philocrates was prosecuted by - Hyperides in 343 for being bribed by Philip and went into exile. Cf. Hyp. frag. 16 He helped to defend - Philocrates who proposed the peace with Philip and was exiled by you in - consequence, he hired a carriage for the envoys who came here with Antipater, - and by attaching them to himself, first introduced into the city the custom of - flattering Macedon.

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Do not acquit him, Athenians. Do not let go unpunished this man who has endorsed - the misfortunes of his country and the rest of Greece, when he has been caught with bribes against the city in - his very hands. Now that good fortune is improving your lot and, after expelling - from the city one of the two who have defiled their country, has surrendered - this other to you for execution, do not oppose all our interests yourselves but - rather bring happier omens to our state affairs and divert our misfortunes on to - the heads of these leaders.

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Against what occasion will you reserve Demosthenes in the belief that he will - prove useful to you? Could any one of you, or of the bystanders, say what public - or private affairs he has not ruined by his contact with them? After gaining - access to the home of AristarchusThis story is - told more fully by Aeschines (Aeschin. - 1.171; Aeschin. 2.148 and Aeschin. 2.166), who says that Aristarchus son - of Moschus was a wealthy orphan, half mad, from whom Demosthenes, pretending - to have taken a fancy to him personally, extracted three talents. He asserts - that together they contrived to murder, with great brutality, Nicodemus of - Aphidna who had once prosecuted Demosthenes for desertion; as the result of - which crime Aristarchus went into exile. Demosthenes himself mentions the - murder in his speech against Midias, where he claims that Midias went about - casting suspicion on him and persuaded the relatives of Nicodemus to do - likewise (Dem. 21.104). Cf. Athen. 23.592 f. and planning with him the - death of Nicodemus which they contrived, an affair of which you all know the - details, did he not banish Aristarchus on the most shameful charges? And did not - Aristarchus find in Demosthenes such a friend as to make him think that this was - some evil spirit which had visited him and the originator of all his - misfortunes?

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Is it not true that once this man began to advise the city, and would he had - never done so,—I shall pass over his private affairs, for time does not permit - me to speak at length,—absolutely no good has befallen it; indeed not only the - city but the whole of Greece has been - involved in dangers, misfortunes, and dishonor? Is it not true that he has had - many opportunities while speaking to you and yet let slip every opportunity to - help you? On those occasions when a patriot with any regard for the city would - have chosen to make some move, this demagogue, who will presently say that he - has been of service to you, was so far from showing signs of action that he even - infected with his own ill-luck the men who were doing something to further your - interests.

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CharidemusCharidemus of Oreos in Euboea was made an Athenian citizen for his services as a - soldier (Dem. 23.151). He went to Persia in 335 - B.C., having been banished from Athens on the orders of Alexander (Arr. 1.10.6), and after being well received - at first by Darius, fell under suspicion two years later and was executed - (Dio. Sic. 17.30). set out to visit - the Persian King, wishing to do you some practical service apart from mere - talking, and anxious at his own peril to win safety for you and every Greek. - Demosthenes went round the market making speeches and associating himself with - the project. So completely did fortune wreck this plan that it turned out in - just the opposite way to what was expected.

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Ephialtes put to sea. Admittedly he hated Demosthenes but he was compelled to - have a partner in public affairs. Fortune robbed the city of this man too.The facts are here distorted. Ephialtes, one of - the orators whose surrender was demanded by Alexander in 335 B.C. (Arr. 1.104), was a - supporter of Demosthenes and, according to the Pseudo-Plutarch, brought back - money for the demagogues from the Persian court (Plut. Vit. Dem. 847 F and 848 E). He was killed while helping - the Persians to defend Halicarnassus against Alexander (Dio. - Sic. 17.27). EuthydicusNo details are known of Euthydicus. He seems to be mentioned as an Athenian - patriot together with Ephialtes and Lycurgus in the third letter of - Demosthenes (Dem. L 3.31), where however the - MSS. have *eu)/dilkon. elected to - work for the people. Demosthenes claimed to be his friend. He too was lost. Do - not these facts, which you see and know better than I do, give you cause for - thought? Do they not make you weigh up your future prospects in the light of the - past and reflect in your own minds that this man is of no use except to our - enemies, against the interests of the city?

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to raise such another force as we had in the time of Agis,While Alexander was in the East, Agis the Third of - Sparta rose against - Macedon with the help of Darius - in 333 B.C. In 331 he headed an army raised by - various Greek states but was refused the support of Athens, on the advice of Demosthenes. - Defeated near Megalopolis - by Antipater he was killed in battle (Dio. Sic. - 17.48 and Dio. Sic. 17.62). - when the Spartans took the field together and Achaeans and men of Elis were taking their part in the campaign - with ten thousand mercenaries also; when Alexander was in India,Alexander was, in fact, in Persia. according to report, and the whole of Greece, owing to the traitors in every city, - was dissatisfied with the existing state of things and hoped for some release - from the misfortunes that beset her. In that hour,—for I need not dwell on other - crises,—

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what was the behavior of this Demosthenes who had the power to give advice and - make proposals, who will shortly tell you that he hates our present - circumstances? On these matters, Demosthenes, did you offer any proposal, any - advice? Did you contribute money? Were you of the smallest value to the men - safeguarding us all? Not the least; you went round suborning speechwriters. He - wrote a letter at home, defiling the city's honor,

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and walked about dangling it from his finger ends, living in luxury during the - city's misfortunes, travelling down the road to the Piraeus in a litter and reproaching the - needy for their poverty. Is this man then going to prove useful to you on future - occasions, when he has let slip every opportunity in the past? By our lady - Athena and Zeus the Savior, I could wish that the enemies of Athens had lighted upon counsellors and - leaders like him and never better.

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Let me remind you, gentlemen, of the conduct of - your forbears, who, at a time when many grave perils beset the city, faced - danger in the interests of the people, in a manner worthy of their country and - their well-earned reputation, as befitted free men. Time does not permit me to - deal with those figures of the past, Aristides and Themistocles: the men who - built the city's walls and carried up to the Acropolis the tribute paid by the - willing and even eager Greeks.

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But you will recall what was done, shortly before our own time, by Cephalus the - orator, Thrason of Herchia, Eleus and Phormisius and other fine men, some of - whom are still alive today.Cephalus assisted - in the overthrow of the Thirty in 403 B.C. His - reputation as an orator is acknowledged by Demosthenes (Dem. 18.219). Cf. Din. - 1.76. Of the other three men little is known. Thrason is - mentioned as a Theban proxenus by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.139); Eleus is perhaps the trierarch (c. 323) whose - name appears in an inscription (I.G. 2.812, b. 14); Phormisius is a mere - name. Cf. Aristot. Const. Ath. - 34.3. Some of them, when the Cadmea was garrisoned by - Spartans, assisted the exiles who returned to Thebes and at their own risk set free a neighboring city, long - enslaved.In 382 - B.C. Thebes was betrayed to Sparta and many leading men were exiled. These took refuge - at Athens, with whose help in - 378 they soon overthrew the new government and ejected the Spartan garrison - from the city (Dio. Sic. 15.25). -

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Others lent aid when your ancestors were persuaded to take the field by Cephalus, - who proposed the decree and who, undaunted by the might of Sparta and regardless of the risks either - of military or political action, moved that the Athenians should march out to - help the exiles who had taken Thebes. Your fathers did march out and in a few - days the commander of the Spartan garrison was expelled, the Thebans had been - freed and your city had acted worthily of your ancestors.

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They were counsellors, Athenians, they were leaders such as yourselves and the - state deserve. How different from rogues like this who neither have done nor - will do the city any service but watch over their own safety and treat - everything as a source of income. They have made the city more infamous than - themselves, and now, convicted of taking bribes against you, they deceive you - and presume, after conduct such as this, to talk to you about their own - aggrandizement. They ought, by the terms of their own decree, to have been put - to death long ago for doing such things.

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Are you not ashamed, Athenians, that you should - think our speeches the only evidence you have on which to determine the - punishment of Demosthenes? Do you not know yourselves that this man is open to - bribes and is both a robber and a traitor to his friends that neither he nor the - fortune which has gone with him is fit for the city? Are there any decrees or - any laws which have not brought him money?

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Are there any people in the court who were among those included in the three - hundred when Demosthenes brought in his law concerning the trierarchs?For the trierarch law see note on Hyp. frag. 43. Then tell your neighbors - that he accepted three talents and used to alter and re-draft the law for every - sitting of the Assembly, in some cases taking money over points for which he had - been paid already, in others failing to honor the sales which he had made.

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Really, gentlemen, tell me: do you think he got nothing for proposing that - DiphilusLittle is known of the various men - mentioned in this section. Diphilus was perhaps the son of Diopithes, - trierarch in 325/4 and 323/2 B.C. (CIA - 2.809 d, 53 and 811 b, 104). For Chaerephilus, a dealer in salt fish, - compare Hyp. frag. 34 and Hyp. frag. 35. The three names following his are those of his - sons. All four were evidently put in the deme of Paeania, Pamphilus and - Phidippus being mentioned as members of it in inscriptions (CIA 2.172 and - CIA 2.811 d, 142). Cf. also Athen. 3.119 sq. and - Athen. 8.339 d. Berisades is probably the - same man as Paerisades, a king of Bosporus to whom Demosthenes refers (Dem. 34.8); Satyrus was his son. should have meals at the - Prytaneum or for that statue to be put up in the market? Nothing for conferring - Athenian citizenship on Chaerephilus, Phidon, Pamphilus, and Phidippus, or again - on Epigenes and Conon the bankers? - Nothing for putting up in the market bronze statues of Berisades, Satyrus and - Gorgippus the tyrants from the Pontus, - from whom he receives a thousand medimni of wheat a year—this man who will - presently tell you that there is nowhere for him to take refuge.

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Did he get nothing for proposing that TaurosthenesDinarchus, like Aeschines, is distorting the facts. (Cf. - Aeschin. 3 85 sq. and schol. ad loc.). - The cities of Euboea had entered - the Athenian alliance in 357 B.C., but in 348 they - revolted, probably owing to the intrigues of Philip with whom Athens was now at war over Olynthus. Taurosthenes and Callias - commanded the army of Chalcis - and the Athenians lost control of the island. In 343 however they - transferred the allegiance of Chalcis to Athens, and a few years later-the exact date is not - certain-were made Athenian citizens on the motion of Demosthenes (cf. Hyp. 5 col. 20), whom Aeschines says they - bribed. should become an Athenian, though he had enslaved his fellow - citizens and, with his brother Callias, betrayed the whole of Euboea to Philip? Taurosthenes whom the laws - forbid to set foot on Athenian soil, providing that if he does so he shall be - liable to the same penalties as an exile who returns after being sentenced by - the Areopagus. This was the man who Demosthenes the democrat proposed should be - your fellow citizen.

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Is there any need then for me to call up witnesses for you so far as these men - are concerned or any of the others whom he has proposed as proxeni or citizens? - I ask you in Athena's name: do you imagine that when he gladly accepts silver he - would refuse twenty talents of gold? Do you think that though he takes money in - dribblets, he would not accept as a lump sum so great a fee, or that the - Areopagus, which spent six months inquiring over Demosthenes, Demades, and - Cephisophon,This is probably the same - Cephisophon, a politician of the time, as is mentioned by Demosthenes (Dem. 18.21 and Dem. - 19.293). has been unjust over the reports submitted to - you?

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Gentlemen, you have very many witnesses, as I said - before, among citizens and other Greeks, watching to see how you will judge this - trial; are you, they wonder, going to bring within the scope of the courts the - venal actions of other men, or will there be complete freedom to accept bribes - against you? Will the things which so far have been held trustworthy and sure - now cease to be so on account of the trial of Demosthenes? On his past record he - ought to have been put to death, and he is liable to all the curses known to the - city,

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having broken the oaths he took on the Areopagus, in the names of the holy - goddesses and the other deities by whom it is customary to swear there, and - making himself accursed at every sitting of the Assembly. He has been proved to - have taken bribes against Athens, - has cheated the people and the council in defiance of the curse, professing - views he does not hold, and in private has recommended to Aristarchus a course - both cruel and unlawful.Cf. Din. 1.30 and note. For these misdeeds, if - there is any power to exact a just punishment from perjurers and criminals—as - there surely is—this man shall pay today. Gentlemen of the jury, listen to the - curse.For the curse pronounced by the - herald before each sitting of the Council and Assembly on all who might be - acting treasonably against the state compare Lyc. - 1.31. - Curse - -

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Despite this, gentlemen of the jury, Demosthenes - is so ready with his lies and utterly unsound assertions, so oblivious of shame, - exposure, or curse, that he will dare to say of me, I gather, that I too was - previously condemned by the council. According to him I am behaving with the - utmost inconsistency, because in the past I opposed the council's report and - pleaded my own case, whereas I am now serving as its advocate and accusing him - over the report before us today.

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This is a story of his own invention, not based on fact, and he is impudent - enough to lie to you. So to make sure that, if he embarks upon this story, you - will pay no attention to him but will realize fully that the council did not - report me and was in no danger of doing so,—the truth being that I suffered at - the hands of a man of low character who has been convicted before you,—let me - explain briefly. Then I will come back to Demosthenes.

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The council of the Areopagus is bound, gentlemen, - to follow one of two methods in making all its reports. What are these methods? - Its inquiry is made either on its own initiative or in obedience to the people's - instructions.See note on Din. 1.6. Apart from these two, there is no - other procedure it could follow. If then you tell us, you abominable brute, that - the council followed the people's instructions in making its inquiry and - publishing the report on me,

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show me the decree and tell me who were my accusers after the report was made. - Compare the present case, where you have both: a decree which authorized the - council's inquiry, and accusers, elected by the people, who are now giving the - jury an account of the crimes. If your story is true, I am prepared to die. But - if you claim that the council took the initiative in reporting me, produce the - Areopagites as witnesses, just as I myself shall produce them to show that I was - not reported,

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to show in fact that, after impeaching one rogue and traitor who, like you, had - maligned the council and myself, I proved before two thousand five hundred - citizens that he had hired himself to PythoclesPythocles was an Athenian orator who, in company with Aeschines, attacked - Demosthenes unsuccessfully after Chaeronea. Cf. Dem. - 18.285. in making this attack upon me, and so avenged myself - with the help of those then serving on the jury. Clerk, please take the - deposition. I laid it before the jury previously as evidence and no one - questioned its veracity. So I will produce it now. Read the deposition. - Deposition - -

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Is it not an anomaly, Athenians, that on that - occasion, because one man, Pistias an Areopagite,Nothing else is known of Pistias except that Dinarchus - composed a speech against him, the title of which appears in the list of his - genuine public orations preserved by Dionysius. told lies against the - council and myself and said that I was a criminal, falsehood would have - prevailed over truth, if through my weakness and isolation at the time the - trumped up lies against me had been believed; whereas now, when the fact is - admitted by the whole Areopagus that Demosthenes has taken twenty talents of - gold against your interests, and is therefore a criminal, and that your popular - leader, in whom some men place their hopes,

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has been caught in the act of taking bribes, the customs of the Areopagus and - truth and justice are going to prove weaker than Demosthenes' word? Truth will - be overridden by the slanderous statement he intends to make against the - council, namely that many of those reported by it as a menace to the people - have, on coming into court, been acquitted, in some cases the council failing to - secure a fifth part of the votes. There is an explanation for this which you - will easily follow.

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The council, gentlemen, has its own method of inquiring into the cases which you - assign to it and the crimes committed within its own body. Unlike - yourselves,—and you need not take offence at this,—who are sometimes apt when - judging to give more weight to mercy than to justice, it simply reports anyone - who is liable to the charges in question or has broken any traditional rule of - conduct believing that if a person is in the habit of committing small offences - he will more easily involve himself in serious crimes.

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Consequently when one of its number robbed the ferryman of his fare it fined him - and reported him to you. Again, when someone claimed the five drachma - allowanceIt appears from Hyperides (Hyp. 5 col. 26), who seems to be referring to the same - case, that Dinarchus is here alluding to the dole made to Athenians to - enable them to attend the theater. The normal price of a seat was one-third - of a drachma only, but as the fund was apparently drawn upon for other - purposes also, it is perhaps not surprising that the sum mentioned here is - larger. Cf. Libanius arg. ad Demosthenem 1. - The portion mentioned in the following sentence was an allowance of - sacrificial meat made to members of the Areopagus. in the name of an - absentee, it reported him also to you. Similarly it fined and expelled the man - who presumed to break the rule and sell the Areopagite portion.

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You tried these men and acquitted them. You were not thereby convicting the - Areopagus of error but you were more concerned with sympathy than justice, and - thought the punishment too severe for the offence which the defendants had - committed. Do you imagine then, Demosthenes, that the council made a false - report? Of course it did not. Nevertheless, gentlemen, you acquitted these men - and others like them, though the council reported that they were guilty of - breaking its rules.

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In the case of Polyeuctus of Cydantidae,For - Polyeuctus of Cydantidae, the accuser of Euxenippus, cf. Hyp. 4.4, Introduction. when the people instructed the - council to inquire whether he was accompanying the exiles to Megara and to report back after the - investigation, it reported that he was doing so. You chose accusers as the law - prescribes: Polyeuctus came into court and you acquitted him, on his admitting - that he was going to Megara to - Nicophanes who, he said, was married to his mother. So you did not consider that - he was doing anything strange or reprehensible in keeping in touch with his - mother's husband who was in difficulties, or in assisting him, so far as he - could, while he was banished from the country.

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The report of the council, Demosthenes, was not proved false; it was quite true, - but the jury decided to acquit Polyeuctus. The council was instructed to - discover the truth, yet, as I say, the court decided whether it was a case for - pardon. Is that any reason for distrusting the council over the present reports - in which it has stated that you and your confederates are in possession of the - gold? That would be disgraceful.

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Convince the jury now, Demosthenes, that any of those crimes ranks with yours and - that to take bribes against one's country is a pardonable act which would - justify these men in acquitting you. For other pecuniary offences the laws - prescribe damages twice as great as the sum involved,A misleading statement. Cf. Hyp. 5 col. - 24, where the contrast made is between a simple and a tenfold - fine. A fine was doubled only if it had not been paid before a specific - date. Cf. Din. 2.17 and Aristot. Const. Ath. 54. but in - cases of bribery they have laid down two penalties only: either death, to ensure - that by meeting with this punishment the guilty man is an example to others, or - a fine for bribery ten times as great as the original bribe, so that men who - dare to commit this offence shall not gain by it.

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Perhaps you will not attempt to argue thus, - Demosthenes, but will say that of those whom the council has reported up till - now the rest have admitted that the penalty which it imposed was deserved, - whereas you alone have protested against it. But you alone, of all those ever - reported, asked these men of your own accord to be your judges and court of - inquiry. You proposed the decree against yourself and made the people witness of - the agreement, defining the penalty for yourself as death, if the council should - report that you had taken any of the money brought into the country by Harpalus. -

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And yet in the past, Demosthenes, you proposed that the council of the Areopagus - should have power over all these men, and the rest of Athens too, to enforce the laws of the land - and punish any who transgressed them. It was you who surrendered the whole city - into the hands of this council which you will presently tell us is oligarchic. - By the terms of your decree the death sentence has been inflicted on two - citizens, a father and a son, who were given over to the executioner.

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One of the descendants of Harmodius was imprisoned in pursuance of your order. - These gentlemen, acting on the council's report, tortured and killed - Antiphon.Demosthenes (Dem. 18.132) confirms this and says that Antiphon - promised Philip that he would burn the dockyards in the Piraeus. Demosthenes caught him there - and brought him before the people, who at first acquitted him. But the - Areopagus intervened and he was later executed. You expelled - CharinusCharinus, a figure of little - importance, is mentioned as a traitor in the speech against Theocrines, - which was attributed by Dionysius to Dinarchus but has survived among the - works of Demosthenes (Dem. 58.38). from - the city for treason on the strength of the council's reports and punishments. - After proposing this treatment for yourself also, are you now overriding the - decree of your own accord? Surely that is neither just nor lawful.

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I summon as my witnesses, Athenians, the awful - goddesses and their abode, the heroes of the land, Athena Polias, and those - other gods who have obtained our city and countryside as their home, to show - that when the people has consigned to you for punishment one who, against his - country's interests, has accepted a part of the imported money,The sense of this passage is clear, though the Greek wording - leaves room for doubt. one who has defiled and ruined the city's - prosperity and betrayed that country which he claimed to have fortified by his - diplomacy,An allusion to some words of - Demosthenes in the speech on the Crown (Dem. - 18.299). -

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enemies, and those who bear the city ill will, would wish him alive, counting - this a disaster for Athens; but all - who favor your concerns and hope that with a turn of fortune the city's - prospects may improve wish that this man may die and pay the penalty merited by - his conduct, and such is the burden of their prayers. I also join in praying the - gods to save our country, which I see to be in danger of forfeiting its safety, - its women and children, its honor, and every other thing of worth.

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What shall we say to the bystanders, Athenians, when we come out of the court, if - you are deceived, as I pray you may not be, by the wizardry of this man? What - will be the feelings of you all, when, on your return, you presume to look upon - your fathers' hearths, after acquitting the traitor who first brought into his - own home the gold of bribery; after convicting as utterly false, in both its - inquiry and its conclusion, the body which all men hold in the greatest awe? -

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What hopes, Athenians,—picture for yourselves,—what hopes shall we have if some - danger overtakes the city, when we have made it a safe thing to take bribes - against one's country and have robbed of its status the body which kept watch - over the city in such times of crisis?

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Or again,—let us suppose this to happen,—what if Alexander, in pursuance of - Demosthenes' decree,Demosthenes had proposed - that the money should be kept on the Acropolis until Alexander sent for - it. sends and asks us for the gold brought into the country by - Harpalus, and, over and above the fact that the council has made a report, sends - down here the slaves which have now been returned to him and asks us to find out - the truth from them; what in Heaven's name shall we say, gentlemen?

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Will you propose, Demosthenes, that we go to war, in view of your success with - the previous wars? Suppose the rest of Athens decides on this, which is fairer: for your gold to be - available for war along with other people's or for others to contribute from - their own property, melting down the personal ornaments of their wives, the cups - and all the country's store of offerings to the gods, as you said you would - suggest, though you yourself paid in fifty drachmas from your houses in - Piraeus and the city? That has - been your contribution under the last levy though now you have twenty talents. -

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Perhaps you will not advocate war but advise us to follow out the decree which - you proposed and give back to Alexander the gold brought to us? If so, it will - be for your sake that the people have to restore it. It is surely neither just - nor fair nor democratic that those who work should contribute, while you plunder - and steal; that some should make no secret of the property they hold and make - contributions proportionate to it, while you who have received more than a - hundred and fifty talents, either from the King's moneySee note on Din. 1.10. or - from your association with Alexander, have no declared property in the city but - have fortified yourself against the people as though you had no confidence in - your own conduct of affairs.

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Is it right, when the laws demand that the orator or general who expects to get - the people's confidence shall observe the laws in begetting children, shall own - land within our boundaries, shall give all the lawful pledges and only thus lay - claim to be the people's leader, that you should have sold the land inherited - from your father or be claiming as yours children which are not your own, thus - breaking the laws which govern oaths in court,A reference to the oath whereby a man called down imprecations on his - children, swearing that he was not guilty of a certain action. Demosthenes - had lost his only child, a daughter, in 336 (Aeschin. 3.77); and if he had other children now, they were - adopted or by a hetaera. Cf. Athen. 13.592 - e. and be ordering others to fight when you deserted the - citizens' ranks yourself?

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What do you think it is, Athenians, that makes - cities vary between good and evil fortunes? You will find only one cause: the - counsellors and leaders. Take Thebes. It was a city; it became supreme. Under - what leaders and generals? All the older men, on whose authority I shall give - you the story, would admit that it was when Pelopidas,Pelopidas and Epaminondas were the chief Theban generals - during their city's period of greatness (371-362 B.C.). In 371 they defeated - Sparta at Leuctra and, in - response to an appeal from the Arcadians who then rose against Sparta, entered the Peloponnese in 370. Here they refounded - the town of Messene which the - Spartans had destroyed at the end of the 8th century B.C. (Dio. Sic. 15.56 and Dio. - Sic. 15.62-66). Epaminondas conducted three further invasions of - the Peloponnese, penetrating - Laconia, but never actually - taking Sparta. It was probably - during the second of these that he founded Megalopolis, the new capital of - Arcadia; in the third he was - killed at Mantinea (362 - B.C.). so they have it,

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led the Sacred BandThe Sacred Band was a - company of 300 picked soldiers maintained by the state. They first attracted - attention by defeating a Spartan force in 375 B.C. - and played a large part in the victory of Leuctra. At Chaeronea they fought to the last man and - were buried by the highway from Phocis to Thebes with the figure of a lion over their - tomb. and Epaminondas and their compeers were in command. It was then - that Thebes won the battle of Leuctra, then that they invaded the Spartans' - country which, it was thought, could not be ravaged. During that period they - accomplished many fine achievements: founded Messene in the four hundredthMessenia was first conquered - about the year 700 B.C., so that the figure 400th - is a very rough estimate; 300th would be nearer. Cf. Lyc. 1.62 and note. year after its fall, gave the - Arcadians self-government, and won a universal reputation.

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On the other hand when was their achievement despicable and unworthy of their - spirit? When Timolaus,The three men mentioned - in this sentence were Theban generals at the battle of Chaeronea. the friend of - Demosthenes, was corrupted and took bribes from Philip, when the traitor - Proxenus commanded the mercenaries enlisted at Amphissa and Theagenes was placed in command of the phalanx, a - man of ill luck and, like the defendant here, open to bribes. Then, because of - the three men whom I have mentioned, the whole city was destroyed and blotted - from the face of Greece. Far from being - false it is only too true that leaders are responsible for all the citizens' - good fortunes and for the reverse.

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Think again, this time of Athens, - with the same points in mind. Our city was great, renowned in Greece, and worthy of our forbears, apart from - the well-known exploits of the past, at the time when - Conon triumphed, as our elders - tell us, in the naval battle at Cnidus; - when Iphicrates destroyed the Spartan company, when Chabrias defeated the - Spartan triremes at sea off Naxos, when - Timotheus won the sea battle off Corcyra.For the exploits of - Conon and Timotheus compare - Din. 1.14 and note. In 391 B.C. the Athenian general Iphicrates, on going to the relief - of Corinth, surprised and - almost annihilated a Spartan company. The defeat of the Spartan fleet by - Chabrias took place in 376 and won supremacy in the Aegean for Athens for over fifty years (Xen. Hell. 5.4.61; Dem. - 20.77). -

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That was the time, Athenians, when the Spartans, once famous through the leaders - in whose ways they had been schooled, came humbly to our city and begged our - ancestors to save them; and the democracy which they had overthrown was made by - the counsellors, whom we then had, the first power in Greece again: deservedly, in my belief; for - they had found generals of the type I have just mentioned and had as advisers - Archinus and Cephalus of Collytus.Like - Cephalus, who is mentioned above (Din. 1.38), - Archinus took a leading part in the overthrow of the Thirty in 403. - For the only salvation of a city or a nation is to find brave men to lead it and - wise counsellors.

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It follows then, Athenians, that if you fully recognize this fact you should not - surely be parties in future to Demosthenes' corruption and ill-luck or rest your - hopes of security on him; you need not think that you will lack brave men or - wise advisers. Let the anger of your forefathers be yours. Put to death this - robber taken in the act, this traitor who does not withhold his hands from the - gold brought into Athens but has - cast the city into the direst misfortunes, this arch-criminal of Greece. Have his body cast beyond the city's - borders, give her fortunes a chance to mend, and then, with this accomplished, - expect a happier lot.

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I want you also, Athenians, to hear that other - decree moved by Demosthenes,One of the several - decrees relating to defence proposed by Demosthenes after Chaeronea; the oracle is mentioned in the - speech on the False Embassy (Dem. 19.297 - sq.). the decree which this democratic statesman proposed when the - city was in disorder after the battle of Chaeronea, and also the oracle sent from Dodona from Dodonian Zeus; for it has long - been warning you clearly to beware of your leaders and advisers. Read the oracle - first. - Oracle - -

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Read that splendid decree of his. - Part of the Decree - A fine democrat indeed who arranges for - himself, being a brave and courageous man, to remain in arms, while he orders - the citizens whom he rejects for service to go off to their work or to do - anything else he thinks is called for. Read the rest. - Rest of the Decree - -

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Listen to that, gentlemen of the jury. The decree says that the chosen embassies - shall set out. When, after the battle of Chaeronea, he heard that Philip intended to invade our country - he appointed himself an envoy, so as to escape from the city, and went off,Dinarchus is perhaps referring to the fact that - after Chaeronea Demosthenes was appointed a commissioner for corn (sitw/nhs) and went abroad to procure it (cf. - Dem. 18.248). Alternatively when appeals - for help were made by Athens to - some of the islands (cf. Lyc. 1.42) Demosthenes - may have served as an envoy. after scraping together eight talents - from the treasury, without a thought about the plight we were in, at a time when - everyone else was contributing from his own money to ensure your protection. -

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That is the character of your adviser. Demosthenes has made only these two - journeys abroad in his lifeThis statement is - wholly incorrect and Dinarchus appears to be contradicting himself, since in - Din. 1.12 of this speech he does not attempt - to refute Demosthenes' claim to have served on many embassies. By excluding - the words “in his life” and placing a colon after “battle” Maetzner would - alter the sense to: “Demosthenes has made only these two journeys abroad - since the battle of Chaeronea.”: one after the battle when he ran away from - the city, and another just recently to Olympia when he wanted to use the presidency of the sacred - embassy as a means of meeting Nicanor.Demosthenes was the - chief Athenian religious envoy at the Olympic games in 324 B.C. when Nicanor - presented Alexander's decree demanding that exiles should be allowed to - return to all Greek cities except Thebes. Cf. Dio. Sic. 18.8; - Hyp. 5 col. 18. A right thing indeed to - entrust the city to this man's charge, when danger confronts us! When it was - time to fight against the enemy, side by side with his fellows, he left his post - and made for home; yet when he should have stayed at home to face danger with - them, he offered himself as an envoy and ran away and left the city.

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When ambassadors were needed for the peace he said he would not move a foot to - leave the city; yet when it was reported that Alexander was restoring the exiles - and Nicanor came to Olympia he offered himself to the council as - president of the sacred embassy. These are the parts he plays: on the field of - battle he is a stay-at-home, when others stay at home he is an ambassador, among - ambassadors he is a runaway.Now read theThat some words have dropped out of the text - here is evident from the fact that two decrees are to be read and compared; - moreover the executions mentioned in Din. 1.83 - could have no connection with the decree relating to the money of Harpalus, - since in this case Demosthenes himself was the first to be tried (Din. 1.106). and the decree relating to the - inquiry over the money proposed by Demosthenes for the Areopagus and affecting - both himself and you. I want you by comparing them together to realize that he - is demented. - Decree - -

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Did you propose this, Demosthenes? You did; you cannot deny it. Was the council - given authority on your motion? It was. Have some of the citizens been executed? - They have. Did your decree have power over them? You cannot deny that it - did.Read the decree again which Demosthenes - proposed against Demosthenes. Let me have your attention, gentlemen. - Decree - -

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The council has found Demosthenes guilty. Need we enlarge on this? It has made - its report on him, Athenians. Justice demanded that, having been self-condemned, - he should immediately be put to death. But now that he has fallen into the hands - of you who have been assembled by the people and have sworn to obey the laws and - the people's decrees, what will you do? Will you ignore the claims of piety - towards the gods and the justice recognized by the world? No, Athenians, do not - do so.

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It would be an utter disgrace if, when others no worse, and even less guilty, - than Demosthenes have been destroyed by his decrees, he, with his contempt for - you and the laws, should be at large unpunished in the city, when by his own - motion and the decrees which he proposed he has been convicted. The same - council, Athenians, the same place, the same rights have been in question.

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The same orator was responsible for the misfortunes which overtook them and those - which will soon overtake him. He himself in the Assembly instructed this council - to judge his case, after calling on you as his witnesses. He made an agreement - with the people and proposed the decree against himself, to be kept by the - mother of the gods,Dinarchus is alluding to - the Metroon, in which the state archives were kept. Cf. Lyc. 1.66 and note. who is the city's guardian of all - written contracts. It would thus be impious for you to invalidate this or, after - swearing by the gods in the present trial, to give a vote which did not conform - with the actions of the gods themselves.

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When Poseidon lost his suit against Ares over Halirrothius he abode by the - decision.According to tradition, - Halirrothius, son of Poseidon, was killed by Ares for trying to seduce his - daughter Alcippe. Poseidon accused Ares before the Areopagus but failed to - secure his conviction. Cf. Apollod. - 3.14.2. The awful goddesses too, in their case against - Orestes,Orestes, pursued by the Furies, - was said to have been given protection by Athena, who allowed the Areopagus - to try his case and herself gave the casting vote which acquitted him. Cf. - Aesch. Eum. 443 sq.; Paus. 1.28.5. abode by the judgement of - this council, associating themselves for the future with its reputation for - truth. How will you act with your claim to unrivalled piety? Will you annul the - decision of the council and follow the bad example of Demosthenes? You will not, - Athenians, if you remain in your senses.

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This is no small or incidental matter that you are deciding today; the question - at issue is the safety of the whole city and also bribery, an evil habit and a - practice which is harmful to you and has always brought men to ruin. If you do - everything in your power to rid the city of this vice and to suppress those who - gladly take bribes against you, we shall be saved, with Heaven's consent. But if - you allow the orators to sell you, you will stand by and see them wreck the - city.

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Demosthenes himself proposed in the Assembly, - clearly implying that it was a just step to take, that we should keep for - Alexander the money brought into Attica - with Harpalus.See Din. - 1.68 and note. Tell me, sir: are we going to keep it under - present conditions, when you have taken twenty talents for personal use, someone - else fifteen, Demades six thousand gold staters, and the others the various sums - that have been credited to them? For sixty-four talents have already been - traced, for which, you must conclude, gentlemen, that these men are to be held - responsible.

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Which is the more honorable alternative, which the more just: that all the money - should be kept in the treasury until the people has reached some fair decision, - or that the orators and certain of the generals should seize and keep it? - Personally I think that to keep it in the treasury is the course which all would - admit to be just, while no one would consider it fair for these men to retain - it.

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The statements made by the defendant, gentlemen, - have been numerous and very varied but never consistent. For he realizes that - all along you have been cheated by him with empty hopes and lying assertions and - that you remember his promises only so long as they are being uttered. If then - the city must go on enjoying the fruits of Demosthenes' wickedness and - ill-fortune, that we may still be plagued by an evil genius,—I can find no other - word for it,—we should acquiesce in the present state of affairs.

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But if we have any regard for our country, if we hate wicked and corrupt men and - want our fortune to change for the better, you must not surrender yourselves, - Athenians, to the prayers of this accursed juggler or lend an ear to his laments - and quackeries. You have had enough experience of him, his speeches, his - actions, and his luck.

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Which of you is so hopeful, Athenians, or so irrational, which of you is so - unversed in past or present history, as to expect that a man who reduced the - city, through whatever fault or fortune,—I am not concerned with that,—from such - great prosperity to such utter disgrace, will save us now by serving as a - counsellor and administrator? For besides the other difficulties and dangers - which beset us we have now corruption also, of men right in the city, and are - one and all striving to clear ourselves of a shameful charge, lest the people be - thought to hold in their own name the money which certain individuals are - keeping for themselves.

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I am not citing other instances of his continual change of policy or of the - pernicious speeches which he has consistently made. At one time he made a - proposal forbidding anyone to believe in any but the accepted gods and at - another said that the people must not question the grant of divine honors to - AlexanderDemosthenes had merely said: “Let - him be the son of Zeus and Poseidon too if he likes.” Cf. Hyp. 5 col. 31.; and again when he was on the point of - being tried before you, he impeached Callimedon for consorting with the - exilesAthens, unlike most Greek cities, refused to obey - Alexander's order for the restoration of exiles (cf. note on Din. 1.81). Callimedon, a politician with - pro-Macedonian sympathies, nicknamed the Crab, is mentioned several times by - Plutarch (e.g. Plut. Dem. 27). in - Megara with intent to overthrow the - democracy,

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and directly after countermanded the impeachment and brought forward at the - recent sitting of the Assembly a false witness whom he had primed to say that - there was a plot afoot threatening the docks. In all this he offered no - proposals but simply furnished us with charges for the present trial, since on - all these points you are witnesses against him. This man is a juggler, - Athenians, and a blackguard, not entitled to be a citizen of Athens, either by virtue of his birth or of - his political record.

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Where are the triremes which Demosthenes, like EubulusFor the confidence inspired by Eubulus, son of Spintharus, - who controlled Athenian finances from 354 to 350 - B.C., and perhaps for a further period also, compare Aeschin. 3.25. in his time, has supplied to the city? - Where are the dockyards built under his administration? When did he improve the - cavalry either by decree or law? Despite such opportunities as were offered - after the battle of Chaeronea, did he - raise a single force either for land or sea? What ornament for the goddess has - he carried up to the Acropolis? What building has Demosthenes put up, either in - your exchange, or in the city, or anywhere else in the country? Not a man could - point to one anywhere.

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Very well; if a person has proved untrustworthy in military matters and useless - in the business of the city, if he has idly watched his opponents accomplish - everything they wished, changing his own position and neglecting to pursue the - people's interests, will you wish to preserve him?

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Not if you are prudent and make the right decision for yourselves and Athens. No; you will welcome the good - fortune which gave up to you for punishment those orators who, through their own - bribery, have humiliated the city, and will beware, as the gods have often - cautioned you in oracles, against the leaders and counsellors of this type. - Listen to the oracle itself. Read the oracle.Cf. Din. 1.78. - Oracle - -

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How then shall we be of one mind, Athenians? How - shall we agree upon the interests of the state when our leaders and demagogues - take bribes and betray their country's interests, when you yourselves and the - whole people are in danger of losing the very foundations of Athens, together with your fathers' temples - and your wives and children, while they have conspired together, so that in the - assemblies they purposely abuse and lose their tempers with each other, though - in private they are united and thus deceive you, who are so ready to lend an ear - to what they say.

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What is the duty of a democratic orator, hating those who menace the city by - speech or bill? What are we told, Demosthenes and Polyeuctus, about your - predecessors? What did they always do, even though no danger threatened the city - at the time? Did they not summon each other for trial; bring in impeachments? - Did they not indict each other for illegal proposals? Have you, who profess to - have the people at heart, and maintain that your safety rests upon this jury's - vote, done a single one of these things?

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Have you denounced a decree, Demosthenes, despite the many outrageous and illegal - measures which Demades has proposed? Have you prevented any political step among - those which he has taken on his own initiative against the interests of the - state? Not a single one. Have you impeached this man who has often acted - contrary to the decrees of the people and the laws? Never. You allowed him to - have his statue set up in bronze in the market and to share entertainment in the - Prytaneum with the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.These honors were paid to Demades about 335 B.C. in recognition of his mission to Alexander after the - destruction of Thebes. Cf. Life of Demades -

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In what way then did the people sample your goodwill, where did we see proof of - the orator's protecting power? Or will you all maintain that herein lie your - powers: to cheat these men by persisting that you cannot leave the country, that - you have no other refuge than our goodwill? You ought first to have made it - clear that in speech and action you opposed the decrees brought forward against - the people's interests and then sought to convince these men that your claim to - have no means of safety but the assistance offered by the people was true.

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But you place your hopes abroad and compete in flattery with those who admit that - they are serving Alexander and have taken bribes from the same sources as those - from which you are reported by the council to have received them. And you, - Demosthenes, after conversing with Nicanor in front of all the Greeks and - settling everything you wanted, now make yourself out to be in need of pity, - traitor though you are and a receiver of bribes; as if these men will forget - your wickedness, as if you will not pay the penalty for the crimes at which you - have been caught. You are acting more boldly than Demades to this extent,

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that though he has given warning in the Assembly of his desperate character and - admits that he accepts money and will continue to do so, still he has not dared - to show his face before these men and did not presume to dispute the council's - report; moreover he did not propose that the council should have authority over - him or lay down the death penalty if he should be proved to have taken bribes. - But you have such complete confidence in your own arguments and such a contempt - for these men's simplicity that you expect to persuade the jury that in your - case only has the council's statement been false and that you alone of those - whom it reported have not accepted the gold. Who could believe that?

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Let me explain, Athenians, what you are going to - do. You have taken over the case from the people, who know the facts; and to - undergo the punishment, due to those whose names appear in the reports, - Demosthenes is brought in first. We have made our accusation and have allowed no - private interest on the part of any to stand in the way of common justice.

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Will you disregard all that has passed and acquit the first man up before you? - Will you, with full power at your command, reject what seemed just both to the - people and the Areopagus, and indeed to everyone, and take upon yourselves these - men's depravity?

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Or will you, for the city's sake, give a demonstration to all alike of the hatred - you bear towards traitors and those who, through love of gain, betray the - people's interests? All this now lies in your control, and the fifteen hundred - of you hold the city's safety in your hands. Your verdict of today will either - bring to Athens great security, if - you are willing to make a just decision, or else, if you endorse such practices - as this, drive all men to despondency.

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You must not be cowed, Athenians, or by losing - your self-control give up the city's just defence, which touches all alike, in - deference to Demosthenes' entreaties. For none of you compelled this man to take - the money, to which he had no right, against your own interests, when he has - acquired, with your assistance, much more than enough besides, nor to defend - himself now when the crimes have been acknowledged and he has proposed the death - penalty for himself. But the avarice and wickedness, fostered in him by his - whole mode of life, have brought this on his head.

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So do not be concerned when he weeps and laments. You might, with far more - justice, pity the country, which this man is exposing to danger by behaving as - he has, and which is begging you, who are its sons, in the names of your wives - and children, to take vengeance on the traitor and save it: the land which your - ancestors, after facing many noble combats for it, have handed on to you free in - which many noble examples have been left us of the courage of those who gave - their lives.

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It is this land, Athenians, the sacrifices traditional in it, and its ancestral - sepulchres to which right-thinking men must turn their thoughts when they give - their vote. And when Demosthenes wishes to cheat you and cunningly turns - pathetic, shedding tears, you must think of the city's person, and the glory - which it once possessed, and judge between two alternatives: which has become - the more deserving of pity: the city because of Demosthenes or Demosthenes - because of the city?

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You will find that this man has become famous since he entered politics; that - from being a speechwriter and a paid advocate, in the service of Ctesippus, - Phormio and many others,Demosthenes was acting - in the interests of Ctesippus, son of Chabrias, when he attacked the Law of - Leptines in 355 B.C. The Phormio referred to is - possibly the freedman of the banker Pasion whom he defended in 350. Cf. - Dem. 20 and Dem. - 36. he has become the richest man in Athens; that after being an unknown figure, - inheriting no family honor from his ancestors, he is now famous, while the city - has reached a pass unworthy of herself or the honor of our forbears. Therefore - ignore this man's entreaties and deceptions, bring in the verdict that is just - and right, having regard for your country's interest, as befits an honorable - jury, not the welfare of Demosthenes.

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And whenever anyone comes forward to speak for - him, bear in mind that he who does so, even if not involved in the reports we - are about to hear, is hostile to the constitution, unwilling to see punished - those who take bribes against the people and anxious that the general protection - of your persons, for which the Areopagus is responsible, should be abolished and - every right in the city overwhelmed; whereas, if it is some orator or general, - one of those participating in the defence because they wish to discredit the - report, which they expect will reflect against themselves, you must give their - arguments no credence, knowing as you do that all these men collaborated over - the landing of Harpalus and his release.

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You must realize then, Athenians, that when these men come forward, they do so - against your interests, being enemies alike of the laws and the entire city. Do - not tolerate them; insist that their defence answers the charges. And do not - countenance his own fury either; for he prides himself on his powers as an - orator and, since he is known to have taken bribes against you, has been proved - an even greater fraud. No, punish him in a manner befitting yourselves and the - city. If you do not, by one verdict and at one trial you will release all who - have been reported, and all who ever will be, and will bring these men's - corruption upon yourselves and upon the people, even though, afterwards, you may - prosecute those who acquitted them, when it will avail you nothing.

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I have now played my full part in assisting the - prosecution and have shown regard for nothing but justice and your interests. I - have not deserted the city or given more weight to personal favor than to the - people's vote. With an appeal to you to show the same spirit I now hand over the - water to the other prosecutors.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4f9a72a0e --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ + + + + + + + + Against Demosthenes + Dinarchus + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + + Dinarchus + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

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This popular leader of yours, Athenians, who has imposed on himself a sentence of death should he be proved to have taken even the smallest sum from Harpalus, has been clearly convicted of taking bribes from those very men whom he formerly professed to oppose. Much has already been said by StratoclesStratocles the orator, who proposed that special honors should be paid to Lycurgus after his death (Plut. Vit. Lyc. 852 A), may possibly be the same man as the general of that name who served at Chaeronea. and most of the charges have now been made; as regards the report itself the Areopagus has expressed opinions which are both just and true, while with events succeeding this Stratocles has already dealt and read the decrees relating to them.

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It remains for us, Athenians, especially when contesting a case never paralleled in the experience of the city, to make a general exhortation to you all. May we ask you first to pardon those of us who have still to speak if there are certain points which we raise again; our aim is not to weary you by alluding twice to the same matters but to arouse your anger all the more. Secondly, may we ask you not to surrender the rights enjoyed by the whole city or to barter away our common security in exchange for the arguments of the defendant.

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You are aware, Athenians, that whereas this man Demosthenes is here for judgement before you, you are on trial before your fellows. For they are waiting to see what kind of conclusion you will reach about your country's interests: are you going to welcome into your midst the private venality and corruption of these people, or will you make it universally known that you hate men who accept bribes against their city and that, in ordering the Areopagus to make its inquiry, your intention was not to acquit the culprits but rather, when the councillors had made their report, to exact punishment in a manner appropriate to the crimes? This decision then rests with you now.

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For when the people passed a lawful decree and every citizen wished to discover which of the politicians had dared to accept money from Harpalus to the discredit and danger of the city; when, moreover, you, Demosthenes, and many others had proposed in a decree that the Areopagus, according to its traditional right, should hold an inquiry to discover if any of them had received gold from Harpalus, the Areopagus began its investigation.

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In reaching a just decision it paid no heed to your challenges, Demosthenes, nor did it wish to pervert the truth or destroy its own reputation on your account. On the contrary, gentlemen, although, as the Areopagites themselves said, the council realized beforehand the strength of these men and their influence as orators and statesmen, it did not consider that if incrimination or danger was threatening its country it ought to be influenced by any misrepresentation likely to be published about itself.

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Though this investigation has been conducted, in the people's opinion, both fairly and profitably, accusations, challenges, and calumnies are proceeding from Demosthenes, since he has been listed as the holder of twenty talents of gold. Will that council then which, in cases of willful] murder, is trustworthy enough to arrive at truth and justice and is empowered to pass judgement in matters of life and death on each of the citizens, to take up the cause of those who have met a violent end and banish or execute any in the city who have broken the law,After the restoration of the democracy in 403 B.C. the Areopagus played a more important part in public affairs than in the preceding half-century. It dealt with all cases of voluntary homicide and sometimes with political cases also, when it could act either on its own initiative (cf. Din. 1.63 and Dem. 18.133) or in response to the people's request, as in the present instance. See Din. 1.50. be powerless now to administer justice over the money credited to Demosthenes?

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It will; for the council has told lies against Demosthenes. This is the crowning argument in his case. It has told lies, has it, against you and Demades: men against whom it is evidently not even safe to speak the truth; though you previously instructed the Areopagus to investigate many public matters and expressed approval of it for the inquiries which it had held? Are the indictments which the council has made against these men false when the whole city cannot compel them to do right? Great Heavens!

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Then why, Demosthenes, did you agree in the Assembly to a penalty of death for yourself, if the report of the council should turn out against you? And why have you yourself ruined many others by insisting on the findings of the council? To what authority should the people now refer, or to whom should it entrust the inquiry in the event of mysterious or momentous crimes, if it is to discover the truth?

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For the council which formerly commanded confidence is being discredited by you, who claim to be the people's man, though it is a body to which the people gave in trust the protection of their lives, to whose charge they have often committed their constitution and democracy, a council which, destined though you were to malign it, has safeguarded your life, according to your own account so often threatened, and which keeps the mystic depositsThe exact nature of these mystic deposits, on which the welfare of the community was thought to depend, is not known; they were probably oracles. whereby the safety of the city is preserved.

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Now in one respect—for I shall speak my mind—the Areopagus fully deserves this treatment. It was faced with two alternatives. One would have been, in accordance with the people's instructions, to conduct the previous investigation over the three hundred talents which came from the Persian kingAfter Alexander's accession Darius subsidized several Greek states to oppose him. Three hundred talents offered by him to Athens and officially refused were said to have been accepted by Demosthenes to be used in the king's interest. Cf. Din. 1.18; Aeschin. 3.239 (who gives the sum which Demosthenes appropriated as seventy talents); Dio. Sic. 17.4.; in which case this monster would have been convicted and the names of those who shared the money published; the betrayal of Thebes, for which Demosthenes was responsible,In 335 B.C., owing to a report that Alexander, who was fighting the Triballi, had been killed, Thebes revolted against Macedonian domination encouraged by Demosthenes and others who assisted them to procure arms. When they applied for assistance to the Peloponnese and Athens, the Peloponnesians sent an army as far as the Isthmus, while Athens voted help but awaited the turn of events. Meanwhile Thebes was taken by Alexander and destroyed. Dinarchus, who goes into greater detail later (Din. 1.18-22), maintains that for ten talents of the Persian money Demosthenes could have secured the help of the Peloponnesian army but was too miserly to do so. Cf. Dio. Sic. 17.8; Aeschin. 3.239-240. would have been exposed, and we, exacting from this demagogue the punishment he deserved, would have been rid of him.

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Alternatively, if it was your wish to forgive Demosthenes for these offences and to have in the city a large number of people who would take bribes against you, the council ought, having tested your wishes in the previous cases, to have refused to undertake an investigation over the payments of money recently reported. For despite the excellence and the justice of this recent report, which incriminates Demosthenes and the rest of them, and despite the fact that the Areopagus has not deferred to the power of Demosthenes or Demades but has regarded justice and truth as more important,

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Demosthenes goes round none the less maligning the council and telling the same stories about himself with which he will probably try to mislead you presently. “I made the Thebans your allies.”In making this claim Demosthenes was referring to events just before the battle of Chaeronea when he won Thebes over to Athens by offering her more liberal terms than Philip. For his defence of this policy see Dem. 18.153 sq. No, Demosthenes, you impaired the common interest of both our states. “I brought everyone into line at Chaeronea.” On the contrary you yourself were the only one to leave the line at Chaeronea.The charge of cowardice in battle is often brought against Demosthenes by Aeschines (e.g. Aeschin. 3.175); it is mentioned by Plutarch (Plut. Dem. 855 A) and in the Lives of the Ten Orators (Plut. Vit. 845 F). “I served on many embassies on your behalf.”

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One wonders what he would have done or what he would have said if the course that he had recommended on these missions had proved successful, when, after touring the whole Greek world to negotiate such disasters and mistakes, he still claims to have been granted the greatest privileges, namely those of accepting bribes against his country and saying and doing whatever he wishes against the public interest.

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You made no allowance for Timotheus,The following passage is repeated almost word for word in the speech against Philocles (Din. 3.17). Timotheus, an Athenian general and a friend of Isocrates, who recounts his exploits (Isoc. 15.107-113), sailed round the Peloponnese and gained a victory at Corcyra in 375 B.C. In 365 he took Samos, which was occupied by a Persian garrison, after a ten months' siege (Dem. 15.9). Thence he moved to Thrace and mastered several Chalcidian cities, of which Dinarchus here mentions three. In 356 he was sent out with two others to reinforce the fleet of Chares who was trying to crush an allied revolt; but in a sea battle near Chios he failed to help Chares, owing to stormy weather, and was therefore prosecuted by him for bribery. Timotheus was not popular owing to his haughty behavior; and being fined the unprecedented amount of a hundred talents, which he could not pay, he went into exile in Chalcis. Cf. Isoc. 15.131. Athenians, although he sailed round the Peloponnese and defeated the Lacedaemonians in a naval battle at Corcyra, and was the son of CononConon, a general in the Peloponnesian war who fought at Aegospotami, was later joint commander of the Persian fleet. In this capacity he rendered a service to Athens by defeating the Spartan Pisander in a naval battle off Cnidus in 394 B.C. too who liberated Greece. Though he captured Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and twenty other cities besides, you did not permit such services to outweigh the trial which you were then conducting or the oaths that governed your vote; instead you fined him a hundred talents because Aristophon said that he had accepted money from the Chians and Rhodians.

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Will you then absolve this abominable wretch, this Scythian,—really I cannot contain myself,—whom no mere individual but the whole Areopagus has shown, after inquiry, to be in possession of money to your detriment, whose bribery and corruption against the city have been revealed and established beyond doubt? Will you not punish him and make him an example to others? He is known not only to have taken gold from the royal treasuriesSee note on Din. 1.10 but also to have enriched himself at the city's own expense, since he did not even withhold his hand from the money lately brought to her by Harpalus.

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Yet the embassies to Thebes which Demosthenes undertook are equivalent to a mere fraction of Timotheus' services; and which of you, contrasting with the exploits on which Demosthenes prides himself those which Timotheus and Conon performed on your behalf, would not laugh to scorn all who consented to listen to this man? But then there should be no comparison made between this outcast and the men who in your interests acted worthily of the city and your ancestors. I will therefore cite the decree which was passed concerning Timotheus and then return to my review of the defendant. Read.

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This citizen, Demosthenes, of such a character, who might well have gained the pardon and gratitude of his colleagues in the public life of those days, since he had rendered great services to the city, not in word only but in deed, and had always remained true to the same policy rather than changing to and fro as you have done, met his death without begging the people for such extensive favors as would set him above the laws or thinking that men who had sworn to vote in accordance with the law should consider anything more important than their word; he was ready even for condemnation, if the jury decided upon it, and did not plead the inclemency of circumstance or express in public opinions which he did not hold.

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Will you not execute this accursed wretch, Athenians, who, in addition to many other crucial blunders, stood by while the Thebans' city was destroyed, though he had accepted three hundred talents from the Persian King for their protection though the Arcadians,See note on Din. 1.10 arriving at the Isthmus, had dismissed with a rebuff the envoys of Antipater and welcomed those from the unhappy Thebans who had reached them with difficulty by sea, bearing a suppliant's staff and heralds' wands, plaited, they said, from olive shoots?

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They came to assure the Arcadians that no wish to break their friendship with the Greeks had led the Thebans to a revolution, nor did they intend to do anything to the detriment of Greece; but they were no longer able to countenance at home the behavior of the Macedonians in the city, to endure slavery, or to witness the outrages perpetrated against the persons of free men.

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The Arcadians were ready to help them and, sympathizing with their misfortunes, explained that, though they were compelled through force of circumstance to serve Alexander with their persons, in spirit they sided always with the Thebans and the cause of Greek liberty. Since their leader, Astylus, was open to bribery, as Stratocles said, and wanted ten talents as the price of helping the Thebans, the envoys approached Demosthenes who, as they knew, held the King's gold and earnestly begged him to spend the money to save their city.

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But this hard-hearted and impious miser could not bring himself to expend, from his great resources, ten paltry talents, though he saw such high hopes dawning for the salvation of Thebes. Instead, as Stratocles said, he allowed others to provide this sum to induce those of the Arcadians who had marched out to return home and deny their help to Thebes.

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Do you consider that the evils for which Demosthenes and his avarice have been responsible are trivial or of little import for the whole of Greece? Do you think that he deserves any pity at your hands after committing such offences? Should he not rather suffer the extreme penalty to atone for his crimes, both past and present? The verdict given by you today, Athenians, will be heard by all mankind, who will observe how you, the judges, treat the man with such a record.

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You are the people who, for crimes far smaller than those Demosthenes has committed, have inflicted on men severe and irrevocable penalties. It was you who killed Menon the miller, because he kept a free boy from Pellene in his mill. You punished with death Themistius of Aphidna, because he assaulted the Rhodian lyre-player at the Eleusinian festival, and Euthymachus, because he put the Olynthian girl in a brothel.

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But through this traitor children and women, the wives of the Thebans, were distributed among the tents of the barbarians, a neighboring and allied city has been torn up from the midst of Greece and the site of Thebes is being ploughed and sown, the city of men who shared with you the war against Philip. Yes, it is being ploughed and sown. And this unfeeling wretch showed no compassion for a city thus lamentably destroyed, though he visited it as an envoy representing you and has often shared the meat and drink of its citizens, claiming himself that he made it our ally. But those to whom he often resorted in their prosperity he has betrayed in their misfortune.

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The Thebans, so our elders tell us, when the democracy in our city had been overthrown and Thrasybulus was assembling the exiles in Thebes ready for the seizure of Phyle,Thrasybulus and Anytus, exiled by the Thirty, were received in Thebes. After seizing and holding the fortress of Phyle in Attica in 404 B.C., they subsequently occupied the Piraeus and, with the intervention of Sparta, brought about the restoration of democracy in Athens. although the Spartans were strong and forbade them to admit or let out any Athenian, helped the democrats to return and passed that decree which has so often been read before you, stating that they would turn a blind eye if any Athenian marched through their territory bearing arms.

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This man who fraternizes, as he will presently tell you, with our allies, behaved very differently; he would not part with any of the money which he had received for their protection. Remember these things, gentlemen; consider the disasters caused by traitors in the downfall of Olynthus and of Thebes; decide wisely now in your interest; destroy those who are ready to take bribes against their country and so rest your hopes of safety on yourselves and on the gods.

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For there is only one way, Athenians, in which you will reform the rest of mankind, only one way: to expose those criminals who are notable men and punish them as their crimes deserve. In the case of the average defendant no one knows or troubles to inquire, when he is convicted, what has been his sentence. But with men of note everyone hears the news and praises the jury, when they have not sacrificed the interests of justice in deference to the reputation of the defendants. Read the Theban decree. Cite the evidence. Read the letters.

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This man is a hireling, Athenians, a hireling of long standing. It was he who summoned from Thebes the embassy coming to us from Philip and was responsible for finishing the first war.The first war with Macedon (349-346 B.C.) was undertaken by Athens and Olynthus against Philip. Even before Olynthus was taken the king made overtures of peace, and it was Philocrates who proposed in Athens that these negotiations should begin. However, after the fall of Olynthus in 348, the Athenians tried to unite other Greek states against Philip, and it was not until this attempt had failed that Demosthenes acquiesced in peace proposals. In 347 he defended Philocrates, who was accused of illegality in making his first peace proposals, and himself served on an embassy to Macedon. The final peace was signed in 346, when Antipater and Parmenio came to Athens as Philip's envoys. Philocrates was prosecuted by Hyperides in 343 for being bribed by Philip and went into exile. Cf. Hyp. frag. 16 He helped to defend Philocrates who proposed the peace with Philip and was exiled by you in consequence, he hired a carriage for the envoys who came here with Antipater, and by attaching them to himself, first introduced into the city the custom of flattering Macedon.

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Do not acquit him, Athenians. Do not let go unpunished this man who has endorsed the misfortunes of his country and the rest of Greece, when he has been caught with bribes against the city in his very hands. Now that good fortune is improving your lot and, after expelling from the city one of the two who have defiled their country, has surrendered this other to you for execution, do not oppose all our interests yourselves but rather bring happier omens to our state affairs and divert our misfortunes on to the heads of these leaders.

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Against what occasion will you reserve Demosthenes in the belief that he will prove useful to you? Could any one of you, or of the bystanders, say what public or private affairs he has not ruined by his contact with them? After gaining access to the home of AristarchusThis story is told more fully by Aeschines (Aeschin. 1.171; Aeschin. 2.148 and Aeschin. 2.166), who says that Aristarchus son of Moschus was a wealthy orphan, half mad, from whom Demosthenes, pretending to have taken a fancy to him personally, extracted three talents. He asserts that together they contrived to murder, with great brutality, Nicodemus of Aphidna who had once prosecuted Demosthenes for desertion; as the result of which crime Aristarchus went into exile. Demosthenes himself mentions the murder in his speech against Midias, where he claims that Midias went about casting suspicion on him and persuaded the relatives of Nicodemus to do likewise (Dem. 21.104). Cf. Athen. 23.592 f. and planning with him the death of Nicodemus which they contrived, an affair of which you all know the details, did he not banish Aristarchus on the most shameful charges? And did not Aristarchus find in Demosthenes such a friend as to make him think that this was some evil spirit which had visited him and the originator of all his misfortunes?

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Is it not true that once this man began to advise the city, and would he had never done so,—I shall pass over his private affairs, for time does not permit me to speak at length,—absolutely no good has befallen it; indeed not only the city but the whole of Greece has been involved in dangers, misfortunes, and dishonor? Is it not true that he has had many opportunities while speaking to you and yet let slip every opportunity to help you? On those occasions when a patriot with any regard for the city would have chosen to make some move, this demagogue, who will presently say that he has been of service to you, was so far from showing signs of action that he even infected with his own ill-luck the men who were doing something to further your interests.

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CharidemusCharidemus of Oreos in Euboea was made an Athenian citizen for his services as a soldier (Dem. 23.151). He went to Persia in 335 B.C., having been banished from Athens on the orders of Alexander (Arr. 1.10.6), and after being well received at first by Darius, fell under suspicion two years later and was executed (Dio. Sic. 17.30). set out to visit the Persian King, wishing to do you some practical service apart from mere talking, and anxious at his own peril to win safety for you and every Greek. Demosthenes went round the market making speeches and associating himself with the project. So completely did fortune wreck this plan that it turned out in just the opposite way to what was expected.

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Ephialtes put to sea. Admittedly he hated Demosthenes but he was compelled to have a partner in public affairs. Fortune robbed the city of this man too.The facts are here distorted. Ephialtes, one of the orators whose surrender was demanded by Alexander in 335 B.C. (Arr. 1.104), was a supporter of Demosthenes and, according to the Pseudo-Plutarch, brought back money for the demagogues from the Persian court (Plut. Vit. Dem. 847 F and 848 E). He was killed while helping the Persians to defend Halicarnassus against Alexander (Dio. Sic. 17.27). EuthydicusNo details are known of Euthydicus. He seems to be mentioned as an Athenian patriot together with Ephialtes and Lycurgus in the third letter of Demosthenes (Dem. L 3.31), where however the MSS. have Εὔδιλκον. elected to work for the people. Demosthenes claimed to be his friend. He too was lost. Do not these facts, which you see and know better than I do, give you cause for thought? Do they not make you weigh up your future prospects in the light of the past and reflect in your own minds that this man is of no use except to our enemies, against the interests of the city?

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to raise such another force as we had in the time of Agis,While Alexander was in the East, Agis the Third of Sparta rose against Macedon with the help of Darius in 333 B.C. In 331 he headed an army raised by various Greek states but was refused the support of Athens, on the advice of Demosthenes. Defeated near Megalopolis by Antipater he was killed in battle (Dio. Sic. 17.48 and Dio. Sic. 17.62). when the Spartans took the field together and Achaeans and men of Elis were taking their part in the campaign with ten thousand mercenaries also; when Alexander was in India,Alexander was, in fact, in Persia. according to report, and the whole of Greece, owing to the traitors in every city, was dissatisfied with the existing state of things and hoped for some release from the misfortunes that beset her. In that hour,—for I need not dwell on other crises,—

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what was the behavior of this Demosthenes who had the power to give advice and make proposals, who will shortly tell you that he hates our present circumstances? On these matters, Demosthenes, did you offer any proposal, any advice? Did you contribute money? Were you of the smallest value to the men safeguarding us all? Not the least; you went round suborning speechwriters. He wrote a letter at home, defiling the city's honor,

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and walked about dangling it from his finger ends, living in luxury during the city's misfortunes, travelling down the road to the Piraeus in a litter and reproaching the needy for their poverty. Is this man then going to prove useful to you on future occasions, when he has let slip every opportunity in the past? By our lady Athena and Zeus the Savior, I could wish that the enemies of Athens had lighted upon counsellors and leaders like him and never better.

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Let me remind you, gentlemen, of the conduct of your forbears, who, at a time when many grave perils beset the city, faced danger in the interests of the people, in a manner worthy of their country and their well-earned reputation, as befitted free men. Time does not permit me to deal with those figures of the past, Aristides and Themistocles: the men who built the city's walls and carried up to the Acropolis the tribute paid by the willing and even eager Greeks.

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But you will recall what was done, shortly before our own time, by Cephalus the orator, Thrason of Herchia, Eleus and Phormisius and other fine men, some of whom are still alive today.Cephalus assisted in the overthrow of the Thirty in 403 B.C. His reputation as an orator is acknowledged by Demosthenes (Dem. 18.219). Cf. Din. 1.76. Of the other three men little is known. Thrason is mentioned as a Theban proxenus by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.139); Eleus is perhaps the trierarch (c. 323) whose name appears in an inscription (I.G. 2.812, b. 14); Phormisius is a mere name. Cf. Aristot. Const. Ath. 34.3. Some of them, when the Cadmea was garrisoned by Spartans, assisted the exiles who returned to Thebes and at their own risk set free a neighboring city, long enslaved.In 382 B.C. Thebes was betrayed to Sparta and many leading men were exiled. These took refuge at Athens, with whose help in 378 they soon overthrew the new government and ejected the Spartan garrison from the city (Dio. Sic. 15.25).

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Others lent aid when your ancestors were persuaded to take the field by Cephalus, who proposed the decree and who, undaunted by the might of Sparta and regardless of the risks either of military or political action, moved that the Athenians should march out to help the exiles who had taken Thebes. Your fathers did march out and in a few days the commander of the Spartan garrison was expelled, the Thebans had been freed and your city had acted worthily of your ancestors.

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They were counsellors, Athenians, they were leaders such as yourselves and the state deserve. How different from rogues like this who neither have done nor will do the city any service but watch over their own safety and treat everything as a source of income. They have made the city more infamous than themselves, and now, convicted of taking bribes against you, they deceive you and presume, after conduct such as this, to talk to you about their own aggrandizement. They ought, by the terms of their own decree, to have been put to death long ago for doing such things.

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Are you not ashamed, Athenians, that you should think our speeches the only evidence you have on which to determine the punishment of Demosthenes? Do you not know yourselves that this man is open to bribes and is both a robber and a traitor to his friends that neither he nor the fortune which has gone with him is fit for the city? Are there any decrees or any laws which have not brought him money?

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Are there any people in the court who were among those included in the three hundred when Demosthenes brought in his law concerning the trierarchs?For the trierarch law see note on Hyp. frag. 43. Then tell your neighbors that he accepted three talents and used to alter and re-draft the law for every sitting of the Assembly, in some cases taking money over points for which he had been paid already, in others failing to honor the sales which he had made.

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Really, gentlemen, tell me: do you think he got nothing for proposing that DiphilusLittle is known of the various men mentioned in this section. Diphilus was perhaps the son of Diopithes, trierarch in 325/4 and 323/2 B.C. (CIA 2.809 d, 53 and 811 b, 104). For Chaerephilus, a dealer in salt fish, compare Hyp. frag. 34 and Hyp. frag. 35. The three names following his are those of his sons. All four were evidently put in the deme of Paeania, Pamphilus and Phidippus being mentioned as members of it in inscriptions (CIA 2.172 and CIA 2.811 d, 142). Cf. also Athen. 3.119 sq. and Athen. 8.339 d. Berisades is probably the same man as Paerisades, a king of Bosporus to whom Demosthenes refers (Dem. 34.8); Satyrus was his son. should have meals at the Prytaneum or for that statue to be put up in the market? Nothing for conferring Athenian citizenship on Chaerephilus, Phidon, Pamphilus, and Phidippus, or again on Epigenes and Conon the bankers? Nothing for putting up in the market bronze statues of Berisades, Satyrus and Gorgippus the tyrants from the Pontus, from whom he receives a thousand medimni of wheat a year—this man who will presently tell you that there is nowhere for him to take refuge.

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Did he get nothing for proposing that TaurosthenesDinarchus, like Aeschines, is distorting the facts. (Cf. Aeschin. 3 85 sq. and schol. ad loc.). The cities of Euboea had entered the Athenian alliance in 357 B.C., but in 348 they revolted, probably owing to the intrigues of Philip with whom Athens was now at war over Olynthus. Taurosthenes and Callias commanded the army of Chalcis and the Athenians lost control of the island. In 343 however they transferred the allegiance of Chalcis to Athens, and a few years later-the exact date is not certain-were made Athenian citizens on the motion of Demosthenes (cf. Hyp. 5 col. 20), whom Aeschines says they bribed. should become an Athenian, though he had enslaved his fellow citizens and, with his brother Callias, betrayed the whole of Euboea to Philip? Taurosthenes whom the laws forbid to set foot on Athenian soil, providing that if he does so he shall be liable to the same penalties as an exile who returns after being sentenced by the Areopagus. This was the man who Demosthenes the democrat proposed should be your fellow citizen.

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Is there any need then for me to call up witnesses for you so far as these men are concerned or any of the others whom he has proposed as proxeni or citizens? I ask you in Athena's name: do you imagine that when he gladly accepts silver he would refuse twenty talents of gold? Do you think that though he takes money in dribblets, he would not accept as a lump sum so great a fee, or that the Areopagus, which spent six months inquiring over Demosthenes, Demades, and Cephisophon,This is probably the same Cephisophon, a politician of the time, as is mentioned by Demosthenes (Dem. 18.21 and Dem. 19.293). has been unjust over the reports submitted to you?

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Gentlemen, you have very many witnesses, as I said before, among citizens and other Greeks, watching to see how you will judge this trial; are you, they wonder, going to bring within the scope of the courts the venal actions of other men, or will there be complete freedom to accept bribes against you? Will the things which so far have been held trustworthy and sure now cease to be so on account of the trial of Demosthenes? On his past record he ought to have been put to death, and he is liable to all the curses known to the city,

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having broken the oaths he took on the Areopagus, in the names of the holy goddesses and the other deities by whom it is customary to swear there, and making himself accursed at every sitting of the Assembly. He has been proved to have taken bribes against Athens, has cheated the people and the council in defiance of the curse, professing views he does not hold, and in private has recommended to Aristarchus a course both cruel and unlawful.Cf. Din. 1.30 and note. For these misdeeds, if there is any power to exact a just punishment from perjurers and criminals—as there surely is—this man shall pay today. Gentlemen of the jury, listen to the curse.For the curse pronounced by the herald before each sitting of the Council and Assembly on all who might be acting treasonably against the state compare Lyc. 1.31.

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Despite this, gentlemen of the jury, Demosthenes is so ready with his lies and utterly unsound assertions, so oblivious of shame, exposure, or curse, that he will dare to say of me, I gather, that I too was previously condemned by the council. According to him I am behaving with the utmost inconsistency, because in the past I opposed the council's report and pleaded my own case, whereas I am now serving as its advocate and accusing him over the report before us today.

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This is a story of his own invention, not based on fact, and he is impudent enough to lie to you. So to make sure that, if he embarks upon this story, you will pay no attention to him but will realize fully that the council did not report me and was in no danger of doing so,—the truth being that I suffered at the hands of a man of low character who has been convicted before you,—let me explain briefly. Then I will come back to Demosthenes.

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The council of the Areopagus is bound, gentlemen, to follow one of two methods in making all its reports. What are these methods? Its inquiry is made either on its own initiative or in obedience to the people's instructions.See note on Din. 1.6. Apart from these two, there is no other procedure it could follow. If then you tell us, you abominable brute, that the council followed the people's instructions in making its inquiry and publishing the report on me,

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show me the decree and tell me who were my accusers after the report was made. Compare the present case, where you have both: a decree which authorized the council's inquiry, and accusers, elected by the people, who are now giving the jury an account of the crimes. If your story is true, I am prepared to die. But if you claim that the council took the initiative in reporting me, produce the Areopagites as witnesses, just as I myself shall produce them to show that I was not reported,

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to show in fact that, after impeaching one rogue and traitor who, like you, had maligned the council and myself, I proved before two thousand five hundred citizens that he had hired himself to PythoclesPythocles was an Athenian orator who, in company with Aeschines, attacked Demosthenes unsuccessfully after Chaeronea. Cf. Dem. 18.285. in making this attack upon me, and so avenged myself with the help of those then serving on the jury. Clerk, please take the deposition. I laid it before the jury previously as evidence and no one questioned its veracity. So I will produce it now. Read the deposition.

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Is it not an anomaly, Athenians, that on that occasion, because one man, Pistias an Areopagite,Nothing else is known of Pistias except that Dinarchus composed a speech against him, the title of which appears in the list of his genuine public orations preserved by Dionysius. told lies against the council and myself and said that I was a criminal, falsehood would have prevailed over truth, if through my weakness and isolation at the time the trumped up lies against me had been believed; whereas now, when the fact is admitted by the whole Areopagus that Demosthenes has taken twenty talents of gold against your interests, and is therefore a criminal, and that your popular leader, in whom some men place their hopes,

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has been caught in the act of taking bribes, the customs of the Areopagus and truth and justice are going to prove weaker than Demosthenes' word? Truth will be overridden by the slanderous statement he intends to make against the council, namely that many of those reported by it as a menace to the people have, on coming into court, been acquitted, in some cases the council failing to secure a fifth part of the votes. There is an explanation for this which you will easily follow.

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The council, gentlemen, has its own method of inquiring into the cases which you assign to it and the crimes committed within its own body. Unlike yourselves,—and you need not take offence at this,—who are sometimes apt when judging to give more weight to mercy than to justice, it simply reports anyone who is liable to the charges in question or has broken any traditional rule of conduct believing that if a person is in the habit of committing small offences he will more easily involve himself in serious crimes.

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Consequently when one of its number robbed the ferryman of his fare it fined him and reported him to you. Again, when someone claimed the five drachma allowanceIt appears from Hyperides (Hyp. 5 col. 26), who seems to be referring to the same case, that Dinarchus is here alluding to the dole made to Athenians to enable them to attend the theater. The normal price of a seat was one-third of a drachma only, but as the fund was apparently drawn upon for other purposes also, it is perhaps not surprising that the sum mentioned here is larger. Cf. Libanius arg. ad Demosthenem 1. The portion mentioned in the following sentence was an allowance of sacrificial meat made to members of the Areopagus. in the name of an absentee, it reported him also to you. Similarly it fined and expelled the man who presumed to break the rule and sell the Areopagite portion.

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You tried these men and acquitted them. You were not thereby convicting the Areopagus of error but you were more concerned with sympathy than justice, and thought the punishment too severe for the offence which the defendants had committed. Do you imagine then, Demosthenes, that the council made a false report? Of course it did not. Nevertheless, gentlemen, you acquitted these men and others like them, though the council reported that they were guilty of breaking its rules.

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In the case of Polyeuctus of Cydantidae,For Polyeuctus of Cydantidae, the accuser of Euxenippus, cf. Hyp. 4.4, Introduction. when the people instructed the council to inquire whether he was accompanying the exiles to Megara and to report back after the investigation, it reported that he was doing so. You chose accusers as the law prescribes: Polyeuctus came into court and you acquitted him, on his admitting that he was going to Megara to Nicophanes who, he said, was married to his mother. So you did not consider that he was doing anything strange or reprehensible in keeping in touch with his mother's husband who was in difficulties, or in assisting him, so far as he could, while he was banished from the country.

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The report of the council, Demosthenes, was not proved false; it was quite true, but the jury decided to acquit Polyeuctus. The council was instructed to discover the truth, yet, as I say, the court decided whether it was a case for pardon. Is that any reason for distrusting the council over the present reports in which it has stated that you and your confederates are in possession of the gold? That would be disgraceful.

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Convince the jury now, Demosthenes, that any of those crimes ranks with yours and that to take bribes against one's country is a pardonable act which would justify these men in acquitting you. For other pecuniary offences the laws prescribe damages twice as great as the sum involved,A misleading statement. Cf. Hyp. 5 col. 24, where the contrast made is between a simple and a tenfold fine. A fine was doubled only if it had not been paid before a specific date. Cf. Din. 2.17 and Aristot. Const. Ath. 54. but in cases of bribery they have laid down two penalties only: either death, to ensure that by meeting with this punishment the guilty man is an example to others, or a fine for bribery ten times as great as the original bribe, so that men who dare to commit this offence shall not gain by it.

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Perhaps you will not attempt to argue thus, Demosthenes, but will say that of those whom the council has reported up till now the rest have admitted that the penalty which it imposed was deserved, whereas you alone have protested against it. But you alone, of all those ever reported, asked these men of your own accord to be your judges and court of inquiry. You proposed the decree against yourself and made the people witness of the agreement, defining the penalty for yourself as death, if the council should report that you had taken any of the money brought into the country by Harpalus.

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And yet in the past, Demosthenes, you proposed that the council of the Areopagus should have power over all these men, and the rest of Athens too, to enforce the laws of the land and punish any who transgressed them. It was you who surrendered the whole city into the hands of this council which you will presently tell us is oligarchic. By the terms of your decree the death sentence has been inflicted on two citizens, a father and a son, who were given over to the executioner.

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One of the descendants of Harmodius was imprisoned in pursuance of your order. These gentlemen, acting on the council's report, tortured and killed Antiphon.Demosthenes (Dem. 18.132) confirms this and says that Antiphon promised Philip that he would burn the dockyards in the Piraeus. Demosthenes caught him there and brought him before the people, who at first acquitted him. But the Areopagus intervened and he was later executed. You expelled CharinusCharinus, a figure of little importance, is mentioned as a traitor in the speech against Theocrines, which was attributed by Dionysius to Dinarchus but has survived among the works of Demosthenes (Dem. 58.38). from the city for treason on the strength of the council's reports and punishments. After proposing this treatment for yourself also, are you now overriding the decree of your own accord? Surely that is neither just nor lawful.

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I summon as my witnesses, Athenians, the awful goddesses and their abode, the heroes of the land, Athena Polias, and those other gods who have obtained our city and countryside as their home, to show that when the people has consigned to you for punishment one who, against his country's interests, has accepted a part of the imported money,The sense of this passage is clear, though the Greek wording leaves room for doubt. one who has defiled and ruined the city's prosperity and betrayed that country which he claimed to have fortified by his diplomacy,An allusion to some words of Demosthenes in the speech on the Crown (Dem. 18.299).

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enemies, and those who bear the city ill will, would wish him alive, counting this a disaster for Athens; but all who favor your concerns and hope that with a turn of fortune the city's prospects may improve wish that this man may die and pay the penalty merited by his conduct, and such is the burden of their prayers. I also join in praying the gods to save our country, which I see to be in danger of forfeiting its safety, its women and children, its honor, and every other thing of worth.

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What shall we say to the bystanders, Athenians, when we come out of the court, if you are deceived, as I pray you may not be, by the wizardry of this man? What will be the feelings of you all, when, on your return, you presume to look upon your fathers' hearths, after acquitting the traitor who first brought into his own home the gold of bribery; after convicting as utterly false, in both its inquiry and its conclusion, the body which all men hold in the greatest awe?

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What hopes, Athenians,—picture for yourselves,—what hopes shall we have if some danger overtakes the city, when we have made it a safe thing to take bribes against one's country and have robbed of its status the body which kept watch over the city in such times of crisis?

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Or again,—let us suppose this to happen,—what if Alexander, in pursuance of Demosthenes' decree,Demosthenes had proposed that the money should be kept on the Acropolis until Alexander sent for it. sends and asks us for the gold brought into the country by Harpalus, and, over and above the fact that the council has made a report, sends down here the slaves which have now been returned to him and asks us to find out the truth from them; what in Heaven's name shall we say, gentlemen?

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Will you propose, Demosthenes, that we go to war, in view of your success with the previous wars? Suppose the rest of Athens decides on this, which is fairer: for your gold to be available for war along with other people's or for others to contribute from their own property, melting down the personal ornaments of their wives, the cups and all the country's store of offerings to the gods, as you said you would suggest, though you yourself paid in fifty drachmas from your houses in Piraeus and the city? That has been your contribution under the last levy though now you have twenty talents.

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Perhaps you will not advocate war but advise us to follow out the decree which you proposed and give back to Alexander the gold brought to us? If so, it will be for your sake that the people have to restore it. It is surely neither just nor fair nor democratic that those who work should contribute, while you plunder and steal; that some should make no secret of the property they hold and make contributions proportionate to it, while you who have received more than a hundred and fifty talents, either from the King's moneySee note on Din. 1.10. or from your association with Alexander, have no declared property in the city but have fortified yourself against the people as though you had no confidence in your own conduct of affairs.

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Is it right, when the laws demand that the orator or general who expects to get the people's confidence shall observe the laws in begetting children, shall own land within our boundaries, shall give all the lawful pledges and only thus lay claim to be the people's leader, that you should have sold the land inherited from your father or be claiming as yours children which are not your own, thus breaking the laws which govern oaths in court,A reference to the oath whereby a man called down imprecations on his children, swearing that he was not guilty of a certain action. Demosthenes had lost his only child, a daughter, in 336 (Aeschin. 3.77); and if he had other children now, they were adopted or by a hetaera. Cf. Athen. 13.592 e. and be ordering others to fight when you deserted the citizens' ranks yourself?

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What do you think it is, Athenians, that makes cities vary between good and evil fortunes? You will find only one cause: the counsellors and leaders. Take Thebes. It was a city; it became supreme. Under what leaders and generals? All the older men, on whose authority I shall give you the story, would admit that it was when Pelopidas,Pelopidas and Epaminondas were the chief Theban generals during their city's period of greatness (371-362 B.C.). In 371 they defeated Sparta at Leuctra and, in response to an appeal from the Arcadians who then rose against Sparta, entered the Peloponnese in 370. Here they refounded the town of Messene which the Spartans had destroyed at the end of the 8th century B.C. (Dio. Sic. 15.56 and Dio. Sic. 15.62-66). Epaminondas conducted three further invasions of the Peloponnese, penetrating Laconia, but never actually taking Sparta. It was probably during the second of these that he founded Megalopolis, the new capital of Arcadia; in the third he was killed at Mantinea (362 B.C.). so they have it,

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led the Sacred BandThe Sacred Band was a company of 300 picked soldiers maintained by the state. They first attracted attention by defeating a Spartan force in 375 B.C. and played a large part in the victory of Leuctra. At Chaeronea they fought to the last man and were buried by the highway from Phocis to Thebes with the figure of a lion over their tomb. and Epaminondas and their compeers were in command. It was then that Thebes won the battle of Leuctra, then that they invaded the Spartans' country which, it was thought, could not be ravaged. During that period they accomplished many fine achievements: founded Messene in the four hundredthMessenia was first conquered about the year 700 B.C., so that the figure 400th is a very rough estimate; 300th would be nearer. Cf. Lyc. 1.62 and note. year after its fall, gave the Arcadians self-government, and won a universal reputation.

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On the other hand when was their achievement despicable and unworthy of their spirit? When Timolaus,The three men mentioned in this sentence were Theban generals at the battle of Chaeronea. the friend of Demosthenes, was corrupted and took bribes from Philip, when the traitor Proxenus commanded the mercenaries enlisted at Amphissa and Theagenes was placed in command of the phalanx, a man of ill luck and, like the defendant here, open to bribes. Then, because of the three men whom I have mentioned, the whole city was destroyed and blotted from the face of Greece. Far from being false it is only too true that leaders are responsible for all the citizens' good fortunes and for the reverse.

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Think again, this time of Athens, with the same points in mind. Our city was great, renowned in Greece, and worthy of our forbears, apart from the well-known exploits of the past, at the time when Conon triumphed, as our elders tell us, in the naval battle at Cnidus; when Iphicrates destroyed the Spartan company, when Chabrias defeated the Spartan triremes at sea off Naxos, when Timotheus won the sea battle off Corcyra.For the exploits of Conon and Timotheus compare Din. 1.14 and note. In 391 B.C. the Athenian general Iphicrates, on going to the relief of Corinth, surprised and almost annihilated a Spartan company. The defeat of the Spartan fleet by Chabrias took place in 376 and won supremacy in the Aegean for Athens for over fifty years (Xen. Hell. 5.4.61; Dem. 20.77).

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That was the time, Athenians, when the Spartans, once famous through the leaders in whose ways they had been schooled, came humbly to our city and begged our ancestors to save them; and the democracy which they had overthrown was made by the counsellors, whom we then had, the first power in Greece again: deservedly, in my belief; for they had found generals of the type I have just mentioned and had as advisers Archinus and Cephalus of Collytus.Like Cephalus, who is mentioned above (Din. 1.38), Archinus took a leading part in the overthrow of the Thirty in 403. For the only salvation of a city or a nation is to find brave men to lead it and wise counsellors.

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It follows then, Athenians, that if you fully recognize this fact you should not surely be parties in future to Demosthenes' corruption and ill-luck or rest your hopes of security on him; you need not think that you will lack brave men or wise advisers. Let the anger of your forefathers be yours. Put to death this robber taken in the act, this traitor who does not withhold his hands from the gold brought into Athens but has cast the city into the direst misfortunes, this arch-criminal of Greece. Have his body cast beyond the city's borders, give her fortunes a chance to mend, and then, with this accomplished, expect a happier lot.

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I want you also, Athenians, to hear that other decree moved by Demosthenes,One of the several decrees relating to defence proposed by Demosthenes after Chaeronea; the oracle is mentioned in the speech on the False Embassy (Dem. 19.297 sq.). the decree which this democratic statesman proposed when the city was in disorder after the battle of Chaeronea, and also the oracle sent from Dodona from Dodonian Zeus; for it has long been warning you clearly to beware of your leaders and advisers. Read the oracle first.

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Read that splendid decree of his.

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A fine democrat indeed who arranges for himself, being a brave and courageous man, to remain in arms, while he orders the citizens whom he rejects for service to go off to their work or to do anything else he thinks is called for. Read the rest.

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Listen to that, gentlemen of the jury. The decree says that the chosen embassies shall set out. When, after the battle of Chaeronea, he heard that Philip intended to invade our country he appointed himself an envoy, so as to escape from the city, and went off,Dinarchus is perhaps referring to the fact that after Chaeronea Demosthenes was appointed a commissioner for corn (σιτώνης) and went abroad to procure it (cf. Dem. 18.248). Alternatively when appeals for help were made by Athens to some of the islands (cf. Lyc. 1.42) Demosthenes may have served as an envoy. after scraping together eight talents from the treasury, without a thought about the plight we were in, at a time when everyone else was contributing from his own money to ensure your protection.

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That is the character of your adviser. Demosthenes has made only these two journeys abroad in his lifeThis statement is wholly incorrect and Dinarchus appears to be contradicting himself, since in Din. 1.12 of this speech he does not attempt to refute Demosthenes' claim to have served on many embassies. By excluding the words “in his life” and placing a colon after “battle” Maetzner would alter the sense to: “Demosthenes has made only these two journeys abroad since the battle of Chaeronea.”: one after the battle when he ran away from the city, and another just recently to Olympia when he wanted to use the presidency of the sacred embassy as a means of meeting Nicanor.Demosthenes was the chief Athenian religious envoy at the Olympic games in 324 B.C. when Nicanor presented Alexander's decree demanding that exiles should be allowed to return to all Greek cities except Thebes. Cf. Dio. Sic. 18.8; Hyp. 5 col. 18. A right thing indeed to entrust the city to this man's charge, when danger confronts us! When it was time to fight against the enemy, side by side with his fellows, he left his post and made for home; yet when he should have stayed at home to face danger with them, he offered himself as an envoy and ran away and left the city.

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When ambassadors were needed for the peace he said he would not move a foot to leave the city; yet when it was reported that Alexander was restoring the exiles and Nicanor came to Olympia he offered himself to the council as president of the sacred embassy. These are the parts he plays: on the field of battle he is a stay-at-home, when others stay at home he is an ambassador, among ambassadors he is a runaway.

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Now read theThat some words have dropped out of the text here is evident from the fact that two decrees are to be read and compared; moreover the executions mentioned in Din. 1.83 could have no connection with the decree relating to the money of Harpalus, since in this case Demosthenes himself was the first to be tried (Din. 1.106). and the decree relating to the inquiry over the money proposed by Demosthenes for the Areopagus and affecting both himself and you. I want you by comparing them together to realize that he is demented.

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Did you propose this, Demosthenes? You did; you cannot deny it. Was the council given authority on your motion? It was. Have some of the citizens been executed? They have. Did your decree have power over them? You cannot deny that it did.

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Read the decree again which Demosthenes proposed against Demosthenes. Let me have your attention, gentlemen.

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The council has found Demosthenes guilty. Need we enlarge on this? It has made its report on him, Athenians. Justice demanded that, having been self-condemned, he should immediately be put to death. But now that he has fallen into the hands of you who have been assembled by the people and have sworn to obey the laws and the people's decrees, what will you do? Will you ignore the claims of piety towards the gods and the justice recognized by the world? No, Athenians, do not do so.

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It would be an utter disgrace if, when others no worse, and even less guilty, than Demosthenes have been destroyed by his decrees, he, with his contempt for you and the laws, should be at large unpunished in the city, when by his own motion and the decrees which he proposed he has been convicted. The same council, Athenians, the same place, the same rights have been in question.

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The same orator was responsible for the misfortunes which overtook them and those which will soon overtake him. He himself in the Assembly instructed this council to judge his case, after calling on you as his witnesses. He made an agreement with the people and proposed the decree against himself, to be kept by the mother of the gods,Dinarchus is alluding to the Metroon, in which the state archives were kept. Cf. Lyc. 1.66 and note. who is the city's guardian of all written contracts. It would thus be impious for you to invalidate this or, after swearing by the gods in the present trial, to give a vote which did not conform with the actions of the gods themselves.

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When Poseidon lost his suit against Ares over Halirrothius he abode by the decision.According to tradition, Halirrothius, son of Poseidon, was killed by Ares for trying to seduce his daughter Alcippe. Poseidon accused Ares before the Areopagus but failed to secure his conviction. Cf. Apollod. 3.14.2. The awful goddesses too, in their case against Orestes,Orestes, pursued by the Furies, was said to have been given protection by Athena, who allowed the Areopagus to try his case and herself gave the casting vote which acquitted him. Cf. Aesch. Eum. 443 sq.; Paus. 1.28.5. abode by the judgement of this council, associating themselves for the future with its reputation for truth. How will you act with your claim to unrivalled piety? Will you annul the decision of the council and follow the bad example of Demosthenes? You will not, Athenians, if you remain in your senses.

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This is no small or incidental matter that you are deciding today; the question at issue is the safety of the whole city and also bribery, an evil habit and a practice which is harmful to you and has always brought men to ruin. If you do everything in your power to rid the city of this vice and to suppress those who gladly take bribes against you, we shall be saved, with Heaven's consent. But if you allow the orators to sell you, you will stand by and see them wreck the city.

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Demosthenes himself proposed in the Assembly, clearly implying that it was a just step to take, that we should keep for Alexander the money brought into Attica with Harpalus.See Din. 1.68 and note. Tell me, sir: are we going to keep it under present conditions, when you have taken twenty talents for personal use, someone else fifteen, Demades six thousand gold staters, and the others the various sums that have been credited to them? For sixty-four talents have already been traced, for which, you must conclude, gentlemen, that these men are to be held responsible.

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Which is the more honorable alternative, which the more just: that all the money should be kept in the treasury until the people has reached some fair decision, or that the orators and certain of the generals should seize and keep it? Personally I think that to keep it in the treasury is the course which all would admit to be just, while no one would consider it fair for these men to retain it.

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The statements made by the defendant, gentlemen, have been numerous and very varied but never consistent. For he realizes that all along you have been cheated by him with empty hopes and lying assertions and that you remember his promises only so long as they are being uttered. If then the city must go on enjoying the fruits of Demosthenes' wickedness and ill-fortune, that we may still be plagued by an evil genius,—I can find no other word for it,—we should acquiesce in the present state of affairs.

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But if we have any regard for our country, if we hate wicked and corrupt men and want our fortune to change for the better, you must not surrender yourselves, Athenians, to the prayers of this accursed juggler or lend an ear to his laments and quackeries. You have had enough experience of him, his speeches, his actions, and his luck.

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Which of you is so hopeful, Athenians, or so irrational, which of you is so unversed in past or present history, as to expect that a man who reduced the city, through whatever fault or fortune,—I am not concerned with that,—from such great prosperity to such utter disgrace, will save us now by serving as a counsellor and administrator? For besides the other difficulties and dangers which beset us we have now corruption also, of men right in the city, and are one and all striving to clear ourselves of a shameful charge, lest the people be thought to hold in their own name the money which certain individuals are keeping for themselves.

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I am not citing other instances of his continual change of policy or of the pernicious speeches which he has consistently made. At one time he made a proposal forbidding anyone to believe in any but the accepted gods and at another said that the people must not question the grant of divine honors to AlexanderDemosthenes had merely said: “Let him be the son of Zeus and Poseidon too if he likes.” Cf. Hyp. 5 col. 31.; and again when he was on the point of being tried before you, he impeached Callimedon for consorting with the exilesAthens, unlike most Greek cities, refused to obey Alexander's order for the restoration of exiles (cf. note on Din. 1.81). Callimedon, a politician with pro-Macedonian sympathies, nicknamed the Crab, is mentioned several times by Plutarch (e.g. Plut. Dem. 27). in Megara with intent to overthrow the democracy,

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and directly after countermanded the impeachment and brought forward at the recent sitting of the Assembly a false witness whom he had primed to say that there was a plot afoot threatening the docks. In all this he offered no proposals but simply furnished us with charges for the present trial, since on all these points you are witnesses against him. This man is a juggler, Athenians, and a blackguard, not entitled to be a citizen of Athens, either by virtue of his birth or of his political record.

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Where are the triremes which Demosthenes, like EubulusFor the confidence inspired by Eubulus, son of Spintharus, who controlled Athenian finances from 354 to 350 B.C., and perhaps for a further period also, compare Aeschin. 3.25. in his time, has supplied to the city? Where are the dockyards built under his administration? When did he improve the cavalry either by decree or law? Despite such opportunities as were offered after the battle of Chaeronea, did he raise a single force either for land or sea? What ornament for the goddess has he carried up to the Acropolis? What building has Demosthenes put up, either in your exchange, or in the city, or anywhere else in the country? Not a man could point to one anywhere.

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Very well; if a person has proved untrustworthy in military matters and useless in the business of the city, if he has idly watched his opponents accomplish everything they wished, changing his own position and neglecting to pursue the people's interests, will you wish to preserve him?

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Not if you are prudent and make the right decision for yourselves and Athens. No; you will welcome the good fortune which gave up to you for punishment those orators who, through their own bribery, have humiliated the city, and will beware, as the gods have often cautioned you in oracles, against the leaders and counsellors of this type. Listen to the oracle itself. Read the oracle.Cf. Din. 1.78.

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How then shall we be of one mind, Athenians? How shall we agree upon the interests of the state when our leaders and demagogues take bribes and betray their country's interests, when you yourselves and the whole people are in danger of losing the very foundations of Athens, together with your fathers' temples and your wives and children, while they have conspired together, so that in the assemblies they purposely abuse and lose their tempers with each other, though in private they are united and thus deceive you, who are so ready to lend an ear to what they say.

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What is the duty of a democratic orator, hating those who menace the city by speech or bill? What are we told, Demosthenes and Polyeuctus, about your predecessors? What did they always do, even though no danger threatened the city at the time? Did they not summon each other for trial; bring in impeachments? Did they not indict each other for illegal proposals? Have you, who profess to have the people at heart, and maintain that your safety rests upon this jury's vote, done a single one of these things?

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Have you denounced a decree, Demosthenes, despite the many outrageous and illegal measures which Demades has proposed? Have you prevented any political step among those which he has taken on his own initiative against the interests of the state? Not a single one. Have you impeached this man who has often acted contrary to the decrees of the people and the laws? Never. You allowed him to have his statue set up in bronze in the market and to share entertainment in the Prytaneum with the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton.These honors were paid to Demades about 335 B.C. in recognition of his mission to Alexander after the destruction of Thebes. Cf. Life of Demades

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In what way then did the people sample your goodwill, where did we see proof of the orator's protecting power? Or will you all maintain that herein lie your powers: to cheat these men by persisting that you cannot leave the country, that you have no other refuge than our goodwill? You ought first to have made it clear that in speech and action you opposed the decrees brought forward against the people's interests and then sought to convince these men that your claim to have no means of safety but the assistance offered by the people was true.

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But you place your hopes abroad and compete in flattery with those who admit that they are serving Alexander and have taken bribes from the same sources as those from which you are reported by the council to have received them. And you, Demosthenes, after conversing with Nicanor in front of all the Greeks and settling everything you wanted, now make yourself out to be in need of pity, traitor though you are and a receiver of bribes; as if these men will forget your wickedness, as if you will not pay the penalty for the crimes at which you have been caught. You are acting more boldly than Demades to this extent,

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that though he has given warning in the Assembly of his desperate character and admits that he accepts money and will continue to do so, still he has not dared to show his face before these men and did not presume to dispute the council's report; moreover he did not propose that the council should have authority over him or lay down the death penalty if he should be proved to have taken bribes. But you have such complete confidence in your own arguments and such a contempt for these men's simplicity that you expect to persuade the jury that in your case only has the council's statement been false and that you alone of those whom it reported have not accepted the gold. Who could believe that?

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Let me explain, Athenians, what you are going to do. You have taken over the case from the people, who know the facts; and to undergo the punishment, due to those whose names appear in the reports, Demosthenes is brought in first. We have made our accusation and have allowed no private interest on the part of any to stand in the way of common justice.

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Will you disregard all that has passed and acquit the first man up before you? Will you, with full power at your command, reject what seemed just both to the people and the Areopagus, and indeed to everyone, and take upon yourselves these men's depravity?

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Or will you, for the city's sake, give a demonstration to all alike of the hatred you bear towards traitors and those who, through love of gain, betray the people's interests? All this now lies in your control, and the fifteen hundred of you hold the city's safety in your hands. Your verdict of today will either bring to Athens great security, if you are willing to make a just decision, or else, if you endorse such practices as this, drive all men to despondency.

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You must not be cowed, Athenians, or by losing your self-control give up the city's just defence, which touches all alike, in deference to Demosthenes' entreaties. For none of you compelled this man to take the money, to which he had no right, against your own interests, when he has acquired, with your assistance, much more than enough besides, nor to defend himself now when the crimes have been acknowledged and he has proposed the death penalty for himself. But the avarice and wickedness, fostered in him by his whole mode of life, have brought this on his head.

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So do not be concerned when he weeps and laments. You might, with far more justice, pity the country, which this man is exposing to danger by behaving as he has, and which is begging you, who are its sons, in the names of your wives and children, to take vengeance on the traitor and save it: the land which your ancestors, after facing many noble combats for it, have handed on to you free in which many noble examples have been left us of the courage of those who gave their lives.

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It is this land, Athenians, the sacrifices traditional in it, and its ancestral sepulchres to which right-thinking men must turn their thoughts when they give their vote. And when Demosthenes wishes to cheat you and cunningly turns pathetic, shedding tears, you must think of the city's person, and the glory which it once possessed, and judge between two alternatives: which has become the more deserving of pity: the city because of Demosthenes or Demosthenes because of the city?

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You will find that this man has become famous since he entered politics; that from being a speechwriter and a paid advocate, in the service of Ctesippus, Phormio and many others,Demosthenes was acting in the interests of Ctesippus, son of Chabrias, when he attacked the Law of Leptines in 355 B.C. The Phormio referred to is possibly the freedman of the banker Pasion whom he defended in 350. Cf. Dem. 20 and Dem. 36. he has become the richest man in Athens; that after being an unknown figure, inheriting no family honor from his ancestors, he is now famous, while the city has reached a pass unworthy of herself or the honor of our forbears. Therefore ignore this man's entreaties and deceptions, bring in the verdict that is just and right, having regard for your country's interest, as befits an honorable jury, not the welfare of Demosthenes.

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And whenever anyone comes forward to speak for him, bear in mind that he who does so, even if not involved in the reports we are about to hear, is hostile to the constitution, unwilling to see punished those who take bribes against the people and anxious that the general protection of your persons, for which the Areopagus is responsible, should be abolished and every right in the city overwhelmed; whereas, if it is some orator or general, one of those participating in the defence because they wish to discredit the report, which they expect will reflect against themselves, you must give their arguments no credence, knowing as you do that all these men collaborated over the landing of Harpalus and his release.

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You must realize then, Athenians, that when these men come forward, they do so against your interests, being enemies alike of the laws and the entire city. Do not tolerate them; insist that their defence answers the charges. And do not countenance his own fury either; for he prides himself on his powers as an orator and, since he is known to have taken bribes against you, has been proved an even greater fraud. No, punish him in a manner befitting yourselves and the city. If you do not, by one verdict and at one trial you will release all who have been reported, and all who ever will be, and will bring these men's corruption upon yourselves and upon the people, even though, afterwards, you may prosecute those who acquitted them, when it will avail you nothing.

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I have now played my full part in assisting the prosecution and have shown regard for nothing but justice and your interests. I have not deserted the city or given more weight to personal favor than to the people's vote. With an appeal to you to show the same spirit I now hand over the water to the other prosecutors.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml index 3441a10b5..867f82b88 100644 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -1,77 +1,77 @@ - - - - Κατὰ Δημοσθένους - Dinarchus - J. O. Burtt - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - Perseus 2.0 - tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml - - Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License - - + + + +Κατὰ Δημοσθένους +Dinarchus +J. O. Burtt +Perseus Project, Tufts University +Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + +The Annenberg CPB/Project + + +Trustees of Tufts University +Medford, MA +Perseus Project +Perseus 2.0 +tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml + +Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + - - - - Dinarchus - Minor Attic Orators - J. O. Burtt - - London - William Heinemann, Ltd. - Cambridge, MA - Harvard University Press - 1954 - 1962 - - 2 - - Internet Archive - - - + + + +Dinarchus +Minor Attic Orators +J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + +2 + + Internet Archive + + + - - - -

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ὁ μὲν δημαγωγὸς ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θανάτου τετιμημένος ἑαυτῷ ἐὰν ἐξελεγχθῇ ὁτιοῦν εἰληφὼς παρʼ Ἁρπάλου, οὗτος φανερῶς ἐξελήλεγκται δῶρʼ εἰληφὼς παρὰ τούτων, οἷς ἐναντία πράττειν ἔφη τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον. πολλῶν δʼ ὑπὸ Στρατοκλέους εἰρημένων καὶ τῶν πλείστων προκατειλημμένων κατηγορημάτων, καὶ περὶ μὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀποφάσεως τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς δικαίας καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἀποδείξεις εἰρηκυίας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκολούθων τούτοις Στρατοκλέους εἰρηκότος καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματʼ ἀνεγνωκότος ἤδη τὰ περὶ τούτων,

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ὑπόλοιπον ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἀγωνιζομένοις ἀγῶνα τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος οὐδεπώποτε γέγονε τῇ πόλει, κοινῇ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν παρακελεύεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἡμῖν συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἂν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνίοις περιπίπτωμεν — οὐ γὰρ ἵνʼ ἐνοχλῶμεν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ὀργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον παροξύνωμεν, ὀργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον παροξύνωμεν Thalheim: ὀργίζησθε μᾶλλον παροξύνομεν A pr. (παροξυνόμενοι A corr. (2)): μᾶλλον ὀργίζησθε παροξύνωμεν N pr. (ὀργίζησθαι (sic N corr. (2)): παροξύν. del. Finke: ὀργίζ. del. Blass. Alii alia. δὶς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν —, ἔπειτα μὴ προΐεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης δίκαια, μηδὲ τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι τῶν τοῦ κρινομένου λόγων.

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ὑπόλοιπον ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ταῦτʼ ἀγωνιζομένοις ἀγῶνα τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος οὐδεπώποτε γέγονε τῇ πόλει, κοινῇ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν παρακελεύεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἡμῖν συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἂν τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνίοις περιπίπτωμεν — οὐ γὰρ ἵνʼ ἐνοχλῶμεν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ὀργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον παροξύνωμεν, ὀργίζεσθαι μᾶλλον παροξύνωμεν Thalheim: ὀργίζησθε μᾶλλον παροξύνομεν A pr. (παροξυνόμενοι A corr. (2)): μᾶλλον ὀργίζησθε παροξύνωμεν N pr. (ὀργίζησθαι (sic N corr. (2)): παροξύν. del. Finke: ὀργίζ. del. Blass. Alii alia. δὶς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν —, ἔπειτα μὴ προΐεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης δίκαια, μηδὲ τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι τῶν τοῦ κρινομένου λόγων.

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ὁρᾶτε γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι παρὰ μὲν ὑμῖν Δημοσθένης οὑτοσὶ κρίνεται, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμεῖς· οἳ σκοποῦσι τίνα ποτὲ γνώμην ἕξετε περὶ τῶν τῇ πατρίδι συμφερόντων, καὶ πότερον τὰς ἰδίας τούτων δωροδοκίας καὶ πονηρίας ἀναδέξεσθʼ ἀναδέξεσθε Stephanus: ἀναδέχεσθε codd. εἰς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ἢ φανερὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσετε διότι μισεῖτε τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πολιτείας δῶρα λαμβάνοντας, καὶ οὐχ ἵνʼ ἀφῆτε ζητεῖν προσετάξατε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ, ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ἀποφηνάντων τούτων ὑμεῖς τιμωρήσησθε τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀξίως. νυνὶ τοίνυν τοῦτʼ ἐφʼ ὑμῖν ἐστι.

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ὁρᾶτε γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι παρὰ μὲν ὑμῖν Δημοσθένης οὑτοσὶ κρίνεται, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑμεῖς· οἳ σκοποῦσι τίνα ποτὲ γνώμην ἕξετε περὶ τῶν τῇ πατρίδι συμφερόντων, καὶ πότερον τὰς ἰδίας τούτων δωροδοκίας καὶ πονηρίας ἀναδέξεσθʼ ἀναδέξεσθε Stephanus: ἀναδέχεσθε codd. εἰς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ἢ φανερὸν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσετε διότι μισεῖτε τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πολιτείας δῶρα λαμβάνοντας, καὶ οὐχ ἵνʼ ἀφῆτε ζητεῖν προσετάξατε τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ, ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ἀποφηνάντων τούτων ὑμεῖς τιμωρήσησθε τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀξίως. νυνὶ τοίνυν τοῦτʼ ἐφʼ ὑμῖν ἐστι.

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ψηφισαμένου γὰρ τοῦ δήμου δίκαιον ψήφισμα, καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν βουλομένων εὑρεῖν τίνες εἰσὶ τῶν ῥητόρων οἱ τολμήσαντες ἐπὶ διαβολῇ καὶ κινδύνῳ τῆς πόλεως χρήματα παρʼ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐν ἐν add. Blass: ψηφίσματι A pr.: ψήφισμά τι A corr.: ψη . . . N pr.: ψήφισμα N corr. (2): del. Thalheim. ψηφίσματι γράψαντος, ὦ Δημόσθενες, σοῦ καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ζητεῖν τὴν βουλὴν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτῇ πάτριόν ἐστιν, εἴ τινες εἰλήφασι παρʼ Ἁρπάλου χρυσίον,

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ψηφισαμένου γὰρ τοῦ δήμου δίκαιον ψήφισμα, καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν βουλομένων εὑρεῖν τίνες εἰσὶ τῶν ῥητόρων οἱ τολμήσαντες ἐπὶ διαβολῇ καὶ κινδύνῳ τῆς πόλεως χρήματα παρʼ Ἁρπάλου λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐν ἐν add. Blass: ψηφίσματι A pr.: ψήφισμά τι A corr.: ψη . . . N pr.: ψήφισμα N corr. (2): del. Thalheim. ψηφίσματι γράψαντος, ὦ Δημόσθενες, σοῦ καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ζητεῖν τὴν βουλὴν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτῇ πάτριόν ἐστιν, εἴ τινες εἰλήφασι παρʼ Ἁρπάλου χρυσίον,

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ζητεῖ ἡ βουλή, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προκλήσεων μαθοῦσα τὸ δίκαιον, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν πίστιν τὴν περὶ περὶ] προτέραν Rosenberg: πατρίαν Blass. αὑτῆς αὑτῆς Bekker: αὐτῆς codd. ἐπὶ σοῦ καταλῦσαι βουλομένη, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται εἶπον, προορῶσα μὲν μὲν add. Reiske. ἡ βουλή, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν τούτων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν δύναμιν, οὐκ οἰομένη δὲ δεῖν οὐδεμίαν ὑπολογίζεσθαι τῶν περὶ αὑτῆς αὑτῆς Bekker: αὐτῆς codd. ἐσομένων βλασφημιῶν, εἴ τις μέλλει τῇ πατρίδι αὐτῆς αὐτῆς] αὐτοῖς, cum BL, Bekker: αὐτῇ Baiter: τις Blass, qui τις post εἰ seclusit. αἰτία μοχθηρὰ καὶ κίνδυνος ἔσεσθαι.

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ζητεῖ ἡ βουλή, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προκλήσεων μαθοῦσα τὸ δίκαιον, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν πίστιν τὴν περὶ περὶ] προτέραν Rosenberg: πατρίαν Blass. αὑτῆς αὑτῆς Bekker: αὐτῆς codd. ἐπὶ σοῦ καταλῦσαι βουλομένη, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται εἶπον, προορῶσα μὲνμὲν add. Reiske. ἡ βουλή, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν τούτων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν δύναμιν, οὐκ οἰομένη δὲ δεῖν οὐδεμίαν ὑπολογίζεσθαι τῶν περὶ αὑτῆς αὑτῆς Bekker: αὐτῆς codd. ἐσομένων βλασφημιῶν, εἴ τις μέλλει τῇ πατρίδι αὐτῆς αὐτῆς] αὐτοῖς, cum BL, Bekker: αὐτῇ Baiter: τις Blass, qui τις post εἰ seclusit. αἰτία μοχθηρὰ καὶ κίνδυνος ἔσεσθαι.

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τούτων ὡς ἐδόκει τῷ δήμῳ καλῶς καὶ συμφερόντως πεπραγμένων, αἰτίαι νῦν καὶ προκλήσεις καὶ συκοφαντίαι παρὰ Δημοσθένους ἥκουσιν, ἐπειδὴ οὗτος ἀποπέφανται εἴκοσι τάλαντα ἔχων χρυσίου· καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φόνων ἀξιόπιστος οὖσα βουλὴ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τἀληθὲς τἀληθὲς Blass: ἀληθὲς codd. εὑρεῖν, καὶ κυρία δικάσαι τε περὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν βιαίῳ θανάτῳ τετελευτηκόσι βοηθῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ παράνομόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπραγμένους ἐκβαλεῖν ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι, νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἀποπεφασμένοις χρήμασιν ἄκυρος ἔσται τοῦ δικαίου;

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τούτων ὡς ἐδόκει τῷ δήμῳ καλῶς καὶ συμφερόντως πεπραγμένων, αἰτίαι νῦν καὶ προκλήσεις καὶ συκοφαντίαι παρὰ Δημοσθένους ἥκουσιν, ἐπειδὴ οὗτος ἀποπέφανται εἴκοσι τάλαντα ἔχων χρυσίου· καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φόνων ἀξιόπιστος οὖσα βουλὴ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τἀληθὲς τἀληθὲς Blass: ἀληθὲς codd. εὑρεῖν, καὶ κυρία δικάσαι τε περὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν βιαίῳ θανάτῳ τετελευτηκόσι βοηθῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ παράνομόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπραγμένους ἐκβαλεῖν ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι, νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἀποπεφασμένοις χρήμασιν ἄκυρος ἔσται τοῦ δικαίου;

ναί· κατέψευσται γὰρ ἡ βουλὴ Δημοσθένους· τουτὶ γάρ ἐστιν ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ πράγματος. σοῦ κατέψευσται καὶ Δημάδου; καθʼ ὧν οὐδὲ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀσφαλές ἐστιν; οἳ πολλὰ πρότερον τῶν κοινῶν ἐκείνῃ ζητεῖν προσετάξατε καὶ διὰ τὰς γενομένας ζητήσεις ἐπῃνέσατε; οὓς δʼ ἡ πόλις ἅπασα οὐ δύναται ἀναγκάσαι τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, κατὰ τούτων ἡ βουλὴ ψευδεῖς ἀποφάσεις πεποίηται;

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ὦ Ἡράκλεις. διὰ τί οὖν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συνεχώρεις, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ἐὰν ἀποφήνῃ κατὰAut κατὰ addendum (cf. sect. 7) aut σὲ pro σοῦ legendum (cf. sect. 61) coni. Wolf. σοῦ ἡ βουλή, θάνατον ἑαυτῷ τὴν ζημίαν; καὶ διὰ τί πολλοὺς ἀνῄρηκας σὺ ταῖς τῆς βουλῆς ἰσχυριζόμενος ἀποφάσεσιν; ἢ ποῖ ποῖ Reiske: ποῦ codd. νῦν ἐλθὼν ὁ δῆμος ἢ τίσι προστάξας ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων εὕρῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

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ὦ Ἡράκλεις. διὰ τί οὖν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συνεχώρεις, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ἐὰν ἀποφήνῃ κατὰAut κατὰ addendum (cf. sect. 7) aut σὲ pro σοῦ legendum (cf. sect. 61) coni. Wolf. σοῦ ἡ βουλή, θάνατον ἑαυτῷ τὴν ζημίαν; καὶ διὰ τί πολλοὺς ἀνῄρηκας σὺ ταῖς τῆς βουλῆς ἰσχυριζόμενος ἀποφάσεσιν; ἢ ποῖ ποῖ Reiske: ποῦ codd. νῦν ἐλθὼν ὁ δῆμος ἢ τίσι προστάξας ζητεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων εὕρῃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

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τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνέδριον, τὸ πρότερον δοκοῦν εἶναι πιστόν, σὺ καταλύεις, ὁ δημοτικὸς εἶναι φάσκων, ᾧ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φυλακὴν ὁ δῆμος παρακαταθήκην ἔδωκεν, ᾧ τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν πολλάκις ἐγκεχείρικεν, ὃ Ν: Α. διαπεφύλαχε διαπεφύλαχε Wolf: διαπεφύλακε codd. τὸ σὸν σῶμα τοῦ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος πολλάκις, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἐπιβουλευθέν, ὃ φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορρήτους διαθήκας, διαθήκας] ἀποθήκας Ν: θήκας Wolf. ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται.

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τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνέδριον, τὸ πρότερον δοκοῦν εἶναι πιστόν, σὺ καταλύεις, ὁ δημοτικὸς εἶναι φάσκων, ᾧ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φυλακὴν ὁ δῆμος παρακαταθήκην ἔδωκεν, ᾧ τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν πολλάκις ἐγκεχείρικεν, ὃ Ν: Α. διαπεφύλαχε διαπεφύλαχε Wolf: διαπεφύλακε codd. τὸ σὸν σῶμα τοῦ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος πολλάκις, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ἐπιβουλευθέν, ὃ φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορρήτους διαθήκας, διαθήκας] ἀποθήκας Ν: θήκας Wolf. ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται.

δίκαια μὲν οὖν, δίκαια τρόπον γέ τινα πάσχει τὸ συνέδριον· εἰρήσεται γὰρ ἃ γιγνώσκω. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἐχρῆν αὐτούς, ἢ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ζήτησιν τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν τριακοσίων ταλάντων τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως ἀφικομένων ζητεῖν, καθάπερ συνέταξεν ὁ δῆμος, ἵνα τότε δόντος δίκην τοῦ θηρίου τούτου, καὶ τῶν μερισαμένων ἐκεῖνα τὰ χρήματα φανερῶν γενομένων, καὶ τῆς περὶ Θηβαίους προδοσίας ἐξελεγχθείσης ἣν οὗτος προδέδωκεν, ἀπηλλάγμεθα τούτου τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ δίκην ἀξίαν δόντος·

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ἤ, εἰ ταῦθʼ ὑμεῖς ἐβούλεσθε Δημοσθένει συγχωρεῖν καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς καθʼ ὑμῶν δωροδοκήσοντας εἶναι, τὴν περὶ τῶν νῦν ἀποπεφασμένων ζήτησιν χρημάτων μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, πεῖραν ὑμῶν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἰληφότας· ὅπου γʼ γε Ald.: γὰρ codd. οὕτω καλῶς καὶ δικαίως τῆς ἀποφάσεως τῆς κατὰ τούτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νυνὶ γεγενημένης, καὶ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς οὔτε τὴν Δημοσθένους οὔτε τὴν Δημάδου δύναμιν ὑποστειλαμένης, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καὶ τἀληθὲς προὐργιαίτερον πεποιημένης,

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ἤ, εἰ ταῦθʼ ὑμεῖς ἐβούλεσθε Δημοσθένει συγχωρεῖν καὶ πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς καθʼ ὑμῶν δωροδοκήσοντας εἶναι, τὴν περὶ τῶν νῦν ἀποπεφασμένων ζήτησιν χρημάτων μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, πεῖραν ὑμῶν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἰληφότας· ὅπου γʼ γε Ald.: γὰρ codd. οὕτω καλῶς καὶ δικαίως τῆς ἀποφάσεως τῆς κατὰ τούτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νυνὶ γεγενημένης, καὶ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς οὔτε τὴν Δημοσθένους οὔτε τὴν Δημάδου δύναμιν ὑποστειλαμένης, ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καὶ τἀληθὲς προὐργιαίτερον πεποιημένης,

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οὐδὲν ἧττον περιέρχεται Δημοσθένης περί τε τῆς βουλῆς βλασφημῶν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγων οἷσπερ ἴσως οἷσπερ ἴσως N corr. (2): οἷς περισσῶς N pr. A. καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτίκα χρήσεται λόγοις ἐξαπατῶν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἐγὼ Θηβαίους ὑμῖν ἐποίησα συμμάχους. οὔκ· ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον ἀμφοτέραις ἐλυμήνω ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὦ Δημόσθενες. ἐγὼ παρέταξα πάντας εἰς Χαιρώνειαν. οὔκ· ἀλλʼ ἔλιπες μόνος αὐτὸς τὴν ἐκεῖ τάξιν. ἐγὼ πολλὰς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐπρέσβευσα πρεσβείας.

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οὐδὲν ἧττον περιέρχεται Δημοσθένης περί τε τῆς βουλῆς βλασφημῶν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγων οἷσπερ ἴσως οἷσπερ ἴσως N corr. (2): οἷς περισσῶς N pr. A. καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτίκα χρήσεται λόγοις ἐξαπατῶν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἐγὼ Θηβαίους ὑμῖν ἐποίησα συμμάχους. οὔκ· ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον ἀμφοτέραις ἐλυμήνω ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὦ Δημόσθενες. ἐγὼ παρέταξα πάντας εἰς Χαιρώνειαν. οὔκ· ἀλλʼ ἔλιπες μόνος αὐτὸς τὴν ἐκεῖ τάξιν. ἐγὼ πολλὰς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐπρέσβευσα πρεσβείας.

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ἐφʼ αἷς αἷς Reiske: οἷς codd. οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅ τι ποτʼ ἂν ἐποίησεν ἢ τίνας ἂν εἶπε λόγους, εἰ συνέβη κατορθῶσαι αὐτῷ αὐτῷ Ν: αὑτῷ Α. ἃ συνεβούλευσεν, ὃς ὃς Taylor: codd. ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀτυχήμασι καὶ κακοῖς ἅπασαν ἐπεληλυθὼς τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅμως ἀξιοῖ δωρεὰς αὑτῷ αὑτῷ Bekker: αὐτῷ codd. δεδόσθαι τὰς μεγίστας, λαμβάνειν δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τοῦ δήμου ἃ ἂν βούληται.

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ἐφʼ αἷς αἷς Reiske: οἷς codd. οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅ τι ποτʼ ἂν ἐποίησεν ἢ τίνας ἂν εἶπε λόγους, εἰ συνέβη κατορθῶσαι αὐτῷ αὐτῷ Ν: αὑτῷ Α. ἃ συνεβούλευσεν, ὃς ὃς Taylor: codd. ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀτυχήμασι καὶ κακοῖς ἅπασαν ἐπεληλυθὼς τὴν οἰκουμένην ὅμως ἀξιοῖ δωρεὰς αὑτῷ αὑτῷ Bekker: αὐτῷ codd. δεδόσθαι τὰς μεγίστας, λαμβάνειν δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν κατὰ τοῦ δήμου ἃ ἂν βούληται.

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καὶ ΤιμοθέῳCf. Din. 3.17. μέν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Πελοπόννησον περιπλεύσαντι καὶ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν νικήσαντι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Κόνωνος υἱεῖ τοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσαντος καὶ Σάμον λαβόντι λαβόντι ex orat. 3 Sauppe: λαβόντος codd. καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Πύδναν καὶ Ποτείδαιαν καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἑτέρας εἴκοσι πόλεις, οὐκ ἐποιήσασθʼ ὑπόλογον, οὐδὲ τῆς τότʼ ἐνεστώσης κρίσεως οὐδὲ τῶν ὅρκων, οὓς ὀμωμοκότες ἐφέρετε τὴν ψῆφον, ἀντικατηλλάξασθε ἀντικατηλλάξασθε Ald.: ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι codd. τὰς τοιαύτας εὐεργεσίας, ἀλλʼ ἑκατὸν ταλάντων ἐτιμήσατε, ὅτι χρήματʼ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ex orat. 3 Gruter: αὐτὸς codd. ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων·

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καὶ ΤιμοθέῳCf. Din. 3.17. μέν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Πελοπόννησον περιπλεύσαντι καὶ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν νικήσαντι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Κόνωνος υἱεῖ τοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσαντος καὶ Σάμον λαβόντι λαβόντι ex orat. 3 Sauppe: λαβόντος codd. καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Πύδναν καὶ Ποτείδαιαν καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἑτέρας εἴκοσι πόλεις, οὐκ ἐποιήσασθʼ ὑπόλογον, οὐδὲ τῆς τότʼ ἐνεστώσης κρίσεως οὐδὲ τῶν ὅρκων, οὓς ὀμωμοκότες ἐφέρετε τὴν ψῆφον, ἀντικατηλλάξασθε ἀντικατηλλάξασθε Ald.: ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι codd. τὰς τοιαύτας εὐεργεσίας, ἀλλʼ ἑκατὸν ταλάντων ἐτιμήσατε, ὅτι χρήματʼ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ex orat. 3 Gruter: αὐτὸς codd. ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων·

τὸν δὲ κατάπτυστον τοῦτον καὶ Σκύθην — ἐξάγομαι γάρ —, ὃν οὐχ εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶσʼ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ζητήσασʼ ἀποπέφαγκε χρήματʼ ἔχειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, καὶ ὃς ἀποπέφανται μισθαρνῶν καὶ δωροδοκῶν κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐξελήλεγκται, τοῦτον οὐ τιμωρησάμενοι παράδειγμα ποιήσετε τοῖς ἄλλοις; ὃς οὐκ ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν μόνον εἰληφὼς χρυσίον φανερός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως κεχρηματισμένος· ὁ νῦν οὐδὲ τῶν ὑφʼ Ἁρπάλου κομισθέντων χρημάτων εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀποσχόμενος.

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καίτοι τί μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου πεπραγμένων ἀγαθῶν ἃς Δημοσθένης ἐπρέσβευσεν εἰς Θήβας πρεσβείας; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν καταγελάσειεν ὑμῶν τῶν τούτου τούτου Reiske: τοῦτο codd. τολμώντων ἀκούειν, ἀντιθεὶς ἐφʼ αἷς οὗτος σεμνύνεται πράξεσιν ἐκείνας ἃς Τιμόθεος ὑμᾶς καὶ Κόνων εὐεργέτησαν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ κάθαρμα παραβάλλειν δεῖ τοὺς ἄξια καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν προγόνων ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πράξαντας. παρασχόμενος οὖν τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Τιμοθέῳ γενόμενον πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ τούτου λόγους βαδιοῦμαι. λέγε.

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καίτοι τί μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου πεπραγμένων ἀγαθῶν ἃς Δημοσθένης ἐπρέσβευσεν εἰς Θήβας πρεσβείας; ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν καταγελάσειεν ὑμῶν τῶν τούτου τούτου Reiske: τοῦτο codd. τολμώντων ἀκούειν, ἀντιθεὶς ἐφʼ αἷς οὗτος σεμνύνεται πράξεσιν ἐκείνας ἃς Τιμόθεος ὑμᾶς καὶ Κόνων εὐεργέτησαν; ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ κάθαρμα παραβάλλειν δεῖ τοὺς ἄξια καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν προγόνων ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πράξαντας. παρασχόμενος οὖν τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Τιμοθέῳ γενόμενον πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ τούτου λόγους βαδιοῦμαι. λέγε.

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Ψήφισμα om. NA.

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ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὦ Δημόσθενες, πολίτης, ὃς δικαίως ἂν καὶ συγγνώμης καὶ χάριτος ἐτύγχανε παρὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις συμπεπολιτευμένων, οὐ λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἔργοις μεγάλα τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθὰ ποιήσας, καὶ διαμείνας ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτῆς add. Cobet. πολιτείας καὶ οὐκ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλόμενος ὥσπερ σύ, ἐτελεύτησεν οὐ τηλικαύτας τὸν δῆμον αἰτήσας δωρεὰς ὥστε τῶν νόμων εἶναι κρείττων, οὐδʼ οἰόμενος δεῖν τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους οἴσειν τὴν ψῆφον ἄλλο τι προὐργιαίτερον ποιεῖσθαι τῆς εὐσεβείας, ἀλλʼ ὑπομένων καὶ κρίνεσθαι,Post κρίνεσθαι lacunam indicavit Blass: κατακρίνεσθαι Wolf. εἰ δόξειε τοῖς δικασταῖς, καὶ οὐ καιροὺς λέγων, οὐδʼ ἕτερα φρονῶν καὶ δημηγορῶν.

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Ψήφισμα om. NA.

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ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὦ Δημόσθενες, πολίτης, ὃς δικαίως ἂν καὶ συγγνώμης καὶ χάριτος ἐτύγχανε παρὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις συμπεπολιτευμένων, οὐ λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἔργοις μεγάλα τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθὰ ποιήσας, καὶ διαμείνας ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς αὐτῆς add. Cobet. πολιτείας καὶ οὐκ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλόμενος ὥσπερ σύ, ἐτελεύτησεν οὐ τηλικαύτας τὸν δῆμον αἰτήσας δωρεὰς ὥστε τῶν νόμων εἶναι κρείττων, οὐδʼ οἰόμενος δεῖν τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους οἴσειν τὴν ψῆφον ἄλλο τι προὐργιαίτερον ποιεῖσθαι τῆς εὐσεβείας, ἀλλʼ ὑπομένων καὶ κρίνεσθαι,Post κρίνεσθαι lacunam indicavit Blass: κατακρίνεσθαι Wolf. εἰ δόξειε τοῖς δικασταῖς, καὶ οὐ καιροὺς λέγων, οὐδʼ ἕτερα φρονῶν καὶ δημηγορῶν.

οὐκ ἀποκτενεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν μιαρὸν τοῦτον ἄνθρωπον, ὃς πρὸς ἑτέροις πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις ἁμαρτήμασι καὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν περιεῖδεν ἀνάστατον γενομένην, τριακόσια τάλαντα λαβὼν εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων σωτηρίαν παρὰ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως, καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων εἰς Ἰσθμὸν καὶ τὴν μὲν παρʼ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον ἀποστειλάντων, τὴν δὲ παρὰ Θηβαίων τῶν ταλαιπώρων προσδεξαμένων, οἳ κατὰ θάλατταν μόλις ἀφίκοντο πρὸς ἐκείνους, ἱκετηρίαν ἔχοντες καὶ κηρύκεια συμπεπλεγμένα, ὡς ἔφασαν, ἐκ τῶν θαλλῶν,

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ἐροῦντες τοῖς Ἀρκάσιν ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδʼ ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ἀλλὰ τὰ παρʼ αὑτοῖς αὑτοῖς Bekker: αὐτοῖς codd. ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνόμενα γιγνόμενα Blass: γενόμενα ΝΑ: γινόμενα, cum ZM, Bekker. φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν δουλείαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾶν τὰς ὁρᾶν τὰς Bekker: ὁρῶντες codd. εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα σώματα γιγνομένας, —

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ἐροῦντες τοῖς Ἀρκάσιν ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδʼ ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ἀλλὰ τὰ παρʼ αὑτοῖς αὑτοῖς Bekker: αὐτοῖς codd. ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνόμενα γιγνόμενα Blass: γενόμενα ΝΑ: γινόμενα, cum ZM, Bekker. φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν δουλείαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾶν τὰς ὁρᾶν τὰς Bekker: ὁρῶντες codd. εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα σώματα γιγνομένας, —

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οἷς ἑτοίμων γενομένων τῶν Ἀρκάδων βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἐλεησάντων ἐν οἷς οἷς] οἵοις Maetzner. ἦσαν κακοῖς, καὶ φανερὸν ποιησάντων ὅτι τοῖς μὲν σώμασι μετʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ἀκολουθεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο, ταῖς δʼ εὐνοίαις μετὰ Θηβαίων καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἦσαν, καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ αὐτῶν Ἀστύλου ὠνίου ὄντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Στρατοκλῆς εἶπε, καὶ δέκα τάλαντʼ αἰτοῦντος ὥστʼ ἀγαγεῖν τὴν βοήθειαν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, καὶ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν ὡς τοῦτον ἐλθόντων, ὃν ᾔδεσαν ἔχοντα τὸ βασιλικὸν χρυσίον, καὶ δεομένων καὶ ἱκετευόντων δοῦναι τὰ χρήματʼ εἰς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν,

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οἷς ἑτοίμων γενομένων τῶν Ἀρκάδων βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἐλεησάντων ἐν οἷς οἷς] οἵοις Maetzner. ἦσαν κακοῖς, καὶ φανερὸν ποιησάντων ὅτι τοῖς μὲν σώμασι μετʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τοὺς καιροὺς ἀκολουθεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο, ταῖς δʼ εὐνοίαις μετὰ Θηβαίων καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἦσαν, καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ αὐτῶν Ἀστύλου ὠνίου ὄντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Στρατοκλῆς εἶπε, καὶ δέκα τάλαντʼ αἰτοῦντος ὥστʼ ἀγαγεῖν τὴν βοήθειαν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, καὶ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν ὡς τοῦτον ἐλθόντων, ὃν ᾔδεσαν ἔχοντα τὸ βασιλικὸν χρυσίον, καὶ δεομένων καὶ ἱκετευόντων δοῦναι τὰ χρήματʼ εἰς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν,

οὐκ ἐτόλμησεν ὁ μιαρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ αἰσχροκερδὴς ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν χρημάτων ὧν εἶχε δέκα μόνον τάλαντα δοῦναι, τοσαύτας ὁρῶν ἐλπίδας ὑποφαινούσας εἰς τὴν Θηβαίων σωτηρίαν, ἀλλὰ περιεῖδεν ἑτέρους δόντας τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον, ὥσπερ καὶ Στρατοκλῆς εἶπεν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ πάλιν ἀπελθεῖν οἴκαδε τοὺς ἐξεληλυθότας Ἀρκάδων καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

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ἆρʼ ὑμῖν δοκεῖ μικρῶν κακῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι Δημοσθένης καὶ ἡ τούτου φιλαργυρία; ἢ προσήκειν αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐλέου τινὸς τυγχάνειν τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῆς ἐσχάτης τιμωρίας καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νῦν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων ἀδικημάτων; ἀκούσονται τὴν κρίσιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ γεγενημένην πάντες ἄνθρωποι· θεωρήσουσιν ὑμᾶς τοὺς κρίνοντας, ὅπως χρῆσθε χρῆσθε] χρήσεσθεRosenberg: κέχρησθε Blass. τῷ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένῳ.

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ἆρʼ ὑμῖν δοκεῖ μικρῶν κακῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι αἴτιος γεγενῆσθαι Δημοσθένης καὶ ἡ τούτου φιλαργυρία; ἢ προσήκειν αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐλέου τινὸς τυγχάνειν τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῆς ἐσχάτης τιμωρίας καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νῦν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων ἀδικημάτων; ἀκούσονται τὴν κρίσιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ γεγενημένην πάντες ἄνθρωποι· θεωρήσουσιν ὑμᾶς τοὺς κρίνοντας, ὅπως χρῆσθε χρῆσθε] χρήσεσθεRosenberg: κέχρησθε Blass. τῷ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένῳ.

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ὑμεῖς ἔσθʼ οἱ διὰ πολλῷ τῶν ὑπὸ τούτου πεπραγμένων ἀδικημάτων ἐλάττω μεγάλας καὶ ἀπαραιτήτους ἐνίοις ἐπιτεθηκότες τιμωρίας. ὑμεῖς Μένωνα μὲν τὸν μυλωθρὸν ἀπεκτείνατε, διότι παῖδʼ ἐλεύθερον ἐκ Πελλήνης ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ μυλῶνι μυλῶνι Sauppe: μύλωνι codd.· Θεμίστιον δὲ τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον, διότι τὴν Ῥοδίαν κιθαρίστριαν ὕβρισεν Ἐλευσινίοις, θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε, Εὐθύμαχον δέ, διότι τὴν Ὀλυνθίαν παιδίσκην ἔστησεν ἐπʼ οἰκήματος.

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ὑμεῖς ἔσθʼ οἱ διὰ πολλῷ τῶν ὑπὸ τούτου πεπραγμένων ἀδικημάτων ἐλάττω μεγάλας καὶ ἀπαραιτήτους ἐνίοις ἐπιτεθηκότες τιμωρίας. ὑμεῖς Μένωνα μὲν τὸν μυλωθρὸν ἀπεκτείνατε, διότι παῖδʼ ἐλεύθερον ἐκ Πελλήνης ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ μυλῶνι μυλῶνι Sauppe: μύλωνι codd.· Θεμίστιον δὲ τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον, διότι τὴν Ῥοδίαν κιθαρίστριαν ὕβρισεν Ἐλευσινίοις, θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε, Εὐθύμαχον δέ, διότι τὴν Ὀλυνθίαν παιδίσκην ἔστησεν ἐπʼ οἰκήματος.

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διὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν προδότην παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες αἱ Θηβαίων ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διενεμήθησαν, πόλις ἀστυγείτων καὶ σύμμαχος ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνήρπασται, ἀροῦται καὶ σπείρεται τὸ Θηβαίων ἄστυ τῶν κοινωνησάντων ὑμῖν τοῦ πρὸς Φίλιππον πολέμου. ἀροῦται, φημί, καὶ σπείρεται· καὶ οὐκ ἠλέησε, φημί, ὁ μιαρὸς οὗτος πόλιν οἰκτρῶς οὕτως ἀπολλυμένην, εἰς ἣν ἐπρέσβευσεν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἀποσταλείς, ἧς ἧς Wolf: οἷς codd. ὁμόσπονδος καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος πολλάκις γέγονεν, ἣν αὐτός φησι σύμμαχον ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι. ἀλλὰ πρὸς οὓς εὐτυχοῦντας πολλάκις ἦλθε, τούτους ἀτυχοῦντας προδέδωκεν.

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διὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν προδότην παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες αἱ Θηβαίων ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς τῶν βαρβάρων διενεμήθησαν, πόλις ἀστυγείτων καὶ σύμμαχος ἐκ μέσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνήρπασται, ἀροῦται καὶ σπείρεται τὸ Θηβαίων ἄστυ τῶν κοινωνησάντων ὑμῖν τοῦ πρὸς Φίλιππον πολέμου. ἀροῦται, φημί, καὶ σπείρεται· καὶ οὐκ ἠλέησε, φημί, ὁ μιαρὸς οὗτος πόλιν οἰκτρῶς οὕτως ἀπολλυμένην, εἰς ἣν ἐπρέσβευσεν ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἀποσταλείς, ἧς ἧς Wolf: οἷς codd. ὁμόσπονδος καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος πολλάκις γέγονεν, ἣν αὐτός φησι σύμμαχον ἡμῖν ποιῆσαι. ἀλλὰ πρὸς οὓς εὐτυχοῦντας πολλάκις ἦλθε, τούτους ἀτυχοῦντας προδέδωκεν.

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κἀκεῖνοι μέν, μέν add. Bekker. ὡς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι λέγουσι, καταλελυμένης τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ συνάγοντος ἐν Θήβαις Θρασυβούλου τοὺς φυγάδας ἐπὶ ἐπὶ Bekker: ἔτι N pr. A: διά τε N corr. (2) τὴν Φυλῆς κατάληψιν, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἰσχυόντων ἰσχυόντων Wolf: ἰσχόντων codd. καὶ ἀπαγορευόντων μηδένʼ Ἀθηναίων ὑποδέχεσθαι μηδʼ ἐκπέμπειν, ὅμως συνέπραττον τῷ δήμῳ τὴν κάθοδον καὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἀνεγνωσμένον παρʼ ὑμῖν ἐψηφίσαντο ψήφισμα, [μὴ] μὴ del. Sauppe: ret. Blass, qui ὁρᾶν pro περιορᾶν scripsit. περιορᾶν ἐάν τις ὅπλα διὰ τῆς χώρας [τῆς] τῆς del. Sauppe: τις (deleto τις post ἐάν) Vogel, Blass. Ἀθηναίων Ἀθηναίων] Θηβαίων Reiske. ἔχων πορεύηται·

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κἀκεῖνοι μέν, μέν add. Bekker. ὡς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι λέγουσι, καταλελυμένης τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ συνάγοντος ἐν Θήβαις Θρασυβούλου τοὺς φυγάδας ἐπὶ ἐπὶ Bekker: ἔτι N pr. A: διά τε N corr. (2) τὴν Φυλῆς κατάληψιν, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἰσχυόντων ἰσχυόντων Wolf: ἰσχόντων codd. καὶ ἀπαγορευόντων μηδένʼ Ἀθηναίων ὑποδέχεσθαι μηδʼ ἐκπέμπειν, ὅμως συνέπραττον τῷ δήμῳ τὴν κάθοδον καὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἀνεγνωσμένον παρʼ ὑμῖν ἐψηφίσαντο ψήφισμα, [μὴ] μὴ del. Sauppe: ret. Blass, qui ὁρᾶν pro περιορᾶν scripsit. περιορᾶν ἐάν τις ὅπλα διὰ τῆς χώρας [τῆς] τῆς del. Sauppe: τις (deleto τις post ἐάν) Vogel, Blass. Ἀθηναίων Ἀθηναίων] Θηβαίων Reiske. ἔχων πορεύηται·

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οὗτος δὲ ὁ κοινὸν αὑτὸν τοῖς συμμάχοις, ὡς αὐτίκα φήσει, φήσει Wolf: φησί codd. παρέχων οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἔπραξεν, οὐδὲ τῶν χρημάτων ὧν ἔλαβεν εἰς τὴν τούτων σωτηρίαν οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε προέσθαι. ὧν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μνησθέντες, καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τοὺς προδότας θεωρήσαντες ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυνθίων καὶ Θηβαίων συμφοραῖς, ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς νυνὶ βουλεύεσθε, καὶ τοὺς δωροδοκεῖν ἐθέλοντας κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνελόντες ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχετε.

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οὗτος δὲ ὁ κοινὸν αὑτὸν τοῖς συμμάχοις, ὡς αὐτίκα φήσει, φήσει Wolf: φησί codd. παρέχων οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἔπραξεν, οὐδὲ τῶν χρημάτων ὧν ἔλαβεν εἰς τὴν τούτων σωτηρίαν οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε προέσθαι. ὧν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μνησθέντες, καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τοὺς προδότας θεωρήσαντες ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυνθίων καὶ Θηβαίων συμφοραῖς, ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς νυνὶ βουλεύεσθε, καὶ τοὺς δωροδοκεῖν ἐθέλοντας κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνελόντες ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχετε.

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μόνως γὰρ οὕτως, ἄνδρες ἄνδρες (hic et passim in orat. I) N: ὦ ἄνδρες (hic et in 29, 80, 83, 108) *a. Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιήσετε βελτίους, ἐὰν τοὺς ἐνδόξους τῶν πονηρῶν ἐξελέγξαντες κολάσητε τῶν ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἀδικημάτων Ν: τῆς πονηρίας Α. ἀξίως. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τυχόντας τῶν κρινομένων, ὅταν ἁλῶσιν, οὐδεὶς οἶδεν οὐδὲ ζητεῖ πυθέσθαι τί πεπόνθασι· τοὺς δʼ ἐνδόξους πάντες πυνθάνονται, καὶ τοὺς δικάζοντας ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὅταν τὸ δίκαιον μὴ προῶνται ταῖς τῶν κρινομένων δόξαις. ἀνάγνωθι τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Θηβαίων. λέγε τὰς μαρτυρίας. ἀναγίγνωσκε τὰς ἐπιστολάς.

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μόνως γὰρ οὕτως, ἄνδρες ἄνδρες (hic et passim in orat. I) N: ὦ ἄνδρες (hic et in 29, 80, 83, 108) *a. Ἀθηναῖοι, μόνως καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιήσετε βελτίους, ἐὰν τοὺς ἐνδόξους τῶν πονηρῶν ἐξελέγξαντες κολάσητε τῶν ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἀδικημάτων Ν: τῆς πονηρίας Α. ἀξίως. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ τυχόντας τῶν κρινομένων, ὅταν ἁλῶσιν, οὐδεὶς οἶδεν οὐδὲ ζητεῖ πυθέσθαι τί πεπόνθασι· τοὺς δʼ ἐνδόξους πάντες πυνθάνονται, καὶ τοὺς δικάζοντας ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὅταν τὸ δίκαιον μὴ προῶνται ταῖς τῶν κρινομένων δόξαις. ἀνάγνωθι τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Θηβαίων. λέγε τὰς μαρτυρίας. ἀναγίγνωσκε τὰς ἐπιστολάς.

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μισθωτὸς οὗτος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μισθωτὸς οὗτός οὗτός] del. Blass. ἐστι παλαιός. οὗτος ἦν ὁ τὴν πρεσβείαν τὴν παρὰ Φιλίππου πορευομένην ὡς ἡμᾶς ἐκ Θηβῶν καλέσας, καὶ τοῦ λυθῆναι τὸν πρῶτον πόλεμον αἴτιος γενόμενος· οὗτος Φιλοκράτει συναπελογεῖτο συναπελογεῖτο Wurm: συνανελογεῖτο codd.: συνανεκοινολογεῖτο Ald. τῷ γράψαντι πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνην, διʼ ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἐξεβάλετε, καὶ ζεύγη τοῖς πρέσβεσιν ἐμισθώσατο τοῖς μετʼ Ἀντιπάτρου δεῦρʼ ἐλθοῦσιν, ἀναλαμβάνων αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ κολακεύειν τοὺς Μακεδόνας πρῶτος εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσάγων.

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μισθωτὸς οὗτος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μισθωτὸς οὗτός οὗτός] del. Blass. ἐστι παλαιός. οὗτος ἦν ὁ τὴν πρεσβείαν τὴν παρὰ Φιλίππου πορευομένην ὡς ἡμᾶς ἐκ Θηβῶν καλέσας, καὶ τοῦ λυθῆναι τὸν πρῶτον πόλεμον αἴτιος γενόμενος· οὗτος Φιλοκράτει συναπελογεῖτο συναπελογεῖτο Wurm: συνανελογεῖτο codd.: συνανεκοινολογεῖτο Ald. τῷ γράψαντι πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνην, διʼ ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἐξεβάλετε, καὶ ζεύγη τοῖς πρέσβεσιν ἐμισθώσατο τοῖς μετʼ Ἀντιπάτρου δεῦρʼ ἐλθοῦσιν, ἀναλαμβάνων αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ κολακεύειν τοὺς Μακεδόνας πρῶτος εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσάγων.

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μὴ ἀφῆτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ ἀφῆτε τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀτυχήμασιν ἐπιγεγραμμένον ἀτιμώρητον, εἰλημμένον ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ δῶρα ἔχοντα κατὰ τῆς πόλεως, μηδὲ τῆς ἀγαθῆς τύχης ὑμᾶς ὑμᾶς Sauppe: ἡμᾶς codd. ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἀγούσης, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἕτερον τῶν τὴν πατρίδα λελυμασμένων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐκβεβληκυίας, τοῦτον δʼ ὑμῖν ἀποκτεῖναι παραδούσης, αὐτοὶ τοῖς πᾶσι συμφέρουσιν ἐναντιωθῆτε, ἀλλὰ μετοιωνίσασθε τὰς τῆς πόλεως πράξεις, εἰς τούτους τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰς ἀποτυχίας τρέψαντες.

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μὴ ἀφῆτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ ἀφῆτε τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀτυχήμασιν ἐπιγεγραμμένον ἀτιμώρητον, εἰλημμένον ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ δῶρα ἔχοντα κατὰ τῆς πόλεως, μηδὲ τῆς ἀγαθῆς τύχης ὑμᾶς ὑμᾶς Sauppe: ἡμᾶς codd. ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἀγούσης, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἕτερον τῶν τὴν πατρίδα λελυμασμένων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐκβεβληκυίας, τοῦτον δʼ ὑμῖν ἀποκτεῖναι παραδούσης, αὐτοὶ τοῖς πᾶσι συμφέρουσιν ἐναντιωθῆτε, ἀλλὰ μετοιωνίσασθε τὰς τῆς πόλεως πράξεις, εἰς τούτους τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰς ἀποτυχίας τρέψαντες.

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εἰς ποῖον γὰρ καιρὸν ἀποθήσεσθε τοῦτον ὑπολαβόντες χρήσιμον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι; ἔχοι τις ἂν εἰπεῖν ἢ ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν περιεστηκότων, εἰς ποῖα οὗτος πράγματα εἰσελθὼν ἢ ἴδια ἢ κοινὰ οὐκ ἀνατέτροφεν; ἀνατέτροφεν Blass: ἀνατέτραφεν codd. οὐκ εἰς μὲν τὴν Ἀριστάρχου οἰκίαν εἰσελθών, βουλεύσας μετʼ ἐκείνου τὸν Νικοδήμῳ θάνατον κατασκευασθέντα, ὃν ἴστε πάντες, ἐξέβαλε τὸν Ἀρίσταρχον ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσχίσταις αἰτίαις; καὶ τοιούτῳ φίλῳ Δημοσθένει ἐχρήσατο, ὥστε δαίμονα αὐτῷ τοῦτον καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων συμφορῶν ἡγεμόνα νομίσαι προσελθεῖν;

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εἰς ποῖον γὰρ καιρὸν ἀποθήσεσθε τοῦτον ὑπολαβόντες χρήσιμον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι; ἔχοι τις ἂν εἰπεῖν ἢ ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν περιεστηκότων, εἰς ποῖα οὗτος πράγματα εἰσελθὼν ἢ ἴδια ἢ κοινὰ οὐκ ἀνατέτροφεν; ἀνατέτροφεν Blass: ἀνατέτραφεν codd. οὐκ εἰς μὲν τὴν Ἀριστάρχου οἰκίαν εἰσελθών, βουλεύσας μετʼ ἐκείνου τὸν Νικοδήμῳ θάνατον κατασκευασθέντα, ὃν ἴστε πάντες, ἐξέβαλε τὸν Ἀρίσταρχον ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσχίσταις αἰτίαις; καὶ τοιούτῳ φίλῳ Δημοσθένει ἐχρήσατο, ὥστε δαίμονα αὐτῷ τοῦτον καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων συμφορῶν ἡγεμόνα νομίσαι προσελθεῖν;

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οὐκ ἐπειδὴ τῷ δήμῳ συμβουλεύειν ἤρξατο, ὡς μήποτε ὤφελεν — ἀφήσω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἴδια· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται μακρολογεῖν —, ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν γέγονε τῇ πόλει, ἐν κινδύνοις δὲ καὶ κακοῖς καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ πᾶσʼ ἡ Ἑλλάς, οὐ μόνον ἡ πόλις, καθέστηκε; καί, πλείστοις καιροῖς ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις χρώμενος, ἅπαντας ἀφῆκε τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καιρούς; καὶ ἐν οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς A corr. (2): ἐν οἷς A pr. N, Thalheim, qui post πρᾶξαι interpunxit et δὲ post τοσοῦτον addidit. τις ἂν φιλόπολις ἀνὴρ καὶ κηδεμὼν προείλετό τι πρᾶξαι, τοσοῦτον ἐδέησεν ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ χρήσιμος αὐτίκα φήσων ὑμῖν γεγενῆσθαι πρᾶξίν τινα προφέρειν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς πράττοντας ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν τι τῆς αὑτοῦ τύχης ἀνέπλησεν.

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οὐκ ἐπειδὴ τῷ δήμῳ συμβουλεύειν ἤρξατο, ὡς μήποτε ὤφελεν — ἀφήσω γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἴδια· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται μακρολογεῖν —, ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν γέγονε τῇ πόλει, ἐν κινδύνοις δὲ καὶ κακοῖς καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ πᾶσʼ ἡ Ἑλλάς, οὐ μόνον ἡ πόλις, καθέστηκε; καί, πλείστοις καιροῖς ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις χρώμενος, ἅπαντας ἀφῆκε τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καιρούς; καὶ ἐν οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς A corr. (2): ἐν οἷς A pr. N, Thalheim, qui post πρᾶξαι interpunxit et δὲ post τοσοῦτον addidit. τις ἂν φιλόπολις ἀνὴρ καὶ κηδεμὼν προείλετό τι πρᾶξαι, τοσοῦτον ἐδέησεν ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ χρήσιμος αὐτίκα φήσων ὑμῖν γεγενῆσθαι πρᾶξίν τινα προφέρειν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς πράττοντας ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν τι τῆς αὑτοῦ τύχης ἀνέπλησεν.

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ἀπῆρε Χαρίδημος πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, χρήσιμος ὑμῖν οὐ λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἔργοις βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις τοῖς αὑτοῦ κινδύνοις ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι βουλόμενος τὴν σωτηρίαν παρασκευάσαι· περιιὼν οὗτος οὗτος Α: οὕτως Ν. κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐλογοποίει καὶ τῶν πραττομένων εἰσεποίει κοινωνὸν αὑτόν· οὕτω κατέστρεψεν ἡ τύχη ταῦτα ὥστʼ ἐναντία ὥστʼ ἐναντία Baiter: ὡς τἀναντία codd. γενέσθαι γενέσθαι Blass: γίνεσθαι Α: γίγνεσθαι Ν. τοῖς προσδοκωμένοις.

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ἀπῆρε Χαρίδημος πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, χρήσιμος ὑμῖν οὐ λόγοις ἀλλʼ ἔργοις βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις τοῖς αὑτοῦ κινδύνοις ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι βουλόμενος τὴν σωτηρίαν παρασκευάσαι· περιιὼν οὗτος οὗτος Α: οὕτως Ν. κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐλογοποίει καὶ τῶν πραττομένων εἰσεποίει κοινωνὸν αὑτόν· οὕτω κατέστρεψεν ἡ τύχη ταῦτα ὥστʼ ἐναντία ὥστʼ ἐναντία Baiter: ὡς τἀναντία codd. γενέσθαι γενέσθαι Blass: γίνεσθαι Α: γίγνεσθαι Ν. τοῖς προσδοκωμένοις.

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ἐξέπλευσεν Ἐφιάλτης, μισῶν μὲν τοῦτον, ἀναγκαζόμενος δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν· ἀφείλετο καὶ τοῦτον ἡ τύχη τῆς πόλεως. Εὐθύδικος προῃρεῖτο τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πράξεις· ἔφη τούτῳ Δημοσθένης φίλος εἶναι· καὶ καὶ add. Reiske. οὗτος ἀπώλετο. καὶ ταῦθʼ ὑμεῖς ὁρῶντες καὶ ἐπιστάμενοι πολὺ βέλτιον ἢ ἐγὼ οὐ λογίζεσθε, οὐ σκοπεῖσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, τεκμαιρόμενοι τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν γεγενημένων, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὗτος χρήσιμος ἀλλʼ ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κατὰ τῆς πόλεωςPost πόλεως lacunam indicavit Maetzner, post ἐγένετο Sauppe.;

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ἐξέπλευσεν Ἐφιάλτης, μισῶν μὲν τοῦτον, ἀναγκαζόμενος δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν· ἀφείλετο καὶ τοῦτον ἡ τύχη τῆς πόλεως. Εὐθύδικος προῃρεῖτο τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πράξεις· ἔφη τούτῳ Δημοσθένης φίλος εἶναι· καὶ καὶ add. Reiske. οὗτος ἀπώλετο. καὶ ταῦθʼ ὑμεῖς ὁρῶντες καὶ ἐπιστάμενοι πολὺ βέλτιον ἢ ἐγὼ οὐ λογίζεσθε, οὐ σκοπεῖσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, τεκμαιρόμενοι τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν γεγενημένων, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὗτος χρήσιμος ἀλλʼ ἢ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κατὰ τῆς πόλεωςPost πόλεως lacunam indicavit Maetzner, post ἐγένετο Sauppe.;

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συστῆσαι κατασκευὴν ἑτέραν οἵα ἐπʼ Ἄγιδος ἐπʼ Ἄγιδος Wesseling: ἐπʼ Αἰγὸς codd.: ἔναγχος Cobet. ἐγένετο, ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἅπαντες ἐξεστράτευσαν, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἠλεῖοι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκοινώνουν, ὑπῆρχον δὲ ξένοι μύριοι, Ἀλέξανδρος δʼ, ὡς οἱ ὡς οἱ] ὡς ἦσαν οἱ Reiske. λέγοντες, ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ἦν, ἡ δʼ Ἑλλὰς ἅπασα διὰ τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων προδότας ἀχθομένη τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν ἠσμένει μεταβολήν τινα τῶν κακῶν τῶν περιεστηκότων.

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συστῆσαι κατασκευὴν ἑτέραν οἵα ἐπʼ Ἄγιδος ἐπʼ Ἄγιδος Wesseling: ἐπʼ Αἰγὸς codd.: ἔναγχος Cobet. ἐγένετο, ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἅπαντες ἐξεστράτευσαν, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἠλεῖοι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκοινώνουν, ὑπῆρχον δὲ ξένοι μύριοι, Ἀλέξανδρος δʼ, ὡς οἱ ὡς οἱ] ὡς ἦσαν οἱ Reiske. λέγοντες, ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ἦν, ἡ δʼ Ἑλλὰς ἅπασα διὰ τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων προδότας ἀχθομένη τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν ἠσμένει μεταβολήν τινα τῶν κακῶν τῶν περιεστηκότων.

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τί οὖν; ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς Δημοσθένης τίς ἦν, ὁ τοῦ συμβουλεῦσαι καὶ γράψαι κύριος καὶ φήσων αὐτίκα δὴ μισεῖν τὰ καθεστῶτα πράγματα; ἐῶ γὰρ τοὺς ἄλλους κινδύνους. ἔγραψάς τι περὶ τούτων τούτων Bekker: του τῶν Α: τῶ . . . τῶν, ut vid., N pr. (τῶ eras.). [κινδύνων]; κινδύνων del. Bekker. συνεβούλευσας; ἐπόρισας χρήματα; μικρόν τι χρήσιμος ἐγένου τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας πράττουσιν; οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλὰ περιῄεις κατασκευάζων λογοποιούς, καὶ παρʼ αὑτῷ γράφων ἐπιστολήν, καὶ καταισχύνων τὴν τῆς πόλεως δόξαν,

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τί οὖν; ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς Δημοσθένης τίς ἦν, ὁ τοῦ συμβουλεῦσαι καὶ γράψαι κύριος καὶ φήσων αὐτίκα δὴ μισεῖν τὰ καθεστῶτα πράγματα; ἐῶ γὰρ τοὺς ἄλλους κινδύνους. ἔγραψάς τι περὶ τούτων τούτων Bekker: του τῶν Α: τῶ . . . τῶν, ut vid., N pr. (τῶ eras.). [κινδύνων]; κινδύνων del. Bekker. συνεβούλευσας; ἐπόρισας χρήματα; μικρόν τι χρήσιμος ἐγένου τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας πράττουσιν; οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν, ἀλλὰ περιῄεις κατασκευάζων λογοποιούς, καὶ παρʼ αὑτῷ γράφων ἐπιστολήν, καὶ καταισχύνων τὴν τῆς πόλεως δόξαν,

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ἐκ τῶν δακτύλων ἀναψάμενος περιεπορεύετο, τρυφῶν ἐν τοῖς τῆς πόλεως κακοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ φορείου κατακομιζόμενος τὴν εἰς Πειραιᾶ ὁδόν, καὶ τὰς τῶν πενήτων ἀπορίας ὀνειδίζων. εἶθʼ οὗτος εἰς τοὺς μέλλοντας ὑμῖν καιροὺς ἔσται χρήσιμος, παραβεβηκὼς ἅπαντας τοὺς παρεληλυθότας; τοιούτων, ὦ δέσποινʼ Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ζεῦ σῶτερ, συμβούλων καὶ ἡγεμόνων ὤφελον τυχεῖν οἱ πολεμήσαντες τῇ πόλει, τῇ πόλει Stephanus: τὴν πόλιν codd. καὶ μηδεπώποτε μηδεπώποτε Blass: μηδέποτε codd. βελτιόνων.

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ἐκ τῶν δακτύλων ἀναψάμενος περιεπορεύετο, τρυφῶν ἐν τοῖς τῆς πόλεως κακοῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ φορείου κατακομιζόμενος τὴν εἰς Πειραιᾶ ὁδόν, καὶ τὰς τῶν πενήτων ἀπορίας ὀνειδίζων. εἶθʼ οὗτος εἰς τοὺς μέλλοντας ὑμῖν καιροὺς ἔσται χρήσιμος, παραβεβηκὼς ἅπαντας τοὺς παρεληλυθότας; τοιούτων, ὦ δέσποινʼ Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ζεῦ σῶτερ, συμβούλων καὶ ἡγεμόνων ὤφελον τυχεῖν οἱ πολεμήσαντες τῇ πόλει, τῇ πόλει Stephanus: τὴν πόλιν codd. καὶ μηδεπώποτε μηδεπώποτε Blass: μηδέποτε codd. βελτιόνων.

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οὐκ ἀναμνήσεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὰς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων πράξεις; οἳ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν κινδύνων καταλαμβανόντων τὴν πόλιν ἀξίως τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς δικαίας δικαίας] παλαιᾶς Bekker: alii alia. ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ δημοσίου συμφερόντων ἐκινδύνευσαν; ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀρχαίους ἐκείνους μακρὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν, Ἀριστείδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα, τοὺς ὀρθώσαντας τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς φόρους εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀνενεγκόντας παρʼ ἑκόντων καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων·

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οὐκ ἀναμνήσεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὰς τῶν πρεσβυτέρων πράξεις; οἳ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν κινδύνων καταλαμβανόντων τὴν πόλιν ἀξίως τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς δικαίας δικαίας] παλαιᾶς Bekker: alii alia. ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ δημοσίου συμφερόντων ἐκινδύνευσαν; ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἀρχαίους ἐκείνους μακρὸν ἂν εἴη λέγειν, Ἀριστείδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα, τοὺς ὀρθώσαντας τὰ τείχη τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοὺς φόρους εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀνενεγκόντας παρʼ ἑκόντων καὶ βουλομένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων·

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ἀλλὰ ταυτὶ τὰ μικρὸν πρὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡλικίας γεγενημένα ὑπὸ Κεφάλου τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ Θράσωνος τοῦ Ἑρχιέως Ἑρχιέως Weidner: Ἐρχιέως codd. καὶ Ἠλείου Ἠλείου Reiske: Ἠλιοῦ ΝΑ. καὶ καὶ add. Bergk. Φορμισίου καὶ ἑτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ἐνίων ἔτι καὶ νῦν ζῇ τὰ σώματα. τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν φρουρουμένης ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τῆς Καδμείας βοηθήσαντες τοῖς εἰς Θήβας κατιοῦσι τῶν φυγάδων τοῖς ἰδίοις κινδύνοις ἠλευθέρωσαν πόλιν ἀστυγείτονα καὶ πολὺν χρόνον δουλεύουσαν,

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ἀλλὰ ταυτὶ τὰ μικρὸν πρὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡλικίας γεγενημένα ὑπὸ Κεφάλου τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ Θράσωνος τοῦ Ἑρχιέως Ἑρχιέως Weidner: Ἐρχιέως codd. καὶ Ἠλείου Ἠλείου Reiske: Ἠλιοῦ ΝΑ. καὶ καὶ add. Bergk. Φορμισίου καὶ ἑτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ἐνίων ἔτι καὶ νῦν ζῇ τὰ σώματα. τούτων γὰρ οἱ μὲν φρουρουμένης ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τῆς Καδμείας βοηθήσαντες τοῖς εἰς Θήβας κατιοῦσι τῶν φυγάδων τοῖς ἰδίοις κινδύνοις ἠλευθέρωσαν πόλιν ἀστυγείτονα καὶ πολὺν χρόνον δουλεύουσαν,

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οἱ δὲ πείσαντος πείσαντος Blass: πείσαντες codd. ἐξελθεῖν ὑμῶν τοὺς προγόνους Κεφάλου τοῦ τὸ τοῦ τὸ Blass: τούτου codd.: τοῦτο τὸ Bekker. ψήφισμα γράψαντος, ὃς οὐ καταπλαγεὶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων δύναμιν, οὐδὲ λογισάμενος ὅτι τὸ κινδυνεύειν καὶ τὸ γράφειν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐπισφαλές ἐστιν, ἔγραψεν ἐξιέναι βοηθήσοντας Ἀθηναίους τοῖς κατειληφόσι τῶν φυγάδων Θήβας· καὶ ἐξελθόντων ἐκεῖσε τῶν ὑμετέρων πατέρων ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐξεβλήθη ὁ τῶν τῶν om. N. Λακεδαιμονίων φρούραρχος, ἠλευθέρωντο ἠλευθέρωντο Bekker: ἠλευθεροῦντο codd. Θηβαῖοι, διεπέπρακτο ἡ πόλις ἡ ὑμετέρα ἄξια τῶν προγόνων.

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οἱ δὲ πείσαντος πείσαντος Blass: πείσαντες codd. ἐξελθεῖν ὑμῶν τοὺς προγόνους Κεφάλου τοῦ τὸ τοῦ τὸ Blass: τούτου codd.: τοῦτο τὸ Bekker. ψήφισμα γράψαντος, ὃς οὐ καταπλαγεὶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων δύναμιν, οὐδὲ λογισάμενος ὅτι τὸ κινδυνεύειν καὶ τὸ γράφειν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐπισφαλές ἐστιν, ἔγραψεν ἐξιέναι βοηθήσοντας Ἀθηναίους τοῖς κατειληφόσι τῶν φυγάδων Θήβας· καὶ ἐξελθόντων ἐκεῖσε τῶν ὑμετέρων πατέρων ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐξεβλήθη ὁ τῶν τῶν om. N. Λακεδαιμονίων φρούραρχος, ἠλευθέρωντο ἠλευθέρωντο Bekker: ἠλευθεροῦντο codd. Θηβαῖοι, διεπέπρακτο ἡ πόλις ἡ ὑμετέρα ἄξια τῶν προγόνων.

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ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν, ἐκεῖνοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄξιοι σύμβουλοι καὶ ἡγεμόνες ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ δήμου· μὰ Δίʼ οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα κινάδη, οἳ πεποιήκασι μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ πράξουσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, τὴν δὲ αὑτῶν ἀσφάλειαν τηροῦντες καὶ πανταχόθεν πανταχόθεν Blass: πάντοθεν codd. ἀργυριζόμενοι καὶ πεποιηκότες τὴν πόλιν ἀδοξοτέραν ἑαυτῶν, καὶ νῦν εἰλημμένοι δῶρα καθʼ ὑμῶν εἰληφότες, παρακρούονται ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἀξιοῦσι τοιοῦτοι γεγενημένοι περὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν πλεονεξίας παραγγέλλειν. οὓς χρῆν χρῆν Bekker: χρὴ codd. τεθνάναι πάλαι κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ψήφισμα, πάλαι κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ψήφισμα Ν: κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ψήφισμα πάλαι Α. τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένους.

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ἐκεῖνοι ἦσαν, ἐκεῖνοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄξιοι σύμβουλοι καὶ ἡγεμόνες ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ δήμου· μὰ Δίʼ οὐ τὰ τοιαῦτα κινάδη, οἳ πεποιήκασι μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ πράξουσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, τὴν δὲ αὑτῶν ἀσφάλειαν τηροῦντες καὶ πανταχόθεν πανταχόθεν Blass: πάντοθεν codd. ἀργυριζόμενοι καὶ πεποιηκότες τὴν πόλιν ἀδοξοτέραν ἑαυτῶν, καὶ νῦν εἰλημμένοι δῶρα καθʼ ὑμῶν εἰληφότες, παρακρούονται ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἀξιοῦσι τοιοῦτοι γεγενημένοι περὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν πλεονεξίας παραγγέλλειν. οὓς χρῆν χρῆν Bekker: χρὴ codd. τεθνάναι πάλαι κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ψήφισμα, πάλαι κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ψήφισμα Ν: κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτῶν ψήφισμα πάλαι Α. τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένους.

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οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν κατὰ Δημοσθένους τιμωρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων μόνων ἡγούμενοι δεῖν κρίνειν; οὐκ ἴστε τοῦτον αὐτοὶ δωροδόκον ὄντα καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προδότην τῶν τῶν om. A. φίλων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀνάξιον καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦτον τύχην γεγενημένην; ἀπὸ ποίων ψηφισμάτων οὗτος ἢ ποίων νόμων οὐκ εἴληφεν ἀργύριον;

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οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν κατὰ Δημοσθένους τιμωρίαν ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων μόνων ἡγούμενοι δεῖν κρίνειν; οὐκ ἴστε τοῦτον αὐτοὶ δωροδόκον ὄντα καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προδότην τῶν τῶν om. A. φίλων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀνάξιον καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦτον τύχην γεγενημένην; ἀπὸ ποίων ψηφισμάτων οὗτος ἢ ποίων νόμων οὐκ εἴληφεν ἀργύριον;

εἰσί τινες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων, ὅθʼ οὗτος ἐτίθει τὸν περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον; οὐ φράσετε τοῖς πλησίον ὅτι τρία τάλαντα λαβὼν μετέγραφε καὶ μετεσκεύαζε τὸν νόμον καθʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπώλει ὧν εἰλήφει τὴν τιμήν, τὰ δʼ ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἐβεβαίου;

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εἴπατέ μοι πρὸς Διός, ὦ ἄνδρες, προῖκα τοῦτον οἴεσθε γράψαι Διφίλῳ τὴν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀνατεθησομένην ἀνατεθησομένην Reiske: ἀναθησομένην codd. εἰκόνα; ἢ τὸ ποιῆσαι πολίτας ὑμετέρους ὑμετέρους (coll. 44) Blass: ὑμᾶς codd. Χαιρέφιλον καὶ Φείδωνα καὶ Πάμφιλον καὶ Φείδιππον, Φείδιππον Bergk: Φίλιππον codd. ἢ πάλιν Ἐπιγένην καὶ Κόνωνα τοὺς τραπεζίτας; ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦς ἐν ἀγορᾷ στῆσαι Βηρισάδην Βηρισάδην Ald.: Βιρισάδην codd.: Παιρισάδην Thalheim. καὶ Σάτυρον καὶ Γόργιππον τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου Baiter: ἐκ τούτων codd.: ἐχθίστους Ald. τυράννους, παρʼ ὧν αὐτῷ χίλιοι μέδιμνοι μέδιμνοι Gibbon: μόδιοι codd. τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ πυρῶν ἀποστέλλονται τῷ οὐδʼ ὅποι ὅποι Ν: ὅπῃ Α. καταφύγῃ αὐτίκα φήσοντι εἶναι;

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εἴπατέ μοι πρὸς Διός, ὦ ἄνδρες, προῖκα τοῦτον οἴεσθε γράψαι Διφίλῳ τὴν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σίτησιν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀνατεθησομένην ἀνατεθησομένην Reiske: ἀναθησομένην codd. εἰκόνα; ἢ τὸ ποιῆσαι πολίτας ὑμετέρους ὑμετέρους (coll. 44) Blass: ὑμᾶς codd. Χαιρέφιλον καὶ Φείδωνα καὶ Πάμφιλον καὶ Φείδιππον, Φείδιππον Bergk: Φίλιππον codd. ἢ πάλιν Ἐπιγένην καὶ Κόνωνα τοὺς τραπεζίτας; ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦς ἐν ἀγορᾷ στῆσαι Βηρισάδην Βηρισάδην Ald.: Βιρισάδην codd.: Παιρισάδην Thalheim. καὶ Σάτυρον καὶ Γόργιππον τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου Baiter: ἐκ τούτων codd.: ἐχθίστους Ald. τυράννους, παρʼ ὧν αὐτῷ χίλιοι μέδιμνοι μέδιμνοι Gibbon: μόδιοι codd. τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ πυρῶν ἀποστέλλονται τῷ οὐδʼ ὅποι ὅποι Ν: ὅπῃ Α. καταφύγῃ αὐτίκα φήσοντι εἶναι;

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ἢ τὸ γράψαι Ταυροσθένην Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι, τὸν τὸν add. Baiter. τοὺς μὲν αὑτοῦ πολίτας καταδουλωσάμενον, τῆς δʼ Εὐβοίας ὅλης μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Καλλίου προδότην Φιλίππῳ γεγενημένον; ὃν οὐκ ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι τῆς Ἀθηναίων χώρας ἐπιβαίνειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχον εἶναι κελεύουσιν οἷσπερ ἄν τις τῶν φευγόντων ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου κατίῃ. κατίῃ Ν: κατίοι Α. καὶ τοῦτον οὗτος ὁ δημοτικὸς ὑμέτερον ἔγραψε πολίτην εἶναι.

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ἢ τὸ γράψαι Ταυροσθένην Ἀθηναῖον εἶναι, τὸν τὸν add. Baiter. τοὺς μὲν αὑτοῦ πολίτας καταδουλωσάμενον, τῆς δʼ Εὐβοίας ὅλης μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Καλλίου προδότην Φιλίππῳ γεγενημένον; ὃν οὐκ ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι τῆς Ἀθηναίων χώρας ἐπιβαίνειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔνοχον εἶναι κελεύουσιν οἷσπερ ἄν τις τῶν φευγόντων ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου κατίῃ. κατίῃ Ν: κατίοι Α. καὶ τοῦτον οὗτος ὁ δημοτικὸς ὑμέτερον ἔγραψε πολίτην εἶναι.

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περὶ τούτων οὖν μάρτυρας ὑμῖν δεῖ καλεῖν, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσους οὗτος γέγραφε προξένους εἶναι καὶ Ἀθηναίους; εἶτα, εἶτα add. Gebauer. πρὸς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, οἴεσθʼ αὐτὸν ἀργύριον μὲν χαίρειν λαμβάνοντα, χρυσίου δʼ εἴκοσι τάλαντʼ οὐκ ἂν λαβεῖν; ἢ κατὰ μικρὸν μὲν δωροδοκεῖν, ἁθρόον δʼ οὐκ ἂν προσδέξασθαι τοσοῦτον λῆμμα; ἢ τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν Δημοσθένην καὶ Δημάδην καὶ Κηφισοφῶντα ζητήσασαν ἓξ μῆνας ἀδίκως εἰς ὑμᾶς πεποιῆσθαι τὰς ἀποφάσεις;

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περὶ τούτων οὖν μάρτυρας ὑμῖν δεῖ καλεῖν, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσους οὗτος γέγραφε προξένους εἶναι καὶ Ἀθηναίους; εἶτα, εἶτα add. Gebauer. πρὸς τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, οἴεσθʼ αὐτὸν ἀργύριον μὲν χαίρειν λαμβάνοντα, χρυσίου δʼ εἴκοσι τάλαντʼ οὐκ ἂν λαβεῖν; ἢ κατὰ μικρὸν μὲν δωροδοκεῖν, ἁθρόον δʼ οὐκ ἂν προσδέξασθαι τοσοῦτον λῆμμα; ἢ τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν Δημοσθένην καὶ Δημάδην καὶ Κηφισοφῶντα ζητήσασαν ἓξ μῆνας ἀδίκως εἰς ὑμᾶς πεποιῆσθαι τὰς ἀποφάσεις;

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πολλοί, ὦ ἄνδρες, πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, θεωροῦσιν ὑμᾶς πῶς τοῦτον δικάσετε τὸν ἀγῶνα, καὶ πότερον εἰσαγωγίμους καὶ τὰς τῶν τὰς τῶν Α: τὰς κατὰ τῶν Ν. ἄλλων δωροδοκίας ποιήσετε, ἢ ἀνέδην ἐξέσται δῶρα λαμβάνειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, καὶ τὰ πρότερον δοκοῦντα πιστὰ καὶ βέβαιʼ εἶναι νῦν ἄπιστα διὰ τὴν Δημοσθένους κρίσιν γενήσεται, ὃν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων προσῆκεν ἀπολωλέναι τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτῷ, ὃς ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀραῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομέναις γιγνομέναις Blass: γενομέναις codd. ἔνοχος καθέστηκεν,

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πολλοί, ὦ ἄνδρες, πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, θεωροῦσιν ὑμᾶς πῶς τοῦτον δικάσετε τὸν ἀγῶνα, καὶ πότερον εἰσαγωγίμους καὶ τὰς τῶν τὰς τῶν Α: τὰς κατὰ τῶν Ν. ἄλλων δωροδοκίας ποιήσετε, ἢ ἀνέδην ἐξέσται δῶρα λαμβάνειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, καὶ τὰ πρότερον δοκοῦντα πιστὰ καὶ βέβαιʼ εἶναι νῦν ἄπιστα διὰ τὴν Δημοσθένους κρίσιν γενήσεται, ὃν ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων προσῆκεν ἀπολωλέναι τῶν πεπολιτευμένων αὐτῷ, ὃς ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀραῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομέναις γιγνομέναις Blass: γενομέναις codd. ἔνοχος καθέστηκεν,

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ἐπιωρκηκὼς μὲν τὰς σεμνὰς θεὰς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς οὓς ἐκεῖ διόμνυσθαι νόμιμόν ἐστι, κατάρατος δὲ καθʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν γιγνόμενος, γιγνόμενος Blass: γενόμενος A pr. N: γινόμενος A corr. ἐξεληλεγμένος δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πόλεως εἰληφώς, ἐξηπατηκὼς δὲ καὶ τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὴν βουλὴν παρὰ τὴν ἀράν, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν λέγων ἕτερα δὲ φρονῶν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ συμβεβουλευκὼς Ἀριστάρχῳ δεινὰς καὶ παρανόμους συμβουλάς, ἀνθʼ ὧν — εἴπερ ἐστί που δικαία τιμωρία κατὰ τῶν ἐπιόρκων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὥσπερ ἔστι — δώσει δίκην οὗτος ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ. ἀκούσατʼ, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῆς ἀρᾶς.

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ἐπιωρκηκὼς μὲν τὰς σεμνὰς θεὰς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς οὓς ἐκεῖ διόμνυσθαι νόμιμόν ἐστι, κατάρατος δὲ καθʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν γιγνόμενος, γιγνόμενος Blass: γενόμενος A pr. N: γινόμενος A corr. ἐξεληλεγμένος δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πόλεως εἰληφώς, ἐξηπατηκὼς δὲ καὶ τὸν δῆμον καὶ τὴν βουλὴν παρὰ τὴν ἀράν, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν λέγων ἕτερα δὲ φρονῶν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ συμβεβουλευκὼς Ἀριστάρχῳ δεινὰς καὶ παρανόμους συμβουλάς, ἀνθʼ ὧν — εἴπερ ἐστί που δικαία τιμωρία κατὰ τῶν ἐπιόρκων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὥσπερ ἔστι — δώσει δίκην οὗτος ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ. ἀκούσατʼ, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῆς ἀρᾶς.

ἀλλʼ ὅμως, ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὕτω Δημοσθένης τῷ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγειν ἑτοίμως χρῆται, καὶ οὔτʼ αἰσχύνης οὔτʼ ἐλέγχου οὔτʼ ἀρᾶς οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλει, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ τολμήσει λέγειν, ὡς ἀκούω, ὡς ἄρα κἀμοῦ κατέγνω πρότερον ἡ βουλή· καὶ ποιῶ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον, ὡς οὗτός φησι, πρότερον μὲν ἐναντίον τῇ τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσει ἀγῶνα ἀπολογούμενος ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ, νυνὶ δὲ συνηγορῶν αὐτῇ, κατηγορῶν τούτου περὶ τῆς γεγενημένης ἀποφάσεως·

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πρᾶγμα κατασκευάζων οὐ γεγενημένον, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς πρὸς ὑμᾶς Baiter et Sauppe: πρός τινας codd. τολμῶν. ἵνʼ οὖν, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἴῃ τὸν λόγον, μὴ ἐπιτρέπητʼ αὐτῷ, ἀλλʼ εἰδῆτʼ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὔτε μʼ ἀπέφηνεν ἡ βουλὴ οὔτʼ ἐμέλλησεν, ἠδικήθην δὲ ὑφʼ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου πονηροῦ καὶ δίκην δεδωκότος παρʼ ὑμῖν, ἀκούσατέ μου βραχέα· ἔπειτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦτον πάλιν βαδιοῦμαι.

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πρᾶγμα κατασκευάζων οὐ γεγενημένον, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς πρὸς ὑμᾶς Baiter et Sauppe: πρός τινας codd. τολμῶν. ἵνʼ οὖν, ἐὰν ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἴῃ τὸν λόγον, μὴ ἐπιτρέπητʼ αὐτῷ, ἀλλʼ εἰδῆτʼ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι οὔτε μʼ ἀπέφηνεν ἡ βουλὴ οὔτʼ ἐμέλλησεν, ἠδικήθην δὲ ὑφʼ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου πονηροῦ καὶ δίκην δεδωκότος παρʼ ὑμῖν, ἀκούσατέ μου βραχέα· ἔπειτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦτον πάλιν βαδιοῦμαι.

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ἀνάγκη τὴν βουλήν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάλου κατὰ δύο τρόπους ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποφάσεις πάσας. τίνας τούτους; ἤτοι αὐτὴν προελομένην καὶ ζητήσασαν, ἢ τοῦ δήμου προστάξαντος αὐτῇ. χωρὶς τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅντινʼ ἂν ὅντινʼ ἂν Baiter et Sauppe: ὅντινα codd. τρόπον ποιήσειεν. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν φῄς, ὦ μιαρὸν σὺ θηρίον, τοῦ δήμου προστάξαντος ζητήσασαν τὴν βουλὴν περὶ ἐμοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν,

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ἀνάγκη τὴν βουλήν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάλου κατὰ δύο τρόπους ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποφάσεις πάσας. τίνας τούτους; ἤτοι αὐτὴν προελομένην καὶ ζητήσασαν, ἢ τοῦ δήμου προστάξαντος αὐτῇ. χωρὶς τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅντινʼ ἂν ὅντινʼ ἂν Baiter et Sauppe: ὅντινα codd. τρόπον ποιήσειεν. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν φῄς, ὦ μιαρὸν σὺ θηρίον, τοῦ δήμου προστάξαντος ζητήσασαν τὴν βουλὴν περὶ ἐμοῦ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν,

δεῖξον τὸ ψήφισμα, καὶ τίνες ἐγένοντο μου κατήγοροι γενομένης τῆς ἀποφάσεως, ὥσπερ νῦν ἀμφότερα γέγονε, καὶ ψήφισμα καθʼ ὃ ἐζήτησεν ἡ βουλή, καὶ κατήγοροι χειροτονήσαντος τοῦ δήμου, παρʼ ὧν νῦν οἱ δικασταὶ τἀδικήματα πυνθάνονται. κἂν ᾖ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ἀποθνήσκειν ἕτοιμός εἰμι. εἰ δʼ αὐτὴν προελομένην ἀποφῆναί με φῄς, παράσχου μάρτυρας τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ παρέξομαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπεφάνθην.

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καταψευσάμενον μέντοι κἀμοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ὥσπερ σὺ καὶ πονηρὸν καὶ προδότην ἕνʼ ἕνʼ Blass: ὃν A pr. (del. ras.) N: ὄντʼ Franke. εἰσαγγείλας, καὶ ἐξελέγξας ἐν πεντακοσίοις καὶ δισχιλίοις τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτι μισθώσας αὑτὸν Πυθοκλεῖ Πυθοκλεῖ Ν: Τιμοκλεῖ Α. κατʼ ἐμοῦ ταῦτʼ ἔπραξεν, ἐτιμωρησάμην μετὰ τῶν τότε δικασάντων. λαβέ μοι σὺ τὴν μαρτυρίαν, ἣν καὶ πρότερον παρεσχόμην μαρτυρουμένην τοῖς δικασταῖς καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐπεσκήψατο ὡς ψευδεῖ οὔσῃ, ἣν καὶ νῦν παρέξομαι. λέγε τὴν μαρτυρίαν.

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καταψευσάμενον μέντοι κἀμοῦ καὶ τῆς βουλῆς ὥσπερ σὺ καὶ πονηρὸν καὶ προδότην ἕνʼ ἕνʼ Blass: ὃν A pr. (del. ras.) N: ὄντʼ Franke. εἰσαγγείλας, καὶ ἐξελέγξας ἐν πεντακοσίοις καὶ δισχιλίοις τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτι μισθώσας αὑτὸν Πυθοκλεῖ Πυθοκλεῖ Ν: Τιμοκλεῖ Α. κατʼ ἐμοῦ ταῦτʼ ἔπραξεν, ἐτιμωρησάμην μετὰ τῶν τότε δικασάντων. λαβέ μοι σὺ τὴν μαρτυρίαν, ἣν καὶ πρότερον παρεσχόμην μαρτυρουμένην τοῖς δικασταῖς καὶ οὐδεὶς ἐπεσκήψατο ὡς ψευδεῖ οὔσῃ, ἣν καὶ νῦν παρέξομαι. λέγε τὴν μαρτυρίαν.

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εἶτʼ οὐ δεινόν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτι μὲν εἷς ἀνὴρ ἔφησε Πιστίας Ἀρεοπαγίτης ὢν ἀδικεῖν με, καταψευδόμενος κἀμοῦ κἀμοῦ Α corr. (2): κατʼ ἐμοῦ A pr. N. καὶ τῆς βουλῆς, ἴσχυσεν ἂν τὸ ψεῦδος τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον, εἰ εἰ Gebauer: καὶ codd. διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν τότε καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν τὴν ἐμὴν ἐπιστεύθησαν αἱ κατʼ ἐμοῦ ψευδεῖς γενόμεναι γενόμεναι Blass: γινόμεναι codd. κατασκευαί· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τἀληθὲς παρὰ πάσης τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς ὁμολογεῖται, Δημοσθένην εἰληφέναι εἴκοσι τάλαντα χρυσίου καθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ ταῦτα πεποιηκότʼ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς ὑμῖν, ἐν ᾧ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσί τινες,

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εἶτʼ οὐ δεινόν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτι μὲν εἷς ἀνὴρ ἔφησε Πιστίας Ἀρεοπαγίτης ὢν ἀδικεῖν με, καταψευδόμενος κἀμοῦ κἀμοῦ Α corr. (2): κατʼ ἐμοῦ A pr. N. καὶ τῆς βουλῆς, ἴσχυσεν ἂν τὸ ψεῦδος τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον, εἰ εἰ Gebauer: καὶ codd. διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν τότε καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν τὴν ἐμὴν ἐπιστεύθησαν αἱ κατʼ ἐμοῦ ψευδεῖς γενόμεναι γενόμεναι Blass: γινόμεναι codd. κατασκευαί· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τἀληθὲς παρὰ πάσης τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς ὁμολογεῖται, Δημοσθένην εἰληφέναι εἴκοσι τάλαντα χρυσίου καθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ ταῦτα πεποιηκότʼ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς ὑμῖν, ἐν ᾧ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσί τινες,

ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρω χρήματα λαμβάνων εἴληπται, νῦν τὰ νόμιμα τἀκεῖθεν καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τἀληθῆ ἀσθενέστερα γενήσεται τῶν Δημοσθένους λόγων, καὶ ἰσχύσει μᾶλλον τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ παρὰ τούτου ῥηθησομένη κατὰ τοῦ συνεδρίου διαβολή, ὡς ἄρα πολλοὺς ἡ βουλὴ ἀποπέφαγκεν ἀδικεῖν τὸν δῆμον, οἳ ἀποπεφεύγασιν εἰσελθόντες εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ἡ βουλὴ ἐπʼ ἐνίων τὸ πέμπτον μέρος οὐ μετείληφε τῶν ψήφων; τοῦτο δὲ ὃν τρόπον γίγνεται, ῥᾳδίως ἅπαντες μαθήσεσθε.

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ἡ βουλή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ζητεῖ τὰ προσταχθένθʼ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ γεγενημένα παρʼ αὑτοῖς αὑτοῖς Bekker: αὐτοῖς codd. ἀδικήματʼ οὐχ ὡς ὑμεῖς — καί μοι μὴ ὀργισθῆτε — δικάζειν ἐνίοτε εἴθισθε, τῇ σῇ γνώμῃ πλέον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἀπονέμοντες, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς τὸν ἔνοχον ὄντα τοῖς ζητουμένοις ἀποφαίνει ἀποφαίνει add. Wolf. καὶ τὸν ὁποιονοῦν ἠδικηκότα παρὰ παρὰ add. Blass. τὰ πάτρια, νομίζουσα τὸν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς συνεθιζόμενον ἀδικεῖν τοῦτον τὰ μεγάλα τῶν ἀδικημάτων εὐχερέστερον προσδέξεσθαι.

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ἡ βουλή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ζητεῖ τὰ προσταχθένθʼ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ γεγενημένα παρʼ αὑτοῖς αὑτοῖς Bekker: αὐτοῖς codd. ἀδικήματʼ οὐχ ὡς ὑμεῖς — καί μοι μὴ ὀργισθῆτε — δικάζειν ἐνίοτε εἴθισθε, τῇ σῇ γνώμῃ πλέον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἀπονέμοντες, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς τὸν ἔνοχον ὄντα τοῖς ζητουμένοις ἀποφαίνει ἀποφαίνει add. Wolf. καὶ τὸν ὁποιονοῦν ἠδικηκότα παρὰ παρὰ add. Blass. τὰ πάτρια, νομίζουσα τὸν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς συνεθιζόμενον ἀδικεῖν τοῦτον τὰ μεγάλα τῶν ἀδικημάτων εὐχερέστερον προσδέξεσθαι.

διόπερ τὸν παρʼ αὑτῶν ἀποστερήσαντα τὸ ναῦλον τὸν πορθμέα ζημιώσασα πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπέφηνε· πάλιν τὸν τὴν πεντεδραχμίαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ μὴ παρόντος ὀνόματι λαβεῖν ἀξιώσαντα, καὶ τοῦτον ὑμῖν ἀπέφηνε, καὶ τὸν τὴν μερίδα τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου τολμήσαντʼ ἀποδόσθαι παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ζημιώσασʼ ἐξέβαλε.

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τούτους ὑμεῖς κρίναντες ἀφήκατε, οὐ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς καταγιγνώσκοντες ψεύδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῇ συγγνώμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσθέμενοι, καὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν μείζω νομίζοντες εἶναι τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν κρινομένων γεγενημένης ἁμαρτίας. ἦ που ἄρα ἡ βουλή, Δημόσθενες, τὰ ψευδῆ ἀπέφηνεν; οὐ δήπου. τούτους μέντοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἀδικεῖν παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς Blass: ἑαυτῆς codd.: ἑαυτῇ Reiske. ἀποφηνάσης τῆς βουλῆς ὑμεῖς ἀφήκατε.

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τούτους ὑμεῖς κρίναντες ἀφήκατε, οὐ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς καταγιγνώσκοντες ψεύδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῇ συγγνώμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσθέμενοι, καὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν μείζω νομίζοντες εἶναι τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν κρινομένων γεγενημένης ἁμαρτίας. ἦ που ἄρα ἡ βουλή, Δημόσθενες, τὰ ψευδῆ ἀπέφηνεν; οὐ δήπου. τούτους μέντοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ τοιούτους ἑτέρους ἀδικεῖν παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς Blass: ἑαυτῆς codd.: ἑαυτῇ Reiske. ἀποφηνάσης τῆς βουλῆς ὑμεῖς ἀφήκατε.

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πολύευκτον δὲ τὸν Κυδαντίδην τοῦ δήμου προστάξαντος ζητῆσαι τὴν βουλήν, εἰ συνέρχεται τοῖς φυγάσιν εἰς Μέγαρα, καὶ ζητήσασαν ἀποφῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀπέφηνεν ἡ βουλὴ συνιέναι. κατηγόρους εἵλεσθε κατὰ τὸν νόμον, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἀπελύσαθʼ ὑμεῖς, ὁμολογοῦντος τοῦ τοῦ om. A. Πολυεύκτου βαδίζειν εἰς Μέγαρʼ ὡς τὸν Νικοφάνην· ἔχειν γὰρ τὴν αὑτοῦ μητέρα τοῦτον. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον οὐδὲ δεινὸν ἐφαίνεθʼ ὑμῖν ποιεῖν τῷ τῆς μητρὸς ἀνδρὶ διαλεγόμενος ἠτυχηκότι καὶ συνευπορῶν, καθʼ ὅσον δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀπεστερημένῳ τῆς πατρίδος.

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πολύευκτον δὲ τὸν Κυδαντίδην τοῦ δήμου προστάξαντος ζητῆσαι τὴν βουλήν, εἰ συνέρχεται τοῖς φυγάσιν εἰς Μέγαρα, καὶ ζητήσασαν ἀποφῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀπέφηνεν ἡ βουλὴ συνιέναι. κατηγόρους εἵλεσθε κατὰ τὸν νόμον, εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἀπελύσαθʼ ὑμεῖς, ὁμολογοῦντος τοῦ τοῦ om. A. Πολυεύκτου βαδίζειν εἰς Μέγαρʼ ὡς τὸν Νικοφάνην· ἔχειν γὰρ τὴν αὑτοῦ μητέρα τοῦτον. οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον οὐδὲ δεινὸν ἐφαίνεθʼ ὑμῖν ποιεῖν τῷ τῆς μητρὸς ἀνδρὶ διαλεγόμενος ἠτυχηκότι καὶ συνευπορῶν, καθʼ ὅσον δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀπεστερημένῳ τῆς πατρίδος.

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αὕτη, Δημόσθενες, τῆς βουλῆς ἡ ἀπόφασις οὐκ ἐξηλέγχθη ψευδὴς οὖσα, ἀληθινῆς δὲ αὐτῆς οὔσης ἔδοξε τοῖς δικασταῖς ἀφεῖναι ἀφεῖναι Blass: ἀφιέναι codd. τὸν Πολύευκτον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς τῇ βουλῇ προσετάχθη ζητεῖν, τὸ δὲ συγγνώμης ἄξιόν φημι φημι] ἢ μὴ Reiske. τὸ δικαστήριον ἔκρινε. διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐ πιστευτέον τῇ βουλῇ περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων γιγνομένων Blass: γινομένων Ν: γενομένων Α. ἀποφάσεων, ἐπειδή σε καὶ τοὺς μετὰ σοῦ τὸ χρυσίον ἔχοντας ἀποπέφαγκε; δεινὸν μέντʼ ἂν εἴη.

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αὕτη, Δημόσθενες, τῆς βουλῆς ἡ ἀπόφασις οὐκ ἐξηλέγχθη ψευδὴς οὖσα, ἀληθινῆς δὲ αὐτῆς οὔσης ἔδοξε τοῖς δικασταῖς ἀφεῖναι ἀφεῖναι Blass: ἀφιέναι codd. τὸν Πολύευκτον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς τῇ βουλῇ προσετάχθη ζητεῖν, τὸ δὲ συγγνώμης ἄξιόν φημι φημι] ἢ μὴ Reiske. τὸ δικαστήριον ἔκρινε. διὰ τοῦτʼ οὐ πιστευτέον τῇ βουλῇ περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων γιγνομένων Blass: γινομένων Ν: γενομένων Α. ἀποφάσεων, ἐπειδή σε καὶ τοὺς μετὰ σοῦ τὸ χρυσίον ἔχοντας ἀποπέφαγκε; δεινὸν μέντʼ ἂν εἴη.

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δεῖξον γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς σύ, Δημόσθενες, νυνὶ ὡς τούτων τι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἁμαρτημάτων Sauppe: ἡμαρτηκότων codd. ὅμοιόν ἐστι τοῖς σοῖς ἀδικήμασι, καὶ ὡς τὸ δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος συγγνώμης ἐστὶν ἄξιον, ὥστʼ ἀποφύγοις ἂν παρὰ τούτοις εἰκότως. ἀλλʼ οἱ νόμοι περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων τῶν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον ἀνηκόντων διπλῆν τὴν βλάβην ὀφλεῖν ὀφλεῖν Meier: ὀφείλειν codd κελεύουσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν δωροδοκούντων δύο μόνον τιμήματα πεποιήκασιν, ἢ φάνατον, ἵνα ταύτης τυχὼν τῆς ζημίας ὁ λαβὼν παράδειγμα γένηται τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ δεκαπλοῦν τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λήμματος τὸ τίμημα τῶν δώρων, ἵνα μὴ λυσιτελήσῃ λυσιτελήσῃ Blass: λυσιτελὴς ᾖ N A pr.: λυσιτελὲς ᾖ A corr. τοῖς τοῦτο τολμῶσι ποιεῖν.

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δεῖξον γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς σύ, Δημόσθενες, νυνὶ ὡς τούτων τι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἁμαρτημάτων Sauppe: ἡμαρτηκότων codd. ὅμοιόν ἐστι τοῖς σοῖς ἀδικήμασι, καὶ ὡς τὸ δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος συγγνώμης ἐστὶν ἄξιον, ὥστʼ ἀποφύγοις ἂν παρὰ τούτοις εἰκότως. ἀλλʼ οἱ νόμοι περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων τῶν εἰς ἀργυρίου λόγον ἀνηκόντων διπλῆν τὴν βλάβην ὀφλεῖν ὀφλεῖν Meier: ὀφείλειν codd κελεύουσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν δωροδοκούντων δύο μόνον τιμήματα πεποιήκασιν, ἢ φάνατον, ἵνα ταύτης τυχὼν τῆς ζημίας ὁ λαβὼν παράδειγμα γένηται τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ δεκαπλοῦν τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λήμματος τὸ τίμημα τῶν δώρων, ἵνα μὴ λυσιτελήσῃ λυσιτελήσῃ Blass: λυσιτελὴς ᾖ N A pr.: λυσιτελὲς ᾖ A corr. τοῖς τοῦτο τολμῶσι ποιεῖν.

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ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσεις λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ τῶν πρότερον πρότερον Scaliger: προτέρων codd. ἀποφανθέντων ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ὡμολογηκέναι συμβέβηκεν ἀξίαν εἶναι τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ζημίαν, ζημίαν A pr.: ζήτησιν A corr. N. σοὶ δὲ μόνῳ τὰ τὰ] del. Dobree. περὶ αὐτῆς ἠναντιῶσθαι. ἀλλὰ μόνος σὺ τῶν πώποτʼ ἀποπεφασμένων ἠξίωσας ἑκὼν σεαυτῷ τούτους κριτὰς καὶ ζητητὰς γενέσθαι, καὶ ἔγραψας κατὰ σαυτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα, καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἐποιήσω μάρτυρα τῶν ὡμολογημένων, ὁρισάμενος σεαυτῷ ζημίαν εἶναι θάνατον, ἐὰν ἀποφήνῃ σʼ σʼ add. Blass. ἡ βουλὴ τῶν χρημάτων εἰληφότα τι τῶν εἰς τὴν χώραν ὑφʼ Ἁρπάλου κομισθέντων.

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ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐπιχειρήσεις λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ τῶν πρότερον πρότερον Scaliger: προτέρων codd. ἀποφανθέντων ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ὡμολογηκέναι συμβέβηκεν ἀξίαν εἶναι τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ζημίαν, ζημίαν A pr.: ζήτησιν A corr. N. σοὶ δὲ μόνῳ τὰ τὰ] del. Dobree. περὶ αὐτῆς ἠναντιῶσθαι. ἀλλὰ μόνος σὺ τῶν πώποτʼ ἀποπεφασμένων ἠξίωσας ἑκὼν σεαυτῷ τούτους κριτὰς καὶ ζητητὰς γενέσθαι, καὶ ἔγραψας κατὰ σαυτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα, καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἐποιήσω μάρτυρα τῶν ὡμολογημένων, ὁρισάμενος σεαυτῷ ζημίαν εἶναι θάνατον, ἐὰν ἀποφήνῃ σʼ σʼ add. Blass. ἡ βουλὴ τῶν χρημάτων εἰληφότα τι τῶν εἰς τὴν χώραν ὑφʼ Ἁρπάλου κομισθέντων.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν πρότερον ἔγραψας σύ, ὦ Δημόσθενες, κατὰ πάντων τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων κυρίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν κολάσαι τὸν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους πλημμελοῦντα, χρωμένην τοῖς πατρίοις πατρίοις Wolf: πατρώοις codd. νόμοις· καὶ παρέδωκας σὺ καὶ ἐνεχείρισας τὴν πόλιν ἅπασαν ταύτῃ, ἣν αὐτίκα φήσεις ὀλιγαρχικὴν εἶναι· καὶ τεθνᾶσι κατὰ τὸ σὸν ψήφισμα δύο τῶν πολιτῶν, πατὴρ καὶ υἱός, παραδοθέντες τῷ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι·

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ἀλλὰ μὴν πρότερον ἔγραψας σύ, ὦ Δημόσθενες, κατὰ πάντων τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων κυρίαν εἶναι τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν κολάσαι τὸν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους πλημμελοῦντα, χρωμένην τοῖς πατρίοις πατρίοις Wolf: πατρώοις codd. νόμοις· καὶ παρέδωκας σὺ καὶ ἐνεχείρισας τὴν πόλιν ἅπασαν ταύτῃ, ἣν αὐτίκα φήσεις ὀλιγαρχικὴν εἶναι· καὶ τεθνᾶσι κατὰ τὸ σὸν ψήφισμα δύο τῶν πολιτῶν, πατὴρ καὶ υἱός, παραδοθέντες τῷ ἐπὶ τῷ ὀρύγματι·

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ἐδέθη τῶν ἀφʼ Ἁρμοδίου γεγονότων εἷς κατὰ τὸ σὸν πρόσταγμα· ἐστρέβλωσαν Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ ἀπέκτειναν οὗτοι τῇ τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσει πεισθέντες· ἐξέβαλες σὺ Χαρῖνον Χαρῖνον Rohdewald: Ἀρχίνον codd. ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ κατὰ τὰς τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσεις καὶ τιμωρίας. κατὰ δὲ σαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτα γράψας αὐτὸς τὸ ψήφισμʼ ἀκυροῖς; καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα δίκαια ἢ νόμιμά ἐστι;

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ἐδέθη τῶν ἀφʼ Ἁρμοδίου γεγονότων εἷς κατὰ τὸ σὸν πρόσταγμα· ἐστρέβλωσαν Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ ἀπέκτειναν οὗτοι τῇ τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσει πεισθέντες· ἐξέβαλες σὺ Χαρῖνον Χαρῖνον Rohdewald: Ἀρχίνον codd. ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ κατὰ τὰς τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσεις καὶ τιμωρίας. κατὰ δὲ σαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτα γράψας αὐτὸς τὸ ψήφισμʼ ἀκυροῖς; καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα δίκαια ἢ νόμιμά ἐστι;

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μαρτύρομαι τὰς σεμνὰς θεάς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸν τόπον ὃν ἐκεῖναι κατέχουσι, καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας τοὺς ἐγχωρίους, καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν Πολιάδα Πολιάδα Wolf: πολίτιδα codd. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς οἳ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν εἰλήχασιν, ὅτι τοῦ δήμου παραδεδωκότος ὑμῖν τιμωρήσασθαι τιμωρήσασθαι Α· Τιμωρής. τε N pr.: τιμωρήσατε N corr. (2): οὐκ ἐτιμωρήσασθε Ald. τὸν εἰληφότα τι τῶνPost τῶν nonnihil excidisse videtur: κομισθέντων χρημάτων supplendum ci. Blass (coll. 70).κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, τὸν λελυμασμένον καὶ ἐφθαρκότα τὴν τῆς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν, τὸν περικεχαρακωμένην προδεδωκότα προδεδωκότα Schmidt: παραδεδωκότα codd. τὴν πατρίδα ταῖς αὑτοῦ συμβουλίαις,

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μαρτύρομαι τὰς σεμνὰς θεάς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸν τόπον ὃν ἐκεῖναι κατέχουσι, καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας τοὺς ἐγχωρίους, καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν Πολιάδα Πολιάδα Wolf: πολίτιδα codd. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς οἳ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν εἰλήχασιν, ὅτι τοῦ δήμου παραδεδωκότος ὑμῖν τιμωρήσασθαι τιμωρήσασθαι Α· Τιμωρής. τε N pr.: τιμωρήσατε N corr. (2): οὐκ ἐτιμωρήσασθε Ald. τὸν εἰληφότα τι τῶνPost τῶν nonnihil excidisse videtur: κομισθέντων χρημάτων supplendum ci. Blass (coll. 70).κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, τὸν λελυμασμένον καὶ ἐφθαρκότα τὴν τῆς πόλεως εὐδαιμονίαν, τὸν περικεχαρακωμένην προδεδωκότα προδεδωκότα Schmidt: παραδεδωκότα codd. τὴν πατρίδα ταῖς αὑτοῦ συμβουλίαις,

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[ὃν] ὃν del. Thalheim. οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακόνοι τῇ πόλει τῇ πόλει Kleyn: τῆς πολέως codd. ζῆν ἂν βούλοιντο, συμφορὰν ἡγούμενοι τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, ὅσοι δὲ εὖνοι τοῖς ὑμετέροις πράγμασι, καὶ μεταπεσούσης τῆς τύχης ἐλπίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἂν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματʼ ἐλθεῖν, τὴν ἀξίαν δίκην δόντα τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀπολωλέναι βούλονται, καὶ ταῦτʼ εὔχονται τοῖς θεοῖς· οὓς κἀγὼ συμπαρακαλῶ σῶσαι τὴν πατρίδα, κινδυνεύουσαν ὁρῶν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας, ὑπὲρ παίδων, ὑπὲρ γυναικῶν, ὑπὲρ δόξης, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων.

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[ὃν] ὃν del. Thalheim. οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακόνοι τῇ πόλει τῇ πόλει Kleyn: τῆς πολέως codd. ζῆν ἂν βούλοιντο, συμφορὰν ἡγούμενοι τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, ὅσοι δὲ εὖνοι τοῖς ὑμετέροις πράγμασι, καὶ μεταπεσούσης τῆς τύχης ἐλπίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἂν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματʼ ἐλθεῖν, τὴν ἀξίαν δίκην δόντα τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀπολωλέναι βούλονται, καὶ ταῦτʼ εὔχονται τοῖς θεοῖς· οὓς κἀγὼ συμπαρακαλῶ σῶσαι τὴν πατρίδα, κινδυνεύουσαν ὁρῶν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας, ὑπὲρ παίδων, ὑπὲρ γυναικῶν, ὑπὲρ δόξης, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων.

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τί γὰρ ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τοὺς περιεστηκότας ἐξελθόντες ἐκ τοῦ δικαστηρίου, ἐάν, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, παρακρουσθῆτε ὑπὸ τῆς τούτου γοητείας; τίσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἕκαστος ὑμῶν τὴν πατρῴαν ἑστίαν οἴκαδʼ ἀπελθὼν ἰδεῖν τολμήσει, τολμήσει Bekker: τολμήσειε Ν: τολμήσειεν Α. ἀπολελυκότες μὲν τὸν προδότην τὸν πρῶτον εἰς τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον εἰσενεγκάμενον τὸ δεδωροδοκημένον χρυσίον, κατεγνωκότες δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς μήτε μήτε Bekker: μηδὲ codd. ζητεῖν μήθʼ εὑρίσκειν τὸ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι σεμνότατον νομιζόμενον συνέδριον;

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τί γὰρ ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τοὺς περιεστηκότας ἐξελθόντες ἐκ τοῦ δικαστηρίου, ἐάν, ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, παρακρουσθῆτε ὑπὸ τῆς τούτου γοητείας; τίσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἕκαστος ὑμῶν τὴν πατρῴαν ἑστίαν οἴκαδʼ ἀπελθὼν ἰδεῖν τολμήσει, τολμήσει Bekker: τολμήσειε Ν: τολμήσειεν Α. ἀπολελυκότες μὲν τὸν προδότην τὸν πρῶτον εἰς τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον εἰσενεγκάμενον τὸ δεδωροδοκημένον χρυσίον, κατεγνωκότες δὲ μηδὲν ἀληθὲς μήτε μήτε Bekker: μηδὲ codd. ζητεῖν μήθʼ εὑρίσκειν τὸ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἶναι σεμνότατον νομιζόμενον συνέδριον;

τίνας δʼ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, — σκοπεῖτε γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς —, τίνας τὰς ἐλπίδας ἕξομεν, ἐὰν κίνδυνός τις καταλάβῃ τὴν πόλιν, τὸ μὲν δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι πεποιηκότες, τὸ δὲ τὴν φυλακὴν ἔχον συνέδριον τῆς πόλεως ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις κινδύνοις ἀδόκιμον καταστήσαντες;

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τί δʼ ἐάν — τιθῶμεν τί δʼ ἐάν, — τιθῶμεν Funkhaenel: τί δέ, ἀντιθῶμεν Α: τί δαὶ ἀντιθῶμεν Ν. γὰρ ταῦτα —, ἐὰν κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Δημοσθένους ἀπαιτῇ πέμψας ἡμᾶς Ἀλέξανδρος τὸ χρυσίον τὸ κομισθὲν εἰς τὴν χώραν ὑφʼ Ἁρπάλου, καὶ πρὸς τῷ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασιν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν ὡς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοῖ πυνθάνεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡμᾶς, ἡμᾶς Baiter et Sauppe: ὑμᾶς codd. πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί ἐροῦμεν;

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τί δʼ ἐάν — τιθῶμεν τί δʼ ἐάν, — τιθῶμεν Funkhaenel: τί δέ, ἀντιθῶμεν Α: τί δαὶ ἀντιθῶμεν Ν. γὰρ ταῦτα —, ἐὰν κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ Δημοσθένους ἀπαιτῇ πέμψας ἡμᾶς Ἀλέξανδρος τὸ χρυσίον τὸ κομισθὲν εἰς τὴν χώραν ὑφʼ Ἁρπάλου, καὶ πρὸς τῷ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασιν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν ὡς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοῖ πυνθάνεσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἡμᾶς, ἡμᾶς Baiter et Sauppe: ὑμᾶς codd. πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί ἐροῦμεν;

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γράψεις γράψεις Stephanus: γράφεις codd. σύ, Δημόσθενες, πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς πρότερον πολέμους καλῶς διῴκησας; καὶ πότερόν ἐστι δικαιότερον, ἂν ταῦτα δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις, εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὸ παρὰ σοῦ χρυσίον, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων ἕκαστον εἰσφέρειν, καὶ καταχωνεύειν τὸν ἴδιον κόσμον τῶν γυναικῶν, καὶ τὰ ἐκπώματα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἀναθήματα τῶν θεῶν, ὥσπερ ἔφησθα σὺ γράψειν, γράψειν Stephanus: γράφειν codd. αὐτὸς εἰσενεγκὼν πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας τῆς ἐν Πειραιεῖ, καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄστει; τοσοῦτον γὰρ κατὰ τὴν προτέραν εἰσφορὰν εἰσενηνοχώς, εἴκοσι τάλαντʼ ἔχεις.

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γράψεις γράψεις Stephanus: γράφεις codd. σύ, Δημόσθενες, πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς πρότερον πολέμους καλῶς διῴκησας; καὶ πότερόν ἐστι δικαιότερον, ἂν ταῦτα δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις, εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὸ παρὰ σοῦ χρυσίον, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων ἕκαστον εἰσφέρειν, καὶ καταχωνεύειν τὸν ἴδιον κόσμον τῶν γυναικῶν, καὶ τὰ ἐκπώματα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἀναθήματα τῶν θεῶν, ὥσπερ ἔφησθα σὺ γράψειν, γράψειν Stephanus: γράφειν codd. αὐτὸς εἰσενεγκὼν πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας τῆς ἐν Πειραιεῖ, καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄστει; τοσοῦτον γὰρ κατὰ τὴν προτέραν εἰσφορὰν εἰσενηνοχώς, εἴκοσι τάλαντʼ ἔχεις.

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ἢ πολεμεῖν μὲν οὐ γράψεις, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον ὑπὸ σοῦ ψήφισμα κελεύσεις κελεύσεις Stephanus: κελεύεις codd. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὸ κεκομισμένον χρυσίον; οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὸν δῆμον ἀποδιδόναι δεήσει. καὶ ποῦ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἢ κοινὸν ἢ δημοτικόν, τοὺς μὲν ἐργαζομένους εἰσφέρειν, σὲ δʼ ἁρπάζειν καὶ κλέπτειν; καὶ κλέπτειν add. N. καὶ τοὺς μὲν φανερὰν κεκτῆσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσφέρειν, σὲ δὲ πλείω ἢ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου πραγμάτων, εἰληφέναι, μηδὲν δὲ φανερὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ διεσκευάσθαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὡς οὐ πιστεύοντα τοῖς ἑαυτῷ πολιτευομένοις;

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ἢ πολεμεῖν μὲν οὐ γράψεις, ἀποδιδόναι δὲ κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον ὑπὸ σοῦ ψήφισμα κελεύσεις κελεύσεις Stephanus: κελεύεις codd. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὸ κεκομισμένον χρυσίον; οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὸν δῆμον ἀποδιδόναι δεήσει. καὶ ποῦ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἢ κοινὸν ἢ δημοτικόν, τοὺς μὲν ἐργαζομένους εἰσφέρειν, σὲ δʼ ἁρπάζειν καὶ κλέπτειν; καὶ κλέπτειν add. N. καὶ τοὺς μὲν φανερὰν κεκτῆσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσφέρειν, σὲ δὲ πλείω ἢ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου πραγμάτων, εἰληφέναι, μηδὲν δὲ φανερὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκτῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ διεσκευάσθαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὡς οὐ πιστεύοντα τοῖς ἑαυτῷ πολιτευομένοις;

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καὶ τοὺς μὲν νόμους προλέγειν τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ, τῷ τῷ add. Reiske. τὴν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου πίστιν ἀξιοῦντι λαμβάνειν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, γῆν ἐντὸς ὅρων κεκτῆσθαι, πάσας τὰς δικαίας πίστεις παρακαταθέμενον οὕτως ἀξιοῦν προεστάναι τοῦ δήμου· σὲ δὲ τὴν μὲν μὲν add. Blass. πατρῴαν γῆν πεπρακέναι, τοὺς δʼ οὐ γεγενημένους υἱεῖς σαυτῷ προσποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τῶν ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν ἕνεκα γιγνομένων ὅρκων, ἐπιτάττειν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις στρατεύεσθαι λιπόντʼ αὐτὸν τὴν κοινὴν τάξιν.

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καὶ τοὺς μὲν νόμους προλέγειν τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ, τῷ τῷ add. Reiske. τὴν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου πίστιν ἀξιοῦντι λαμβάνειν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, γῆν ἐντὸς ὅρων κεκτῆσθαι, πάσας τὰς δικαίας πίστεις παρακαταθέμενον οὕτως ἀξιοῦν προεστάναι τοῦ δήμου· σὲ δὲ τὴν μὲν μὲν add. Blass. πατρῴαν γῆν πεπρακέναι, τοὺς δʼ οὐ γεγενημένους υἱεῖς σαυτῷ προσποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους τῶν ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν ἕνεκα γιγνομένων ὅρκων, ἐπιτάττειν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις στρατεύεσθαι λιπόντʼ αὐτὸν τὴν κοινὴν τάξιν.

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ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, παρὰ τί οἴεσθε τὰς πόλεις τοτὲ μὲν εὖ τοτὲ δὲ φαύλως πράττειν; οὐδὲν εὑρήσετʼ ἄλλο πλὴν παρὰ τοὺς συμβούλους καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας. ἐπιβλέψατε δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν. ἐγένετο πότε ante ἐγένετο add. Stephanus, ante καὶ τίνων Blass. πόλις,Verba πόλις, ἐγένετο del. Dobree. ἐγένετο μεγίστη· καὶ τίνων τυχοῦσα ἡγεμόνων καὶ στρατηγῶν; ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν οἱ οἱ add. Reiske. πρεσβύτεροι, παρʼ ὧνπερ κἀγὼ τοὺς λόγους ἀκούων ἐρῶ,

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ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, παρὰ τί οἴεσθε τὰς πόλεις τοτὲ μὲν εὖ τοτὲ δὲ φαύλως πράττειν; οὐδὲν εὑρήσετʼ ἄλλο πλὴν παρὰ τοὺς συμβούλους καὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας. ἐπιβλέψατε δʼ ἐπὶ τὴν Θηβαίων πόλιν. ἐγένετο πότε ante ἐγένετο add. Stephanus, ante καὶ τίνων Blass. πόλις,Verba πόλις, ἐγένετο del. Dobree. ἐγένετο μεγίστη· καὶ τίνων τυχοῦσα ἡγεμόνων καὶ στρατηγῶν; ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν οἱ οἱ add. Reiske. πρεσβύτεροι, παρʼ ὧνπερ κἀγὼ τοὺς λόγους ἀκούων ἐρῶ,

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ὅτε Πελοπίδας, ὥς φασιν, ἡγεῖτο τοῦ ἱεροῦ λόχου λόχου A corr. (2): λόγου A pr. N. καὶ Ἐπαμινώνδας ἐστρατήγει καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων, τότε τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχην ἐνίκησεν ἡ τῶν Θηβαίων πόλις, τότʼ εἰς τὴν ἀπόρθητον νομιζομένην εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίων χώραν εἰσέβαλον, κατʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διεπράξαντʼ ἔργα, Μεσσήνην τετρακοσιοστῷ ἔτει κατῴκισαν, Ἀρκάδας αὐτονόμους ἐποίησαν, ἔνδοξοι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἦσαν.

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ὅτε Πελοπίδας, ὥς φασιν, ἡγεῖτο τοῦ ἱεροῦ λόχου λόχου A corr. (2): λόγου A pr. N. καὶ Ἐπαμινώνδας ἐστρατήγει καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων, τότε τὴν ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχην ἐνίκησεν ἡ τῶν Θηβαίων πόλις, τότʼ εἰς τὴν ἀπόρθητον νομιζομένην εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίων χώραν εἰσέβαλον, κατʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διεπράξαντʼ ἔργα, Μεσσήνην τετρακοσιοστῷ ἔτει κατῴκισαν, Ἀρκάδας αὐτονόμους ἐποίησαν, ἔνδοξοι παρὰ πᾶσιν ἦσαν.

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πότε δʼ αὖ τοὐναντίον ταπεινὰ καὶ τοῦ φρονήματος ἀνάξια διεπράξαντο; ὅτʼ ἐδωροδόκει μὲν λαμβάνων χρήματα παρὰ Φιλίππου Τιμόλαος ὁ τούτου φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ξένοις τοῖς εἰς Ἄμφισσαν συλλεγεῖσι Πρόξενος ὁ προδότης ἐγένετο, ἡγεμὼν δὲ τῆς φάλαγγος κατέστη Θεαγένης, ἄνθρωπος ἀτυχὴς καὶ δωροδόκος ὥσπερ οὗτος. τότε διὰ τρεῖς γʼ ἀνθρώπους οὓς εἶπον ἅπασʼ ἡ πόλις ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (ἐκ?) τῶν Ἑλλήνων A pr.: μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἁπάντων A corr.: μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ν. ἀπώλετο καὶ διεφθάρη. οὐ γὰρ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀληθὲς τὸ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αἰτίους ἁπάντων γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πολίταις.

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πότε δʼ αὖ τοὐναντίον ταπεινὰ καὶ τοῦ φρονήματος ἀνάξια διεπράξαντο; ὅτʼ ἐδωροδόκει μὲν λαμβάνων χρήματα παρὰ Φιλίππου Τιμόλαος ὁ τούτου φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ξένοις τοῖς εἰς Ἄμφισσαν συλλεγεῖσι Πρόξενος ὁ προδότης ἐγένετο, ἡγεμὼν δὲ τῆς φάλαγγος κατέστη Θεαγένης, ἄνθρωπος ἀτυχὴς καὶ δωροδόκος ὥσπερ οὗτος. τότε διὰ τρεῖς γʼ ἀνθρώπους οὓς εἶπον ἅπασʼ ἡ πόλις ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (ἐκ?) τῶν Ἑλλήνων A pr.: μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἁπάντων A corr.: μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ν. ἀπώλετο καὶ διεφθάρη. οὐ γὰρ ψεῦδός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἀληθὲς τὸ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αἰτίους ἁπάντων γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πολίταις.

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θεωρήσατε δὴ πάλιν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξετάσαντες. ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἦν μεγάλη καὶ ἔνδοξος παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἀξία, μετά γε τὰς ἀρχαίας ἐκείνας πράξεις, ὅτε Κόνων, ὡς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι λέγουσιν, ἐνίκησε τὴν ἐν Κνίδῳ ναυμαχίαν, ὅτʼ Ἰφικράτης ἀνεῖλε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μόραν, μόραν Scaliger: μοῖραν codd. ὅτε Χαβρίας ἐν Νάξῳ κατεναυμάχησε τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων τριήρεις, ὅτε Τιμόθεος τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν ἐνίκησε.

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θεωρήσατε δὴ πάλιν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξετάσαντες. ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἦν μεγάλη καὶ ἔνδοξος παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἀξία, μετά γε τὰς ἀρχαίας ἐκείνας πράξεις, ὅτε Κόνων, ὡς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι λέγουσιν, ἐνίκησε τὴν ἐν Κνίδῳ ναυμαχίαν, ὅτʼ Ἰφικράτης ἀνεῖλε τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μόραν, μόραν Scaliger: μοῖραν codd. ὅτε Χαβρίας ἐν Νάξῳ κατεναυμάχησε τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων τριήρεις, ὅτε Τιμόθεος τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν ἐνίκησε.

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τότε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τότε οἱ μὲν πρότερον ὄντες λαμπροὶ διὰ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐκείνων ἤθεσι τραφέντες ταπεινοὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἧκον, δεόμενοι τῆς παρὰ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας, ὁ δὲ καταλυθεὶς ὑπʼ ἐκείνων δῆμος διὰ τοὺς τότε γενομένους παρʼ ἡμῖν ἡμῖν Sauppe: ὑμῖν codd. συμβούλους πάλιν ἡγεμὼν ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, δικαίως οἶμαι, στρατηγῶν μὲν τοιούτων τετυχηκὼς οἵων εἶπον ἀρτίως, συμβούλους δʼ ἔχων Ἀρχῖνον καὶ Κέφαλον τὸν Κολλυτέα. μία γὰρ αὕτη σωτηρία καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐστί, τὸ προστατῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων τυχεῖν.

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τότε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τότε οἱ μὲν πρότερον ὄντες λαμπροὶ διὰ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐκείνων ἤθεσι τραφέντες ταπεινοὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἧκον, δεόμενοι τῆς παρὰ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν σωτηρίας, ὁ δὲ καταλυθεὶς ὑπʼ ἐκείνων δῆμος διὰ τοὺς τότε γενομένους παρʼ ἡμῖν ἡμῖν Sauppe: ὑμῖν codd. συμβούλους πάλιν ἡγεμὼν ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, δικαίως οἶμαι, στρατηγῶν μὲν τοιούτων τετυχηκὼς οἵων εἶπον ἀρτίως, συμβούλους δʼ ἔχων Ἀρχῖνον καὶ Κέφαλον τὸν Κολλυτέα. μία γὰρ αὕτη σωτηρία καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐστί, τὸ προστατῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων τυχεῖν.

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διόπερ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖ ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντας καὶ λογιζομένους μὴ μὰ Δία τὸν πλείω χρόνον τῆς Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας καὶ ἀτυχίας κοινωνεῖν, μηδʼ ἐν τούτῳ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχειν, μηδʼ οἴεσθαι ἀπορήσειν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν προγόνων λαβόντας ὀργὴν τὸν ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ κλέπτην εἰλημμένον καὶ προδότην, τὸν οὐκ ἀπεχόμενον τῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀφικνουμένων χρημάτων, τὸν εἰς τὰς δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ἐμβεβληκότα τὴν πόλιν, τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον ἀποκτείνανταςPost ἀποκτείναντας add. δεῖ N A pr., del. A corr. ras. ἐξόριστον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ποιῆσαι, καὶ μεταβαλέσθαι μεταβαλέσθαι A corr. (2): μεταβάλλεσθαι A pr. N. τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἐᾶσαι, καὶ προσδοκῆσαι τούτων γενομένων βέλτιον πράξειν.

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διόπερ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖ ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντας καὶ λογιζομένους μὴ μὰ Δία τὸν πλείω χρόνον τῆς Δημοσθένους δωροδοκίας καὶ ἀτυχίας κοινωνεῖν, μηδʼ ἐν τούτῳ τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας ἔχειν, μηδʼ οἴεσθαι ἀπορήσειν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ συμβούλων σπουδαίων, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν προγόνων λαβόντας ὀργὴν τὸν ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ κλέπτην εἰλημμένον καὶ προδότην, τὸν οὐκ ἀπεχόμενον τῶν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀφικνουμένων χρημάτων, τὸν εἰς τὰς δεινοτάτας ἀτυχίας ἐμβεβληκότα τὴν πόλιν, τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτήριον ἀποκτείνανταςPost ἀποκτείναντας add. δεῖ N A pr., del. A corr. ras. ἐξόριστον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ποιῆσαι, καὶ μεταβαλέσθαι μεταβαλέσθαι A corr. (2): μεταβάλλεσθαι A pr. N. τὴν τῆς πόλεως τύχην ἐᾶσαι, καὶ προσδοκῆσαι τούτων γενομένων βέλτιον πράξειν.

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ἀκούσατε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, κἀκείνου τοῦ ψηφίσματος τοῦ γραφέντος ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους, ὃ A corr. ras.: ὅτ. N pr.: ὅτε A pr. N. corr. τεταραγμένης τῆς πόλεως μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην ἔγραψεν ὁ δημοτικὸς οὗτος, καὶ τῆς μαντείας τῆς ἐλθούσης ἐκ Δωδώνης παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου· σαφῶς γὰρ ὑμῖν πάλαι προείρηκε φυλάττεσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ τοὺς συμβούλους. λέγε τὴν μαντείαν πρῶτον.

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ἀκούσατε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, κἀκείνου τοῦ ψηφίσματος τοῦ γραφέντος ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους, ὃ A corr. ras.: ὅτ. N pr.: ὅτε A pr. N. corr. τεταραγμένης τῆς πόλεως μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην ἔγραψεν ὁ δημοτικὸς οὗτος, καὶ τῆς μαντείας τῆς ἐλθούσης ἐκ Δωδώνης παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου· σαφῶς γὰρ ὑμῖν πάλαι προείρηκε φυλάττεσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας καὶ τοὺς συμβούλους. λέγε τὴν μαντείαν πρῶτον.

λέγε δὴ τὸ καλὸν ψήφισμα τούτου.

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δημοτικός γʼ ὁ διατάττων ἑαυτὸν μέν, ἐπειδὴ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ εὔψυχός ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μένειν, οὓς δʼ ἂν οὗτος οὗτος Ν: αὐτὸς Α. ἀποδοκιμάσῃ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα ἀπιέναι, καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο τούτῳ δόξῃ ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. λέγε τὰ λοιπά.

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δημοτικός γʼ ὁ διατάττων ἑαυτὸν μέν, ἐπειδὴ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ εὔψυχός ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μένειν, οὓς δʼ ἂν οὗτος οὗτος Ν: αὐτὸς Α. ἀποδοκιμάσῃ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα ἀπιέναι, καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο τούτῳ δόξῃ ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. λέγε τὰ λοιπά.

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ἀκούετε, ἄνδρες δικασταί. ἀπιέναι φησὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ ψήφισμα] del. Bekker. τὰς ᾑρημένας ᾑρημένας Wolf: εἰρημένας codd. πρεσβείας. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γὰρ add. Reiske. ἤκουσε μετὰ τὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνεία Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν μέλλειν εἰσβάλλειν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκευάσας, ἵνʼ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδραίη, ᾤχετο ᾤχετο hic add. Blass (iam infra post τάλαντα suppleverat Maetzner'. συσκευασάμενος ἐκ ἐκ add. Wurm. τῆς διοικήσεως ὀκτὼ τάλαντα, οὐδὲν φροντίσας τῆς τότε παρούσης ἀπορίας, ἡνίχʼ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπεδίδοσαν εἰς τὴν ὑμετέραν σωτηρίαν.

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ἀκούετε, ἄνδρες δικασταί. ἀπιέναι φησὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ ψήφισμα] del. Bekker. τὰς ᾑρημένας ᾑρημένας Wolf: εἰρημένας codd. πρεσβείας. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ γὰρ add. Reiske. ἤκουσε μετὰ τὴν μάχην τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνεία Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν μέλλειν εἰσβάλλειν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβευτὴν κατασκευάσας, ἵνʼ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδραίη, ᾤχετο ᾤχετο hic add. Blass (iam infra post τάλαντα suppleverat Maetzner'. συσκευασάμενος ἐκ ἐκ add. Wurm. τῆς διοικήσεως ὀκτὼ τάλαντα, οὐδὲν φροντίσας τῆς τότε παρούσης ἀπορίας, ἡνίχʼ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπεδίδοσαν εἰς τὴν ὑμετέραν σωτηρίαν.

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τοιοῦτος ὑμῖν ὁ σύμβουλος, καὶ δύο ταύτας μόνας ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐν τῷ βίῳ] delendum ci. Maetzner, qui post μάχην interpunxit. Δημοσθένης πεποίηται ἀποδημίας, μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὅτʼ ἀπεδίδρασκεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ νῦν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν, ἐπεὶ Νικάνορι διὰ τῆς ἀρχεθεωρίας ἐντυχεῖν ἐβούλετο. ἄξιόν γε τούτῳ παρακαταθέσθαι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐπιτρέψαι ἐπιτρέψαι Α: ἐπιτρέψειν Ν. κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας, ὃς ὅτε μὲν ἔδει μάχεσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς πολεμίοις, λιπὼν τὴν τάξιν ᾤχετο ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε, ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσῆκεν οἴκοι κινδυνεύειν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, πρεσβευτὴν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν προβαλόμενος προβαλόμενος A corr. ras.: προβαλλόμενος A pr. N. ᾤχετο ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδρὰς,

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τοιοῦτος ὑμῖν ὁ σύμβουλος, καὶ δύο ταύτας μόνας ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐν τῷ βίῳ] delendum ci. Maetzner, qui post μάχην interpunxit. Δημοσθένης πεποίηται ἀποδημίας, μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὅτʼ ἀπεδίδρασκεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ νῦν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν, ἐπεὶ Νικάνορι διὰ τῆς ἀρχεθεωρίας ἐντυχεῖν ἐβούλετο. ἄξιόν γε τούτῳ παρακαταθέσθαι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐπιτρέψαι ἐπιτρέψαι Α: ἐπιτρέψειν Ν. κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας, ὃς ὅτε μὲν ἔδει μάχεσθαι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς πολεμίοις, λιπὼν τὴν τάξιν ᾤχετο ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε, ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσῆκεν οἴκοι κινδυνεύειν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, πρεσβευτὴν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν προβαλόμενος προβαλόμενος A corr. ras.: προβαλλόμενος A pr. N. ᾤχετο ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδρὰς,

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ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβεύειν ἔδει περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, οὐκ ἂν ἔφασκεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθεῖν οὐδὲ τὸν ἕτερον πόδα, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς φυγάδας Ἀλέξανδρον ἔφασαν κατάγειν καὶ Νικάνωρ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἧκεν, ἀρχεθεωρὸν αὑτὸν ἐπέδωκε ἐπέδωκε Scaliger: ἀπέδωκε codd. τῇ βουλῇ. τοιοῦτος οὗτος, ἐν μὲν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν οἰκουρός, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οἴκοι μένουσι πρεσβευτής, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς δραπέτης ἐστίν.

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λέγε δὴPost δὴ lacunam susp. Maetzner, infra post ὑμῶν Weil.καὶ τὸ περὶ ζητήσεως τῶν χρημάτων ψήφισμα, ἃ Maetzner: codd. ἔγραψε Δημοσθένης τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ περὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ ὑμῶν, ἵνα παρʼ ἄλληλα θεωρήσαντες εἰδῆτε τὴν Δημοσθένους ἀπόνοιαν.Ψήφισμα

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ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβεύειν ἔδει περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, οὐκ ἂν ἔφασκεν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθεῖν οὐδὲ τὸν ἕτερον πόδα, ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς φυγάδας Ἀλέξανδρον ἔφασαν κατάγειν καὶ Νικάνωρ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἧκεν, ἀρχεθεωρὸν αὑτὸν ἐπέδωκε ἐπέδωκε Scaliger: ἀπέδωκε codd. τῇ βουλῇ. τοιοῦτος οὗτος, ἐν μὲν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν οἰκουρός, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οἴκοι μένουσι πρεσβευτής, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς δραπέτης ἐστίν.

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λέγε δὴPost δὴ lacunam susp. Maetzner, infra post ὑμῶν Weil.καὶ τὸ περὶ ζητήσεως τῶν χρημάτων ψήφισμα, ἃ Maetzner: codd. ἔγραψε Δημοσθένης τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ περὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ ὑμῶν, ἵνα παρʼ ἄλληλα θεωρήσαντες εἰδῆτε τὴν Δημοσθένους ἀπόνοιαν.Ψήφισμα

ἔγραψας σὺ τοῦτο, Δημόσθενες; ἔγραψας· οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν. ἐγένετο ἡ βουλὴ κυρία σοῦ προστάξαντος; ἐγένετο. τεθνᾶσι τῶν πολιτῶν ἄνδρες; τεθνᾶσι. κύριον ἦν τὸ σὸν ψήφισμα κατʼ ἐκείνων; ἀδύνατον ἀντειπεῖν.λέγε δὴ πάλιν ὃ Δημοσθένης κατὰ Δημοσθένους ἔγραψε. προσέχετε, ὦ ἄνδρες.Ψήφισμα

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ἡ βουλὴ εὕρηκε Δημοσθένην. τί δεῖ πολλῶν λόγων; ἀποπέφαγκεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν δίκαιον ἦν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ κεκριμένον εὐθὺς ἀποθνῄσκειν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἥκει χεῖρας τῶν τῶν . . . συνειλεγμένων . . . τῶν ὀμωμοκότων Stephanus (συνειλεγμένων iam Ald.): τοὺς . . . συνειλεγμένους . . . τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας codd. ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου συνειλεγμένων καὶ τῶν ὀμωμοκότωνSee the preceding note πείσεσθαι πείσεσθαι Baiter: πείθεσθαι codd. τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς τοῦ δήμου ψηφίσμασι, τί ποιήσετε; προήσεσθε τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὰ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δίκαια νομιζόμενα;

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ἡ βουλὴ εὕρηκε Δημοσθένην. τί δεῖ πολλῶν λόγων; ἀποπέφαγκεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν δίκαιον ἦν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ κεκριμένον εὐθὺς ἀποθνῄσκειν· ἐπειδὴ δʼ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἥκει χεῖρας τῶν τῶν . . . συνειλεγμένων . . . τῶν ὀμωμοκότων Stephanus (συνειλεγμένων iam Ald.): τοὺς . . . συνειλεγμένους . . . τοὺς ὀμωμοκότας codd. ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου συνειλεγμένων καὶ τῶν ὀμωμοκότωνSee the preceding note πείσεσθαι πείσεσθαι Baiter: πείθεσθαι codd. τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς τοῦ δήμου ψηφίσμασι, τί ποιήσετε; προήσεσθε τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὰ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δίκαια νομιζόμενα;

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μή, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μή· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ καὶ δεινόν, ἑτέρους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Δημοσθένους ψηφισμάτων, οὐδὲν ὄντας τούτου χείρους οὐδὲ τοσαῦτʼ ἠδικηκότας ὅσαπερ οὗτος, ἀπολωλέναι, τουτονὶ δὲ καταφρονοῦντα ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων ἀτιμώρητον ἐν τῇ πόλει περιιέναι, αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ὧν ἔγραψεν ἑαλωκότα. ταὐτὸ ταὐτὸ ταὐτὰ Dobree: τουτὶ τὸ . . . ταὐτὰ τὰ codd. συνέδριον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος, καὶ ταὐτὰSee preceding note δίκαια.

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μή, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μή· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ καὶ δεινόν, ἑτέρους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Δημοσθένους ψηφισμάτων, οὐδὲν ὄντας τούτου χείρους οὐδὲ τοσαῦτʼ ἠδικηκότας ὅσαπερ οὗτος, ἀπολωλέναι, τουτονὶ δὲ καταφρονοῦντα ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων ἀτιμώρητον ἐν τῇ πόλει περιιέναι, αὐτὸν ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων ὧν ἔγραψεν ἑαλωκότα. ταὐτὸ ταὐτὸ ταὐτὰ Dobree: τουτὶ τὸ . . . ταὐτὰ τὰ codd. συνέδριον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τόπος, καὶ ταὐτὰSee preceding note δίκαια.

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ὁ αὐτὸς ῥήτωρ ἐκείνοις τʼ αἴτιος ἐγένετο τῶν συμβάντων κακῶν καὶ αὑτῷ τῶν νῦν συμβησομένων. ἐπέτρεψεν [ὁ] del. Kleyn. αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ συνεδρίῳ τούτῳ κρῖναι περὶ αὑτοῦ, μάρτυρας ὑμᾶς πεποιημένος. ἔθετο συνθήκας μετὰ τοῦ δήμου, γράψας τὸ ψήφισμα καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ τὴν μητέρα τὴν μητέρα] τῇ μητρὶ Reiske. τῶν θεῶν, ἣ πάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι δικαίων φύλαξ τῇ πόλει καθέστηκε. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὅσιον ὑμῖν ἐστὶ ταύτας ἀκύρους ποιεῖν, οὐδὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀμωμοκόσι περὶ ταύτης τῆς κρίσεως ταῖς αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν πράξεσιν ἐναντίαν τὴν ψῆφον ἐνεγκεῖν.

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ὁ αὐτὸς ῥήτωρ ἐκείνοις τʼ αἴτιος ἐγένετο τῶν συμβάντων κακῶν καὶ αὑτῷ τῶν νῦν συμβησομένων. ἐπέτρεψεν [ὁ] del. Kleyn. αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῷ συνεδρίῳ τούτῳ κρῖναι περὶ αὑτοῦ, μάρτυρας ὑμᾶς πεποιημένος. ἔθετο συνθήκας μετὰ τοῦ δήμου, γράψας τὸ ψήφισμα καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ παρὰ τὴν μητέρα τὴν μητέρα] τῇ μητρὶ Reiske. τῶν θεῶν, ἣ πάντων τῶν ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι δικαίων φύλαξ τῇ πόλει καθέστηκε. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὅσιον ὑμῖν ἐστὶ ταύτας ἀκύρους ποιεῖν, οὐδὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀμωμοκόσι περὶ ταύτης τῆς κρίσεως ταῖς αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν πράξεσιν ἐναντίαν τὴν ψῆφον ἐνεγκεῖν.

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κρίσεως κρίσεως Blass: κρίσει codd. Ποσειδῶν ἀποτυχὼν τῆς τῆς . . . γενομένης Ν Α pr.: τοῖς . . . γενομένοις Α corr. (2): τῇ γενομένῃ Bekker. ὑπὲρ Ἁλιρροθίου πρὸς Ἄρη γενομένηςSee preceding note ἐνέμεινεν· ἐνέμειναν ἐνέμειναν hic add. Sauppe, infra post γενομένῃ Reiske. αὐταὶ αἰ σεμναὶ θεαὶ τῇ πρὸς Ὀρέστην ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνεδρίῳ κρίσει γενομένῃ καὶ τῇ τούτου ἀληθείᾳ συνοίκους ἑαυτὰς εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον κατέστησαν. ὑμεῖς δὲ τί ποιήσετε οἱ πάντων εἶναι φάσκοντες εὐσεβέστατοι; εὐσεβέστατοι Ν: εὐσεβέστεροι Α. τὴν τοῦ συνεδρίου γνώμην γνώμην Α: γνῶσιν Ν. ἄκυρον καταστήσετε τῇ Δημοσθένους ἐπακολουθήσαντες πονηρίᾳ; οὐκ, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι·

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κρίσεως κρίσεως Blass: κρίσει codd. Ποσειδῶν ἀποτυχὼν τῆς τῆς . . . γενομένης Ν Α pr.: τοῖς . . . γενομένοις Α corr. (2): τῇ γενομένῃ Bekker. ὑπὲρ Ἁλιρροθίου πρὸς Ἄρη γενομένηςSee preceding note ἐνέμεινεν· ἐνέμειναν ἐνέμειναν hic add. Sauppe, infra post γενομένῃ Reiske. αὐταὶ αἰ σεμναὶ θεαὶ τῇ πρὸς Ὀρέστην ἐν τούτῳ τῷ συνεδρίῳ κρίσει γενομένῃ καὶ τῇ τούτου ἀληθείᾳ συνοίκους ἑαυτὰς εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον κατέστησαν. ὑμεῖς δὲ τί ποιήσετε οἱ πάντων εἶναι φάσκοντες εὐσεβέστατοι; εὐσεβέστατοι Ν: εὐσεβέστεροι Α. τὴν τοῦ συνεδρίου γνώμην γνώμην Α: γνῶσιν Ν. ἄκυρον καταστήσετε τῇ Δημοσθένους ἐπακολουθήσαντες πονηρίᾳ; οὐκ, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι·

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οὐ γὰρ περὶ μικρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν τυχόντων ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ δικάζετε, ἀλλὰ περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης καὶ πρὸς τούτοις περὶ δωροδοκίας, ἔθους πονηροῦ καὶ πράγματος ἀλυσιτελοῦς ὑμῖν καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀπολωλεκότος. add. Reiske. εἰ μέν, καθʼ ὅσον ἐστὲ δυνατοί, ἐκβαλεῖτʼ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ παύσετε τοὺς ῥᾳδίως καθʼ ὑμῶν χρήματα λαμβάνοντας, σωθησόμεθα θεῶν βουλομένων· εἰ δʼ ἐπιτρέψετε τοῖς ῥήτορσι πωλεῖν ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, περιόψεσθε τὴν πόλιν ἀνατραπεῖσαν ὑπὸ τούτων.

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οὐ γὰρ περὶ μικρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν τυχόντων ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ δικάζετε, ἀλλὰ περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης καὶ πρὸς τούτοις περὶ δωροδοκίας, ἔθους πονηροῦ καὶ πράγματος ἀλυσιτελοῦς ὑμῖν καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀπολωλεκότος. add. Reiske. εἰ μέν, καθʼ ὅσον ἐστὲ δυνατοί, ἐκβαλεῖτʼ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ παύσετε τοὺς ῥᾳδίως καθʼ ὑμῶν χρήματα λαμβάνοντας, σωθησόμεθα θεῶν βουλομένων· εἰ δʼ ἐπιτρέψετε τοῖς ῥήτορσι πωλεῖν ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, περιόψεσθε τὴν πόλιν ἀνατραπεῖσαν ὑπὸ τούτων.

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ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης, ὡς δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα. οὕτως οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰπέ μοι, φυλάξομεν, φυλάξομεν Α: φυλάξωμεν Ν. ἐὰν σὺ μὲν εἴκοσι τάλαντα λαβὼν ἔχῃς ἰδίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ Wurm: ἴδια codd. ἕτερος δὲ πεντεκαίδεκα, Δημάδης δʼ ἑξακισχιλίους χρυσοῦ στατῆρας, ἕτεροι δʼ ὅσα δή ποτε ἀποπεφασμένοι εἰσί; τέτταρα τέτταρα Α corr. (2): τετρακόσια Α pr. N: διακόσια Thalheim. γὰρ τάλαντʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἑξήκοντα ἤδη εὑρημένα, ὧν οἴεσθε τὴν αἰτίαν τούτοις δεῖν τούτοις δεῖν (δεῖν post οἴεσθε iam Reiske) Blass: τουτοισὶν codd. ἀναθεῖναι.

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ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένης, ὡς δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἁρπάλου χρήματα. οὕτως οὖν, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰπέ μοι, φυλάξομεν, φυλάξομεν Α: φυλάξωμεν Ν. ἐὰν σὺ μὲν εἴκοσι τάλαντα λαβὼν ἔχῃς ἰδίᾳ, ἰδίᾳ Wurm: ἴδια codd. ἕτερος δὲ πεντεκαίδεκα, Δημάδης δʼ ἑξακισχιλίους χρυσοῦ στατῆρας, ἕτεροι δʼ ὅσα δή ποτε ἀποπεφασμένοι εἰσί; τέτταρα τέτταρα Α corr. (2): τετρακόσια Α pr. N: διακόσια Thalheim. γὰρ τάλαντʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἑξήκοντα ἤδη εὑρημένα, ὧν οἴεσθε τὴν αἰτίαν τούτοις δεῖν τούτοις δεῖν (δεῖν post οἴεσθε iam Reiske) Blass: τουτοισὶν codd. ἀναθεῖναι.

καὶ πότερα κάλλιόν ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ δικαιότερον, ἅπαντʼ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ φυλάττεσθαι, ἕως ἄν τι δίκαιον ὁ δῆμος βουλεύσηται, ἢ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐνίους διηρπακότας ἔχειν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαι τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ φυλάττειν παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ τούτους ἔχειν μηδένʼ ἂν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστι καλῶς ἔχον.

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πολλοὺς οὗτος εἴρηκε εἴρηκε Dobree: ἐρεῖ codd., ret. Wurm. καὶ παντοδαποὺς λόγους, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ οὐδεπώποτε οὐδεπώποτε] οὐδέποτε Wurm. τοὺς αὐτούς. ὁρᾷ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἐλπίσι κεναῖς καὶ ψευδέσι λόγοις ἐξηπατημένους ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μέχρι τούτου μνημονεύοντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις μέχρι μέχρι Blass: μέχρις codd. ἂν ῥηθῶσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τῆς Δημοσθένους πονηρίας καὶ ἀτυχίας ἀπολαύειν, ἵνα πλείω πλείω Ν: πλέον Α. κακοδαιμονῶμεν — οὐ οὐ Ν: οὐδὲ Α. γὰρ ἔχω τί ἄλλο εἴπω —,στερκτέον ἂν ἂν add. Bekker. εἴη τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν·

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πολλοὺς οὗτος εἴρηκε εἴρηκε Dobree: ἐρεῖ codd., ret. Wurm. καὶ παντοδαποὺς λόγους, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ οὐδεπώποτε οὐδεπώποτε] οὐδέποτε Wurm. τοὺς αὐτούς. ὁρᾷ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἐλπίσι κεναῖς καὶ ψευδέσι λόγοις ἐξηπατημένους ὑφʼ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μέχρι τούτου μνημονεύοντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις μέχρι μέχρι Blass: μέχρις codd. ἂν ῥηθῶσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τῆς Δημοσθένους πονηρίας καὶ ἀτυχίας ἀπολαύειν, ἵνα πλείω πλείω Ν: πλέον Α. κακοδαιμονῶμεν — οὐ οὐ Ν: οὐδὲ Α. γὰρ ἔχω τί ἄλλο εἴπω —,στερκτέον ἂν ἂν add. Bekker. εἴη τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν·

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εἰ δέ τι δέ τι Baiter: δʼ ἔτι codd. κηδόμεθα τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ δωροδόκους μισοῦμεν καὶ μετοιωνίσασθαι τὴν τύχην καὶ μεταλλάξασθαι βουλόμεθα, οὐ προετέον προετέον Wolf: προσεκτέον codd. ἐστὶν ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῖς τοῦ μιαροῦ καὶ γόητος τούτου δεήσεσιν, οὐδὲ προσδεκτέον τοὺς οἴκτους καὶ τοὺς φενακισμοὺς τοὺς τοὺς add. Baiter et Sauppe. τούτου· ἱκανὴν γὰρ εἰλήφατε πεῖραν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῆς τύχης.

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εἰ δέ τι δέ τι Baiter: δʼ ἔτι codd. κηδόμεθα τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ δωροδόκους μισοῦμεν καὶ μετοιωνίσασθαι τὴν τύχην καὶ μεταλλάξασθαι βουλόμεθα, οὐ προετέον προετέον Wolf: προσεκτέον codd. ἐστὶν ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῖς τοῦ μιαροῦ καὶ γόητος τούτου δεήσεσιν, οὐδὲ προσδεκτέον τοὺς οἴκτους καὶ τοὺς φενακισμοὺς τοὺς τοὺς add. Baiter et Sauppe. τούτου· ἱκανὴν γὰρ εἰλήφατε πεῖραν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῆς τύχης.

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τίς οὕτως εὔελπις ὑμῶν ἐστιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τίς οὕτως ἀλόγιστος, τίς τῶν προγεγενημένων καὶ νῦν ἐνεστηκότων πραγμάτων ἄπειρος, ὅστις ὅστις Ald.: τίς codd. ἐλπίζει τὸν ἐκ τοσαύτης εὐδαιμονίας εἰς τοσαύτην ἀδοξίαν καταστήσαντα τὴν πόλιν, διʼ ἡντιναδήποτε αἰτίαν ἢ τύχην — ἐῶ γὰρ τοῦτο — νῦν, τοῦτο — νῦν, Gebauer: τοῦτο νῦν — codd. ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀπορίαις καὶ τοῖς περιεστηκόσιν ἡμᾶς κινδύνοις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως δωροδοκία προσγέγονε, καὶ περὶ αἰσχρᾶς αἰτίας κοινῇ πάντες ἀγωνιζόμεθα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν τὰ ἰδίᾳ ἰδίᾳ Bekker: ἰδία A corr. (2): ἴδια A pr. N. παρά τισιν ὄντα χρήματα κοινῇ τὸν δῆμον ἔχειν, τηνικαῦτα συμβουλεύοντα καὶ διοικοῦντα τοῦτον σώσειν ὑμᾶς;

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τίς οὕτως εὔελπις ὑμῶν ἐστιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τίς οὕτως ἀλόγιστος, τίς τῶν προγεγενημένων καὶ νῦν ἐνεστηκότων πραγμάτων ἄπειρος, ὅστις ὅστις Ald.: τίς codd. ἐλπίζει τὸν ἐκ τοσαύτης εὐδαιμονίας εἰς τοσαύτην ἀδοξίαν καταστήσαντα τὴν πόλιν, διʼ ἡντιναδήποτε αἰτίαν ἢ τύχην — ἐῶ γὰρ τοῦτο — νῦν, τοῦτο — νῦν, Gebauer: τοῦτο νῦν — codd. ἐπειδὴ πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀπορίαις καὶ τοῖς περιεστηκόσιν ἡμᾶς κινδύνοις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως δωροδοκία προσγέγονε, καὶ περὶ αἰσχρᾶς αἰτίας κοινῇ πάντες ἀγωνιζόμεθα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν τὰ ἰδίᾳ ἰδίᾳ Bekker: ἰδία A corr. (2): ἴδια A pr. N. παρά τισιν ὄντα χρήματα κοινῇ τὸν δῆμον ἔχειν, τηνικαῦτα συμβουλεύοντα καὶ διοικοῦντα τοῦτον σώσειν ὑμᾶς;

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ἐῶ γὰρ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβαλλόμενος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ δημηγορῶν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς διατετέλεκε, διατετέλεκε Ν: τετέλεκε Α. καὶ τοτὲ μὲν γράφων καὶ ἀπαγορεύων μηδένα νομίζειν ἄλλον θεὸν ἢ τοὺς παραδεδομένους, τοτὲ δὲ λέγων ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸν δῆμον ἀμφισβητεῖν τῶν ἐν τῷ τῷ add. N. οὐρανῷ τιμῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃ κριθήσεσθαι παρʼ ὑμῖν, Καλλιμέδοντα εἰσαγγέλλων συνιέναι ἐν Μεγάροις τοῖς φυγάσιν ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου, καὶ ταύτην τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν εὐθὺς παραχρῆμα ἀναιρούμενος,

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ἐῶ γὰρ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβαλλόμενος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ δημηγορῶν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς διατετέλεκε, διατετέλεκε Ν: τετέλεκε Α. καὶ τοτὲ μὲν γράφων καὶ ἀπαγορεύων μηδένα νομίζειν ἄλλον θεὸν ἢ τοὺς παραδεδομένους, τοτὲ δὲ λέγων ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸν δῆμον ἀμφισβητεῖν τῶν ἐν τῷ τῷ add. N. οὐρανῷ τιμῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃ κριθήσεσθαι παρʼ ὑμῖν, Καλλιμέδοντα εἰσαγγέλλων συνιέναι ἐν Μεγάροις τοῖς φυγάσιν ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου, καὶ ταύτην τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν εὐθὺς παραχρῆμα ἀναιρούμενος,

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ταύτῃ τῇ πρώην γεγενημένῃ προσάγων καὶ κατασκευάζων ψευδῆ μηνυτὴν ὡς ἐπιβουλευομένων τῶν νεωρίων, καὶ περὶ τούτων γράφων μὲν οὐδέν, αἰτίας δʼ ἕνεκα τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος παρασκευάζων· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑμεῖς τούτῳ μάρτυρές ἐστε. γόης οὗτος, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μιαρὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τῷ γένει τῆς πόλεως πολίτης οὔτε τοῖς πεπολιτευμένοις αὐτῷ καὶ πεπραγμένοις.

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ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Εὐβούλου, τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τούτου πολιτευομένου γεγόνασι; πότε οὗτος ἢ διὰ ψηφίσματος ἢ νόμου ἐπηνώρθωσε τὸ ἱππικόν; τίνα κατεσκεύασε δύναμιν τοιούτων καιρῶν παραγενομένων μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην, ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικήν; τίς ἀνενήνεκται ἀνενήνεκται Bekker: ἀνήνεκται codd. τῇ θεῷ κόσμος εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ὑπὸ τούτου; τί κατεσκεύακεν οἰκοδόμημα Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ ἐμπορίῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἢ ἄλλοθί που τῆς χώρας; οὐδεὶς ἂν ἂν Stephanus: οὖν codd. οὐδαμοῦ δείξειεν.

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ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Εὐβούλου, τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοικοι τούτου πολιτευομένου γεγόνασι; πότε οὗτος ἢ διὰ ψηφίσματος ἢ νόμου ἐπηνώρθωσε τὸ ἱππικόν; τίνα κατεσκεύασε δύναμιν τοιούτων καιρῶν παραγενομένων μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχην, ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικήν; τίς ἀνενήνεκται ἀνενήνεκται Bekker: ἀνήνεκται codd. τῇ θεῷ κόσμος εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ὑπὸ τούτου; τί κατεσκεύακεν οἰκοδόμημα Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ ἐμπορίῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἢ ἄλλοθί που τῆς χώρας; οὐδεὶς ἂν ἂν Stephanus: οὖν codd. οὐδαμοῦ δείξειεν.

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ἔπειτα τὸν ἐν μὲν ἐν μὲν Blass: μὲν ἐν codd. ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεσιν ἄπιστον γεγενημένον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίαις ἄχρηστον, περιεορακότα δὲ τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους ἅπαντα διαπεπραγμένους διαπεπραγμένους A corr. (2): δὲ πεπραγμένους A pr. N. ὅσʼ ἐβουλήθησαν, μεταβεβλημένον δʼ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πράξεις ἐγκαταλελοιπότα, τοῦτον περιποιῆσαι βουλήσεσθε; βουλήσεσθε Dobree: βούλεσθε codd.

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ἔπειτα τὸν ἐν μὲν ἐν μὲν Blass: μὲν ἐν codd. ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεσιν ἄπιστον γεγενημένον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίαις ἄχρηστον, περιεορακότα δὲ τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους ἅπαντα διαπεπραγμένους διαπεπραγμένους A corr. (2): δὲ πεπραγμένους A pr. N. ὅσʼ ἐβουλήθησαν, μεταβεβλημένον δʼ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πράξεις ἐγκαταλελοιπότα, τοῦτον περιποιῆσαι βουλήσεσθε; βουλήσεσθε Dobree: βούλεσθε codd.

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οὐκ, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε καὶ καλῶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως βουλεύησθε βουλεύησθε A corr.: βουλεύεσθε A pr. N.· ἀλλὰ δέξεσθε δέξεσθε Dobree: δέξασθε codd. τὴν ἀγαθὴν τύχην, ἣ τιμωρήσασθαι παρέδωκε τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δωροδοκίαν ταπεινὴν πεποιηκότας, καὶ φυλάξεσθε, φυλάξεσθε Dobree: φυλάξασθε codd. καθάπερ οἱ θεοὶ προειρήκασιν ὑμῖν ἐν ταῖς μαντείαις πολλάκις, τοὺς τοιούτους ἡγεμόνας καὶ συμβούλους. ἀκούσατε δʼ αὐτῆς τῆς μαντείας. λέγε τὴν μαντείαν.

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οὐκ, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε καὶ καλῶς καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως βουλεύησθε βουλεύησθε A corr.: βουλεύεσθε A pr. N.· ἀλλὰ δέξεσθε δέξεσθε Dobree: δέξασθε codd. τὴν ἀγαθὴν τύχην, ἣ τιμωρήσασθαι παρέδωκε τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δωροδοκίαν ταπεινὴν πεποιηκότας, καὶ φυλάξεσθε, φυλάξεσθε Dobree: φυλάξασθε codd. καθάπερ οἱ θεοὶ προειρήκασιν ὑμῖν ἐν ταῖς μαντείαις πολλάκις, τοὺς τοιούτους ἡγεμόνας καὶ συμβούλους. ἀκούσατε δʼ αὐτῆς τῆς μαντείας. λέγε τὴν μαντείαν.

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πῶς οὖν μίαν γνώμην ἕξομεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι; πῶς ὁμονοήσομεν ὁμονοήσομεν Α: ὁμονοήσωμεν Ν. ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων, ὅταν οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ χρήματα λαμβάνοντες προϊῶνται τὰ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντα, καὶ ὑμεῖς μὲν καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἅπας κινδυνεύῃ περὶ τοῦ ἐδάφους τοῦ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν πατρῴων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν, οἱ δὲ διηλλαγμένοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις λοιδορῶνται καὶ προσκρούωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐξεπίτηδες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταὐτὰ Wolf: τὰ αὐτὰ Ν: ταῦτα Α. πράττωσιν ἐξαπατῶντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥᾷστα πειθομένους τοῖς τούτων λόγοις;

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πῶς οὖν μίαν γνώμην ἕξομεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι; πῶς ὁμονοήσομεν ὁμονοήσομεν Α: ὁμονοήσωμεν Ν. ἅπαντες ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων, ὅταν οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ χρήματα λαμβάνοντες προϊῶνται τὰ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέροντα, καὶ ὑμεῖς μὲν καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἅπας κινδυνεύῃ περὶ τοῦ ἐδάφους τοῦ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν πατρῴων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν, οἱ δὲ διηλλαγμένοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις λοιδορῶνται καὶ προσκρούωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐξεπίτηδες, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταὐτὰ Wolf: τὰ αὐτὰ Ν: ταῦτα Α. πράττωσιν ἐξαπατῶντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ῥᾷστα πειθομένους τοῖς τούτων λόγοις;

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τί γάρ ἐστι ῥήτορος δημοτικοῦ καὶ μισοῦντος τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας καὶ γράφοντας; ἢ τί φασι τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν ὑμῶν Reiske: ἡμῶν codd. γεγενημένους, ὦ Δημόσθενες καὶ Πολύευκτε, διατελεῖν ποιοῦντας; καὶ ταῦτʼ οὐδενὸς δεινοῦ τότε τὴν πόλιν περιεστηκότος. οὐ κρίνειν ἀλλήλους; οὐκ εἰσαγγέλλειν; οὐ γράφεσθαι παρανόμων; ἔστιν οὖν ὅ τι πεποιήκατε τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ φάσκοντες τοῦ δήμου κήδεσθαι καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ τούτων εἶναι ψήφῳ;

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τί γάρ ἐστι ῥήτορος δημοτικοῦ καὶ μισοῦντος τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας καὶ γράφοντας; ἢ τί φασι τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν ὑμῶν Reiske: ἡμῶν codd. γεγενημένους, ὦ Δημόσθενες καὶ Πολύευκτε, διατελεῖν ποιοῦντας; καὶ ταῦτʼ οὐδενὸς δεινοῦ τότε τὴν πόλιν περιεστηκότος. οὐ κρίνειν ἀλλήλους; οὐκ εἰσαγγέλλειν; οὐ γράφεσθαι παρανόμων; ἔστιν οὖν ὅ τι πεποιήκατε τούτων ὑμεῖς οἱ φάσκοντες τοῦ δήμου κήδεσθαι καὶ τὴν σωτηρίαν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ τούτων εἶναι ψήφῳ;

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γέγραψαι ψήφισμα, Δημόσθενες, πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ δεινῶν παρανόμων ὧν Δημάδης γέγραφε; κεκώλυκας τινὰ πρᾶξιν ὧν ἐκεῖνος προελόμενος κατὰ τοῦ δήμου πεπολίτευται; οὐδʼ ἡντινοῦν. εἰσήγγελκας τὸν παρὰ τὰ τὰ . . . ψηφίσματα Reiske: τὸ . . . ψήφισμα codd. τοῦ δήμου ψηφίσματαSee preceding note καὶ τοὺς νόμους πολλὰ διαπεπραγμένον; οὐδεπώποτε, οὐδεπώποτε Α: οὐδέποτε Ν. ἀλλὰ περιεῖδες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ χαλκοῦν σταθέντα καὶ τῆς ἐν ἐν πρυτανείῳ Α (cf. 43): ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ Ν. πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως κεκοινωνηκότα τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀπογόνοις.

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γέγραψαι ψήφισμα, Δημόσθενες, πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ δεινῶν παρανόμων ὧν Δημάδης γέγραφε; κεκώλυκας τινὰ πρᾶξιν ὧν ἐκεῖνος προελόμενος κατὰ τοῦ δήμου πεπολίτευται; οὐδʼ ἡντινοῦν. εἰσήγγελκας τὸν παρὰ τὰ τὰ . . . ψηφίσματα Reiske: τὸ . . . ψήφισμα codd. τοῦ δήμου ψηφίσματαSee preceding note καὶ τοὺς νόμους πολλὰ διαπεπραγμένον; οὐδεπώποτε, οὐδεπώποτε Α: οὐδέποτε Ν. ἀλλὰ περιεῖδες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ χαλκοῦν σταθέντα καὶ τῆς ἐν ἐν πρυτανείῳ Α (cf. 43): ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ Ν. πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως κεκοινωνηκότα τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀπογόνοις.

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ἔπειτα ποῦ τῆς εὐνοίας τῆς σῆς ὁ δῆμος ἔλαβε πεῖραν, ἢ ποῦ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος βοήθειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐξεταζομένην εἴδομεν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα φήσετʼ εἶναι δεινοί, εἰ παρακρούεσθε παρακρούεσθε Blass: παρακρούσησθε Ν: παρακρούσετε Α: παρακρούετεDobree. τούτους ἀεὶ λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω τῆς πατρίδος ὑμῖν ἐξελθεῖν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη καταφυγὴ χωρὶς τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐνοίας; φανεροὺς ἐχρῆν γεγενημένους ἀντιπράττοντας καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ τοῖς κατὰ τοῦ δήμου γραφομένοις ψηφίσμασιν, οὕτω πείθειν τούτους λέγοντας ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑμῖν οὐδεμία σωτηρία χωρὶς τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου βοηθείας.

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ἔπειτα ποῦ τῆς εὐνοίας τῆς σῆς ὁ δῆμος ἔλαβε πεῖραν, ἢ ποῦ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος βοήθειαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐξεταζομένην εἴδομεν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα φήσετʼ εἶναι δεινοί, εἰ παρακρούεσθε παρακρούεσθε Blass: παρακρούσησθε Ν: παρακρούσετε Α: παρακρούετεDobree. τούτους ἀεὶ λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξω τῆς πατρίδος ὑμῖν ἐξελθεῖν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη καταφυγὴ χωρὶς τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐνοίας; φανεροὺς ἐχρῆν γεγενημένους ἀντιπράττοντας καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ τοῖς κατὰ τοῦ δήμου γραφομένοις ψηφίσμασιν, οὕτω πείθειν τούτους λέγοντας ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑμῖν οὐδεμία σωτηρία χωρὶς τῆς παρὰ τοῦ δήμου βοηθείας.

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ὑμεῖς δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχετε, ἁμιλλώμενοι ταῖς κολακείαις πρὸς τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου πράττειν καὶ δῶρʼ εἰληφέναι παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὧνπερ νῦν ἀποπέφαγκεν ὑμᾶς ἡ βουλή, καὶ σύ, πάντων ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων Maetzner: ἐναντίων τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ν: τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον Α. διειλεγμένος Νικάνορι καὶ κεχρηματικὼς [ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ] ἐν Ὀλυμπία del. Kleyn. περὶ ὧν ἐβουλήθης, ἐλεεινὸν νῦν σεαυτὸν κατασκευάζεις προδότης ὢν καὶ δωροδόκος, ὡς ἐπιλησομένους ἐπιλησομένους Stephanus: ἐπιμελησομένους codd. τούτους τῆς σῆς πονηρίας, καὶ οὐ δώσων δίκην ὑπὲρ ὧν εἴληψαι πεποιηκώς,

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ὑμεῖς δʼ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχετε, ἁμιλλώμενοι ταῖς κολακείαις πρὸς τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου πράττειν καὶ δῶρʼ εἰληφέναι παρὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὧνπερ νῦν ἀποπέφαγκεν ὑμᾶς ἡ βουλή, καὶ σύ, πάντων ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων Maetzner: ἐναντίων τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ν: τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναντίον Α. διειλεγμένος Νικάνορι καὶ κεχρηματικὼς [ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ] ἐν Ὀλυμπία del. Kleyn. περὶ ὧν ἐβουλήθης, ἐλεεινὸν νῦν σεαυτὸν κατασκευάζεις προδότης ὢν καὶ δωροδόκος, ὡς ἐπιλησομένους ἐπιλησομένους Stephanus: ἐπιμελησομένους codd. τούτους τῆς σῆς πονηρίας, καὶ οὐ δώσων δίκην ὑπὲρ ὧν εἴληψαι πεποιηκώς,

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τοσούτῳ τολμηρότερον Δημάδου, ὥσθʼ ὁ μὲν προειρηκὼς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν, καὶ ὁμολογῶν λαμβάνειν καὶ λήψεσθαι, ὅμως οὐ τετόλμηκε τούτοις τετόλμηκε τούτοις Ν: τετόλμηκεν αὐτοῖς Α. δεῖξαι δεῖξαι Α: ἐνδεῖξαι Ν. τὸ πρόσωπον, οὐδʼ ἐναντία τῇ βουλῆς ἀποφάσει λέγειν ἠξίωσε — καίτοι οὐκ ἔγραψεν ἐκεῖνος περὶ αὑτοῦ κυρίαν εἶναι τὴν βουλήν, οὐδὲ θάνατον ὡρίσατο, ἐὰν ἀποφανθῇ χρήματʼ εἰληφώς — σὺ δʼ οὕτω σφόδρα πεπίστευκας τοῖς σεαυτοῦ λόγοις καὶ καταπεφρόνηκας τῆς τούτων εὐηθείας, ὥστε πείσειν οἴει τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς μόνου σοῦ κατέψευσται τὸ συνέδριον καὶ μόνον οὐκ εἰληφότα σε τὸ χρυσίον ἀποπέφαγκεν. καὶ τίς ἂν ταῦτα πεισθείη;

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τοσούτῳ τολμηρότερον Δημάδου, ὥσθʼ ὁ μὲν προειρηκὼς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν αὑτοῦ τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν, καὶ ὁμολογῶν λαμβάνειν καὶ λήψεσθαι, ὅμως οὐ τετόλμηκε τούτοις τετόλμηκε τούτοις Ν: τετόλμηκεν αὐτοῖς Α. δεῖξαι δεῖξαι Α: ἐνδεῖξαι Ν. τὸ πρόσωπον, οὐδʼ ἐναντία τῇ βουλῆς ἀποφάσει λέγειν ἠξίωσε — καίτοι οὐκ ἔγραψεν ἐκεῖνος περὶ αὑτοῦ κυρίαν εἶναι τὴν βουλήν, οὐδὲ θάνατον ὡρίσατο, ἐὰν ἀποφανθῇ χρήματʼ εἰληφώς — σὺ δʼ οὕτω σφόδρα πεπίστευκας τοῖς σεαυτοῦ λόγοις καὶ καταπεφρόνηκας τῆς τούτων εὐηθείας, ὥστε πείσειν οἴει τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς μόνου σοῦ κατέψευσται τὸ συνέδριον καὶ μόνον οὐκ εἰληφότα σε τὸ χρυσίον ἀποπέφαγκεν. καὶ τίς ἂν ταῦτα πεισθείη;

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ὁρᾶτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τί μέλλετε ποιεῖν. παρειλήφατε παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ γεγενημένον εἰδότος, εἰδότος Emperius: εἶδος codd.: ἤδη Ald. τιμωρίας δʼ ἕνεκα τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἐνόχων ὄντων ταῖς ἀποφάσεσιPost ἀποφάσεσι punctum habet Blass. Δημοσθένης εἰσάγεται πρῶτος. κατηγορήκαμεν ἡμεῖς, οὐδὲν οὐδὲν add. Reiske. οὐδενὶ καταχαρισάμενοι τῶν κοινῶν δικαίων.

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ὁρᾶτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τί μέλλετε ποιεῖν. παρειλήφατε παρὰ τοῦ δήμου τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ γεγενημένον εἰδότος, εἰδότος Emperius: εἶδος codd.: ἤδη Ald. τιμωρίας δʼ ἕνεκα τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἐνόχων ὄντων ταῖς ἀποφάσεσιPost ἀποφάσεσι punctum habet Blass. Δημοσθένης εἰσάγεται πρῶτος. κατηγορήκαμεν ἡμεῖς, οὐδὲν οὐδὲν add. Reiske. οὐδενὶ καταχαρισάμενοι τῶν κοινῶν δικαίων.

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πότερʼ ἀμελήσαντες τῶν γεγενημένων ἁπάντων ἀφήσετε τὸν πρῶτον εἰσεληλυθότα πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ τὰ δίκαια [τὰ] τὰ del. Sauppe. παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου δόξαντʼ εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις, ταῦθʼ ὑμεῖς οἱ κύριοι πάντων λύσετε, καὶ τὴν πονηρίαν αὐτοὶ τὴν τούτων ἀναδέξεσθε;

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πότερʼ ἀμελήσαντες τῶν γεγενημένων ἁπάντων ἀφήσετε τὸν πρῶτον εἰσεληλυθότα πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ τὰ δίκαια [τὰ] τὰ del. Sauppe. παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου δόξαντʼ εἶναι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις, ταῦθʼ ὑμεῖς οἱ κύριοι πάντων λύσετε, καὶ τὴν πονηρίαν αὐτοὶ τὴν τούτων ἀναδέξεσθε;

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ἢ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παράδειγμα ἐξοίσετε κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, ὅτι μισεῖτε τοὺς προδότας καὶ τοὺς χρημάτων ἕνεκα προϊεμένους τὰ τοῦ δήμου συμφέροντα; ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντʼ ἐστὶν ἐφʼ ὑμῖν νῦν, καὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι ὄντες τὴν ἁπάσης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχετε, καὶ ἡ τήμερον ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ ὑμετέρα ψῆφος πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῇ τῇ Α: ἐν τῇ Ν. πόλει καταστήσει τὰ δίκαια ὑμῶν ἐθελόντων κρίνειν, ἢ μοχθηρὰς ἐλπίδας ποιήσετε πάντας ἔχειν τοιαῦθʼ ὑμῶν ἔθη καθιστάντων.

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ἢ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παράδειγμα ἐξοίσετε κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, ὅτι μισεῖτε τοὺς προδότας καὶ τοὺς χρημάτων ἕνεκα προϊεμένους τὰ τοῦ δήμου συμφέροντα; ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντʼ ἐστὶν ἐφʼ ὑμῖν νῦν, καὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι ὄντες τὴν ἁπάσης τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχετε, καὶ ἡ τήμερον ἡμέρα καὶ ἡ ὑμετέρα ψῆφος πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῇ τῇ Α: ἐν τῇ Ν. πόλει καταστήσει τὰ δίκαια ὑμῶν ἐθελόντων κρίνειν, ἢ μοχθηρὰς ἐλπίδας ποιήσετε πάντας ἔχειν τοιαῦθʼ ὑμῶν ἔθη καθιστάντων.

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οὐ καταπληκτέον ἐστίν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲ προετέον, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, τοῖς Δημοσθένους ἐλέοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ δικαίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀπολογίαν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὑμῶν ἠνάγκαζε τοῦτον τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα χρήματα λαμβάνειν λαμβάνειν Wolf: λαμβάνοντα codd.: λαυβάνειν τὰ Ald. καθʼ ὑμῶν, πολλῷ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν διʼ ὑμᾶς ἕτερα κεκτημένον, οὐδʼ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι A pr.: ἀπολεῖσθαι A corr. ras. N. νῦν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδικημάτων, γράψαντα καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν· ἀλλʼ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου ἔμφυτος αἰσχροκέρδεια καὶ πονηρία ταῦτʼ εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῷ τέτροφε. τέτροφε Blass: τέτραφε codd.

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οὐ καταπληκτέον ἐστίν, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲ προετέον, ἐὰν σωφρονῆτε, τοῖς Δημοσθένους ἐλέοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ δικαίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀπολογίαν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὑμῶν ἠνάγκαζε τοῦτον τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα χρήματα λαμβάνειν λαμβάνειν Wolf: λαμβάνοντα codd.: λαυβάνειν τὰ Ald. καθʼ ὑμῶν, πολλῷ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν διʼ ὑμᾶς ἕτερα κεκτημένον, οὐδʼ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι A pr.: ἀπολεῖσθαι A corr. ras. N. νῦν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀδικημάτων, γράψαντα καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν· ἀλλʼ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου ἔμφυτος αἰσχροκέρδεια καὶ πονηρία ταῦτʼ εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῷ τέτροφε. τέτροφε Blass: τέτραφε codd.

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μὴ οὖν ἄχθεσθʼ αὐτοῦ κλαίοντος καὶ ὀδυρομένου· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον ἐλεήσαιτε ἐλεήσαιτε Dobree: ἐλεήσετε codd. τὴν χώραν, ἣν οὗτος καθίστησιν εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους τοιαῦτα πράττων, ἣ τοὺς ἐξ αὑτῆς γεγενημένους ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύει, παραστησαμένη τὰ ὑμέτερα τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας, τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν προδότην καὶ σῴζειν ἑαυτήν, ὑπὲρ ἧς οἱ πρόγονοι πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς] del. Baiter. κινδύνους ὑπομείναντες ἐλευθέραν ὑμῖν αὐτὴν παραδεδώκασιν, ἐν ᾗ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ παραδείγματα λέλειπται τῆς τῶν τελευτησάντων ἀρετῆς.

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μὴ οὖν ἄχθεσθʼ αὐτοῦ κλαίοντος καὶ ὀδυρομένου· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν δικαιότερον ἐλεήσαιτε ἐλεήσαιτε Dobree: ἐλεήσετε codd. τὴν χώραν, ἣν οὗτος καθίστησιν εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους τοιαῦτα πράττων, ἣ τοὺς ἐξ αὑτῆς γεγενημένους ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύει, παραστησαμένη τὰ ὑμέτερα τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας, τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν προδότην καὶ σῴζειν ἑαυτήν, ὑπὲρ ἧς οἱ πρόγονοι πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς] del. Baiter. κινδύνους ὑπομείναντες ἐλευθέραν ὑμῖν αὐτὴν παραδεδώκασιν, ἐν ᾗ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ παραδείγματα λέλειπται τῆς τῶν τελευτησάντων ἀρετῆς.

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εἰς ταύτην ἀποβλέψαντας, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνομένας πατρίους θυσίας καὶ τὰς τῶν προγόνων θήκας φέρειν δεῖ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας τὴν ψῆφον. καὶ ὅταν Δημοσθένης ἐξαπατῆσαι βουλόμενος καὶ παρακρουόμενος ὑμᾶς ὑμᾶς Α: ἡμᾶς Ν. οἰκτίζηται καὶ δακρύῃ, ὑμεῖς εἰς τὸ τῆς πόλεως σῶμʼ ἀποβλέψαντες καὶ τὴν πρότερον δόξαν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῇ Ν: αὐτῇ ὑπάρχουσαν Α. αὐτῇ ἀντίθετε, πότερον ἡ πόλις ἐλεεινοτέρα διὰ τοῦτον γέγονεν ἢ διὰ τὴν πόλιν Δημοσθένης.

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εἰς ταύτην ἀποβλέψαντας, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ γιγνομένας πατρίους θυσίας καὶ τὰς τῶν προγόνων θήκας φέρειν δεῖ τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας τὴν ψῆφον. καὶ ὅταν Δημοσθένης ἐξαπατῆσαι βουλόμενος καὶ παρακρουόμενος ὑμᾶς ὑμᾶς Α: ἡμᾶς Ν. οἰκτίζηται καὶ δακρύῃ, ὑμεῖς εἰς τὸ τῆς πόλεως σῶμʼ ἀποβλέψαντες καὶ τὴν πρότερον δόξαν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῇ Ν: αὐτῇ ὑπάρχουσαν Α. αὐτῇ ἀντίθετε, πότερον ἡ πόλις ἐλεεινοτέρα διὰ τοῦτον γέγονεν ἢ διὰ τὴν πόλιν Δημοσθένης.

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εὑρήσετε γὰρ τοῦτον μὲν λαμπρὸν ἐξ οὗ προσελήλυθε πρὸς προσελήλυθε πρὸς Ν: προσελήλυθεν εἰς Α. τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι γεγενημένον, καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν λογογράφου καὶ μισθοῦ τὰς δίκας λέγοντος ὑπὲρ Κτησίππου καὶ Φορμίωνος καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν πλουσιώτατον πλουσιώτατον Ν: πλουσιώτερον Α. ὄντα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἀντὶ δʼ ἀγνῶτος καὶ οὐδεμίαν πατρικὴν δόξαν παρὰ τῶν προγόνων παρειληφότος ἔνδοξον γεγενημένον, τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐκ ἀξίως ἑαυτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς τῶν προγόνων δόξης διακειμένην. ἀφέντες οὖν τοὺς ἐλέους καὶ τοὺς φενακισμοὺς τοὺς τούτου τὴν ὁσίαν καὶ δικαίαν φέρετε ψῆφον, καὶ σκοπεῖτε τὸ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον, μὴ τὸ τὸ Α: τῷ Ν. Δημοσθένει· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δικαστῶν ἔργον.

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εὑρήσετε γὰρ τοῦτον μὲν λαμπρὸν ἐξ οὗ προσελήλυθε πρὸς προσελήλυθε πρὸς Ν: προσελήλυθεν εἰς Α. τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι γεγενημένον, καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν λογογράφου καὶ μισθοῦ τὰς δίκας λέγοντος ὑπὲρ Κτησίππου καὶ Φορμίωνος καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν πλουσιώτατον πλουσιώτατον Ν: πλουσιώτερον Α. ὄντα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἀντὶ δʼ ἀγνῶτος καὶ οὐδεμίαν πατρικὴν δόξαν παρὰ τῶν προγόνων παρειληφότος ἔνδοξον γεγενημένον, τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐκ ἀξίως ἑαυτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς τῶν προγόνων δόξης διακειμένην. ἀφέντες οὖν τοὺς ἐλέους καὶ τοὺς φενακισμοὺς τοὺς τούτου τὴν ὁσίαν καὶ δικαίαν φέρετε ψῆφον, καὶ σκοπεῖτε τὸ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον, μὴ τὸ τὸ Α: τῷ Ν. Δημοσθένει· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δικαστῶν ἔργον.

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καὶ ὅταν ἀναβαίνῃ τις συνηγορήσων Δημοσθένει. λογίζεσθʼ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἔνοχος ὢν ταῖς μελλούσαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἀναβαίνει, κακόνους ἐστὶ τῇ πολιτεία, καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ δῶρα λαμβάνοντας οὐ βουλόμενος δίκην δοῦναι καὶ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν ὑμετέρων σωμάτων φυλακήν, ἐφʼ ᾗ τέτακται τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, καταλυθῆναι βούλεται καὶ συγκεχύσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει δίκαια· εἰ δὲ ῥήτωρ ἢ στρατηγός, οἳ τὴν προσδοκωμένην καθʼ αὑτῶν ἀπόφασιν ἄπιστον βουλόμενοι γενέσθαι συνηγοροῦσιν, οὐ προσεκτέον ὑμῖν ἐστι τοῖς τούτων λόγοις, εἰδότας ὅτι ἐκ πάντων τούτων γεγένηται γεγένηται Maetzner: γίνεται codd. συνεργία περὶ τὸν Ἁρπάλου κατάπλουν καὶ τὴν ἄφεσιν.

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καὶ ὅταν ἀναβαίνῃ τις συνηγορήσων Δημοσθένει. λογίζεσθʼ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἔνοχος ὢν ταῖς μελλούσαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἀναβαίνει, κακόνους ἐστὶ τῇ πολιτεία, καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ δῶρα λαμβάνοντας οὐ βουλόμενος δίκην δοῦναι καὶ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν ὑμετέρων σωμάτων φυλακήν, ἐφʼ ᾗ τέτακται τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συνέδριον, καταλυθῆναι βούλεται καὶ συγκεχύσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει δίκαια· εἰ δὲ ῥήτωρ ἢ στρατηγός, οἳ τὴν προσδοκωμένην καθʼ αὑτῶν ἀπόφασιν ἄπιστον βουλόμενοι γενέσθαι συνηγοροῦσιν, οὐ προσεκτέον ὑμῖν ἐστι τοῖς τούτων λόγοις, εἰδότας ὅτι ἐκ πάντων τούτων γεγένηται γεγένηται Maetzner: γίνεται codd. συνεργία περὶ τὸν Ἁρπάλου κατάπλουν καὶ τὴν ἄφεσιν.

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νομίσαντες οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καθʼ ὑμῶν πάντας τούτους ἀναβαίνειν καὶ κοινοὺς ἐχθροὺς εἶναι τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης, μὴ ἀποδέχεσθʼ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ κελεύετʼ ἀπολογεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν κατηγορημένων· μηδὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τούτου μανίαν, ὃς μέγα φρονεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν φανερὸς φανερὸς Α: φανερῶς Ν. ὑμῖν γένηται δωροδοκῶν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐξελήλεγκται φενακίζων ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ add. Reiske. τιμωρήσασθε ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίως. εἰ δὲ μή, μιᾷ ψήφῳ καὶ ἑνὶ ἀγῶνι πάντας τοὺς ἀποπεφασμένους καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀφέντες εἰς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὴν τούτων δωροδοκίαν τρέψετε, κἂν κἂν N corr. A corr.: κα. N pr.: καὶ A pr.: κᾆθʼ Blass. ὕστερον ἐγκαλῆτε ἐγκαλῆτε N corr. A corr.: ἐγκαλ. τε N pr.: ἐγκαλεῖτε A pr. Blass. τοῖς ἀφεῖσιν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔσται πλέον ὑμῖν.

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νομίσαντες οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καθʼ ὑμῶν πάντας τούτους ἀναβαίνειν καὶ κοινοὺς ἐχθροὺς εἶναι τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἁπάσης, μὴ ἀποδέχεσθʼ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ κελεύετʼ ἀπολογεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν κατηγορημένων· μηδὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τούτου μανίαν, ὃς μέγα φρονεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ δύνασθαι λέγειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν φανερὸς φανερὸς Α: φανερῶς Ν. ὑμῖν γένηται δωροδοκῶν, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐξελήλεγκται φενακίζων ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ add. Reiske. τιμωρήσασθε ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίως. εἰ δὲ μή, μιᾷ ψήφῳ καὶ ἑνὶ ἀγῶνι πάντας τοὺς ἀποπεφασμένους καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀφέντες εἰς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸν δῆμον τὴν τούτων δωροδοκίαν τρέψετε, κἂν κἂν N corr. A corr.: κα. N pr.: καὶ A pr.: κᾆθʼ Blass. ὕστερον ἐγκαλῆτε ἐγκαλῆτε N corr. A corr.: ἐγκαλ. τε N pr.: ἐγκαλεῖτε A pr. Blass. τοῖς ἀφεῖσιν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔσται πλέον ὑμῖν.

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ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὅσον εἰς τὸ μέρος τοὐμὸν τῆς κατηγορίας ἥκει, βεβοήθηκα, τἆλλα πάντα παριδὼν πλὴν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν. οὐκ ἐγκαταλέλοιπα τὴν πόλιν, οὐ χάριν προὐργιαιτέραν τῆς τοῦ δήμου χειροτονίας ἐποιησάμην. ἀξιῶν δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχειν, παραδίδωμι τὸ ὕδωρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατηγόροις. κατὰ δημοσθένους subicit N.

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ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὅσον εἰς τὸ μέρος τοὐμὸν τῆς κατηγορίας ἥκει, βεβοήθηκα, τἆλλα πάντα παριδὼν πλὴν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὑμῖν. οὐκ ἐγκαταλέλοιπα τὴν πόλιν, οὐ χάριν προὐργιαιτέραν τῆς τοῦ δήμου χειροτονίας ἐποιησάμην. ἀξιῶν δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχειν, παραδίδωμι τὸ ὕδωρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατηγόροις. κατὰ δημοσθένους subicit N.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/__cts__.xml index 707510638..e4f6030de 100644 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Κατὰ Ἀριστογείτονος - Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + + Against Aristogiton + Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 726bf54b7..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0082", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Dinarchus/opensource/din_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=2", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 37e74a6ea..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,363 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - - - Against Aristogiton - Dinarchus - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - Dinarchus - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - - -
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There is nothing, it appears, Athenians, which we - must not expect either to hear or see in connection with the reports which have - been made; but the most remarkable fact of all, in my opinion, confronts us now. - The worst character in the city, I should say in the whole world, Aristogiton, - has come to pit himself in law against the Areopagus on the subject of truth and - justice; and the council which has made the report is now in greater danger than - this man who takes bribes against you and who sold for twenty minas the right of - free speech in the cause of justice.

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It will be no new or alarming experience for the defendant if he is convicted, - for he has committed in the past many other crimes meriting the death penalty - and has spent more time in prison than out of it. While he has been in debt to - the state he has prosecuted men with citizen rights, though not entitled to do - so, and has committed numerous other offences of which you have a more exact - knowledge than I. It is a most shameful and monstrous thing for this council to - be suspected of making a false report against Aristogiton and for him to be - considered among you as having more justice on his side than it has.

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For this reason, Athenians, thinking that the trial holds no dangers for him, - this man is coming forward, I believe, to test your attitude. He has often - undergone all sorts of suffering short of death, which, if God so wills it and - you are wise, he will undergo today. For you must assume, by Heracles, that - there will be no improvement in him if he is pardoned by you now, and that in - future he will not abstain from taking bribes against you if you now acquit him. - For when wickedness is in its infancy perhaps it can be checked by punishment, - but when it has grown old and has sampled the usual penalties, it is said to be - incurable.

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If therefore you wish depravity to grow up ingrained in Athens, you should preserve Aristogiton and - allow him to act there as he pleases. But if you hate the wicked and accursed - and can recall with resentment what this man has done in the past, kill him, for - he dared to take money from Harpalus, who he knew was coming to seize your city. - Cut short his excuses and deceptive arguments, on which he now depends when he - appears before you.

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Do you realize that, awkward though the arrival of - Harpalus was, it has been an advantage to the city in one respect, because it - has given you a sure means of testing those who give up everything to the - enemies of Athens for a payment of - silver or gold? Do not be lax, Athenians, or weary of punishing the guilty; - purge the city of bribery to the utmost of your ability. Do not ask for - arguments from me when you see that the crimes have been plainly attributed to - those whom the council has reported.

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[;Or ought you to spare the defendant on account of his ancestry and his - moderation, or because he has done you many public and private services?];This sentence was excluded from the text by - Bekker. It is out of place in the argument here and its substance is given - at the beginning of Din. 2.8. What - information do you lack that makes you ask for arguments against the defendant - here before you? What if we, the accusers, all ten of us, use up all the water - in our clocks and proclaim that it is a terrible thing to release men who have - been caught with bribes against the city in their very hands; will that make the - council's report against Aristogiton true and just?

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Or suppose that each of us assumes that you are just as well aware as we on which - side justice lies in the present trials, and so leaves the platform after a - short speech; will the report then be a false one, unjustly made by the - Areopagites? Or don't you realize that to take bribes in order to betray the - city's interests is one of the greatest crimes causing the most irreparable harm - to cities?

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No doubt I shall be told that the defendant is - himself a man of sober character coming of a good family, that he has done you - many noble services in private and in public life and that therefore you are - justified in sparing him. You must all have often heard that, when Aristogiton's - father Cydimachus was condemned to death and fled from the city, this admirable - son allowed his own father to lack the bare necessities of life, while he - survived, and do without a proper burial when he died: a fact for which evidence - was often brought against him;

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or again, that the man himself, on being taken to prison for the first time,—no - doubt you realize that he has often been imprisoned—dared to behave in such a - way there that the inmates voted that no one should either light a fire for him - or sit at meals or share the usual sacrifices with him. Reflect, Athenians; what - sort of character must we suppose this man to have, who was thrown into prison - for criminal conduct

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and when he was there, among those who had been segregated from the rest of the - world as felons, was looked upon as so debased that even there he was not - thought worthy of the same treatment as the rest? It is said, in fact, that he - was caught thieving among them and that, if there had been any other place more - degraded where they could have isolated men who stole in prison, this monster - would have been conducted there. These facts, as I said just now, were - established by evidence against Aristogiton, as is well known, when the lot fell - to him to be custodian of the exchange but he was rejected by those who then - decided the appointment to that office.The - custodians of the exchange were responsible for seeing that the laws - governing import and export trade were observed. Like most magistrates, they - were appointed by lot but were submitted to an examination in court - (dokimasi/a) before taking office and - could be rejected if unsuitable. -

-
-
-

Do you then feign ignorance among yourselves and give way to pity when the man - concerning whom you are about to vote is Aristogiton, who did not pity his own - father when reduced to starvation? Do you still wish to hear us talk about the - damages he must pay, when you know quite well that his whole life, as well as - his recent conduct, justifies the extreme penalty?

-
-
-

Was it not Aristogiton, Athenians, who made in writing such lying assertions - about the priestess of Artemis BrauroniaThe - shrine of Artemis at Brauron in - Attica was supposed to contain - the image of the goddess brought from the Tauri by Iphigenia. There was also - a temple of Artemis Brauronia, called to\ i(ero\n - kunhge/sion, on the Acropolis ( cf. arg. ad Demosthenem 25.; - Paus. 1.23.7).and her relatives, - that when you discovered the truth from his accusers, you fined him five - talents, a sum equal to the fine set down in an indictment for illegal - proposals? Has he not persisted in maligning every one of you he meets, though - he has not yet paid up, and in speaking and proposing measures in the Assembly, - regardless of all the penalties against wrongdoers which the laws prescribe? -

-
-
-

And finally, when an information was lodged against him by Lycurgus,Cf. Lyc. frag. 13 - and note.and he was convicted, a debtor to the state without the - right to speak in public, when he had been handed over to the Eleven in - accordance with the laws, was he not seen - Reiske's emendation is followed here.walking about in the front of - the lawcourts, and used he not to sit on the seat of the Prytanes?

-
-
-

Well then, Athenians, if a man has often been - committed to you lawfully for punishment, condemned on information lodged by - citizens, if neither the Eleven nor the prison have been able to restrain him, - will you want to use him as a counsellor? The law demands that the herald shall - first pray, amid dead silence, before he surrenders to you the task of - deliberating on public affairs. Will you then allow an impious wretch, who has - proved wicked in his dealings with everyone, and in particular his own father, - to share in citizenship with you, with your families and kinsmen?

-
-
-

After rejecting all thought of pardon for Demades and Demosthenes, because they - were proved to have been taking bribes against you, and punishing them,—quite - rightly, though you knew that they had served you during their administration, - certainly in many respects if not in everything,—will you acquit this accursed - man who has not done you a service ever since he has been in politics but has - been the greatest possible menace? Would not everyone reproach you if you - accepted such a person as your adviser? For when you are addressed by a man - whose wickedness is both notorious and undeniable and a byword among all - Athenians, the bystanders will wonder whether you who listen to him have no - better advisers or whether you enjoy hearing such people.

-
-
-

Like the early lawgivers, Athenians, who made laws to deal with those addressing - your ancestors in the Assembly, you too should try, by your behavior as - listeners, to make the speakers who come before you better. What was the - attitude of the lawgivers to these men? In the first place, at every sitting of - the Assembly they publicly proclaimed curses against wrongdoers, calling down - destruction on any who, after accepting bribes, made speeches or proposals upon - state affairs, and to that class Aristogiton now belongs.

-
-
-

Secondly, they provided in the laws for indictments for bribery, and this is the - only offence for which they imposed a payment equal to ten times the assessment - of damages,Cf. note on Din. 1.60. Aristotle (Aristot. - Const. Ath. 54) states that theft was punished in the same - way.in the belief that one who is ready to be paid for the opinions - which he is going to express in the Assembly has at heart, when he is speaking, - not the interests of the people but the welfare of those who have paid him. Now - the council has reported Aristogiton as guilty of this. Moreover, when choosing - a man for public office they used to ask what his personal character was, - whether he treated his parents well, whether he had served the city in the - field, whether he had an ancestral cult or paid taxes.

-
-
-

Aristogiton could not claim one of these qualifications for himself. So far from - treating his parents well this man has ill-treated his own father. When you were - all serving in the army he was in prison; and, far from being able to point to - any memorial of his father, Athenians, he did not give him a proper funeral even - in Eretria where he died.Cf. Dem. - 25.54. While other Athenians are contributing from their own - purses this man has not even paid up all the money to defray the public debts - which he incurred.

-
-
-

In fact he has never ceased to contravene all the laws, and his is the one case - of those on which the Areopagus has reported where you had inquired yourselves - and already knew the answer. For your knowledge that this man is a rogue and a - criminal was not gained from the council; you are all very well aware of his - wickedness, and hence the statement so often made applies here also, namely - that, while you are passing judgement on the defendant, the bystanders and - everyone besides are passing judgement on you.

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-

Therefore it is your duty as a sensible jury, - Athenians, not to vote against yourselves or the rest of Athens; you should sentence him unanimously - to be handed over to the executioners for the death penalty. Do not be traitors - and fail to give the honest verdict demanded by your oath. Remember that this - man has been convicted by the council of taking bribes against you, convicted of - ill-treating him, to use the mildest term, by his father during his life and - after his death, condemned by the people's vote and handed over to you for - punishment.

-
-
-

Remember that this man has caused a deal of harm and has now been caught doing - wrong in circumstances which make it shameful for you, his judges, to release - him unpunished. For if you do so, how are you going to vote on the other - reports, Athenians? What justification will you give for having condemned those - men whom you have already tried? What reason will you have, when you were - clearly anxious for the council to report those who had taken the money, for - failing obviously to punish the men whose names they submit?

-
-
-

You must not imagine that these trials are private issues concerning no one but - the men reported; they are public and concern the rest of us as well. A case of - bribery and treason tried before you will affect others in the future in two - possible ways: either it will make them accept bribes against you unhesitatingly - in the knowledge that they will not be brought to justice, or it will make them - afraid to take them, since they will know that those who are caught will be - punished in a manner suited to the crime.

-
-
-

Do you not know that now the fear of what you will do restrains those who are - grasping for the money offered for use against you and often makes them turn - their backs on the bribe, and that the people's decree, ordering the council to - inquire about this money, has prevented even those who brought the gold into the - country from admitting their action?

-
-
-

It was a noble decree, Athenians, a noble decree of your ancestors on this - question, providing for a pillar on the Acropolis at the time when Arthmius, son - of Pithonax, the Zelite, is said to have brought the gold from the Persians to - corrupt the Greeks.Demosthenes (Dem. 9.42 and Dem. - 19.271) refers to this pillar. Arthmius of Zelea was an Athenian - proxenus. He was sent by Artaxerxes to the Peloponnesus, probably in 461, to stir up war against the - Athenians, who had been assisting a revolt in Egypt. (Cf. Thuc. 1.109; Dio. Sic. 11.74. 5; Aeschin. 3.258.) For before anyone had accepted it or - given proof of his character they sentenced the man who had brought the gold to - exile and banished him completely from the country. This decision, as I said, - they engraved on a bronze pillar and set up on the Acropolis as a lesson for you - their descendants; for they believed that the man who accepted money in any way - at all had in mind the interests of the donors rather than those of the city. -

-
-
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His was the only case in which they added the reason why the people banished him - from the city, explicitly writing on the pillar that Arthmius, son of Pithonax, - the Zelite, was an enemy of the people and its allies, he and his descendants, - and was exiled from Athens because - he had brought the Persian gold to the Peloponnese. And yet if the people regarded the gold in the - Peloponnese as a source of great - danger to Greece, how can we remain - unmoved at the sight of bribery in the city itself? Please attend to the - inscription on the pillar. - Inscription - -

-
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Now what do you think those men would have done, - Athenians, if they had caught a general or an orator, one of their own citizens, - accepting bribes against the interests of their country, when they so justly and - wisely expelled a man who was alien to Greece in birth and character? That is the reason why they - faced danger against the barbarian worthily of the city and their - ancestors.The conclusion of the speech is - lost.

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- - -
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diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..220a1dde0 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ + + + + + + + + Against Aristogiton + Dinarchus + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + + Dinarchus + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

+
+
+ + + + + +
+ + + + English + Greek + + + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion + edited markup + split composite text and converted to unicode + SGML markup + +
+ + + +
+

There is nothing, it appears, Athenians, which we must not expect either to hear or see in connection with the reports which have been made; but the most remarkable fact of all, in my opinion, confronts us now. The worst character in the city, I should say in the whole world, Aristogiton, has come to pit himself in law against the Areopagus on the subject of truth and justice; and the council which has made the report is now in greater danger than this man who takes bribes against you and who sold for twenty minas the right of free speech in the cause of justice.

+

It will be no new or alarming experience for the defendant if he is convicted, for he has committed in the past many other crimes meriting the death penalty and has spent more time in prison than out of it. While he has been in debt to the state he has prosecuted men with citizen rights, though not entitled to do so, and has committed numerous other offences of which you have a more exact knowledge than I. It is a most shameful and monstrous thing for this council to be suspected of making a false report against Aristogiton and for him to be considered among you as having more justice on his side than it has.

+

For this reason, Athenians, thinking that the trial holds no dangers for him, this man is coming forward, I believe, to test your attitude. He has often undergone all sorts of suffering short of death, which, if God so wills it and you are wise, he will undergo today. For you must assume, by Heracles, that there will be no improvement in him if he is pardoned by you now, and that in future he will not abstain from taking bribes against you if you now acquit him. For when wickedness is in its infancy perhaps it can be checked by punishment, but when it has grown old and has sampled the usual penalties, it is said to be incurable.

+

If therefore you wish depravity to grow up ingrained in Athens, you should preserve Aristogiton and allow him to act there as he pleases. But if you hate the wicked and accursed and can recall with resentment what this man has done in the past, kill him, for he dared to take money from Harpalus, who he knew was coming to seize your city. Cut short his excuses and deceptive arguments, on which he now depends when he appears before you.

+

Do you realize that, awkward though the arrival of Harpalus was, it has been an advantage to the city in one respect, because it has given you a sure means of testing those who give up everything to the enemies of Athens for a payment of silver or gold? Do not be lax, Athenians, or weary of punishing the guilty; purge the city of bribery to the utmost of your ability. Do not ask for arguments from me when you see that the crimes have been plainly attributed to those whom the council has reported.

+

Or ought you to spare the defendant on account of his ancestry and his moderation, or because he has done you many public and private services?This sentence was excluded from the text by Bekker. It is out of place in the argument here and its substance is given at the beginning of Din. 2.8. What information do you lack that makes you ask for arguments against the defendant here before you? What if we, the accusers, all ten of us, use up all the water in our clocks and proclaim that it is a terrible thing to release men who have been caught with bribes against the city in their very hands; will that make the council's report against Aristogiton true and just?

+

Or suppose that each of us assumes that you are just as well aware as we on which side justice lies in the present trials, and so leaves the platform after a short speech; will the report then be a false one, unjustly made by the Areopagites? Or don't you realize that to take bribes in order to betray the city's interests is one of the greatest crimes causing the most irreparable harm to cities?

+

No doubt I shall be told that the defendant is himself a man of sober character coming of a good family, that he has done you many noble services in private and in public life and that therefore you are justified in sparing him. You must all have often heard that, when Aristogiton's father Cydimachus was condemned to death and fled from the city, this admirable son allowed his own father to lack the bare necessities of life, while he survived, and do without a proper burial when he died: a fact for which evidence was often brought against him;

+

or again, that the man himself, on being taken to prison for the first time,—no doubt you realize that he has often been imprisoned—dared to behave in such a way there that the inmates voted that no one should either light a fire for him or sit at meals or share the usual sacrifices with him. Reflect, Athenians; what sort of character must we suppose this man to have, who was thrown into prison for criminal conduct

+

and when he was there, among those who had been segregated from the rest of the world as felons, was looked upon as so debased that even there he was not thought worthy of the same treatment as the rest? It is said, in fact, that he was caught thieving among them and that, if there had been any other place more degraded where they could have isolated men who stole in prison, this monster would have been conducted there. These facts, as I said just now, were established by evidence against Aristogiton, as is well known, when the lot fell to him to be custodian of the exchange but he was rejected by those who then decided the appointment to that office.The custodians of the exchange were responsible for seeing that the laws governing import and export trade were observed. Like most magistrates, they were appointed by lot but were submitted to an examination in court (δοκιμασία) before taking office and could be rejected if unsuitable.

+

Do you then feign ignorance among yourselves and give way to pity when the man concerning whom you are about to vote is Aristogiton, who did not pity his own father when reduced to starvation? Do you still wish to hear us talk about the damages he must pay, when you know quite well that his whole life, as well as his recent conduct, justifies the extreme penalty?

+

Was it not Aristogiton, Athenians, who made in writing such lying assertions about the priestess of Artemis BrauroniaThe shrine of Artemis at Brauron in Attica was supposed to contain the image of the goddess brought from the Tauri by Iphigenia. There was also a temple of Artemis Brauronia, called τὸ ἱερὸν κυνηγέσιον, on the Acropolis ( cf. arg. ad Demosthenem 25.; Paus. 1.23.7).and her relatives, that when you discovered the truth from his accusers, you fined him five talents, a sum equal to the fine set down in an indictment for illegal proposals? Has he not persisted in maligning every one of you he meets, though he has not yet paid up, and in speaking and proposing measures in the Assembly, regardless of all the penalties against wrongdoers which the laws prescribe?

+

And finally, when an information was lodged against him by Lycurgus,Cf. Lyc. frag. 13 and note.and he was convicted, a debtor to the state without the right to speak in public, when he had been handed over to the Eleven in accordance with the laws, was he not seen Reiske's emendation is followed here.walking about in the front of the lawcourts, and used he not to sit on the seat of the Prytanes?

+

Well then, Athenians, if a man has often been committed to you lawfully for punishment, condemned on information lodged by citizens, if neither the Eleven nor the prison have been able to restrain him, will you want to use him as a counsellor? The law demands that the herald shall first pray, amid dead silence, before he surrenders to you the task of deliberating on public affairs. Will you then allow an impious wretch, who has proved wicked in his dealings with everyone, and in particular his own father, to share in citizenship with you, with your families and kinsmen?

+

After rejecting all thought of pardon for Demades and Demosthenes, because they were proved to have been taking bribes against you, and punishing them,—quite rightly, though you knew that they had served you during their administration, certainly in many respects if not in everything,—will you acquit this accursed man who has not done you a service ever since he has been in politics but has been the greatest possible menace? Would not everyone reproach you if you accepted such a person as your adviser? For when you are addressed by a man whose wickedness is both notorious and undeniable and a byword among all Athenians, the bystanders will wonder whether you who listen to him have no better advisers or whether you enjoy hearing such people.

+

Like the early lawgivers, Athenians, who made laws to deal with those addressing your ancestors in the Assembly, you too should try, by your behavior as listeners, to make the speakers who come before you better. What was the attitude of the lawgivers to these men? In the first place, at every sitting of the Assembly they publicly proclaimed curses against wrongdoers, calling down destruction on any who, after accepting bribes, made speeches or proposals upon state affairs, and to that class Aristogiton now belongs.

+

Secondly, they provided in the laws for indictments for bribery, and this is the only offence for which they imposed a payment equal to ten times the assessment of damages,Cf. note on Din. 1.60. Aristotle (Aristot. Const. Ath. 54) states that theft was punished in the same way.in the belief that one who is ready to be paid for the opinions which he is going to express in the Assembly has at heart, when he is speaking, not the interests of the people but the welfare of those who have paid him. Now the council has reported Aristogiton as guilty of this. Moreover, when choosing a man for public office they used to ask what his personal character was, whether he treated his parents well, whether he had served the city in the field, whether he had an ancestral cult or paid taxes.

+

Aristogiton could not claim one of these qualifications for himself. So far from treating his parents well this man has ill-treated his own father. When you were all serving in the army he was in prison; and, far from being able to point to any memorial of his father, Athenians, he did not give him a proper funeral even in Eretria where he died.Cf. Dem. 25.54. While other Athenians are contributing from their own purses this man has not even paid up all the money to defray the public debts which he incurred.

+

In fact he has never ceased to contravene all the laws, and his is the one case of those on which the Areopagus has reported where you had inquired yourselves and already knew the answer. For your knowledge that this man is a rogue and a criminal was not gained from the council; you are all very well aware of his wickedness, and hence the statement so often made applies here also, namely that, while you are passing judgement on the defendant, the bystanders and everyone besides are passing judgement on you.

+

Therefore it is your duty as a sensible jury, Athenians, not to vote against yourselves or the rest of Athens; you should sentence him unanimously to be handed over to the executioners for the death penalty. Do not be traitors and fail to give the honest verdict demanded by your oath. Remember that this man has been convicted by the council of taking bribes against you, convicted of ill-treating him, to use the mildest term, by his father during his life and after his death, condemned by the people's vote and handed over to you for punishment.

+

Remember that this man has caused a deal of harm and has now been caught doing wrong in circumstances which make it shameful for you, his judges, to release him unpunished. For if you do so, how are you going to vote on the other reports, Athenians? What justification will you give for having condemned those men whom you have already tried? What reason will you have, when you were clearly anxious for the council to report those who had taken the money, for failing obviously to punish the men whose names they submit?

+

You must not imagine that these trials are private issues concerning no one but the men reported; they are public and concern the rest of us as well. A case of bribery and treason tried before you will affect others in the future in two possible ways: either it will make them accept bribes against you unhesitatingly in the knowledge that they will not be brought to justice, or it will make them afraid to take them, since they will know that those who are caught will be punished in a manner suited to the crime.

+

Do you not know that now the fear of what you will do restrains those who are grasping for the money offered for use against you and often makes them turn their backs on the bribe, and that the people's decree, ordering the council to inquire about this money, has prevented even those who brought the gold into the country from admitting their action?

+

It was a noble decree, Athenians, a noble decree of your ancestors on this question, providing for a pillar on the Acropolis at the time when Arthmius, son of Pithonax, the Zelite, is said to have brought the gold from the Persians to corrupt the Greeks.Demosthenes (Dem. 9.42 and Dem. 19.271) refers to this pillar. Arthmius of Zelea was an Athenian proxenus. He was sent by Artaxerxes to the Peloponnesus, probably in 461, to stir up war against the Athenians, who had been assisting a revolt in Egypt. (Cf. Thuc. 1.109; Dio. Sic. 11.74. 5; Aeschin. 3.258.) For before anyone had accepted it or given proof of his character they sentenced the man who had brought the gold to exile and banished him completely from the country. This decision, as I said, they engraved on a bronze pillar and set up on the Acropolis as a lesson for you their descendants; for they believed that the man who accepted money in any way at all had in mind the interests of the donors rather than those of the city.

+

His was the only case in which they added the reason why the people banished him from the city, explicitly writing on the pillar that Arthmius, son of Pithonax, the Zelite, was an enemy of the people and its allies, he and his descendants, and was exiled from Athens because he had brought the Persian gold to the Peloponnese. And yet if the people regarded the gold in the Peloponnese as a source of great danger to Greece, how can we remain unmoved at the sight of bribery in the city itself? Please attend to the inscription on the pillar.

+
+

+

Now what do you think those men would have done, Athenians, if they had caught a general or an orator, one of their own citizens, accepting bribes against the interests of their country, when they so justly and wisely expelled a man who was alien to Greece in birth and character? That is the reason why they faced danger against the barbarian worthily of the city and their ancestors.The conclusion of the speech is lost.

+
+ +
+
diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml index d8924ccec..8c88c4616 100644 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -2,80 +2,81 @@ - - - Κατὰ Ἀριστογείτονος - Dinarchus - J. O. Burtt - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - Perseus 2.0 - tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml - - Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License - - - - - - - Dinarchus - Minor Attic Orators - J. O. Burtt - - London - William Heinemann, Ltd. - Cambridge, MA - Harvard University Press - 1954 - 1962 - - 2 - - Internet Archive - - - + + +Κατὰ Ἀριστογείτονος +Dinarchus +J. O. Burtt +Perseus Project, Tufts University +Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + +The Annenberg CPB/Project + + +Trustees of Tufts University +Medford, MA +Perseus Project +Perseus 2.0 +tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml + +Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + +Dinarchus +Minor Attic Orators +J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + +2 + + Internet Archive + + + - - - -

This pointer pattern extracts section.

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This pointer pattern extracts section.

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- - - Greek - English - - - - EpiDoc and CTS conversion - edited markup - split composite text and converted to unicode - Checked and corrected section breaks. - SGML markup done from raw file as the result of a bad global change that had eliminated the first character of each line of Loeb text. The notes had to be inserted in the text, as opposed to the bottom of the page, and asterisks deleted in the english text. *blass to Blass + + +Greek +Latin +English + + + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion + edited markup + split composite text and converted to unicode + Checked and corrected section breaks. + SGML markup done from raw file as the result of a bad global change that had eliminated the first character of each line of Loeb text. The notes had to be inserted in the text, as opposed to the bottom of the page, and asterisks deleted in the english text. *blass to Blass
@@ -86,82 +87,82 @@

πάνθʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, προσδοκητέα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἰδεῖν ἐν ταῖς γεγενημέναις ἀποφάσεσι· θαυμασιώτατον δὲ πάντων, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὸ νῦν γιγνόμενον. ὁ γὰρ πονηρότατος τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, Ἀριστογείτων διαδικασόμενος ἥκει τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῇ περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, καὶ νυνὶ μείζονα κίνδυνον ἡ τὴν ἀπόφασιν πεποιημένη βουλὴ κινδυνεύει ἢ ὁ δῶρα λαμβάνων καθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων παρρησίαν ἀποδόμενος εἴκοσι μνῶν.

-

τούτῳ μέν γε καινὸν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ δεινόν, ἐὰν ἁλῶ, συμβήσεται· καὶ γὰρ θανάτου ἄξια πολλὰ πρότερον ἕτερα διαπέπρακται, καὶ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ πλείω χρόνον ἢ ἔξω διατέτριφε, καὶ ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτίμων γέγραφεν οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πεποίηκε, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀκριβέστερονὑμεῖς ἀκριβέστερον Ν: ἀκριβέστερον ὑμεῖς Α. ἐμοῦ γιγνώσκετε· τῇ δὲ βουλῇ τὸ δόξαι ψευδῆψευδῆ A corr. ras.: τὰ ψευδῆ, ut vid., A pr.: καὶ ψευδῆ Ν. κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀποφαίνειν καὶ τοῦτον ἐκείνης παρʼ ὑμῖν ὑποληφθῆναι δικαιότερα λέγειν τῶν αἰσχίστων καὶ δεινοτάτων ἐστίν.

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τούτῳ μέν γε καινὸν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ δεινόν, ἐὰν ἁλῶ, συμβήσεται· καὶ γὰρ θανάτου ἄξια πολλὰ πρότερον ἕτερα διαπέπρακται, καὶ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ πλείω χρόνον ἢ ἔξω διατέτριφε, καὶ ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτίμων γέγραφεν οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πεποίηκε, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀκριβέστερονὑμεῖς ἀκριβέστερον Ν: ἀκριβέστερον ὑμεῖς Α. ἐμοῦ γιγνώσκετε· τῇ δὲ βουλῇ τὸ δόξαι ψευδῆψευδῆ A corr. ras.: τὰ ψευδῆ, ut vid., A pr.: καὶ ψευδῆ Ν. κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀποφαίνειν καὶ τοῦτον ἐκείνης παρʼ ὑμῖν ὑποληφθῆναι δικαιότερα λέγειν τῶν αἰσχίστων καὶ δεινοτάτων ἐστίν.

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διόπερ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὗτός μοι δοκεῖ, τὸν ἀγῶνα αὑτῷ ἀσφαλῆ εἶναι νομίζων, διαπειρασόμενος ἥκειν τῆς ὑμετέρας γνώμης. ἅπαντα γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλάκις τὰ δεινὰ συμβέβηκε, πλὴν τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν· τοῦτο δʼ, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ καὶ ὑμεῖς σωφρονῆτε, ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ συμβήσεται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα βελτίω γενήσεσθαι αὐτὸν προσδοκᾶτε συγγνώμης νυνὶ τυγχάνοντα παρʼ ὑμῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀφέξεσθαι τοῦ λαμβάνειν χρήματα καθʼ ὑμῶν, ἐὰν νῦν ἀφῆτε αὐτόν. πονηρίαν γὰρ ἀρχομένην μὲν κωλῦσαι τάχʼ ἄντάχʼ ἄν Bekker: τάχα codd. τις κολάζων δυνηθείη, ἐγκαταγεγηρακυῖαν δὲ καὶ γεγευμένηνγεγευμένην B, Bekker: γεγενημένην ΝΑ. τῶν εἰθισμένων τιμωριῶν ἀδύνατον εἶναι λέγουσιν.

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διόπερ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὗτός μοι δοκεῖ, τὸν ἀγῶνα αὑτῷ ἀσφαλῆ εἶναι νομίζων, διαπειρασόμενος ἥκειν τῆς ὑμετέρας γνώμης. ἅπαντα γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλάκις τὰ δεινὰ συμβέβηκε, πλὴν τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν· τοῦτο δʼ, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ καὶ ὑμεῖς σωφρονῆτε, ἐν τῇ τήμερον ἡμέρᾳ συμβήσεται. οὐ γὰρ δὴ μὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα βελτίω γενήσεσθαι αὐτὸν προσδοκᾶτε συγγνώμης νυνὶ τυγχάνοντα παρʼ ὑμῶν, οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀφέξεσθαι τοῦ λαμβάνειν χρήματα καθʼ ὑμῶν, ἐὰν νῦν ἀφῆτε αὐτόν. πονηρίαν γὰρ ἀρχομένην μὲν κωλῦσαι τάχʼ ἄντάχʼ ἄν Bekker: τάχα codd. τις κολάζων δυνηθείη, ἐγκαταγεγηρακυῖαν δὲ καὶ γεγευμένηνγεγευμένην B, Bekker: γεγενημένην ΝΑ. τῶν εἰθισμένων τιμωριῶν ἀδύνατον εἶναι λέγουσιν.

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εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγγενήσεσθαι βούλεσθε δευσοποιὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει πονηρίαν, διαφυλάττειν ὑμᾶς Ἀριστογείτονα δεῖ, καὶ ἐᾶν ὅ τι ἄν [τις]τις del. Bekker. βούληται ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπράττεσθαι· εἰ δὲ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ καταράτους ἀνθρώπους μισεῖτε καὶ ἔστιν ὑμῖν ὀργὴ καὶ μνήμη τῶν πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου πεπραγμένων, ἀποκτείνατε τοῦτον, ὃς παρʼ ʼΑρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθʼ ἥκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν,ὑμῶν Α: ἡμῶν Ν. καὶ τὰς προφάσεις καὶ τοὺς φενακισμοὺς ἐκκόψατε αὐτοῦ· τούτοις γὰρ ἥκει πιστεύων πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

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εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγγενήσεσθαι βούλεσθε δευσοποιὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει πονηρίαν, διαφυλάττειν ὑμᾶς Ἀριστογείτονα δεῖ, καὶ ἐᾶν ὅ τι ἄν [τις]τις del. Bekker. βούληται ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπράττεσθαι· εἰ δὲ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ καταράτους ἀνθρώπους μισεῖτε καὶ ἔστιν ὑμῖν ὀργὴ καὶ μνήμη τῶν πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου πεπραγμένων, ἀποκτείνατε τοῦτον, ὃς παρʼ ʼΑρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾔσθεθʼ ἥκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὑμῶν,ὑμῶν Α: ἡμῶν Ν. καὶ τὰς προφάσεις καὶ τοὺς φενακισμοὺς ἐκκόψατε αὐτοῦ· τούτοις γὰρ ἥκει πιστεύων πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

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ἆρʼ ἴσθʼ ὅτι τῆς ʼΑρπάλου ἀφίξεως δυσχεροῦς οὔσης ἐκεῖνο συμβέβηκεν εὐτύχημα τῇ πόλει, διότι πεῖραν εἰλήφατʼ ἀκριβῆ τῶν ἕνεκʼ ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου προϊεμένων πάντα τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἐχθροῖς; μὴ καταρρᾳθυμήσητε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδʼ ἀπείπητε τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀλλʼ ἐκκαθάρατε, καθʼ ὅσον δυνατόν ἐστι, τὴν δωροδοκίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ μὴ τῶν παρʼ ἐμοῦ λόγων ἀκούειν ζητήσητε, φανερῶν ὑμῖν γεγενημένων τῶν ἀδικημάτων κατὰκατὰ N A pr.: ἐκ A corr. (2) τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀποπεφασμένων.

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ἆρʼ ἴσθʼ ὅτι τῆς ʼΑρπάλου ἀφίξεως δυσχεροῦς οὔσης ἐκεῖνο συμβέβηκεν εὐτύχημα τῇ πόλει, διότι πεῖραν εἰλήφατʼ ἀκριβῆ τῶν ἕνεκʼ ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου προϊεμένων πάντα τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἐχθροῖς; μὴ καταρρᾳθυμήσητε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδʼ ἀπείπητε τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀλλʼ ἐκκαθάρατε, καθʼ ὅσον δυνατόν ἐστι, τὴν δωροδοκίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ μὴ τῶν παρʼ ἐμοῦ λόγων ἀκούειν ζητήσητε, φανερῶν ὑμῖν γεγενημένων τῶν ἀδικημάτων κατὰκατὰ N A pr.: ἐκ A corr. (2) τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀποπεφασμένων.

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[ἢ διὰ τοὺς τοῦ κρινομένου προγόνους καὶκαὶ Α: καὶ διὰ Ν. τὴν αὐτοῦ μετριότητα, καὶ ὅτι ὑμᾶς πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀγαθὰ εἴργασται, ἄξιόν ἐστινἐστιν om. A. αὐτοῦ φείσασθαι;]Verba ἢ διὰ usque ad φείσασθαι del. Bekker, coll. 8 init. τί γὰρ ἀγνοεῖτε διʼ ὃ δεῖσθε λόγων ἀκούειν κατὰ τοῦ νῦν κρινομένου; πότερʼ ἡ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασις, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμεῖς οἱ κατήγοροι δέκα ὄντες τὸ ὕδωρ ἀναλώσωμεν ἅπαν καὶ ἀναβοήσωμεν ὡς δεινόν ἐστιν ἀφεῖσθαι τοὺς εἰλημμένους ἔχοντας ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαία ἔσταιἔσται ἡ κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀπόφασις Ν: ἡ κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔσται ἀπόφασις A: quae omnia del. Dobree; infra, ante παρὰ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, habet Blass. ἡ κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος [ἀπόφασις]·ἀπόφασιςdel. Maetzner.

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[ἢ διὰ τοὺς τοῦ κρινομένου προγόνους καὶκαὶ Α: καὶ διὰ Ν. τὴν αὐτοῦ μετριότητα, καὶ ὅτι ὑμᾶς πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἀγαθὰ εἴργασται, ἄξιόν ἐστινἐστιν om. A. αὐτοῦ φείσασθαι;]Verba ἢ διὰ usque ad φείσασθαι del. Bekker, coll. 8 init. τί γὰρ ἀγνοεῖτε διʼ ὃ δεῖσθε λόγων ἀκούειν κατὰ τοῦ νῦν κρινομένου; πότερʼ ἡ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασις, ἐὰν μὲν ἡμεῖς οἱ κατήγοροι δέκα ὄντες τὸ ὕδωρ ἀναλώσωμεν ἅπαν καὶ ἀναβοήσωμεν ὡς δεινόν ἐστιν ἀφεῖσθαι τοὺς εἰλημμένους ἔχοντας ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαία ἔσταιἔσται ἡ κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀπόφασις Ν: ἡ κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔσται ἀπόφασις A: quae omnia del. Dobree; infra, ante παρὰ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν, habet Blass. ἡ κατʼ Ἀριστογείτονος [ἀπόφασις]·ἀπόφασιςdel. Maetzner.

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ἐὰν δʼ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ὡς εἰδότων ὑμῶν πάντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡμῶν τὰ δίκαια περὶ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀγώνων, βραχέα εἰπὼν καταβῇ, ψευδής, καὶ οὐ δικαίωςοὐ δικαίως Hug: οὐδεὶς ὡς N A pr.: οὐδεὶς ταύτῃ πιστεύσει ὡς A corr. (2): ἄδικος Blass. παρὰ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν γεγενημένη;γεγενημένη Blass: γεγενημένῃ codd. ἢ τὸ δῶρα λαμβάνειν ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῶν τῆς πόλεως συμφερόντων οὐκ ἴσθʼ ὅτι τῶν δεινοτάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν πλεῖστα κακὰ τὰς πόλεις ἐργαζομένων.

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ἐὰν δʼ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ὡς εἰδότων ὑμῶν πάντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἡμῶν τὰ δίκαια περὶ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀγώνων, βραχέα εἰπὼν καταβῇ, ψευδής, καὶ οὐ δικαίωςοὐ δικαίως Hug: οὐδεὶς ὡς N A pr.: οὐδεὶς ταύτῃ πιστεύσει ὡς A corr. (2): ἄδικος Blass. παρὰ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν γεγενημένη;γεγενημένη Blass: γεγενημένῃ codd. ἢ τὸ δῶρα λαμβάνειν ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ τῶν τῆς πόλεως συμφερόντων οὐκ ἴσθʼ ὅτι τῶν δεινοτάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν πλεῖστα κακὰ τὰς πόλεις ἐργαζομένων.

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ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ὁ κρινόμενος νὴ Δία μέτριος τὸν τρόπον, καὶ προγόνων χρηστῶν, καὶ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ καλὰ εἰργασμένος, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτʼταῦτʼ Blass: τοῦτʼ codd. ἄξιόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ φείσασθαι; καὶ τίς ὑμῶν οὐ πολλάκις ἀκήκοεν, ὅτι Κυδιμάχου μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος θανάτου καταγνωσθέντος καὶ φυγόντος ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ὁ χρηστὸς οὗτος υἱὸς περιεῖδε τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα καὶ ζῶντα τῶν ἀναγκαίων σπανίζοντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα οὐ τυχόντα τῶν νομίμων, ἅπερ αὐτοῦ πολλάκις κατεμαρτυρεῖτο·

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ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ὁ κρινόμενος νὴ Δία μέτριος τὸν τρόπον, καὶ προγόνων χρηστῶν, καὶ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ καλὰ εἰργασμένος, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτʼταῦτʼ Blass: τοῦτʼ codd. ἄξιόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ φείσασθαι; καὶ τίς ὑμῶν οὐ πολλάκις ἀκήκοεν, ὅτι Κυδιμάχου μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος θανάτου καταγνωσθέντος καὶ φυγόντος ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ὁ χρηστὸς οὗτος υἱὸς περιεῖδε τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα καὶ ζῶντα τῶν ἀναγκαίων σπανίζοντα καὶ τελευτήσαντα οὐ τυχόντα τῶν νομίμων, ἅπερ αὐτοῦ πολλάκις κατεμαρτυρεῖτο·

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αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον, ὅτʼ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον τὸ πρῶτον ἀπήχθη — πολλάκις γὰρ ἴστε τοῦτο δήπου γεγενημένον —, τοιαῦτα τολμήσαντα ποιεῖν αὐτοῦ,αὐτοῦ Wurm: αὐτούς codd. ὥστʼ ἐκείνους ἀποψηφίσασθαι μήτε πῦρ ἐναύειν τούτῳ μήτε συσσιτεῖν μηδένα μήτε θυσιῶν τῶν γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν; καίτοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τίνα χρὴ τοῦτον νομίζειν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ὃς διὰ μὲν πονηρίαν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐνέπεσεν,

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αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον, ὅτʼ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον τὸ πρῶτον ἀπήχθη — πολλάκις γὰρ ἴστε τοῦτο δήπου γεγενημένον —, τοιαῦτα τολμήσαντα ποιεῖν αὐτοῦ,αὐτοῦ Wurm: αὐτούς codd. ὥστʼ ἐκείνους ἀποψηφίσασθαι μήτε πῦρ ἐναύειν τούτῳ μήτε συσσιτεῖν μηδένα μήτε θυσιῶν τῶν γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν; καίτοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τίνα χρὴ τοῦτον νομίζειν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ὃς διὰ μὲν πονηρίαν εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐνέπεσεν,

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ἐκεῖ δʼ ὢν παρὰ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων κακούργοις ἀπηγμένοιςἀπηγμένοις Wurm: ἀνηγμένοις codd. οὕτως εἶναι πονηρὸς ἔδοξεν, ὥστε μηδʼ ἐκεῖἐκεῖ Dobree: ἐκείνοις codd. τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλὰ κλέπτην ὥς φασι ληφθέντα τουτονὶ παρʼ ἐκείνοις, εἰ ἦν ἕτερός τις τόπος ἀνοσιώτερος ἵνα ἐξῆν ἀπάγειν τοὺς ἐκἐκ Α: ἐκ τοῦ Ν. δεσμωτηρίου κλέπτοντας, εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἂν τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον ἀπαχθῆναι; καὶ ταῦθʼ, ὅπερὅπερ Blass: ἅπερ codd. ἀρτίως εἶπον, τίς οὐκ οἶδε καταμαρτυρηθέντʼ Ἀριστογείτονος, ὅτʼ ἐμπορίου ἐπιμελητὴς λαχὼν ἀπεδοκιμάσθη ὑπὸ τῶν τότε δικαζόντων ἄρχειν ταύτην τὴνταύτην τὴν Baiter et Sauppe: αὐτὴν τὴν Ν: τὴν αὐτὴν Α. ἀρχήν;

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ἐκεῖ δʼ ὢν παρὰ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων κακούργοις ἀπηγμένοιςἀπηγμένοις Wurm: ἀνηγμένοις codd. οὕτως εἶναι πονηρὸς ἔδοξεν, ὥστε μηδʼ ἐκεῖἐκεῖ Dobree: ἐκείνοις codd. τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλὰ κλέπτην ὥς φασι ληφθέντα τουτονὶ παρʼ ἐκείνοις, εἰ ἦν ἕτερός τις τόπος ἀνοσιώτερος ἵνα ἐξῆν ἀπάγειν τοὺς ἐκἐκ Α: ἐκ τοῦ Ν. δεσμωτηρίου κλέπτοντας, εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἂν τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον ἀπαχθῆναι; καὶ ταῦθʼ, ὅπερὅπερ Blass: ἅπερ codd. ἀρτίως εἶπον, τίς οὐκ οἶδε καταμαρτυρηθέντʼ Ἀριστογείτονος, ὅτʼ ἐμπορίου ἐπιμελητὴς λαχὼν ἀπεδοκιμάσθη ὑπὸ τῶν τότε δικαζόντων ἄρχειν ταύτην τὴνταύτην τὴν Baiter et Sauppe: αὐτὴν τὴν Ν: τὴν αὐτὴν Α. ἀρχήν;

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ἔπειτʼ εἰρωνεύεσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ Ἀριστογείτονος μέλλοντες φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον ἐλεεῖτε, ὃς τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα κακῶς διατιθέμενον ὑπὸ τοῦτοῦ om. A. λιμοῦ οὐκ ἠλέησεν; ἔπειτα παρʼ ἡμῶν ἔτι λόγους ἀκούειν βούλεσθε περὶ τῆς Ἀριστογείτονος τιμήσεως, ὃν ἴστε ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δικαίως ἂν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν αὐτῷ πεπραγμένων τῆς ἐσχάτης τύχοι τιμωρίας;

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ἔπειτʼ εἰρωνεύεσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ Ἀριστογείτονος μέλλοντες φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον ἐλεεῖτε, ὃς τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα κακῶς διατιθέμενον ὑπὸ τοῦτοῦ om. A. λιμοῦ οὐκ ἠλέησεν; ἔπειτα παρʼ ἡμῶν ἔτι λόγους ἀκούειν βούλεσθε περὶ τῆς Ἀριστογείτονος τιμήσεως, ὃν ἴστε ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δικαίως ἂν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου βίου καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν αὐτῷ πεπραγμένων τῆς ἐσχάτης τύχοι τιμωρίας;

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οὐκ Ἀριστογείτων ἐστίν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἱερείας τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τῆς ΒραυρωνίαςΒραυρωνίας Markland: βαυβρωνίας ΝΑ. καὶ τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῆς τοιαῦτα γράψας καὶ ψευσάμενος, ὥσθʼ ὑμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπύθεσθε παρὰ τῶν κατηγόρων, πέντε ταλάντων τιμῆσαι τούτῳ,τούτῳ Ν: τοῦτον Α. ὅσονπερ ἦν ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν παρανόμων γραφῇ τίμημα ἐπιγεγραμμένον; οὐχοὐχ Schmidt: codd., ret. Bekker (del. τοῦτο). οὗτος πρὶν ἐκτῖσαι τοῦτο, συκοφαντῶν τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα ὑμῶν καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διατετέλεκε, καὶ καταφρονῶν ἁπασῶν τῶν τιμωριῶν αἳ κατὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις εἰσὶ γεγραμμέναι;

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οὐκ Ἀριστογείτων ἐστίν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἱερείας τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τῆς ΒραυρωνίαςΒραυρωνίας Markland: βαυβρωνίας ΝΑ. καὶ τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῆς τοιαῦτα γράψας καὶ ψευσάμενος, ὥσθʼ ὑμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπύθεσθε παρὰ τῶν κατηγόρων, πέντε ταλάντων τιμῆσαι τούτῳ,τούτῳ Ν: τοῦτον Α. ὅσονπερ ἦν ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν παρανόμων γραφῇ τίμημα ἐπιγεγραμμένον; οὐχοὐχ Schmidt: codd., ret. Bekker (del. τοῦτο). οὗτος πρὶν ἐκτῖσαι τοῦτο, συκοφαντῶν τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα ὑμῶν καὶ λέγων καὶ γράφων ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διατετέλεκε, καὶ καταφρονῶν ἁπασῶν τῶν τιμωριῶν αἳ κατὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις εἰσὶ γεγραμμέναι;

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οὐ τὸ τελευταῖον οὗτος ἐνδειχθεὶς ὑπὸ Λυκούργου, καὶ ἐξελεγχθεὶς ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ λέγειν οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ παραδοθεὶς τοῖς ἕνδεκα κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περιπατῶν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν δικαστηρίωνPost δικαστηρίων intercidisse ὤφθη vel ἑωρᾶτο susp. Reiske. καὶ εἰς τὴν προεδρίαν τῶντῶν Α: τὴν Ν. πρυτάνεων ἐκάθιζεν;ἐκάθιζεν] ἐγκαθίζων Reiske.

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οὐ τὸ τελευταῖον οὗτος ἐνδειχθεὶς ὑπὸ Λυκούργου, καὶ ἐξελεγχθεὶς ὀφείλων τῷ δημοσίῳ λέγειν οὐκ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ παραδοθεὶς τοῖς ἕνδεκα κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περιπατῶν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν δικαστηρίωνPost δικαστηρίων intercidisse ὤφθη vel ἑωρᾶτο susp. Reiske. καὶ εἰς τὴν προεδρίαν τῶντῶν Α: τὴν Ν. πρυτάνεων ἐκάθιζεν;ἐκάθιζεν] ἐγκαθίζων Reiske.

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εἶτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃν οἱ νόμοι μὲν πολλάκις ὑμῖν παραδεδώκασι τιμωρήσασθαι κατεψηφισμένονPost κατεψηφισμένον Sauppe δʼ addidit. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνδειχθέντα,ἐνδειχθέντα Ald.: διδαχθέντες ΝΑ: καὶ ἀπαχθέντα Sauppe. φυλάξαι δʼδʼ del. Sauppe. οὔθʼ οἱ ἕνδεκα δεδύνηνται οὔτε τὸ δεσμωτήριον, τούτῳ βουλήσεσθε συμβούλῳ χρῆσθαι; καὶ ὁ μὲν νόμος εὐξάμενονεὐξάμενον Α: εὐξάμενος Ν. κελεύει τὸν κήρυκα μετʼ εὐφημίας πολλῆς, οὕτως ὑμῖν τὸ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παραδιδόναι· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἀνόσιον καὶ περὶ πάντας πονηρὸν καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα γεγενημένον, τοῦτον μεθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων οἰκείων καὶ συγγενῶν ἐάσετε πολιτεύεσθαι; καὶ Δημάδῃ μὲν καὶ Δημοσθένει οὐδεμίαν ὤεσθε δεῖν συγγνώμην ἔχειν,

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εἶτʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃν οἱ νόμοι μὲν πολλάκις ὑμῖν παραδεδώκασι τιμωρήσασθαι κατεψηφισμένονPost κατεψηφισμένον Sauppe δʼ addidit. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνδειχθέντα,ἐνδειχθέντα Ald.: διδαχθέντες ΝΑ: καὶ ἀπαχθέντα Sauppe. φυλάξαι δʼδʼ del. Sauppe. οὔθʼ οἱ ἕνδεκα δεδύνηνται οὔτε τὸ δεσμωτήριον, τούτῳ βουλήσεσθε συμβούλῳ χρῆσθαι; καὶ ὁ μὲν νόμος εὐξάμενονεὐξάμενον Α: εὐξάμενος Ν. κελεύει τὸν κήρυκα μετʼ εὐφημίας πολλῆς, οὕτως ὑμῖν τὸ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων παραδιδόναι· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἀνόσιον καὶ περὶ πάντας πονηρὸν καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα γεγενημένον, τοῦτον μεθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὑμετέρων οἰκείων καὶ συγγενῶν ἐάσετε πολιτεύεσθαι; καὶ Δημάδῃ μὲν καὶ Δημοσθένει οὐδεμίαν ὤεσθε δεῖν συγγνώμην ἔχειν,

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ὅτι δῶρα καθʼ ὑμῶν ἐξηλέγχθησαν λαμβάνοντες, ἀλλʼ ἐτιμωρήσασθε, καὶ δικαίως, οἷς εἰ μὴ πάντα ἀλλὰ πολλά γε συνῇστεσυνῇστε Hirschig: σύνιστε codd. χρήσιμα πεπολιτευμένοιςπεπολιτευμένοις Ν: πολιτευομένοις Α.· τὸν δὲ κατάρατον τοῦτον, ὃς ἀγαθὸν μὲν ὑμᾶς οὐδεπώποτε πεποίηκενοὐδεπώποτε πεποίηκεν Maetzner: οὐδέποτε πεποίηκεν Ν: πεποίηκεν οὐδεπώποτε Α. ἐξ οὗ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσελήλυθε, κακὸν δʼ ὅ τι δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀφήσετε; καὶ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλέσειεν ὑμῖν τοῖς τοῦτον προσδεχομένοιςπροσδεχομένοις Ν: δεχομένοις Α. σύμβουλον; ὅταν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γνώριμον καὶ φανερὰνγνώριμον καὶ φανερὰν Reiske: γνώριμος καὶ φανερὸς codd. καὶ περιβόητον τὴν πονηρίαν παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἔχων ἐν ὑμῖνἐν ὑμῖν om. A. δημηγορῇ, τότε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὑμᾶς οἱ περιεστηκότες θαυμάσουσι, πότεραπότερα Ν: πότερον Α. βελτίους οὐκ ἔχετε συμβούλους ἢ καὶ χαίρετε τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούοντες.

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ὅτι δῶρα καθʼ ὑμῶν ἐξηλέγχθησαν λαμβάνοντες, ἀλλʼ ἐτιμωρήσασθε, καὶ δικαίως, οἷς εἰ μὴ πάντα ἀλλὰ πολλά γε συνῇστεσυνῇστε Hirschig: σύνιστε codd. χρήσιμα πεπολιτευμένοιςπεπολιτευμένοις Ν: πολιτευομένοις Α.· τὸν δὲ κατάρατον τοῦτον, ὃς ἀγαθὸν μὲν ὑμᾶς οὐδεπώποτε πεποίηκενοὐδεπώποτε πεποίηκεν Maetzner: οὐδέποτε πεποίηκεν Ν: πεποίηκεν οὐδεπώποτε Α. ἐξ οὗ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσελήλυθε, κακὸν δʼ ὅ τι δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀφήσετε; καὶ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλέσειεν ὑμῖν τοῖς τοῦτον προσδεχομένοιςπροσδεχομένοις Ν: δεχομένοις Α. σύμβουλον; ὅταν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γνώριμον καὶ φανερὰνγνώριμον καὶ φανερὰν Reiske: γνώριμος καὶ φανερὸς codd. καὶ περιβόητον τὴν πονηρίαν παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἔχων ἐν ὑμῖνἐν ὑμῖν om. A. δημηγορῇ, τότε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὑμᾶς οἱ περιεστηκότες θαυμάσουσι, πότεραπότερα Ν: πότερον Α. βελτίους οὐκ ἔχετε συμβούλους ἢ καὶ χαίρετε τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούοντες.

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χρὴ δʼ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πρῶτοι νομοθέται περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ λεγόντων τοῖς προγόνοις ὑμῶνὑμῶν Ν: ἡμῶν Α. ἐνομοθέτησαν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμᾶς ζητεῖν ἀκούειν, ἵνα βελτίους τοὺς προσιόντας ὑμῖν ποιήσητε. πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τούτων ἐγίγνωσκον; πρῶτον μὲν καθʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίανἐκκλησίαν add. Dobree. δημοσίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀρὰς ποιούμενοι, εἴ τις δῶρα λαμβάνων μετὰ ταῦτα λέγει καὶ γιγνώσκει περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξώλη τοῦτον εἶναι· ὧν οὗτος νῦν ἐστιν Ἀριστογείτων·

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χρὴ δʼ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πρῶτοι νομοθέται περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ λεγόντων τοῖς προγόνοις ὑμῶνὑμῶν Ν: ἡμῶν Α. ἐνομοθέτησαν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμᾶς ζητεῖν ἀκούειν, ἵνα βελτίους τοὺς προσιόντας ὑμῖν ποιήσητε. πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τούτων ἐγίγνωσκον; πρῶτον μὲν καθʼ ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίανἐκκλησίαν add. Dobree. δημοσίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πονηρῶν ἀρὰς ποιούμενοι, εἴ τις δῶρα λαμβάνων μετὰ ταῦτα λέγει καὶ γιγνώσκει περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξώλη τοῦτον εἶναι· ὧν οὗτος νῦν ἐστιν Ἀριστογείτων·

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ἔπειτʼ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις δώρων γραφὰς ποιήσαντες, καὶ κατὰ μόνου τούτου τῶν ἀδικημάτων δεκαπλασίαν ἐπιθέντεςἐπιθέντες Fuhr: ἐπιτιθέντες codd. τοῦ τιμήματος τὴν ἔκτισιν, ἡγούμενοι τὸν τιμὴν λαμβάνοντα τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ῥηθήσεσθαι μελλόντων λόγων, τοῦτον οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ δήμου βελτίστων ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῖς δοῦσι συμφερόντων δημηγορεῖν· Ἀριστογείτονα τοίνυν ἡ βουλὴ ἀποπέφαγκε· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀνακρίνοντεςἀνακρίνοντες (coll. ποιούμενοι 16) Blass: ἀνακρίναντες codd. τοὺς τῶν κοινῶν τι μέλλοντας διοικεῖν, τίς ἐστιἐστι Reiske: ἔσται codd. τὸν ἴδιον τρόπον, εἰ γονέας εὖ ποιεῖ, εἰ τὰς στρατείας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐστράτευται, εἰ ἱερὰἱερὰ] ἠρία Valesius. πατρῷά ἐστιν, εἰ τὰ τέλη τελεῖ·

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ἔπειτʼ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις δώρων γραφὰς ποιήσαντες, καὶ κατὰ μόνου τούτου τῶν ἀδικημάτων δεκαπλασίαν ἐπιθέντεςἐπιθέντες Fuhr: ἐπιτιθέντες codd. τοῦ τιμήματος τὴν ἔκτισιν, ἡγούμενοι τὸν τιμὴν λαμβάνοντα τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ῥηθήσεσθαι μελλόντων λόγων, τοῦτον οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ δήμου βελτίστων ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῖς δοῦσι συμφερόντων δημηγορεῖν· Ἀριστογείτονα τοίνυν ἡ βουλὴ ἀποπέφαγκε· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀνακρίνοντεςἀνακρίνοντες (coll. ποιούμενοι 16) Blass: ἀνακρίναντες codd. τοὺς τῶν κοινῶν τι μέλλοντας διοικεῖν, τίς ἐστιἐστι Reiske: ἔσται codd. τὸν ἴδιον τρόπον, εἰ γονέας εὖ ποιεῖ, εἰ τὰς στρατείας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐστράτευται, εἰ ἱερὰἱερὰ] ἠρία Valesius. πατρῷά ἐστιν, εἰ τὰ τέλη τελεῖ·

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ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ἔχοι δεῖξαιδεῖξαι hic N: post αὑτῷ Α. συμβεβηκὸς Ἀριστογείτων αὑτῷ. ἀντὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γονέας εὖ ποιεῖν κακῶς οὗτος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα πεποίηκεν· ὅτε δʼ ὑμεῖς ἐστρατεύεσθε πάντες, οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ· τοσοῦτον δʼ ἀπολέλοιπε τοῦ πατρὸς μνῆμά τι ἔχειν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖξαι, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐκεῖ τὰ νομιζόμενα ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ· τῶν δʼ ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων εἰσφερόντων ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, οὗτος οὐδὲοὐδὲ Ν: οὐδʼ ἐκ Α. τῶν δημοσίων καὶ ὧν ὦφλε τὸ ἀργύριον ἅπαν ἐκτέτεικεν.

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ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν ἔχοι δεῖξαιδεῖξαι hic N: post αὑτῷ Α. συμβεβηκὸς Ἀριστογείτων αὑτῷ. ἀντὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γονέας εὖ ποιεῖν κακῶς οὗτος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα πεποίηκεν· ὅτε δʼ ὑμεῖς ἐστρατεύεσθε πάντες, οὗτος ἦν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ· τοσοῦτον δʼ ἀπολέλοιπε τοῦ πατρὸς μνῆμά τι ἔχειν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖξαι, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐκεῖ τὰ νομιζόμενα ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ· τῶν δʼ ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων εἰσφερόντων ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων, οὗτος οὐδὲοὐδὲ Ν: οὐδʼ ἐκ Α. τῶν δημοσίων καὶ ὧν ὦφλε τὸ ἀργύριον ἅπαν ἐκτέτεικεν.

ἁπλῶς δʼ εἰπεῖν, ἐναντία τοῖς νόμοις ἅπασι πράττων διατετέλεκε, καὶ τοῦτον μόνον ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ τοῖς ἐζητηκόσι καὶ εἰδόσιν ἀποπέφαγκεν· οὐ γὰρ παρʼ ἐκείνης ὑμεῖς πυθόμενοι τοῦτον ἴστε πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, ἀλλʼ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἀκριβῶς οἶδε τὴν τούτου πονηρίαν. ὥστε τὸ πολλάκις λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, ὅτι περὶ μὲν τούτου τὴν ψῆφον ὑμεῖς μέλλετε φέρειν, περὶ δʼ ὑμῶν οἱ περιεστηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

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διὸ καὶ σωφρόνων ἐστὶ δικαστῶν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μήθʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίαν ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν ψῆφον μήτε πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλʼ ὁμοθυμαδὸν καταψηφισαμένους πάντας παραδοῦναι τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένοις θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι, καὶ μὴ προέσθαι καὶ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν ὁσίανὁσίαν Bekker: θείαν codd. καὶ τὴν εὔορκον ψῆφον, ἀναμνησθέντας ὅτι τούτου κατέγνωκεν ἡ βουλὴ δῶρα λαμβάνειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, τούτου κατέγνωκεν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν, [καὶ]καὶ del. Emperius. ἵνα τὸ πραότατονπραότατον Reiske: πραότερον codd. εἴπω τῶν ὀνομάτων, τούτου καταχειροτονήσας ὁ δῆμος παραδέδωκενπαραδέδωκεν Ν: παρέδωκεν Α. ὑμῖν τιμωρήσασθαι,

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διὸ καὶ σωφρόνων ἐστὶ δικαστῶν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μήθʼ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίαν ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν ψῆφον μήτε πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλʼ ὁμοθυμαδὸν καταψηφισαμένους πάντας παραδοῦναι τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένοις θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι, καὶ μὴ προέσθαι καὶ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν ὁσίανὁσίαν Bekker: θείαν codd. καὶ τὴν εὔορκον ψῆφον, ἀναμνησθέντας ὅτι τούτου κατέγνωκεν ἡ βουλὴ δῶρα λαμβάνειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, τούτου κατέγνωκεν ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀδικεῖν ἑαυτόν, [καὶ]καὶ del. Emperius. ἵνα τὸ πραότατονπραότατον Reiske: πραότερον codd. εἴπω τῶν ὀνομάτων, τούτου καταχειροτονήσας ὁ δῆμος παραδέδωκενπαραδέδωκεν Ν: παρέδωκεν Α. ὑμῖν τιμωρήσασθαι,

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οὗτος πολλὰ κακὰ διαπεπραγμένος ἐπὶ τοιούτοις εἴληπται πράγμασι νῦν ἀδικῶν, ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ὑμῖν τοῖς δικάζουσιν ἀτιμώρητον ἐᾶσαι τοῦτον. τίνα γὰρ τρόπον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεων οἴσετε τὴν ψῆφον; ἢ διὰ τίνας προφάσεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων ἔσεσθε κατεψηφισμένοι; ἢ διὰ τί τὸ μὲν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς εἰληφότας τὰ χρήματα φανεῖσθεφανεῖσθε Dobree: φαίνεσθε codd. σπουδάζοντες, τὸ δὲ τιμωρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀποπεφασμένους ἐῶντες;

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οὗτος πολλὰ κακὰ διαπεπραγμένος ἐπὶ τοιούτοις εἴληπται πράγμασι νῦν ἀδικῶν, ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ὑμῖν τοῖς δικάζουσιν ἀτιμώρητον ἐᾶσαι τοῦτον. τίνα γὰρ τρόπον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεων οἴσετε τὴν ψῆφον; ἢ διὰ τίνας προφάσεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων ἔσεσθε κατεψηφισμένοι; ἢ διὰ τί τὸ μὲν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς εἰληφότας τὰ χρήματα φανεῖσθεφανεῖσθε Dobree: φαίνεσθε codd. σπουδάζοντες, τὸ δὲ τιμωρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀποπεφασμένους ἐῶντες;

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μὴ γὰρ ἰδίους τοὺςτοὺς om. A. ἀγῶνας τούτους ὑπολάβητε εἶναι κατὰ τῶν νῦν ἀποπεφασμένων μόνων, ἀλλὰ κοινοὺς καὶ κατὰκατὰ N A corr.: ἀπὸ A pr. τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. δωροδοκία γὰρ καὶ προδοσία κρινομένη παρʼ ὑμῖν δυοῖν θάτερον ἐκἐκ N A pr.: ἐπὶ A corr. (2) τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ποιήσει τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ χρήματα λαμβάνειν καθʼ ὑμῶν θαρροῦντας ὡς οὐ δώσοντας δίκην, ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ λαμβάνειν ὡς τῆς τιμωρίας τοῖς ληφθεῖσιν ἀξίας γενησομένης τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

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μὴ γὰρ ἰδίους τοὺςτοὺς om. A. ἀγῶνας τούτους ὑπολάβητε εἶναι κατὰ τῶν νῦν ἀποπεφασμένων μόνων, ἀλλὰ κοινοὺς καὶ κατὰκατὰ N A corr.: ἀπὸ A pr. τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. δωροδοκία γὰρ καὶ προδοσία κρινομένη παρʼ ὑμῖν δυοῖν θάτερον ἐκἐκ N A pr.: ἐπὶ A corr. (2) τοῦ λοιποῦ χρόνου ποιήσει τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ χρήματα λαμβάνειν καθʼ ὑμῶν θαρροῦντας ὡς οὐ δώσοντας δίκην, ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ λαμβάνειν ὡς τῆς τιμωρίας τοῖς ληφθεῖσιν ἀξίας γενησομένης τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

-

οὐκ ἴσθʼ, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ὁ φόβος ὁ παρʼ ὑμῶν τοὺς ὁρμῶντας ἐπὶ τὰ καθʼ ὑμῶνὑμῶν Ν: ἡμῶν Α. ἥκοντα χρήματα [νῦν]νῦν del. Bekker. ἀνείργει καὶ ποιεῖ πολλάκις ἀπὸ τοῦ λήμματος ἀποστρέφειν; καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου, τὸ ζητεῖν τὴν βουλὴν περὶ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων προστάττον,προστάττον Reiske: πρός τʼ αὐτόν codd. οὐδὲ τοὺς κεκομικότας τὸ χρυσίον εἰς τὴν χώραν ὁμολογεῖν πεποίηκε;

+

οὐκ ἴσθʼ, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ὁ φόβος ὁ παρʼ ὑμῶν τοὺς ὁρμῶντας ἐπὶ τὰ καθʼ ὑμῶνὑμῶν Ν: ἡμῶν Α. ἥκοντα χρήματα [νῦν]νῦν del. Bekker. ἀνείργει καὶ ποιεῖ πολλάκις ἀπὸ τοῦ λήμματος ἀποστρέφειν; καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου, τὸ ζητεῖν τὴν βουλὴν περὶ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων προστάττον,προστάττον Reiske: πρός τʼ αὐτόν codd. οὐδὲ τοὺς κεκομικότας τὸ χρυσίον εἰς τὴν χώραν ὁμολογεῖν πεποίηκε;

καλῶς γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς οἱ πρόγονοι περὶ τούτων ψηφισάμενοι στήλην εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἀνήνεγκαν, ὅτε φασὶν Ἄρθμιον τὸν Πυθώνακτος τὸν Ζελείτην κομίσαι τὸ χρυσίον ἐκ Μήδων ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων. πρὶν γὰρ λαβεῖν τινας καὶ δοῦναι τοῦ τρόπου πεῖραν, φυγὴν τοῦ κομίσαντος τὸ χρυσίον καταγνόντες, ἐξήλασαν αὐτὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς χώρας. καὶ ταῦθʼ, ὥσπερ εἶπον, εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν εἰς στήλην χαλκῆν γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν, παράδειγμα ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις καθιστάντες, καὶ νομίζοντες τὸν ὁπωσοῦν χρήματα λαμβάνοντα οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν διδόντων βουλεύεσθαι.

-

καὶ μόνῳ τούτῳ προσέγραψαν τὴν αἰτίαν διʼ ἣν ὁ δῆμος ἐξέβαλεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, γράψαντες διαρρήδην· Ἄρθμιον τὸν Πυθώνακτος τὸν Ζελείτην πολέμιον εἶναι τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, αὐτὸν καὶ γένος, καὶ φεύγειν Ἀθήνας ὅτι τὸν ἐκ Μήδων χρυσὸν ἤγαγεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον. καίτοι εἰ τὸν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ χρυσὸν ὁ δῆμος πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον ἡγεῖτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ ῥᾳθύμως ἔχειν ὁρῶντας ἐν αὐτῇαὐτῇ Dobree: ταύτῃ codd. τῇ πόλει δωροδοκίαν γιγνομένην; καί μοι σκοπεῖτε ταύτην τὴν στήλην.

+

καὶ μόνῳ τούτῳ προσέγραψαν τὴν αἰτίαν διʼ ἣν ὁ δῆμος ἐξέβαλεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, γράψαντες διαρρήδην· Ἄρθμιον τὸν Πυθώνακτος τὸν Ζελείτην πολέμιον εἶναι τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, αὐτὸν καὶ γένος, καὶ φεύγειν Ἀθήνας ὅτι τὸν ἐκ Μήδων χρυσὸν ἤγαγεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον. καίτοι εἰ τὸν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ χρυσὸν ὁ δῆμος πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον ἡγεῖτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ ῥᾳθύμως ἔχειν ὁρῶντας ἐν αὐτῇαὐτῇ Dobree: ταύτῃ codd. τῇ πόλει δωροδοκίαν γιγνομένην; καί μοι σκοπεῖτε ταύτην τὴν στήλην.

-

καίτοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τί ἂν οἴεσθʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαιποιῆσαι hic N: supra post οἴεσθε Α. λαβόντας ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ῥήτορα πολίτην ἑαυτῶν δῶρα δεχόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρουσιν, οἳ τὸν ἀλλότριον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ φύσει τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄνθρωπον οὕτω δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως ἐξήλασαν [ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης];ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης del. Bekker. τοιγάρτοι τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἀξίως ἐκινδύνευσαν πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον.κατὰ ἀριστογείτονος subicit N: deesse quaedam putant Baiter et Sauppe.

+

καίτοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τί ἂν οἴεσθʼ ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας ποιῆσαιποιῆσαι hic N: supra post οἴεσθε Α. λαβόντας ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ῥήτορα πολίτην ἑαυτῶν δῶρα δεχόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρουσιν, οἳ τὸν ἀλλότριον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ φύσει τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄνθρωπον οὕτω δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως ἐξήλασαν [ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης];ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης del. Bekker. τοιγάρτοι τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν προγόνων ἀξίως ἐκινδύνευσαν πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον.κατὰ ἀριστογείτονος subicit N: deesse quaedam putant Baiter et Sauppe.

- +
diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/__cts__.xml index 072ae4682..551c498d1 100644 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Κατὰ Φιλοκλέους - Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + Against Philocles + Dinarchus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index cbfdcb9ad..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0082", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Dinarchus/opensource/din_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=3", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index abb3ca701..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,288 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - - - Against Philocles - Dinarchus - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - Dinarchus - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - - -
-

What in Heaven's name are we to say about such men as this? How will you deal - with the wickedness of Philocles, who has been convicted by the Areopagus not - once only but three times, as you all know, and as you were recently informed in - the Assembly? He has lied before all the Athenians and the surrounding crowd, - saying that he would prevent Harpalus from putting into the Piraeus, when he had been appointed by you - as general in command of Munichia and the dockyards,

-
-
-

and he dared to take bribes against you all, against your country and your wives - and children; he has broken the oath which he swore between the statue of Athena - and the table; and he proposed a decree against himself imposing the death - penalty on him if he had accepted any of the money which Harpalus brought into - the country.

-
-
-

Yet despite this he dared to come and show himself to you when you knew that he - had been proved answerable on all these counts. It is not justice on which he is - relying, Athenians; for what has he to do with justice? No, it is audacity and - effrontery, in virtue of which he has seen fit to take bribes in the past, to - the utter disregard of yourselves and the course of justice in the city, and has - now come forward to explain that he is guilty of none of these things. So - complete has been his contempt for your apathy.

-
-
-

The law of the city, which binds us all, lays it down that if anyone breaks an - agreement made in the presence of one of the citizens he shall be liable as an - offender. Shall this man, who has deceived every Athenian, betrayed the trust - which he did not deserve to receive from you, and so done everything in his - power to ruin all the city's institutions, claim that he is coming to make his - defence against the charge laid against him?

-
-
-

It is my personal opinion, Athenians, if I am to speak the truth,—as I must,—that - there is no question whether the reports bearing on Philocles are true or false; - you have simply to consider now the punishment mentioned in the decree and to - decide whether you ought to fine a man who has done the city so much harm or - sentence him to death,—as he proposed in the decree against - himself,—confiscating the property which he has amassed from perquisites like - this.

-
-
-

Do you think that this question of the gold is the - first occasion when Philocles has shown his dishonesty and that he has never - taken bribes against you before? You are wrong. He has been like this a long - time, though you did not notice it; indeed you have been fortunate not to have - met with his venality on more important occasions; for there is no greater - menace than a man whose dishonesty passes unobserved.

-
-
-

Athenians, will you not all unite in killing one who has plunged many of our - citizens into such deep disgrace and guilt, who first opened the way for the - gold that has been distributed, exposing the whole of Athens to blame? Or will you consent to - hear this man, who has done so much to harm you, argue that the council of the - Areopagus has falsified the reports and that, while he is just and upright and - incorruptible, it has published all this in return for favors or bribes?

-
-
-

Do you realize that, although in the case of other offences you must first - consider critically and with deliberation, discovering the truth, and only then - administer punishment to the offenders, nevertheless, in cases of obvious and - unquestioned treason, you should give first place to anger and the vengeance - that goes with it?

-
-
-

Do you think this man would refrain from selling any one of the things most vital - in the city, when you, relying on his loyalty and honesty, had placed him in - charge of it? Do you think that there are any triremes in the dockyards which he - would not let go, or that he would trouble to keep anything safe, if there was a - prospect of escaping detection and receiving double the amount of gold which he - has now received? Nothing, gentlemen, is beyond a man of this type.

-
-
-

For if anyone values silver and gold more highly than his loyalty to you and has - no more regard for an oath or for honor and right than he has for making money, - then that man, in so far as he is able, will sell Munichia if he has a buyer; he - will signal to the enemy and reveal your secrets, he will betray your army and - your fleet.

-
-
-

Therefore, Athenians, do not imagine that, in - assessing the penalty, you are merely going to judge of the crimes which - Philocles has actually committed; you will bear in mind those which he would - have committed, had it been in his power. Thank the gods, now that you know the - defendant's character, that you have suffered no more grievous harm at his - hands, and punish him as your duty and his baseness demand.

-
-
-

This man, Athenians, has held a cavalry command, three or four times, over - reputable men; he has been appointed a general by you more than ten times, - unworthy though he was, and has enjoyed honor and aroused emulation because of - his reputation for loyalty towards you. Yet he sold and betrayed the dignity of - a command conferred by us, reducing himself to the level of Aristogiton and - changing from a general into a hireling and a traitor.

-
-
-

Is this a reason why you, the injured parties, should give way to feelings of - consideration for such a person when he himself showed no consideration in - treating you and your fellows as he did? Those who could justly claim your pity, - Athenians, are not the like of him,—far from it,—they are those whom Philocles - would have betrayed if he had had the chance of a good price; and among them are - the promontory and harbors, and the dockyards which your ancestors built and - left you.

-
-
-

You must remember these, Athenians, and not make light of the reports published - by the council. Treat this caseThe sense of - this passage is evident, though it is not clear whether Dinarchus is - expressing himself loosely or whether, as Blass suggests, a few words have - dropped out of the text. as you treated those on which you have - already passed judgement. For it is shameful to grow weary of punishing men who - have proved traitors to the city, and shameful that any lawbreakers and - reprobates should survive, when the gods have exposed them and surrendered them - to you for punishment, having seen that the whole people had accused Philocles - and handed him over first of all to meet with his deserts before you.

-
-
-

By Zeus the Savior, I am ashamed that you should - need us to encourage you and goad you on before you proceed to punish the - defendant now on trial. Are you not eyewitnesses of the crimes he has committed? - The whole people considered that it was not safe or right to trust him with - their children and so rejected him as Supervisor of the Ephebi.

-
-
-

Will you, the guardians of democracy and law, spare a man who has behaved like - this; you to whom the fortune of lot has entrusted the protectionSome such meaning seems called for as is - presumed by Reiske, but the actual Greek words supplied by him make the - future participle dika/sontas rather - awkward. of the people by means of the judgement you will give? You - are the supreme court of justice in the city. Will you acquit a man guilty of - taking bribes and every other crime, who, as I said just now, is unique among - criminals in that he has been reported not once merely but three times and might - already have been rightly made liable three times to the death penalty by his - own decree.

-
-
-

Then why will you wait, Athenians? What further crimes do you wish to hear of - greater than those we have mentioned? Was it not you and your ancestors who made - no allowance for Timotheus,This passage - corresponds almost word for word with Din. 1.14. - See note on that. though he had sailed round the Peloponnese and beaten the Spartans in the - sea-fight at Corcyra, though his father - was Conon who liberated Greece and he - himself had taken Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and twenty cities besides? You did not take - this record into consideration at all, or allow such services to outweigh the - case before you or the oaths which you swear before giving your verdict, but - fined him a hundred talents, because Aristophon said he had been bribed by the - Chians and Rhodians.

-
-
-

Will you then acquitAn apodosis conveying some - such meaning as this, which is needed to complete the sense of the sentence, - seems to have dropped out of the Greek text. this abominable man, - reported not by one individual but by the whole council of the Areopagus, after - an investigation, to be holding bribes against you; who, though he has ample - means and no male heirs and lacks nothing else that a normal man could need, did - not withhold his hand from the bribes offered against his country or suppress - his natural depravity, but destroyed entirely his reputation for loyalty towards - you, by ranging himself with those whom he once professed to oppose and proving - that his counterfeited honesty was sham?

-
-
-

Let every one of you bear these points in mind, - Athenians, and remember the present circumstances, which call for good faith, - not corruption. You must hate the wicked, wipe out such monsters from the city, - and show the world that the mass of people have not been corrupted with a few - orators and generals and are not cowed by their reputation; for they realize - that with integrity and agreement among ourselves we shall easily triumph, by - the grace of the gods, if anyone unjustly attacks us, but that with bribery and - treason and the allied vices practiced by men like this no city could survive. -

-
-
-

Therefore, Athenians, do not admit any request or plea for pity; do not condone - the guilt which you have seen fastened upon the defendants in the plain light of - facts, or invalidate the council's reportSome - words have clearly dropped out from this passage. No certain restoration is - possible, although the general sense is not difficult to conjecture. The - restoration of Sauppe is followed in the translation.; but one and - all assist your country and the laws, since both are now on trial against this - man's iniquity.

-
-
-

The whole country will be affected by the verdict you are about to give: the - shrines which have been erected in it, the agelong traditions, and the - constitution which your ancestors have handed down to you. It is not a question - of Philocles alone; for he has condemned himself to death long ago. In - addressing these entreaties to you I am urging a far juster plea than the men - who have committed these shameful acts: I am asking you not to desert the things - for which your ancestors faced many dangers, not to turn the city's honor into - utter shame, and not to let personal regard for the defendants override your - respect for the laws, the people's decrees, and the reports of the council.

-
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>For let me make it quite clear to you, Athenians, quite clear, that you are - being applauded universally in consequence of the inquiries held upon this - money, and that men who have been convicted of taking bribes against their own - country are regarded as wicked and injurious, haters of democracy, professing, - as they do, to be your friends and to work for the city's interests, and having - made their reputation thanks to you.The - concluding sentences of the speech are lost.

-
- - -
-
diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7ef1cfd95 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ + + + + + + + + Against Philocles + Dinarchus + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + + Dinarchus + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

+
+
+ + + + + +
+ + + + English + Greek + + + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion + edited markup + split composite text and converted to unicode + SGML markup + +
+ + + +
+

What in Heaven's name are we to say about such men as this? How will you deal with the wickedness of Philocles, who has been convicted by the Areopagus not once only but three times, as you all know, and as you were recently informed in the Assembly? He has lied before all the Athenians and the surrounding crowd, saying that he would prevent Harpalus from putting into the Piraeus, when he had been appointed by you as general in command of Munichia and the dockyards,

+

and he dared to take bribes against you all, against your country and your wives and children; he has broken the oath which he swore between the statue of Athena and the table; and he proposed a decree against himself imposing the death penalty on him if he had accepted any of the money which Harpalus brought into the country.

+

Yet despite this he dared to come and show himself to you when you knew that he had been proved answerable on all these counts. It is not justice on which he is relying, Athenians; for what has he to do with justice? No, it is audacity and effrontery, in virtue of which he has seen fit to take bribes in the past, to the utter disregard of yourselves and the course of justice in the city, and has now come forward to explain that he is guilty of none of these things. So complete has been his contempt for your apathy.

+

The law of the city, which binds us all, lays it down that if anyone breaks an agreement made in the presence of one of the citizens he shall be liable as an offender. Shall this man, who has deceived every Athenian, betrayed the trust which he did not deserve to receive from you, and so done everything in his power to ruin all the city's institutions, claim that he is coming to make his defence against the charge laid against him?

+

It is my personal opinion, Athenians, if I am to speak the truth,—as I must,—that there is no question whether the reports bearing on Philocles are true or false; you have simply to consider now the punishment mentioned in the decree and to decide whether you ought to fine a man who has done the city so much harm or sentence him to death,—as he proposed in the decree against himself,—confiscating the property which he has amassed from perquisites like this.

+

Do you think that this question of the gold is the first occasion when Philocles has shown his dishonesty and that he has never taken bribes against you before? You are wrong. He has been like this a long time, though you did not notice it; indeed you have been fortunate not to have met with his venality on more important occasions; for there is no greater menace than a man whose dishonesty passes unobserved.

+

Athenians, will you not all unite in killing one who has plunged many of our citizens into such deep disgrace and guilt, who first opened the way for the gold that has been distributed, exposing the whole of Athens to blame? Or will you consent to hear this man, who has done so much to harm you, argue that the council of the Areopagus has falsified the reports and that, while he is just and upright and incorruptible, it has published all this in return for favors or bribes?

+

Do you realize that, although in the case of other offences you must first consider critically and with deliberation, discovering the truth, and only then administer punishment to the offenders, nevertheless, in cases of obvious and unquestioned treason, you should give first place to anger and the vengeance that goes with it?

+

Do you think this man would refrain from selling any one of the things most vital in the city, when you, relying on his loyalty and honesty, had placed him in charge of it? Do you think that there are any triremes in the dockyards which he would not let go, or that he would trouble to keep anything safe, if there was a prospect of escaping detection and receiving double the amount of gold which he has now received? Nothing, gentlemen, is beyond a man of this type.

+

For if anyone values silver and gold more highly than his loyalty to you and has no more regard for an oath or for honor and right than he has for making money, then that man, in so far as he is able, will sell Munichia if he has a buyer; he will signal to the enemy and reveal your secrets, he will betray your army and your fleet.

+

Therefore, Athenians, do not imagine that, in assessing the penalty, you are merely going to judge of the crimes which Philocles has actually committed; you will bear in mind those which he would have committed, had it been in his power. Thank the gods, now that you know the defendant's character, that you have suffered no more grievous harm at his hands, and punish him as your duty and his baseness demand.

+

This man, Athenians, has held a cavalry command, three or four times, over reputable men; he has been appointed a general by you more than ten times, unworthy though he was, and has enjoyed honor and aroused emulation because of his reputation for loyalty towards you. Yet he sold and betrayed the dignity of a command conferred by us, reducing himself to the level of Aristogiton and changing from a general into a hireling and a traitor.

+

Is this a reason why you, the injured parties, should give way to feelings of consideration for such a person when he himself showed no consideration in treating you and your fellows as he did? Those who could justly claim your pity, Athenians, are not the like of him,—far from it,—they are those whom Philocles would have betrayed if he had had the chance of a good price; and among them are the promontory and harbors, and the dockyards which your ancestors built and left you.

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You must remember these, Athenians, and not make light of the reports published by the council. Treat this caseThe sense of this passage is evident, though it is not clear whether Dinarchus is expressing himself loosely or whether, as Blass suggests, a few words have dropped out of the text. as you treated those on which you have already passed judgement. For it is shameful to grow weary of punishing men who have proved traitors to the city, and shameful that any lawbreakers and reprobates should survive, when the gods have exposed them and surrendered them to you for punishment, having seen that the whole people had accused Philocles and handed him over first of all to meet with his deserts before you.

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By Zeus the Savior, I am ashamed that you should need us to encourage you and goad you on before you proceed to punish the defendant now on trial. Are you not eyewitnesses of the crimes he has committed? The whole people considered that it was not safe or right to trust him with their children and so rejected him as Supervisor of the Ephebi.

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Will you, the guardians of democracy and law, spare a man who has behaved like this; you to whom the fortune of lot has entrusted the protectionSome such meaning seems called for as is presumed by Reiske, but the actual Greek words supplied by him make the future participle δικάσοντας rather awkward. of the people by means of the judgement you will give? You are the supreme court of justice in the city. Will you acquit a man guilty of taking bribes and every other crime, who, as I said just now, is unique among criminals in that he has been reported not once merely but three times and might already have been rightly made liable three times to the death penalty by his own decree.

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Then why will you wait, Athenians? What further crimes do you wish to hear of greater than those we have mentioned? Was it not you and your ancestors who made no allowance for Timotheus,This passage corresponds almost word for word with Din. 1.14. See note on that. though he had sailed round the Peloponnese and beaten the Spartans in the sea-fight at Corcyra, though his father was Conon who liberated Greece and he himself had taken Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and twenty cities besides? You did not take this record into consideration at all, or allow such services to outweigh the case before you or the oaths which you swear before giving your verdict, but fined him a hundred talents, because Aristophon said he had been bribed by the Chians and Rhodians.

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Will you then acquitAn apodosis conveying some such meaning as this, which is needed to complete the sense of the sentence, seems to have dropped out of the Greek text. this abominable man, reported not by one individual but by the whole council of the Areopagus, after an investigation, to be holding bribes against you; who, though he has ample means and no male heirs and lacks nothing else that a normal man could need, did not withhold his hand from the bribes offered against his country or suppress his natural depravity, but destroyed entirely his reputation for loyalty towards you, by ranging himself with those whom he once professed to oppose and proving that his counterfeited honesty was sham?

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Let every one of you bear these points in mind, Athenians, and remember the present circumstances, which call for good faith, not corruption. You must hate the wicked, wipe out such monsters from the city, and show the world that the mass of people have not been corrupted with a few orators and generals and are not cowed by their reputation; for they realize that with integrity and agreement among ourselves we shall easily triumph, by the grace of the gods, if anyone unjustly attacks us, but that with bribery and treason and the allied vices practiced by men like this no city could survive.

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Therefore, Athenians, do not admit any request or plea for pity; do not condone the guilt which you have seen fastened upon the defendants in the plain light of facts, or invalidate the council's reportSome words have clearly dropped out from this passage. No certain restoration is possible, although the general sense is not difficult to conjecture. The restoration of Sauppe is followed in the translation.; but one and all assist your country and the laws, since both are now on trial against this man's iniquity.

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The whole country will be affected by the verdict you are about to give: the shrines which have been erected in it, the agelong traditions, and the constitution which your ancestors have handed down to you. It is not a question of Philocles alone; for he has condemned himself to death long ago. In addressing these entreaties to you I am urging a far juster plea than the men who have committed these shameful acts: I am asking you not to desert the things for which your ancestors faced many dangers, not to turn the city's honor into utter shame, and not to let personal regard for the defendants override your respect for the laws, the people's decrees, and the reports of the council.

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>For let me make it quite clear to you, Athenians, quite clear, that you are being applauded universally in consequence of the inquiries held upon this money, and that men who have been convicted of taking bribes against their own country are regarded as wicked and injurious, haters of democracy, professing, as they do, to be your friends and to work for the city's interests, and having made their reputation thanks to you.The concluding sentences of the speech are lost.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml index 720696ec8..c97fe7e29 100644 --- a/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ - + Κατὰ Φιλοκλέους Dinarchus @@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ Perseus Project, Tufts University Gregory Crane - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith +Prepared under the supervision of +Lisa Cerrato +William Merrill +Elli Mylonas +David Smith The Annenberg CPB/Project @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ - + Dinarchus Minor Attic Orators J. O. Burtt @@ -40,21 +40,21 @@ William Heinemann, Ltd. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press - 1954 - 1962 + 1954 + 1962 2 - - Internet Archive + +Internet Archive - - - + + + -

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- - + + + Greek + Latin English - - + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion edited markup split composite text and converted to unicode Checked and corrected section breaks. SGML markup done from raw file as the result of a bad global change that had eliminated the first character of each line of Loeb text. The notes had to be inserted in the text, as opposed to the bottom of the page, and asterisks deleted in the english text. *blass to Blass - +
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τί χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς τῶν θεῶν περὶ τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων,τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων Ν: τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου Α. ἢ πῶςἢ πῶς Bekker: ὅπως codd. χρήσεσθε τῇ τούτου πονηρίᾳ; ὃς οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ τρὶς ἐξεληλεγμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴστε καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἠκούετε, καὶ ἐψευσμένος ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίον καὶ τῶν περιεστηκότων, φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταπλεῦσαι,καταπλεῦσαι Bekker: καταπλεύσειν codd. στρατηγὸς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Μουνιχίαν καὶ τὰ νεώρια κεχειροτονημένος,

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τί χρὴ λέγειν πρὸς τῶν θεῶν περὶ τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων,τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων Ν: τοιούτου ἀνθρώπου Α. ἢ πῶςἢ πῶς Bekker: ὅπως codd. χρήσεσθε τῇ τούτου πονηρίᾳ; ὃς οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ τρὶς ἐξεληλεγμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴστε καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἠκούετε, καὶ ἐψευσμένος ἁπάντων Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίον καὶ τῶν περιεστηκότων, φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἅρπαλον εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταπλεῦσαι,καταπλεῦσαι Bekker: καταπλεύσειν codd. στρατηγὸς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Μουνιχίαν καὶ τὰ νεώρια κεχειροτονημένος,

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καὶ δῶρα τολμήσας λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ ἐπιωρκηκὼς ὃν ὤμοσεν ὅρκον μεταξὺ τοῦ ἕδους καὶ τῆς τραπέζης, καὶ γράψας καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ ψήφισμα, καὶ θανάτου τιμησάμενος ἐὰν εἰλήφῃεἰλήφῃ Bekker: εἴληφέ codd. τι τῶν χρημάτων ὧν Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν χώραν ἐκόμισεν,

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καὶ δῶρα τολμήσας λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ ἐπιωρκηκὼς ὃν ὤμοσεν ὅρκον μεταξὺ τοῦ ἕδους καὶ τῆς τραπέζης, καὶ γράψας καθʼ ἑαυτοῦ ψήφισμα, καὶ θανάτου τιμησάμενος ἐὰν εἰλήφῃεἰλήφῃ Bekker: εἴληφέ codd. τι τῶν χρημάτων ὧν Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν χώραν ἐκόμισεν,

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ὅμως ἐτόλμησεν εἰς τοὺς εἰδότας ὑμᾶς ἐξεληλεγμένον ἑαυτὸν ἅπασι τούτοις ἔνοχον γεγενημένον ἐλθεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι ἑαυτόν, οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ πιστεύων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι,ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι om. A. — τί γὰρ τούτῳ δικαιοσύνης μέτεστιν; — ἀλλὰ τῇ τόλμῃ καὶκαὶ add. A corr. (2) τῇ ἀναιδείᾳ, ᾗ χρώμενος πρότερον μὲν ἠξίωσε καταφρονήσας ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δικαίων τὰ χρήματα λαβεῖν, νυνὶ δὲ ἀπολογησόμενος ἥκει ὡς οὐδὲν τούτων διαπέπρακται· τοσοῦτον τῆς ὑμετέρας ῥᾳθυμίας καταπεφρόνηκε.

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ὅμως ἐτόλμησεν εἰς τοὺς εἰδότας ὑμᾶς ἐξεληλεγμένον ἑαυτὸν ἅπασι τούτοις ἔνοχον γεγενημένον ἐλθεῖν καὶ δεῖξαι ἑαυτόν, οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ πιστεύων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι,ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι om. A. — τί γὰρ τούτῳ δικαιοσύνης μέτεστιν; — ἀλλὰ τῇ τόλμῃ καὶκαὶ add. A corr. (2) τῇ ἀναιδείᾳ, ᾗ χρώμενος πρότερον μὲν ἠξίωσε καταφρονήσας ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δικαίων τὰ χρήματα λαβεῖν, νυνὶ δὲ ἀπολογησόμενος ἥκει ὡς οὐδὲν τούτων διαπέπρακται· τοσοῦτον τῆς ὑμετέρας ῥᾳθυμίας καταπεφρόνηκε.

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καὶ ὁ μὲν κοινὸς τῆς πόλεως νόμος, ἐάν τις ἑνὸςἑνὸς hic add. Blass (iam post ἐναντίον Bake): ἑνί τινι pro ἐναντίον Lipsius. ἐναντίον τῶν πολιτῶν ὁμολογήσας τι παραβῇ τοῦτον ἔνοχον εἶναι κελεύει τῷ ἀδικεῖν· ὁ δὲ πάντας Ἀθηναίους ἐξηπατηκώς, καὶ προδοὺς τὴν πίστιν ἣν παρʼ ὑμῶν οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν ἔλαβε, καὶ τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν μέρος ἅπαντʼ ἀνατετροφὼς τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὗτος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἥκειν φήσει τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰτίας τῆς εἰς αὑτὸναὑτὸν Baiter et Sauppe: αὐτὸν codd. γεγενημένης;

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καὶ ὁ μὲν κοινὸς τῆς πόλεως νόμος, ἐάν τις ἑνὸςἑνὸς hic add. Blass (iam post ἐναντίον Bake): ἑνί τινι pro ἐναντίον Lipsius. ἐναντίον τῶν πολιτῶν ὁμολογήσας τι παραβῇ τοῦτον ἔνοχον εἶναι κελεύει τῷ ἀδικεῖν· ὁ δὲ πάντας Ἀθηναίους ἐξηπατηκώς, καὶ προδοὺς τὴν πίστιν ἣν παρʼ ὑμῶν οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν ἔλαβε, καὶ τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν μέρος ἅπαντʼ ἀνατετροφὼς τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὗτος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἥκειν φήσει τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰτίας τῆς εἰς αὑτὸναὑτὸν Baiter et Sauppe: αὐτὸν codd. γεγενημένης;

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ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες,ἄνδρες Α: Ἀθηναῖοι Ν. εἰ δεῖ τἀληθῆ λέγειν — δεῖ δέ —, οὐοὐ Maetzner: οὐδὲ codd. τὰς ἀποφάσεις οἶμαι νῦν κρίνεσθαι, πότερον ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν ἢ ψευδεῖς αἱ κατὰ Φιλοκλέους γεγενημέναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνηςμόνης Reiske: μὲν codd. τῆς τιμωρίας ὑμᾶς δεῖν τῆς ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι γεγραμμένης δικάσαι νῦν, πότερα δεῖ χρημάτων τιμῆσαι τῷ τηλικαῦτα ἠδικηκότι τὴν πόλιν, ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιώσαντας, ὥσπερ οὗτος ἔγραψεν ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι καθʼ αὑτοῦ, [ἢ] del. Reiske. δημεῦσαι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐκ τοιούτων λημμάτων συνειλεγμένην.

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ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες,ἄνδρες Α: Ἀθηναῖοι Ν. εἰ δεῖ τἀληθῆ λέγειν — δεῖ δέ —, οὐοὐ Maetzner: οὐδὲ codd. τὰς ἀποφάσεις οἶμαι νῦν κρίνεσθαι, πότερον ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν ἢ ψευδεῖς αἱ κατὰ Φιλοκλέους γεγενημέναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνηςμόνης Reiske: μὲν codd. τῆς τιμωρίας ὑμᾶς δεῖν τῆς ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι γεγραμμένης δικάσαι νῦν, πότερα δεῖ χρημάτων τιμῆσαι τῷ τηλικαῦτα ἠδικηκότι τὴν πόλιν, ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιώσαντας, ὥσπερ οὗτος ἔγραψεν ἐν τῷ ψηφίσματι καθʼ αὑτοῦ, [ἢ] del. Reiske. δημεῦσαι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐκ τοιούτων λημμάτων συνειλεγμένην.

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οἴεσθε τοῦτον νῦν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων πονηρὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ἢ νῦν πρῶτον καθʼ ὑμῶν δῶρα εἰληφέναι; οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάλαι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐλάνθανεν ὑμᾶς, καὶ ηὐτυχήκαθʼ ὅτιηὐτυχήκαθʼ ὅτι Vogel: ηὐτύχει καθότι Α: εὐτύχει καθότι Ν. οὐκ ἐν μείζοσι καιροῖς ἐπύθεσθε τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν αὐτοῦ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι χαλεπώτερον ἀνθρώπου τὴν αὑτοῦαὑτοῦ N corr. (2): αὐτὴν N pr. A, del. Maetzner. πονηρίαν ἀγνοουμένην ἔχοντος.

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οἴεσθε τοῦτον νῦν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων πονηρὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ἢ νῦν πρῶτον καθʼ ὑμῶν δῶρα εἰληφέναι; οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάλαι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐλάνθανεν ὑμᾶς, καὶ ηὐτυχήκαθʼ ὅτιηὐτυχήκαθʼ ὅτι Vogel: ηὐτύχει καθότι Α: εὐτύχει καθότι Ν. οὐκ ἐν μείζοσι καιροῖς ἐπύθεσθε τὴν αἰσχροκέρδειαν αὐτοῦ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι χαλεπώτερον ἀνθρώπου τὴν αὑτοῦαὑτοῦ N corr. (2): αὐτὴν N pr. A, del. Maetzner. πονηρίαν ἀγνοουμένην ἔχοντος.

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οὐκ ἀποκτενεῖτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντες ὁμοθυμαδὸν τὸν εἰς τοσαύτην αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶντῶν πολιτῶν om. A. ἐμβεβληκότα, τὸν ἀρχηγὸν γενόμενον τοῦ διαδεδομένου χρυσίου καὶ εἰς αἰτίαν καθιστάντακαθιστάντα Stephanus: καθίσαντα codd. πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν; ἀλλʼ ὑπομενεῖτʼ ἀκούειν τοῦ τοσαῦτα διαπεπραγμένου καθʼ ὑμῶν, ὡς [ὅτι]ὅτι del. Maetzner. τὸ συνέδριον τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ψευδεῖς πεποίηται τὰς ἀποφάσεις, καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν δίκαιος καὶ χρηστὸς καὶ ἀδωροδόκητός ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ταῦτα πάντα προεῖται χάριτος ἢ λημμάτωνλημμάτων Ν: λήμματος Α. ἕνεκα;

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οὐκ ἀποκτενεῖτε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντες ὁμοθυμαδὸν τὸν εἰς τοσαύτην αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶντῶν πολιτῶν om. A. ἐμβεβληκότα, τὸν ἀρχηγὸν γενόμενον τοῦ διαδεδομένου χρυσίου καὶ εἰς αἰτίαν καθιστάντακαθιστάντα Stephanus: καθίσαντα codd. πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν; ἀλλʼ ὑπομενεῖτʼ ἀκούειν τοῦ τοσαῦτα διαπεπραγμένου καθʼ ὑμῶν, ὡς [ὅτι]ὅτι del. Maetzner. τὸ συνέδριον τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ψευδεῖς πεποίηται τὰς ἀποφάσεις, καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν δίκαιος καὶ χρηστὸς καὶ ἀδωροδόκητός ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ταῦτα πάντα προεῖται χάριτος ἢ λημμάτωνλημμάτων Ν: λήμματος Α. ἕνεκα;

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ἆρʼ ἴσθʼ ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων σκεψαμένους ἀκριβῶς δεῖ μεθʼ ἡσυχίας καὶ τἀληθὲς ἐξετάσαντας, οὕτως ἐπιτιθέναι τοῖς ἠδικηκόσι τὴν τιμωρίαν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς φανεραῖς καὶ παρὰ πάντων ὡμολογημέναις προδοσίαις πρώτηνπρώτην Reiske: πρῶτον codd. τετάχθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὴν μετʼ αὐτῆςαὐτῆς Bekker: αὐτὴν codd. γιγνομένην τιμωρίαν;

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ἆρʼ ἴσθʼ ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων σκεψαμένους ἀκριβῶς δεῖ μεθʼ ἡσυχίας καὶ τἀληθὲς ἐξετάσαντας, οὕτως ἐπιτιθέναι τοῖς ἠδικηκόσι τὴν τιμωρίαν, ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς φανεραῖς καὶ παρὰ πάντων ὡμολογημέναις προδοσίαις πρώτηνπρώτην Reiske: πρῶτον codd. τετάχθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ τὴν μετʼ αὐτῆςαὐτῆς Bekker: αὐτὴν codd. γιγνομένην τιμωρίαν;

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τί γὰρ τοῦτον οὐκ ἂν οἴεσθε ἀποδόσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει σπουδαιοτάτων, ὅταν ὑμεῖς ὡς πιστὸν αὐτὸν καὶ δίκαιον φύλακα καταστήσητε; ποίας οὐκ ἂν προδοῦναι τριήρεις τῶν ἐν τοῖς νεωρίοις; ἢ τίνος ἂν φροντίσαι φυλακῆς, λήσειν ἐλπίσαντα καὶ λήψεσθαιλήψεσθαι Α corr. (2) N corr. (2): λήψεσθε Α pr. N pr. διπλάσιον οὗ νῦν εἴληφε χρυσίου; οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὦ ἄνδρες, ποιήσειεν.

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τί γὰρ τοῦτον οὐκ ἂν οἴεσθε ἀποδόσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει σπουδαιοτάτων, ὅταν ὑμεῖς ὡς πιστὸν αὐτὸν καὶ δίκαιον φύλακα καταστήσητε; ποίας οὐκ ἂν προδοῦναι τριήρεις τῶν ἐν τοῖς νεωρίοις; ἢ τίνος ἂν φροντίσαι φυλακῆς, λήσειν ἐλπίσαντα καὶ λήψεσθαιλήψεσθαι Α corr. (2) N corr. (2): λήψεσθε Α pr. N pr. διπλάσιον οὗ νῦν εἴληφε χρυσίου; οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ὦ ἄνδρες, ποιήσειεν.

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ὅστις γὰρ ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον περὶ πλείονος τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς πίστεως ἡγεῖταιἡγεῖται Baiter et Sauppe: αἱρεῖται codd. καὶ μήθʼ ὅρκου μήτʼ αἰσχύνης μήτε δικαίου πλείω λόγον ἢ τοῦ λαμβάνειν ποιεῖται, οὗτος ἀποδώσεται τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, ἂν ἔχῃ τὸν ὠνησόμενον, οὗτος ἐξαγγελεῖ τοῖς πολεμίοις σύνθημα φήνας καθʼ ὑμῶν, οὗτος προδώσει τὴντὴν om. N. πεζὴνπεζὴν Ν: πεζικὴν Α. καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν.

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ὅστις γὰρ ἀργύριον καὶ χρυσίον περὶ πλείονος τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς πίστεως ἡγεῖταιἡγεῖται Baiter et Sauppe: αἱρεῖται codd. καὶ μήθʼ ὅρκου μήτʼ αἰσχύνης μήτε δικαίου πλείω λόγον ἢ τοῦ λαμβάνειν ποιεῖται, οὗτος ἀποδώσεται τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸν τὴν Μουνιχίαν, ἂν ἔχῃ τὸν ὠνησόμενον, οὗτος ἐξαγγελεῖ τοῖς πολεμίοις σύνθημα φήνας καθʼ ὑμῶν, οὗτος προδώσει τὴντὴν om. N. πεζὴνπεζὴν Ν: πεζικὴν Α. καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν.

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μὴ οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν τίμησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγενημένων μόνον ὑπὸ Φιλοκλέους ἀδικημάτων ἡγεῖσθε μέλλειν ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἂνἂν add. A corr. (2) ἔπραξεν οὗτος κύριος γενόμενος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἔχετε χάριν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν τι μεῖζον ὑπὸ τούτου δεινόν, ἐγνωκότες τοῦτον οἷός ἐστιν· ἀξίως δʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ κρινομένου πονηρίας κολάσατε αὐτόν·

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μὴ οὖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν τίμησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγενημένων μόνον ὑπὸ Φιλοκλέους ἀδικημάτων ἡγεῖσθε μέλλειν ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν ἂνἂν add. A corr. (2) ἔπραξεν οὗτος κύριος γενόμενος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἔχετε χάριν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν τι μεῖζον ὑπὸ τούτου δεινόν, ἐγνωκότες τοῦτον οἷός ἐστιν· ἀξίως δʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ κρινομένου πονηρίας κολάσατε αὐτόν·

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ὅς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τρὶς μὲνμὲν om. A. ἢ τετράκις ἱππαρχηκὼς ἀνδρῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, πλεονάκις δʼ ἢ δεκάκις στρατηγὸς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν κεχειροτονημένος οὐκ ἄξιος ὤν, τιμώμενος καὶ ζηλούμενος διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πίστιν ἀπέδοτο καὶ προέδωκε τὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡγεμονίαςἡμετέρας ἡγεμονίας Ν: ἡγεμονίας ἡμῶν Α. ἀξίωμα, καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κατέστησεν ἑαυτὸν Ἀριστογείτονι, καὶ μισθωτὸν καὶ προδότην ἀντὶ στρατηγοῦ ἐποίησεν.

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ὅς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τρὶς μὲνμὲν om. A. ἢ τετράκις ἱππαρχηκὼς ἀνδρῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν, πλεονάκις δʼ ἢ δεκάκις στρατηγὸς ὑφʼ ὑμῶν κεχειροτονημένος οὐκ ἄξιος ὤν, τιμώμενος καὶ ζηλούμενος διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πίστιν ἀπέδοτο καὶ προέδωκε τὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡγεμονίαςἡμετέρας ἡγεμονίας Ν: ἡγεμονίας ἡμῶν Α. ἀξίωμα, καὶ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κατέστησεν ἑαυτὸν Ἀριστογείτονι, καὶ μισθωτὸν καὶ προδότην ἀντὶ στρατηγοῦ ἐποίησεν.

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ἔπειθʼ ὑποστείλασθαί τι δεῖ πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὑμᾶς,ὑμᾶς Reiske: ὑμῖν codd. καὶ αἰσχυνθῆναι τοὺς ἠδικημένους, ὃς οὐκ ᾐσχύνθη τοιαῦτα πράττων καθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεοῖντʼ ἂν εἰκότως παρʼ ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι· πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ· ἀλλʼ οἱ προδοθέντες ἂν ὑπὸ Φιλοκλέους, εἴ τινʼ οὗτος παρέλαβε καιρὸν χρημάτων πολλῶνχρημάτων πολλῶν infra post πρόγονοι transtulit Blass.· ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ ἀκτὴ καὶ οἱ λιμένες εἰσὶ καὶ τὰ νεώρια, ἃ οἱ πρόγονοι κατασκευάσαντες ὑμῖνκατασκευάσαντες ὑμῖν Ν ὑμῖν κατασκευάσαντες Α. κατέλιπον.

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ἔπειθʼ ὑποστείλασθαί τι δεῖ πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὑμᾶς,ὑμᾶς Reiske: ὑμῖν codd. καὶ αἰσχυνθῆναι τοὺς ἠδικημένους, ὃς οὐκ ᾐσχύνθη τοιαῦτα πράττων καθʼ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; οὐχ οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεοῖντʼ ἂν εἰκότως παρʼ ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι· πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ· ἀλλʼ οἱ προδοθέντες ἂν ὑπὸ Φιλοκλέους, εἴ τινʼ οὗτος παρέλαβε καιρὸν χρημάτων πολλῶνχρημάτων πολλῶν infra post πρόγονοι transtulit Blass.· ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡ ἀκτὴ καὶ οἱ λιμένες εἰσὶ καὶ τὰ νεώρια, ἃ οἱ πρόγονοι κατασκευάσαντες ὑμῖνκατασκευάσαντες ὑμῖν Ν ὑμῖν κατασκευάσαντες Α. κατέλιπον.

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ὧν ἀναμιμνησκομένους ὑμᾶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖ μὴ παρέργως ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς γεγενημένας ἀποφάσεις, ἀλλʼ ἀκολούθως ταῖς πρότερον κεκριμέναιςPost κεκριμέναις lacunam indicavit Blass, qui καὶ ταύτην κρίνειν deesse putavit.· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἀπειπεῖν τιμωρουμένους ἐστὶ τοὺς προδότας τῆς πόλεως γεγενημένους, καὶ ὑπολείπεσθαί τινας τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτε οἱ θεοὶ φανεροὺς ὑμῖν ποιήσαντες παρέδοσαν τιμωρήσασθαι, ἑορακότεςἑορακότες Blass: ἑωρακότες ΝΑ: ἑωρακότας Stephanus. τὸν δῆμον ἅπαντα κατήγορον τούτου γεγενημένον καὶ προκεχειρικότα πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸτὸ Ν: τῷ Α. τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν ὑμῖν δοῦναι.

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ὧν ἀναμιμνησκομένους ὑμᾶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δεῖ μὴ παρέργως ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς γεγενημένας ἀποφάσεις, ἀλλʼ ἀκολούθως ταῖς πρότερον κεκριμέναιςPost κεκριμέναις lacunam indicavit Blass, qui καὶ ταύτην κρίνειν deesse putavit.· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἀπειπεῖν τιμωρουμένους ἐστὶ τοὺς προδότας τῆς πόλεως γεγενημένους, καὶ ὑπολείπεσθαί τινας τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτε οἱ θεοὶ φανεροὺς ὑμῖν ποιήσαντες παρέδοσαν τιμωρήσασθαι, ἑορακότεςἑορακότες Blass: ἑωρακότες ΝΑ: ἑωρακότας Stephanus. τὸν δῆμον ἅπαντα κατήγορον τούτου γεγενημένον καὶ προκεχειρικότα πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸτὸ Ν: τῷ Α. τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν ὑμῖν δοῦναι.

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ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε, νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτῆρα, αἰσχύνομαι, εἰ προτραπέντας ὑμᾶς δεῖδεῖ A corr. ras.: δεῖν A pr. N. καὶ παροξυνθέντας ὑφʼ ἡμῶνἡμῶν A corr.: ὑμῶν A pr. N. ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ νῦν εἰσεληλυθότοςεἰσεληλυθότος Blass (iam εἰσεληλυθότος [τὴν κρίσιν] Maetzner': ἐκλελοιπότος ΝΑ. τὴν κρίσιν τιμωρίαν ἐλθεῖν. [καὶ]καὶ del. Baiter. οὐκ αὐτόπται ἐστὲ τῶν ὑπὸ τούτου γεγενημένων ἀδικημάτων; καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἅπας οὔτʼ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε δίκαιον νομίζων εἶναι παρακαταθέσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἀπεχειροτόνησεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἐπιμελείας,

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ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε, νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτῆρα, αἰσχύνομαι, εἰ προτραπέντας ὑμᾶς δεῖδεῖ A corr. ras.: δεῖν A pr. N. καὶ παροξυνθέντας ὑφʼ ἡμῶνἡμῶν A corr.: ὑμῶν A pr. N. ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ νῦν εἰσεληλυθότοςεἰσεληλυθότος Blass (iam εἰσεληλυθότος [τὴν κρίσιν] Maetzner': ἐκλελοιπότος ΝΑ. τὴν κρίσιν τιμωρίαν ἐλθεῖν. [καὶ]καὶ del. Baiter. οὐκ αὐτόπται ἐστὲ τῶν ὑπὸ τούτου γεγενημένων ἀδικημάτων; καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἅπας οὔτʼ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε δίκαιον νομίζων εἶναι παρακαταθέσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἀπεχειροτόνησεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἐπιμελείας,

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ὑμεῖς δʼ οἱ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν νόμων φύλακες, οἷςοἷς Reiske: οὓς codd.: οἷς et δικάσαι infra pro δικάσοντας Sauppe; sed inter φύλακες et ἐπέτρεψεν nonnihil excidisse videtur: post δικάσοντας lacunam indicavit Blass, qui οὓς retinuit: sensum ita supplet Reiske: οἷς ἡ τύχη . . . τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου ἀμύνεσθαι δικάσοντας ἐπέτρεψεν. ἡ τύχη καὶ ὁ κλῆρος ὑπὲρ τοῦτοῦ add. A corr. (2) δήμου δικάσοντας ἐπέτρεψεν, φείσεσθε τοῦ τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένου, καὶ τὸ πέρας ἔχοντες τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἁπάντων δικαίων ἀτιμώρητον ἀφήσετε τὸν δωροδόκον καὶ πάντων τῶν γεγενημένων κακῶν αἴτιον, ὅς, ὅπερ καὶ μικρῷ πρότερον εἶπον, μόνος τῶν πονηρῶν πάντων τρὶς οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀποπέφανται, καὶ τρὶς ἤδη δικαίως [ἂν]ἂν add. Reiske. ἐζημιωμένος θανάτῳ κατὰ τὸ αὑτοῦ ψήφισμα.

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ὑμεῖς δʼ οἱ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν νόμων φύλακες, οἷςοἷς Reiske: οὓς codd.: οἷς et δικάσαι infra pro δικάσοντας Sauppe; sed inter φύλακες et ἐπέτρεψεν nonnihil excidisse videtur: post δικάσοντας lacunam indicavit Blass, qui οὓς retinuit: sensum ita supplet Reiske: οἷς ἡ τύχη . . . τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου ἀμύνεσθαι δικάσοντας ἐπέτρεψεν. ἡ τύχη καὶ ὁ κλῆρος ὑπὲρ τοῦτοῦ add. A corr. (2) δήμου δικάσοντας ἐπέτρεψεν, φείσεσθε τοῦ τοιαῦτα διαπεπραγμένου, καὶ τὸ πέρας ἔχοντες τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἁπάντων δικαίων ἀτιμώρητον ἀφήσετε τὸν δωροδόκον καὶ πάντων τῶν γεγενημένων κακῶν αἴτιον, ὅς, ὅπερ καὶ μικρῷ πρότερον εἶπον, μόνος τῶν πονηρῶν πάντων τρὶς οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀποπέφανται, καὶ τρὶς ἤδη δικαίως [ἂν]ἂν add. Reiske. ἐζημιωμένος θανάτῳ κατὰ τὸ αὑτοῦ ψήφισμα.

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τί οὖν ἀναμενεῖτʼ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι; καὶ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ζητεῖτε ἕτερα μείζω τῶν εἰρημένων ἀκοῦσαι; οὐχ ὑμεῖς ἐστε καὶ οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι οἱ ΤιμοθέῳCf. διν. 1.14. Πελοπόννησον περιπλεύσαντι καὶ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίους νικήσαντι καὶ Κόνωνος υἱεῖ τοῦτοῦ add. A corr. (2) τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσαντοςἐλευθερώσαντος A corr. (2): ἐλευθερώσαντι A pr. N. καὶ Σάμον λαβόντιλαβόντι N A pr.: λαβόντος A corr. (2) καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Πύδναν καὶ Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἑτέρας εἴκοσι πόλεις, οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπόλογον ποιησάμενοι; οὐδὲ τῆς τότε ἐνεστώσης κρίσεως καὶ τῶν ὅρκων οὓς ὀμωμοκότες φέρετε τὴν ψῆφον ἀντικαταλλαξάμενοι τὰς τηλικαύτας εὐεργεσίας, ἀλλʼ ἑκατὸν ταλάντων τιμήσαντες, ὅτι χρήματʼ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων; τὸν δὲ μιαρὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ προδότην,

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τί οὖν ἀναμενεῖτʼ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι; καὶ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ζητεῖτε ἕτερα μείζω τῶν εἰρημένων ἀκοῦσαι; οὐχ ὑμεῖς ἐστε καὶ οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι οἱ ΤιμοθέῳCf. διν. 1.14. Πελοπόννησον περιπλεύσαντι καὶ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίους νικήσαντι καὶ Κόνωνος υἱεῖ τοῦτοῦ add. A corr. (2) τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσαντοςἐλευθερώσαντος A corr. (2): ἐλευθερώσαντι A pr. N. καὶ Σάμον λαβόντιλαβόντι N A pr.: λαβόντος A corr. (2) καὶ Μεθώνην καὶ Πύδναν καὶ Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις ἑτέρας εἴκοσι πόλεις, οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπόλογον ποιησάμενοι; οὐδὲ τῆς τότε ἐνεστώσης κρίσεως καὶ τῶν ὅρκων οὓς ὀμωμοκότες φέρετε τὴν ψῆφον ἀντικαταλλαξάμενοι τὰς τηλικαύτας εὐεργεσίας, ἀλλʼ ἑκατὸν ταλάντων τιμήσαντες, ὅτι χρήματʼ αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων; τὸν δὲ μιαρὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ προδότην,

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ὃν οὐχ εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ζητήσασα ἀποπέφαγκε χρήματʼ ἔχειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, ὃς οὐσίαν ἔχων πολλὴν καὶ παίδων ἀρρένων οὐκ ὄντων αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δεόμενος ὧν ἂνἂν add. Bekker. ἄνθρωπος μέτριος δεηθείη, οὐκ ἀπέσχετο χρημάτων διδομένων κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, οὐδʼ ἀπεκρύψατο τὴν ἔμφυτον πονηρίαν, ἀλλʼ ἀνεῖλε πᾶσαν τὴν γεγενημένην αὑτῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πίστιν, καὶ οἷς πρότερον ἔφη διαφέρεσθαι, πρὸς τούτους ἔταξεν αὑτόν, καὶ ἐξήλεγξεν αὑτοῦ τὴν προσποίητον καλοκαγαθίαν, ὅτι ψευδὴς ἦν.Post ψευδὴς ἦν apodosin excidisse putant nonnulli.

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ὃν οὐχ εἷς ἀνὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ ζητήσασα ἀποπέφαγκε χρήματʼ ἔχειν καθʼ ὑμῶν, ὃς οὐσίαν ἔχων πολλὴν καὶ παίδων ἀρρένων οὐκ ὄντων αὐτῷ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δεόμενος ὧν ἂνἂν add. Bekker. ἄνθρωπος μέτριος δεηθείη, οὐκ ἀπέσχετο χρημάτων διδομένων κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος, οὐδʼ ἀπεκρύψατο τὴν ἔμφυτον πονηρίαν, ἀλλʼ ἀνεῖλε πᾶσαν τὴν γεγενημένην αὑτῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πίστιν, καὶ οἷς πρότερον ἔφη διαφέρεσθαι, πρὸς τούτους ἔταξεν αὑτόν, καὶ ἐξήλεγξεν αὑτοῦ τὴν προσποίητον καλοκαγαθίαν, ὅτι ψευδὴς ἦν.Post ψευδὴς ἦν apodosin excidisse putant nonnulli.

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ἃ χρὴ λογισαμένους ὑμᾶς πάντας,πάντας add. N. ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τῶν παρόντων καιρῶν ἀναμνησθέντας, οἳ πίστεως οὐ δωροδοκίας δέονται, μισεῖν τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀνελεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεωςπόλεως Ν: πολιτείας Α. τὰ τοιαῦτα θηρία, καὶ δεῖξαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι οὐ συνδιέφθαρται τὸ τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τισιν, οὐδὲ δουλεύει ταῖς δόξαις, εἰδόταςεἰδότας Ald.: εἰδότες ΝΑ. ὅτι μετὰ μὲν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίας ῥᾳδίως ἀμυνούμεθα, θεῶν ἵλεων ὄντων, ἐάν τινες ἡμῖνἡμῖν A corr. (2): ὑμῶν A pr. N. ἀδίκως ἐπιτιθῶνται, μετὰ δὲ δωροδοκίας καὶ προδοσίας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τούτοις κακῶν, ἃ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις πρόσεστιν, οὐδεμίʼ ἂνοὐδεμίʼ ἂν Bekker: οὐδεμία codd. πόλις σωθείη.

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ἃ χρὴ λογισαμένους ὑμᾶς πάντας,πάντας add. N. ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τῶν παρόντων καιρῶν ἀναμνησθέντας, οἳ πίστεως οὐ δωροδοκίας δέονται, μισεῖν τοὺς πονηρούς, ἀνελεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεωςπόλεως Ν: πολιτείας Α. τὰ τοιαῦτα θηρία, καὶ δεῖξαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι οὐ συνδιέφθαρται τὸ τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τισιν, οὐδὲ δουλεύει ταῖς δόξαις, εἰδόταςεἰδότας Ald.: εἰδότες ΝΑ. ὅτι μετὰ μὲν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμονοίας ῥᾳδίως ἀμυνούμεθα, θεῶν ἵλεων ὄντων, ἐάν τινες ἡμῖνἡμῖν A corr. (2): ὑμῶν A pr. N. ἀδίκως ἐπιτιθῶνται, μετὰ δὲ δωροδοκίας καὶ προδοσίας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων τούτοις κακῶν, ἃ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις πρόσεστιν, οὐδεμίʼ ἂνοὐδεμίʼ ἂν Bekker: οὐδεμία codd. πόλις σωθείη.

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μηδεμίαν οὖν δέησιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδʼ ἔλεον εἰς ὑμᾶς λαμβάνοντεςλαμβάνοντες] del. Thalheim, qui post αὐτοὺς excidisse προσεμένοι vel aliud simile putat. αὐτούς, μηδὲ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποδεδειγμένην ὑμῖν κατὰ τῶν κρινομένων ἀδικίανPost ἀδικίαν lacunam indicavit Sauppe, qui totum locum sic restituit: μηδʼ ἔλεον δεξάμενοι μηδὲ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν κτλ. . . . ἀδικίαν εἰς ὑμᾶς λαμβάνοντες αὐτοὺς μηδὲ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασιν ἄκυρον ποιήσαντες κτλ.ἄκυρον ποιήσαντες, βοηθήσατε κοινῇ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα διαδικάζεται νῦν πρὸς τὴν τούτου πονηρίαν.

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μηδεμίαν οὖν δέησιν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μηδʼ ἔλεον εἰς ὑμᾶς λαμβάνοντεςλαμβάνοντες] del. Thalheim, qui post αὐτοὺς excidisse προσεμένοι vel aliud simile putat. αὐτούς, μηδὲ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποδεδειγμένην ὑμῖν κατὰ τῶν κρινομένων ἀδικίανPost ἀδικίαν lacunam indicavit Sauppe, qui totum locum sic restituit: μηδʼ ἔλεον δεξάμενοι μηδὲ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν κτλ. . . . ἀδικίαν εἰς ὑμᾶς λαμβάνοντες αὐτοὺς μηδὲ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς ἀπόφασιν ἄκυρον ποιήσαντες κτλ.ἄκυρον ποιήσαντες, βοηθήσατε κοινῇ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφότερα διαδικάζεται νῦν πρὸς τὴν τούτου πονηρίαν.

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ὑπὲρ πάσης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς χώρας νῦν μέλλετε φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον, καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ κατεσκευασμένων ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων νομίμων καὶ τῆς παραδεδομένης ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων ὑμῖνὑμῖν Reiske: ὑμῶν codd. πολιτείας, οὐχ ὑπὲρ Φιλοκλέους μόνον· οὗτος μὲνμὲν om. A. γὰρ αὑτοῦ πάλαι θάνατον κατέγνωκε. ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύων ἐγὼ δικαιοτέραν πολὺ δέησιν δέομαι τούτων τῶν τοιαῦτατοιαῦτα Blass: ταῦτα codd. πεπραχότων, μὴ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ πρόγονοι πολλοὺς ὑπέμειναν κινδύνους, μηδʼ εἰς ἀδοξίαν αἰσχρὰν ἀγαγεῖν τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα, μηδὲ ἀντικαταλλάξασθαιἀντικαταλλάξασθαι Hirschig: καταλλάξασθαι codd. τὴν πρὸς τούτους χάριν τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου ψηφισμάτωνψηφισμάτων add. Maetzner. καὶ τῶν τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσεων.

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ὑπὲρ πάσης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς χώρας νῦν μέλλετε φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον, καὶ τῶν ἐν ταύτῃ κατεσκευασμένων ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων νομίμων καὶ τῆς παραδεδομένης ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων ὑμῖνὑμῖν Reiske: ὑμῶν codd. πολιτείας, οὐχ ὑπὲρ Φιλοκλέους μόνον· οὗτος μὲνμὲν om. A. γὰρ αὑτοῦ πάλαι θάνατον κατέγνωκε. ταῦθʼ ὑμᾶς ἱκετεύων ἐγὼ δικαιοτέραν πολὺ δέησιν δέομαι τούτων τῶν τοιαῦτατοιαῦτα Blass: ταῦτα codd. πεπραχότων, μὴ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ πρόγονοι πολλοὺς ὑπέμειναν κινδύνους, μηδʼ εἰς ἀδοξίαν αἰσχρὰν ἀγαγεῖν τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα, μηδὲ ἀντικαταλλάξασθαιἀντικαταλλάξασθαι Hirschig: καταλλάξασθαι codd. τὴν πρὸς τούτους χάριν τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου ψηφισμάτωνψηφισμάτων add. Maetzner. καὶ τῶν τῆς βουλῆς ἀποφάσεων.

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ἀκριβῶς γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀκριβῶς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπαινεῖσθε ταῖς γεγενημέναις ζητήσεσιν ὑπὲρ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων, οἱ δʼ ἐξεληλεγμένοι κατὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος δῶρα εἰληφότες πονηροὶ καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ μισόδημοι νομίζονται εἶναι, φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς φάσκοντες καὶ πράττειν ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἀγαθῶν, καὶ διʼ ὑμᾶς ἔνδοξοι γεγενημένοι.κατὰ φιλοκλέους subicit N: deesse quaedam putant Baiter et Sauppe.

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ἀκριβῶς γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀκριβῶς, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπαινεῖσθε ταῖς γεγενημέναις ζητήσεσιν ὑπὲρ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων, οἱ δʼ ἐξεληλεγμένοι κατὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος δῶρα εἰληφότες πονηροὶ καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ μισόδημοι νομίζονται εἶναι, φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς φάσκοντες καὶ πράττειν ὑπὲρ τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἀγαθῶν, καὶ διʼ ὑμᾶς ἔνδοξοι γεγενημένοι.κατὰ φιλοκλέους subicit N: deesse quaedam putant Baiter et Sauppe.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/__cts__.xml index 58462d9ca..21116d602 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Λυκόφρονος - Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + + In Defence of Lycophron + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 16e4ca92e..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0140", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Hyperides/opensource/hyp_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=1", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 4bea93ea7..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,347 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - In Defence of Lycophron from Speeches (English). Machine readable - text - Hyperides - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - - - Hyperides - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - -
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. . . each man in private and in public life,Blass, comparing Aeschin. - 3.1, conjectured the sense to be: “I come before you now having - put my trust both in the gods, on whom you all rely in private and in public - life, and also in the law, etc.” and also in the law and in the oath - which bids you give an equal hearing to the prosecution and to the defence.

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. . . to conduct the prosecution,The sense is no doubt: “Since you allowed my opponents to - conduct the prosecution as they wished, allow me also a fair hearing in my - defence.” allow me also in the same way to follow out, so far as I am - able, the line of defence which I have chosen. I must ask you all, while I am - speaking, to refrain from interrupting me with: “Why are you telling us this?” - And do not add anything of your own to the prosecution's argument; rather - <attend> to the defence . . .

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. . . nor is it true that the law, while allowing - freedom to join in the prosecution of men on trial, denies the right to share in - their defence. I do not intend to waste words before coming to the point, and - shall therefore proceed to the actual defence, after praying the gods to help me - and bring me safely through the present trial and requesting you, gentlemen of - the jury, first . . .

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. . . either the betrayal of dockyards, the - burning of public buildings, or the seizure of the Acropolis . . .

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. . . Euphemus . . . first . . . when the husband - died . . . of Phlya . . . from him . . - . that the woman . . . he had left his wife with child, which did not entail any - breach of the law. But if their interpretation of this story tallied with that - given by Ariston in the impeachment, theyThe - reference seems to be to those relatives due to benefit by the will in the - event of the child's death. See Introduction. should not surely have - prevented the nearest relatives from ejecting Euphemus. They ought to have let - them do so. Whereas now, by behaving as they did, they have by their own action - furnished evidence that the charge against me is false. Besides, is it not - strange that if anything had happened to the child at birth, or after, they - would have adhered firmly to this will, in which . . .

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. . . nor is it possible for him to deny his own - handwriting

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. . . to be sluggish. . .

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. . . and he had Ariston's slaves in his works. This fact he confirmed for you - himselfThe subject is probably - Theomnestus. in court when Ariston was bringing an action against - Archestratides.Nothing is known of this - man. He may be the Archestratides against whom Hyperides composed a speech. - Compare Hyp. Fr. 52. -

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Let me explain the kind of method which this man Ariston employs. He issues a - summons against everyone he meets, accusing and prosecuting those who do not - give him money, but letting go all who are willing to pay. He gives the money to - Theomnestus who takes it and buys slaves, providing Ariston with a livelihood, - as is done for pirates, and paying him an obol a day for each slave, to enable - him to continue permanently as a false informer.

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When considering the matter, gentlemen of the - jury, we ought to begin with the charges which my accusers themselves brought - against me at the outset in the Assembly. My relatives communicated the - impeachment to me by letter, and also the charges which they made against me in - the Assembly when they brought the impeachment in. Among these was recorded a - statement of Lycurgus, who claimed to have been told by the relatives that - during the wedding of Charippus to the woman I followed and tried to persuade - her to reserve herself and have nothing to do with Charippus.

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Let me now repeat to you the answer which I gave to the relatives and also to my - own relations directly I arrived, namely this. If these accusations are true, I - agree to having done all the other things set down in the impeachment. But they - are false, as is surely obvious to everyone.

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For who is there in Athens so - uncritical as to believe these allegations? There must have been attenders, - gentlemen of the jury, with the carriage that conveyed the bride: first a - muleteer and a guide, and then her escort of boys, and also Dioxippus.For Dioxippus, the athlete who accompanied - Alexander to India (Diod. Sic. 17.100.2), see Introduction to the - speech. For he was in attendance, too, since she was a widow being - given away in marriage.

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Was I then so utterly senseless, do you think, that with all those other people - in the procession, as well as Dioxippus and Euphraeus his fellow-wrestler, both - acknowledged to be the strongest men in Greece, I had the impudence to pass such comments on a free - woman, in the hearing of everyone, and was not afraid of being strangled on the - spot? Would anyone have listened to such remarks about his sister as these men - accuse me of having made, without killing the speaker?

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And to crown it all, as I said just now, are we to conclude that Charippus was so - completely obtuse that he was still prepared to marry her, although in the first - place she said beforehand, according to their story, that she was pledged to me - and in the second place he heard me encouraging her to keep the promises she had - made? Do you think that the mad Orestes, or Margites,Margites, the hero of an old comic epic early attributed to - Homer, came to be regarded as the typification of a fool. the - greatest fool of all time, would act like that?

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But then, in my opinion, gentlemen of the jury, - the prosecutors in a trial have many advantages over the defendants. For them - the case involves no risk,For the importance - of this statement for determining the date of the speech see - Introduction. and so they are free to talk and lie to their heart's - content, while the men on trial are afraid and so forget to mention a great - deal, even of what they have really done.

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Also, accusers, speaking first, do not confine themselves to putting the just - arguments which support their case, but trump up baseless slanders about the - accused and so deprive them of the means of defence. The latter are thus - affected in one of two ways. Either they defend themselves against the - extraneous charges and fall short in the relevant parts of their defence, or - else they forget the accusations which have just been made, and so leave the - jury with the impression that these are true.

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In addition to this the accusers create a prejudice against the advocates for the - defence and distort the case of the accused himself; which is what Ariston here - attempted to do, when speaking for the prosecution, since he does not even allow - me to benefit from those who come forward to help me intending to share in my - defence. What reason is there why they should not? Is it not right that men on - trial should be supported by their relatives and friends? Or is there any custom - in the city more democraticCompare Hyp. 4.11. than that which permits citizens - capable of public-speaking to assist those who are incapable when they are in - trouble?

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But you, Ariston, have not merely discussed my advocates; you even determine my - own arguments and tell the jury what they must listen to, what line of defence - they must prescribe for me, and what they must not tolerate. Surely it is most - unfair that after conducting the prosecution as you wanted you should rob me of - my defence, because you know already the honest answers I can offer to your - lies.

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And you accuse me in the impeachment of undermining the democracy by breaking the - laws; but you override every law yourself, by presenting an impeachment in a - case where the laws require a public charge before the Thesmothetae.A list of offences for which impeachments were - appropriate is given in Hyp. 4.8. The Thesmothetae - were concerned mainly with crimes directed against the state, but they also - dealt with cases of assault and adultery (u(/bris and moixei/a). - See Hyp. 4.6 and Aristot. Ath. Pol. 59. Your object was to run no risk in - bringing in the action and also to have the opportunity of writing tragic - phrasesFor this use of the noun tragw|di/a compare Hyp. - 4.26. The verb tragw|de/w is - used with a similar sense by Demosthenes (e.g. Dem. 18. - 13). in the impeachment, such as you have written now, - protesting that I am making many women grow old unmarried in their homes and - many live illegally with men unsuited for them.

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The fact is that you can instance no other woman in the city whom I have wronged - in this way, and as for the subject of your present charge, what view did you - take of her? Was she right to live with Charippus, an Athenian citizen who was - her husband; or was she growing old unmarried in her home,This passage is not very clearly expressed in the Greek. - Lycophron is answering the charge that he causes women (a) to grow old - unmarried; (b) to live with the wrong men. Taking these points in the - reverse order he retorts by asking whether in the present case the woman is - (b) doing wrong by living with her legal husband or (a) growing old - unmarried. In view of the words ou)prosh/kei in § l2 above, a negative before prodh/kein would make the sense of what - follows much clearer. Kirchhoff's suggested emendation is therefore rather - tempting. she who was married at once, as soon as Euphemus supplied a - talent of silver as a dowry, obviously with no ulterior motive but simply out of - kindness?Probably Ariston had alleged that - Euphemus was acting in collusion with Lycophron, but we have no - details. -

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So Ariston may say whatever he pleases, gentlemen - of the jury, and invent lies against me, but surely your verdict upon me must be - based, not on the slanders of the prosecutor, but on a review of the whole of my - life. No one in the city, whether good or bad, can deceive the community in - which you live. Indeed the most reliable testimonial of character which a man - can have is his past career, especially in refuting charges like the present. -

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Where the crime is one which can be committed at any time during a man's life it - should be considered in the light of the particular accusation made. But - adultery is a practice which no man can begin after fifty. Either he has been a - loose-liver for a long lime—and let these men prove that that is true of me—or - else the charge may be presumed false.

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Now I, gentlemen of the jury, have lived with you in Athens all my life. I have never been - subjected to any discreditable charge, nor have I brought an accusation against - another citizen. I have not been defendant or prosecutor in any lawsuit, but - have always been a keen horsebreeder, consistently overtaxing my strength and my - resources.Horsebreeding, which was carried - on either for war or racing, was sometimes frowned on as a mark of wealth - and ostentation. (Compare Lyc. 1.139. ). But - here, though he admits extravagance, Lycophron is simply claiming to be - doing his duty as a knight. I have been crowned for bravery by the - order of knights and by my colleagues in office.

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For you appointed me, gentlemen of the jury, first as Phylarch and later as - Cavalry Leader at Lemnos.The ten phylarchs, one from each tribe, - commanded the cavalry of their own tribe under the hipparchs. Of these there - were two elected from the whole people. One of them was appointed to command - a body of Athenian cavalry in Lemnos, after the Athenians gained control of the island by - the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C. Compare Aristot. Ath. Pol. 6l. 6; Dem. 4. 27;CIA2. 14 and 593. - I held the command there for two years, the only cavalry leader who has ever - done so, and prolonged my stay for a third, as I did not wish, in exacting the - pay for the horsemen rashly, to burden citizens in financial straits.

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During that time no one there brought an action against me, either private or - public. In fact I was crowned three times by the inhabitants of Hephaestia and - as many times more by those of Myrine. These facts should satisfy you, in the - present trial, that the charges against me are false. No man can be good in - Lemnos if he is bad in Athens, and you had no poor opinion of me - when you dispatched me there and made me responsible for two of your own cities. -

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Well, gentlemen of the jury, you have heard - virtually all that I had to say in my own defence. The prosecutor, who is an - experienced speaker and used to frequent litigation, summoned advocatesThe chief of these advocates was the orator - Lycurgus. See Introduction to the speech. to help him in unjustly - ruining a citizen. So I too am asking you, most earnestly, for your authority to - summon my advocates in this important case, and I beg you to give a sympathetic - hearing to any of my relatives or friends who can help me.

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I am a fellow-citizen of yours, an amateur unused to speaking, on trial now with - the risk not only of losing my life—a minor consideration to men with a proper - sense of values—but also of being cast out after death, without even the - prospect of a grave in my own country. So if you will give the word, gentlemen - of the jury, I will call an advocate. Will you please come up, Theophilus, and - say what you can in my defence? The jury ask you to do so.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a00846d17 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ + + + + + + + In Defence of Lycophron + Hyperides + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + + Hyperides + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

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+ + + + English + Greek + + + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion + edited markup + split composite text and converted to unicode + add refdecl, changed some of the FRAG attributes that had commentary in them, made notes have a space after them. + Put bios and intros to speeches into separate files. Change markup in accordance with orator dtd + +
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each man in private and in public life,Blass, comparing Aeschin. 3.1, conjectured the sense to be: I come before you now having put my trust both in the gods, on whom you all rely in private and in public life, and also in the law, etc. and also in the law and in the oath which bids you give an equal hearing to the prosecution and to the defence.

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to conduct the prosecution,The sense is no doubt: Since you allowed my opponents to conduct the prosecution as they wished, allow me also a fair hearing in my defence. allow me also in the same way to follow out, so far as I am able, the line of defence which I have chosen. I must ask you all, while I am speaking, to refrain from interrupting me with: Why are you telling us this? And do not add anything of your own to the prosecution’s argument; rather attend to the defence

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nor is it true that the law, while allowing freedom to join in the prosecution of men on trial, denies the right to share in their defence. I do not intend to waste words before coming to the point, and shall therefore proceed to the actual defence, after praying the gods to help me and bring me safely through the present trial and requesting you, gentlemen of the jury, first

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either the betrayal of dockyards, the burning of public buildings, or the seizure of the Acropolis

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Euphemus first when the husband died of Phlya from him that the woman he had left his wife with child, which did not entail any breach of the law. But if their interpretation of this story tallied with that given by Ariston in the impeachment, theyThe reference seems to be to those relatives due to benefit by the will in the event of the child’s death. See Introduction. should not surely have prevented the nearest relatives from ejecting Euphemus. They ought to have let them do so. Whereas now, by behaving as they did, they have by their own action furnished evidence that the charge against me is false. Besides, is it not strange that if anything had happened to the child at birth, or after, they would have adhered firmly to this will, in which

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nor is it possible for him to deny his own handwriting

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to be sluggish

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and he had Ariston’s slaves in his works. This fact he confirmed for you himselfThe subject is probably Theomnestus. in court when Ariston was bringing an action against Archestratides.Nothing is known of this man. He may be the Archestratides against whom Hyperides composed a speech. Compare Hyp. Fr. 52.

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Let me explain the kind of method which this man Ariston employs. He issues a summons against everyone he meets, accusing and prosecuting those who do not give him money, but letting go all who are willing to pay. He gives the money to Theomnestus who takes it and buys slaves, providing Ariston with a livelihood, as is done for pirates, and paying him an obol a day for each slave, to enable him to continue permanently as a false informer.

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When considering the matter, gentlemen of the jury, we ought to begin with the charges which my accusers themselves brought against me at the outset in the Assembly. My relatives communicated the impeachment to me by letter, and also the charges which they made against me in the Assembly when they brought the impeachment in. Among these was recorded a statement of Lycurgus, who claimed to have been told by the relatives that during the wedding of Charippus to the woman I followed and tried to persuade her to reserve herself and have nothing to do with Charippus.

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Let me now repeat to you the answer which I gave to the relatives and also to my own relations directly I arrived, namely this. If these accusations are true, I agree to having done all the other things set down in the impeachment. But they are false, as is surely obvious to everyone.

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For who is there in Athens so uncritical as to believe these allegations? There must have been attenders, gentlemen of the jury, with the carriage that conveyed the bride: first a muleteer and a guide, and then her escort of boys, and also Dioxippus.For Dioxippus, the athlete who accompanied Alexander to India (Diod. Sic. 17.100.2), see Introduction to the speech. For he was in attendance, too, since she was a widow being given away in marriage.

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Was I then so utterly senseless, do you think, that with all those other people in the procession, as well as Dioxippus and Euphraeus his fellow-wrestler, both acknowledged to be the strongest men in Greece, I had the impudence to pass such comments on a free woman, in the hearing of everyone, and was not afraid of being strangled on the spot? Would anyone have listened to such remarks about his sister as these men accuse me of having made, without killing the speaker?

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And to crown it all, as I said just now, are we to conclude that Charippus was so completely obtuse that he was still prepared to marry her, although in the first place she said beforehand, according to their story, that she was pledged to me and in the second place he heard me encouraging her to keep the promises she had made? Do you think that the mad Orestes, or Margites,Margites, the hero of an old comic epic early attributed to Homer, came to be regarded as the typification of a fool. the greatest fool of all time, would act like that?

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But then, in my opinion, gentlemen of the jury, the prosecutors in a trial have many advantages over the defendants. For them the case involves no risk,For the importance of this statement for determining the date of the speech see Introduction. and so they are free to talk and lie to their heart’s content, while the men on trial are afraid and so forget to mention a great deal, even of what they have really done.

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Also, accusers, speaking first, do not confine themselves to putting the just arguments which support their case, but trump up baseless slanders about the accused and so deprive them of the means of defence. The latter are thus affected in one of two ways. Either they defend themselves against the extraneous charges and fall short in the relevant parts of their defence, or else they forget the accusations which have just been made, and so leave the jury with the impression that these are true.

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In addition to this the accusers create a prejudice against the advocates for the defence and distort the case of the accused himself; which is what Ariston here attempted to do, when speaking for the prosecution, since he does not even allow me to benefit from those who come forward to help me intending to share in my defence. What reason is there why they should not? Is it not right that men on trial should be supported by their relatives and friends? Or is there any custom in the city more democraticCompare Hyp. 4.11. than that which permits citizens capable of public-speaking to assist those who are incapable when they are in trouble?

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But you, Ariston, have not merely discussed my advocates; you even determine my own arguments and tell the jury what they must listen to, what line of defence they must prescribe for me, and what they must not tolerate. Surely it is most unfair that after conducting the prosecution as you wanted you should rob me of my defence, because you know already the honest answers I can offer to your lies.

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And you accuse me in the impeachment of undermining the democracy by breaking the laws; but you override every law yourself, by presenting an impeachment in a case where the laws require a public charge before the Thesmothetae.A list of offences for which impeachments were appropriate is given in Hyp. 4.8. The Thesmothetae were concerned mainly with crimes directed against the state, but they also dealt with cases of assault and adultery (u(/bris and moixei/a). See Hyp. 4.6 and Aristot. Ath. Pol. 59. Your object was to run no risk in bringing in the action and also to have the opportunity of writing tragic phrasesFor this use of the noun tragw|di/a compare Hyp. 4.26. The verb tragw|de/w is used with a similar sense by Demosthenes (e.g. Dem. 18. 13). in the impeachment, such as you have written now, protesting that I am making many women grow old unmarried in their homes and many live illegally with men unsuited for them.

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The fact is that you can instance no other woman in the city whom I have wronged in this way, and as for the subject of your present charge, what view did you take of her? Was she right to live with Charippus, an Athenian citizen who was her husband; or was she growing old unmarried in her home,This passage is not very clearly expressed in the Greek. Lycophron is answering the charge that he causes women (a) to grow old unmarried; (b) to live with the wrong men. Taking these points in the reverse order he retorts by asking whether in the present case the woman is (b) doing wrong by living with her legal husband or (a) growing old unmarried. In view of the words ou)prosh/kei in § l2 above, a negative before prodh/kein would make the sense of what follows much clearer. Kirchhoff’s suggested emendation is therefore rather tempting. she who was married at once, as soon as Euphemus supplied a talent of silver as a dowry, obviously with no ulterior motive but simply out of kindness?Probably Ariston had alleged that Euphemus was acting in collusion with Lycophron, but we have no details.

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So Ariston may say whatever he pleases, gentlemen of the jury, and invent lies against me, but surely your verdict upon me must be based, not on the slanders of the prosecutor, but on a review of the whole of my life. No one in the city, whether good or bad, can deceive the community in which you live. Indeed the most reliable testimonial of character which a man can have is his past career, especially in refuting charges like the present.

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Where the crime is one which can be committed at any time during a man’s life it should be considered in the light of the particular accusation made. But adultery is a practice which no man can begin after fifty. Either he has been a loose-liver for a long lime—and let these men prove that that is true of me—or else the charge may be presumed false.

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Now I, gentlemen of the jury, have lived with you in Athens all my life. I have never been subjected to any discreditable charge, nor have I brought an accusation against another citizen. I have not been defendant or prosecutor in any lawsuit, but have always been a keen horsebreeder, consistently overtaxing my strength and my resources.Horsebreeding, which was carried on either for war or racing, was sometimes frowned on as a mark of wealth and ostentation. (Compare Lyc. 1.139. ). But here, though he admits extravagance, Lycophron is simply claiming to be doing his duty as a knight. I have been crowned for bravery by the order of knights and by my colleagues in office.

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For you appointed me, gentlemen of the jury, first as Phylarch and later as Cavalry Leader at Lemnos.The ten phylarchs, one from each tribe, commanded the cavalry of their own tribe under the hipparchs. Of these there were two elected from the whole people. One of them was appointed to command a body of Athenian cavalry in Lemnos, after the Athenians gained control of the island by the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C. Compare Aristot. Ath. Pol. 6l. 6; Dem. 4. 27;CIA2. 14 and 593. I held the command there for two years, the only cavalry leader who has ever done so, and prolonged my stay for a third, as I did not wish, in exacting the pay for the horsemen rashly, to burden citizens in financial straits.

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During that time no one there brought an action against me, either private or public. In fact I was crowned three times by the inhabitants of Hephaestia and as many times more by those of Myrine. These facts should satisfy you, in the present trial, that the charges against me are false. No man can be good in Lemnos if he is bad in Athens, and you had no poor opinion of me when you dispatched me there and made me responsible for two of your own cities.

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Well, gentlemen of the jury, you have heard virtually all that I had to say in my own defence. The prosecutor, who is an experienced speaker and used to frequent litigation, summoned advocatesThe chief of these advocates was the orator Lycurgus. See Introduction to the speech. to help him in unjustly ruining a citizen. So I too am asking you, most earnestly, for your authority to summon my advocates in this important case, and I beg you to give a sympathetic hearing to any of my relatives or friends who can help me.

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I am a fellow-citizen of yours, an amateur unused to speaking, on trial now with the risk not only of losing my life—a minor consideration to men with a proper sense of values—but also of being cast out after death, without even the prospect of a grave in my own country. So if you will give the word, gentlemen of the jury, I will call an advocate. Will you please come up, Theophilus, and say what you can in my defence? The jury ask you to do so.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml index 5a422403f..76f798f95 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ William Heinemann, Ltd. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press - 1954 - 1962 + 1954 + 1962 2 @@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ - +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

@@ -73,12 +72,13 @@ Latin + EpiDoc and CTS conversion edited markup split composite text and converted to unicode when importing, did lots of changes. Restored is now square brackets, like Bacchyl. gap is note type="text" and columns is note type="papyr". Also fixed SGML errors. and added spaces around notes. fixed some beta errors. - tagged FRAGWORD's and restored text + tagged FRAGWORD’s and restored text checkmark Change markup in accordance with orator dtd @@ -88,89 +88,89 @@
- Frag. IHoc fragmentum restituit Kenyon. -

Column 41 καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ κοινῇ, ἔπειτα τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῷ ὅρκῳ, ὃς κελεύει ὑμᾶς ὁμοίως ἀκούειν τῶν τε κατηγόρωνκατηγόρων Fuhr:κατηγορούντων Kenyon. καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων καὶ Desunt col. 41 versus fere viginti unus et col. 42 fere tota.

+ Frag. IHoc fragmentum restituit Kenyon. +

Column 41 καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ κοινῇ, ἔπειτα τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῷ ὅρκῳ, ὃς κελεύει ὑμᾶς ὁμοίως ἀκούειν τῶν τε κατηγόρωνκατηγόρων Fuhr:κατηγορούντων Kenyon. καὶ τῶν ἀπολογουμένων καὶ Desunt col. 41 versus fere viginti unus et col. 42 fere tota.

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Column 43 τῇ κατηγορίᾳ χρῆσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐμὲ ἐᾶτε ὃν τρόπον προῄρημαι καὶ ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἀπαντάτω μοι μεταξὺ λέγοντι, τί τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν λέγεις; μηδὲ προστίθετε τῇ κατηγορίᾳ παρʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν μηδέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ Desunt col. 43 versus fere quindecim et col. 44 versus fere decem.

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Column 43 τῇ κατηγορίᾳ χρῆσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐμὲ ἐᾶτε ὃν τρόπον προῄρημαι καὶ ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἀπαντάτω μοι μεταξὺ λέγοντι, τί τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν λέγεις; μηδὲ προστίθετε τῇ κατηγορίᾳ παρʼ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν μηδέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ Desunt col. 43 versus fere quindecim et col. 44 versus fere decem.

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Column 44 οὐδὲ ὁ νόμος συγκατηγορεῖνσυγκατηγορεῖν Sauppe. μὲν τῷ βουλομένῳ κατὰ τῶν κρινομένωνκρινομένων Boeckh, Sauppe. ἐξουσίαν δίδωσι, συναπολογεῖσθαι δὲ κωλύει. ἵνα δὲ μὴ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος πολλοὺς λόγους ἀναλώσω, ἀναλώσω Babington. ἐπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπολογίανἀπολογίαν Boeckh, Sauppe. πορεύσομαι, τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς εὐξάμενος βοηθῆσαί μοι καὶ σῶσαι ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος, ὑμᾶς δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐκεῖνο παραιτησάμενος, πρῶτον Deest col. 45 fere tota.

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Column 44 οὐδὲ ὁ νόμος συγκατηγορεῖνσυγκατηγορεῖν Sauppe. μὲν τῷ βουλομένῳ κατὰ τῶν κρινομένωνκρινομένων Boeckh, Sauppe. ἐξουσίαν δίδωσι, συναπολογεῖσθαι δὲ κωλύει. ἵνα δὲ μὴ πρὸ τοῦ πράγματος πολλοὺς λόγους ἀναλώσω, ἀναλώσω Babington. ἐπʼ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπολογίανἀπολογίαν Boeckh, Sauppe. πορεύσομαι, τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς εὐξάμενος βοηθῆσαί μοι καὶ σῶσαι ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος, ὑμᾶς δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐκεῖνο παραιτησάμενος, πρῶτον Deest col. 45 fere tota.

- Frag. IIIa (IV)Hoc fragmentum a Polluce (9. 156) servatum huc inseruit Blass. + Frag. IIIa (IV)Hoc fragmentum a Polluce (9. 156) servatum huc inseruit Blass.

ἢ νεωρίων προδοσίαν ἢ ἀρχείων ἐμπυρισμὸν ἢ κατάληψιν ἄκρας

Frag. IV (V) -

Column 46Desunt col. 46 versus fere quindecim. ὁ Εὔφημος Εὔφημος Blass.πρῶτον πρῶτον Fuhr.ἐπειδὴ ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖνοςρος ὁ Φλυεύς,ἐπειδὴ usque adΦλυεύς restituit Sauppe:ἐκεῖνος ὁ Χαρίσανδρος ὁ Φλυεύς Colin.ἐξ αὐτοῦ Desunt col. 46 versus septem Column 47 ὅτι ἡ γυνὴτον καὶ τοατο ἐκεῖνος κυοῦσαν τὴν γυναῖκα ἐξ αὑτοῦ καταλέλοιπεν, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους γενόμενον. εἰ δʼ ὥςπερ Ἀρίστων ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ γράφει,ὥσπερ et γράφει Kenyon. οὕτως ὑπέλαβον τὰ περὶ τούτων εἶναι,τούτων εἶναι Jensen. οὐκ ἔδει δήπου αὐτοὺς κωλύειν τοὺς ἐγγυτάτωἐγγυτάτω Boeckh. γένους ἐξάγεινκυοῦσαν usque ad ἐξάγειν plerumque restituit Blass. τὸν Εὔφημον, ἀλλʼ ἐᾶν. νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ποιήσαντες ἔργῳ μεμαρτυρήκασιν αὐτοί, ὡς ψευδής ἐστιν ἡ αἰτία κατʼ ἐμοῦ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ μέν τι ἔπαθεν τὸ παιδίον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ καὶ ὕστερον, ταύταις ταῖς διαθήκαις ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ἂν αὐτούς, ἐν αἷς Desunt col. 48 versus fere viginti. Column 48 τὸν Εὔφημον ἐκώλυεπαρέχοντα Εὔφημον et παρέχοντα Blass.μαρτυρίας μαρτυρίας Boeckh.

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Column 46Desunt col. 46 versus fere quindecim. ὁ Εὔφημος Εὔφημος Blass.πρῶτον πρῶτον Fuhr.ἐπειδὴ ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖνοςρος ὁ Φλυεύς,ἐπειδὴ usque adΦλυεύς restituit Sauppe:ἐκεῖνος ὁ Χαρίσανδρος ὁ Φλυεύς Colin.ἐξ αὐτοῦ Desunt col. 46 versus septem Column 47 ὅτι ἡ γυνὴτον καὶ τοατο ἐκεῖνος κυοῦσαν τὴν γυναῖκα ἐξ αὑτοῦ καταλέλοιπεν, οὐ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους γενόμενον. εἰ δʼ ὥςπερ Ἀρίστων ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ γράφει,ὥσπερ et γράφει Kenyon. οὕτως ὑπέλαβον τὰ περὶ τούτων εἶναι,τούτων εἶναι Jensen. οὐκ ἔδει δήπου αὐτοὺς κωλύειν τοὺς ἐγγυτάτωἐγγυτάτω Boeckh. γένους ἐξάγεινκυοῦσαν usque ad ἐξάγειν plerumque restituit Blass. τὸν Εὔφημον, ἀλλʼ ἐᾶν. νῦν δὲ τοῦτο ποιήσαντες ἔργῳ μεμαρτυρήκασιν αὐτοί, ὡς ψευδής ἐστιν ἡ αἰτία κατʼ ἐμοῦ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ μέν τι ἔπαθεν τὸ παιδίον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ καὶ ὕστερον, ταύταις ταῖς διαθήκαις ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ἂν αὐτούς, ἐν αἷς Desunt col. 48 versus fere viginti. Column 48 τὸν Εὔφημον ἐκώλυεπαρέχοντα Εὔφημον et παρέχοντα Blass.μαρτυρίας μαρτυρίας Boeckh.

- Frag. IVaHaec duo fragmenta a Polluce (ii. 152 et ix. 137) servata huc inseruit Blass. + Frag. IVaHaec duo fragmenta a Polluce (ii. 152 et ix. 137) servata huc inseruit Blass.

Pollux ii. 152οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρα δυνατὸν ἀρνήσασθαι.

- Frag. IVbHaec duo fragmenta a Polluce (ii. 152 et ix. 137) servata huc inseruit Blass. + Frag. IVbHaec duo fragmenta a Polluce (ii. 152 et ix. 137) servata huc inseruit Blass.

Pollux ix.. 137νωθρεύεσθαι

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Source is Pap. Ardenianus.Column 2 Ἀρίστωνος δὲ ἀνδράποδα εἶχεν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· καὶ ταῦτα αὐτὸς ὑμῖν ἐμαρτύρησεν ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαςτηρίου, ὅτʼ ἦν τούτῳ ὁ ἀγὼν πρὸς Ἀρχεστρατίδην.Ἀρχεστρατίδην Babington.

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Source is Pap. Ardenianus.Column 2 Ἀρίστωνος δὲ ἀνδράποδα εἶχεν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· καὶ ταῦτα αὐτὸς ὑμῖν ἐμαρτύρησεν ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαςτηρίου, ὅτʼ ἦν τούτῳ ὁ ἀγὼν πρὸς Ἀρχεστρατίδην.Ἀρχεστρατίδην Babington.

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τοιοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι τὸ Ἀρίστωνος τουτουὶ πρᾶγμα· οὗτος οὗτος Shilleto: αὐτὸς Schneidewin. προσκαλεῖται μὲν περιὼν πάντας ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δʼ ὅσοι μὲν ἂν μὴ διδῶσιν αὐτῷ ἀργύριον, κρίνει καὶ κατηγορεῖ, ὁπόσοι δʼ ἂν ἐθέλωσιν ἀποτίνειν,ὁπόσοι et ἀποτίνειν Babington. ἀφίησιν, τὸ δʼ ἀργύριον ΘεομνήστῳἈρίστωνος usque ad Θεομνήστῳ plerumque restituit Schneidewin. δίδωσιν· ἐκεῖνος δὲ λαμβάνων ἀνδράποδα ἀγοράζει, καὶ παρέχει ὥσπερ τοῖς λῃσταῖς ἐπισιτισμόν, καὶ δίδωσι τούτῳ ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου τοῦ Column 3 ἀνδραπόδου ὀβολὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ ἀθάνατος συκοφάντης.

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τοιοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι τὸ Ἀρίστωνος τουτουὶ πρᾶγμα· οὗτος οὗτος Shilleto: αὐτὸς Schneidewin. προσκαλεῖται μὲν περιὼν πάντας ἀνθρώπους, τῶν δʼ ὅσοι μὲν ἂν μὴ διδῶσιν αὐτῷ ἀργύριον, κρίνει καὶ κατηγορεῖ, ὁπόσοι δʼ ἂν ἐθέλωσιν ἀποτίνειν,ὁπόσοι et ἀποτίνειν Babington. ἀφίησιν, τὸ δʼ ἀργύριον ΘεομνήστῳἈρίστωνος usque ad Θεομνήστῳ plerumque restituit Schneidewin. δίδωσιν· ἐκεῖνος δὲ λαμβάνων ἀνδράποδα ἀγοράζει, καὶ παρέχει ὥσπερ τοῖς λῃσταῖς ἐπισιτισμόν, καὶ δίδωσι τούτῳ ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου τοῦ Column 3 ἀνδραπόδου ὀβολὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ ἀθάνατος συκοφάντης.

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ἄξιον δʼ ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, κἀκεῖθεν ἐξετάσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀφʼ ὧν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὶ εὐθὺς ᾐτιάσαντο. ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱοἱ add. Schneidewin. οἰκεῖοι ἀπέστειλανἀπέστειλαν ἐπέστειλαν Blass. γράψαντες τήν τε εἰσαγγελίαν καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἃς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ᾐτιάσαντό με, ὅτε τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἐδίδοσαν, ἐν αἷς ἦν γεγραμμένον ὅτι Λυκοῦργος λέγει, φάσκων τῶν οἰκείων ἀκηκοέναι,οἰκείων ἀκηκοέναι Babington. ὡς ἐγὼ παρακολουθῶν, ὅτε Χάριππος ἐγάμει τὴν γυναῖκα, παρεκελευόμην αὐτῇ ὅπως μὴ πλησιάσει πλησιάσει Schneidewin: πλησιάσῃ A. Χαρίππῳ ἀλλὰ διαφυλάξει αὑτήν.

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ἄξιον δʼ ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, κἀκεῖθεν ἐξετάσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀφʼ ὧν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὶ εὐθὺς ᾐτιάσαντο. ἐμοὶ γὰρ οἱοἱ add. Schneidewin. οἰκεῖοι ἀπέστειλανἀπέστειλαν ἐπέστειλαν Blass. γράψαντες τήν τε εἰσαγγελίαν καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἃς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ᾐτιάσαντό με, ὅτε τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἐδίδοσαν, ἐν αἷς ἦν γεγραμμένον ὅτι Λυκοῦργος λέγει, φάσκων τῶν οἰκείων ἀκηκοέναι,οἰκείων ἀκηκοέναι Babington. ὡς ἐγὼ παρακολουθῶν, ὅτε Χάριππος ἐγάμει τὴν γυναῖκα, παρεκελευόμην αὐτῇ ὅπως μὴ πλησιάσει πλησιάσει Schneidewin: πλησιάσῃ A. Χαρίππῳ ἀλλὰ διαφυλάξει αὑτήν.

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ἐγὼ δὲ ἃ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Column 4 ἐπιτηδείους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους οἰκείους Babington. τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ εὐθὺς εὐθὺς Blass: τότε Babington. ἥκων ἔλεγον, καὶ νῦν πρὸς ὑμᾶς λέγω,λέγω Schneidewin: ἐρῶ Babington. ὅτι, εἰ ἔστιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὁμολογῶ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὰ ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ γεγραμμένα.γεγραμμένα Babington. ὅτι δὲ ψευδῆ ψευδῆ Schneidewin. ἐστιν, ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι οἶμαι Caesar. εἶναι ἅπασιν ἰδεῖν. ἰδεῖν Caesar: γνῶναι Patakis. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀλόγιστος,

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ἐγὼ δὲ ἃ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Column 4 ἐπιτηδείους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους οἰκείους Babington. τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ εὐθὺς εὐθὺς Blass: τότε Babington. ἥκων ἔλεγον, καὶ νῦν πρὸς ὑμᾶς λέγω,λέγω Schneidewin: ἐρῶ Babington. ὅτι, εἰ ἔστιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὁμολογῶ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὰ ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ γεγραμμένα.γεγραμμένα Babington. ὅτι δὲ ψευδῆ ψευδῆ Schneidewin. ἐστιν, ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι οἶμαι Caesar. εἶναι ἅπασιν ἰδεῖν. ἰδεῖν Caesar: γνῶναι Patakis. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀλόγιστος,

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ὅςτις ἂν πιστεύσαι τούτοις τοῖςἐστι et sq. Babington, sedτούτοις τοῖς Blass:τοιούτοις Babington. λόγοις; ἀνάγκη γάρ,ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν Sauppe:ἦν om. Blass. ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πρῶτον μὲν ὀρεωκόμον καὶ προηγητὴν ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ζεύγει, ὃ ἦγεν τὴν γυναῖκα, Column 5 ἔπειτα δὲ παῖδας τοὺς προπέμποντας αὐτὴν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ Διώξιππον· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἠκολούθει διὰ τὸ χήραν ἐκδίδοσθαι αὐτήν.

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ὅςτις ἂν πιστεύσαι τούτοις τοῖςἐστι et sq. Babington, sedτούτοις τοῖς Blass:τοιούτοις Babington. λόγοις; ἀνάγκη γάρ,ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν Sauppe:ἦν om. Blass. ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πρῶτον μὲν ὀρεωκόμον καὶ προηγητὴν ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ζεύγει, ὃ ἦγεν τὴν γυναῖκα, Column 5 ἔπειτα δὲ παῖδας τοὺς προπέμποντας αὐτὴν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ Διώξιππον· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἠκολούθει διὰ τὸ χήραν ἐκδίδοσθαι αὐτήν.

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εἶτʼ ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦτο ἀπονοίας ἦλθον, ὥστε ἄλλων τε τοσούτων ἀνθρώπων συνακολουθούντων καὶ Διωξίππου καὶ Εὐφραίου τοῦ προσγυμναστοῦπροσγυμναστοῦ προγυμναστοῦ Westermann. αὐτοῦ, οἳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμολογουμένως ἰσχυρότατοί εἰσιν, οὔτʼ ᾐσχυνόμην τοιούτους λόγους λέγων περὶ γυναικὸς ἐλευθέρας πάντων ἀκουόντων, οὔτʼοὔτʼ . . . οὔτʼ Sauppe:οὐκ . . . οὐδʼ Blass. ἐδεδίειν μὴ παραχρῆμα ἀπόλωμαι πνιγόμενος;πνιγόμενος Kenyon: ἀπαγόμενος Babington, Colin. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο τοιαῦτα περὶ τῆς Column 6 αὑτοῦ ἀδελφῆς ἀκούων οἷά με οὗτοι αἰτιῶνται εἰρηκέναι καὶκαὶ Schneidewin: ἆρʼ Babington. οὐκ ἂν ἀπέκτεινεἀπέκτεινε ἀπεκώλυσε Colin. τὸν λέγοντα;

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εἶτʼ ἐγὼ εἰς τοῦτο ἀπονοίας ἦλθον, ὥστε ἄλλων τε τοσούτων ἀνθρώπων συνακολουθούντων καὶ Διωξίππου καὶ Εὐφραίου τοῦ προσγυμναστοῦπροσγυμναστοῦ προγυμναστοῦ Westermann. αὐτοῦ, οἳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμολογουμένως ἰσχυρότατοί εἰσιν, οὔτʼ ᾐσχυνόμην τοιούτους λόγους λέγων περὶ γυναικὸς ἐλευθέρας πάντων ἀκουόντων, οὔτʼοὔτʼ . . . οὔτʼ Sauppe:οὐκ . . . οὐδʼ Blass. ἐδεδίειν μὴ παραχρῆμα ἀπόλωμαι πνιγόμενος;πνιγόμενος Kenyon: ἀπαγόμενος Babington, Colin. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο τοιαῦτα περὶ τῆς Column 6 αὑτοῦ ἀδελφῆς ἀκούων οἷά με οὗτοι αἰτιῶνται εἰρηκέναι καὶκαὶ Schneidewin: ἆρʼ Babington. οὐκ ἂν ἀπέκτεινεἀπέκτεινε ἀπεκώλυσε Colin. τὸν λέγοντα;

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τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιονἀπούων usque ad κεφάλαιον plerumque restituit Babington. ἁπάντων, ἁπάντων Sauppe. ὡςὡς Blass:ὧν Colin. καὶ μικρῷ πρότερον πρότερον Sauppe. εἶπον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀναισθησίας ὁ Χάριππος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἦλθεν, ὥστε πρότερον μέν, ὥς φασιν, τῆς γυναικὸς προλεγούσης ὅτι συνομωμοκυῖα εἴη πρὸς ἐμέ, πάλιν δὲ ἀκούων ἐμοῦ παρακελευμένου αὐτῇτοῦτο usque adαὐτῇ Babington. ὅπως ἐμμείνειενἐμμείνειεν Herwerden: ἐμμενεῖ ἐν Schneidewin. τοῖς ὅρκοις οἷς ὤμοσεν, ἐλάμβανε τὴντὴν Babington: ὅμως Blass. γυναῖκα; καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ ἂν ὑμῖν ἢ Ὀρέστης Ὀρέστης Blass. ἐκεῖνος ὁ μαινόμενος ποιῆσαι ἢ Μαργίτης ὁ πάντων ἀβελτερώτατος;

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τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιονἀπούων usque ad κεφάλαιον plerumque restituit Babington. ἁπάντων, ἁπάντων Sauppe. ὡςὡς Blass:ὧν Colin. καὶ μικρῷ πρότερον πρότερον Sauppe. εἶπον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀναισθησίας ὁ Χάριππος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἦλθεν, ὥστε πρότερον μέν, ὥς φασιν, τῆς γυναικὸς προλεγούσης ὅτι συνομωμοκυῖα εἴη πρὸς ἐμέ, πάλιν δὲ ἀκούων ἐμοῦ παρακελευμένου αὐτῇτοῦτο usque adαὐτῇ Babington. ὅπως ἐμμείνειενἐμμείνειεν Herwerden: ἐμμενεῖ ἐν Schneidewin. τοῖς ὅρκοις οἷς ὤμοσεν, ἐλάμβανε τὴντὴν Babington: ὅμως Blass. γυναῖκα; καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ ἂν ὑμῖν ἢ Ὀρέστης Ὀρέστης Blass. ἐκεῖνος ὁ μαινόμενος ποιῆσαι ἢ Μαργίτης ὁ πάντων ἀβελτερώτατος;

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ἀλλʼ οἶμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πολλὰ Column 7 πλεονεκτοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν οἱ κατήγοροι τῶν φευγόντων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀκίνδυνον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα ῥᾳδίως ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται λέγουσι καὶ καταψεύδονται, οἱ δὲ κρινόμενοι διὰ τὸν φόβον πολλὰ καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν ἐπιλανθάνονται.

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ἀλλʼ οἶμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πολλὰ Column 7 πλεονεκτοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν οἱ κατήγοροι τῶν φευγόντων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀκίνδυνον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα ῥᾳδίως ὅ τι ἂν βούλωνται λέγουσι καὶ καταψεύδονται, οἱ δὲ κρινόμενοι διὰ τὸν φόβον πολλὰ καὶ τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν ἐπιλανθάνονται.

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ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἐπειδὰν πρότερονπρότερον τὸν πρότερον Colin: πρότεροι Patakis. λόγον λάβωσιν, οὐ μόνον ἃ ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ δίκαια περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ συσκευάσαντες λοιδορίας ψευδεῖς κατὰ τῶν κρινομένων ἐξιστᾶσιν τῆς ἀπολογίας· ὥστε συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν διαβολῶν Column 8 ἀπολογουμένοιςἀπολογουμένοις usque adδιαστρέφουσιν plerumque restituit Babington. τῆς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀπολογίας ἀπολελεῖφθαι,ἀπολελεῖφθαι Schneidewin. μὴ μεμνημένοις et μεμνημένοις Shilleto. τῶντῶν περὶ τῶν Babington. προκατηγορηθέντων, οἴησινοἴησιν Schneidewin:οὕτω δόξαν Blass. καταλείπειν παρὰ τοῖς δικασταῖς ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ εἰρημένα.

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ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἐπειδὰν πρότερονπρότερον τὸν πρότερον Colin: πρότεροι Patakis. λόγον λάβωσιν, οὐ μόνον ἃ ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ δίκαια περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ συσκευάσαντες λοιδορίας ψευδεῖς κατὰ τῶν κρινομένων ἐξιστᾶσιν τῆς ἀπολογίας· ὥστε συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ περὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν διαβολῶν Column 8 ἀπολογουμένοιςἀπολογουμένοις usque adδιαστρέφουσιν plerumque restituit Babington. τῆς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀπολογίας ἀπολελεῖφθαι,ἀπολελεῖφθαι Schneidewin. μὴ μεμνημένοις et μεμνημένοις Shilleto. τῶντῶν περὶ τῶν Babington. προκατηγορηθέντων, οἴησινοἴησιν Schneidewin:οὕτω δόξαν Blass. καταλείπειν παρὰ τοῖς δικασταῖς ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ εἰρημένα.

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πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τούς τε μέλλοντας βοηθεῖν τοῖς φεύγουσιτοῖς φεύγουσι Caesar. προδιαβάλλουσι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κρινομένου τὴν ἀπολογίαν διαστρέφουσιν·See note onἀπολογουμένοις above. οἷον καὶ Ἀρίστων Ἀρίστων Sauppe. οὑτοσὶ ἐνεχείρησε ἐνεχείρησε Schneidewin. ποιῆσαι ποιῆσαι Blass: που Kenyon. ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ,κατηγορία Babington. ὃς οὐδʼὃς οὐδʼ Blass:οὐδʼ Kayser. ἀπολαύειν ἀπολαύειν Sudhaus: ἀπολογίαν Blass. δίδωσι τῶν ἀναβαινόντων ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ καὶδίδωσι usque adκαὶ Blass. συναπολογησομένων.συναπολογησομένων Kayser. διὰ τί δʼ οὗτοι μὴ ἀπολογῶνται;διὰ usque ad ἀπολογῶνται Blass: ἀπολογήσονται Fuhr. πότερʼ οὐ δίκαιόν Column 9στιδίκαιόν ἐστι Sauppe. τοῖς κρινομένοις τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς φίλους βοηθεῖν; ἢ ἔστιν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τούτου δημοτικώτερον, τοῦ τοὺς δυναμένους εἰπεῖν τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις τῶν πολιτῶν κινδυνεύουσι βοηθεῖν;

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πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τούς τε μέλλοντας βοηθεῖν τοῖς φεύγουσιτοῖς φεύγουσι Caesar. προδιαβάλλουσι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κρινομένου τὴν ἀπολογίαν διαστρέφουσιν·See note onἀπολογουμένοις above. οἷον καὶ Ἀρίστων Ἀρίστων Sauppe. οὑτοσὶ ἐνεχείρησε ἐνεχείρησε Schneidewin. ποιῆσαι ποιῆσαι Blass: που Kenyon. ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ,κατηγορία Babington. ὃς οὐδʼὃς οὐδʼ Blass:οὐδʼ Kayser. ἀπολαύειν ἀπολαύειν Sudhaus: ἀπολογίαν Blass. δίδωσι τῶν ἀναβαινόντων ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ καὶδίδωσι usque adκαὶ Blass. συναπολογησομένων.συναπολογησομένων Kayser. διὰ τί δʼ οὗτοι μὴ ἀπολογῶνται;διὰ usque ad ἀπολογῶνται Blass: ἀπολογήσονται Fuhr. πότερʼ οὐ δίκαιόν Column 9στιδίκαιόν ἐστι Sauppe. τοῖς κρινομένοις τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς φίλους βοηθεῖν; ἢ ἔστιν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τούτου δημοτικώτερον, τοῦ τοὺς δυναμένους εἰπεῖν τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις τῶν πολιτῶν κινδυνεύουσι βοηθεῖν;

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σὺ δὲ οὐ μόνον περὶ τῶν συνηγόρων τοὺς λόγους πεποίησαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν τὴν ἐμὴν διατάττεις· καὶ παραγγέλλεις τοῖς δικασταῖς περὶ ὧν δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀκούειν καὶ καὶ add. Kayser:ἀκούειν del. Schneidewin. κελεύειν με ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὧν μὴ ἐᾶν λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς καλῶς ἔχει, σὲ μὲν ὅπως ἠβούλου τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, Column 10 προειδότα δὲ ἃ ἔχω ἐγὼ δίκαια λέγειν πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σοῦ ἐψευσμένα, ὑφαιρεῖσθαί μου τὴν ἀπολογίαν;

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σὺ δὲ οὐ μόνον περὶ τῶν συνηγόρων τοὺς λόγους πεποίησαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν τὴν ἐμὴν διατάττεις· καὶ παραγγέλλεις τοῖς δικασταῖς περὶ ὧν δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀκούειν καὶ καὶ add. Kayser:ἀκούειν del. Schneidewin. κελεύειν με ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὧν μὴ ἐᾶν λέγειν. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς καλῶς ἔχει, σὲ μὲν ὅπως ἠβούλου τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, Column 10 προειδότα δὲ ἃ ἔχω ἐγὼ δίκαια λέγειν πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σοῦ ἐψευσμένα, ὑφαιρεῖσθαί μου τὴν ἀπολογίαν;

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καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν αἰτιᾷ ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον παραβαίνοντα τοὺς νόμους, αὐτὸς δʼ ὑπερπηδήςας ἅπαντας ἅπαντας Blass. τοὺς νόμουςνόμους usque adτραγῳδίας plerumque restituit Babington. εἰσαγγελίαν δέδωκας ὑπὲρ ὧν γραφαὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεςμοθέτας ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν ἀκίνδυνος εἰςίῃς εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἔπειτα ἐξῇ σοιἐξῇ σοι Kayser. τραγῳδίαςSee note on νόμους above. γράψαι εἰς τὴνγράψαι εἰς τὴν Blass. εἰσαγγελίαν οἵαςπερ οἵασπερ Kayser. νῦν γέγραφας, ὅς μʼὅς μʼ Blass. αἰτιᾷ ὅτι πολλὰς μὲνπολλὰς μὲν Sauppe. γυναῖκας ποιῶποιῶ Blass. ἀγάμους ἔνδον καταγηράσκειν,ἀγάμους ἔνδον καταγηράσκειν Babington. πολλὰς δὲ ςυνοικεῖν οἷς πολλὰς usque ad οἷς Sauppe. Column 11 οὐ προσήκει παρὰ τοὺς νόμους.

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καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν αἰτιᾷ ἐν τῇ εἰσαγγελίᾳ καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον παραβαίνοντα τοὺς νόμους, αὐτὸς δʼ ὑπερπηδήςας ἅπαντας ἅπαντας Blass. τοὺς νόμουςνόμους usque adτραγῳδίας plerumque restituit Babington. εἰσαγγελίαν δέδωκας ὑπὲρ ὧν γραφαὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεςμοθέτας ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν ἀκίνδυνος εἰςίῃς εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἔπειτα ἐξῇ σοιἐξῇ σοι Kayser. τραγῳδίαςSee note on νόμους above. γράψαι εἰς τὴνγράψαι εἰς τὴν Blass. εἰσαγγελίαν οἵαςπερ οἵασπερ Kayser. νῦν γέγραφας, ὅς μʼὅς μʼ Blass. αἰτιᾷ ὅτι πολλὰς μὲνπολλὰς μὲν Sauppe. γυναῖκας ποιῶποιῶ Blass. ἀγάμους ἔνδον καταγηράσκειν,ἀγάμους ἔνδον καταγηράσκειν Babington. πολλὰς δὲ ςυνοικεῖν οἷς πολλὰς usque ad οἷς Sauppe. Column 11 οὐ προσήκει παρὰ τοὺς νόμους.

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οὐκοῦν οὐκοῦν Babington: οὔκουν Schneidewin. ἄλλην μὲν οὐδεμίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γυναῖκα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, ᾗτινι ἐγὼ τούτων αἴτιός εἰμι, περὶ ἧς δὲ νῦν τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίησαι, πότερα ᾤουPostᾤου add. οὐ Kirchhoff. προσήκειν συνοικεῖν ἐκδεδομένην Χαρίππῳ, ἑνὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἢ ἀνέκδοτον ἔνδον καταγηράσκειν, ἣ εὐθὺς ἐξεδόθη τάλαντον ἀργυρίου προσθέντος αὐτῇ Εὐφήμου, δηλονότι οὐ διὰ πονηρίαν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐπιείκειαν;

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οὐκοῦν οὐκοῦν Babington: οὔκουν Schneidewin. ἄλλην μὲν οὐδεμίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γυναῖκα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν, ᾗτινι ἐγὼ τούτων αἴτιός εἰμι, περὶ ἧς δὲ νῦν τὴν κατηγορίαν πεποίησαι, πότερα ᾤουPostᾤου add. οὐ Kirchhoff. προσήκειν συνοικεῖν ἐκδεδομένην Χαρίππῳ, ἑνὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἢ ἀνέκδοτον ἔνδον καταγηράσκειν, ἣ εὐθὺς ἐξεδόθη τάλαντον ἀργυρίου προσθέντος αὐτῇ Εὐφήμου, δηλονότι οὐ διὰ πονηρίαν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἐπιείκειαν;

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τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἔξεστιν, add. Babington, quod dubium an A supra versum habeat. ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται καὶ καταψεύδεσθαι, ὑμᾶς δʼ οἶμαι δεῖν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ κατηγόρου Column 12 διαβολῶν περὶ ἐμοῦ δικάζειν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ βίου ὃν βεβίωκα ἐξετάσαντας. λαθεῖν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον οὐκ ἔνι οὔτε πονηρὸν ὄντα οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἐπιεικῆ, ἀλλʼ ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος μάρτυς ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ τρόπου ἀκριβέστατος, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν οἵα αὕτη ἐστίν.

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τούτῳ μὲν οὖν ἔξεστιν, add. Babington, quod dubium an A supra versum habeat. ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται καὶ καταψεύδεσθαι, ὑμᾶς δʼ οἶμαι δεῖν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ κατηγόρου Column 12 διαβολῶν περὶ ἐμοῦ δικάζειν, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ βίου ὃν βεβίωκα ἐξετάσαντας. λαθεῖν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον οὐκ ἔνι οὔτε πονηρὸν ὄντα οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε ἐπιεικῆ, ἀλλʼ ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος μάρτυς ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ τρόπου ἀκριβέστατος, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν οἵα αὕτη ἐστίν.

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ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῇ τῇ Sauppe. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνδέχεταιἐνδέχεται usque adτοιοῦτος plerumque restituit Babington. ἀδικῆσαι, ταῦτα μὲν δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐγκλήματοςἐγκλήματος Blass: ἀξιώματος Babington. οὗ ἂν ἔχῃ τις· μοιχεύειν δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀπὸ πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον olim Jensen: ἀρξάμενον Babington. ἀλλʼ ἢ πάλαι τοιοῦτόςSee note onἐενδέχεται above. ἐστιν, ὃ δειξάτωσαν οὗτοι, Column 13 ἢ ψευδῆ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰκὸς εἶναι.

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ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῇ τῇ Sauppe. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐνδέχεταιἐνδέχεται usque adτοιοῦτος plerumque restituit Babington. ἀδικῆσαι, ταῦτα μὲν δεῖ σκοπεῖν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐγκλήματοςἐγκλήματος Blass: ἀξιώματος Babington. οὗ ἂν ἔχῃ τις· μοιχεύειν δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀπὸ πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον olim Jensen: ἀρξάμενον Babington. ἀλλʼ ἢ πάλαι τοιοῦτόςSee note onἐενδέχεται above. ἐστιν, ὃ δειξάτωσαν οὗτοι, Column 13 ἢ ψευδῆ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰκὸς εἶναι.

ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μεθʼ ὑμῶν διατρίβων ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, οὔτε αἰτίαν πονηρὰν οὐδεμίαν πώποτʼ ἔλαβον, οὔτʼ ἔγκλημά μοι πρὸς οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν γέγονεν, οὐδὲ πέφευγα δίκην οὐδεμίαν, οὐδʼ ἕτερον δεδίωχα, ἱπποτροφῶν δὲ διατετέλεκα φιλοτίμως τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ. ἐστεφάνωμαι δʼ ὑπό τε τῶν ἱππέων πάντων ἀνδραγαθίας ἕνεκα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν συναρχόντων.

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ὑμεῖς γάρ με, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, Column 14 πρῶτον μὲν φύλαρχον ἐχειροτονήσατε, ἔπειτα εἰς Λῆμνον ἵππαρχον· καὶ ἦρξα μὲν αὐτόθι δύʼ ἔτη τῶν πώποθʼ ἱππαρχηκότων μόνος, προσκατέμεινα δὲ αὐτόθι τὸν τρίτον ἐνιαυτόν, οὐ βουλόμενος πολίτας ἄνδρας ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν εἰσπράττειν τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἀπόρως διακειμένους.

+

ὑμεῖς γάρ με, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, Column 14 πρῶτον μὲν φύλαρχον ἐχειροτονήσατε, ἔπειτα εἰς Λῆμνον ἵππαρχον· καὶ ἦρξα μὲν αὐτόθι δύʼ ἔτη τῶν πώποθʼ ἱππαρχηκότων μόνος, προσκατέμεινα δὲ αὐτόθι τὸν τρίτον ἐνιαυτόν, οὐ βουλόμενος πολίτας ἄνδρας ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν εἰσπράττειν τὸν μισθὸν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἀπόρως διακειμένους.

-

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μοι τῷ χρόνῳ ἔγκλημα μὲν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐνεκάλεσεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ, στεφάνοις δὲ τρισὶν ἐστεφανώθην ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ ἐν Ἡφαιςτίᾳ καὶ ἑτέροις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν Μυρίνῃ· ἃ χρ χρὴ Blass. τεκμήρια ὑμῖν εἶναι εἶναι Sauppe. εἰς τοῦτον τὸν Column 15 ἀγῶνα, ὡς ψευδεῖς κατʼ ἐμοῦ αἱαἱ add. Babington. αἰτίαι εἰσίν. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν Ἀθήνησι πονηρὸν ἐν Λήμνῳ χρηστὸν εἶναι, οὐδʼ ὑμεῖς ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄντα με ἀπεστέλλετε ἐκεῖσε, παρακατατιθέμενοι δύο πόλεις τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν.

+

καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μοι τῷ χρόνῳ ἔγκλημα μὲν οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐκεῖ ἐνεκάλεσεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ, στεφάνοις δὲ τρισὶν ἐστεφανώθην ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ ἐν Ἡφαιςτίᾳ καὶ ἑτέροις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν Μυρίνῃ· ἃ χρ χρὴ Blass. τεκμήρια ὑμῖν εἶναι εἶναι Sauppe. εἰς τοῦτον τὸν Column 15 ἀγῶνα, ὡς ψευδεῖς κατʼ ἐμοῦ αἱαἱ add. Babington. αἰτίαι εἰσίν. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸν Ἀθήνησι πονηρὸν ἐν Λήμνῳ χρηστὸν εἶναι, οὐδʼ ὑμεῖς ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄντα με ἀπεστέλλετε ἐκεῖσε, παρακατατιθέμενοι δύο πόλεις τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν.

-

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ εἶχον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ εἰπεῖν, σχεδὸν ἀκηκόατε. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ κατήγορος οὐκ ἀπείρως ἔχων τοῦ λέγειν, εἰωθὼς δὲ πολλάκις ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἐκάλει συνηγόρους τοὺς συναπολοῦντάς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀδίκως, δέομαι ὑμῶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἀντιβολῶ κελεῦσαι κἀμὲ καλέσαι τοὺς συνεροῦντας Column 16 ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τηλικούτου ἀγῶνος, καὶ ἀκοῦσαι εὐνοικῶς, εἴ τίς μοι ἔχει τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων βοηθῆσαι,

+

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ εἶχον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ εἰπεῖν, σχεδὸν ἀκηκόατε. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ κατήγορος οὐκ ἀπείρως ἔχων τοῦ λέγειν, εἰωθὼς δὲ πολλάκις ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἐκάλει συνηγόρους τοὺς συναπολοῦντάς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀδίκως, δέομαι ὑμῶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ἀντιβολῶ κελεῦσαι κἀμὲ καλέσαι τοὺς συνεροῦντας Column 16 ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τηλικούτου ἀγῶνος, καὶ ἀκοῦσαι εὐνοικῶς, εἴ τίς μοι ἔχει τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων βοηθῆσαι,

πολίτῃ μὲν ὄντι ὑμετέρῳ, ἰδιώτῃ δὲ καὶ οὐκ εἰωθότι λέγειν, ἀγωνιζομένῳ δὲ καὶ κινδυνεύοντι οὐ μόνον περὶ θανάτου, ἐλάχιστον γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστιν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις, ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐξορισθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανόντα μηδὲ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ταφῆναι. ἐὰν οὖν κελεύητε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καλῶ τινα βοηθήσοντα. ἀνάβηθί μοι, Θεόφιλε, καὶ σύνειπε ὅ τι ἔχεις· κελεύουσιν οἱ δικασταί.

diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/__cts__.xml index e6aaba4e4..c8d58b161 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Κατὰ Φιλιππίδου - Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + + Against Philippides + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 69bbe7dfb..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0140", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Hyperides/opensource/hyp_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=2", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 7e9174b9c..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,292 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - Against Philippides from Speeches (English). Machine readable text - Hyperides - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - - Hyperides - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - -
-

. . . in a free city furthering the interests of - tyrants . . . towards slavery . . .

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-
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. . . was responsible for actions which did credit - to the city and to Greece.The subject is perhaps Conon, an Athenian commander who was often - praised in this way. Compare Din. 1. 14 and - note. Therefore both here and everywhere else he was paid the highest - honors . . . rightly . . .

-
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. . . we must thank Alexander on account of those - who died . . . but I think. . .

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Moreover these men trample on the people in their - misfortune, and for this reason they deserve your hatred far more. For just as - human bodies need most care when they are sick, so it is with cities, which need - most attention in times of misfortune. To these men ?) only . . .

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-

. . . [Very fragmentary.]

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. . . each of them gives, one in Thebes, another in Tanagra . . .

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Or that they do not pray for the overthrow of all - that is left in Greece, when they are - deriving profits from the cities that are being destroyed? Or that, while they - wish you to spend your lives in fear and danger . . .

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Unimpressive in person on account of his thinness. -

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. . . make accusations. And they make it clear - that even when they were friends of the LacedaemoniansHyperides may be alluding to the period from 378 to - 371 B.C., when Athens and Thebes were at war with Sparta. their speeches were prompted not by love for - them but by hatred of Athens and a - willingness to flatter those whose power at any time threatened you.

-
-
-

And when the power recently shifted from them to Philip they then chose to - flatter him and Democrates of AphidnaDemocrates of - Aphidna was a politician - whom Aeschines mentions (Aeschin. 2. 17;cf. - Isaeus 6. 22). He had quite a reputation - for wit and some of his sayings are preserved. As a descendant of one of the - tyrant-slayers, probably of Aristogiton, who appears to have been a member - of the tribe Aphidna, he - enjoyed free meals in the Prytaneum, a privilege to which apparently only - the eldest of each line was entitled (CIA1.8; 2. 240). - who never leaves their sides . . . makes jokes on the city's misfortunes, - abusing you in the market place by day and then coming at evening to dine at - your table. And yet you, Democrates, are the one person who has no right to say - a single hard word against the state, for two reasons:

-
-
-

first because you needed no one but yourself to show you that the city is - grateful to her benefactors, you who now enjoy the honors for services which - other men once rendered; and secondly because the people drew up a law - forbidding anyone to speak ill of Harmodius and Aristogeiton or sing disparaging - songs about them.Harmodius and Aristogiton are - mentioned again in Hyp. 6. 39. This particular - privilege is not elsewhere recorded. It is therefore scandalous that, - though the people saw fit to prevent even a drunken man from abusing your - ancestors, you should be speaking ill of the state even when you are sober.

-
-
-

I have a few more points to make, gentlemen of the - jury, and after summing up my argument will leave the platform. The case in - which you are going to vote is an indictment for the proposing of illegal - measures and the decree under consideration is one congratulating - presidents.In the 4th century B.C. the - chairman of the pruta/neis appointed - these presidents by lot, one from each tribe except that to which he himself - belonged, for each meeting of the Council or Assembly. After their - appointment he drew lots among them for their chairman (e)pista/ths). (See Aeschin. 1. 104, Aeschin. 3. 39, - and Aristot. Ath. Pol. 44. - 2.) Presidents should observe the law during their period of - office. These men have broken it. As evidence for both these facts you heard the - actual laws read.

-
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The sequel now rests with you. For you will make it plain whether you are going - to punish the proposers of illegal measures or whether you intend to grant those - honors, which till now have been paid to your benefactors, to presidents whose - conduct is not lawful; and that too when you have sworn to observe the laws in - giving your vote. There is, however, one argument open to them, namely that the - people were compelled to pass the votes of honor.i. e., the votes of honor for certain Macedonians. Hyperides - agrees that it may have been impossible to avoid passing the votes of honor, - but that there was no need to congratulate the presidents for having done - so. Even this cannot possibly mislead you; for it cannot be said that - we were under any compulsion to crown the presidents.

-
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-

Moreover the defendant has himself made your decision easy, since he stated in - writing his reasons for crowning them. They had, he said, been just towards the - Athenian people and observed the laws during their office. That is a statement - for which you must now summon him to answer. And you, Philippides, show us that - what you assumed about the presidents in your decree is true and you will be - acquitted.

-
-
-

But if you think that your usual vulgarity and joking will secure your pardon in - court or win from these men any indulgence or sympathy to which you are not - entitled, you are a fool and very far from the mark. You see, you laid up - popularity for yourself, not in Athens, but elsewhere. You thought fit to cringe before those - whom the people feared rather than before the men who now have power to save - you.

-
-
-

You have concluded that one person will be immortal,This passage is important for determining the date of the - speech. It has been held, e. g., by Kenyon, that the remark is a gibe, in which there would be - no point unless Philip were already dead. But the use of the perfect tense - (u(pei/lhfas) seems to imply that he - was still living when Hyperides spoke, or had only just been killed. - yet you sentenced to death a city as old as ours, never realizing the simple - fact that no tyrant has yet risen from the dead, while many cities, though - utterly destroyed, have come again to power. You and your party took no account - of the history of the Thirty or of the city's triumph over her assailants from - without and those within her walls who joined in the attack upon her.The reference is to the return of the democrats - to Athens in 403 - B.C., under Thrasybulus, who had to contend both with the Spartans under - Lysander and with the Thirty. It was well known that you were all - watching the city's fortunes, waiting for the chance to say or do something - against the people.

-
-
-

Will you dare then presently to mention opportunities, when the opportunities you - sought were for the city's ruin? Have you brought your children with you into - court, Philippides?For the bringing of - children into court compare Hyp. 4.41. Are - you going to bring them soon on to the platform and so claim pity from the jury? - You have no right to pity. When others felt compassion for the city's - misfortunes, you and your like were exulting over her.At the time of Chaeronea (338 B.C.). They had resolved - to save Greece in a spirit which ill - deserved the fate they met. But you, who are unjustly bringing Athens into the depths of shame, deserve - the punishment you are now about.to suffer.

-
-
-

Why should you spare this man, gentlemen? Because he is a democrat? Why, you are - well aware that he has chosen to be the slave of tyrants and is ready on the - other hand to give the people orders. Would it be because he is a good man? No; - for you twice condemned him as a criminal. True, you may say, but he is useful. - Granted; but if you use a man whom you are known to have condemned as wicked, it - will appear either that your judgements are wrong or that you welcome wicked - men. It is not therefore right to take upon yourselves this man's misdeeds. On - the contrary: the transgressor must be punished.

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And if anyone comes forward with the plea that he has twice before been convicted - for illegal proposals and that therefore you should acquit him,The penalties for illegal proposals and for giving false - witness seem to have been the same, although the exact rules governing them - in the 4th century B.C. are not quite clear. In the 5th century a man three - times convicted of false witness was automatically disfranchised (See Andoc. 1.74), and the present passage suggests - that in the 4th century too a third conviction led to partial a)timi/a. (Cf. Dem. - 51.12 and Plat. Laws. 937 c, - evidently inspired by current Athenian practice.) The actual penalty seems - to have been a fine; but if this was not paid the prosecutor had the right - to enforce the judgement by a suit of ejection(di/kh e)cou/lhs) and thus partially disfranchise the culprit. - (See Isoc. 16. 47.) When orators speak as if - a)timi/a were inevitable after any - conviction they are probably exaggerating. please do just the - opposite, and that for two reasons. In the first place it is a piece of good - fortune, when a man is known to have proposed illegal measures, that you should - catch him coming up for trial a third time. He is not a good man and need not be - spared as such. Indeed you should rid yourselves of him as quickly as you can, - since he has twice already proved his character to you.

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And secondly, compare the case of false witness. If people have been twice - convicted of this, you have allowed them to refrain from giving evidence a third - time, even of events at which they have themselves been present, so that, if - anyone is disfranchised, responsibility shall rest, not on the people, but on - the man himself, for continuing to bear false witness. Similarly men convicted - of illegal proposals need not bring forward proposals in future. If they do they - are clearly actuated by some private motive. So that people of this type deserve - punishment, not pity.

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I do not wish to speak too long after setting myself as a limit an amphora of - water in the clock; so the clerk will read you the indictment again. And now - bear in mind the accusations and the laws which you heard read and bring in a - verdict that will be just and also expedient for yourselves.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5646d8a81 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ + + + + + + Against Philippides + Hyperides + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + Hyperides + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

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+ + + English + Greek + + + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion + edited markup + split composite text and converted to unicode + add refdecl, changed some of the FRAG attributes that had commentary in them, made notes have a space after them. + Put bios and intros to speeches into separate files. Change markup in accordance with orator dtd + +
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in a free city furthering the interests of tyrants towards slavery

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+

was responsible for actions which did credit to the city and to Greece.The subject is perhaps Conon, an Athenian commander who was often praised in this way. Compare Din. 1. 14 and note. Therefore both here and everywhere else he was paid the highest honors rightly

+
+
+

we must thank Alexander on account of those who died but I think

+
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+

Moreover these men trample on the people in their misfortune, and for this reason they deserve your hatred far more. For just as human bodies need most care when they are sick, so it is with cities, which need most attention in times of misfortune. To these men ?) only

+
+
+

[Very fragmentary.]

+
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+

each of them gives, one in Thebes, another in Tanagra

+
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+

Or that they do not pray for the overthrow of all that is left in Greece, when they are deriving profits from the cities that are being destroyed? Or that, while they wish you to spend your lives in fear and danger

+
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Unimpressive in person on account of his thinness.

+
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make accusations. And they make it clear that even when they were friends of the LacedaemoniansHyperides may be alluding to the period from 378 to 371 B.C., when Athens and Thebes were at war with Sparta. their speeches were prompted not by love for them but by hatred of Athens and a willingness to flatter those whose power at any time threatened you.

+
+
+

And when the power recently shifted from them to Philip they then chose to flatter him and Democrates of AphidnaDemocrates of Aphidna was a politician whom Aeschines mentions (Aeschin. 2. 17;cf. Isaeus 6. 22). He had quite a reputation for wit and some of his sayings are preserved. As a descendant of one of the tyrant-slayers, probably of Aristogiton, who appears to have been a member of the tribe Aphidna, he enjoyed free meals in the Prytaneum, a privilege to which apparently only the eldest of each line was entitled (CIA1.8; 2. 240). who never leaves their sides makes jokes on the city’s misfortunes, abusing you in the market place by day and then coming at evening to dine at your table. And yet you, Democrates, are the one person who has no right to say a single hard word against the state, for two reasons:

+
+
+

first because you needed no one but yourself to show you that the city is grateful to her benefactors, you who now enjoy the honors for services which other men once rendered; and secondly because the people drew up a law forbidding anyone to speak ill of Harmodius and Aristogeiton or sing disparaging songs about them.Harmodius and Aristogiton are mentioned again in Hyp. 6. 39. This particular privilege is not elsewhere recorded. It is therefore scandalous that, though the people saw fit to prevent even a drunken man from abusing your ancestors, you should be speaking ill of the state even when you are sober.

+
+
+

I have a few more points to make, gentlemen of the jury, and after summing up my argument will leave the platform. The case in which you are going to vote is an indictment for the proposing of illegal measures and the decree under consideration is one congratulating presidents.In the 4th century B.C. the chairman of the πρυτάνεις appointed these presidents by lot, one from each tribe except that to which he himself belonged, for each meeting of the Council or Assembly. After their appointment he drew lots among them for their chairman (ἐπιστάτης). (See Aeschin. 1. 104, Aeschin. 3. 39, and Aristot. Ath. Pol. 44. 2.) Presidents should observe the law during their period of office. These men have broken it. As evidence for both these facts you heard the actual laws read.

+
+
+

The sequel now rests with you. For you will make it plain whether you are going to punish the proposers of illegal measures or whether you intend to grant those honors, which till now have been paid to your benefactors, to presidents whose conduct is not lawful; and that too when you have sworn to observe the laws in giving your vote. There is, however, one argument open to them, namely that the people were compelled to pass the votes of honor.i. e., the votes of honor for certain Macedonians. Hyperides agrees that it may have been impossible to avoid passing the votes of honor, but that there was no need to congratulate the presidents for having done so. Even this cannot possibly mislead you; for it cannot be said that we were under any compulsion to crown the presidents.

+
+
+

Moreover the defendant has himself made your decision easy, since he stated in writing his reasons for crowning them. They had, he said, been just towards the Athenian people and observed the laws during their office. That is a statement for which you must now summon him to answer. And you, Philippides, show us that what you assumed about the presidents in your decree is true and you will be acquitted.

+
+
+

But if you think that your usual vulgarity and joking will secure your pardon in court or win from these men any indulgence or sympathy to which you are not entitled, you are a fool and very far from the mark. You see, you laid up popularity for yourself, not in Athens, but elsewhere. You thought fit to cringe before those whom the people feared rather than before the men who now have power to save you.

+
+
+

You have concluded that one person will be immortal,This passage is important for determining the date of the speech. It has been held, e. g., by Kenyon, that the remark is a gibe, in which there would be no point unless Philip were already dead. But the use of the perfect tense (ὑπείληφας) seems to imply that he was still living when Hyperides spoke, or had only just been killed. yet you sentenced to death a city as old as ours, never realizing the simple fact that no tyrant has yet risen from the dead, while many cities, though utterly destroyed, have come again to power. You and your party took no account of the history of the Thirty or of the city’s triumph over her assailants from without and those within her walls who joined in the attack upon her.The reference is to the return of the democrats to Athens in 403 B.C., under Thrasybulus, who had to contend both with the Spartans under Lysander and with the Thirty. It was well known that you were all watching the city’s fortunes, waiting for the chance to say or do something against the people.

+
+
+

Will you dare then presently to mention opportunities, when the opportunities you sought were for the city’s ruin? Have you brought your children with you into court, Philippides?For the bringing of children into court compare Hyp. 4.41. Are you going to bring them soon on to the platform and so claim pity from the jury? You have no right to pity. When others felt compassion for the city’s misfortunes, you and your like were exulting over her.At the time of Chaeronea (338 B.C.). They had resolved to save Greece in a spirit which ill deserved the fate they met. But you, who are unjustly bringing Athens into the depths of shame, deserve the punishment you are now about.to suffer.

+
+
+

Why should you spare this man, gentlemen? Because he is a democrat? Why, you are well aware that he has chosen to be the slave of tyrants and is ready on the other hand to give the people orders. Would it be because he is a good man? No; for you twice condemned him as a criminal. True, you may say, but he is useful. Granted; but if you use a man whom you are known to have condemned as wicked, it will appear either that your judgements are wrong or that you welcome wicked men. It is not therefore right to take upon yourselves this man’s misdeeds. On the contrary: the transgressor must be punished.

+
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And if anyone comes forward with the plea that he has twice before been convicted for illegal proposals and that therefore you should acquit him,The penalties for illegal proposals and for giving false witness seem to have been the same, although the exact rules governing them in the 4th century B.C. are not quite clear. In the 5th century a man three times convicted of false witness was automatically disfranchised (See Andoc. 1.74), and the present passage suggests that in the 4th century too a third conviction led to partial ἀτιμία. (Cf. Dem. 51.12 and Plat. Laws. 937 c, evidently inspired by current Athenian practice.) The actual penalty seems to have been a fine; but if this was not paid the prosecutor had the right to enforce the judgement by a suit of ejection(δίκη ἐξούλης) and thus partially disfranchise the culprit. (See Isoc. 16. 47.) When orators speak as if ἀτιμία were inevitable after any conviction they are probably exaggerating. please do just the opposite, and that for two reasons. In the first place it is a piece of good fortune, when a man is known to have proposed illegal measures, that you should catch him coming up for trial a third time. He is not a good man and need not be spared as such. Indeed you should rid yourselves of him as quickly as you can, since he has twice already proved his character to you.

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And secondly, compare the case of false witness. If people have been twice convicted of this, you have allowed them to refrain from giving evidence a third time, even of events at which they have themselves been present, so that, if anyone is disfranchised, responsibility shall rest, not on the people, but on the man himself, for continuing to bear false witness. Similarly men convicted of illegal proposals need not bring forward proposals in future. If they do they are clearly actuated by some private motive. So that people of this type deserve punishment, not pity.

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I do not wish to speak too long after setting myself as a limit an amphora of water in the clock; so the clerk will read you the indictment again. And now bear in mind the accusations and the laws which you heard read and bring in a verdict that will be just and also expedient for yourselves.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-grc2.xml index c2e26e636..b6366e5dd 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ 2 - Internet Archive + Internet Archive @@ -88,75 +88,75 @@
- Frag. IFrag. I restituit Sudhaus. + Frag. IFrag. I restituit Sudhaus.

unknown ἐν ἐλευθέρᾳ πόλει τὰ τοῖς τυράννοις συμφέροντα πραττοντν εἰς δουλείαν

- Frag. VIFrag. 6 plerumque restituit Blass. -

καλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς Ἕλληςιν αἴτιος ἐγένετο. τοιγαροῦντοιγαροῦν Jensen: τὸ παλαιὸν Blass. καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν τῶν μεγίςτωντῶν μεγίστων Fuhr: Κόνων (̣) μεγίστων Blass. δωρεῶν ἔτυχενδικαίως γὰρὑπὸ

+ Frag. VIFrag. 6 plerumque restituit Blass. +

καλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς Ἕλληςιν αἴτιος ἐγένετο. τοιγαροῦντοιγαροῦν Jensen: τὸ παλαιὸν Blass. καὶ παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν τῶν μεγίςτωντῶν μεγίστων Fuhr: Κόνων (̣) μεγίστων Blass. δωρεῶν ἔτυχενδικαίως γὰρὑπὸ

- Frag. VIII (sub finem)Frag. 8 hanc partem restituit Blass. -

unknownδεῖ χάριν ἡμᾶς ἀποδιδόναι Ἀλεξάνοδρῳ διὰ τοὺς τελευτήσανταςἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαιοἶμαι Jensen.

+ Frag. VIII (sub finem)Frag. 8 hanc partem restituit Blass. +

unknownδεῖ χάριν ἡμᾶς ἀποδιδόναι Ἀλεξάνοδρῳ διὰ τοὺς τελευτήσανταςἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαιοἶμαι Jensen.

- Frag. XFrag. 10 e septem fragmentulis composuit Blass, qui pleraque restituit. -

unknown ἐκεῖνος. ἔπειθʼ οὗτοι ἐπεμβαίνουσιν τῷ δήμῳ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις. διόπερ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄξιοί εἰσιν μισεῖσθαι. ὥςπερ γὰρ τὰ σώματα πλείςτηςπλείστης Kenyon:μεγίστης Blass. ἐπιμελείας ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωςτίαις δεῖται, οὕτως καὶ αἱ πόλεις πλείστης θεραπείας ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις δέονται. μόνοις δὲ τούτοιςτούτοις Kenyon.

+ Frag. XFrag. 10 e septem fragmentulis composuit Blass, qui pleraque restituit. +

unknown ἐκεῖνος. ἔπειθʼ οὗτοι ἐπεμβαίνουσιν τῷ δήμῳ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις. διόπερ καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἄξιοί εἰσιν μισεῖσθαι. ὥςπερ γὰρ τὰ σώματα πλείςτηςπλείστης Kenyon:μεγίστης Blass. ἐπιμελείας ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωςτίαις δεῖται, οὕτως καὶ αἱ πόλεις πλείστης θεραπείας ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις δέονται. μόνοις δὲ τούτοιςτούτοις Kenyon.

- Frag. XIFrag 11, cuius solum a sinistra parte margo exstat, sic restituere tentavit Blass: + Frag. XIFrag 11, cuius solum a sinistra parte margo exstat, sic restituere tentavit Blass:

unknown δημοκρατία. ἀφεὶς δὲ τὰ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν καὶ συνηγόρει Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐστρατεύσατο μετʼ ἐκείνου ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοῦτο δηλώσωΦιλιπποἐστρατεύσατο ἐφʼ ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἀκριβῶς γε

Frag. XVa -

unknown δίδωσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν, ὁ μὲν ἐν Θήβαις, ὁ δʼ ἐν Τανάγρᾳ, ὁ δʼ ἐν τῇ ἐλευθεἘλευθερίδι Kenyon: ἐλευθέρᾳ Blass.ατα τῶν

+

unknown δίδωσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν, ὁ μὲν ἐν Θήβαις, ὁ δʼ ἐν Τανάγρᾳ, ὁ δʼ ἐν τῇ ἐλευθεἘλευθερίδι Kenyon: ἐλευθέρᾳ Blass.ατα τῶν

- Frag. XVbFrag. 15b e compluribus fragmentis composuit Blass. -

unknownπαλλαγέντα; ἢ οὐκ εὔχεσθαι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀνατραπῆναι, οἵ γʼ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναιρουμένων πόλεων ἀπαρχὰς λαμβάνουσιν; καὶ ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀεὶὑμᾶς μὲν ἀεὶ Jensen. βούλεσθαι ἐν φόβῳ καὶφόβῳ καὶ Blass. κινδύνοις εἶναι

+ Frag. XVbFrag. 15b e compluribus fragmentis composuit Blass. +

unknownπαλλαγέντα; ἢ οὐκ εὔχεσθαι καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀνατραπῆναι, οἵ γʼ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναιρουμένων πόλεων ἀπαρχὰς λαμβάνουσιν; καὶ ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀεὶὑμᾶς μὲν ἀεὶ Jensen. βούλεσθαι ἐν φόβῳ καὶφόβῳ καὶ Blass. κινδύνοις εἶναι

- Frag. XXIFrag. 21 ab Athenaeo xii. 552 d citatum est. + Frag. XXIFrag. 21 ab Athenaeo xii. 552 d citatum est.

Athenaeus 22.522 dεὐτελὴς τὸ σῶμα διὰ λεπτότητα.

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Column 1 κατηγορίας ποιοῦνται, καὶ φανερὸν ποιοῦσιν ὅτι οὐδὲ τότε φίλοι ὄντες Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν μισοῦντες καὶ τοὺς ἰσχύοντας ἀεὶColl. 1 et 2 plerumque restituit Kenyon. καθʼ ὑμῶν θεραπεύοντες.

+

Column 1 κατηγορίας ποιοῦνται, καὶ φανερὸν ποιοῦσιν ὅτι οὐδὲ τότε φίλοι ὄντες Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν μισοῦντες καὶ τοὺς ἰσχύοντας ἀεὶColl. 1 et 2 plerumque restituit Kenyon. καθʼ ὑμῶν θεραπεύοντες.

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ἐπεὶ δὲ νῦν ἡ ἐκείνων δύναμις εἰς τοῦτοντοῦτον Jensen:μικρὸν Blass, Kenyon. μετέστη, τότε δκολακεύειν προείλοντοπροείλοντο Blass.· καὶ ΔημοκράτηςPostΔημοκράτης add. νῦν Kenyon: om. Jensen. αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀφιδναῖος ἀεὶ παρακαθήμενοςπαρακαθήμενος Jensen: συγκαθήμενος Kenyon. καὶον ἱστὰςκαὶ χορὸν ἱστὰς Blass. γελωτοποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀτυχήμασιν, καὶ λοιδορεῖθʼλοιδορεῖθʼ Blass. ὑμῖν μεθʼ ἡμέραν ἐν ἐν Blass. τῇ ἀγορᾷ, εἰς ἑσπέραν δὲ δειπνήσων ὡς ὑμᾶς ἔρχεται. καίτοι, ὦ Δημόκρατες, μόνῳ σοι οὐκ ἔνι λέγεινἔνι λέγειν Blass. περὶ τοῦ δήμου φλαῦρον φλαῦρον Cronert: φαῦλον Kenyon. οὐδέν·

+

ἐπεὶ δὲ νῦν ἡ ἐκείνων δύναμις εἰς τοῦτοντοῦτον Jensen:μικρὸν Blass, Kenyon. μετέστη, τότε δκολακεύειν προείλοντοπροείλοντο Blass.· καὶ ΔημοκράτηςPostΔημοκράτης add. νῦν Kenyon: om. Jensen. αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀφιδναῖος ἀεὶ παρακαθήμενοςπαρακαθήμενος Jensen: συγκαθήμενος Kenyon. καὶον ἱστὰςκαὶ χορὸν ἱστὰς Blass. γελωτοποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀτυχήμασιν, καὶ λοιδορεῖθʼλοιδορεῖθʼ Blass. ὑμῖν μεθʼ ἡμέραν ἐν ἐν Blass. τῇ ἀγορᾷ, εἰς ἑσπέραν δὲ δειπνήσων ὡς ὑμᾶς ἔρχεται. καίτοι, ὦ Δημόκρατες, μόνῳ σοι οὐκ ἔνι λέγεινἔνι λέγειν Blass. περὶ τοῦ δήμου φλαῦρον φλαῦρον Cronert: φαῦλον Kenyon. οὐδέν·

-

διὰ τί; ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν οὐ παρʼ Column 2 ἑτέρου σʼ ἔδει μαθεῖν ὅτι ὁ δῆμος χάριτας ἀποδίδωσιν τοῖς εὐεργέταις, ἀλλὰ παρὰ σαυτοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἕτεροι εὐεργέτησαν νῦν τὰς τιμὰς κομίζει. ἔπειθʼ ὅτι ἐν νόμῳ γράψας ὁ δῆμος ἀπεῖπεν μήτε λέγειν ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ κακῶς Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριςτογείτονα, μήτʼ ᾆσαι ἐπὶᾆσαι ἐπὶ Jebb. τὰ κακίονα. ᾗ Blass: L, Kenyon. καὶ δεινόν ἐστιν εἰ τοὺς μὲν σοὺς προγόνους ὁ δῆμος οὐδὲ μεθυσθέντι ᾤετο δεῖν ἐξεῖναι κακῶς εἰπεῖν, σὺ δὲ νήφων τὸν δῆμον κακῶς λέγεις.

+

διὰ τί; ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν οὐ παρʼ Column 2 ἑτέρου σʼ ἔδει μαθεῖν ὅτι ὁ δῆμος χάριτας ἀποδίδωσιν τοῖς εὐεργέταις, ἀλλὰ παρὰ σαυτοῦ· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἕτεροι εὐεργέτησαν νῦν τὰς τιμὰς κομίζει. ἔπειθʼ ὅτι ἐν νόμῳ γράψας ὁ δῆμος ἀπεῖπεν μήτε λέγειν ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ κακῶς Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριςτογείτονα, μήτʼ ᾆσαι ἐπὶᾆσαι ἐπὶ Jebb. τὰ κακίονα. ᾗ Blass: L, Kenyon. καὶ δεινόν ἐστιν εἰ τοὺς μὲν σοὺς προγόνους ὁ δῆμος οὐδὲ μεθυσθέντι ᾤετο δεῖν ἐξεῖναι κακῶς εἰπεῖν, σὺ δὲ νήφων τὸν δῆμον κακῶς λέγεις.

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Βραχέα δʼ ἔτι πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπών, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ἀναλογισάμενος, καταβήσομαι. γραφὴ παρανόμων ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἧς τὴν ψῆφον μέλλετε φέρεινφέρειν Blass.. τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα Column 3 τὸ κρινόμενον ἔπαινος προέδρων. ὅτι δὲ προσήκει τοὺς προέδρους κατὰ τοὺς νόμους προεδρεύειν, οὗτοι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους προηδρεύκασιν, αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων ἠκούετε ἀναγιγνωσκομένων.

+

Βραχέα δʼ ἔτι πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπών, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καὶ ἀναλογισάμενος, καταβήσομαι. γραφὴ παρανόμων ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἧς τὴν ψῆφον μέλλετε φέρεινφέρειν Blass.. τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα Column 3 τὸ κρινόμενον ἔπαινος προέδρων. ὅτι δὲ προσήκει τοὺς προέδρους κατὰ τοὺς νόμους προεδρεύειν, οὗτοι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους προηδρεύκασιν, αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων ἠκούετε ἀναγιγνωσκομένων.

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τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη ἐστὶν παρʼ ὑμῖν· δείξετε γὰρ πότερα τοὺς παράνομα γράφοντας τιμωρήσεσθε, ἢ τὰς τοῖς εὐεργέταις ἀποδεδειγμένας τιμὰς ταύτας δώσετε τοῖς ἐναντία τοῖς νόμοις προεδρεύουσιν, καὶ ταῦτα ὀμωμοκότες κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐξαπατηθῆναι ὑμῖν ἔνεστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν, ἂν φῶσιν ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἐπαίνωνἐπαίνων Blass. ψηφίζεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ προέδρους Column 4 οὐκ ἔνεστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνάγκη τις ἦν στεφανῶσαι.

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τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη ἐστὶν παρʼ ὑμῖν· δείξετε γὰρ πότερα τοὺς παράνομα γράφοντας τιμωρήσεσθε, ἢ τὰς τοῖς εὐεργέταις ἀποδεδειγμένας τιμὰς ταύτας δώσετε τοῖς ἐναντία τοῖς νόμοις προεδρεύουσιν, καὶ ταῦτα ὀμωμοκότες κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἐξαπατηθῆναι ὑμῖν ἔνεστιν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου αὐτῶν, ἂν φῶσιν ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἐπαίνωνἐπαίνων Blass. ψηφίζεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ προέδρους Column 4 οὐκ ἔνεστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνάγκη τις ἦν στεφανῶσαι.

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πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑμῖνColl. 4 ad 8 plerumque restituit Kenyon, sed ὑμῖν Koehler: ἡμῖν L. οτος ῥᾳδίαν πεποίηκεν τὴν γνῶσιν· ἔγραψεν γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστεφάνωσεν τοὺς προέδρους, δικαιοσύνης τε τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ διότι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους προηδρεύκασιν. ἐπὶ δ δὴ Blass. ταῦτʼ ἄγετʼ αὐτὸν ἀπολογησόμενον, καὶ σύ, ὦ Φιλιππίδη, δείξας ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν προέδρων, ἃ ὑπέθου ἐν τῷ ψηφίςματι, ἀπόφευγε.

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πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αὐτὸς ὑμῖνColl. 4 ad 8 plerumque restituit Kenyon, sed ὑμῖν Koehler: ἡμῖν L. οτος ῥᾳδίαν πεποίηκεν τὴν γνῶσιν· ἔγραψεν γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστεφάνωσεν τοὺς προέδρους, δικαιοσύνης τε τῆς εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ διότι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους προηδρεύκασιν. ἐπὶ δ δὴ Blass. ταῦτʼ ἄγετʼ αὐτὸν ἀπολογησόμενον, καὶ σύ, ὦ Φιλιππίδη, δείξας ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ περὶ τῶν προέδρων, ἃ ὑπέθου ἐν τῷ ψηφίςματι, ἀπόφευγε.

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εἰ δʼ οἴει κορδακίζων καὶ γελωτοποιῶν, ὅπερ ποιεῖν εἴωθας,Postεἴωθας interpunxit Kenyon: infra, postδικαστηρίων Blass. ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἀποφεύξεσθαι, εὐήθης εἶ, ἢ παρὰ τούτοις τούτοις Jenson:τούτων φὴς Kenyon. συγγνώμην ἢ ἔλεόν ἔλεόν Sandys. τινα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν.ὑπάρχειν Blass. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. οὐ γὰρδεῖ. οὐ γὰρ Herwerden et Diels. Column 5 ἀπέθου σαυτῷ εὔνοιαν παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρωθι, οὐδὲ τοὺς σῶσαί σε δυναμένους ᾤου δεῖν κολακεύειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῷ δήμῳ φοβεροὺς ὄντας.

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εἰ δʼ οἴει κορδακίζων καὶ γελωτοποιῶν, ὅπερ ποιεῖν εἴωθας,Postεἴωθας interpunxit Kenyon: infra, postδικαστηρίων Blass. ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἀποφεύξεσθαι, εὐήθης εἶ, ἢ παρὰ τούτοις τούτοις Jenson:τούτων φὴς Kenyon. συγγνώμην ἢ ἔλεόν ἔλεόν Sandys. τινα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν.ὑπάρχειν Blass. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. οὐ γὰρδεῖ. οὐ γὰρ Herwerden et Diels. Column 5 ἀπέθου σαυτῷ εὔνοιαν παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρωθι, οὐδὲ τοὺς σῶσαί σε δυναμένους ᾤου δεῖν κολακεύειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῷ δήμῳ φοβεροὺς ὄντας.

καὶ ἓν μὲν σῶμα ἀθάνατον ὑπείληφας ἔσεσθαι, πόλεως δὲ τηλικαύτης θάνατον κατέγνως, οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνο συνιδών, ὅτι τῶν μὲν τυράννων οὐδεὶς πώποτε τελευτήσας ἀνεβίωσεν, πόλεις δὲ πολλαὶ ἄρδην ἀναιρεθεῖσαι πάλιν ἴσχυσαν. οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐλογίσασθε, οὐδʼ ὡς καὶ τῶν ἐπιστρατευσάντων καὶ τῶν ἔνδοθεν συνεπιθεμένων αὐτῇ περιεγένετο, ἀλλὰ φανεροὶ ἐγένεσθε καιροφυλακοῦντες τὴν πόλιν εἴ ποτε δοθήσεται ἐξουσία λέγειν τι ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τοῦ δήμου.

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εἶτα περὶ Column 6 καιρῶν αὐτίκα δὴ τολμήσετε λέγειν τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καιροὺς [οὐ]οὐ del. Koehler:οὕτω Thalheim:ὡς οὐ ci. Kenyon: οἱ Weil. παραφυλάξαντες; καὶ τὰ παιδία ἥκεις ἔχων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ἀναβιβάσας αὐτίκα δὴ ἀξιώσεις ὑπὸ τούτων ἐλεεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαιον· ὅτε γὰρ ἡ πόλις ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ᾠκτείρετο διὰ τὰ συμβάντα, τόθʼ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐξυβρίζετο. καίτοι οὗτοι μὲν τὴν Ἑλλάδα σῴζειν προελόμενοι ἀνάξια τῶν φρονημάτων ἔπασχον, σὺ δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας αἰσχύνας ἀδίκως καθιστὰς νυνὶ δικαίως τιμωρίας τεύξῃ.

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εἶτα περὶ Column 6 καιρῶν αὐτίκα δὴ τολμήσετε λέγειν τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καιροὺς [οὐ]οὐ del. Koehler:οὕτω Thalheim:ὡς οὐ ci. Kenyon: οἱ Weil. παραφυλάξαντες; καὶ τὰ παιδία ἥκεις ἔχων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, καὶ ἀναβιβάσας αὐτίκα δὴ ἀξιώσεις ὑπὸ τούτων ἐλεεῖσθαι; ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαιον· ὅτε γὰρ ἡ πόλις ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ᾠκτείρετο διὰ τὰ συμβάντα, τόθʼ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ἐξυβρίζετο. καίτοι οὗτοι μὲν τὴν Ἑλλάδα σῴζειν προελόμενοι ἀνάξια τῶν φρονημάτων ἔπασχον, σὺ δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὰς ἐσχάτας αἰσχύνας ἀδίκως καθιστὰς νυνὶ δικαίως τιμωρίας τεύξῃ.

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διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν ἂν add. Herwerden. τούτου φείσαισθε; πότερα διότι δημοτικός ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ ἴστʼ αὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν τυράννοις δουλεύειν προελόμενον, τῷ δὲ δήμῳ προστάττειν ἀξιοῦντα. ἀλλʼ ὅτι χρηστός; ἀλλὰ δὶς Column 7 αὐτοῦ ἀδικίαν κατέγνωτε. ναί, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος· ἀλλʼ εἰ χρήςεςθε τῷ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ὁμολογουμένως πονηρῷ κριθέντι, ἢ κρίνειν κακῶς δόξετε ἢ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμεῖν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἄξιον τὰ τούτου ἀδικήματα αὐτοὺςαὐτοὺς Blass. ἀναδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθαι τὸν ἀδικοῦντα.

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διὰ τί γὰρ ἂν ἂν add. Herwerden. τούτου φείσαισθε; πότερα διότι δημοτικός ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ ἴστʼ αὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν τυράννοις δουλεύειν προελόμενον, τῷ δὲ δήμῳ προστάττειν ἀξιοῦντα. ἀλλʼ ὅτι χρηστός; ἀλλὰ δὶς Column 7 αὐτοῦ ἀδικίαν κατέγνωτε. ναί, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος· ἀλλʼ εἰ χρήςεςθε τῷ ὑφʼ ὑμῶν ὁμολογουμένως πονηρῷ κριθέντι, ἢ κρίνειν κακῶς δόξετε ἢ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμεῖν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἄξιον τὰ τούτου ἀδικήματα αὐτοὺςαὐτοὺς Blass. ἀναδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθαι τὸν ἀδικοῦντα.

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καὶ ἂν ἂν Jenson:ἐὰν Kenyon. ἄρα λέγῃ τις ἀναβὰς ὡς δὶς ἥλωκεν πρότερον παρανόμων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φῇ δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀποψηφίσασθαι, τοὐναντίον ποιεῖτε κατʼ ἀμφότερα. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι εὐτύχημά ἐστιν τὸν ὁμολογουμένως τὰ παράνομα γράφοντα τὸ τρίτον κρινόμενον λαβεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ τινος φείδεσθαι προσήκει τούτου, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην ἀπηλλάχθαι, ὅς γε τοῦ τρόπου δὶς ἤδη ἐν ὑμῖν Column 8 βάσανον δέδωκεν.

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καὶ ἂν ἂν Jenson:ἐὰν Kenyon. ἄρα λέγῃ τις ἀναβὰς ὡς δὶς ἥλωκεν πρότερον παρανόμων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φῇ δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀποψηφίσασθαι, τοὐναντίον ποιεῖτε κατʼ ἀμφότερα. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι εὐτύχημά ἐστιν τὸν ὁμολογουμένως τὰ παράνομα γράφοντα τὸ τρίτον κρινόμενον λαβεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ τινος φείδεσθαι προσήκει τούτου, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην ἀπηλλάχθαι, ὅς γε τοῦ τρόπου δὶς ἤδη ἐν ὑμῖν Column 8 βάσανον δέδωκεν.

ἔπειτα δέ, ὥσπερ τοῖς τῶν ψευδομαρτυρίων δὶς ἡλωκόσιν δεδώκατε ὑμεῖς τὸ τρίτον μὴ μαρτυρεῖν μηδʼ οἷς ἂν παραγένωνται, ἵνα μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ᾖ τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αἴτιον τοῦ ἠτιμῶσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς ατῷ, ἂν μὴ παύηται τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρῶν, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς ἡλωκόσι παρανόμων ἔξεστιν μηκέτι γράφειν, εἰ δὲ μή, δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἰδίου τινὸς ἕνεκα τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὥστε οὐκ οἴκτου οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας.

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ἵνα δὲ μὴ προθέμενος πρὸς ἀμφορέα ὕδατος εἰπεῖν μακρολογῶ, ὁ μὲν γραμματεὺς ὑμῖν ἀναγνώσεται τὴν γραφὴν πάλιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν τε κατηγορημένων Column 9 μεμνημένοι καὶ τῶν νόμων ἀκούσαντες ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ψηφίζεσθε.

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ἵνα δὲ μὴ προθέμενος πρὸς ἀμφορέα ὕδατος εἰπεῖν μακρολογῶ, ὁ μὲν γραμματεὺς ὑμῖν ἀναγνώσεται τὴν γραφὴν πάλιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν τε κατηγορημένων Column 9 μεμνημένοι καὶ τῶν νόμων ἀκούσαντες ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ψηφίζεσθε.

diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg003/__cts__.xml index e3f9c42a4..f5453a8ba 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg003/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Κατ᾽ Ἀθηνογένους - Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + + Against Athenogenes + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 3adb94b1d..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0140", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Hyperides/opensource/hyp_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=3", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index ae4720f05..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,512 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - Against Athenogenes from Speeches (English). Machine readable text - Hyperides - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - - - Hyperides - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - -
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When I told her what had happened and explained - that Athenogenes was rude to me and unwilling to come to any reasonable - agreement, she said that he was always like that and told me not to worry, as - she would support me in everything herself.

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Her manner when she said this could not have been more sincere, and she took the - most solemn oaths to prove that she was thinking only of my welfare and was - telling me the plain truth. So, to be quite honest with you, gentlemen of the - jury, I took her at her word. That is how love, I suppose, upsets a man's - natural balance when it takes a woman as its ally. She, at any rate, by this act - of wholesale trickery pocketed, as a reward for her kindness, a further three - hundred drachmas, ostensibly to buy a girl.

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Perhaps there is nothing very surprising, gentlemen of the jury, in my having - been taken in like this by Antigone, a woman who was, I am told, the most gifted - courtesan of her time and who has continued to practise as a procuress . . . has - ruined the house of . . . of the deme Chollidae which was equal to any. And yet - if that was how she behaved on her own, what do you think her plans are now when - she has taken Athenogenes into partnership, who is a speechwriter, a man of - affairs and, most significant of all, an Egyptian?

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At all events, to make a long story short, she finally sent for me again later - and said that after a long talk with Athenogenes she had with difficulty managed - to persuade him to release Midas and both his sons for me for forty minas.This was a high price for three slaves. - Demosthenes tells us that the total cost of his father's fifty-two slaves - (thirty-two swordsmiths and twenty couchmakers) was 230 minas, i.e., an - average of just under eight pounds per head. (Dem. 27. - 9.) She told me to produce the money as quickly as I could - before Athenogenes changed his mind on any point.

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After I had collected it from every source and been a nuisance to my friends I - deposited the forty minas in the bank and came to Antigone. She brought us both - together, Athenogenes and myself, and after reconciling us asked us to treat - each other as friends in future. I consented to this and Athenogenes, the - defendant, replied that I had Antigone to thank for what had passed. “And now,” - he said, “I will show you how well I am going to treat you for her sake.For the explanation of this offer see - Introduction. You are going to put down the money,” he went on, “for - the liberation of Midas and his sons. Instead I will sell them to you formally - as your own, so that no one shall interfere with, or seduce the boy, and also so - that the slaves themselves shall abstain from being troublesome, for fear of the - consequences.

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But this is the chief advantage: under the present arrangement they would think - that it was I who had freed them; whereas, if you buy them formally first and - then liberate them afterwards at your leisure, they will be doubly grateful to - you. However,” he said, “you will become responsible for what money they owe: a - debt for some sweet oil to Pancalus and ProclesThe name is given as Polycles in § 10. and any other sums which - customers have invested in the perfumery in the ordinary course. It is a - trifling amount and much more than counterbalanced by the stocks in the shop, - sweet oil, scent-boxes, myrrh” (and he mentioned the names of some other - things), “which will easily cover all the debts.”

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There, so it seems, gentlemen of the jury, lay the catch, the real point of the - elaborate plot. For if I used the money to buy their freedom I was simply losing - whatever I gave him without suffering any serious harm. But if I bought them - formally and agreed to take over their debts assuming, since I had no previous - information, that these were negligible, he meant to set all his creditors and - contributorsI.e., friends who had made - loans to the business. The money would be repaid in instalments free of - interest. Cf. §§ 9 and 11. on me, using the agreement as a trap.

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And that is just what he did. For when I accepted his proposals he immediately - took a document from his lap and began to read the contents, which were the text - of an agreement with me. I listened to it being read, but my attention was - concentrated on completing the business I had come for. He sealed the agreement - directly in the same house, so that no one with any interest in me should hear - the contents, and added with my name that of Nicon of Cephisia.

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We went to the perfumery and deposited the document with Lysicles of Leuconoe, - and I put down the forty minas and so made the purchase. When this was settled I - was visited by the creditors, to whom Midas owed money, and the contributors - too, who talked things over with me. In three months all the debts had been - declared, with the result that, including repayment of contributions, I owed, as - I said just now, about five talents.

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When I realized what a plight I was in, at long last I called together my friends - and relatives and we read the copy of the agreement in which the names of - Pancalus and PolyclesThe name is given as - Procles in § 6. It is not known which is the correct form. were - expressly written with the statement that certain sums were owing to them for - sweet oil. These were small amounts, and they were justified in saying that the - oil in the shop was equal in value to the money. But the majority of the debts, - including the largest, were not given specifically; they were mentioned as an - unimportant item in a sort of footnote which ran:

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“and any debt which Midas may owe to any other person.” Of the contributions one - was noted of which three instalments for repayment were still outstanding.See § 7, note. This was given in the name - of Dicaeocrates. But the others, on the strength of which Midas had acquired - everything and which were of recent date, were not entered by him in the - agreement but kept secret.

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On thinking it over we decided to go to Athenogenes and broach the matter. We - found him near the perfume stalls and asked him whether he was not ashamed of - being a liar and trapping us with the agreement by not declaring the debts - beforehand. He replied that he did not know what debts we meant and that we made - no impression on him; he had in safe-keeping a document relating to me which - covered the transaction. A crowd gathered and overheard the incident, as our - altercation took place in the market. Although they gave him a slating and told - us to arrest him summarily as a kidnapper,Summary arrest (a)pagwgh/) by which the - injured party seized the criminal and took him before the magistrate, could - be used against various types of offender, e.g., thieves and kidnappers. - Athenogenes was not actually a kidnapper, but he was driving a man to debt, - which, though it did not lead to enslavement, might result in total atimi/a. we thought it best not to do - so. Instead we summoned him before you, as the law permits. First of all then, - the clerk shall read you the agreement; for you shall have the actual text of - the document as evidence of the plot, for which Athenogenes and no other is to - blame. Read the agreement. -

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Well, gentlemen of the jury, you have heard - the facts in detail. But Athenogenes will presently tell you that in law - whatever agreements one man makes with another are binding.This law is quoted elsewhere,e.g., by Dem. 47.77. Yes, my friend, just - agreements. But if they are unjust, the opposite is true: the law forbids - that they be binding. I will quote the laws themselves to make this clearer - to you. For you have reduced me to such a state of fear lest I shall be - ruined by you and your craftiness that I have been searching the laws night - and day and studying them to the neglect of everything else.

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The first law, then, stipulates that people shall not tell lies in the - market, which seems to me a most admirable provision.The first of these two laws cited by the plaintiff is - mentioned also by Dem. 20.9. It was enforced - by the ten agoranomoi, whose duty it was to guard against fraud in all - questions of purchase. See Aristot. Ath. - Pol. 51. For the second law compare Aeschin. 3.249 and Plat. Laws. 915 - c. Yet you lied in the middle of the market when you - made the agreement to defraud me. But if you show that you declared to me - beforehand the contributions and the debts, or that you wrote in the - agreement the names of those whose existence I later discovered, I have no - quarrel with you; I admit that I owe the money.

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After this there is a second law, covering agreements between individuals, which - states that whenever anyone sells a slave, he must declare in advance any - physical disability from which the man suffers. Otherwise the slave in question - can be returned to the vendor. And yet if a slave can be returned simply because - of some weakness due to mischance which the master keeps secret at the time of - the sale, how can you fail to take the responsibility for the crimes which you - deliberately planned? But the epileptic slave does not involve the buyer in - fresh expense, whereas Midas, whom you sold to me, has even lost my friends' - money.

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Consider the legal position, Athenogenes, as regards free persons as well as - slaves. No doubt you know as everyone does that the children of married women - are legitimate. Yet the mere act of betrothing a woman on the part of a father - or brother was not enough for the lawmaker. On the contrary, he wrote expressly - in the lawThis law is mentioned by Demosthenes - (Dem. 44.49) and quoted in Dem. 46.18, from which the text is here - reconstructed. : “whomsoever any man has lawfully betrothed as wife, - her children shall be legitimate”; not: “if any man has betrothed some other - woman on the pretence that she is his daughter.” He lays it down that just - betrothals shall be valid and unjust ones invalid.

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Moreover the law dealing with wills is very similar to this.This law is quoted in Dem. - 46.14. Compare Isaeus 6.10; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 35. As Colin points - out, the comparison between sunqh=kai - (an agreement and diaqh/lkh a will) - seems closer in Greek than in English. It allows a man to bequeath - his property as he wishes unless he is affected by old age, illness or insanity, - and provided he is not influenced by a woman or imprisoned or otherwise coerced. - But if even our own personal property cannot be administered according to an - unjust will, surely Athenogenes who is disposing of my property through his - agreement cannot enforce such terms.

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Apparently if a man respects the wishes of his own wife in making his will it - will be invalid. Then must I, who was influenced by the mistress of Athenogenes, - accept the contract and be ruined too,The - argument is rather condensed; the contrast is this: A will may be otherwise - just and yet it becomes invalid when made under the influence of a wife. - Therefore, a fortiori, this contract becomes invalid because (1) it was not - just in other respects, (2) it was made under the influence of a woman less - reputable than a wife. even though I can claim the very powerful help - of the law, having been compelled by these people to conclude the agreement? Do - you insist on the agreement when you and your mistress laid a trap for me to get - it signed? In circumstances where the laws relating to conspiracy proclaim that - you are guilty, are you expecting actually to make a profit? You were not - content with the forty minas for the perfumery. No; you robbed me of a further - five talents as though I were caught . . .The - exact words cannot be restored but the sense is: “It is absurd for - Athenogenes, a shrewd business man, to plead ignorance, when I with no - experience of the market discovered the facts so soon without - effort.” -

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the affairs of the market, but by simply waiting I discovered all the debts and - loans in three months. Whereas this man had two generations of perfume sellers - behind him; he used to sit in the market every day, was the owner of three - stalls and had accounts submitted to him monthly and still he did not know his - debts. Though an expert in other matters he was a complete simpleton in dealing - with his slave, and though he knew, apparently, of some of the debts, he pleads - ignorance of others—to suit his convenience.

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In using an argument like this, gentlemen of the jury, he is accusing, not - excusing, himself, since he is admitting that I need not pay the debts. For if - he says that he did not know the full amount owing, surely he cannot claim that - he informed me of the debts beforehand; and I am not bound to pay those of which - the seller did not notify me. You knew that Midas owed this money, Athenogenes, - as I think we all realize for several reasons, and chiefly because you summoned - Nicon to give security for meThis passage was - restored by Blass, partly following Revillout, to give the following - meaning: “ . . . because you summoned Nicon to give security for me, knowing - that I could not meet the debts alone without his help. And indeed I cannot, - but I want to get to grips with this claim of yours that you did not know - who had invested what sums, or what the individual debts were. Let us - consider it in this way.” For Nicon see § 8. . . .

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in this way. If ignorance prevented you from informing me in advance of all the - debts, and if I thought when I concluded the agreement that your statement - covered them all, which of us has to pay them? The subsequent purchaser, or the - man who owned the business originally, when the money was borrowed? Personally I - think that you are liable. But if it turns out that we disagree on this, let the - law be our arbiter, which was made neither by lovers nor men with designs on - other people's property but by that great democrat Solon.

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He knew that sales are constantly taking place in the city and passed a law, - which everyone admits to be just, stating that any offences or crimes committed - by a slave shall be the responsibility of the master who owns him at the - time.This law, which does not seem to be - mentioned elsewhere, is not strictly applicable here, since the plaintiff - had agreed in his contract to assume responsibility for Midas's debts. - However, it was a fair law, and if Athenogenes had not intended to take - advantage of the plaintiff he would have been willing to observe it. - zhmi/an e)rga/zesqai, which appears - to be an old legal phrase, is variously understood. Other interpretations - than that adopted in the translation are: (1) to incur loss, (2) to incur a - fine. This is only fair; for if a slave gains any success or brings - in earnings, his owner enjoys the benefits. But you ignore the law and talk - about agreements being broken. Solon did not consider that a decree, even when - constitutionally proposed, should override the law.This provision of Solon is mentioned by Andoc. 1.87 and by Dem. - 23.87. Yet you maintain that even unjust agreements take - precedence over all the laws.

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Besides this, gentlemen of the jury, he was saying to my father and my other - relatives that . . .The sense evidently is: - “that he offered me the one boy as a present and asked me to leave - Midas.”Cf.§ 27. telling me to leave Midas for him instead of buying - him, but that I refused and wanted to buy them all. I gather that he is even - going to mention these points to you with the idea of convincing you of his - moderation, if you please. He must think that he is going to address a set of - fools who will not realize his effrontery.

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You must hear what happened; for you will see that it fits in with the rest of - their plot. He sent me the boy, whom I mentioned just now, with the message that - he could not stay with me unless I freed his father and brother. When I had - already agreed to put down the money for the three of them, Athenogenes - approached some of my friends and said:

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“Why does Epicrates want to give himself extra trouble when he could take the boy - and use . . .?”

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I am not a seller of perfumeThe general sense - of this mutilated passage is restored by Colin, in his translation, as - follows: “Despite his dishonest purpose, I accepted his word, and when he - offered me the boy, raised no objection over the price. I thus agreed to pay - 40 minas, but I now find I must produce five talents for a perfumery in - which I have no interest.” and I do not practise any other trade. I - simply farm the property which my father gave me, and I was landed in the - purchase by these people. Which is more probable, Athenogenes, that I set my - heart on your trade in which I was not proficient, or that you and your mistress - had designs on my money? Personally, I think that you are indicated. Therefore, - gentlemen of the jury, you could fairly excuse me for being cheated by . . . and - for having had the misfortune to fall in with a man like this, but to - Athenogenes . . .

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all to be mine and the profits of the fraud to be his. . . . that I took Midas . - . . whom he says he was reluctant to let go. But for the boy whom, we are told, - he originally offered me for nothing, he has now been paid a far higher price - than he is worth; and yet in the end the boy will not be my property but will be - freed on the strength of your verdict.The - point of this remark is not clear. The plaintiff might mean that if he wins - his case the boy will be freed, since he never intended to buy him as a - slave; but the following sentence suggests that he has in mind at present - the consequences of his condemnation. -

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However I do not think myself that in addition to my other troubles I deserve to - be disfranchised by Athenogenes.Disfranchisement could only follow upon condemnation if the plaintiff - failed to obtain one-fifth of the votes and so became liable to pay e)pwbeli/a,i.e., compensation to Athenogenes - at the rate of one-sixth of the sum in question. On failure to pay this he - would become liable to prosecution again (di/kh - e)cou/lhs) and if condemned would have to pay a fine to the - state too. Finally as a state debtor he would be liable to loss of civic - rights (a)timi/a). The payment of - e)pwbeli/a certainly obtained in - mercantile, and some other cases, and probably in cases of damage also. See - Andoc. 1.73; Dem. - 21.44, Dem. 27.67, Dem. 28.21, Dem. - 47.64; Aeschin. 1.163. For I - should be receiving harsh treatment indeed, gentlemen of the jury, if . . . of - the metics to come unguarded.

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During the war against Philip he left the city just before the battle and did not - serve with you at Chaeronea. Instead, - he moved to Troezen, disregarding the - lawThis law, which is not mentioned by any - other writer appears to be the same as the one subsequently read out (§ 33) - which forbade resident aliens to emigrate in time of war. It is not clear, - however, why the clause quoted here should relate to an attempted return on - the part of the lawbreaker rather than to his actual departure. If the - plaintiff is making a valid point we must assume that the law existed before - the battle of Chaeronea, since it - was then that Athenogenes left Athens. If so, it must have applied to resident aliens only - (as indeed appears from § 33 to have been the case) for had it applied to - citizens, Lycurgus would surely have mentioned it in his speech against - Leocrates, as he was there concerned with just this question. It is - possible, however, that Hyperides is alluding to some provision which did - not come into force until the time of emergency after Chaeronea, but is attempting to impose on - the ignorance of his hearers. which says that a man who moves in - wartime shall be indicted and summarily arrested if he returns. The reason for - the move, it seems, was this: he thought that the city of Troezen would survive, whereas he had passed a - sentence of death on ours. His daughters whom he had brought up in the - prosperity which you provided . . . he married off . . . with the intention of - returning later to carry on his business when peace was established.

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. . .

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after disregarding the agreement which we all make with the state, he insists on - his private contract with me, as if anyone would believe that a man who made - light of his duty to you would have cared about his obligations to me. He is so - degraded and so true to type wherever he is, that even after his arrival at - Troezen when they had made him a - citizen he became the tool of Mnesias the ArgiveMnesias the Argive is mentioned as a traitor by - Demosthenes. (See Dem. 18.295, where, however, - the name is spelt *mnase/as.) - and, after being made a magistrate by him, expelled the citizens from the city. - The men themselves will bear witness to this; for they are here in exile.As these men were still in Athens, Alexander's decree of - 424 B.C., providing that exiles should return, cannot yet - have been issued. Hence we have a terminus ante quem for the speech. -

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And you, gentlemen of the jury, took them in when they were banished; you made - them citizens and granted them a share of all your privileges. Remembering, - after more than a hundred and fifty years,The - Athenians sent women and children to Troezen before the battle of Salamis. (See Cic. de Offic. 3. - 11.48.) Hence we have a rough terminus post quem for the - speech. the help they gave you against the barbarian, you felt that - when men had been of service to you in times of danger you should protect them - in their misfortune. But this abandoned wretch, who forsook you and was enrolled - at Troezen, engaged in nothing that was - worthy either of the constitution or the spirit of that city. He treated those - who had welcomed him so cruelly that . . . in the Assembly . . . fled.The sense appears to be, as Colin suggests, that - he was accused in the Assemhly of the Troezenians, and, fearing punishment, - fled back to Athens. -

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To prove that what I say is true the clerk will read you first the law, which - forbids metics to move in war time, then the evidence of the Troezenians and - also the Troezenians' decree passed by them in honor of your city, in return for - which you welcomed them and made them citizens. Read. -

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Now take the evidence of the father-in-lawRevillout suggests that the defendant called for - the father-in-law to give evidence that Athenogenes had been lavishing all - his money on Antigone. . . .

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the way in which Athenogenes has plotted against me and also his behavior towards - you. If a man has been vicious in his private life and given up hope of his - city's safety; if he has deserted you and expelled the citizens from the town of - his adoption, will you not punish him when he is in your power?

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For my part, gentlemen of the jury, I beg you most earnestly to show me mercy. - Remember in this trial that you ought to have pity . . . suffer nothing if he is - convicted . . .

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f06503403 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ + + + + + + Against Athenogenes + Hyperides + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + Hyperides + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

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When I told her what had happened and explained that Athenogenes was rude to me and unwilling to come to any reasonable agreement, she said that he was always like that and told me not to worry, as she would support me in everything herself.

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Her manner when she said this could not have been more sincere, and she took the most solemn oaths to prove that she was thinking only of my welfare and was telling me the plain truth. So, to be quite honest with you, gentlemen of the jury, I took her at her word. That is how love, I suppose, upsets a man’s natural balance when it takes a woman as its ally. She, at any rate, by this act of wholesale trickery pocketed, as a reward for her kindness, a further three hundred drachmas, ostensibly to buy a girl.

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Perhaps there is nothing very surprising, gentlemen of the jury, in my having been taken in like this by Antigone, a woman who was, I am told, the most gifted courtesan of her time and who has continued to practise as a procuress has ruined the house of of the deme Chollidae which was equal to any. And yet if that was how she behaved on her own, what do you think her plans are now when she has taken Athenogenes into partnership, who is a speechwriter, a man of affairs and, most significant of all, an Egyptian?

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At all events, to make a long story short, she finally sent for me again later and said that after a long talk with Athenogenes she had with difficulty managed to persuade him to release Midas and both his sons for me for forty minas.This was a high price for three slaves. Demosthenes tells us that the total cost of his father’s fifty-two slaves (thirty-two swordsmiths and twenty couchmakers) was 230 minas, i.e., an average of just under eight pounds per head. (Dem. 27. 9.) She told me to produce the money as quickly as I could before Athenogenes changed his mind on any point.

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After I had collected it from every source and been a nuisance to my friends I deposited the forty minas in the bank and came to Antigone. She brought us both together, Athenogenes and myself, and after reconciling us asked us to treat each other as friends in future. I consented to this and Athenogenes, the defendant, replied that I had Antigone to thank for what had passed. And now, he said, I will show you how well I am going to treat you for her sake.For the explanation of this offer see Introduction. You are going to put down the money, he went on, for the liberation of Midas and his sons. Instead I will sell them to you formally as your own, so that no one shall interfere with, or seduce the boy, and also so that the slaves themselves shall abstain from being troublesome, for fear of the consequences.

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But this is the chief advantage: under the present arrangement they would think that it was I who had freed them; whereas, if you buy them formally first and then liberate them afterwards at your leisure, they will be doubly grateful to you. However, he said, you will become responsible for what money they owe: a debt for some sweet oil to Pancalus and ProclesThe name is given as Polycles in § 10. and any other sums which customers have invested in the perfumery in the ordinary course. It is a trifling amount and much more than counterbalanced by the stocks in the shop, sweet oil, scent-boxes, myrrh (and he mentioned the names of some other things), which will easily cover all the debts.

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There, so it seems, gentlemen of the jury, lay the catch, the real point of the elaborate plot. For if I used the money to buy their freedom I was simply losing whatever I gave him without suffering any serious harm. But if I bought them formally and agreed to take over their debts assuming, since I had no previous information, that these were negligible, he meant to set all his creditors and contributorsI.e., friends who had made loans to the business. The money would be repaid in instalments free of interest. Cf. §§ 9 and 11. on me, using the agreement as a trap.

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And that is just what he did. For when I accepted his proposals he immediately took a document from his lap and began to read the contents, which were the text of an agreement with me. I listened to it being read, but my attention was concentrated on completing the business I had come for. He sealed the agreement directly in the same house, so that no one with any interest in me should hear the contents, and added with my name that of Nicon of Cephisia.

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We went to the perfumery and deposited the document with Lysicles of Leuconoe, and I put down the forty minas and so made the purchase. When this was settled I was visited by the creditors, to whom Midas owed money, and the contributors too, who talked things over with me. In three months all the debts had been declared, with the result that, including repayment of contributions, I owed, as I said just now, about five talents.

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When I realized what a plight I was in, at long last I called together my friends and relatives and we read the copy of the agreement in which the names of Pancalus and PolyclesThe name is given as Procles in § 6. It is not known which is the correct form. were expressly written with the statement that certain sums were owing to them for sweet oil. These were small amounts, and they were justified in saying that the oil in the shop was equal in value to the money. But the majority of the debts, including the largest, were not given specifically; they were mentioned as an unimportant item in a sort of footnote which ran:

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and any debt which Midas may owe to any other person. Of the contributions one was noted of which three instalments for repayment were still outstanding.See § 7, note. This was given in the name of Dicaeocrates. But the others, on the strength of which Midas had acquired everything and which were of recent date, were not entered by him in the agreement but kept secret.

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On thinking it over we decided to go to Athenogenes and broach the matter. We found him near the perfume stalls and asked him whether he was not ashamed of being a liar and trapping us with the agreement by not declaring the debts beforehand. He replied that he did not know what debts we meant and that we made no impression on him; he had in safe-keeping a document relating to me which covered the transaction. A crowd gathered and overheard the incident, as our altercation took place in the market. Although they gave him a slating and told us to arrest him summarily as a kidnapper,Summary arrest (ἀπαγωγή) by which the injured party seized the criminal and took him before the magistrate, could be used against various types of offender, e.g., thieves and kidnappers. Athenogenes was not actually a kidnapper, but he was driving a man to debt, which, though it did not lead to enslavement, might result in total ἀτιμία. we thought it best not to do so. Instead we summoned him before you, as the law permits. First of all then, the clerk shall read you the agreement; for you shall have the actual text of the document as evidence of the plot, for which Athenogenes and no other is to blame. Read the agreement.

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Well, gentlemen of the jury, you have heard the facts in detail. But Athenogenes will presently tell you that in law whatever agreements one man makes with another are binding.This law is quoted elsewhere,e.g., by Dem. 47.77. Yes, my friend, just agreements. But if they are unjust, the opposite is true: the law forbids that they be binding. I will quote the laws themselves to make this clearer to you. For you have reduced me to such a state of fear lest I shall be ruined by you and your craftiness that I have been searching the laws night and day and studying them to the neglect of everything else.

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The first law, then, stipulates that people shall not tell lies in the market, which seems to me a most admirable provision.The first of these two laws cited by the plaintiff is mentioned also by Dem. 20.9. It was enforced by the ten agoranomoi, whose duty it was to guard against fraud in all questions of purchase. See Aristot. Ath. Pol. 51. For the second law compare Aeschin. 3.249 and Plat. Laws. 915 c. Yet you lied in the middle of the market when you made the agreement to defraud me. But if you show that you declared to me beforehand the contributions and the debts, or that you wrote in the agreement the names of those whose existence I later discovered, I have no quarrel with you; I admit that I owe the money.

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After this there is a second law, covering agreements between individuals, which states that whenever anyone sells a slave, he must declare in advance any physical disability from which the man suffers. Otherwise the slave in question can be returned to the vendor. And yet if a slave can be returned simply because of some weakness due to mischance which the master keeps secret at the time of the sale, how can you fail to take the responsibility for the crimes which you deliberately planned? But the epileptic slave does not involve the buyer in fresh expense, whereas Midas, whom you sold to me, has even lost my friends’ money.

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Consider the legal position, Athenogenes, as regards free persons as well as slaves. No doubt you know as everyone does that the children of married women are legitimate. Yet the mere act of betrothing a woman on the part of a father or brother was not enough for the lawmaker. On the contrary, he wrote expressly in the lawThis law is mentioned by Demosthenes (Dem. 44.49) and quoted in Dem. 46.18, from which the text is here reconstructed. : whomsoever any man has lawfully betrothed as wife, her children shall be legitimate; not: if any man has betrothed some other woman on the pretence that she is his daughter. He lays it down that just betrothals shall be valid and unjust ones invalid.

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Moreover the law dealing with wills is very similar to this.This law is quoted in Dem. 46.14. Compare Isaeus 6.10; Aristot. Ath. Pol. 35. As Colin points out, the comparison between συνθῆκαι (an agreement and διαθήλκη a will) seems closer in Greek than in English. It allows a man to bequeath his property as he wishes unless he is affected by old age, illness or insanity, and provided he is not influenced by a woman or imprisoned or otherwise coerced. But if even our own personal property cannot be administered according to an unjust will, surely Athenogenes who is disposing of my property through his agreement cannot enforce such terms.

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Apparently if a man respects the wishes of his own wife in making his will it will be invalid. Then must I, who was influenced by the mistress of Athenogenes, accept the contract and be ruined too,The argument is rather condensed; the contrast is this: A will may be otherwise just and yet it becomes invalid when made under the influence of a wife. Therefore, a fortiori, this contract becomes invalid because (1) it was not just in other respects, (2) it was made under the influence of a woman less reputable than a wife. even though I can claim the very powerful help of the law, having been compelled by these people to conclude the agreement? Do you insist on the agreement when you and your mistress laid a trap for me to get it signed? In circumstances where the laws relating to conspiracy proclaim that you are guilty, are you expecting actually to make a profit? You were not content with the forty minas for the perfumery. No; you robbed me of a further five talents as though I were caught The exact words cannot be restored but the sense is: It is absurd for Athenogenes, a shrewd business man, to plead ignorance, when I with no experience of the market discovered the facts so soon without effort.

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the affairs of the market, but by simply waiting I discovered all the debts and loans in three months. Whereas this man had two generations of perfume sellers behind him; he used to sit in the market every day, was the owner of three stalls and had accounts submitted to him monthly and still he did not know his debts. Though an expert in other matters he was a complete simpleton in dealing with his slave, and though he knew, apparently, of some of the debts, he pleads ignorance of others—to suit his convenience.

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In using an argument like this, gentlemen of the jury, he is accusing, not excusing, himself, since he is admitting that I need not pay the debts. For if he says that he did not know the full amount owing, surely he cannot claim that he informed me of the debts beforehand; and I am not bound to pay those of which the seller did not notify me. You knew that Midas owed this money, Athenogenes, as I think we all realize for several reasons, and chiefly because you summoned Nicon to give security for meThis passage was restored by Blass, partly following Revillout, to give the following meaning: because you summoned Nicon to give security for me, knowing that I could not meet the debts alone without his help. And indeed I cannot, but I want to get to grips with this claim of yours that you did not know who had invested what sums, or what the individual debts were. Let us consider it in this way. For Nicon see § 8.

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in this way. If ignorance prevented you from informing me in advance of all the debts, and if I thought when I concluded the agreement that your statement covered them all, which of us has to pay them? The subsequent purchaser, or the man who owned the business originally, when the money was borrowed? Personally I think that you are liable. But if it turns out that we disagree on this, let the law be our arbiter, which was made neither by lovers nor men with designs on other people’s property but by that great democrat Solon.

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He knew that sales are constantly taking place in the city and passed a law, which everyone admits to be just, stating that any offences or crimes committed by a slave shall be the responsibility of the master who owns him at the time.This law, which does not seem to be mentioned elsewhere, is not strictly applicable here, since the plaintiff had agreed in his contract to assume responsibility for Midas’s debts. However, it was a fair law, and if Athenogenes had not intended to take advantage of the plaintiff he would have been willing to observe it. ζημίαν ἐργάζεσθαι, which appears to be an old legal phrase, is variously understood. Other interpretations than that adopted in the translation are: (1) to incur loss, (2) to incur a fine. This is only fair; for if a slave gains any success or brings in earnings, his owner enjoys the benefits. But you ignore the law and talk about agreements being broken. Solon did not consider that a decree, even when constitutionally proposed, should override the law.This provision of Solon is mentioned by Andoc. 1.87 and by Dem. 23.87. Yet you maintain that even unjust agreements take precedence over all the laws.

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Besides this, gentlemen of the jury, he was saying to my father and my other relatives that The sense evidently is: that he offered me the one boy as a present and asked me to leave Midas.Cf.§ 27. telling me to leave Midas for him instead of buying him, but that I refused and wanted to buy them all. I gather that he is even going to mention these points to you with the idea of convincing you of his moderation, if you please. He must think that he is going to address a set of fools who will not realize his effrontery.

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You must hear what happened; for you will see that it fits in with the rest of their plot. He sent me the boy, whom I mentioned just now, with the message that he could not stay with me unless I freed his father and brother. When I had already agreed to put down the money for the three of them, Athenogenes approached some of my friends and said:

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Why does Epicrates want to give himself extra trouble when he could take the boy and use ?

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I am not a seller of perfumeThe general sense of this mutilated passage is restored by Colin, in his translation, as follows: Despite his dishonest purpose, I accepted his word, and when he offered me the boy, raised no objection over the price. I thus agreed to pay 40 minas, but I now find I must produce five talents for a perfumery in which I have no interest. and I do not practise any other trade. I simply farm the property which my father gave me, and I was landed in the purchase by these people. Which is more probable, Athenogenes, that I set my heart on your trade in which I was not proficient, or that you and your mistress had designs on my money? Personally, I think that you are indicated. Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you could fairly excuse me for being cheated by and for having had the misfortune to fall in with a man like this, but to Athenogenes

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all to be mine and the profits of the fraud to be his that I took Midas whom he says he was reluctant to let go. But for the boy whom, we are told, he originally offered me for nothing, he has now been paid a far higher price than he is worth; and yet in the end the boy will not be my property but will be freed on the strength of your verdict.The point of this remark is not clear. The plaintiff might mean that if he wins his case the boy will be freed, since he never intended to buy him as a slave; but the following sentence suggests that he has in mind at present the consequences of his condemnation.

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However I do not think myself that in addition to my other troubles I deserve to be disfranchised by Athenogenes.Disfranchisement could only follow upon condemnation if the plaintiff failed to obtain one-fifth of the votes and so became liable to pay ἐπωβελία,i.e., compensation to Athenogenes at the rate of one-sixth of the sum in question. On failure to pay this he would become liable to prosecution again (δίκη ἐξούλης) and if condemned would have to pay a fine to the state too. Finally as a state debtor he would be liable to loss of civic rights (ἀτιμία). The payment of ἐπωβελία certainly obtained in mercantile, and some other cases, and probably in cases of damage also. See Andoc. 1.73; Dem. 21.44, Dem. 27.67, Dem. 28.21, Dem. 47.64; Aeschin. 1.163. For I should be receiving harsh treatment indeed, gentlemen of the jury, if of the metics to come unguarded.

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During the war against Philip he left the city just before the battle and did not serve with you at Chaeronea. Instead, he moved to Troezen, disregarding the lawThis law, which is not mentioned by any other writer appears to be the same as the one subsequently read out (§ 33) which forbade resident aliens to emigrate in time of war. It is not clear, however, why the clause quoted here should relate to an attempted return on the part of the lawbreaker rather than to his actual departure. If the plaintiff is making a valid point we must assume that the law existed before the battle of Chaeronea, since it was then that Athenogenes left Athens. If so, it must have applied to resident aliens only (as indeed appears from § 33 to have been the case) for had it applied to citizens, Lycurgus would surely have mentioned it in his speech against Leocrates, as he was there concerned with just this question. It is possible, however, that Hyperides is alluding to some provision which did not come into force until the time of emergency after Chaeronea, but is attempting to impose on the ignorance of his hearers. which says that a man who moves in wartime shall be indicted and summarily arrested if he returns. The reason for the move, it seems, was this: he thought that the city of Troezen would survive, whereas he had passed a sentence of death on ours. His daughters whom he had brought up in the prosperity which you provided he married off with the intention of returning later to carry on his business when peace was established.

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after disregarding the agreement which we all make with the state, he insists on his private contract with me, as if anyone would believe that a man who made light of his duty to you would have cared about his obligations to me. He is so degraded and so true to type wherever he is, that even after his arrival at Troezen when they had made him a citizen he became the tool of Mnesias the ArgiveMnesias the Argive is mentioned as a traitor by Demosthenes. (See Dem. 18.295, where, however, the name is spelt Μνασέας.) and, after being made a magistrate by him, expelled the citizens from the city. The men themselves will bear witness to this; for they are here in exile.As these men were still in Athens, Alexander’s decree of 424 B.C., providing that exiles should return, cannot yet have been issued. Hence we have a terminus ante quem for the speech.

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And you, gentlemen of the jury, took them in when they were banished; you made them citizens and granted them a share of all your privileges. Remembering, after more than a hundred and fifty years,The Athenians sent women and children to Troezen before the battle of Salamis. (See Cic. de Offic. 3. 11.48.) Hence we have a rough terminus post quem for the speech. the help they gave you against the barbarian, you felt that when men had been of service to you in times of danger you should protect them in their misfortune. But this abandoned wretch, who forsook you and was enrolled at Troezen, engaged in nothing that was worthy either of the constitution or the spirit of that city. He treated those who had welcomed him so cruelly that in the Assembly fled.The sense appears to be, as Colin suggests, that he was accused in the Assemhly of the Troezenians, and, fearing punishment, fled back to Athens.

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To prove that what I say is true the clerk will read you first the law, which forbids metics to move in war time, then the evidence of the Troezenians and also the Troezenians’ decree passed by them in honor of your city, in return for which you welcomed them and made them citizens. Read.

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Now take the evidence of the father-in-lawRevillout suggests that the defendant called for the father-in-law to give evidence that Athenogenes had been lavishing all his money on Antigone.

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the way in which Athenogenes has plotted against me and also his behavior towards you. If a man has been vicious in his private life and given up hope of his city’s safety; if he has deserted you and expelled the citizens from the town of his adoption, will you not punish him when he is in your power?

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For my part, gentlemen of the jury, I beg you most earnestly to show me mercy. Remember in this trial that you ought to have pity suffer nothing if he is convicted

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Column 1 αὐτήν.Primae litterae dubiae sunt. αὐτήν Jensen: om. Kenyon. εἰπόντος δέ μου πρὸς αὐτὴν τά τε πραχθέντα, πραχθέντα Revillout: πεπραγμένα Diels. καὶ ὅτι μοι Ἀθηνογένης χαλεπὸς εἴη καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοι τῶν μετρίων συγχωρεῖν, τοῦτον μὲν ἔφη ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἐμὲ δʼ ἐκέλευε θαρρεῖν· αὐτὴ γάρ μοι πάντα συναγωνιεῖσθαι.

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Column 1 αὐτήν.Primae litterae dubiae sunt. αὐτήν Jensen: om. Kenyon. εἰπόντος δέ μου πρὸς αὐτὴν τά τε πραχθέντα, πραχθέντα Revillout: πεπραγμένα Diels. καὶ ὅτι μοι Ἀθηνογένης χαλεπὸς εἴη καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοι τῶν μετρίων συγχωρεῖν, τοῦτον μὲν ἔφη ἀεὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἐμὲ δʼ ἐκέλευε θαρρεῖν· αὐτὴ γάρ μοι πάντα συναγωνιεῖσθαι.

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καὶ ταῦτʼ ἔλεγεν σπουδάζουσά τε τῷ ἤθει ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα καὶ ὀμνύουσα τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, ἦ μὴν μετʼ εὐνοίας τῆς ἐμῆς λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης ἀληθείας· ὥστʼ ἐμέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ῥηθήσεταιῥηθήσεται Jensen:εἰρήσεται Kenyon. γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθές, ταῦτα πεπεῖσθαι. οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπουἀνθρώπου Blass: ἡμῶν τὴν Diels. φύσιν ἔρως, προσλαβὼν γυναικὸς συνεργίαν.συνεργίαν Jensen:ποικιλίαν Kenyon: alii alia. ἐκείνη γοῦν φενακίζουσα ἅπανταἅπαντα Diels: τὰ μάταια Kenyon. ταῦτα προσπεριέκοψεν αὑτῇ ὡς δὴ ὡς δὴ Diels: ἔτι Jensen. εἰς παιδίσκην τριακοσίας δραχμὰς εὐνοίας ἕνεκα.

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καὶ ταῦτʼ ἔλεγεν σπουδάζουσά τε τῷ ἤθει ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα καὶ ὀμνύουσα τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, ἦ μὴν μετʼ εὐνοίας τῆς ἐμῆς λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης ἀληθείας· ὥστʼ ἐμέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ῥηθήσεταιῥηθήσεται Jensen:εἰρήσεται Kenyon. γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθές, ταῦτα πεπεῖσθαι. οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπουἀνθρώπου Blass: ἡμῶν τὴν Diels. φύσιν ἔρως, προσλαβὼν γυναικὸς συνεργίαν.συνεργίαν Jensen:ποικιλίαν Kenyon: alii alia. ἐκείνη γοῦν φενακίζουσα ἅπανταἅπαντα Diels: τὰ μάταια Kenyon. ταῦτα προσπεριέκοψεν αὑτῇ ὡς δὴ ὡς δὴ Diels: ἔτι Jensen. εἰς παιδίσκην τριακοσίας δραχμὰς εὐνοίας ἕνεκα.

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ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, οὐδὲν ὑπερθαύμαστόνὑπερθαύμαστόν ci. Kenyon, qui tamen οὕτω θαυμαστόν habet: tantumθαυμαστόν Jensen. με ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνας τὸν τρόπον τουτονὶ παιδαγωγηθῆναι, γυναικὸς ἣ δεινοτάτη μὲν τῶν ἑταιρῶν, ὥς φασιν, ἐφʼ ἡλικίας ἐγένετο, διατετέλεκεδιατετέλεκε Weil. δὲ πορνοβοσκοῦσα ενοἶκον τοῦ Χολλίδου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττωοὐδενὸς ἐλάττω Jensen: οὐ φαῦλον οὕτω Blass. ὄντα ἀνῄρηκεν. καίτοι ὅπου καθʼὅπου καθʼin add. Jensen:ἥτις καθʼBlass:εἰ καθʼWeil.αυτὴν οὖσα τοιαῦτα διεπράττετο, τί οἴεςθʼ τί οἴεσθʼ Kenyon. αὐτὴν νῦν ἐννοεῖν,ἐννοεῖν Jensen:ἐπιτελεῖν Weil. προςλαβοῦσανπροσλαβοῦσανKenyon. συναγωνιστὴν Ἀθηνογένην, Column 2 ἄνθρωπον λογογράφον τε καὶ ἀγοραῖον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, Αἰγύπτιον;

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ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, οὐδὲν ὑπερθαύμαστόνὑπερθαύμαστόν ci. Kenyon, qui tamen οὕτω θαυμαστόν habet: tantumθαυμαστόν Jensen. με ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνας τὸν τρόπον τουτονὶ παιδαγωγηθῆναι, γυναικὸς ἣ δεινοτάτη μὲν τῶν ἑταιρῶν, ὥς φασιν, ἐφʼ ἡλικίας ἐγένετο, διατετέλεκεδιατετέλεκε Weil. δὲ πορνοβοσκοῦσα ενοἶκον τοῦ Χολλίδου οὐδενὸς ἐλάττωοὐδενὸς ἐλάττω Jensen: οὐ φαῦλον οὕτω Blass. ὄντα ἀνῄρηκεν. καίτοι ὅπου καθʼὅπου καθʼin add. Jensen:ἥτις καθʼBlass:εἰ καθʼWeil.αυτὴν οὖσα τοιαῦτα διεπράττετο, τί οἴεςθʼ τί οἴεσθʼ Kenyon. αὐτὴν νῦν ἐννοεῖν,ἐννοεῖν Jensen:ἐπιτελεῖν Weil. προςλαβοῦσανπροσλαβοῦσανKenyon. συναγωνιστὴν Ἀθηνογένην, Column 2 ἄνθρωπον λογογράφον τε καὶ ἀγοραῖον, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, Αἰγύπτιον;

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τέλος δʼ οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶ, μεταπεμψαμένη γάργάρ del. Kenyon. με πάλιν ὕστερον εἶπεν ὅτι πολλοὺς λόγους ἀναλώσασα πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηνογένην μόλις εἴη συμπεπεικυῖα αὐτὸν ἀπολῦσαί μοι τόν τε Μίδαν καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀμφοτέρους τετταράκοντα μνῶν, καὶ ἐκέλευέ με τὴν ταχίστην πορίζειν τὸ ἀργύριον, πρὶν μεταδόξαι τι Ἀθηνογένει.

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τέλος δʼ οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογῶ, μεταπεμψαμένη γάργάρ del. Kenyon. με πάλιν ὕστερον εἶπεν ὅτι πολλοὺς λόγους ἀναλώσασα πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηνογένην μόλις εἴη συμπεπεικυῖα αὐτὸν ἀπολῦσαί μοι τόν τε Μίδαν καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς ἀμφοτέρους τετταράκοντα μνῶν, καὶ ἐκέλευέ με τὴν ταχίστην πορίζειν τὸ ἀργύριον, πρὶν μεταδόξαι τι Ἀθηνογένει.

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συναγαγὼν δʼ ἐγὼ πανταχόθεν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἐνοχλήσας καὶ θεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν τὰς τετταράκοντα μνᾶς ἧκον ὡς τὴν Ἀντιγόναν. κἀκείνη ςυνήγαγεν συνήγαγεν Revillout. ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ἐμέ τε καὶ Ἀθηνογένην, καὶ διήλλαξε, καὶ παρεκελεύσατο τοῦ λοιποῦ εὖ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἔγωγʼ ἔφην ταῦτα ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀθηνογένης οὑτοσὶ ὑπολαβὼν εἶπεν ὅτι τῶν πεπραγμένων δεῖ με χάριν ἔχειν Ἀντιγόνᾳ· καὶ νῦν, ἔφη, ταύτης ἕνεκα ἤδη σοι ἐνδείξομαι ὅσα σε ἀγαθὰ ποιήσω. σὺ μὲν γάρ, γάρ Diels. ἔφη, τὸτὸ Diels. ἀργύριον ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβαλεῖς καταβαλεῖς Kenyon. τοτοῦWeil:τῇDiels. ΜίδουΜίδου Revillout. καὶ τῶν παίδων, ἐγὼ δέ σοι ἀποδώσομαι αὐτοὺς ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν μηδεὶς παρενοχλῇπαρενοχλῇ Blass: σε ἐνοχλῇ Revillout. μηδὲ διαφθείρῃ τὸν παῖδα, ἔπειτʼ παῖδα, ἔπειτʼ Blass (secundum Jensen': Μίδαν, εἶτʼ Kenyon. αὐτοὶ μὴμὴ Blass. ἐγχειρῶσι πονηρεύεσθαι πονηρεύεσθαι Weil. μηδὲν διὰ τὸν φόβον.φόβον Kenyon.

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συναγαγὼν δʼ ἐγὼ πανταχόθεν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἐνοχλήσας καὶ θεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν τὰς τετταράκοντα μνᾶς ἧκον ὡς τὴν Ἀντιγόναν. κἀκείνη ςυνήγαγεν συνήγαγεν Revillout. ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ αὐτό, ἐμέ τε καὶ Ἀθηνογένην, καὶ διήλλαξε, καὶ παρεκελεύσατο τοῦ λοιποῦ εὖ ποιεῖν ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἔγωγʼ ἔφην ταῦτα ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀθηνογένης οὑτοσὶ ὑπολαβὼν εἶπεν ὅτι τῶν πεπραγμένων δεῖ με χάριν ἔχειν Ἀντιγόνᾳ· καὶ νῦν, ἔφη, ταύτης ἕνεκα ἤδη σοι ἐνδείξομαι ὅσα σε ἀγαθὰ ποιήσω. σὺ μὲν γάρ, γάρ Diels. ἔφη, τὸτὸ Diels. ἀργύριον ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβαλεῖς καταβαλεῖς Kenyon. τοτοῦWeil:τῇDiels. ΜίδουΜίδου Revillout. καὶ τῶν παίδων, ἐγὼ δέ σοι ἀποδώσομαι αὐτοὺς ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν μηδεὶς παρενοχλῇπαρενοχλῇ Blass: σε ἐνοχλῇ Revillout. μηδὲ διαφθείρῃ τὸν παῖδα, ἔπειτʼ παῖδα, ἔπειτʼ Blass (secundum Jensen': Μίδαν, εἶτʼ Kenyon. αὐτοὶ μὴμὴ Blass. ἐγχειρῶσι πονηρεύεσθαι πονηρεύεσθαι Weil. μηδὲν διὰ τὸν φόβον.φόβον Kenyon.

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τὸ δὲ Column 3 μέγιστον, νῦν μὲν ἂν δόξειαν διʼ ἐμὲ γεγονέναι ἐλεύθεροι· ἐὰν δὲ πριάμενος σὺ ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει εἶθʼ ὕστερον, ὅτε ἄν σοι δοκῇ, ἀφῇς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, διπλασίαν ἕξουσίν σοι τὴν χάριν. ὅσον μέντοι ὀφείλουσιν ἀργύριον, μύρου τέ τινος τιμὴν Παγκάλῳ καὶ Προκλεῖ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο κατέθετό τις ἐπὶ τὸ μυροπώλιον τῶν προσφοιτώντων, οἷα γίγνεται, ταῦτα, ἔφη, σὺ ἀναδέξῃ· ἔστιν δὲ μικρὰ κομιδῇ καὶ πολλῷ πλείω φορτία ἐστὶν τούτων ἐν τῷ ἐργαστηρίῳ, μύρον καὶ ἀλάβαστροι καὶ σμύρνα, καὶ ἄλλʼ ἄττα ὀνόματα λέγων, ὅθεν πάντα ταῦτα διαλυθήσεται διαλυθήσεται Weil. ῥᾳδίως.

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τὸ δὲ Column 3 μέγιστον, νῦν μὲν ἂν δόξειαν διʼ ἐμὲ γεγονέναι ἐλεύθεροι· ἐὰν δὲ πριάμενος σὺ ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει εἶθʼ ὕστερον, ὅτε ἄν σοι δοκῇ, ἀφῇς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, διπλασίαν ἕξουσίν σοι τὴν χάριν. ὅσον μέντοι ὀφείλουσιν ἀργύριον, μύρου τέ τινος τιμὴν Παγκάλῳ καὶ Προκλεῖ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο κατέθετό τις ἐπὶ τὸ μυροπώλιον τῶν προσφοιτώντων, οἷα γίγνεται, ταῦτα, ἔφη, σὺ ἀναδέξῃ· ἔστιν δὲ μικρὰ κομιδῇ καὶ πολλῷ πλείω φορτία ἐστὶν τούτων ἐν τῷ ἐργαστηρίῳ, μύρον καὶ ἀλάβαστροι καὶ σμύρνα, καὶ ἄλλʼ ἄττα ὀνόματα λέγων, ὅθεν πάντα ταῦτα διαλυθήσεται διαλυθήσεται Weil. ῥᾳδίως.

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ἦν δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἐπιβουλὴ καὶ τὸ πλάσμα τὸ μέγα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβάλλοιμι αὐτῶν τὸ ἀργύριον, τοῦτο μόνον ἀπώλλυον ὃ δοίην αὐτῷ, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἔπασχον· εἰ δὲ πριαίμην ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει, ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ τὰ χρέα ἀναδέξεσθαι, ἀναδέξεσθαι Blass:ἀναδέξασθαι P, ut vid. (sed littera a dubia), Kenyon, et in add. Jensen. ὡς οὐθενὸς ἄξια ὄντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ προειδέναι, καὶ τοὺς πληρωτὰς τῶν ἐράνων ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ λαβών· ὅπερ ἐποίησεν.

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ἦν δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνταῦθα ἡ ἐπιβουλὴ καὶ τὸ πλάσμα τὸ μέγα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐλευθερίᾳ καταβάλλοιμι αὐτῶν τὸ ἀργύριον, τοῦτο μόνον ἀπώλλυον ὃ δοίην αὐτῷ, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν δεινὸν ἔπασχον· εἰ δὲ πριαίμην ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει, ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ τὰ χρέα ἀναδέξεσθαι, ἀναδέξεσθαι Blass:ἀναδέξασθαι P, ut vid. (sed littera a dubia), Kenyon, et in add. Jensen. ὡς οὐθενὸς ἄξια ὄντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ προειδέναι, καὶ τοὺς πληρωτὰς τῶν ἐράνων ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ λαβών· ὅπερ ἐποίησεν.

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ὡς γὰρ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ἐγὼ προσωμολόγησα, εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν γονάτων λαβὼν τῶν αὑτοῦ γραμματεῖόν τι τὸ ἐγγεγραμμένον τι τὸ ἐγγ . . Blass: τὸ ἐγγ . . Kenyon: τι προγ . . Colin. ἀνεγίγνωσκεν. Column 4 ἦσαν δὲ αὗται συνθῆκαι πρὸς ἐμέ· ὧν ἐγὼ ἀναγιγνωσκομένων μὲν ἤκουον, ἔσπευδον μέντοι ἐφʼ ὃ ἧκον τοῦτο διοικήσασθαι, καὶ σημαίνεται τὰς συνθήκας εὐθὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οἰκίᾳ ἵνα μηδεὶς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἀκούσαι τὰ ἐγγεγραμμένα, προσεγγράψας μετʼ ἐμοῦ Νίκωνα τὸν Κηφισιέα.

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ὡς γὰρ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα ἐγὼ προσωμολόγησα, εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν γονάτων λαβὼν τῶν αὑτοῦ γραμματεῖόν τι τὸ ἐγγεγραμμένον τι τὸ ἐγγ . . Blass: τὸ ἐγγ . . Kenyon: τι προγ . . Colin. ἀνεγίγνωσκεν. Column 4 ἦσαν δὲ αὗται συνθῆκαι πρὸς ἐμέ· ὧν ἐγὼ ἀναγιγνωσκομένων μὲν ἤκουον, ἔσπευδον μέντοι ἐφʼ ὃ ἧκον τοῦτο διοικήσασθαι, καὶ σημαίνεται τὰς συνθήκας εὐθὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οἰκίᾳ ἵνα μηδεὶς τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἀκούσαι τὰ ἐγγεγραμμένα, προσεγγράψας μετʼ ἐμοῦ Νίκωνα τὸν Κηφισιέα.

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ἐλθόντες δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μυροπώλιον τὸ μὲν γραμματεῖον τιθέμεθα παρὰ Λυσικλεῖ Λευκονοιεῖ,Λευκονοιεῖ Kenyon:Λευκονοεῖ P. τὰς δὲ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς ἐγὼ καταβαλὼν τὴν ὠνὴν ἐποιησάμην. τούτου δὲ γενομένου προσῄεσάν μοι οἱ χρῆσται οἷς ὠφείλετο παρὰ τῷ Μίδᾳ καὶ οἱ πληρωταὶ τῶν ἐράνων καὶ διελέγοντό μοι· καὶ ἐν τρισὶν μησὶν ἅπαντα τὰ χρέα φανερὰ ἐγεγόνει, ὥστʼ εἶναί μοι σὺν τοῖς ἐράνοις, ὅπερ καὶ ἀρτίως εἶπον, περὶ πέντε τάλαντα.

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ἐλθόντες δʼ ἐπὶ τὸ μυροπώλιον τὸ μὲν γραμματεῖον τιθέμεθα παρὰ Λυσικλεῖ Λευκονοιεῖ,Λευκονοιεῖ Kenyon:Λευκονοεῖ P. τὰς δὲ τετταράκοντα μνᾶς ἐγὼ καταβαλὼν τὴν ὠνὴν ἐποιησάμην. τούτου δὲ γενομένου προσῄεσάν μοι οἱ χρῆσται οἷς ὠφείλετο παρὰ τῷ Μίδᾳ καὶ οἱ πληρωταὶ τῶν ἐράνων καὶ διελέγοντό μοι· καὶ ἐν τρισὶν μησὶν ἅπαντα τὰ χρέα φανερὰ ἐγεγόνει, ὥστʼ εἶναί μοι σὺν τοῖς ἐράνοις, ὅπερ καὶ ἀρτίως εἶπον, περὶ πέντε τάλαντα.

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ὡς δʼ ᾐσθόμην οὗ ἦν κακοῦ, τότʼ ἤδη τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους συνήγαγον καὶ τὰ ἀντίγραφα τῶν συνθηκῶν ἀνεγιγνώσκομεν· ἐν αἷς ἐγέγραπτο μὲν τὸ τοῦ Παγκάλου καὶ τοῦ Πολυκλέους ὄνομα διαρρήδην, καὶ ὅτι μύρων τιμαὶ ὠφείλοντο, ἃ ἦν βραχέα τε καὶ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μύρον ἄξιον εἴη τοῦ ἀργυρίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐργαστηρίῳ, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα οὐκ ἐνεγέγραπτο ἐπʼ Column 5 ὀνομάτων, ἀλλʼ ἐν προσθήκης μέρει ὡς οὐδὲν ὄντα, καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὀφείλει τι Μίδας.

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ὡς δʼ ᾐσθόμην οὗ ἦν κακοῦ, τότʼ ἤδη τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους συνήγαγον καὶ τὰ ἀντίγραφα τῶν συνθηκῶν ἀνεγιγνώσκομεν· ἐν αἷς ἐγέγραπτο μὲν τὸ τοῦ Παγκάλου καὶ τοῦ Πολυκλέους ὄνομα διαρρήδην, καὶ ὅτι μύρων τιμαὶ ὠφείλοντο, ἃ ἦν βραχέα τε καὶ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ μύρον ἄξιον εἴη τοῦ ἀργυρίου τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐργαστηρίῳ, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα οὐκ ἐνεγέγραπτο ἐπʼ Column 5 ὀνομάτων, ἀλλʼ ἐν προσθήκης μέρει ὡς οὐδὲν ὄντα, καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὀφείλει τι Μίδας.

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καὶ τῶν ἐράνων εἷς μὲν οὖν, [Δικαιοκράτης];, Δικαιοκράτης del. Weil. ἐνεγέγραπτο, οὗ ἦσαν λοιπαὶ τρεῖς φοραί· οὗτος μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ Δικαιοκράτους ὀνόματος ἦν γεγραμμένος, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι, ἐφʼ οἷς εἰλήφειεἰλήφει ὤφειλε Weil. πάντα ὁ Μίδας, νεοσύλλογοι δʼ ἦσαν, τούτους δʼ οὐκ ἐνέγραψεν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, ἀλλʼ ἀπεκρύψατο.

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καὶ τῶν ἐράνων εἷς μὲν οὖν, [Δικαιοκράτης];, Δικαιοκράτης del. Weil. ἐνεγέγραπτο, οὗ ἦσαν λοιπαὶ τρεῖς φοραί· οὗτος μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ Δικαιοκράτους ὀνόματος ἦν γεγραμμένος, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι, ἐφʼ οἷς εἰλήφειεἰλήφει ὤφειλε Weil. πάντα ὁ Μίδας, νεοσύλλογοι δʼ ἦσαν, τούτους δʼ οὐκ ἐνέγραψεν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, ἀλλʼ ἀπεκρύψατο.

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βουλευομένοις δʼ ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τοῦτον καὶ διαλέγεσθαι. καὶ καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν πρὸς τοῖς μυροπωλίοις ἠρωτῶμεν εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνοιτο ψευδόμενος καὶ ἐνεδρεύσας ἡμᾶς ταῖς συνθήκαις, οὐ προειπὼν τὰ χρέα. ὁ δʼ ἀπεκρίνατο ἡμῖν ὡς οὔτε τὰ χρέα γιγνώσκοι ἃ λέγομεν, οὔτε προσέχοι ἡμῖν τὸν νοῦν, γραμματεῖόν τʼ εἴη αὐτῷ κείμενον πρὸς ἐμὲ περὶ τούτων. πολλῶν δʼ ἀνθρώπων ςυλλεγομένων καὶ ἐπακουόντων τοῦ πράγματος, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ τοὺς λόγους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ κατατεμνόντων αὐτόν, κελευόντων τε ἀπάγειν ἀπάγειν et sq. ad col. 6 finem plerumque restituit Blass. ὡς ἀνδραποδιστήν, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ᾠόμεθαᾠόμεθα Weil: οἰόμεθα P. δεῖν ποιεῖν, προσεκαλεσάμεθα δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὸν νόμον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τὰς ςυνθήκας ἀναγνώσεται· ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν Revillout. γὰρ τῶνColumn 6 γεγραμμένων μαθήσεσθε τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν αὐτοῦ τούτου. λέγε τὰς συνθήκας.

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βουλευομένοις δʼ ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πορεύεσθαι πρὸς τοῦτον καὶ διαλέγεσθαι. καὶ καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν πρὸς τοῖς μυροπωλίοις ἠρωτῶμεν εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνοιτο ψευδόμενος καὶ ἐνεδρεύσας ἡμᾶς ταῖς συνθήκαις, οὐ προειπὼν τὰ χρέα. ὁ δʼ ἀπεκρίνατο ἡμῖν ὡς οὔτε τὰ χρέα γιγνώσκοι ἃ λέγομεν, οὔτε προσέχοι ἡμῖν τὸν νοῦν, γραμματεῖόν τʼ εἴη αὐτῷ κείμενον πρὸς ἐμὲ περὶ τούτων. πολλῶν δʼ ἀνθρώπων ςυλλεγομένων καὶ ἐπακουόντων τοῦ πράγματος, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ τοὺς λόγους γίγνεσθαι, καὶ κατατεμνόντων αὐτόν, κελευόντων τε ἀπάγειν ἀπάγειν et sq. ad col. 6 finem plerumque restituit Blass. ὡς ἀνδραποδιστήν, τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ᾠόμεθαᾠόμεθα Weil: οἰόμεθα P. δεῖν ποιεῖν, προσεκαλεσάμεθα δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς ὑμᾶς κατὰ τὸν νόμον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τὰς ςυνθήκας ἀναγνώσεται· ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν Revillout. γὰρ τῶνColumn 6 γεγραμμένων μαθήσεσθε τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν αὐτοῦ τούτου. λέγε τὰς συνθήκας.

τὰ μὲν τοίνυν πεπραγμένα, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον ἀκηκόατε. ἐρεῖ δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτίκα μάλα Ἀθηνογένης ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει, ὅσα ἂν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ὁμολογήσῃ κύρια εἶναι. τά γε δίκαια, ὦ βέλτιστε· τὰ δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κύρια εἶναι. ἐξ αὐτῶν δέ σοι τῶν νόμων ἐγὼ φανερώτερον ποιήσω. καὶ γὰρ οὕτω με διατέθεικας καὶ περίφοβον πεποίηκας μὴ ἀπόλωμαι ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ τῆς δεινότητος τῆς σῆς, ὥστε τούς τε νόμους ἐξετάζειν καὶ μελετᾶν νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν, πάρεργα τἄλλα πάντα ποιησάμενον.

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ὁ μὲν τοίνυν εἷς νόμος κελεύει ἀψευδεῖν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ,ἀγορᾷ Revillout. πάντων, οἶμαι, παράγγελμα κάλλιστον παραγγέλλων· σὺ δὲ ψευσάμενος ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἀγορᾷ συνθήκας κατʼ ἐμοῦ ἔθου. ἐπεὶ ἐὰν δείξῃςδείξῃςWeil. προειπὼνπροειπὼν Revillout. ἐμοὶ τοὺς ἐράνους καὶ τὰ χρέα, ἢ γράψας ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ὅσους ἐπυθόμην, οὐδὲνἐπυθόμην, οὐδὲνFuhr. ἀντιλέγω σοι ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ ὀφείλειν.

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ὁ μὲν τοίνυν εἷς νόμος κελεύει ἀψευδεῖν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ,ἀγορᾷ Revillout. πάντων, οἶμαι, παράγγελμα κάλλιστον παραγγέλλων· σὺ δὲ ψευσάμενος ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἀγορᾷ συνθήκας κατʼ ἐμοῦ ἔθου. ἐπεὶ ἐὰν δείξῃςδείξῃςWeil. προειπὼνπροειπὼν Revillout. ἐμοὶ τοὺς ἐράνους καὶ τὰ χρέα, ἢ γράψας ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ὅσους ἐπυθόμην, οὐδὲνἐπυθόμην, οὐδὲνFuhr. ἀντιλέγω σοι ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ ὀφείλειν.

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μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἕτερος νόμος ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν Column 7 ὁμολογοῦντεςπερὶ ὧν Weil:ὁμολογοῦντες Revillout: κεῖται περὶ ὧν οἱ πωλοῦντες Volckmar. ἀλλήλοις συμβάλλουσιν, ὅταν τις πωλῇ ἀνδράποδον προλέγειν ἐάν τι ἔχῃ ἀρρώστημα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγωγὴ τούτου ἐστίν. καίτοι ὅπου τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης νοσήματα ἂν μὴ δηλώσῃ τις πωλῶν οἰκέτην ἀνάγειν ἔξεστι, πῶς τά γε παρὰ σοῦ ἀδικήματα συσκευασθέντα οὐκ ἀναδεκτέον σοί ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μὲν ἐπίληπτον ἀνδράποδον οὐ προσαπολλύει τοῦ πριαμένου τὴν οὐσίαν, ὁ δὲ Μίδας, ὃν σύ μοι ἀπέδου, καὶ τὴν τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν ἀπολώλεκε.

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μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἕτερος νόμος ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν Column 7 ὁμολογοῦντεςπερὶ ὧν Weil:ὁμολογοῦντες Revillout: κεῖται περὶ ὧν οἱ πωλοῦντες Volckmar. ἀλλήλοις συμβάλλουσιν, ὅταν τις πωλῇ ἀνδράποδον προλέγειν ἐάν τι ἔχῃ ἀρρώστημα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγωγὴ τούτου ἐστίν. καίτοι ὅπου τὰ παρὰ τῆς τύχης νοσήματα ἂν μὴ δηλώσῃ τις πωλῶν οἰκέτην ἀνάγειν ἔξεστι, πῶς τά γε παρὰ σοῦ ἀδικήματα συσκευασθέντα οὐκ ἀναδεκτέον σοί ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μὲν ἐπίληπτον ἀνδράποδον οὐ προσαπολλύει τοῦ πριαμένου τὴν οὐσίαν, ὁ δὲ Μίδας, ὃν σύ μοι ἀπέδου, καὶ τὴν τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν ἀπολώλεκε.

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σκέψαι δέ, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, μὴ μόνον περὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων σωμάτων ὃν τρόπον οἱ νόμοι ἔχουσιν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱοἱ add. Blass. ἄλλοι πάντες ὅτι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγυητῶν γυναικῶν παῖδες οὗτοι γνήσιοί εἰσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴνἀλλὰ μὴνet sq. ad col. 8 finem plerumque restituit Revillout. οὐκ ἀπέχρησε τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸ ἐγγυηθῆναι τὴν γυναῖκα ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἔγραψε διαρρήδην ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ἣν ἂν ἐγγυήσῃ τις ἐπὶ δικαίοις δάμαρτα ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παῖδας γνησίους,εἶναι παῖδας γνησίουςWeil. καὶ οὐκ καὶ οὐκ Blass: ἀλλʼ οὐκ Weil. ἐάν τις ψευςάμενος ὡς θυγατέρα ἐγγυήσῃ ἄλλην τινά. ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν δικαίας ὡς θυγατέρα usque ad δικαίας Fuhr. ἐγγύας κυρίας, τὰς δὲ μὴ δικαίας ἀκύρους καθίστησιν.κυρίαςusque adκαθίστησινBlass.

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σκέψαι δέ, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, μὴ μόνον περὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων σωμάτων ὃν τρόπον οἱ νόμοι ἔχουσιν. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱοἱ add. Blass. ἄλλοι πάντες ὅτι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγυητῶν γυναικῶν παῖδες οὗτοι γνήσιοί εἰσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴνἀλλὰ μὴνet sq. ad col. 8 finem plerumque restituit Revillout. οὐκ ἀπέχρησε τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸ ἐγγυηθῆναι τὴν γυναῖκα ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἔγραψε διαρρήδην ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ἣν ἂν ἐγγυήσῃ τις ἐπὶ δικαίοις δάμαρτα ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παῖδας γνησίους,εἶναι παῖδας γνησίουςWeil. καὶ οὐκ καὶ οὐκ Blass: ἀλλʼ οὐκ Weil. ἐάν τις ψευςάμενος ὡς θυγατέρα ἐγγυήσῃ ἄλλην τινά. ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν δικαίας ὡς θυγατέρα usque ad δικαίας Fuhr. ἐγγύας κυρίας, τὰς δὲ μὴ δικαίας ἀκύρους καθίστησιν.κυρίαςusque adκαθίστησινBlass.

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ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν Column 8 διαθηκῶν νόμος παραπλήσιος τούτοις ἐστίν· κελεύει γὰρ ἐξεῖναι γὰρ ἐξεῖναι Blass. τὰ ἑαυτοῦ διατίθεσθαι ὅπως ἄν ὅπως ἄν Fuhr. τις βούληται πλὴν ἢ γήρως ἕνεκεν ἢ νόσου ἢ μανιῶν ἢ γυναικὶ πειθόμενον ἢ ὑπὸ δεσμοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης καταληφθέντα. ὅπου δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἰδίων αἱ μὴ δίκαιαι μὴ δίκαιαι Blass. διαθῆκαι κύριαί εἰσιν, πῶς Ἀθηνογένει γε κατὰ τῶν κατὰ τῶν Kenyon. ἐμῶν συνθεμένῳ τοιαῦτα δεῖ κύρια εἶναι;

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ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν Column 8 διαθηκῶν νόμος παραπλήσιος τούτοις ἐστίν· κελεύει γὰρ ἐξεῖναι γὰρ ἐξεῖναι Blass. τὰ ἑαυτοῦ διατίθεσθαι ὅπως ἄν ὅπως ἄν Fuhr. τις βούληται πλὴν ἢ γήρως ἕνεκεν ἢ νόσου ἢ μανιῶν ἢ γυναικὶ πειθόμενον ἢ ὑπὸ δεσμοῦ ἢ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης καταληφθέντα. ὅπου δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἰδίων αἱ μὴ δίκαιαι μὴ δίκαιαι Blass. διαθῆκαι κύριαί εἰσιν, πῶς Ἀθηνογένει γε κατὰ τῶν κατὰ τῶν Kenyon. ἐμῶν συνθεμένῳ τοιαῦτα δεῖ κύρια εἶναι;

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καὶ ἐὰν μέν τις ὡς ἔοικεν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὶ πειθόμενος διαθήκας γράψῃ γράψῃ Diels. ἄκυροι ἔσονται, εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ τῇ Ἀθηνογένους ἑταίρᾳ ἐπείσθην, προσαπολωλέναι μεμε Weil. δεῖ, ὃς ἔχω μεγίςτηνμεγίστην Weil. βοήθειαν τὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένην, ἀναγκασθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτων ταῦτα συνθέσθαι; εἶτα σὺ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἰςχυρίζῃ ἃς ἐνεδρεύσαντές με σὺ καὶ ἡ ἑταίρα σουἑταίρα σουDiels. ἐςημήνασθε, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ νόμοι βουλεύσεως ὑμᾶς κελεύουσιν αἰτίους εἶναι, ἐπὶ τούτοις προςλαμβάνειν τι ἀξιοῦτε. ὑπὲρ ὧν usque ad ἀξιοῦτε Jensen in add.: alii alia. καὶ οὐχ ἱκανόν σοι ἦν τὰςἦν τὰςWeil. τετταράκοντα μνᾶς εἰληφέναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μυροπωλίου, ἀλλὰ καὶ πέντε τάλαντα προσαφείλουπροσαφείλουKenyon:ἀπεστερήκατεWeil. με ὥσπερ πο ὑποχείριον ἐν ποδοστράβῃ κατειλημμένον Revillout, coll. Harpocratione s.v. ποδοστράβη· ὑπὸ θηρευτοῦ κτλ. Richards.κατειλημμένον

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καὶ ἐὰν μέν τις ὡς ἔοικεν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γυναικὶ πειθόμενος διαθήκας γράψῃ γράψῃ Diels. ἄκυροι ἔσονται, εἰ δʼ ἐγὼ τῇ Ἀθηνογένους ἑταίρᾳ ἐπείσθην, προσαπολωλέναι μεμε Weil. δεῖ, ὃς ἔχω μεγίςτηνμεγίστην Weil. βοήθειαν τὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γεγραμμένην, ἀναγκασθεὶς ὑπὸ τούτων ταῦτα συνθέσθαι; εἶτα σὺ ταῖς συνθήκαις ἰςχυρίζῃ ἃς ἐνεδρεύσαντές με σὺ καὶ ἡ ἑταίρα σουἑταίρα σουDiels. ἐςημήνασθε, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ νόμοι βουλεύσεως ὑμᾶς κελεύουσιν αἰτίους εἶναι, ἐπὶ τούτοις προςλαμβάνειν τι ἀξιοῦτε. ὑπὲρ ὧν usque ad ἀξιοῦτε Jensen in add.: alii alia. καὶ οὐχ ἱκανόν σοι ἦν τὰςἦν τὰςWeil. τετταράκοντα μνᾶς εἰληφέναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ μυροπωλίου, ἀλλὰ καὶ πέντε τάλαντα προσαφείλουπροσαφείλουKenyon:ἀπεστερήκατεWeil. με ὥσπερ πο ὑποχείριον ἐν ποδοστράβῃ κατειλημμένον Revillout, coll. Harpocratione s.v. ποδοστράβη· ὑπὸ θηρευτοῦ κτλ. Richards.κατειλημμένον

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ς οὐκ ᾔδειΜίδαν αδσθέντα αλ Column 9 ςεἰς τὰ ἐν ἀγορᾷ, ἀτρέμαColl. 9, 10, 11 plerumque restituit Blass. ἀτρεκὲς δὴ ἐγὼ Kenyon. δʼ ἔχων ἐν τρισὶ ἐν τρισὶ Weil. μησὶν ἅπαντα τὰ χρέα καὶ τοὺς ἐράνους ἐπυθόμην, οὗτος δέ, ὁ ἐκ τριγονίας ὢν μυροπώλης, καθήμενος δʼ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, τρία δὲ μυροπώλια κεκτημένος, λόγους δὲ κατὰ μῆνα λαμβάνων, οὐκ ᾔδει τὰ χρέα. ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἰδιώτης ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν οἰκέτην οὕτως εὐήθης ἐγένετο, καί τινα μὲν τῶν χρεῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾔδει, τὰ δέ φησιν οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅσα μὴ βούλεται.

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ς οὐκ ᾔδειΜίδαν αδσθέντα αλ Column 9 ςεἰς τὰ ἐν ἀγορᾷ, ἀτρέμαColl. 9, 10, 11 plerumque restituit Blass. ἀτρεκὲς δὴ ἐγὼ Kenyon. δʼ ἔχων ἐν τρισὶ ἐν τρισὶ Weil. μησὶν ἅπαντα τὰ χρέα καὶ τοὺς ἐράνους ἐπυθόμην, οὗτος δέ, ὁ ἐκ τριγονίας ὢν μυροπώλης, καθήμενος δʼ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, τρία δὲ μυροπώλια κεκτημένος, λόγους δὲ κατὰ μῆνα λαμβάνων, οὐκ ᾔδει τὰ χρέα. ἀλλʼ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἰδιώτης ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν οἰκέτην οὕτως εὐήθης ἐγένετο, καί τινα μὲν τῶν χρεῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾔδει, τὰ δέ φησιν οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅσα μὴ βούλεται.

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ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ Revillout:οἶμαι Kenyon. λόγος, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, οὐκ ἀπολόγημά ἀπολόγημά Reinach. ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὁμολόγημα ὡς οὐ δεῖ με τὰ χρέα διαλύειν. ὅταν γὰρ φῇ μὴ εἰδέναι ἅπανταἅπαντα Revillout. τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ δήπου τόδʼτόδʼ Kenyon. εἰπεῖν ὡς προεῖπέ μοι περὶ τῶν χρεῶν· ὅσα δʼ οὐκὅσα δʼ οὐκ Revillout. ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ πωλοῦντος ταῦτα οὐ δίκαιός εἰμι διαλύειν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ᾔδεις, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, ὀφείλοντα Μίδαν τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα οἶμαι πᾶσιν εἶναι δῆλον ἐξ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτεῖν σε τὸν Νίκωνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ἐγγυητήν, εἰτὰ χρέα ὄντα ἱκανὸννο. οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐγὼτῷ λόγωι σοῦ τούτ

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ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ Revillout:οἶμαι Kenyon. λόγος, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, οὐκ ἀπολόγημά ἀπολόγημά Reinach. ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ὁμολόγημα ὡς οὐ δεῖ με τὰ χρέα διαλύειν. ὅταν γὰρ φῇ μὴ εἰδέναι ἅπανταἅπαντα Revillout. τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ δήπου τόδʼτόδʼ Kenyon. εἰπεῖν ὡς προεῖπέ μοι περὶ τῶν χρεῶν· ὅσα δʼ οὐκὅσα δʼ οὐκ Revillout. ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ πωλοῦντος ταῦτα οὐ δίκαιός εἰμι διαλύειν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ᾔδεις, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, ὀφείλοντα Μίδαν τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα οἶμαι πᾶσιν εἶναι δῆλον ἐξ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰτεῖν σε τὸν Νίκωνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ἐγγυητήν, εἰτὰ χρέα ὄντα ἱκανὸννο. οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐγὼτῷ λόγωι σοῦ τούτ

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ος καὶ οὐκ εἰλνος καὶ τωτουτονὶ τὸν τρόπον. Column 10 εἰ σὺ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι μὴ προεῖπάς μοιμοι Diels. πάντα τὰ χρέα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὅσα σου ἤκουσα ταῦτα μόνον οἰόμενος εἶναι τὰς συνθήκας ἐθέμην, πότερος δίκαιός ἐστιν ἐκτεῖσαι, ὁ ὕστερος πριάμενος ἢ ὁ πάλαι κεκτημένος ὅτʼ ἐδανείζετο; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἴομαι σέ. εἰ δʼ ἄρʼ ἀντιλέγομεν περὶ τούτου, διαιτητὴς ἡμῖν γενέσθω ὁ νόμος, ὃν οὐχ οἱ ἐρῶντες οὐδʼ οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἔθεσαν, ἀλλʼ ὁ δημοτικώτατος Σόλων·

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ος καὶ οὐκ εἰλνος καὶ τωτουτονὶ τὸν τρόπον. Column 10 εἰ σὺ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι μὴ προεῖπάς μοιμοι Diels. πάντα τὰ χρέα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὅσα σου ἤκουσα ταῦτα μόνον οἰόμενος εἶναι τὰς συνθήκας ἐθέμην, πότερος δίκαιός ἐστιν ἐκτεῖσαι, ὁ ὕστερος πριάμενος ἢ ὁ πάλαι κεκτημένος ὅτʼ ἐδανείζετο; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἴομαι σέ. εἰ δʼ ἄρʼ ἀντιλέγομεν περὶ τούτου, διαιτητὴς ἡμῖν γενέσθω ὁ νόμος, ὃν οὐχ οἱ ἐρῶντες οὐδʼ οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἔθεσαν, ἀλλʼ ὁ δημοτικώτατος Σόλων·

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ὃς εἰδὼς ὅτι πολλαὶ ὠναὶ γίγνονται ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔθηκε νόμον δίκαιον, ὡς παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται, τὰς ζημίας ἃς ἂν ἐργάσωνται οἱ οἰκέται καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικήματα Jensen olim: ἀναλώματα Revillout. διαλύειν τὸν δεσπότην παρʼ ᾧ ἂν ἐργάςωνται ἂν ἐργάσωνται Weil. οἱ οἰκέται. εἰκότως· καὶ γὰρ ἐάν τι ἀγαθὸν ἐάν τι ἀγαθὸν Weil. πράξῃ ἢ ἐργασίαν εὕρ ὁ οἰκέτης τοῦ κεκτημένου αὐτὸν γίγνεται. σὺ δὲ τὸν νόμον ἀφεὶς περὶ συνθηκῶν παραβαινομένων παραβαινομένων Diels. διαλέγῃ. καὶ ὁ μὲν Σόλων οὐδʼ ὃ δικαίως ἔγραφεν ψήφισμά τις τοῦ νόμου ψήφισμά τις τοῦ νόμου Jensen. οἴεται δεῖν κυριώτερον εἶναι, σὺ δὲ καὶσὺ δὲ καὶJensen:σὺ δὲ οἴει Blass. τὰς ἀδίκους συνθήκας ἀξιοῖς κρατεῖνἀξιοῖς κρατεῖνJensen:δεῖν κρατεῖνBlass. πάντωνπάντωνRevillout. τῶν νόμων.

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ὃς εἰδὼς ὅτι πολλαὶ ὠναὶ γίγνονται ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔθηκε νόμον δίκαιον, ὡς παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται, τὰς ζημίας ἃς ἂν ἐργάσωνται οἱ οἰκέται καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικήματα Jensen olim: ἀναλώματα Revillout. διαλύειν τὸν δεσπότην παρʼ ᾧ ἂν ἐργάςωνται ἂν ἐργάσωνται Weil. οἱ οἰκέται. εἰκότως· καὶ γὰρ ἐάν τι ἀγαθὸν ἐάν τι ἀγαθὸν Weil. πράξῃ ἢ ἐργασίαν εὕρ ὁ οἰκέτης τοῦ κεκτημένου αὐτὸν γίγνεται. σὺ δὲ τὸν νόμον ἀφεὶς περὶ συνθηκῶν παραβαινομένων παραβαινομένων Diels. διαλέγῃ. καὶ ὁ μὲν Σόλων οὐδʼ ὃ δικαίως ἔγραφεν ψήφισμά τις τοῦ νόμου ψήφισμά τις τοῦ νόμου Jensen. οἴεται δεῖν κυριώτερον εἶναι, σὺ δὲ καὶσὺ δὲ καὶJensen:σὺ δὲ οἴει Blass. τὰς ἀδίκους συνθήκας ἀξιοῖς κρατεῖνἀξιοῖς κρατεῖνJensen:δεῖν κρατεῖνBlass. πάντωνπάντωνRevillout. τῶν νόμων.

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καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῷ τε πατρὶ τῷ ἐμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδείοις ἔλεγεν ὡςεθελδωρεὰν Column 11 κετὸν δὲ Μίδαν κελεύςαςκελεύσας Jensen: κελεύοι με Weil. ἐᾶν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὠνεῖσθαι· ἐμὲ δʼ οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἀλλὰ βούλεσθαι πάντας πρίασθαι. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτόν, φασίν, μέλλειν λέγειν, ἵνα δὴ δοκοίη μέτριος εἶναι, ὥςπερ πρὸς ἠλιθίους τινὰς διαλεξόμενος καὶ οὐκ αἰσθησομένους τὴν τούτου ἀναίδειαν.

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καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τῷ τε πατρὶ τῷ ἐμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδείοις ἔλεγεν ὡςεθελδωρεὰν Column 11 κετὸν δὲ Μίδαν κελεύςαςκελεύσας Jensen: κελεύοι με Weil. ἐᾶν αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὠνεῖσθαι· ἐμὲ δʼ οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἀλλὰ βούλεσθαι πάντας πρίασθαι. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτόν, φασίν, μέλλειν λέγειν, ἵνα δὴ δοκοίη μέτριος εἶναι, ὥςπερ πρὸς ἠλιθίους τινὰς διαλεξόμενος καὶ οὐκ αἰσθησομένους τὴν τούτου ἀναίδειαν.

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τὸ δὲ γενόμενον δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι· φανήσεται γὰρ ἀκόλουθον ὂν τῇ ἄλλῃ αὐτῶν ἐπιβουλῇ. τὸν μὲν γὰρ παῖδα, ὅνπερ ἀρτίως εἶπον, ἔπεμπέ μοι λέγοντα ὅτι οὐκ ἂν συνείη μοι, εἰ μὴ λύσομαιεἰ μὴ λύσομαι Kenyon: ἂν μὴ ὠνῶμαι Weil. αὐτοῦ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν.ἀδελφόν Weil. ἤδη δʼ ἐμοῦ ὡμολογηκότος αὐτῶν καταθήσειν, τριῶν ὄντων, τὸ ἀργύριον,ἀργύριονRevillout. προςελθὼν ὁ Ἀθηνογένης πρός τιναςτιναςDiels. τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν

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τὸ δὲ γενόμενον δεῖ ὑμᾶς ἀκοῦσαι· φανήσεται γὰρ ἀκόλουθον ὂν τῇ ἄλλῃ αὐτῶν ἐπιβουλῇ. τὸν μὲν γὰρ παῖδα, ὅνπερ ἀρτίως εἶπον, ἔπεμπέ μοι λέγοντα ὅτι οὐκ ἂν συνείη μοι, εἰ μὴ λύσομαιεἰ μὴ λύσομαι Kenyon: ἂν μὴ ὠνῶμαι Weil. αὐτοῦ τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν.ἀδελφόν Weil. ἤδη δʼ ἐμοῦ ὡμολογηκότος αὐτῶν καταθήσειν, τριῶν ὄντων, τὸ ἀργύριον,ἀργύριονRevillout. προςελθὼν ὁ Ἀθηνογένης πρός τιναςτιναςDiels. τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν

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τί βούλεται, ἔφη, ἐπικρατὴςἐβούλετο γενόμενος ἐπικρατὴςKenyon. πράγματα ἔχειν ᾧ ἔξεστι λαβόντι τὸν παῖδα χρῆσθαιPostχρῆσθαι add. ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃHager.τὴν μὲν συκοφαντίανποιεῖτο τῷ δὲ λδικημάτων καἐπίστευσα ς ετὸν μὲν παῖδα διν οὐκ ἤθελον οὖν τετταράκοντα μνᾶςπέντε τάλαντατετταράκονταusque adτάλανταDiels. Desunt versus duo.

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τί βούλεται, ἔφη, ἐπικρατὴςἐβούλετο γενόμενος ἐπικρατὴςKenyon. πράγματα ἔχειν ᾧ ἔξεστι λαβόντι τὸν παῖδα χρῆσθαιPostχρῆσθαι add. ὅ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃHager.τὴν μὲν συκοφαντίανποιεῖτο τῷ δὲ λδικημάτων καἐπίστευσα ς ετὸν μὲν παῖδα διν οὐκ ἤθελον οὖν τετταράκοντα μνᾶςπέντε τάλαντατετταράκονταusque adτάλανταDiels. Desunt versus duo.

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Column 12 οὔτε μυροπώληςColl. 12 et 13 plerumque restituit Blass: οὔτε μυροπώλης Diels. εἰμὶ οὔτʼ ἄλλην τέχνην ἐργάζομαι, ἀλλʼ ἅπερ ὁ πατήρ μοι ἔδωκεν χωρίαταῦταταῦτα Jensen. γεωργῶ, πρὸς δὲ τούτων εἰς τὴν ὠνὴν ἐνεσείσθην. πότερα γὰρ εἰκός ἐςτιν, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, ἐμὲ τῆς σῆς τέχνηςτέχνηςWeil. ἐπιθυμῆσαι, ἧς οὐκ ἤμην ἔμπειρος, ἤ σε καὶ τὴν ᾔ σε καὶ τὴν Weil. ἑταίραν τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐπιβουλεῦσαι; ἐπιβουλεῦσαι Diels. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἴομαι ὑμᾶς. διόπερ, ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν εἰκότως συγγνώμην ἔχοιτʼ ἀπατηθῆναι ἔχοιτʼ ἀπατηθῆναι de *ricci, qui ὑπʼ Ἀντιγόνας addit. καὶ ἀτυχῆσαι τοιούτῳ ἀνθρώπῳ περιπεσόνταπεριπεσόντα Diels. Ἀθηνογένει δὲ .. Ἀθηνογένει δὲ Hager, qui ὀργίζοισθε addit. *huc inserunt quidam editores fragmentum extremae alicuius columnae quod ad finem orationis dedi. Desunt versus fere sedecim.

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Column 12 οὔτε μυροπώληςColl. 12 et 13 plerumque restituit Blass: οὔτε μυροπώλης Diels. εἰμὶ οὔτʼ ἄλλην τέχνην ἐργάζομαι, ἀλλʼ ἅπερ ὁ πατήρ μοι ἔδωκεν χωρίαταῦταταῦτα Jensen. γεωργῶ, πρὸς δὲ τούτων εἰς τὴν ὠνὴν ἐνεσείσθην. πότερα γὰρ εἰκός ἐςτιν, ὦ Ἀθηνόγενες, ἐμὲ τῆς σῆς τέχνηςτέχνηςWeil. ἐπιθυμῆσαι, ἧς οὐκ ἤμην ἔμπειρος, ἤ σε καὶ τὴν ᾔ σε καὶ τὴν Weil. ἑταίραν τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἐπιβουλεῦσαι; ἐπιβουλεῦσαι Diels. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἴομαι ὑμᾶς. διόπερ, ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν εἰκότως συγγνώμην ἔχοιτʼ ἀπατηθῆναι ἔχοιτʼ ἀπατηθῆναι de *ricci, qui ὑπʼ Ἀντιγόνας addit. καὶ ἀτυχῆσαι τοιούτῳ ἀνθρώπῳ περιπεσόνταπεριπεσόντα Diels. Ἀθηνογένει δὲ .. Ἀθηνογένει δὲ Hager, qui ὀργίζοισθε addit. *huc inserunt quidam editores fragmentum extremae alicuius columnae quod ad finem orationis dedi. Desunt versus fere sedecim.

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Column 13 ενεπάντα ἕνεκα πάθη πάντα Colin. ἐμοὶ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀπάτης κέρδη αὐτ ἀπάτης κέρδη αὐτῷ Revillout. · καὶ τὸν μὲν Μίδαν τὸν τολξαι, τολμῶντα συμπρᾶξαι Vogt. ὃν ἄκων φησὶν ἀπολῦσαι, τοῦτονλαβεῖν, τοῦτον συγχωρῶ λαβεῖν Blass. τοῦ δὲ παιδὸς ὃν τότε προῖκά μοί φησινφησινBlass:ἔφηKenyon. διδόναι, νῦν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν ἀργύριον πολὺ πλεῖον τῆς ἀξίας, οὐχ ὥστε ἐμὸν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὥστε ὑφʼ ὑμῶν τῇ ψήφῳ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεσθαι.ἀφίεσθαιJenson:ἀφεθῆναιBlass.

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Column 13 ενεπάντα ἕνεκα πάθη πάντα Colin. ἐμοὶ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀπάτης κέρδη αὐτ ἀπάτης κέρδη αὐτῷ Revillout. · καὶ τὸν μὲν Μίδαν τὸν τολξαι, τολμῶντα συμπρᾶξαι Vogt. ὃν ἄκων φησὶν ἀπολῦσαι, τοῦτονλαβεῖν, τοῦτον συγχωρῶ λαβεῖν Blass. τοῦ δὲ παιδὸς ὃν τότε προῖκά μοί φησινφησινBlass:ἔφηKenyon. διδόναι, νῦν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν ἀργύριον πολὺ πλεῖον τῆς ἀξίας, οὐχ ὥστε ἐμὸν εἶναι, ἀλλʼ ὥστε ὑφʼ ὑμῶν τῇ ψήφῳ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεσθαι.ἀφίεσθαιJenson:ἀφεθῆναιBlass.

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αὐτὸςαὐτὸςDiels. μέντοι οὐκ ἀξιῶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἀτιμωθῆναι ἀτιμωθῆναι Weil. ὑπʼ Ἀθηνογένους. καὶ γὰρ ἂνκαὶ γὰρ ἂν Fuhr: λίαν γὰρ ἂν Diels. δεινὸν συμβαίνοι μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί,μοι, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί Revillout. εἰ μοςειςον ἥμαρτονδικμία δὲ κουιοἠδίκηκενθεδικήσανττιμήματι δπται πολιτνος ἐνίοτε Desunt versus fere decem. Column 14 ώτατοι τῶν μετοίκων ἀφυλάκτως ἔρχεσθαι.Coll. 14, 15, 16 plerumque restituit Revillout: ἀφυλάκτως ἔρχεσθαι Jensen.

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αὐτὸςαὐτὸςDiels. μέντοι οὐκ ἀξιῶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἀτιμωθῆναι ἀτιμωθῆναι Weil. ὑπʼ Ἀθηνογένους. καὶ γὰρ ἂνκαὶ γὰρ ἂν Fuhr: λίαν γὰρ ἂν Diels. δεινὸν συμβαίνοι μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί,μοι, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί Revillout. εἰ μοςειςον ἥμαρτονδικμία δὲ κουιοἠδίκηκενθεδικήσανττιμήματι δπται πολιτνος ἐνίοτε Desunt versus fere decem. Column 14 ώτατοι τῶν μετοίκων ἀφυλάκτως ἔρχεσθαι.Coll. 14, 15, 16 plerumque restituit Revillout: ἀφυλάκτως ἔρχεσθαι Jensen.

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ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς Φίλιππον μικρὸν πρὸ τῆς μάχης ἀπέλιπεἀπέλιπε Revillout:ἀπέδρα Kenyon. τὴν πόλιν, καὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐ συνεστρατεύςατο εἰς Χαιρώνειαν, ἐξῴκησε δὲ εἰς Τροιζῆνα, παρὰ τὸν νόμον ὃς κελεύει ἔνδειξιν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν τοῦ ἐξοικήσαντος ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐὰν πάλιν ἔλθῃ. καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐποίει τὴν μὲν ἐκείνων πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, περιέσεσθαι περιέσεσθαι Weil. ὑπολαμβάνων, τῆς δὲ ἡμετέρας θάνατον καταγνούς. ἡμετέρας θάνατον καταγνούς Blass. καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐν θυγατέρας ἐν Vogt. τῇ παρʼ ὑμῖν εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκθρέψαςPost ἐκθρέψας add. ἐν τῇ ἀτυχίᾳ Colin, postἐξέδωκεν add.ἄλλοσε Weil.ἐξέδωκενως ως incertum: ὃς πάλιν ἧκεν ὑμῖν παρεργασόμενος Colin. πάλιν ηἐργασόμενος ἐπεὶ εἰρήνη γέγονεν.

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ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ πρὸς Φίλιππον μικρὸν πρὸ τῆς μάχης ἀπέλιπεἀπέλιπε Revillout:ἀπέδρα Kenyon. τὴν πόλιν, καὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐ συνεστρατεύςατο εἰς Χαιρώνειαν, ἐξῴκησε δὲ εἰς Τροιζῆνα, παρὰ τὸν νόμον ὃς κελεύει ἔνδειξιν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγὴν τοῦ ἐξοικήσαντος ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐὰν πάλιν ἔλθῃ. καὶ ταῦτʼ ἐποίει τὴν μὲν ἐκείνων πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικε, περιέσεσθαι περιέσεσθαι Weil. ὑπολαμβάνων, τῆς δὲ ἡμετέρας θάνατον καταγνούς. ἡμετέρας θάνατον καταγνούς Blass. καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐν θυγατέρας ἐν Vogt. τῇ παρʼ ὑμῖν εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκθρέψαςPost ἐκθρέψας add. ἐν τῇ ἀτυχίᾳ Colin, postἐξέδωκεν add.ἄλλοσε Weil.ἐξέδωκενως ως incertum: ὃς πάλιν ἧκεν ὑμῖν παρεργασόμενος Colin. πάλιν ηἐργασόμενος ἐπεὶ εἰρήνη γέγονεν.

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ταῦταταῦτα Kenyon. γὰρ ὑμῖνασιν οἱ χρηςοὗτοι ποιτῇ εἰρήνῃ χρπωἐν τοῖς κινδύνοιςπμὲν ἐν Πλαταιαῖςδήσαντες οἈθηνογένης πχειννωτουθ Desunt versus fere sex.

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ταῦταταῦτα Kenyon. γὰρ ὑμῖνασιν οἱ χρηςοὗτοι ποιτῇ εἰρήνῃ χρπωἐν τοῖς κινδύνοιςπμὲν ἐν Πλαταιαῖςδήσαντες οἈθηνογένης πχειννωτουθ Desunt versus fere sex.

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Column 15 τὰς κοινὰς τῆς πόλεως συνθήκας παραβὰς ταῖς ἰδίαις πρὸς ἐμὲ ἰσχυρίζεται, ὥσπερ ἄν τινα πεισθέντα ὡς ὁ τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς δικαίων καταφρονήσας οὗτος ἂν τῶν πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐμὲ Diels. ἐφρόντιζεν· ὃς οὕτω πονηρός ἐστι καὶ πανταχοῦ ὅμοιος ὥστε καὶ εἰς Τροιζῆνα ἐλθὼν καὶ ποιησαμένων αὐτὸν Τροιζηνίων πολίτην, ὑποπεσὼν Μνησίαν τὸν Ἀργεῖον καὶ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου καταςταθεὶς ἄρχων, ἐξέβαλεν τοὺς πολίτας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὡς ὑμῖν αὐτοὶ μαρτυρήσουσιν· ἐνθάδε γὰρ φεύγουσιν.

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Column 15 τὰς κοινὰς τῆς πόλεως συνθήκας παραβὰς ταῖς ἰδίαις πρὸς ἐμὲ ἰσχυρίζεται, ὥσπερ ἄν τινα πεισθέντα ὡς ὁ τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς δικαίων καταφρονήσας οὗτος ἂν τῶν πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐμὲ Diels. ἐφρόντιζεν· ὃς οὕτω πονηρός ἐστι καὶ πανταχοῦ ὅμοιος ὥστε καὶ εἰς Τροιζῆνα ἐλθὼν καὶ ποιησαμένων αὐτὸν Τροιζηνίων πολίτην, ὑποπεσὼν Μνησίαν τὸν Ἀργεῖον καὶ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου καταςταθεὶς ἄρχων, ἐξέβαλεν τοὺς πολίτας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὡς ὑμῖν αὐτοὶ μαρτυρήσουσιν· ἐνθάδε γὰρ φεύγουσιν.

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καὶ ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐκπεσόντας αὐτοὺς ὑπεδέξασθε καὶ πολίτας ἐποιήσασθε καὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν πάντων μετέδοτε, ἀπομνημονεύσαντες τὴν εὐεργεσίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον διʼ ἐτῶν πλειόνων Kenyon. πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ οἰόμενοι δεῖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ὑμῖν χρησίμους γενομένους τούτους ἀτυχοῦντας περιςωθῆναιπερισωθῆναι Jensen in add. ὑφʼ ὑμῶν. οὗτος δὲ ὁ μιαρός, ἀφεὶς ὑμᾶς κἀκεῖ ἐγγραφείς, οὔτε τῆς πολιτείας οὔτε τοῦ ἤθους τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲν πετήδευεν ἄξιον οὔτε usque adἄξιον Jensen. ἀλλʼ οὕτως ὠμῶς τοῖς ὑποδεξαμένοις αὐτὸν ὑποδεξαμένοις αὐτὸν Blass. ἐχρήσατο ὥστε μετατο ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳκατὰ τοῦτο Column 16 ραν δεδιὼςιν κατέφυγεν.

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καὶ ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐκπεσόντας αὐτοὺς ὑπεδέξασθε καὶ πολίτας ἐποιήσασθε καὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν πάντων μετέδοτε, ἀπομνημονεύσαντες τὴν εὐεργεσίαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον διʼ ἐτῶν πλειόνων Kenyon. πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ οἰόμενοι δεῖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ὑμῖν χρησίμους γενομένους τούτους ἀτυχοῦντας περιςωθῆναιπερισωθῆναι Jensen in add. ὑφʼ ὑμῶν. οὗτος δὲ ὁ μιαρός, ἀφεὶς ὑμᾶς κἀκεῖ ἐγγραφείς, οὔτε τῆς πολιτείας οὔτε τοῦ ἤθους τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲν πετήδευεν ἄξιον οὔτε usque adἄξιον Jensen. ἀλλʼ οὕτως ὠμῶς τοῖς ὑποδεξαμένοις αὐτὸν ὑποδεξαμένοις αὐτὸν Blass. ἐχρήσατο ὥστε μετατο ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳκατὰ τοῦτο Column 16 ραν δεδιὼςιν κατέφυγεν.

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καὶ ταῦτα ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἀναγνώσεται ὑμῖν πρῶτον μὲν τὸν νόμον ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ τοὺς μετοίκους ἐξοικεῖν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἔπειτα τὴν Τροιζηνίων μαρτυρίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ τῶν Τροιζηνίων Τροιζηνίων Blass: αὐτῶν ἐκείνων Kenyon. ψήφισμα ὃ ἐψηφίσαντο τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ, τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ Diels. διʼ ὃ ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς ὑπεδέξασθε καὶ πολίτας ἐποιήσασθε. ἀνάγνωθι. <del>νόμος</del> Μαρτυρία <del>ψήφισμα</del>

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καὶ ταῦτα ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἀναγνώσεται ὑμῖν πρῶτον μὲν τὸν νόμον ὃς οὐκ ἐᾷ τοὺς μετοίκους ἐξοικεῖν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἔπειτα τὴν Τροιζηνίων μαρτυρίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ τῶν Τροιζηνίων Τροιζηνίων Blass: αὐτῶν ἐκείνων Kenyon. ψήφισμα ὃ ἐψηφίσαντο τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ, τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ Diels. διʼ ὃ ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς ὑπεδέξασθε καὶ πολίτας ἐποιήσασθε. ἀνάγνωθι. <del>νόμος</del> Μαρτυρία <del>ψήφισμα</del>

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λαβὲ δή μοιδή μοιBlass:μοι νῦνRevillout. καὶ τὴν τοῦ κηδεστοῦ αὐτοῦ μαρτυρίαν μαρτυρίαν Blass.μεν ουσιαι λατπακαταλειφθέντααδξῆς πάλιν ωαπτὴν Ἀντιγόνανεμαρτυρ Desunt versus fere decem.

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λαβὲ δή μοιδή μοιBlass:μοι νῦνRevillout. καὶ τὴν τοῦ κηδεστοῦ αὐτοῦ μαρτυρίαν μαρτυρίαν Blass.μεν ουσιαι λατπακαταλειφθέντααδξῆς πάλιν ωαπτὴν Ἀντιγόνανεμαρτυρ Desunt versus fere decem.

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Column 17 πραχθένταCol. 17 plerumque restituit Blass. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐπιβεβούλευκέν ἐπιβεβούλευκέν Weil. μοι Ἀθηνογένης, καὶ ὡς ὑμῖν προσενήνεκται. προσενήνεκται Sudhaus. τὸν δὴ καὶ ἰδίᾳ πονηρὸν καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς πόλεως Diels. τὴν σωτηρίαν ἀπελπίσαντα καὶ ὑμᾶςκαὶ ὑμᾶςRevillout. ἐγκαταλιπόντα, καὶ παρʼ οὓς ἐξῴκησεν ἀναστάτους ποιήσαντα, τοῦτοντοῦτονWeil. ὑμεῖς συνειληφότεςσυνειληφότες Sudhaus: νῦν εἰληφότες Blass. οὐ κολάσετε;

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Column 17 πραχθένταCol. 17 plerumque restituit Blass. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐπιβεβούλευκέν ἐπιβεβούλευκέν Weil. μοι Ἀθηνογένης, καὶ ὡς ὑμῖν προσενήνεκται. προσενήνεκται Sudhaus. τὸν δὴ καὶ ἰδίᾳ πονηρὸν καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς πόλεως Diels. τὴν σωτηρίαν ἀπελπίσαντα καὶ ὑμᾶςκαὶ ὑμᾶςRevillout. ἐγκαταλιπόντα, καὶ παρʼ οὓς ἐξῴκησεν ἀναστάτους ποιήσαντα, τοῦτοντοῦτονWeil. ὑμεῖς συνειληφότεςσυνειληφότες Sudhaus: νῦν εἰληφότες Blass. οὐ κολάσετε;

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καὶ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέομαι ὑμῶν καὶ ἀντιβολῶ ἐλεῆσαί ἐλεῆσαί Hager. με, ἐκεῖνο σκεψαμένους, ὅτι προσήκει ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δίκῃιν ἐλεεῖν οὐ τὸν φἐὰν ἁλῷ οὐδὲν πάσχεινδε τοττι παλδʼ ἂν ἀποφύγῃ ἀποφύγῃ Diels. μεἀπολοῦμαι. ἀπολοῦμαι Diels. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δυναίμηνψ ν οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν μέροςαναιαχ ἄνδρες δικασταί,ς ἐξαὐτῶν τ Desunt versus octo vel minus.

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καὶ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέομαι ὑμῶν καὶ ἀντιβολῶ ἐλεῆσαί ἐλεῆσαί Hager. με, ἐκεῖνο σκεψαμένους, ὅτι προσήκει ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δίκῃιν ἐλεεῖν οὐ τὸν φἐὰν ἁλῷ οὐδὲν πάσχεινδε τοττι παλδʼ ἂν ἀποφύγῃ ἀποφύγῃ Diels. μεἀπολοῦμαι. ἀπολοῦμαι Diels. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δυναίμηνψ ν οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν μέροςαναιαχ ἄνδρες δικασταί,ς ἐξαὐτῶν τ Desunt versus octo vel minus.

in extrema duodecima columna αντησολεκεν ἄλλοιςταῦτα πέπονθεν των ἀναλωμάτων λωμάτωναλυσιτφείλουςιὅ ποτε ἀπέλυσενὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, οὐδεὶς ὑμῶντουκατα

diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/__cts__.xml index c2af3264a..996e096d8 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου ἐισαγγελίας ἀπολογία πρὸς Πολύευκτον - Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + + In Defence of Euxenippus + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 955c7fa5b..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0140", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Hyperides/opensource/hyp_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=4", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 9ece2202c..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,536 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - In Defence of Euxenippus from Speeches (English). Machine readable - text - Hyperides - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - - - Hyperides - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - -
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Personally, gentlemen of the jury, as I was just - saying to those seated beside me,The opening - words are the same as those of the speech against Demosthenes. I am - surprised that you are not tired by now of this kind of impeachment. At one time - the men impeached before you were Timomachus, Leosthenes, Callistratus, Philon - of Anaea, Theotimus who lost Sestos, - and others of the same type.Timomachus was an - Athenian general who failed in his command against Cotys of Thrace (c. 361 B.C.), and on - his return to Athens was - condemned either to death or to a heavy fine. See Dem. - 19.180, and the scholiast on Aeschin. - 1.56. Leosthenes, who led an Athenian fleet against Alexander of - Pherae (c. 361 B.C.), lost five triremes, was condemned to - death at Athens and went into - exile. See Aeschin. 2.124, and Diod. Sic. 15.95.2. For Callistratus, a prominent - orator, exiled at about the same time and later put to death, see Lyc. 1.93. Theotimus, also about the year 361, was - impeached for losing Sestos to - Cotys. Of PhiIon nothing further is known. Some were accused of - betraying ships, others of giving up Athenian cities, and another, an orator, of - speaking against the people's interests.

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Though there were five of them, not one waited to be tried; they left the city of - their own accord and went into exile. The same is true of many others who were - impeached. In fact it was a rare thing to see anyone subjected to impeachment - appearing in court. So serious and so notorious were the crimes which at that - time led to an impeachment. But the present practice in the city is utterly - absurd.

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Diognides and Antidorus the metic are impeached on a charge of hiring out - flute-girls at a higher price than that fixed by law, Agasicles of PiraeusAgasicles, according to Harpocration and Suidas (sv. *)agasiklh=s), though an alien, bribed the - people of Halimus to enroll him in their deme. The former adds that - Dinarchus wrote a speech prosecuting him for this. See Din. Fr. 7. because he was registered in Halimus, and - Euxenippus because of the dreams which he claims to have had; though surely not - one of these charges has anything to do with the impeachment law.

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And yet in public trials, gentlemen of the jury, - the jury should refuse to listen to the details of the prosecution until they - have first considered the point at issue, and also the written statement of the - accused, to see if the pleas are legally valid. It is certainly wrong to - maintain, as Polyeuctus did in his speech for the prosecution, that defendants - should not insist on the impeachment law; which lays it down that impeachments - shall be reserved for the orators themselves, when they speak against the - interests of the people, but shall not apply to every Athenian.

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With me this law would have first claim to notice; and a point, I think, which - should be dwelt on as much as any, is how to ensure that the laws in a democracy - are binding and that impeachments and other actions brought into court are - legally valid. It was with this in view that you made separate laws covering - individually all offences committed in the city.

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Suppose someone commits a religious offence. There is the method of public - prosecution before the King-Archon. Or he maltreats his parents. The Archon - presides over his case. Someone makes illegal proposals in the city. There is - the board of Thesmothetae ready. Perhaps he does something involving summary - arrest. You have the authority of the Eleven.The King-Archon, who supervised all religious ceremonies of state, judged - all cases connected with religion, while the Archon himself dealt with - family law. (See Aristot. Ath. Pol. - 57.2 and Aristot. Ath. Pol. - 56.6.) For the Thesmothetae compare Hyp. - 1.12 and note. Summary arrest could be legally employed against - three classes of criminal. Of these, two were tried by the Eleven and one by - the Thesmothetae. (See Aristot. Ath. Po1. - 52.1.) Similarly, to deal with every other offence you - have established laws, offices, and courts appropriate to each.

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In what cases then do you think impeachments should be used? Your answer has - already been embodied in detail in the law, so as to leave no room for doubt. - “If any person,” it says, “seeks to overthrow the democracy of the Athenians.” - Naturally, gentlemen of the jury; for a charge like that admits of no excuse - from anyone nor of an oath for postponement.A - man due to be tried could offer the court an excuse (skh=fis) and provide a second party to take - an oath (u(pwmosi/a) that this excuse - was true. In such cases the jury might grant a postponement. It - should come directly into court.

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“Or if he attends a meeting in any place with intent to undermine the democracy, - or forms a political society; or if anyone betrays a city, or ships, or any - land, or naval force, or being an orator, makes speeches contrary to the - interests of the Athenian people, receiving bribes.” The opening provisions of - the law were made applicable by you to the entire citizen body, since those are - offences which anyone might commit; but the latter part is directed against the - orators themselves, in whose hands the proposing of measures rests.

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You would have been insane if you had framed the law in any other way; if, when - the orators enjoy both the honors and the profits of speaking, you had exposed - the ordinary citizen to the risks that go with them. Nevertheless, Polyeuctus is - bold enough to assert, though he is bringing in an impeachment, that defendants - must not make use of the impeachment law.

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All other prosecutors who think it necessary, when speaking first, to steal the - defendants' arguments from them encourage the jury to refuse to listen to any - defendant who does not keep within the scope of the law, to challenge his - statements and tell the clerk to read the law. The opposite is true of you: it - is recourse to law of which you think you should deprive Euxenippus in his - defence.

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You also maintain that no one should even help him - or be his advocate, and you exhort the jury to refuse a hearing to those who - come up to speak. And yet, of the many good institutions of the city, what is - better or more democraticCompare Hyp. 1.10. than our custom, when some - private person is facing the danger of a trial and cannot conduct his own - defence, of allowing any citizen who wishes to come forward to help him and give - the jury a fair statement of the case?

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You will claim, no doubt, that you have never worked on such a principle. Yet - when you were prosecuted by Alexander of Oeon,Nothing further is known of this trial. For other occasions on which - Hyperides opposed Polyeuctus compare Hyp. Fr. - 24 andHyp. Fr. 25. you asked - for ten advocates from the tribe Aegeis, and I was one of them, chosen by - yourself. You also summoned men from other tribes into the court to help you. - But why should I mention other instances? Take your handling of the present - trial. Did you not make as many accusations as you wished? Did you not call - Lycurgus to join you in the prosecution, a speaker who is the equal of any in - the city and who has the reputation among these gentlemen of being sound and - honorable?

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If you then, as a defendant, may summon advocates, or as a prosecutor may bring - in co-prosecutors—you who are not merely capable of speaking for yourself but - well able to give a whole city trouble—is Euxenippus, because he is not a - professional speaker and is now advanced in years, even to be denied the help of - friends and relatives, on pain of their being abused by you?

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Yes; for in the words of your indictment, his - conduct has been scandalous and deserves the death penalty. Gentlemen of the - jury, will you please review it and scrutinize it point by point? The people - ordered Euxenippus, as one of three, to lie down in the temple; and he tells us - that he fell asleep and had a dream which he reported to them. If you assumed, - Polyeuctus, that this was true and that he reported to the people what he - actually saw in his sleep, why is he to blame for notifying the Athenians of the - commands which the god had been giving him?

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If on the other hand, as you now maintain, you thought that he misrepresented the - god and, out of partiality for certain persons, had made a false report to the - people, rather than propose a decree disputing the dream you ought to have sent - to Delphi, as the previous speaker - said, and inquired the truth from the god. But instead of doing that, you - proposed a decree, entirely conceived by yourself,I follow Colin's interpretation of the word au)totelh/s in this passage, although it was - often used technically to describe a decree laid before the people without - previous consideration by the Council (see Hesychius, sv. au)totele/s - yh/fisma). against two tribes, a measure not - only most unjust but self-contradictory also. This was what caused your - conviction for illegal proposals. It was not the fault of Euxenippus.

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Let us consider it in this way. The tribes, formed - into groups of two, shared out the mountains in Oropus awarded to them by the - people. This mountain fell to the lot of Acamantis and Hippothoontis. You - proposed that these tribes should restore the mountain to Amphiaraus and the - price of produce from it which they had sold; your reason being that the fifty - boundary officials had selected it beforehand and set it apart for the god, and - that the two tribes had no right to be holding it.

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A little later in the same decree you propose that the eight tribes shall provide - compensation and pay it to the other two so that they shall not suffer unfairly. - But if the mountain really belonged to the two tribes and you tried to take it - from them, surely we are entitled to be angry. Alternatively, if they had no - right to be occupying it and it belonged to the god, why were you proposing that - the other tribes should actually pay them compensation? They should have been - well content that when restoring the property of the god they did not also pay a - fine in cash.

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These proposals, when examined in court, were - considered unsatisfactory, and the jury condemned you. So if you had been - acquitted in your trial, Euxenippus would not have misrepresented the god: - because you happened to be convicted, must ruin fall on him?Apparently it was loss of prestige which caused Polyeuctus - to be resentful against Euxenippus, since the actual fine was - negligible. And when you, who proposed a decree like that, were fined - a mere twenty-five drachmas, is the man who lay down in the temple at the - people's request even to be refused a grave in Attica?

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Yes, you say; for he committed a serious crime in - regard to the cup which he allowed Olympias to dedicate to the statue of - Health.Olympias, mother of Alexander the - Great, was sent by him about 331 B.C. to Epirus, where her brother Alexander was - king. On the death of the latter she became regent for the young prince - Neoptolemus and so controlled Molossia, which had been attached to the - kingdom by Philip in 343 B.C. The statue of Health stood on the - Acropolis. (See Paus. 1.23.5.) It is not known - how Euxenippus was connected with this affair. You think that if you - bring her name irrelevantly into the case to serve your own ends and accuse - Euxenippus of deceitful flattery, you will bring down the jury's hatred and - anger upon him. The thing to do, my friend, is not to use the name of Olympias - and Alexander in the hope of harming some citizen.

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Wait till they send the Athenian people some injunctions which are unjust or - inappropriate. Then is the time for you to get up and oppose them in the - interests of your city, disputing the cause of justice with their envoys and - resorting to the Congress of the GreeksThe - Congress, which united all Greek states except Sparta, was founded by Philip after the - battle of Chaeronea in - 338 B.C. as the champion of your country. But you - never stood up or spoke about them there; it is only here that you hate Olympias -

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so that you can ruin Euxenippus by alleging that he flatters her and the - Macedonians. If you show us that he has ever been to Macedon or entertained any of the people in - his own home, that he knows a Macedonian intimately or meets any of them; if you - prove that he has said one word about such matters, either in a shop or in the - market or anywhere else, instead of quietly and modestly minding his own - business as much as any other citizen, the jury may do what they like with him. -

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For if these charges of yours were true, not only you but everyone else in the - city would know the facts, as is the case with all the others who speak or act - in the interests of Macedon. Their - conduct is no secret. The rest of Athens, even the schoolchildren, know the orators who take - Macedonian money and the other persons who put up Macedonian visitors, either - secretly making them welcome or going into the streets to meet them when they - arrive. You will not see Euxenippus classed with a single one of these men - anywhere.

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But you do not prosecute or bring to trial any of the people who are universally - known to be doing these things, and yet you accuse Euxenippus of flattery when - his manner of life disproves the charge. And yet if you had any sense, you would - neither be blaming Euxenippus for the dedication of the cup nor have made any - further mention of the affair, since it is impolitic to do so. Why is that? Will - you please listen, gentlemen of the jury, to the account which I am going to - give?

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Olympias has made complaints against you about the - incident at Dodona,Dodona in - Epirus was, second to - Delphi, the most famous - oracle of Greece. Dione, a consort - of Zeus, was often worshipped in his temples. complaints which are - unfair, as I have twice already proved in the Assembly before yourselves and the - rest of Athens. I explained to her - envoys that the charges she brings against the city are not justified. For Zeus - of Dodona commanded you through the - oracle to embellish the statue of Dione.

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You made a face as beautiful as you could, together with all the other - appropriate parts; and having prepared a great deal of expensive finery for the - goddess and dispatched envoys with a sacrifice at great expense, you embellished - the statue of Dione in a manner worthy of yourselves and of the goddess. These - measures brought you the complaints of Olympias, who said in her letters that - the country of Molossia, in which the temple stands, belonged to her, and that - therefore we had no right to interfere with anything there at all.

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Now if you decide that the incidents relating to the cup constitute an offence, - we are in a sense condemning ourselves as being wrong in what we did at - Dodona. But if we acquiesce in - what has been done we shall have taken away her right to these theatrical - complaints and accusations. For I presume that when Olympias can furnish - ornaments for shrines in Athens we - may safely do so at Dodona, - particularly when the god demands it.

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However, it seems to me, Polyeuctus, that there is - nothing which you would not use as grounds for an accusation. But from the time - when you decided to play a part in public life, for which I admit you are well - fitted, you should not have prosecuted private individuals or made them the - victims of your impudence. Wait for an orator to commit a crime and then - prosecute him, or for a general to do wrong and then impeach him. These are the - men who have power to harm the city, all of them who choose to do so, not - Euxenippus or any member of this jury.

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It is not as if I were prescribing one line of conduct for you having followed - another in my own public life. I myself never in my life prosecuted any private - citizen, and there are some whom before now I have done my best to help. What - men, then, have I prosecuted and brought to trial? Aristophon of Hazenia,Of the three orators here mentioned Aristophon - was prosecuted by Hyperides in 362 B.C., Diopithes at an - unknown date, and Philocrates in 343. See further, notes on Hyp. Fr. 17,Hyp. Fr. - 15, and Hyp. Fr. 16. now a - most influential person in public life—he was acquitted in this court by two - votes only;

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Diopithes of Sphettus, thought to be the most formidable man in the city; - Philocrates of Hagnus, whose political career has been marked by the utmost - daring and wantonness. I prosecuted that man for his services to Philip against - Athens and secured his - conviction in court. The impeachment which I drew up was just and in accordance - with the law, referring to him as “an orator giving counsel against the best - interests of the people and receiving money and gifts from those working against - them.”

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Even so I was not satisfied to bring in the impeachment before I had added - underneath: “These proposals he made against the best interests of the people, - because he had taken bribes.” And I wrote his decree underneath. And again I - added: “These further proposals he made against the best interests of the - people, because he had taken bribes.” And I wrote the decree alongside. Indeed - this statement is written down five or six times in my speech; for I thought - that I must make the trial and the prosecution just. But you could not include - in your impeachment the things which you allege Euxenippus to have said against - the best interests of the people. Yet, though he is a private citizen, by your - mode of prosecution you class him as an orator.

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After a scanty reference to the defendant's written statement you are now - bringing fresh charges and incriminations against him, mentioning, amongst other - similar allegations, that he tried to marry his daughter to Philocles, that he - undertook an arbitration for Demotion, and other similar charges.Nothing is known of Philocles and the reference - to Demotion is obscure. He was clearly an unpopular character, perhaps the - parasite feeder satirized by comedians (see Athen. - 6.243 b). The translation of the phrase *dhmoti/wnos di/aitan e)/laben is doubtful; it might mean: - “adopted the method of life of Demotion.” Your intention is that, if - the defence neglect the main indictment and deal with the irrelevant - allegations, the jury shall interrupt them by calling: “Why do you tell us - this?” and if they ignore the additional points entirely their case shall be - weakened. For any charge that is not refuted is left to be fastened on by the - anger of the jury.

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The most outrageous feature of your speech was the fact that often during the - argument you let fall the remark—you thought that your motive in doing so passed - unnoticed, though it was obvious—that Euxenippus was rich, and again, a little - later, that he had amassed great wealth dishonestly. It has surely nothing to do - with this case whether he is a man of large means or small, and to raise the - matter is malicious and implies an unfair assumption regarding the jury, namely - that they would base their verdict on other considerations than the point at - issue and the question whether the man on trial is offending against you or not. -

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You do not realize, Polyeuctus, it seems to me, - you and those who share your views, that there is not in the world a single - democracy or monarch or race more magnanimous than the Athenian people, and that - it does not forsake those citizens who are maligned by others, whether singly or - in numbers, but supports them.

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Let me give an instance. When Tisis of Agryle brought in an inventory of the - estate of Euthycrates, amounting to more than sixty talents, on the grounds of - its being public property, and again later promised to bring in an inventory of - the estate of Philip and Nausicles saying that they had made their money from - unregistered mines, this jury were so far from approving such a suggestion or - coveting the property of others that they immediately disfranchised the man who - tried to slander the accused and did not award him a fifth part of the - votes.No other details are known of the - cases mentioned here. An Epicrates of Pallene is known to have been trierarch in 342 - B.C. (IG. 2.803 e), and may be the man referred to in connection with the - second of the two trials. -

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Or take a recent instance, if you like, the verdict given by the jury last month, - surely a most commendable decision. I refer to the case of Lysander, who - reported that the mine of Epicrates of Pallene had been bored beyond the boundaries. It had already - been worked for three years and virtually the richest men in Athens had shares in it. Lysander promised - to secure three hundred talents for the city, since that, he claimed, was the - sum which they had made from the mine.

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In spite of this the jury were governed, not by the accusers promises, but by the - claims of justice. They decided that the mine was within its proper limits, and - in one and the same verdict assured the safety of the men's estates and - guaranteed their working of the mine for the remainder of the period. That is - why the excavation of new mines, neglected previously because men were afraid, - is now in progress, and the city's revenues from these are again being - increased, revenues which some of our orators impaired by misleading the people - and subjecting the mine-workers to tribute.

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The good citizen, gentlemen of the jury, is not a man to make some small - additions to the public funds in ways which cause an ultimate loss, nor one who, - by dishonestly producing an immediate profit, cuts off the city's lawful source - of revenue. On the contrary, he is the man who is anxious to keep what will be - profitable to the city in the future, to preserve agreement among the citizens - and safeguard your reputation. There are some who disregard these things. By - taking money from contractors they claim that they are providing revenue, - although it is the lack of it that they are really causing in the city. For when - anxiety is attached to earning and saving, who will want to take the risk?

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Now perhaps it is not easy to prevent these men - from acting as they do; but you, gentlemen of the jury, have saved many other - citizens who were unjustly brought to trial. Then help Euxenippus in the same - way, rather than desert him over a trivial matter, and in an impeachment like - the present: an impeachment to which he is not liable, which has been framed in - defiance of the laws, and which moreover has been partly invalidated by the - prosecutor himself.

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For Polyeuctus has impeached Euxenippus for speaking against the best interests - of the people of Athens, being in - receipt of money and gifts from those acting against the people of Athens. Now if he were arguing that there - were men outside the city with whom Euxenippus was co-operating on receipt of - bribes, he would then be able to say that, since these persons could not be - punished, their servants in the city must be brought to justice. But, in fact, - he says that it is from Athenians that Euxenippus has had the gifts. For shame, - sir; when you have here in the city the men who act against the people, do you - let them be and choose instead to harass Euxenippus?

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I will say a few words more about the vote which - you are going to give and then leave the platform. When about to go to the - ballot, gentlemen of the jury, tell the clerk to read you the impeachment, the - impeachment law and the oath sworn by jurymen. Dispense with the arguments of us - all let the impeachment and the laws govern your decision and give whatever - verdict you consider to be just and in keeping with your oath.

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And now, Euxenippus, I have done all in my power - to help you. It remains for you to ask the jury's permission to summon your - friends and bring your children to the bar.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ccc6edce --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ + + + + + + In Defence of Euxenippus + Hyperides + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + Hyperides + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

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Personally, gentlemen of the jury, as I was just saying to those seated beside me,The opening words are the same as those of the speech against Demosthenes. I am surprised that you are not tired by now of this kind of impeachment. At one time the men impeached before you were Timomachus, Leosthenes, Callistratus, Philon of Anaea, Theotimus who lost Sestos, and others of the same type.Timomachus was an Athenian general who failed in his command against Cotys of Thrace (c. 361 B.C.), and on his return to Athens was condemned either to death or to a heavy fine. See Dem. 19.180, and the scholiast on Aeschin. 1.56. Leosthenes, who led an Athenian fleet against Alexander of Pherae (c. 361 B.C.), lost five triremes, was condemned to death at Athens and went into exile. See Aeschin. 2.124, and Diod. Sic. 15.95.2. For Callistratus, a prominent orator, exiled at about the same time and later put to death, see Lyc. 1.93. Theotimus, also about the year 361, was impeached for losing Sestos to Cotys. Of PhiIon nothing further is known. Some were accused of betraying ships, others of giving up Athenian cities, and another, an orator, of speaking against the people’s interests.

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Though there were five of them, not one waited to be tried; they left the city of their own accord and went into exile. The same is true of many others who were impeached. In fact it was a rare thing to see anyone subjected to impeachment appearing in court. So serious and so notorious were the crimes which at that time led to an impeachment. But the present practice in the city is utterly absurd.

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Diognides and Antidorus the metic are impeached on a charge of hiring out flute-girls at a higher price than that fixed by law, Agasicles of PiraeusAgasicles, according to Harpocration and Suidas (sv. Ἀγασικλῆς), though an alien, bribed the people of Halimus to enroll him in their deme. The former adds that Dinarchus wrote a speech prosecuting him for this. See Din. Fr. 7. because he was registered in Halimus, and Euxenippus because of the dreams which he claims to have had; though surely not one of these charges has anything to do with the impeachment law.

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And yet in public trials, gentlemen of the jury, the jury should refuse to listen to the details of the prosecution until they have first considered the point at issue, and also the written statement of the accused, to see if the pleas are legally valid. It is certainly wrong to maintain, as Polyeuctus did in his speech for the prosecution, that defendants should not insist on the impeachment law; which lays it down that impeachments shall be reserved for the orators themselves, when they speak against the interests of the people, but shall not apply to every Athenian.

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With me this law would have first claim to notice; and a point, I think, which should be dwelt on as much as any, is how to ensure that the laws in a democracy are binding and that impeachments and other actions brought into court are legally valid. It was with this in view that you made separate laws covering individually all offences committed in the city.

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Suppose someone commits a religious offence. There is the method of public prosecution before the King-Archon. Or he maltreats his parents. The Archon presides over his case. Someone makes illegal proposals in the city. There is the board of Thesmothetae ready. Perhaps he does something involving summary arrest. You have the authority of the Eleven.The King-Archon, who supervised all religious ceremonies of state, judged all cases connected with religion, while the Archon himself dealt with family law. (See Aristot. Ath. Pol. 57.2 and Aristot. Ath. Pol. 56.6.) For the Thesmothetae compare Hyp. 1.12 and note. Summary arrest could be legally employed against three classes of criminal. Of these, two were tried by the Eleven and one by the Thesmothetae. (See Aristot. Ath. Po1. 52.1.) Similarly, to deal with every other offence you have established laws, offices, and courts appropriate to each.

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In what cases then do you think impeachments should be used? Your answer has already been embodied in detail in the law, so as to leave no room for doubt. If any person, it says, seeks to overthrow the democracy of the Athenians. Naturally, gentlemen of the jury; for a charge like that admits of no excuse from anyone nor of an oath for postponement.A man due to be tried could offer the court an excuse (σκῆφις) and provide a second party to take an oath (ὑπωμοσία) that this excuse was true. In such cases the jury might grant a postponement. It should come directly into court.

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Or if he attends a meeting in any place with intent to undermine the democracy, or forms a political society; or if anyone betrays a city, or ships, or any land, or naval force, or being an orator, makes speeches contrary to the interests of the Athenian people, receiving bribes. The opening provisions of the law were made applicable by you to the entire citizen body, since those are offences which anyone might commit; but the latter part is directed against the orators themselves, in whose hands the proposing of measures rests.

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You would have been insane if you had framed the law in any other way; if, when the orators enjoy both the honors and the profits of speaking, you had exposed the ordinary citizen to the risks that go with them. Nevertheless, Polyeuctus is bold enough to assert, though he is bringing in an impeachment, that defendants must not make use of the impeachment law.

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All other prosecutors who think it necessary, when speaking first, to steal the defendants’ arguments from them encourage the jury to refuse to listen to any defendant who does not keep within the scope of the law, to challenge his statements and tell the clerk to read the law. The opposite is true of you: it is recourse to law of which you think you should deprive Euxenippus in his defence.

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You also maintain that no one should even help him or be his advocate, and you exhort the jury to refuse a hearing to those who come up to speak. And yet, of the many good institutions of the city, what is better or more democraticCompare Hyp. 1.10. than our custom, when some private person is facing the danger of a trial and cannot conduct his own defence, of allowing any citizen who wishes to come forward to help him and give the jury a fair statement of the case?

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You will claim, no doubt, that you have never worked on such a principle. Yet when you were prosecuted by Alexander of Oeon,Nothing further is known of this trial. For other occasions on which Hyperides opposed Polyeuctus compare Hyp. Fr. 24 andHyp. Fr. 25. you asked for ten advocates from the tribe Aegeis, and I was one of them, chosen by yourself. You also summoned men from other tribes into the court to help you. But why should I mention other instances? Take your handling of the present trial. Did you not make as many accusations as you wished? Did you not call Lycurgus to join you in the prosecution, a speaker who is the equal of any in the city and who has the reputation among these gentlemen of being sound and honorable?

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If you then, as a defendant, may summon advocates, or as a prosecutor may bring in co-prosecutors—you who are not merely capable of speaking for yourself but well able to give a whole city trouble—is Euxenippus, because he is not a professional speaker and is now advanced in years, even to be denied the help of friends and relatives, on pain of their being abused by you?

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Yes; for in the words of your indictment, his conduct has been scandalous and deserves the death penalty. Gentlemen of the jury, will you please review it and scrutinize it point by point? The people ordered Euxenippus, as one of three, to lie down in the temple; and he tells us that he fell asleep and had a dream which he reported to them. If you assumed, Polyeuctus, that this was true and that he reported to the people what he actually saw in his sleep, why is he to blame for notifying the Athenians of the commands which the god had been giving him?

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If on the other hand, as you now maintain, you thought that he misrepresented the god and, out of partiality for certain persons, had made a false report to the people, rather than propose a decree disputing the dream you ought to have sent to Delphi, as the previous speaker said, and inquired the truth from the god. But instead of doing that, you proposed a decree, entirely conceived by yourself,I follow Colin’s interpretation of the word αὐτοτελής in this passage, although it was often used technically to describe a decree laid before the people without previous consideration by the Council (see Hesychius, sv. αὐτοτελές ψήφισμα). against two tribes, a measure not only most unjust but self-contradictory also. This was what caused your conviction for illegal proposals. It was not the fault of Euxenippus.

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Let us consider it in this way. The tribes, formed into groups of two, shared out the mountains in Oropus awarded to them by the people. This mountain fell to the lot of Acamantis and Hippothoontis. You proposed that these tribes should restore the mountain to Amphiaraus and the price of produce from it which they had sold; your reason being that the fifty boundary officials had selected it beforehand and set it apart for the god, and that the two tribes had no right to be holding it.

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A little later in the same decree you propose that the eight tribes shall provide compensation and pay it to the other two so that they shall not suffer unfairly. But if the mountain really belonged to the two tribes and you tried to take it from them, surely we are entitled to be angry. Alternatively, if they had no right to be occupying it and it belonged to the god, why were you proposing that the other tribes should actually pay them compensation? They should have been well content that when restoring the property of the god they did not also pay a fine in cash.

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These proposals, when examined in court, were considered unsatisfactory, and the jury condemned you. So if you had been acquitted in your trial, Euxenippus would not have misrepresented the god: because you happened to be convicted, must ruin fall on him?Apparently it was loss of prestige which caused Polyeuctus to be resentful against Euxenippus, since the actual fine was negligible. And when you, who proposed a decree like that, were fined a mere twenty-five drachmas, is the man who lay down in the temple at the people’s request even to be refused a grave in Attica?

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Yes, you say; for he committed a serious crime in regard to the cup which he allowed Olympias to dedicate to the statue of Health.Olympias, mother of Alexander the Great, was sent by him about 331 B.C. to Epirus, where her brother Alexander was king. On the death of the latter she became regent for the young prince Neoptolemus and so controlled Molossia, which had been attached to the kingdom by Philip in 343 B.C. The statue of Health stood on the Acropolis. (See Paus. 1.23.5.) It is not known how Euxenippus was connected with this affair. You think that if you bring her name irrelevantly into the case to serve your own ends and accuse Euxenippus of deceitful flattery, you will bring down the jury’s hatred and anger upon him. The thing to do, my friend, is not to use the name of Olympias and Alexander in the hope of harming some citizen.

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Wait till they send the Athenian people some injunctions which are unjust or inappropriate. Then is the time for you to get up and oppose them in the interests of your city, disputing the cause of justice with their envoys and resorting to the Congress of the GreeksThe Congress, which united all Greek states except Sparta, was founded by Philip after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. as the champion of your country. But you never stood up or spoke about them there; it is only here that you hate Olympias

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so that you can ruin Euxenippus by alleging that he flatters her and the Macedonians. If you show us that he has ever been to Macedon or entertained any of the people in his own home, that he knows a Macedonian intimately or meets any of them; if you prove that he has said one word about such matters, either in a shop or in the market or anywhere else, instead of quietly and modestly minding his own business as much as any other citizen, the jury may do what they like with him.

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For if these charges of yours were true, not only you but everyone else in the city would know the facts, as is the case with all the others who speak or act in the interests of Macedon. Their conduct is no secret. The rest of Athens, even the schoolchildren, know the orators who take Macedonian money and the other persons who put up Macedonian visitors, either secretly making them welcome or going into the streets to meet them when they arrive. You will not see Euxenippus classed with a single one of these men anywhere.

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But you do not prosecute or bring to trial any of the people who are universally known to be doing these things, and yet you accuse Euxenippus of flattery when his manner of life disproves the charge. And yet if you had any sense, you would neither be blaming Euxenippus for the dedication of the cup nor have made any further mention of the affair, since it is impolitic to do so. Why is that? Will you please listen, gentlemen of the jury, to the account which I am going to give?

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Olympias has made complaints against you about the incident at Dodona,Dodona in Epirus was, second to Delphi, the most famous oracle of Greece. Dione, a consort of Zeus, was often worshipped in his temples. complaints which are unfair, as I have twice already proved in the Assembly before yourselves and the rest of Athens. I explained to her envoys that the charges she brings against the city are not justified. For Zeus of Dodona commanded you through the oracle to embellish the statue of Dione.

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You made a face as beautiful as you could, together with all the other appropriate parts; and having prepared a great deal of expensive finery for the goddess and dispatched envoys with a sacrifice at great expense, you embellished the statue of Dione in a manner worthy of yourselves and of the goddess. These measures brought you the complaints of Olympias, who said in her letters that the country of Molossia, in which the temple stands, belonged to her, and that therefore we had no right to interfere with anything there at all.

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Now if you decide that the incidents relating to the cup constitute an offence, we are in a sense condemning ourselves as being wrong in what we did at Dodona. But if we acquiesce in what has been done we shall have taken away her right to these theatrical complaints and accusations. For I presume that when Olympias can furnish ornaments for shrines in Athens we may safely do so at Dodona, particularly when the god demands it.

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However, it seems to me, Polyeuctus, that there is nothing which you would not use as grounds for an accusation. But from the time when you decided to play a part in public life, for which I admit you are well fitted, you should not have prosecuted private individuals or made them the victims of your impudence. Wait for an orator to commit a crime and then prosecute him, or for a general to do wrong and then impeach him. These are the men who have power to harm the city, all of them who choose to do so, not Euxenippus or any member of this jury.

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It is not as if I were prescribing one line of conduct for you having followed another in my own public life. I myself never in my life prosecuted any private citizen, and there are some whom before now I have done my best to help. What men, then, have I prosecuted and brought to trial? Aristophon of Hazenia,Of the three orators here mentioned Aristophon was prosecuted by Hyperides in 362 B.C., Diopithes at an unknown date, and Philocrates in 343. See further, notes on Hyp. Fr. 17,Hyp. Fr. 15, and Hyp. Fr. 16. now a most influential person in public life—he was acquitted in this court by two votes only;

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Diopithes of Sphettus, thought to be the most formidable man in the city; Philocrates of Hagnus, whose political career has been marked by the utmost daring and wantonness. I prosecuted that man for his services to Philip against Athens and secured his conviction in court. The impeachment which I drew up was just and in accordance with the law, referring to him as an orator giving counsel against the best interests of the people and receiving money and gifts from those working against them.

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Even so I was not satisfied to bring in the impeachment before I had added underneath: These proposals he made against the best interests of the people, because he had taken bribes. And I wrote his decree underneath. And again I added: These further proposals he made against the best interests of the people, because he had taken bribes. And I wrote the decree alongside. Indeed this statement is written down five or six times in my speech; for I thought that I must make the trial and the prosecution just. But you could not include in your impeachment the things which you allege Euxenippus to have said against the best interests of the people. Yet, though he is a private citizen, by your mode of prosecution you class him as an orator.

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After a scanty reference to the defendant’s written statement you are now bringing fresh charges and incriminations against him, mentioning, amongst other similar allegations, that he tried to marry his daughter to Philocles, that he undertook an arbitration for Demotion, and other similar charges.Nothing is known of Philocles and the reference to Demotion is obscure. He was clearly an unpopular character, perhaps the parasite feeder satirized by comedians (see Athen. 6.243 b). The translation of the phrase Δημοτίωνος δίαιταν ἔλαβενs is doubtful; it might mean: adopted the method of life of Demotion. Your intention is that, if the defence neglect the main indictment and deal with the irrelevant allegations, the jury shall interrupt them by calling: Why do you tell us this? and if they ignore the additional points entirely their case shall be weakened. For any charge that is not refuted is left to be fastened on by the anger of the jury.

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The most outrageous feature of your speech was the fact that often during the argument you let fall the remark—you thought that your motive in doing so passed unnoticed, though it was obvious—that Euxenippus was rich, and again, a little later, that he had amassed great wealth dishonestly. It has surely nothing to do with this case whether he is a man of large means or small, and to raise the matter is malicious and implies an unfair assumption regarding the jury, namely that they would base their verdict on other considerations than the point at issue and the question whether the man on trial is offending against you or not.

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You do not realize, Polyeuctus, it seems to me, you and those who share your views, that there is not in the world a single democracy or monarch or race more magnanimous than the Athenian people, and that it does not forsake those citizens who are maligned by others, whether singly or in numbers, but supports them.

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Let me give an instance. When Tisis of Agryle brought in an inventory of the estate of Euthycrates, amounting to more than sixty talents, on the grounds of its being public property, and again later promised to bring in an inventory of the estate of Philip and Nausicles saying that they had made their money from unregistered mines, this jury were so far from approving such a suggestion or coveting the property of others that they immediately disfranchised the man who tried to slander the accused and did not award him a fifth part of the votes.No other details are known of the cases mentioned here. An Epicrates of Pallene is known to have been trierarch in 342 B.C. (IG. 2.803 e), and may be the man referred to in connection with the second of the two trials.

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Or take a recent instance, if you like, the verdict given by the jury last month, surely a most commendable decision. I refer to the case of Lysander, who reported that the mine of Epicrates of Pallene had been bored beyond the boundaries. It had already been worked for three years and virtually the richest men in Athens had shares in it. Lysander promised to secure three hundred talents for the city, since that, he claimed, was the sum which they had made from the mine.

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In spite of this the jury were governed, not by the accusers promises, but by the claims of justice. They decided that the mine was within its proper limits, and in one and the same verdict assured the safety of the men’s estates and guaranteed their working of the mine for the remainder of the period. That is why the excavation of new mines, neglected previously because men were afraid, is now in progress, and the city’s revenues from these are again being increased, revenues which some of our orators impaired by misleading the people and subjecting the mine-workers to tribute.

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The good citizen, gentlemen of the jury, is not a man to make some small additions to the public funds in ways which cause an ultimate loss, nor one who, by dishonestly producing an immediate profit, cuts off the city’s lawful source of revenue. On the contrary, he is the man who is anxious to keep what will be profitable to the city in the future, to preserve agreement among the citizens and safeguard your reputation. There are some who disregard these things. By taking money from contractors they claim that they are providing revenue, although it is the lack of it that they are really causing in the city. For when anxiety is attached to earning and saving, who will want to take the risk?

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Now perhaps it is not easy to prevent these men from acting as they do; but you, gentlemen of the jury, have saved many other citizens who were unjustly brought to trial. Then help Euxenippus in the same way, rather than desert him over a trivial matter, and in an impeachment like the present: an impeachment to which he is not liable, which has been framed in defiance of the laws, and which moreover has been partly invalidated by the prosecutor himself.

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For Polyeuctus has impeached Euxenippus for speaking against the best interests of the people of Athens, being in receipt of money and gifts from those acting against the people of Athens. Now if he were arguing that there were men outside the city with whom Euxenippus was co-operating on receipt of bribes, he would then be able to say that, since these persons could not be punished, their servants in the city must be brought to justice. But, in fact, he says that it is from Athenians that Euxenippus has had the gifts. For shame, sir; when you have here in the city the men who act against the people, do you let them be and choose instead to harass Euxenippus?

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I will say a few words more about the vote which you are going to give and then leave the platform. When about to go to the ballot, gentlemen of the jury, tell the clerk to read you the impeachment, the impeachment law and the oath sworn by jurymen. Dispense with the arguments of us all let the impeachment and the laws govern your decision and give whatever verdict you consider to be just and in keeping with your oath.

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And now, Euxenippus, I have done all in my power to help you. It remains for you to ask the jury’s permission to summon your friends and bring your children to the bar.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml index 9c79fc225..60a6a926e 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -88,127 +88,127 @@
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Column 1 ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρακαθημένους ἀρτίως ἔλεγον, θαυμάζω εἰ μὴ προσίστανται ἤδη ὑμῖν αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσαγγελίαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρότερον εἰσηγγέλλοντο παρʼ ὑμῖν Τιμόμαχος καὶ Λεωσθένης καὶ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Φίλων ὁ ἐξ Ἀναίωνἐξ Ἀναίων Αἰξωνεὺς ci. Schneidewin. καὶ Θεότιμος ὁ Σηστὸν ἀπολέσας καὶ ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι· καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς αἰτίαν ἔχοντες προδοῦναι, οἱ δὲ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων, ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ ὢν λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ.

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Column 1 ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρακαθημένους ἀρτίως ἔλεγον, θαυμάζω εἰ μὴ προσίστανται ἤδη ὑμῖν αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσαγγελίαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρότερον εἰσηγγέλλοντο παρʼ ὑμῖν Τιμόμαχος καὶ Λεωσθένης καὶ Καλλίστρατος καὶ Φίλων ὁ ἐξ Ἀναίωνἐξ Ἀναίων Αἰξωνεὺς ci. Schneidewin. καὶ Θεότιμος ὁ Σηστὸν ἀπολέσας καὶ ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι· καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς αἰτίαν ἔχοντες προδοῦναι, οἱ δὲ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων, ὁ δὲ ῥήτωρ ὢν λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ.

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καὶ οὔτε τούτων πέντε ὄντων οὐδεὶς ὑπέμεινε τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ ᾤχοντο φεύγοντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, οὔτʼ Column 2 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων, ἀλλʼ ἦν σπάνιον ἰδεῖν ἀπʼ εἰσαγγελίας τινὰ κρινόμενον ὑπακούσαντα εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον· οὕτως ὑπὲρ μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων καὶ περιφανῶν αἱ εἰσαγγελίαι τότε ἦσαν. νυνὶ δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει πάνυ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν.

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καὶ οὔτε τούτων πέντε ὄντων οὐδεὶς ὑπέμεινε τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ ᾤχοντο φεύγοντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, οὔτʼ Column 2 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων, ἀλλʼ ἦν σπάνιον ἰδεῖν ἀπʼ εἰσαγγελίας τινὰ κρινόμενον ὑπακούσαντα εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον· οὕτως ὑπὲρ μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων καὶ περιφανῶν αἱ εἰσαγγελίαι τότε ἦσαν. νυνὶ δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει πάνυ καταγέλαστόν ἐστιν.

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Διογνίδης μὲν καὶ Ἀντίδωρος ὁ μέτοικος εἰσαγγέλλονται ὡς πλέονος μισθοῦντες τὰς αὐλητρίδας ἢ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, Ἀγασικλῆς Ἀγασικλῆς Babington: Ἀγησικλης A. δʼ ὁ ἐκ Πειραιέως ὅτι εἰς Ἁλιμουσίους ἐνεγράφη, Εὐξένιππος δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ὧν φησιν ἑωρακέναι· ὧν οὐδεμία δήπου τῶν αἰτιῶν τούτων οὐδὲν Column 3 κοινωνεῖ τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ.

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Διογνίδης μὲν καὶ Ἀντίδωρος ὁ μέτοικος εἰσαγγέλλονται ὡς πλέονος μισθοῦντες τὰς αὐλητρίδας ἢ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, Ἀγασικλῆς Ἀγασικλῆς Babington: Ἀγησικλης A. δʼ ὁ ἐκ Πειραιέως ὅτι εἰς Ἁλιμουσίους ἐνεγράφη, Εὐξένιππος δʼ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνυπνίων ὧν φησιν ἑωρακέναι· ὧν οὐδεμία δήπου τῶν αἰτιῶν τούτων οὐδὲν Column 3 κοινωνεῖ τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ.

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καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἀγώνων οὐ χρὴ τοὺς δικαστὰς πρότερον τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τῆς κατηγορίας ὑπομένειν ἀκούειν, πρὶν ἂν ἂν add. Schneidewin. αὐτὸ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦ ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν ἀντιγραφὴν ἐξετάσωσιν εἰ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἢ μή· οὐ μὰ Δία οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ Πολύευκτος ἔλεγεν, οὐ φάσκων δεῖν τοὺς ἀπολογουμένους ἰσχυρίζεσθαι τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ, ὃς κελεύει κατὰ τῶν ῥητόρων αὐτῶν τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἶναι περὶ τοῦ λέγειν μὴ [οὐ]οὐ del. Babington. τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ κατὰ Column 4 πάντων Ἀθηναίων.

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καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἀγώνων οὐ χρὴ τοὺς δικαστὰς πρότερον τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τῆς κατηγορίας ὑπομένειν ἀκούειν, πρὶν ἂν ἂν add. Schneidewin. αὐτὸ τὸ κεφάλαιον τοῦ ἀγῶνος καὶ τὴν ἀντιγραφὴν ἐξετάσωσιν εἰ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἢ μή· οὐ μὰ Δία οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ Πολύευκτος ἔλεγεν, οὐ φάσκων δεῖν τοὺς ἀπολογουμένους ἰσχυρίζεσθαι τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ, ὃς κελεύει κατὰ τῶν ῥητόρων αὐτῶν τὰς εἰσαγγελίας εἶναι περὶ τοῦ λέγειν μὴ [οὐ]οὐ del. Babington. τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ κατὰ Column 4 πάντων Ἀθηναίων.

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ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε πρότερον οὐδενὸς ἂν μνησθείην ἢ τούτου, οὔτε πλείους οἶμαι δεῖν λόγους ποιεῖσθαι περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ὅπως ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ κύριοι οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι κρίσεις κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἰσίασινεἰσίασιν edd.:εἰσίσασιν A. εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ὅσα ἔστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, νόμους ἔθεσθε χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν.

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ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε πρότερον οὐδενὸς ἂν μνησθείην ἢ τούτου, οὔτε πλείους οἶμαι δεῖν λόγους ποιεῖσθαι περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ὅπως ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ κύριοι οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰσαγγελίαι καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι κρίσεις κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἰσίασινεἰσίασιν edd.:εἰσίσασιν A. εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ὅσα ἔστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει, νόμους ἔθεσθε χωρὶς περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν.

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ἀσεβεῖ τις περὶ τὰ ἱερά· γραφαὶγραφαὶ γράφεται Schneidewin: post γραφαὶ add.εἰσιν Cobet. ἀσεβείας πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. — φαῦλός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ γονεῖς· ὁ ἄρχων ἐπὶ τούτου κάθηται. — παράνομά τις ἐν τῇ πόλει Column 5 γράφει· θεσμοθετῶν συνέδριον ἔστι. — ἀπαγωγῆς ἄξια ποιεῖ· ἀρχὴ τῶν ἕνδεκα καθέστηκε. — τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων ἁπάντων καὶ νόμους καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δικαστήρια τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν ἀπέδοτε.

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ἀσεβεῖ τις περὶ τὰ ἱερά· γραφαὶγραφαὶ γράφεται Schneidewin: post γραφαὶ add.εἰσιν Cobet. ἀσεβείας πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. — φαῦλός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ γονεῖς· ὁ ἄρχων ἐπὶ τούτου κάθηται. — παράνομά τις ἐν τῇ πόλει Column 5 γράφει· θεσμοθετῶν συνέδριον ἔστι. — ἀπαγωγῆς ἄξια ποιεῖ· ἀρχὴ τῶν ἕνδεκα καθέστηκε. — τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικημάτων ἁπάντων καὶ νόμους καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δικαστήρια τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν ἀπέδοτε.

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ὑπὲρ τίνων οὖν οἴεσθεοἴεσθε ᾤεσθε Cobet. δεῖν τὰς εἰσαγγελίας γίγνεσθαι; τοῦτʼ ἤδη καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἐγράψατε, ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοῇ μηδείς· ἐάν τις, φησί, τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καταλύῃ· — εἰκότως, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη αἰτία οὐ παραδέχεται σκῆψιν οὐδεμίαν οὐδενὸς οὐδʼ ὑπωμοσίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην αὐτὴν δεῖ Column 6 εἶναι ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· —

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ὑπὲρ τίνων οὖν οἴεσθεοἴεσθε ᾤεσθε Cobet. δεῖν τὰς εἰσαγγελίας γίγνεσθαι; τοῦτʼ ἤδη καθʼ ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἐγράψατε, ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοῇ μηδείς· ἐάν τις, φησί, τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καταλύῃ· — εἰκότως, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη αἰτία οὐ παραδέχεται σκῆψιν οὐδεμίαν οὐδενὸς οὐδʼ ὑπωμοσίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ταχίστην αὐτὴν δεῖ Column 6 εἶναι ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· —

συνίῃ ποι ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου ἢ ἑταιρικὸν συναγάγῃ, ἢ ἐάν τις πόλιν τινὰ προδῷ ἢ ναῦς ἢ πεζὴν ἢ ναυτικὴν στρατιάν, ἢ ῥήτωρ ὢν μὴ λέγῃ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνων· τὰ μὲν ἄνω τοῦ νόμου κατὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν γράψαντες (ἐκ πάντων γὰρ καὶ τἀδικήματα ταῦτα γένοιτʼ ἄν), τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον τοῦ νόμου κατʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ῥητόρων, παρʼ οἷς ἔστιν καὶ τὸ γράφειν τὰ ψηφίσματα.

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ἐμαίνεσθε γὰρ ἄν, εἰ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τὸν νόμον τοῦτον ἔθεσθε ἢ οὕτως· εἰ τὰς μὲν τιμὰς καὶ τὰς Column 7 ὠφελίας ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες καρποῦνται, τοὺς δὲ κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀνεθήκατε. ἀλλʼ ὅμως Πολύευκτος οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀνδρεῖος, ὥστε εἰσαγγελίαν διώκων οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν τοὺς φεύγοντας τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ χρῆσθαι.

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ἐμαίνεσθε γὰρ ἄν, εἰ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τὸν νόμον τοῦτον ἔθεσθε ἢ οὕτως· εἰ τὰς μὲν τιμὰς καὶ τὰς Column 7 ὠφελίας ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν οἱ ῥήτορες καρποῦνται, τοὺς δὲ κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀνεθήκατε. ἀλλʼ ὅμως Πολύευκτος οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀνδρεῖος, ὥστε εἰσαγγελίαν διώκων οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν τοὺς φεύγοντας τῷ εἰσαγγελτικῷ νόμῳ χρῆσθαι.

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καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες κατήγοροι, ὅταν οἴωνται δεῖν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ λόγῳ ὑφελεῖν τῶν φευγόντων τὰς ἀπολογίας, τοῦτο παρακελεύονται τοῖς δικασταῖς, μὴ ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν ἀπολογουμένων, ἐάν τινες ἔξω τοῦ νόμου λέγωσιν, ἀλλʼ ἀπαντᾶν πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ κελεύειν τὸν νόμον ἀναγιγνώσκειν· σὺ δὲ Column 8 τοὐναντίον τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καταφυγὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀπολογίας οἴει δεῖν ἀφελέσθαι Εὐξενίππου.

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καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες κατήγοροι, ὅταν οἴωνται δεῖν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ λόγῳ ὑφελεῖν τῶν φευγόντων τὰς ἀπολογίας, τοῦτο παρακελεύονται τοῖς δικασταῖς, μὴ ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν ἀπολογουμένων, ἐάν τινες ἔξω τοῦ νόμου λέγωσιν, ἀλλʼ ἀπαντᾶν πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ κελεύειν τὸν νόμον ἀναγιγνώσκειν· σὺ δὲ Column 8 τοὐναντίον τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καταφυγὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀπολογίας οἴει δεῖν ἀφελέσθαι Εὐξενίππου.

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καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲ βοηθεῖν οὐδένα φῂς δεῖν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ συναγορεύειν, ἀλλὰ παρακελεύῃ τοῖς δικασταῖς μὴ θέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν ἀναβαινόντων. καίτοι τί τούτου τῶν τούτου τῶν Cobet: τοῦ τῶν A. ἐν τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἢ δημοτικώτερόν ἐστι, πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων καλῶν ὄντων, ἢ ὁπόταν τις ἰδιώτης εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ κίνδυνον καταστὰς μὴ δύνηται ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, τούτῳ τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξεῖναι ἀναβάντα βοηθῆσαι καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος τὰ δίκαια διδάξαι;

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καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδὲ βοηθεῖν οὐδένα φῂς δεῖν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ συναγορεύειν, ἀλλὰ παρακελεύῃ τοῖς δικασταῖς μὴ θέλειν ἀκούειν τῶν ἀναβαινόντων. καίτοι τί τούτου τῶν τούτου τῶν Cobet: τοῦ τῶν A. ἐν τῇ πόλει βέλτιον ἢ δημοτικώτερόν ἐστι, πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων καλῶν ὄντων, ἢ ὁπόταν τις ἰδιώτης εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ κίνδυνον καταστὰς μὴ δύνηται ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, τούτῳ τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξεῖναι ἀναβάντα βοηθῆσαι καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγματος τὰ δίκαια διδάξαι;

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Column 9 ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία αὐτὸς τοιούτῳ πράγματι οὐ κέχρησαι, ἀλλʼ ὅτʼ ἔφευγες τὸν ἀγῶνα ὑπʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ ἐξ Οἴου, δέκα μὲν συνηγόρους ἐκ τῆς Αἰγηίδος φυλῆς ᾐτήσω, ὧν καὶ ἐγὼ εἷς ἦν αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐκάλεις ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον τοὺς βοηθήσοντάς σοι. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τί δεῖ λέγειν; αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ ἀγῶνι πῶς κέχρησαι; οὐ κατηγόρησας ὁπόσα ἐβούλου; οὐ Λυκοῦργον ἐκάλεις συγκατηγορήσοντα, οὔτε τῷ λέγειν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καταδεέστερον ὄντα, παρὰ τούτοις τε μέτριον καὶ ἐπιεικῆ δοκοῦντα εἶναι;

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Column 9 ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία αὐτὸς τοιούτῳ πράγματι οὐ κέχρησαι, ἀλλʼ ὅτʼ ἔφευγες τὸν ἀγῶνα ὑπʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ ἐξ Οἴου, δέκα μὲν συνηγόρους ἐκ τῆς Αἰγηίδος φυλῆς ᾐτήσω, ὧν καὶ ἐγὼ εἷς ἦν αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἐκάλεις ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον τοὺς βοηθήσοντάς σοι. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τί δεῖ λέγειν; αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ ἀγῶνι πῶς κέχρησαι; οὐ κατηγόρησας ὁπόσα ἐβούλου; οὐ Λυκοῦργον ἐκάλεις συγκατηγορήσοντα, οὔτε τῷ λέγειν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καταδεέστερον ὄντα, παρὰ τούτοις τε μέτριον καὶ ἐπιεικῆ δοκοῦντα εἶναι;

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εἶτα σοὶ μὲν ἔξεστι καὶ φεύγοντι τοὺς βοηθήσοντας Column 10 καλεῖν καὶ διώκοντι τοὺς συγκατηγόρους ἀναβιβάσασθαι, ὃς οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ δύνασαι εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλῃPostὅλῃ add. τῇ Cobet. πόλει πράγματα παρέχειν ἱκανὸς εἶ, Εὐξενίππῳ δʼ ὅτι ἰδιώτης ἐστὶ καὶ πρεσβύτερος οὐδὲ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἐξέσται βοηθεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, διαβληθήσονται ὑπὸ σοῦ;

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εἶτα σοὶ μὲν ἔξεστι καὶ φεύγοντι τοὺς βοηθήσοντας Column 10 καλεῖν καὶ διώκοντι τοὺς συγκατηγόρους ἀναβιβάσασθαι, ὃς οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ δύνασαι εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλῃPostὅλῃ add. τῇ Cobet. πόλει πράγματα παρέχειν ἱκανὸς εἶ, Εὐξενίππῳ δʼ ὅτι ἰδιώτης ἐστὶ καὶ πρεσβύτερος οὐδὲ τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους ἐξέσται βοηθεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, διαβληθήσονται ὑπὸ σοῦ;

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νὴ Δία, τὰ γὰρ πεπραγμένα αὐτῷ δεινά ἐστι καὶ ἄξια θανάτου, ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ. σκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐξετάζοντες. ὁ δῆμος προσέταξεν Εὐξενίππῳ τρίτῳ αὐτῷ ἐγκατακλιθῆναι εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, οὗτος δὲ κοιμηθεὶς ἐνύπνιόν φησιν ἰδεῖν, Column 11 ὃ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τοῦτʼ εἰ μὲν ὑπελάμβανες ἀληθὲς εἶναι, καὶ ὃ εἶδεν ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸν ἀπαγγεῖλαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, τί καὶ ἀδικεῖ, ἃ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ προσέταττε ταῦτʼ ἐξαγγείλας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους;

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νὴ Δία, τὰ γὰρ πεπραγμένα αὐτῷ δεινά ἐστι καὶ ἄξια θανάτου, ὡς σὺ λέγεις ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ. σκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐξετάζοντες. ὁ δῆμος προσέταξεν Εὐξενίππῳ τρίτῳ αὐτῷ ἐγκατακλιθῆναι εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, οὗτος δὲ κοιμηθεὶς ἐνύπνιόν φησιν ἰδεῖν, Column 11 ὃ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπαγγεῖλαι. τοῦτʼ εἰ μὲν ὑπελάμβανες ἀληθὲς εἶναι, καὶ ὃ εἶδεν ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸν ἀπαγγεῖλαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, τί καὶ ἀδικεῖ, ἃ ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ προσέταττε ταῦτʼ ἐξαγγείλας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους;

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εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ νυνὶ λέγεις, ἡγοῦ αὐτὸν καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ χαριζόμενόν τισι μὴ τἀληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ ψήφισμα ἐχρῆν σε πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον γράφειν, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ὁ πρότερος ἐμοῦ λέγων εἶπεν, εἰς Δελφοὺς πέμψαντα πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. σὺ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησας, ψήφισμα δὲ αὐτοτελὲς ἔγραψας κατὰ δυοῖν φυλαῖν οὐ μόνον ἀδικώτατον, Column 12 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ· διʼ ὅπερ ἥλως παρανόμων, οὐ διʼ Εὐξένιππον.

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εἰ δέ, ὥσπερ νυνὶ λέγεις, ἡγοῦ αὐτὸν καταψεύσασθαι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ χαριζόμενόν τισι μὴ τἀληθῆ ἀπηγγελκέναι τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ ψήφισμα ἐχρῆν σε πρὸς τὸ ἐνύπνιον γράφειν, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ὁ πρότερος ἐμοῦ λέγων εἶπεν, εἰς Δελφοὺς πέμψαντα πυθέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. σὺ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐποίησας, ψήφισμα δὲ αὐτοτελὲς ἔγραψας κατὰ δυοῖν φυλαῖν οὐ μόνον ἀδικώτατον, Column 12 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ· διʼ ὅπερ ἥλως παρανόμων, οὐ διʼ Εὐξένιππον.

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ἐξετάσωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τουτονὶ τὸν τρόπον. αἱ φυλαὶ σύνδυο γενόμεναι τὰ ὄρη τὰ ἐν Ὠρωπῷ διείλοντο, τοῦ δήμου αὐταῖς δόντος. τοῦτο τὸ ὄρος ἔλαχενἔλαχεν ἔλαχον Cobet. Ἀκαμαντὶς καὶ Ἱπποθοωντίς. ταύτας τὰς φυλὰς ἔγραψας ἀποδοῦναι τὸ ὄρος τῷ Ἀμφιαράῳ καὶ τὴν τιμὴν ὧν ἀπέδοντο, ὡς πρότερον τοὺς ὁριστὰς τοὺς πεντήκοντα ἐξελόντας αὐτὸ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἀφορίσαντας, καὶ οὐ προσηκόντως τὰς δύο φυλὰς ἐχούσας τὸ ὄρος.

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ἐξετάσωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τουτονὶ τὸν τρόπον. αἱ φυλαὶ σύνδυο γενόμεναι τὰ ὄρη τὰ ἐν Ὠρωπῷ διείλοντο, τοῦ δήμου αὐταῖς δόντος. τοῦτο τὸ ὄρος ἔλαχενἔλαχεν ἔλαχον Cobet. Ἀκαμαντὶς καὶ Ἱπποθοωντίς. ταύτας τὰς φυλὰς ἔγραψας ἀποδοῦναι τὸ ὄρος τῷ Ἀμφιαράῳ καὶ τὴν τιμὴν ὧν ἀπέδοντο, ὡς πρότερον τοὺς ὁριστὰς τοὺς πεντήκοντα ἐξελόντας αὐτὸ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἀφορίσαντας, καὶ οὐ προσηκόντως τὰς δύο φυλὰς ἐχούσας τὸ ὄρος.

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μικρὸν δὲ διαλιπὼν ἐν ταὐτῷ ψηφίσματι γράφεις τὰς ὀκτὼ φυλὰς πορίσαιπορίσαι Cobet:ποιῆσαι A. τοῖν τοῖν Westermann:ταν A. Column 13 δυοῖν φυλαῖν τὰ διάφορα καὶ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐλαττῶνται. καίτοι εἰ μὲν ἴδιον ὂνὂν add. Cobet. τῶν φυλῶν ἀφῃροῦ τὸ ὄρος, πῶς οὐκ ὀργῆς ἄξιος εἶ;εἶ add. Schneidewin. εἰ δὲ μὴ προσηκόντως εἶχον αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ὄν, διὰ τί τὰς ἄλλας φυλὰς ἔγραφες αὐταῖς προσαποδιδόναι ἀργύριον; ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἦν αὐταῖς εἰ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποδώσουσιν καὶ μὴ προσαποτείσουσιν ἀργύριον.

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μικρὸν δὲ διαλιπὼν ἐν ταὐτῷ ψηφίσματι γράφεις τὰς ὀκτὼ φυλὰς πορίσαιπορίσαι Cobet:ποιῆσαι A. τοῖν τοῖν Westermann:ταν A. Column 13 δυοῖν φυλαῖν τὰ διάφορα καὶ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅπως ἂν μὴ ἐλαττῶνται. καίτοι εἰ μὲν ἴδιον ὂνὂν add. Cobet. τῶν φυλῶν ἀφῃροῦ τὸ ὄρος, πῶς οὐκ ὀργῆς ἄξιος εἶ;εἶ add. Schneidewin. εἰ δὲ μὴ προσηκόντως εἶχον αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ὄν, διὰ τί τὰς ἄλλας φυλὰς ἔγραφες αὐταῖς προσαποδιδόναι ἀργύριον; ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἦν αὐταῖς εἰ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποδώσουσιν καὶ μὴ προσαποτείσουσιν ἀργύριον.

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ταῦτʼ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐξεταζόμενα οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκει γεγράφθαι, ἀλλὰ κατεψηφίσαντό σου οἱ δικασταί. εἶτʼ εἰ μὲν ἀπέφυγες τὴν γραφήν, οὐκ ἂν κατεψεύσατο οὗτος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνέβη σοι ἁλῶναι, Εὐξένιππον δεῖ ἀπολωλέναι; καὶ σοὶ Column 14 μὲν τῷ τοιοῦτο ψήφισμα γράψαντι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι δραχμῶν ἐτιμήθη, τὸν δὲ κατακλιθέντα εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ δήμου κελεύσαντος μηδʼ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ δεῖ τεθάφθαι;

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ταῦτʼ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐξεταζόμενα οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκει γεγράφθαι, ἀλλὰ κατεψηφίσαντό σου οἱ δικασταί. εἶτʼ εἰ μὲν ἀπέφυγες τὴν γραφήν, οὐκ ἂν κατεψεύσατο οὗτος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνέβη σοι ἁλῶναι, Εὐξένιππον δεῖ ἀπολωλέναι; καὶ σοὶ Column 14 μὲν τῷ τοιοῦτο ψήφισμα γράψαντι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι δραχμῶν ἐτιμήθη, τὸν δὲ κατακλιθέντα εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ δήμου κελεύσαντος μηδʼ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ δεῖ τεθάφθαι;

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ναί τεθάφαι. ναί Kayser (coll. Hyp. ii. 10; Dinarch i. 7): τεταφναι A (litterisθαι in margine additis).· δεινὰ γὰρ ἐποίησεν περὶ τὴν φιάλην, ἐάσας Ὀλυμπιάδα ἀναθεῖναι εἰς τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς Ὑγιείας. τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἐφόδιον ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸ ἐκείνης ὄνομα παραφέρων καὶ κολακείαν ψευδῆ κατηγορῶν Εὐξενίππον, μῖσος καὶ ὀργὴν αὐτῷ συλλέξειν παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν. δεῖ δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε, μὴ ἐπὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπιάδος ὀνόματι καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρου τῶν πολιτῶν Column 15 τινα ζητεῖν κακόν τι ἐργάσασθαι,

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ναί τεθάφαι. ναί Kayser (coll. Hyp. ii. 10; Dinarch i. 7): τεταφναι A (litterisθαι in margine additis).· δεινὰ γὰρ ἐποίησεν περὶ τὴν φιάλην, ἐάσας Ὀλυμπιάδα ἀναθεῖναι εἰς τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς Ὑγιείας. τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἐφόδιον ἑαυτῷ εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸ ἐκείνης ὄνομα παραφέρων καὶ κολακείαν ψευδῆ κατηγορῶν Εὐξενίππον, μῖσος καὶ ὀργὴν αὐτῷ συλλέξειν παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν. δεῖ δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε, μὴ ἐπὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπιάδος ὀνόματι καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρου τῶν πολιτῶν Column 15 τινα ζητεῖν κακόν τι ἐργάσασθαι,

ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιστέλλωσι μὴ τὰ δίκαια μηδὲ τὰ προσήκοντα, τότε ἀναστάντα ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἀντιλέγειν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἥκοντας παρʼ αὐτῶν δικαιολογεῖσθαι καὶ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον πορεύεσθαι βοηθήσοντα τῇ πατρίδι. σὺ δʼ ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐδεπώποτε ἀνέστης οὐδὲ λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐποιήσω, ἐνθάδε δὲ μισεῖς Ὀλυμπιάδα ἐπὶ τῷ ἀπολέσαι Εὐξένιππον,

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καὶ φῂς κόλακα αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐκείνης καὶ Μακεδόνων· ὃν ἐὰν δείξῃς ἀφιγμένον πώποτε εἰς Column 16 Μακεδονίαν, ἢ ἐκείνων τινὰ ὑποδεξάμενον εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν, ἢ χρώμενον τῶν ἐκεῖθέν τινι ἢ ἐντυγχάνοντα, ἢ λόγους καὶ οὑστινασοῦν ἢ ἐπʼ ἐργαστηρίου ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἢ ἄλλοθί που περὶ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰρηκότα, καὶ μὴ κοσμίως καὶ μετρίως τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα ὥσπερ εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν, χρησάσθωσαν αὐτῷ οἱ δικασταὶ ὅ τι βούλονται.

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καὶ φῂς κόλακα αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐκείνης καὶ Μακεδόνων· ὃν ἐὰν δείξῃς ἀφιγμένον πώποτε εἰς Column 16 Μακεδονίαν, ἢ ἐκείνων τινὰ ὑποδεξάμενον εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν, ἢ χρώμενον τῶν ἐκεῖθέν τινι ἢ ἐντυγχάνοντα, ἢ λόγους καὶ οὑστινασοῦν ἢ ἐπʼ ἐργαστηρίου ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἢ ἄλλοθί που περὶ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰρηκότα, καὶ μὴ κοσμίως καὶ μετρίως τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα ὥσπερ εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν, χρησάσθωσαν αὐτῷ οἱ δικασταὶ ὅ τι βούλονται.

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εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἦν ἀληθῆ ἃ κατηγορεῖς, οὐκ ἂν σὺ μόνος ᾔδεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει· ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι τι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἢ λέγουσιν ἢ πράττουσιν, Column 17 οὐ μόνον αὐτοί,αὐτοί οὗτοι Cobet. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι ἴσασι καὶ τὰ παιδία τὰ ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς παρʼ ἐκείνων μισθαρνοῦντας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς ξενίζοντας τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν ἥκοντας καὶ ὑποδεχομένους καὶ εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς ὑπαντῶντας ὅταν προσίωσιπροσίωσι προίωσι Cobet.· καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ὄψει οὐδὲ παρʼ ἑνὶ τούτων Εὐξένιππον καταριθμούμενον.

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εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἦν ἀληθῆ ἃ κατηγορεῖς, οὐκ ἂν σὺ μόνος ᾔδεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει· ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι τι ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἢ λέγουσιν ἢ πράττουσιν, Column 17 οὐ μόνον αὐτοί,αὐτοί οὗτοι Cobet. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι ἴσασι καὶ τὰ παιδία τὰ ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς παρʼ ἐκείνων μισθαρνοῦντας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς ξενίζοντας τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν ἥκοντας καὶ ὑποδεχομένους καὶ εἰς τὰς ὁδοὺς ὑπαντῶντας ὅταν προσίωσιπροσίωσι προίωσι Cobet.· καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ὄψει οὐδὲ παρʼ ἑνὶ τούτων Εὐξένιππον καταριθμούμενον.

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σὺ δʼ ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδένα κρίνεις οὐδʼ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθίστης, οὓς πάντες ἴσασι ταὺτα πράττοντας, κατʼ Εὐξενίππου δὲ κολακείαν κατηγορεῖς, οὗ ὁ βίος τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ παραδέχεται. Column 18 καίτοι, εἰ νοῦν εἶχες, περί γε τῆς φιάλης τῆς ἀνατεθείσης οὔτʼ ἂν Εὐξένιππον ᾐτιῶ, οὔτʼ ἂν ἄλλον λόγον οὐδένα ἐνταῦθα ἐποιήσω· οὐ γὰρ ἁρμόττει. διὰ τί; καί μου τὸν λόγον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀκούσατε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν.

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σὺ δʼ ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδένα κρίνεις οὐδʼ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθίστης, οὓς πάντες ἴσασι ταὺτα πράττοντας, κατʼ Εὐξενίππου δὲ κολακείαν κατηγορεῖς, οὗ ὁ βίος τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ παραδέχεται. Column 18 καίτοι, εἰ νοῦν εἶχες, περί γε τῆς φιάλης τῆς ἀνατεθείσης οὔτʼ ἂν Εὐξένιππον ᾐτιῶ, οὔτʼ ἂν ἄλλον λόγον οὐδένα ἐνταῦθα ἐποιήσω· οὐ γὰρ ἁρμόττει. διὰ τί; καί μου τὸν λόγον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀκούσατε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν.

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ὑμῖν Ὀλυμπιὰς ἐγκλήματα πεποίηται περὶ τὰ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οὐ δίκαια, ὡς ἐγὼ δὶς ἤδη ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τοὺς ἥκοντας παρʼ αὐτῆς ἐξήλεγξα οὐ προσήκοντα αὐτὴν ἐγκλήματα τῇ πόλει ἐγκαλοῦσαν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Δωδωναῖος προσέταξεν ἐν τῇ μαντείᾳ τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς Διώνης Column 19 ἐπικοσμῆσαι·

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ὑμῖν Ὀλυμπιὰς ἐγκλήματα πεποίηται περὶ τὰ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οὐ δίκαια, ὡς ἐγὼ δὶς ἤδη ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τοὺς ἥκοντας παρʼ αὐτῆς ἐξήλεγξα οὐ προσήκοντα αὐτὴν ἐγκλήματα τῇ πόλει ἐγκαλοῦσαν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Δωδωναῖος προσέταξεν ἐν τῇ μαντείᾳ τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς Διώνης Column 19 ἐπικοσμῆσαι·

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καὶ ὑμεῖς πρόσωπόν τε ποιησάμενοι ποιησάμενοι Kayser:κοσμησάμενοι A: κομισάμενοι Comparetti. ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ ἀκόλουθα, καὶ κόσμον πολὺν καὶ πολυτελῆ τῇ θεῷ παρασκευάσαντες, καὶ θεωρίαν καὶ θυσίαν πολλῶν χρημάτων ἀποστείλαντες, ἐπεκοσμήσατε τὸ ἕδος τῆς Διώνης ἀξίως καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς θεοῦ. ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε παρʼ Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοττία Μολοττία Lightfoot: Μολοσσία A : del.Cobet. αὑτῆς, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσήκεινπροσήκειν Cobet:προσῆκεν A. ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ ἓν κινεῖν.

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καὶ ὑμεῖς πρόσωπόν τε ποιησάμενοι ποιησάμενοι Kayser:κοσμησάμενοι A: κομισάμενοι Comparetti. ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστον καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ ἀκόλουθα, καὶ κόσμον πολὺν καὶ πολυτελῆ τῇ θεῷ παρασκευάσαντες, καὶ θεωρίαν καὶ θυσίαν πολλῶν χρημάτων ἀποστείλαντες, ἐπεκοσμήσατε τὸ ἕδος τῆς Διώνης ἀξίως καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς θεοῦ. ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε παρʼ Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χώρα εἴη ἡ Μολοττία Μολοττία Lightfoot: Μολοσσία A : del.Cobet. αὑτῆς, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὔκουν προσήκεινπροσήκειν Cobet:προσῆκεν A. ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ ἓν κινεῖν.

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ἐὰν μὲν τοίνυν τὰ περὶ τὴν φιάλην γεγονότα ἐν ἀδικήματι ψηφίσησθε εἶναι, Column 20 τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καταγιγνώσκομεν ὡς τὰ ἐκεῖ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπράξαμεν· ἐὰν δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ γεγενημένου ἐῶμεν, τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας ἀφῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα. οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὀλυμπιάδι μὲν τὰ Ἀθήνησιν ἱερὰ ἐπικοσμεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οὐκ ἐξέσται, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ θεοῦ προστάξαντος.

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ἐὰν μὲν τοίνυν τὰ περὶ τὴν φιάλην γεγονότα ἐν ἀδικήματι ψηφίσησθε εἶναι, Column 20 τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καταγιγνώσκομεν ὡς τὰ ἐκεῖ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπράξαμεν· ἐὰν δʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ γεγενημένου ἐῶμεν, τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας ἀφῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα. οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὀλυμπιάδι μὲν τὰ Ἀθήνησιν ἱερὰ ἐπικοσμεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὰ ἐν Δωδώνῃ οὐκ ἐξέσται, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ θεοῦ προστάξαντος.

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ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Πολύευκτε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ὅθεν κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιο. καίτοι σε ἐχρῆν, ἐπείπερ προῄρησαι πολιτεύεσθαι, καὶ νὴ Δία καὶ δύνασαι, μὴ τοὺς ἰδιώτας κρίνειν μηδʼ εἰς τούτους νεανιεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν Column 21 ῥητόρων ἐάν τις ἀδικῇ, τοῦτον κρίνειν, στρατηγὸς ἐάν τις μὴ τὰ δίκαια πράττῃ, τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλλειν· παρὰ γὰρ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι βλάπτειν τὴν πόλιν, ὅσοι ἂν αὐτῶν προαιρῶνται, οὐ παρʼ Εὐξενίππῳ οὐδὲ τῶν δικαστῶν τούτων οὐδενί.

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ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Πολύευκτε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, ὅθεν κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιο. καίτοι σε ἐχρῆν, ἐπείπερ προῄρησαι πολιτεύεσθαι, καὶ νὴ Δία καὶ δύνασαι, μὴ τοὺς ἰδιώτας κρίνειν μηδʼ εἰς τούτους νεανιεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν Column 21 ῥητόρων ἐάν τις ἀδικῇ, τοῦτον κρίνειν, στρατηγὸς ἐάν τις μὴ τὰ δίκαια πράττῃ, τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλλειν· παρὰ γὰρ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι βλάπτειν τὴν πόλιν, ὅσοι ἂν αὐτῶν προαιρῶνται, οὐ παρʼ Εὐξενίππῳ οὐδὲ τῶν δικαστῶν τούτων οὐδενί.

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καὶ οὐ σὲ μὲν οὕτως οἴομαι δεῖν πράττειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τῇ πολιτείᾳ κέχρημαι, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ αὐτὸς ἰδιώτην οὐδένα πώποτε ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἔκρινα, ἤδη δέ τισι καθʼ ὅσον ἐδυνάμην ἐβοήθησα. τίνας οὖν κέκρικα καὶ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθέστακα; Ἀριστοφῶντα τὸν Ἁζηνιέα, Ἁζηνιέα Schaefer:αιζηνιεα A. ὃς ἰσχυρότατος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγένηται ( Column 22 καὶ οὗτος ἐν τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ δύο ψήφους ἀπέφυγε)·

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καὶ οὐ σὲ μὲν οὕτως οἴομαι δεῖν πράττειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τῇ πολιτείᾳ κέχρημαι, ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ αὐτὸς ἰδιώτην οὐδένα πώποτε ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἔκρινα, ἤδη δέ τισι καθʼ ὅσον ἐδυνάμην ἐβοήθησα. τίνας οὖν κέκρικα καὶ εἰς ἀγῶνα καθέστακα; Ἀριστοφῶντα τὸν Ἁζηνιέα, Ἁζηνιέα Schaefer:αιζηνιεα A. ὃς ἰσχυρότατος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγένηται ( Column 22 καὶ οὗτος ἐν τούτῳ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ δύο ψήφους ἀπέφυγε)·

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Διοπείθη τὸν Σφήττιον, ὃς δεινότατος ἐδόκει ἐδόκει Schaefer: δόκει A. εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· Φιλοκράτη τὸν Ἁγνούσιον, ὃς θρασύτατα καὶ ἀσελγέστατα τῇ πολιτείᾳ κέχρηται. τοῦτον εἰσαγγείλας ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ὧν Φιλίππῳ ὑπηρέτει [αὶ] καὶ del. Blass:ὑπηρετήκει Schoemann. κατὰ τῆς πόλεως, εἷλον ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, καὶ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἔγραψα δικαίαν καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, ῥήτορα ὄντα λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνοντα καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ τῶν τἀναντία πραττόντων τῷ δήμῳ·

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Διοπείθη τὸν Σφήττιον, ὃς δεινότατος ἐδόκει ἐδόκει Schaefer: δόκει A. εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· Φιλοκράτη τὸν Ἁγνούσιον, ὃς θρασύτατα καὶ ἀσελγέστατα τῇ πολιτείᾳ κέχρηται. τοῦτον εἰσαγγείλας ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ὧν Φιλίππῳ ὑπηρέτει [αὶ] καὶ del. Blass:ὑπηρετήκει Schoemann. κατὰ τῆς πόλεως, εἷλον ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, καὶ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν ἔγραψα δικαίαν καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος κελεύει, ῥήτορα ὄντα λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνοντα καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ τῶν τἀναντία πραττόντων τῷ δήμῳ·

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καὶ οὐδʼ οὕτως ἀπέχρησέ μοι τὴν Column 23 εἰσαγγελίαν ἂν ἂν del. Babington. δοῦναι, ἀλλʼ ὑποκάτω παρέγραψα· τάδʼ εἶπεν οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ χρήματα λαβών, εἶτα τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτοῦ ὑπέγραψα· καὶ πάλιν, τάδε εἶπεν οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ χρήματα λαβών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα παρέγραφον. καὶ ἔστι μοι πεντάκις ἢ ἑξάκις τοῦτο γεγραμμένον· δίκαιον γὰρ ᾤμην δεῖν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιῆσαι. σὺ δʼ ἃ μὲν εἰπεῖν Εὐξένιππον φῂς οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, οὐκ εἶχες γράψαι εἰς τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν, ἰδιώτην δʼ ὄντα κρίνεις ἐν τῇ τοῦ ῥήτορος τάξει.

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καὶ οὐδʼ οὕτως ἀπέχρησέ μοι τὴν Column 23 εἰσαγγελίαν ἂν ἂν del. Babington. δοῦναι, ἀλλʼ ὑποκάτω παρέγραψα· τάδʼ εἶπεν οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ χρήματα λαβών, εἶτα τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτοῦ ὑπέγραψα· καὶ πάλιν, τάδε εἶπεν οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ χρήματα λαβών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα παρέγραφον. καὶ ἔστι μοι πεντάκις ἢ ἑξάκις τοῦτο γεγραμμένον· δίκαιον γὰρ ᾤμην δεῖν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ποιῆσαι. σὺ δʼ ἃ μὲν εἰπεῖν Εὐξένιππον φῂς οὐ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ, οὐκ εἶχες γράψαι εἰς τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν, ἰδιώτην δʼ ὄντα κρίνεις ἐν τῇ τοῦ ῥήτορος τάξει.

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μικρὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀντιγραφῆς εἰπών, ἑτέρας αἰτίας καὶ διαβολὰς Column 24 ἥκεις φέρων κατʼ αὐτοῦ, λέγων ὡς Φιλοκλεῖ τὴν θυγατέρα ἐδίδου καὶ Δημοτίωνος δίαιταν ἔλαβεν, καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας κατηγορίας, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἀφέμενοιPost ἀφέμενοι excidisse οἱ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἀπολογούμενοι vel simile aliquid suspicatus est Kenyon. τῆς εἰσαγγελίας περὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος κατηγορηθέντων ἀπολογῶνται, ἀπαντῶσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ δικασταί· τί ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν λέγετε; ἐὰν δὲ μηδένα λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν ποιῶνται, ὁ ἀγὼν αὐτοῖς χείρων γίγνηται. τῶν γὰρ κατηγορηθέντων τὸ μὴ λαβὸν ἀπολογίαν ὑπὸ τῇ ὀργῇ τῶν δικαστῶν καταλείπεται.

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μικρὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀντιγραφῆς εἰπών, ἑτέρας αἰτίας καὶ διαβολὰς Column 24 ἥκεις φέρων κατʼ αὐτοῦ, λέγων ὡς Φιλοκλεῖ τὴν θυγατέρα ἐδίδου καὶ Δημοτίωνος δίαιταν ἔλαβεν, καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας κατηγορίας, ἵνʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἀφέμενοιPost ἀφέμενοι excidisse οἱ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἀπολογούμενοι vel simile aliquid suspicatus est Kenyon. τῆς εἰσαγγελίας περὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος κατηγορηθέντων ἀπολογῶνται, ἀπαντῶσιν αὐτοῖς οἱ δικασταί· τί ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν λέγετε; ἐὰν δὲ μηδένα λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν ποιῶνται, ὁ ἀγὼν αὐτοῖς χείρων γίγνηται. τῶν γὰρ κατηγορηθέντων τὸ μὴ λαβὸν ἀπολογίαν ὑπὸ τῇ ὀργῇ τῶν δικαστῶν καταλείπεται.

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καὶ τὸ πάντων δεινότατον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λεγομένων μένων ὑπὸ σοῦ, ὃ σὺ ᾤου λανθάνειν ὧν Column 25 ἕνεκα λέγεις, οὐ λανθάνων, ὁπότε παραφθέγγοιο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ πολλάκις, ὡς πλούσιός ἐστιν Εὐξένιππος, καὶ πάλιν διαλιπών, ὡς οὐκ ἐκ δικαίου πολλὴν οὐσίαν συνείλεκται· ἃ εἰς μὲν τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον οὐδὲν δήπου ἐστίν, εἴτε πολλὰ οὗτος κέκτηται εἴτε ὀλίγα, τοῦ δὲ λέγοντος κακοηθία καὶ ὑπόληψις εἰς τοὺς δικαστὰς οὐ δικαία, ὡς ἄλλοθί που οὗτοι τὴν γνώμην ἂν σχοίησαν ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ πότερον ἀδικεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κρινόμενος ἢ οὔ.

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καὶ τὸ πάντων δεινότατον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λεγομένων μένων ὑπὸ σοῦ, ὃ σὺ ᾤου λανθάνειν ὧν Column 25 ἕνεκα λέγεις, οὐ λανθάνων, ὁπότε παραφθέγγοιο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ πολλάκις, ὡς πλούσιός ἐστιν Εὐξένιππος, καὶ πάλιν διαλιπών, ὡς οὐκ ἐκ δικαίου πολλὴν οὐσίαν συνείλεκται· ἃ εἰς μὲν τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον οὐδὲν δήπου ἐστίν, εἴτε πολλὰ οὗτος κέκτηται εἴτε ὀλίγα, τοῦ δὲ λέγοντος κακοηθία καὶ ὑπόληψις εἰς τοὺς δικαστὰς οὐ δικαία, ὡς ἄλλοθί που οὗτοι τὴν γνώμην ἂν σχοίησαν ἢ ἐπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ πότερον ἀδικεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κρινόμενος ἢ οὔ.

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κακῶς μοικακῶς μοι Blass: κακῶς ἐμοὶ Cobet. δοκεῖς εἰδέναι, ὦ Πολύευκτε, ςύ τε σύ τε Cobet. καὶ οἱ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκοντες,γιγνώσκοντες Muller. ὅτι οὔτε δῆμός οὔτε δῆμός Cobet. ἐστιν οὐδὲ εἷς οὐδὲ εἷς Blass. ἐν τῇ Column 26 οἰκουμένῃ οὔτε μόναρχος οὔτε ἔθνος μεγαλοψυχότερον τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ συκοφαντουμένους τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπό τινων ἢ καθʼ ἕνα ἢ ἅθρους οὐ προίεται ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ.

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κακῶς μοικακῶς μοι Blass: κακῶς ἐμοὶ Cobet. δοκεῖς εἰδέναι, ὦ Πολύευκτε, ςύ τε σύ τε Cobet. καὶ οἱ ταὐτὰ γιγνώσκοντες,γιγνώσκοντες Muller. ὅτι οὔτε δῆμός οὔτε δῆμός Cobet. ἐστιν οὐδὲ εἷς οὐδὲ εἷς Blass. ἐν τῇ Column 26 οἰκουμένῃ οὔτε μόναρχος οὔτε ἔθνος μεγαλοψυχότερον τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ συκοφαντουμένους τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπό τινων ἢ καθʼ ἕνα ἢ ἅθρους οὐ προίεται ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ.

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καὶ πρῶτον μὲν Τείσιδος τοῦ Ἀγρυλῆθεν ἀπογράψαντος τὴν Εὐθυκράτους οὐσίαν ὡς δημοσίαν οὖσαν, ἣ πλεόνων ἢ ἑξήκοντα ταλάντων ἦν, καὶ μετʼ ἐκείνην πάλιν ὑπισχνουμένου τὴν Θιλίππου καὶ Ναυσικλέους ἀπογράψειν, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἐξ ἀναπογράφων μετάλλων πεπλουτήκασι, τοσοῦτον τοσοῦτον Caesar. οὗτοι ἀπέλιπον τοῦ προσέσθαι τοῦ προσέσθαι Spengel. τινὰ τοιοῦτοντοιοῦτον Babington. λόγον Column 27 ἢ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥστε τὸν ἐγχειρήσαντα συκοφαντεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς ἠτίμωσαν, τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐ μεταδόντες.

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καὶ πρῶτον μὲν Τείσιδος τοῦ Ἀγρυλῆθεν ἀπογράψαντος τὴν Εὐθυκράτους οὐσίαν ὡς δημοσίαν οὖσαν, ἣ πλεόνων ἢ ἑξήκοντα ταλάντων ἦν, καὶ μετʼ ἐκείνην πάλιν ὑπισχνουμένου τὴν Θιλίππου καὶ Ναυσικλέους ἀπογράψειν, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἐξ ἀναπογράφων μετάλλων πεπλουτήκασι, τοσοῦτον τοσοῦτον Caesar. οὗτοι ἀπέλιπον τοῦ προσέσθαι τοῦ προσέσθαι Spengel. τινὰ τοιοῦτοντοιοῦτον Babington. λόγον Column 27 ἢ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥστε τὸν ἐγχειρήσαντα συκοφαντεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς ἠτίμωσαν, τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐ μεταδόντες.

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τοῦτο δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τὸ πρώην ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν πραχθὲν τοῦ ἐξελθόντος μηνὸς πῶς οὐ μεγάλου ἐπαίνου ἄξιόν ἐστι; φήναντος γὰρ Λυσάνδρου τὸ Ἐπικράτους μέταλλον τοῦ ΠαλληνέωςPostΠαλληνέως add.ὡς Cobet. ἐντὸςἐντὸς ἐκτὸς Cobet, et apud Dem. xxxvii, 36. τῶν μέτρων τετμημένον, ὃ ἠργάζετο μὲν ἤδη τρία ἔτη, μετεῖχον δʼ αὐτοῦ οἱ πλουςιώτατοι σχεδόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος ὑπισχνεῖτο τριακόσια τάλαντα εἰςπράξειν εἰσπράξειν Schneidewin. τῇ πόλει (τοσαῦτατοσαῦτα Babington. γὰρ εἰληφέναι αὐτοὺςαὐτοὺς Cobet:αὐτὸν Babington.κ Column 28 τοῦ μετάλλου)·

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τοῦτο δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τὸ πρώην ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν πραχθὲν τοῦ ἐξελθόντος μηνὸς πῶς οὐ μεγάλου ἐπαίνου ἄξιόν ἐστι; φήναντος γὰρ Λυσάνδρου τὸ Ἐπικράτους μέταλλον τοῦ ΠαλληνέωςPostΠαλληνέως add.ὡς Cobet. ἐντὸςἐντὸς ἐκτὸς Cobet, et apud Dem. xxxvii, 36. τῶν μέτρων τετμημένον, ὃ ἠργάζετο μὲν ἤδη τρία ἔτη, μετεῖχον δʼ αὐτοῦ οἱ πλουςιώτατοι σχεδόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος ὑπισχνεῖτο τριακόσια τάλαντα εἰςπράξειν εἰσπράξειν Schneidewin. τῇ πόλει (τοσαῦτατοσαῦτα Babington. γὰρ εἰληφέναι αὐτοὺςαὐτοὺς Cobet:αὐτὸν Babington.κ Column 28 τοῦ μετάλλου)·

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ἀλλʼ ὅμως οἱ δικασταὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ κατηγόρου ὑποσχέσεις ἀποβλέποντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἔγνωσαν ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ μέταλλον, καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ τάς τε οὐσίας αὐτῶν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν ὑπόλοιπον ἐργασίαν τοῦ μετάλλου ἐβεβαίωσαν. τοιγαροῦν αἱ καινοτομίαιPost καινοτομίαι add. αἱ Cobet. πρότερον ἐκλελειμμέναι διὰ τὸν φόβον νῦν ἐνεργοί, καὶ τῆς πόλεως αἱ πρόσοδοι αἱ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν αὔξονται, ἃς ἐλυμήναντό τινες τῶν ῥητόρων ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ δασμολογήσαντες τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν. ἐκεῖθεν Lightfoot.

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ἀλλʼ ὅμως οἱ δικασταὶ οὐ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ κατηγόρου ὑποσχέσεις ἀποβλέποντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἔγνωσαν ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ μέταλλον, καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ τάς τε οὐσίας αὐτῶν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν ὑπόλοιπον ἐργασίαν τοῦ μετάλλου ἐβεβαίωσαν. τοιγαροῦν αἱ καινοτομίαιPost καινοτομίαι add. αἱ Cobet. πρότερον ἐκλελειμμέναι διὰ τὸν φόβον νῦν ἐνεργοί, καὶ τῆς πόλεως αἱ πρόσοδοι αἱ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν αὔξονται, ἃς ἐλυμήναντό τινες τῶν ῥητόρων ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ δασμολογήσαντες τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν. ἐκεῖθεν Lightfoot.

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ἔστι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐχ οὗτος χρηστὸςχρηστὸς Meuss. πολίτης, ὅστις Column 29 μικρὰ δοὺς πλείω βλάπτει τὰ κοινά, οὐδʼ ὅστις εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἐξ ἀδίκου πορίσας κατέλυσε τῆς πόλεως τὴν ἐκ δικαίου πρόσοδον, ἀλλʼ ὅτῳ μέλει καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὠφελίμων τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς ὁμονοίας τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑμετέρας· ὧν ἔνιοι οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐργαζομένων ἀφαιρούμενοι πόρους φασὶ τούτους πορίζειν, ἀπορίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασκευάζοντες. ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ Babington: ἦν A. φοβερὸν τὸ κτᾶσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, τίς βουλήσεται κινδυνεύειν;

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ἔστι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐχ οὗτος χρηστὸςχρηστὸς Meuss. πολίτης, ὅστις Column 29 μικρὰ δοὺς πλείω βλάπτει τὰ κοινά, οὐδʼ ὅστις εἰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἐξ ἀδίκου πορίσας κατέλυσε τῆς πόλεως τὴν ἐκ δικαίου πρόσοδον, ἀλλʼ ὅτῳ μέλει καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὠφελίμων τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς ὁμονοίας τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑμετέρας· ὧν ἔνιοι οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐργαζομένων ἀφαιρούμενοι πόρους φασὶ τούτους πορίζειν, ἀπορίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασκευάζοντες. ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ Babington: ἦν A. φοβερὸν τὸ κτᾶσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, τίς βουλήσεται κινδυνεύειν;

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τούτους μὲν οὖν ἴσως οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι κωλῦσαι ταῦτα πράττειν· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Column 30 δικασταί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς σεσώκατε τῶν πολιτῶν ἀδίκως εἰς ἀγῶνας καταστάντας, οὕτω καὶ Εὐξενίππῳ βοηθήσατε, καὶ μὴ περιίδητε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πράγματι οὐδενὸς ἀξίῳ καὶ εἰσαγγελίᾳ τοιαύτῃ, ᾗ οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν εἰσηγγελμένη, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κατηγόρου τρόπον τινὰ ἀπολελυμένη.

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τούτους μὲν οὖν ἴσως οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι κωλῦσαι ταῦτα πράττειν· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες Column 30 δικασταί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς σεσώκατε τῶν πολιτῶν ἀδίκως εἰς ἀγῶνας καταστάντας, οὕτω καὶ Εὐξενίππῳ βοηθήσατε, καὶ μὴ περιίδητε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ πράγματι οὐδενὸς ἀξίῳ καὶ εἰσαγγελίᾳ τοιαύτῃ, ᾗ οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν εἰσηγγελμένη, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κατηγόρου τρόπον τινὰ ἀπολελυμένη.

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εἰσήγγελκε γὰρ αὐτὸν Πολύευκτος λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνοντα καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ τῶν τἀναντία πραττόντων τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔξωθεν τῆς Column 31 πόλεώς τινας ᾐτιᾶτο εἶναι, παρʼ ὧν τὰ δῶρα εἰληφότα. Εὐξένιππον συναγωνίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς, ἦν ἂν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνους οὐκ ἔστι τιμωρήσασθαι, δεῖ τοὺς ἐνθάδε αὐτοῖςαὐτοῖς Babington:αὐτοὺς A. ὑπηρετοῦντας δίκην δοῦναι. νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους φησὶν εἶναι παρʼ ὧν τὰς δωρεὰς εἰληφέναι αὐτόν. εἶτα σύ, ἔχων ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς ὑπεναντία πράττοντας τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ τιμωρῇ, ἀλλʼ Εὐξενίππῳ πράγματα παρέχεις;

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εἰσήγγελκε γὰρ αὐτὸν Πολύευκτος λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνοντα καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ τῶν τἀναντία πραττόντων τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔξωθεν τῆς Column 31 πόλεώς τινας ᾐτιᾶτο εἶναι, παρʼ ὧν τὰ δῶρα εἰληφότα. Εὐξένιππον συναγωνίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς, ἦν ἂν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνους οὐκ ἔστι τιμωρήσασθαι, δεῖ τοὺς ἐνθάδε αὐτοῖςαὐτοῖς Babington:αὐτοὺς A. ὑπηρετοῦντας δίκην δοῦναι. νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους φησὶν εἶναι παρʼ ὧν τὰς δωρεὰς εἰληφέναι αὐτόν. εἶτα σύ, ἔχων ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς ὑπεναντία πράττοντας τῷ δήμῳ, οὐ τιμωρῇ, ἀλλʼ Εὐξενίππῳ πράγματα παρέχεις;

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βραχὺ δʼ ἔτι εἰπὼν περὶ τῆς ψήφου ἧς ὑμεῖς μέλλετε φέρειν καταβήσομαι. ὅταν γὰρ μέλλητε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, διαψηφίζεσθαι, κελεύετε Column 32 ὑμῖν τὸν γραμματέα ὑπαναγνῶναι τήν τε εἰσαγγελίαν καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν εἰσαγγελτικὸν καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τὸν ἡλιαστικόν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἁπάντων ἡμῶν ἀφέλετε, ἐκ δὲ τῆς εἰσαγγελίας καὶ τῶν νόμων σκεψάμενοι ὅ τι ἂν ὑμῖν δοκῇ δίκαιον καὶ εὔορκον εἶναι, τοῦτο ψηφίσασθε.

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βραχὺ δʼ ἔτι εἰπὼν περὶ τῆς ψήφου ἧς ὑμεῖς μέλλετε φέρειν καταβήσομαι. ὅταν γὰρ μέλλητε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, διαψηφίζεσθαι, κελεύετε Column 32 ὑμῖν τὸν γραμματέα ὑπαναγνῶναι τήν τε εἰσαγγελίαν καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν εἰσαγγελτικὸν καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τὸν ἡλιαστικόν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν λόγους ἁπάντων ἡμῶν ἀφέλετε, ἐκ δὲ τῆς εἰσαγγελίας καὶ τῶν νόμων σκεψάμενοι ὅ τι ἂν ὑμῖν δοκῇ δίκαιον καὶ εὔορκον εἶναι, τοῦτο ψηφίσασθε.

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ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν σοί, Εὐξένιππε, βεβοήθηκα ὅσα εἶχον. λοιπὸν δʼ ἐστὶ δεῖσθαι τῶν δικαστῶν καὶ τοὺς φίλους παρακαλεῖν καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀναβιβάζεσθαι.Subscriptio in A: ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου εἰσαγγελίας ἀπολογία πρὸς Πολύευκτον.

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ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν σοί, Εὐξένιππε, βεβοήθηκα ὅσα εἶχον. λοιπὸν δʼ ἐστὶ δεῖσθαι τῶν δικαστῶν καὶ τοὺς φίλους παρακαλεῖν καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀναβιβάζεσθαι.Subscriptio in A: ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου εἰσαγγελίας ἀπολογία πρὸς Πολύευκτον.

diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/__cts__.xml index 8ed09a35f..97a911640 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Κατὰ Δημοσθένους ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἁρπαλείων - Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + Against Demosthenes + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index da840b1af..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0140", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Hyperides/opensource/hyp_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=5", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index b1a804980..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,455 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - Against Demosthenes from Speeches (English). Machine readable text - Hyperides - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - - - Hyperides - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - -
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Personally, gentlemen of the jury, as I was just - saying to those seated beside me, what surprises me is this. Is it really true - that Demosthenes, unlike any other man in Athens, is exempt from the laws which enforce an agreement made - by a person against his own interests? Is he unaffected by the people's decrees, - which you have sworn to observe in voting, decrees which were proposed, not by - any of his enemies, but by Demosthenes himself, and which the people carried on - his motion, almost as though he deliberately sought to destroy himself . . . and - yet the just verdict, gentlemen of the jury, is, as I see it, simple: it is in - our favor against Demosthenes. In private suits differences are often settled by - challenge, and that is how this affair also has been settled. Look at it in this - way, gentlemen. The people accused you, Demosthenes, of having accepted twenty - talents illegally, against the interests of the state. You denied having done so - and drew up a challenge, which you laid before the people in the form of a - decree entrusting the matter on which you were accused to the council of the - Areopagus. . . .

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. . . and you malign the Areopagus and publish - challenges, in which you ask how you came by the gold, who gave it you, and - where. Perhaps you will end by asking what you used it for after you obtained - it, as though you were demanding a banker's statement from the Areopagus. I, on - the other hand, should like to know from you why the council of the Areopagus - said . . .

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. . . the reports. On the contrary they have - shown, as you will recognize, an exceptionally democratic spirit in handling the - affair. They reported the guilty persons; even this was not done from choice but - in answer to repeated pressure from the people; and they did not undertake to - punish them on their own responsibility but rightly left it to you, with whom - the final authority rests. It is not only his own trial which Demosthenes has in - mind when he determines to mislead you by abusing the report; he wishes also to - frustrate all the other prosecutions which the city has in hand. That is a point - to be carefully borne in mind and you must not be deceived by the defendant's - argument. For these reports concerning the money of Harpalus have all been drawn - up by the Areopagus on an equal footing. They are the same for all the accused. - In no case has the council added the reason why it publishes a particular name. - It stated summarily how much money each man had received, adding that he was - liable for that amount. Is Demosthenes to have more weight with you than the - report given against him? . . .The sense of - the missing words appears to be: “If you discredit the report, you thereby - admit that no one took the money, and all the others are acquitted.” - For of course this argument, if it protects Demosthenes, will also protect the - rest. The sum on which you are pronouncing judgement is not twenty, but four - hundred,The figure mentioned later, in - column 10, is 350 talents, which is confirmed by Pseudo-Plut. Dem. 846 B. Hence Boeckh suggested the reading 400 - in this passage, on the grounds that Hyperides would be more likely to - exaggerate than otherwise. talents. You are judging all the crimes, - not one. For your mad conduct, Demosthenes, has made you champion of all these - criminals, foremost in danger as you are in impudence. In my opinion the fact - that you took the gold is proved to the jury well enough by your being condemned - by the council to which you entrusted yourself. . . .Although the missing Greek words cannot be restored with - certainty, the sense appears to be: “I shall now produce the evidence - relating to the gold which you previously accepted, and, as I said, explain - why you took the money and for what reasons you disgraced the whole - city.” When Harpalus arrived in Attica, gentlemen of the jury, and the envoys from Philoxenus - demanding him were, at the same time, brought into the Assembly, Demosthenes - came forward and made a long speech in which he argued that it was not right for - Athens to surrender Harpalus to - the envoys from Philoxenus,Philoxenus, one of - Alexander's generals, was governor of Cilicia at the time. and that Alexander must not be - left with any cause for complaint, on his account, against the people; the - safest course for the city was to guard the money and the person of Harpalus, - and to take up all the money, with which Harpalus had entered Attica, to the Acropolis on the following day, - while Harpalus himself should announce then and there how much money there was. - His real purpose, it seems, was not simply to learn the figure, but to find out - from how large a sum he was to collect his commission. Sitting below in his - usual place in the niche,It is not known what - niche is meant. It may have been a cutting in the side of the Pnyx. The word - katatomh/ is cited by Harpocration - as occurring in this speech. he told Mnesitheus the dancer to ask - Harpalus how much money there would be to take up to the Acropolis. The answer - given was seven hundred talents. . . .In the - missing lines Hyperides probably explained that the Assembly was then - dismissed and not summoned again until the following day, when the money had - been paid over. Pseudo-Plut. Dem. 846 B, - says that Demosthenes was accused of having taken bribes because he had not - reported the amount of money brought to the Acropolis or the carelessness of - those in charge of it. He had told you himself in the Assembly that - that was the correct figure; and yet when the total brought up to the Acropolis - was three hundred and fifty talents instead of seven hundred, having by then - received his twenty, he did not utter a word. . . . After saying before the - Assembly that there were seven hundred talents you now bring up half. . . .The sense of the mutilated column 11 appears to - be: “You did not reflect that if the whole amount originally mentioned was - not taken up to the Acropolis someone must have embezzled. You were - interested solely in your own fee; for you cannot persuade us that you - received nothing when we know that Demades was paid 5000 staters.” For the - bribe paid to Demades see Din. 1.89. - Harpalus would not have bought . . . nor would the city be exposed to accusation - and reproach. But of all these things, Demosthenes . . . It was you who decreed - that a guard should be posted over the person of Harpalus. Yet when it relaxed - its vigilance you did not try to restore it, and after it was disbanded you did - not prosecute those responsible. I suppose you went unpaid for your shrewd - handling of the crisis? If Harpalus distributed his gold among the lesser - orators, who had nothing to give but noise and shouting, what of you who control - our whole policy? Did he pass you over? That is incredible. So supreme is the - contempt, gentlemen of the jury, with which Demosthenes has treated the affair, - or to be quite frank, you and the laws, that at the outset, it seems, he - admitted having taken the money but said that he had used it on your behalf and - had borrowed it free of interestThere does not - seem to be an exact parallel for this use of the word prodanei/zomai and there are two possible - interpretations. (1) The active prodanei/zw apparently has the sense of “lend without - interest” in Pseudo-Plut. Lives of the Ten Orators 852 B, and in Aristot. Ath. Pol. 16. If the - translation given above is correct, Demosthenes claimed to have borrowed the - money from Harpalus and to have advanced it to the Athenian people. (2) On - the other hand the noun prodaneisth/s is - used in a Delian inscription with the sense of “one who borrows for - another.” On this analogy we might translate prodaneisme/nos as “having borrowed for the people.” - Demosthenes would thus be claiming to have acted as an intermediary in - accepting a loan from Harpalus to the state. for the Theoric fund. - CnosionCnosion, a boy with whom - Demosthenes was friendly, is mentioned also by Aeschin. 2.149, and by the scholiast on that passage. and - his other friends went about saying that Demosthenes would be compelled by his - accusers to publish facts which he wished kept secret and to admit that he had - borrowed the money free of interest for the state to meet expenses of - government. Since the anger of those of you who heard this statement was greatly - increased by these aspersions cast on your democracy, on the grounds that he was - not content to have taken bribes himself but thought fit to infect the people - too . . .The gist of the missing lines was - probably that Demosthenes changed his tactics and began to plead a different - excuse. speaking and complaining that the Areopagus was seeking favor - with Alexander and for that reason wanted to destroy him. As if you did not all - know that no one destroys the kind of man who can be bought. On the contrary, it - is the opponent who can be neither persuaded nor corrupted with bribes that men - contrive to be rid of by any means in their power. There is some likelihood, it - seems, that you, Demosthenes, are deaf to prayers and not to be persuaded into - taking bribes? Do not imagine, gentlemen, that only trivial matters are affected - by the venal conduct of these men. For it is no secret that all who conspire for - power in Greece secure the smaller - cities by force of arms and the larger ones by buying the influential citizens - in them; and we know that Philip reached the height he did because, at the - outset, he sent money to the Peloponnese, Thessaly, - and the rest of Greece, and those with - power in the cities and authority. . . .The - words “he bribed” should probably be added to complete the sense. -

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. . . you tell us marvellous stories, little - thinking that your conduct is no secret; you professed to be supporting the - people's interests but were clearly speaking on behalf of Alexander. Personally - I believe that even in the past everyone knew that you acted in this way over - the Thebans, and over all the rest, and that you appropriated money, which was - sent from Asia to buy help,Compare Din. 1.10, - note and Din. 1.18-22; Aeschin. 3.239-240. Demosthenes was said by his opponents to - have accepted money from Persia for - use against Macedon, but to have - withheld it when Alexander destroyed Thebes in 335 B.C. for your own - personal use, spending most of it; and now you engage in sea commerce and make - bottomry loans, and having bought a house . . . you do not live in the - Piraeus but have your anchorage - outside the city.The house in the Piraeus is mentioned by Din. 1.69; and Aeschin. 3. - 209 uses these exact words. A popular leader worthy of the - name should be the savior of his country, not a deserter. When Harpalus recently - descended on Greece so suddenly that he - took everyone by surprise, he found affairs in the Peloponnese and in the rest of Greece in this condition owing to the arrival of Nicanor with - the orders which he brought from Alexander relating to the exilesDin. 1.82 also refers - to this event, which took place in 324 B.C. - Nicanor, the son-in-law of Aristotle, was sent by Alexander to Olympia to proclaim his demand for the - return to their cities of all Greek exiles except the Thebans. and to - the . . . of the Achaean, Arcadian, and Boeotian Leagues. . . . You have - contrived this situation by means of your decree, because you arrested Harpalus. - You have induced the whole of Greece to - send envoys to Alexander, since they have no other recourse, and have prevented - all the satraps, who by themselves would willingly have joined forces with us, - each with money and all the troops at his disposal, not merely from revolting - from him, by your detention of Harpalus, but also . . . each of them . . .The general sense appears to be: “All the - satraps united with Alexander. You yourself are now a supporter of his and - have your agents with every important Macedonian.” -

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. . . sent by Demosthenes,Sauppe suspected that the man here referred to was Aristion - of Samos, a friend of Demosthenes - who, according to >Harpocration (s. v. *)aristi/wn), was mentioned in this speech and was sent by - Demosthenes to Hephaestion in order to reach an understanding with him. For - Callias and Taurosthenes of Chalcis compare Din. 1.44 and - note. and with Olympias Callias the Chalcidian, the brother of - Taurosthenes. For these men were made Athenian citizens on the motion of - Demosthenes and they are his special agents. Naturally enough; for being - perpetually unstable himself, I suppose he might well have friends from the - Euripus.A comparison between the Euripus, - a very changeable strait, and the character of Callias is made also by Aeschin. 3.90. Will you dare then - presently to speak to me of friendship . . . you yourself broke up that - friendship when you accepted bribes against your country and made a change of - front. You made yourself a laughing stock and brought disgrace on those who had - ever shared your policy in former years. When we might have gained the highest - distinction in public life and been accompanied for the remainder of our lives - by the best of reputations, you frustrated all these hopes, and you are not - ashamed, even at your age,Demosthenes was just - over sixty. to be tried by youths for bribery. And yet the positions - ought to be reversed: your generation ought to be training the younger orators, - reproving and punishing any over-impetuous action. But the fact is just the - opposite: the youths are taking to task the men of over sixty. Therefore, - gentlemen of the jury, you have a right to feel resentful towards Demosthenes; - for after gaining a tolerable reputation and great riches, all through you, even - on the threshold of old age he has no loyalty to his country. But you used to be - ashamed . . . the Greeks who were standing round, when you passed sentence on - certain persons, to think that such popular leaders and generals and guardians - of your affairs . . .The sense of this passage - is probably: “Since you condemned such generals as Timotheus, though you - shrank from doing so, you should not hesitate to condemn Demosthenes.” - Compare Din. 1.16. -

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. . . For to take money is not so serious as to - take it from the wrong source, and the private individuals who took the gold are - not so culpable as the orators and generals. Why is that? Because the private - individuals were given the money by Harpalus for safe-keeping, but the generals - and orators have accepted it with some policy in view. The laws prescribe that - ordinary offenders shall pay a simple fine but that men accepting bribes shall - pay ten times the usual sum.The term a)dikei=n seems to be used in this context to - describe the milder breaches of the law, and is used in the same sense by - Aristot. Ath. Pol. 54.2, where - kle/ptein, dw=ra, lamba/nein and - a)dikei=n are distinguished as - punishable with a tenfold fine, a tenfold fine, and a simple fine - respectively. Dinarchus is misleading when he refers (Din. 1.60) to a double fine. A simple fine was doubled only when - it was not paid up within a fixed time. Therefore, just as we can - lawfully fix the penalty for these men, so also . . . from you against them. . . - . It is as I said in the Assembly. You give full permission, gentlemen of the - jury, to the orators and generals to reap substantial rewards. It is not the - laws which grant them this privilege but your tolerance and generosity. But on - one point you insist: your interests must be furthered, not opposed, with the - money they receive. Now Demosthenes and Demades, from actual decrees passed in - the city and from proxenies, have each received, I believe, more than sixty - talents, quite apart from the Persian funds and money sent from Alexander. If - neither of these sources suffices for them, and they have now accepted bribes - which threaten the city's life itself, can we doubt our right to punish them? - Suppose that one of you, mere private individuals, during the tenure of some - office, makes a mistake through ignorance or inexperience; he will be - overwhelmed in court by the eloquence of these men and will either lose his life - or be banished from his country. Shall they themselves, after harming the city - on such a scale, escape unscathed? Conon of Paeania took theoric money for his son who was - abroad.Conon is perhaps the banker to whom Dinarchus refers (Din. 1.43), and the incident which he mentions - later in the speech (i. 56) is possibly the same as that to which Hyperides - is alluding here, though according to Dinarchus it was the Areopagus who - accused the culprit. Compare Din. 1.56, note. The - story of Aristomachus is not known. He was prosecuted for it by these - men in court, and though he asked your pardon, had to pay a talent, all for - taking five drachmas. Aristomachus also, because, on becoming principal of the - Academy, he transferred a spade from the wrestling school to his own garden near - by and used it and . . .

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. . . However during the period which - followedHyperides is referring to the - period which followed Chaeronea, - and the statesman in question is Lycurgus. Demosthenes also speaks of the - number of trials which took place at this time (Dem. - 18.249). Hyperides himself was prosecuted by Aristogiton. Compare - Hyp. Fr. 18 and note. the people did - not forbid us to approach them or to discuss with them; instead they used us as - counsellors and advisers . . . and elected him next . . . as treasurer with full - control of their finances, considering, quite rightly, that we owed him a debt - of gratitude. Later, too, though we were often brought to trial on the strength - of that policy and the war itself, these men did not vote against us once but - brought us safely through everything; and one could not have a more impressive, - or a surer sign of popular favor. . . .The - sense of the mutilated passage beginning with the words kai\ gra/yai has been restored by Blass and - Colin as follows: “Although you, Demosthenes, dared to propose the death - penalty for yourself if the council reported that you had received anything - from Harpalus, when it made its report and you were ipso facto convicted by - the terms of the decree, these gentlemen did not take account of the - circumstance but allowed you a special trial. For the people have always - behaved in such a way towards us orators, etc.” the people so behaved - that though deprived themselves by fortune of their crown of glory, they did not - take from us the wreath which they had granted. When the people have acted thus - towards us should we not render them all due service, and if need be die for - them? I believe we should, but you, against the people . . .The sense appears to be: “You oppose the people and forget - that there are men who wish to serve their own country instead of other - people's. You have continued to be disloyal and to display your - eloquence.” benefits. For them to serve their own, and not some - other's country . . . you have continued to display the power of your eloquence. - When you thought that the Areopagus would report those who had the gold you - became hostile and created a disturbance in the city so as to obstruct the - inquiry. But when the Areopagus postponed its statement on the grounds that it - had not yet discovered the truth, you conceded in the Assembly that Alexander - might be the son of Zeus and Poseidon too if he wished . . .Compare Din. 1.94 wished . - . . to set up a statue of Alexander, the king and god invincible . . . Olympias - . . . announced to the people . . .

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. . . of the charges and made a proclamation about - them.Dinarchus makes no clear reference to - this proclamation. Compare Din. 1.4. And - they, instead of returning what they had received and being quit of the affair, - were proposing penalties and inquiries directed against themselves. How ought we - to treat men who began by doing wrong and taking bribes and then, when exemption - was offered them, did not give back the gold? Should we let them go unpunished? - No; for it would be a shameful thing, gentlemen of the jury, to jeopardize the - safety of the city because of charges brought against individual men. You cannot - acquit these men themselves unless you are willing also to assume responsibility - for their crimes. . . . Then do not indulge their love of gain, gentlemen of the - jury, at the expense of your own security. Do not let your motive for making war - be love of sordid gain; let it be rather a wish for a more creditable record and - a change to better fortunes. . . .

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. . . on behalf of them . . . we made peace. . . . - to be rendered to it by each of us. The prosecuting in court and the exposing of - those who had received the money and taken bribes against their country it - allotted to us, the chosen accusers. The reporting of the names of the - recipients it assigned to the Areopagus, who gave these men's names to the - people. Punishment of the criminals . . . to you . . . the Areopagus. If the - vote goes contrary to law or justice, that is a responsibility, gentlemen of the - jury, which will rest with you. You must all therefore . . . the safety of the - city and the good fortune which in other ways you all enjoy in this country both - collectively and individually. Remember the tombs of your ancestors and punish - the offenders in the interests of the whole city. Do not allow their - plausibility in argument . . . the men who have taken bribes against their - country and defied the laws. And do not let the tears of HagnonidesHagnonides, who is described by Plutarch as a - sycophant, and against whom, if Reiske's emendation is correct, Dinarchus - composed a speech, was probably acquitted. He fled from Athens after the Lamian war but later - returned and was condemned to death. Compare Din. Fr. - 9; Plut. Phoc. 38. affect - you. Remember this . . . but this man would have no right to shed tears, any - more than pirates who cry upon the wheel when they need not have embarked in the - boat. The same is true of Demosthenes. What excuse will he have for tears when - he need not have accepted . . .

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But you call upon the younger men, though you used - to abuse and insult them with the name of wine-swillers.

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Anyone who drank rather freely used to vex you. -

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Not even within a limited time.

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/div>Cowardly.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..03273c9dd --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ + + + + + + Against Demosthenes + Hyperides + J. O. Burtt + Perseus Project, Tufts University + Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + + The Annenberg CPB/Project + + + Trustees of Tufts University + Medford, MA + Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + + Hyperides + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + + 2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

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Personally, gentlemen of the jury, as I was just saying to those seated beside me, what surprises me is this. Is it really true that Demosthenes, unlike any other man in Athens, is exempt from the laws which enforce an agreement made by a person against his own interests? Is he unaffected by the people’s decrees, which you have sworn to observe in voting, decrees which were proposed, not by any of his enemies, but by Demosthenes himself, and which the people carried on his motion, almost as though he deliberately sought to destroy himself and yet the just verdict, gentlemen of the jury, is, as I see it, simple: it is in our favor against Demosthenes. In private suits differences are often settled by challenge, and that is how this affair also has been settled. Look at it in this way, gentlemen. The people accused you, Demosthenes, of having accepted twenty talents illegally, against the interests of the state. You denied having done so and drew up a challenge, which you laid before the people in the form of a decree entrusting the matter on which you were accused to the council of the Areopagus.

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and you malign the Areopagus and publish challenges, in which you ask how you came by the gold, who gave it you, and where. Perhaps you will end by asking what you used it for after you obtained it, as though you were demanding a banker’s statement from the Areopagus. I, on the other hand, should like to know from you why the council of the Areopagus said

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the reports. On the contrary they have shown, as you will recognize, an exceptionally democratic spirit in handling the affair. They reported the guilty persons; even this was not done from choice but in answer to repeated pressure from the people; and they did not undertake to punish them on their own responsibility but rightly left it to you, with whom the final authority rests. It is not only his own trial which Demosthenes has in mind when he determines to mislead you by abusing the report; he wishes also to frustrate all the other prosecutions which the city has in hand. That is a point to be carefully borne in mind and you must not be deceived by the defendant’s argument. For these reports concerning the money of Harpalus have all been drawn up by the Areopagus on an equal footing. They are the same for all the accused. In no case has the council added the reason why it publishes a particular name. It stated summarily how much money each man had received, adding that he was liable for that amount. Is Demosthenes to have more weight with you than the report given against him? The sense of the missing words appears to be: If you discredit the report, you thereby admit that no one took the money, and all the others are acquitted. For of course this argument, if it protects Demosthenes, will also protect the rest. The sum on which you are pronouncing judgement is not twenty, but four hundred,The figure mentioned later, in column 10, is 350 talents, which is confirmed by Pseudo-Plut. Dem. 846 B. Hence Boeckh suggested the reading 400 in this passage, on the grounds that Hyperides would be more likely to exaggerate than otherwise. talents. You are judging all the crimes, not one. For your mad conduct, Demosthenes, has made you champion of all these criminals, foremost in danger as you are in impudence. In my opinion the fact that you took the gold is proved to the jury well enough by your being condemned by the council to which you entrusted yourselfAlthough the missing Greek words cannot be restored with certainty, the sense appears to be: I shall now produce the evidence relating to the gold which you previously accepted, and, as I said, explain why you took the money and for what reasons you disgraced the whole city. When Harpalus arrived in Attica, gentlemen of the jury, and the envoys from Philoxenus demanding him were, at the same time, brought into the Assembly, Demosthenes came forward and made a long speech in which he argued that it was not right for Athens to surrender Harpalus to the envoys from Philoxenus,Philoxenus, one of Alexander’s generals, was governor of Cilicia at the time. and that Alexander must not be left with any cause for complaint, on his account, against the people; the safest course for the city was to guard the money and the person of Harpalus, and to take up all the money, with which Harpalus had entered Attica, to the Acropolis on the following day, while Harpalus himself should announce then and there how much money there was. His real purpose, it seems, was not simply to learn the figure, but to find out from how large a sum he was to collect his commission. Sitting below in his usual place in the niche,It is not known what niche is meant. It may have been a cutting in the side of the Pnyx. The word κατατομή is cited by Harpocration as occurring in this speech. he told Mnesitheus the dancer to ask Harpalus how much money there would be to take up to the Acropolis. The answer given was seven hundred talentsIn the missing lines Hyperides probably explained that the Assembly was then dismissed and not summoned again until the following day, when the money had been paid over. Pseudo-Plut. Dem. 846 B, says that Demosthenes was accused of having taken bribes because he had not reported the amount of money brought to the Acropolis or the carelessness of those in charge of it. He had told you himself in the Assembly that that was the correct figure; and yet when the total brought up to the Acropolis was three hundred and fifty talents instead of seven hundred, having by then received his twenty, he did not utter a wordAfter saying before the Assembly that there were seven hundred talents you now bring up halfThe sense of the mutilated column 11 appears to be: You did not reflect that if the whole amount originally mentioned was not taken up to the Acropolis someone must have embezzled. You were interested solely in your own fee; for you cannot persuade us that you received nothing when we know that Demades was paid 5000 staters. For the bribe paid to Demades see Din. 1.89. Harpalus would not have bought nor would the city be exposed to accusation and reproach. But of all these things, Demosthenes It was you who decreed that a guard should be posted over the person of Harpalus. Yet when it relaxed its vigilance you did not try to restore it, and after it was disbanded you did not prosecute those responsible. I suppose you went unpaid for your shrewd handling of the crisis? If Harpalus distributed his gold among the lesser orators, who had nothing to give but noise and shouting, what of you who control our whole policy? Did he pass you over? That is incredible. So supreme is the contempt, gentlemen of the jury, with which Demosthenes has treated the affair, or to be quite frank, you and the laws, that at the outset, it seems, he admitted having taken the money but said that he had used it on your behalf and had borrowed it free of interestThere does not seem to be an exact parallel for this use of the word προδανείζομαι and there are two possible interpretations. (1) The active προδανείζω apparently has the sense of lend without interest in Pseudo-Plut. Lives of the Ten Orators 852 B, and in Aristot. Ath. Pol. 16. If the translation given above is correct, Demosthenes claimed to have borrowed the money from Harpalus and to have advanced it to the Athenian people. (2) On the other hand the noun προδανειστής is used in a Delian inscription with the sense of one who borrows for another. On this analogy we might translate προδανεισμένος as having borrowed for the people. Demosthenes would thus be claiming to have acted as an intermediary in accepting a loan from Harpalus to the state. for the Theoric fund. CnosionCnosion, a boy with whom Demosthenes was friendly, is mentioned also by Aeschin. 2.149, and by the scholiast on that passage. and his other friends went about saying that Demosthenes would be compelled by his accusers to publish facts which he wished kept secret and to admit that he had borrowed the money free of interest for the state to meet expenses of government. Since the anger of those of you who heard this statement was greatly increased by these aspersions cast on your democracy, on the grounds that he was not content to have taken bribes himself but thought fit to infect the people too The gist of the missing lines was probably that Demosthenes changed his tactics and began to plead a different excuse. speaking and complaining that the Areopagus was seeking favor with Alexander and for that reason wanted to destroy him. As if you did not all know that no one destroys the kind of man who can be bought. On the contrary, it is the opponent who can be neither persuaded nor corrupted with bribes that men contrive to be rid of by any means in their power. There is some likelihood, it seems, that you, Demosthenes, are deaf to prayers and not to be persuaded into taking bribes? Do not imagine, gentlemen, that only trivial matters are affected by the venal conduct of these men. For it is no secret that all who conspire for power in Greece secure the smaller cities by force of arms and the larger ones by buying the influential citizens in them; and we know that Philip reached the height he did because, at the outset, he sent money to the Peloponnese, Thessaly, and the rest of Greece, and those with power in the cities and authorityThe words he bribed should probably be added to complete the sense.

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you tell us marvellous stories, little thinking that your conduct is no secret; you professed to be supporting the people’s interests but were clearly speaking on behalf of Alexander. Personally I believe that even in the past everyone knew that you acted in this way over the Thebans, and over all the rest, and that you appropriated money, which was sent from Asia to buy help,Compare Din. 1.10, note and Din. 1.18-22; Aeschin. 3.239-240. Demosthenes was said by his opponents to have accepted money from Persia for use against Macedon, but to have withheld it when Alexander destroyed Thebes in 335 B.C. for your own personal use, spending most of it; and now you engage in sea commerce and make bottomry loans, and having bought a house you do not live in the Piraeus but have your anchorage outside the city.The house in the Piraeus is mentioned by Din. 1.69; and Aeschin. 3. 209 uses these exact words. A popular leader worthy of the name should be the savior of his country, not a deserter. When Harpalus recently descended on Greece so suddenly that he took everyone by surprise, he found affairs in the Peloponnese and in the rest of Greece in this condition owing to the arrival of Nicanor with the orders which he brought from Alexander relating to the exilesDin. 1.82 also refers to this event, which took place in 324 B.C. Nicanor, the son-in-law of Aristotle, was sent by Alexander to Olympia to proclaim his demand for the return to their cities of all Greek exiles except the Thebans. and to the of the Achaean, Arcadian, and Boeotian Leagues You have contrived this situation by means of your decree, because you arrested Harpalus. You have induced the whole of Greece to send envoys to Alexander, since they have no other recourse, and have prevented all the satraps, who by themselves would willingly have joined forces with us, each with money and all the troops at his disposal, not merely from revolting from him, by your detention of Harpalus, but also each of them The general sense appears to be: All the satraps united with Alexander. You yourself are now a supporter of his and have your agents with every important Macedonian.

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sent by Demosthenes,Sauppe suspected that the man here referred to was Aristion of Samos, a friend of Demosthenes who, according to >Harpocration (s. v. Ἀριστίων), was mentioned in this speech and was sent by Demosthenes to Hephaestion in order to reach an understanding with him. For Callias and Taurosthenes of Chalcis compare Din. 1.44 and note. and with Olympias Callias the Chalcidian, the brother of Taurosthenes. For these men were made Athenian citizens on the motion of Demosthenes and they are his special agents. Naturally enough; for being perpetually unstable himself, I suppose he might well have friends from the Euripus.A comparison between the Euripus, a very changeable strait, and the character of Callias is made also by Aeschin. 3.90. Will you dare then presently to speak to me of friendship you yourself broke up that friendship when you accepted bribes against your country and made a change of front. You made yourself a laughing stock and brought disgrace on those who had ever shared your policy in former years. When we might have gained the highest distinction in public life and been accompanied for the remainder of our lives by the best of reputations, you frustrated all these hopes, and you are not ashamed, even at your age,Demosthenes was just over sixty. to be tried by youths for bribery. And yet the positions ought to be reversed: your generation ought to be training the younger orators, reproving and punishing any over-impetuous action. But the fact is just the opposite: the youths are taking to task the men of over sixty. Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you have a right to feel resentful towards Demosthenes; for after gaining a tolerable reputation and great riches, all through you, even on the threshold of old age he has no loyalty to his country. But you used to be ashamed the Greeks who were standing round, when you passed sentence on certain persons, to think that such popular leaders and generals and guardians of your affairs The sense of this passage is probably: Since you condemned such generals as Timotheus, though you shrank from doing so, you should not hesitate to condemn Demosthenes. Compare Din. 1.16.

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For to take money is not so serious as to take it from the wrong source, and the private individuals who took the gold are not so culpable as the orators and generals. Why is that? Because the private individuals were given the money by Harpalus for safe-keeping, but the generals and orators have accepted it with some policy in view. The laws prescribe that ordinary offenders shall pay a simple fine but that men accepting bribes shall pay ten times the usual sum.The term ἀδικεῖν seems to be used in this context to describe the milder breaches of the law, and is used in the same sense by Aristot. Ath. Pol. 54.2, where κλέπτειν, δῶρα, λαμβάνειν and ἀδικεῖν are distinguished as punishable with a tenfold fine, a tenfold fine, and a simple fine respectively. Dinarchus is misleading when he refers (Din. 1.60) to a double fine. A simple fine was doubled only when it was not paid up within a fixed time. Therefore, just as we can lawfully fix the penalty for these men, so also from you against them . It is as I said in the Assembly. You give full permission, gentlemen of the jury, to the orators and generals to reap substantial rewards. It is not the laws which grant them this privilege but your tolerance and generosity. But on one point you insist: your interests must be furthered, not opposed, with the money they receive. Now Demosthenes and Demades, from actual decrees passed in the city and from proxenies, have each received, I believe, more than sixty talents, quite apart from the Persian funds and money sent from Alexander. If neither of these sources suffices for them, and they have now accepted bribes which threaten the city’s life itself, can we doubt our right to punish them? Suppose that one of you, mere private individuals, during the tenure of some office, makes a mistake through ignorance or inexperience; he will be overwhelmed in court by the eloquence of these men and will either lose his life or be banished from his country. Shall they themselves, after harming the city on such a scale, escape unscathed? Conon of Paeania took theoric money for his son who was abroad.Conon is perhaps the banker to whom Dinarchus refers (Din. 1.43), and the incident which he mentions later in the speech (i. 56) is possibly the same as that to which Hyperides is alluding here, though according to Dinarchus it was the Areopagus who accused the culprit. Compare Din. 1.56, note. The story of Aristomachus is not known. He was prosecuted for it by these men in court, and though he asked your pardon, had to pay a talent, all for taking five drachmas. Aristomachus also, because, on becoming principal of the Academy, he transferred a spade from the wrestling school to his own garden near by and used it and

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However during the period which followedHyperides is referring to the period which followed Chaeronea, and the statesman in question is Lycurgus. Demosthenes also speaks of the number of trials which took place at this time (Dem. 18.249). Hyperides himself was prosecuted by Aristogiton. Compare Hyp. Fr. 18 and note. the people did not forbid us to approach them or to discuss with them; instead they used us as counsellors and advisers and elected him next as treasurer with full control of their finances, considering, quite rightly, that we owed him a debt of gratitude. Later, too, though we were often brought to trial on the strength of that policy and the war itself, these men did not vote against us once but brought us safely through everything; and one could not have a more impressive, or a surer sign of popular favorThe sense of the mutilated passage beginning with the words καὶ γράψαι has been restored by Blass and Colin as follows: Although you, Demosthenes, dared to propose the death penalty for yourself if the council reported that you had received anything from Harpalus, when it made its report and you were ipso facto convicted by the terms of the decree, these gentlemen did not take account of the circumstance but allowed you a special trial. For the people have always behaved in such a way towards us orators, etc. the people so behaved that though deprived themselves by fortune of their crown of glory, they did not take from us the wreath which they had granted. When the people have acted thus towards us should we not render them all due service, and if need be die for them? I believe we should, but you, against the people The sense appears to be: You oppose the people and forget that there are men who wish to serve their own country instead of other people’s. You have continued to be disloyal and to display your eloquence. benefits. For them to serve their own, and not some other’s country you have continued to display the power of your eloquence. When you thought that the Areopagus would report those who had the gold you became hostile and created a disturbance in the city so as to obstruct the inquiry. But when the Areopagus postponed its statement on the grounds that it had not yet discovered the truth, you conceded in the Assembly that Alexander might be the son of Zeus and Poseidon too if he wished Compare Din. 1.94 wished . . . to set up a statue of Alexander, the king and god invincible Olympias announced to the people

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of the charges and made a proclamation about them.Dinarchus makes no clear reference to this proclamation. Compare Din. 1.4. And they, instead of returning what they had received and being quit of the affair, were proposing penalties and inquiries directed against themselves. How ought we to treat men who began by doing wrong and taking bribes and then, when exemption was offered them, did not give back the gold? Should we let them go unpunished? No; for it would be a shameful thing, gentlemen of the jury, to jeopardize the safety of the city because of charges brought against individual men. You cannot acquit these men themselves unless you are willing also to assume responsibility for their crimes Then do not indulge their love of gain, gentlemen of the jury, at the expense of your own security. Do not let your motive for making war be love of sordid gain; let it be rather a wish for a more creditable record and a change to better fortunes

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on behalf of them we made peace to be rendered to it by each of us. The prosecuting in court and the exposing of those who had received the money and taken bribes against their country it allotted to us, the chosen accusers. The reporting of the names of the recipients it assigned to the Areopagus, who gave these men’s names to the people. Punishment of the criminals to you the Areopagus. If the vote goes contrary to law or justice, that is a responsibility, gentlemen of the jury, which will rest with you. You must all therefore the safety of the city and the good fortune which in other ways you all enjoy in this country both collectively and individually. Remember the tombs of your ancestors and punish the offenders in the interests of the whole city. Do not allow their plausibility in argument the men who have taken bribes against their country and defied the laws. And do not let the tears of HagnonidesHagnonides, who is described by Plutarch as a sycophant, and against whom, if Reiske’s emendation is correct, Dinarchus composed a speech, was probably acquitted. He fled from Athens after the Lamian war but later returned and was condemned to death. Compare Din. Fr. 9; Plut. Phoc. 38. affect you. Remember this but this man would have no right to shed tears, any more than pirates who cry upon the wheel when they need not have embarked in the boat. The same is true of Demosthenes. What excuse will he have for tears when he need not have accepted

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But you call upon the younger men, though you used to abuse and insult them with the name of wine-swillers.

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Anyone who drank rather freely used to vex you. +

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Not even within a limited time.

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Cowardly.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml index 5cb3f9fc4..2c5e216b4 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -90,39 +90,39 @@
Frag. I -

Column 1 ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρεςColl. 1 et 2 plerumque restituit Blass. δικασταί, ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρακαθημένους ἀρτίως ἔλεγον, θαυμάζω θαυμάζω Jensen:θαῦμα τηλικουτὶ νομίζω Blass. τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἰ δεἰ δὴ Jensen:εἰ μὴ Blass. νὴ Δία κατὰ Δημοσθένους μόνου τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει μήτε οἱ νόμοι ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ κελεύοντες κύρια εἶναι ὅσα ἄν τις αὐτὸς καθʼ αὑτοῦ διάθηται, μήτε τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου, καθʼ ἃ ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀμωμόκατε τὴν ψῆφον οἴσειν, ἔγραψεν δὲ αὐτὰ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῶν Δημοσθένους, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς οὗτος, ἐψηφίσατο δὲ ὁ δῆμος τούτου κελεύοντοςκελεύοντος Sauppe. καὶ μόνον οὐχ ἑκουσίως αὑτὸν ἀπολλύοντος Desunt col. 1 versus fere tres. καίτοι τὸ Column 2 δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἁπλοῦν ὑπολαμβάνω ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸς Δημοσθένη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐγκλημάτων πολλὰ διὰ προκλήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτως καὶ τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κέκριται. σκέψασθε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὑτωσί. ᾐτιάσατό σε, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ὁ δῆμος εἰληφέναι εἴκοσι τάλαντα ἐπὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις. ταῦτα ςὺ ἔξαρνος ἐγένου μὴ λαβεῖν, καὶ πρόκλησιν γράψας ἐν ψηφίσματι προσήνεγκας τῷ δήμῳ, ἐπιτρέπων ὑπὲρ ὧν τὴν αἰτίαν ἔσχες τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου Desunt col. 2 versus fere tres et col. 3 versus fere quattuordecim.

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Column 1 ἀλλʼ ἐγώ, ὦ ἄνδρεςColl. 1 et 2 plerumque restituit Blass. δικασταί, ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρακαθημένους ἀρτίως ἔλεγον, θαυμάζω θαυμάζω Jensen:θαῦμα τηλικουτὶ νομίζω Blass. τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἰ δεἰ δὴ Jensen:εἰ μὴ Blass. νὴ Δία κατὰ Δημοσθένους μόνου τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει μήτε οἱ νόμοι ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ κελεύοντες κύρια εἶναι ὅσα ἄν τις αὐτὸς καθʼ αὑτοῦ διάθηται, μήτε τὰ ψηφίσματα τοῦ δήμου, καθʼ ἃ ὑμεῖς μὲν ὀμωμόκατε τὴν ψῆφον οἴσειν, ἔγραψεν δὲ αὐτὰ οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐχθρῶν τῶν Δημοσθένους, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς οὗτος, ἐψηφίσατο δὲ ὁ δῆμος τούτου κελεύοντοςκελεύοντος Sauppe. καὶ μόνον οὐχ ἑκουσίως αὑτὸν ἀπολλύοντος Desunt col. 1 versus fere tres. καίτοι τὸ Column 2 δίκαιον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἁπλοῦν ὑπολαμβάνω ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸς Δημοσθένη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐγκλημάτων πολλὰ διὰ προκλήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτως καὶ τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κέκριται. σκέψασθε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὑτωσί. ᾐτιάσατό σε, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ὁ δῆμος εἰληφέναι εἴκοσι τάλαντα ἐπὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις. ταῦτα ςὺ ἔξαρνος ἐγένου μὴ λαβεῖν, καὶ πρόκλησιν γράψας ἐν ψηφίσματι προσήνεγκας τῷ δήμῳ, ἐπιτρέπων ὑπὲρ ὧν τὴν αἰτίαν ἔσχες τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου Desunt col. 2 versus fere tres et col. 3 versus fere quattuordecim.

Frag. II -

Column 3 καὶ συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλήν, προκλήσεις ἐκτιθεὶς καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβεςColl. 3 et 4 composuit et plerumque restituit Blass: verbaσυκοφαντεῖς usque ad ἀπαιτῶν citat Alexander *numen, ΠερὶΣχημ. viii. 457 *walz. τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοι ὁ δούς, καὶ ποῦ. τελευτῶνποῦ et τελευτῶν A:πῶς et τελευταῖον Alexander. δʼ ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ὅτιὅ τι εἰ Alexander. ἐχρήσω λαβὼνλαβὼν om. Alexander. τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν. ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον Column 4 ἡδέως ἂν παρὰ σοῦ πυθοίμην, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα ἕνεκα Egger. ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ βουλὴ Egger. ἔφηις ἀδίκωςτατοχρυφησι τουωτατις.ε δικαστἂν ἐνοιεσθαι ἐμδικαίως τωι Desunt col. 4 versus fere viginti et col. 5 versus fere decem.

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Column 3 καὶ συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλήν, προκλήσεις ἐκτιθεὶς καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβεςColl. 3 et 4 composuit et plerumque restituit Blass: verbaσυκοφαντεῖς usque ad ἀπαιτῶν citat Alexander *numen, ΠερὶΣχημ. viii. 457 *walz. τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοι ὁ δούς, καὶ ποῦ. τελευτῶνποῦ et τελευτῶν A:πῶς et τελευταῖον Alexander. δʼ ἴσως ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ὅτιὅ τι εἰ Alexander. ἐχρήσω λαβὼνλαβὼν om. Alexander. τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν. ἐγὼ δὲ τοὐναντίον Column 4 ἡδέως ἂν παρὰ σοῦ πυθοίμην, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα ἕνεκα Egger. ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ βουλὴ Egger. ἔφηις ἀδίκωςτατοχρυφησι τουωτατις.ε δικαστἂν ἐνοιεσθαι ἐμδικαίως τωι Desunt col. 4 versus fere viginti et col. 5 versus fere decem.

Frag. III -

Column 5 τὰς ἀποφάσεις. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάντων φανήσονται μάλιστα δημοτικώτατα τῷ πράγματι κεχρημένοι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέφηναν, καὶ ταῦτʼ οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πολλάκις ἀναγκαζόμενοι· τὸ δὲ κολάσαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦνταςδημοτικώτατα usque ad ἀδικοῦντας Sauppe. οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς ἐποίησαν, ἀλλʼ ὑμῖν ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς κυρίοις. δημοσθένηςἐποίησαν usque ad Δημοσθένης Blass. δʼ οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ Column 6 αὑτοῦ ἀγῶνος οἴεται δεῖν ὑμᾶς παρακρούσασθαι διαβαλὼν τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀγῶνας ἅπαντας ἀφελέσθαι ζητεῖ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως· ὑπὲρ οὗ δεῖ ὑμᾶς νυνὶ βουλεύσασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, καὶ μὴ τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τούτου ἐξαπατηθῆναι. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις ταύτας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ πεποίηται καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφεν διὰ τί ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου γράψασα ὁπόσον ἕκαστος εἴληφεν χρυσίον, τοῦτʼ οὖν ὀφειλέτω.ὀφειλέτω Boeckh. ἰσχύσει Δημοσθένης παρʼ Column 7 ὑμῖν τῆς κατʼ αὐτοῦ ἀποφάσεωςCol. 7 plerumque restituit Sauppe, sed ὑμῖν usque ad ἀποφάσεως Blass. μεῖζον; μεῖζον Fuhr: μᾶλλον Blass. οὐκ ἐσἀπογιἀπόφαἔλαβενσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες· οὐ γὰρ δήπου Δημοσθένει μόνῳ τοῦτο ἰσχυρὸνδήπου usque ad ἰσχυρὸν Kenyon, sed μόνῳ Jensen (μὲν Kenyon). ἔσται, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις οὔ. καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὲρ εἴκοσιεἴκοσι Boeckh. ταλάντων δικάζετε, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ τετρακοσίων, οὐδʼ ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς ἀδικήματος,τετρακοσίων usque ad ἀδικήματος Boeckh: τριακοσίων Sauppe. ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων. ἡ γὰρἡ γὰρ Blass. σὴ ἀπόνοια, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀδικούντων νῦν προκινδυνεύει καὶ προαναισχυντεῖ. ἐγὼ δʼ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς τὸ τὴν βουλήν σου καταγνῶναι, Column 8 ᾗ σαυτὸνCol. 8 composuit Sauppe et Blass, plerumque restituit Blass.πέτρεψας· τίνων δὲ ἕνεκα ἔλαβες, καὶ ἐπὶκαὶ ἐπὶ Jensen:ἔτι δὲ Blass. τίσιν αἰτίαις πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν καενοςχρυσίτος τοὺςὥςπερ εἰφανερὸν ποιήσω. ποιήσω Fuhr. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἦλθεν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, καὶ οἱ παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐξαιτοῦντες αὐτὸν ἅμα προσήχθηςαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, τότε παρελθὼντότε παρελθὼν Jensen:μέμνησθε ὡς τότε Blass. Δημοσθένης διεξῆλθεν μακρὸν λόγον, φάσκωνφάσκων Kenyon. οὔτε τοῖς παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐλθοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν τὸν Ἅρπαλον ἐκδοῦναι ἐκδοῦναι Kenyon. τὴν πόλιν, οὔτε δεῖν αἰτίαν οὐδεμίαν τῷ δήμῳ διʼ ἐκεῖνον παρʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου Column 9 καταλείπεσθαι, ἀσφαλέστατον δʼ εἶναι τῇ πόλειCol. 9 composuit Sauppe et Kenyon, plerumque restituit Kenyon. τά τε χρήματα καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα φυλάττειν, καὶ ἀναφέρειν τὰ χρήματα ἅπαντα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἃ ἦλθεν ἔχων Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἐν τῇ αὔριον ἡμέρᾳ· Ἅρπαλον δʼ ἤδηδʼ ἤδη Schaefer:δὲ δὴ Sauppe. ἀποδεῖξαι τὰ χρήματα, ὁπόσα ἐστίν· οὐχ ὅπως πύθοιτο τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁπόσα ἦν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα εἰδῇ ἀφʼ ὅσων αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸν μισθὸν πράττεσθαι. καὶ καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, οὗπερ εἴωθε καθῆςθαι, ἐκέλευε ΜνηςίθεονΜνησίθεον Blass. τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον, ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. ὁ δʼ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι Column 10 ἑπτακόσια τάλαντα Desunt col. 10 versus duodecim. τὰ χρήματα εἶναι τηλικαῦταCol. 10 plerumque restituit Blass. αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπών, ἀναφερομένων τριακοσίων ταλάντων καὶ πεντήκοντα ἀνθʼ ἑπτακοσίων, λαβὼν τὰ εἴκοσι τάλαντα οὐδένα λόγον ἐποιήσατο Desunt versus tres. ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια φήσας εἶναι τάλαντα, νῦν τὰ Column 11μίση ἀναφέρεις, καω ὅτιCol. 11 om. Kenyon. τοῦ ἀνενεχθῆναιεἰς ἀκρόπολιν ταῦτα τὰ πράγματα Desunt versus quattuor.ονλιἔκρινον τὸνοὔτʼ ἂν ἐπρίατο Ἅρπαλος τὰς φεοὔτʼ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἐν αἰτίαις καὶ διαβολαῖς ἦν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων, ὦ Δημόσθενεςἐστίνμως ἐγστους αἰσχυννειχρυσίονγὰρ ὅτινοιωτουπεν Column 12 ςτατῆρας ἔλαβε· σὺ δʼ ὁ τῷ ψηφίσματι τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ τὴν φυλακὴν καταστήσας καὶ οὔτʼ ἐκλειπομένην ἐπανορθῶν οὔτε καταλυθείσης τοὺς αἰτίους κρίνας, προῖκα δηλονότι τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τεταμίευσαι; καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐλάττοσι ῥήτορσιν ἀπέτινεν ὁ Ἅρπαλος χρυσίον, τοῖς θορύβου μόνον καὶ κραυγῆς κυρίοις, σὲ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτην παρεῖδεν; καὶ τῷ τοῦτο πιστόν; τοσοῦτον δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῦ πράγματος καταπεφρόνηκεν Δημοσθένης, μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ δεῖ μετὰ παρρησίας εἰπεῖν, ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, Column 13 ὁμολογεῖνCol. 13 plerumque restituit Blass. μὲν εἰληφέναι εἰληφέναι Boeckh. τὰ χρήματα, ἀλλὰ κατακεχρῆσθαι αὐτὰ ὑμῖν προδεδανεισμένος δεδανεισμένος εἰς τὸ θεωρικόν· καὶ περιὼν Κνωσίων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι αὐτοῦ ἔλεγον ὅτι ἀναγκάσουσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἱ αἰτιώμενοι εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἐνεγκεῖν ἃ οὐ βούλεται, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῷ δήμῳ προδεδάνεισται τὰ χρήματα εἰς τὴν διοίκησιν. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑμῶν οἱ ἀκούσαντες πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἠγανάκτουν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ ὑμετέρου λόγοις, εἰ μὴ μόνον ἱκανὸν εἴη αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ δεδωροδοκηκέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δῆμον οἴοιτο δεῖν ἀναπιμπλάναι Desunt col. 13 versus unus et col. 14 versus octo. Column 14 λέγων καὶ αἰτιώμενος,Col. 14 composuit Sauppe et Blass:αἰτιώμενος Blass. ὅτι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ χαριζομένη ἡ βουλὴ ἀνελεῖν αὐτὸν βούλεται· ὥσπερ οὐ πάντας ὑμᾶς εἰδότας, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναιρεῖ, ὃν ἔστιν πρίασθαι, ἀλλʼ ὅντινα μήτε πεῖσαι ἔστιν μήτε χρήμασιν διαφθεῖραι, τοῦτον δὴ ςκοποῦσιν ὅπως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἐκποδὼν ποιήσουσιν. κίνδυνος δʼ ὡς ἔοικεν ἐστίν, μὴ σύ, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ἀπαραίτητος καὶ ἄπειστος εἶ πρὸς δωροδοκίαν;δὴ usque ad δωροδοκίαν Kenyon. Column 15 μὴ νομίζετε δὲμὴ νομίζετε δὲ Colin:ἢ μὴ νομίζῃ τις Kenyon. διὰ τῆς τούτων δωροδοκίας τὰ τυχόντα τῶντυχόντα τῶν Boeckh. πραγμάτων ἁλίςκεσθαι. ἁλίσκεσθαι Blass. οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλόν ἄδηλόν Sauppe. ἐστιν ὅτι πάντες πάντες Sauppe. οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς πράγμασιν τὰς μὲν μικρὰς πόλεις τοῖς ὅπλοις συσκευάζονται, τὰς δὲ μεγάλας τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν αὐταῖς ὠνούμενοι, οὐδʼ ὅτι Φίλιππος τηλικοῦτος τηλικοῦτος Boeckh. ἐγένετο ἐξ ἀρχῆςἐξ ἀρχῆς Boeckh. χρήματα διαπέμψας διαπέμψας Sauppe. εἰς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Θετταλίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἐλλάδα, καὶ τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει ὄντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ προεστῶταςδυνάμει usque ad προεστῶτας Blass. Desunt col. 15 versus quinque et col. 16 fere tota.

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Column 5 τὰς ἀποφάσεις. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάντων φανήσονται μάλιστα δημοτικώτατα τῷ πράγματι κεχρημένοι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέφηναν, καὶ ταῦτʼ οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πολλάκις ἀναγκαζόμενοι· τὸ δὲ κολάσαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦνταςδημοτικώτατα usque ad ἀδικοῦντας Sauppe. οὐκ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς ἐποίησαν, ἀλλʼ ὑμῖν ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς κυρίοις. δημοσθένηςἐποίησαν usque ad Δημοσθένης Blass. δʼ οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ Column 6 αὑτοῦ ἀγῶνος οἴεται δεῖν ὑμᾶς παρακρούσασθαι διαβαλὼν τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀγῶνας ἅπαντας ἀφελέσθαι ζητεῖ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως· ὑπὲρ οὗ δεῖ ὑμᾶς νυνὶ βουλεύσασθαι προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν, καὶ μὴ τῷ λόγῳ ὑπὸ τούτου ἐξαπατηθῆναι. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις ταύτας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἁρπάλου πάσας ὁμοίως ἡ βουλὴ πεποίηται καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐδεμιᾷ προσγέγραφεν διὰ τί ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου γράψασα ὁπόσον ἕκαστος εἴληφεν χρυσίον, τοῦτʼ οὖν ὀφειλέτω.ὀφειλέτω Boeckh. ἰσχύσει Δημοσθένης παρʼ Column 7 ὑμῖν τῆς κατʼ αὐτοῦ ἀποφάσεωςCol. 7 plerumque restituit Sauppe, sed ὑμῖν usque ad ἀποφάσεως Blass. μεῖζον; μεῖζον Fuhr: μᾶλλον Blass. οὐκ ἐσἀπογιἀπόφαἔλαβενσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες· οὐ γὰρ δήπου Δημοσθένει μόνῳ τοῦτο ἰσχυρὸνδήπου usque ad ἰσχυρὸν Kenyon, sed μόνῳ Jensen (μὲν Kenyon). ἔσται, τοῖς δʼ ἄλλοις οὔ. καὶ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὲρ εἴκοσιεἴκοσι Boeckh. ταλάντων δικάζετε, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ τετρακοσίων, οὐδʼ ὑπὲρ ἑνὸς ἀδικήματος,τετρακοσίων usque ad ἀδικήματος Boeckh: τριακοσίων Sauppe. ἀλλʼ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων. ἡ γὰρἡ γὰρ Blass. σὴ ἀπόνοια, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀδικούντων νῦν προκινδυνεύει καὶ προαναισχυντεῖ. ἐγὼ δʼ ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς τὸ τὴν βουλήν σου καταγνῶναι, Column 8 ᾗ σαυτὸνCol. 8 composuit Sauppe et Blass, plerumque restituit Blass.πέτρεψας· τίνων δὲ ἕνεκα ἔλαβες, καὶ ἐπὶκαὶ ἐπὶ Jensen:ἔτι δὲ Blass. τίσιν αἰτίαις πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν καενοςχρυσίτος τοὺςὥςπερ εἰφανερὸν ποιήσω. ποιήσω Fuhr. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἦλθεν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, καὶ οἱ παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐξαιτοῦντες αὐτὸν ἅμα προσήχθηςαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, τότε παρελθὼντότε παρελθὼν Jensen:μέμνησθε ὡς τότε Blass. Δημοσθένης διεξῆλθεν μακρὸν λόγον, φάσκωνφάσκων Kenyon. οὔτε τοῖς παρὰ Φιλοξένου ἐλθοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν τὸν Ἅρπαλον ἐκδοῦναι ἐκδοῦναι Kenyon. τὴν πόλιν, οὔτε δεῖν αἰτίαν οὐδεμίαν τῷ δήμῳ διʼ ἐκεῖνον παρʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου Column 9 καταλείπεσθαι, ἀσφαλέστατον δʼ εἶναι τῇ πόλειCol. 9 composuit Sauppe et Kenyon, plerumque restituit Kenyon. τά τε χρήματα καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα φυλάττειν, καὶ ἀναφέρειν τὰ χρήματα ἅπαντα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἃ ἦλθεν ἔχων Ἅρπαλος εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἐν τῇ αὔριον ἡμέρᾳ· Ἅρπαλον δʼ ἤδηδʼ ἤδη Schaefer:δὲ δὴ Sauppe. ἀποδεῖξαι τὰ χρήματα, ὁπόσα ἐστίν· οὐχ ὅπως πύθοιτο τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁπόσα ἦν, ἀλλʼ ἵνα εἰδῇ ἀφʼ ὅσων αὐτὸν δεῖ τὸν μισθὸν πράττεσθαι. καὶ καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, οὗπερ εἴωθε καθῆςθαι, ἐκέλευε ΜνηςίθεονΜνησίθεον Blass. τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἅρπαλον, ὁπόσα εἴη τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. ὁ δʼ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι Column 10 ἑπτακόσια τάλαντα Desunt col. 10 versus duodecim. τὰ χρήματα εἶναι τηλικαῦταCol. 10 plerumque restituit Blass. αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπών, ἀναφερομένων τριακοσίων ταλάντων καὶ πεντήκοντα ἀνθʼ ἑπτακοσίων, λαβὼν τὰ εἴκοσι τάλαντα οὐδένα λόγον ἐποιήσατο Desunt versus tres. ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ἑπτακόσια φήσας εἶναι τάλαντα, νῦν τὰ Column 11μίση ἀναφέρεις, καω ὅτιCol. 11 om. Kenyon. τοῦ ἀνενεχθῆναιεἰς ἀκρόπολιν ταῦτα τὰ πράγματα Desunt versus quattuor.ονλιἔκρινον τὸνοὔτʼ ἂν ἐπρίατο Ἅρπαλος τὰς φεοὔτʼ ἂν ἡ πόλις ἐν αἰτίαις καὶ διαβολαῖς ἦν. ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων, ὦ Δημόσθενεςἐστίνμως ἐγστους αἰσχυννειχρυσίονγὰρ ὅτινοιωτουπεν Column 12 ςτατῆρας ἔλαβε· σὺ δʼ ὁ τῷ ψηφίσματι τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ τὴν φυλακὴν καταστήσας καὶ οὔτʼ ἐκλειπομένην ἐπανορθῶν οὔτε καταλυθείσης τοὺς αἰτίους κρίνας, προῖκα δηλονότι τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τεταμίευσαι; καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐλάττοσι ῥήτορσιν ἀπέτινεν ὁ Ἅρπαλος χρυσίον, τοῖς θορύβου μόνον καὶ κραυγῆς κυρίοις, σὲ δὲ τὸν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτην παρεῖδεν; καὶ τῷ τοῦτο πιστόν; τοσοῦτον δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῦ πράγματος καταπεφρόνηκεν Δημοσθένης, μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ δεῖ μετὰ παρρησίας εἰπεῖν, ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς ἔοικεν, Column 13 ὁμολογεῖνCol. 13 plerumque restituit Blass. μὲν εἰληφέναι εἰληφέναι Boeckh. τὰ χρήματα, ἀλλὰ κατακεχρῆσθαι αὐτὰ ὑμῖν προδεδανεισμένος δεδανεισμένος εἰς τὸ θεωρικόν· καὶ περιὼν Κνωσίων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι αὐτοῦ ἔλεγον ὅτι ἀναγκάσουσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἱ αἰτιώμενοι εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἐνεγκεῖν ἃ οὐ βούλεται, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῷ δήμῳ προδεδάνεισται τὰ χρήματα εἰς τὴν διοίκησιν. ἐπειδὴ δʼ ὑμῶν οἱ ἀκούσαντες πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἠγανάκτουν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ ὑμετέρου λόγοις, εἰ μὴ μόνον ἱκανὸν εἴη αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ δεδωροδοκηκέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δῆμον οἴοιτο δεῖν ἀναπιμπλάναι Desunt col. 13 versus unus et col. 14 versus octo. Column 14 λέγων καὶ αἰτιώμενος,Col. 14 composuit Sauppe et Blass:αἰτιώμενος Blass. ὅτι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ χαριζομένη ἡ βουλὴ ἀνελεῖν αὐτὸν βούλεται· ὥσπερ οὐ πάντας ὑμᾶς εἰδότας, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναιρεῖ, ὃν ἔστιν πρίασθαι, ἀλλʼ ὅντινα μήτε πεῖσαι ἔστιν μήτε χρήμασιν διαφθεῖραι, τοῦτον δὴ ςκοποῦσιν ὅπως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου ἐκποδὼν ποιήσουσιν. κίνδυνος δʼ ὡς ἔοικεν ἐστίν, μὴ σύ, ὦ Δημόσθενες, ἀπαραίτητος καὶ ἄπειστος εἶ πρὸς δωροδοκίαν;δὴ usque ad δωροδοκίαν Kenyon. Column 15 μὴ νομίζετε δὲμὴ νομίζετε δὲ Colin:ἢ μὴ νομίζῃ τις Kenyon. διὰ τῆς τούτων δωροδοκίας τὰ τυχόντα τῶντυχόντα τῶν Boeckh. πραγμάτων ἁλίςκεσθαι. ἁλίσκεσθαι Blass. οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλόν ἄδηλόν Sauppe. ἐστιν ὅτι πάντες πάντες Sauppe. οἱ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς πράγμασιν τὰς μὲν μικρὰς πόλεις τοῖς ὅπλοις συσκευάζονται, τὰς δὲ μεγάλας τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν αὐταῖς ὠνούμενοι, οὐδʼ ὅτι Φίλιππος τηλικοῦτος τηλικοῦτος Boeckh. ἐγένετο ἐξ ἀρχῆςἐξ ἀρχῆς Boeckh. χρήματα διαπέμψας διαπέμψας Sauppe. εἰς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Θετταλίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἐλλάδα, καὶ τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει ὄντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ προεστῶταςδυνάμει usque ad προεστῶτας Blass. Desunt col. 15 versus quinque et col. 16 fere tota.

Frag. IV (V) -

Column 17 τερατεύῃ,Col. 17 plerumque restituit Blass. καὶ οὐχ ἅπασιν οἴει φανερὸν εἶναι ὅτι φάσκων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου δήμου Babington. λέγειν ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου φανερῶς ἐδημηγόρεις; ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ἔμπροσθεν γνῶναι ἐδημηγόρεις usque ad γνῶναι Sauppe. ἅπαντας ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἐποίησας καὶ περὶ Θηβαίων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, καὶ ὅτι χρήματα εἰς ταῦτα δοθέντα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας αὐτὸς σαυτῷ ἰδίᾳ περιποιησάμενοςπεριποιησάμενος Sauppe. κατανήλωσας τὰ πολλά, καὶ νῦν δὲ ναυτικοῖς ἐργάζῃ χρήμασιν χρήμασιν Jensen. καὶ ἐκδόσεις δίδως, καὶ πριάμενος οἰκίανμοColin sic restituit: ὕφορμον, ὅποι ὑπάγοις ἐν τῷ καιρῷ. υπαν τωρωι, οὐκ οἰκεῖς ἐν Πειραιεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἐξορμεῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. δεῖ δὲ τὸν δίκαιον δημαγωγὸν σωτῆρα τῆς ἑαυτοῦἑαυτοῦ Jensen. πατρίδος εἶναι,πατρίδος εἶναι Kenyon. μὴ δραπέτην. ἐπειδὴ δὲ νῦν Ἅρπαλος οὕτως ἐξαίφνηςμὴ usque ad ἐξαίφνης Blass. Column 18 πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα προσέπεσεν ὥστε μηδένα προαισθέσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ Ἑλλάδι οὕτως ἔχοντα κατέλαβεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφίξεως τῆς Νικάνορος καὶ τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων ὧν ἧκεν φέρων παρʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου περί τε τῶν φυγάδων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων καὶ ΒοιωτῶνΒοιωτῶν Blass: τοιούτων Colin.Desunt col. 18 versus fere duodecim. Column 19 ταῦταCol. 19 plerumque restituit Boeckh. σὺ παρεσκεύακαςπαρεσκεύακας Jensen: παρῄρησαι Blass. τῷ ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας πρεςβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἀποςτροφήν, τοὺς δὲ ςατράπας,σατράπας Sauppe. οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἧκον ἑκόντες πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχεν, τούτους σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον κεκώλυκας ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου τῇ συλλήψει τῇ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶκαστον αὐτῶν. αὐτῶν Jensen.Desunt col. 19 versus fere sex et col. 20 versus fere undecim.

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Column 17 τερατεύῃ,Col. 17 plerumque restituit Blass. καὶ οὐχ ἅπασιν οἴει φανερὸν εἶναι ὅτι φάσκων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου δήμου Babington. λέγειν ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου φανερῶς ἐδημηγόρεις; ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ἔμπροσθεν γνῶναι ἐδημηγόρεις usque ad γνῶναι Sauppe. ἅπαντας ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἐποίησας καὶ περὶ Θηβαίων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, καὶ ὅτι χρήματα εἰς ταῦτα δοθέντα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας αὐτὸς σαυτῷ ἰδίᾳ περιποιησάμενοςπεριποιησάμενος Sauppe. κατανήλωσας τὰ πολλά, καὶ νῦν δὲ ναυτικοῖς ἐργάζῃ χρήμασιν χρήμασιν Jensen. καὶ ἐκδόσεις δίδως, καὶ πριάμενος οἰκίανμοColin sic restituit: ὕφορμον, ὅποι ὑπάγοις ἐν τῷ καιρῷ. υπαν τωρωι, οὐκ οἰκεῖς ἐν Πειραιεῖ, ἀλλʼ ἐξορμεῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. δεῖ δὲ τὸν δίκαιον δημαγωγὸν σωτῆρα τῆς ἑαυτοῦἑαυτοῦ Jensen. πατρίδος εἶναι,πατρίδος εἶναι Kenyon. μὴ δραπέτην. ἐπειδὴ δὲ νῦν Ἅρπαλος οὕτως ἐξαίφνηςμὴ usque ad ἐξαίφνης Blass. Column 18 πρὸς τὴν Ἑλλάδα προσέπεσεν ὥστε μηδένα προαισθέσθαι, τὰ δʼ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ Ἑλλάδι οὕτως ἔχοντα κατέλαβεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀφίξεως τῆς Νικάνορος καὶ τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων ὧν ἧκεν φέρων παρʼ Ἀλεξάνδρου περί τε τῶν φυγάδων καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοὺς κοινοὺς συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων καὶ ΒοιωτῶνΒοιωτῶν Blass: τοιούτων Colin.Desunt col. 18 versus fere duodecim. Column 19 ταῦταCol. 19 plerumque restituit Boeckh. σὺ παρεσκεύακαςπαρεσκεύακας Jensen: παρῄρησαι Blass. τῷ ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἅρπαλον, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας πρεςβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἀποςτροφήν, τοὺς δὲ ςατράπας,σατράπας Sauppe. οἳ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἧκον ἑκόντες πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχεν, τούτους σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον κεκώλυκας ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου τῇ συλλήψει τῇ Ἁρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶκαστον αὐτῶν. αὐτῶν Jensen.Desunt col. 19 versus fere sex et col. 20 versus fere undecim.

Frag. V (VI) -

Column 20 ὑπὸColl. 20 et 21 plerumque restituit Blass. δημοσθένους ἀποσταλείς, παρὰ δʼ Ὀλυμπιάδι Καλλίας ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὁ Ταυροσθένους ἀδελφός· τούτους γὰρ ἔγραψε Δημοσθένης Ἀθηναίους εἶναι καὶ χρῆται τούτοις πάντων μάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένων εἰκότως φίλους τοὺς ἀπʼ Εὐρίπου κέκτηται. εἶτα σὺ περὶ φιλίας πρὸς ἐμὲ τολμήσεις αὐτίκα μάλα λέγειν Desunt col. 20 versus fere unus et col. 21 unus. Column 21 ταύτην τὴν φιλίαν διέλυσας αὐτός, ὅτε χρυσίον κατὰ τῆς πατρίδοςπατρίδος Boeckh. ἔλαβες καὶ μετεβάλου. καὶ καταγέλαστον καταγέλαστον Babington. μὲν σαυτὸν ἐποίησας, κατῄσχυνας δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔμπροσθεν Boeckh. χρόνων τῶν αὐτῶν τί σοι προελομένους· καὶ ἐξὸν ἡμῖν λαμπροτάτοις εἶναι παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὸν ὑπόλοιπον βίον ὑπὸ δόξης χρηστῆς παραπεμφθῆναι, ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἀνέτρεψας, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνει νυνὶ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὑπὸ μειρακίων κρινόμενος περὶ δωροδοκίας. καίτοι ἔδει τοὐναντίον ὑφʼ ὑμῶν παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νεωτέρους τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ εἴ τι προπετέστερον Column 22 ἔπραττον ἐπιτιμᾶσθαι καὶ κολάζεσθαι. νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν. διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δικαίως ἂν ὀργίζοισθε Δημοσθένει, εἰ καὶ δόξης ἱκανῆς καὶ πλούτου πολλοῦ διʼ ὑμᾶςδιʼ ὑμᾶς Sauppe. μετεσχηκὼς μηδʼ ἐπὶ γήρως δῷ ὀδῷ Babington, coll. Polluce ii. 15. κήδεται τῆς πατρίδος. ἀλλʼ ὑμεῖς μὲν ᾐσχύνεσθε ἐπὶηςυ τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὅτε τινῶντινῶν Blass. κατεχειροτονεῖτε, εἰ τοιούτους καὶ δημαγωγοὺς καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ φύλακας τῶν πραγμάτων Desunt col. 22 versus quattuor et col. 23 fere tota.

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Column 20 ὑπὸColl. 20 et 21 plerumque restituit Blass. δημοσθένους ἀποσταλείς, παρὰ δʼ Ὀλυμπιάδι Καλλίας ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὁ Ταυροσθένους ἀδελφός· τούτους γὰρ ἔγραψε Δημοσθένης Ἀθηναίους εἶναι καὶ χρῆται τούτοις πάντων μάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· οὐδέποτε γὰρ οἶμαι ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένων εἰκότως φίλους τοὺς ἀπʼ Εὐρίπου κέκτηται. εἶτα σὺ περὶ φιλίας πρὸς ἐμὲ τολμήσεις αὐτίκα μάλα λέγειν Desunt col. 20 versus fere unus et col. 21 unus. Column 21 ταύτην τὴν φιλίαν διέλυσας αὐτός, ὅτε χρυσίον κατὰ τῆς πατρίδοςπατρίδος Boeckh. ἔλαβες καὶ μετεβάλου. καὶ καταγέλαστον καταγέλαστον Babington. μὲν σαυτὸν ἐποίησας, κατῄσχυνας δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔμπροσθεν Boeckh. χρόνων τῶν αὐτῶν τί σοι προελομένους· καὶ ἐξὸν ἡμῖν λαμπροτάτοις εἶναι παρὰ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὸν ὑπόλοιπον βίον ὑπὸ δόξης χρηστῆς παραπεμφθῆναι, ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἀνέτρεψας, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνει νυνὶ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὑπὸ μειρακίων κρινόμενος περὶ δωροδοκίας. καίτοι ἔδει τοὐναντίον ὑφʼ ὑμῶν παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς νεωτέρους τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ εἴ τι προπετέστερον Column 22 ἔπραττον ἐπιτιμᾶσθαι καὶ κολάζεσθαι. νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον οἱ νέοι τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη σωφρονίζουσιν. διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δικαίως ἂν ὀργίζοισθε Δημοσθένει, εἰ καὶ δόξης ἱκανῆς καὶ πλούτου πολλοῦ διʼ ὑμᾶςδιʼ ὑμᾶς Sauppe. μετεσχηκὼς μηδʼ ἐπὶ γήρως δῷ ὀδῷ Babington, coll. Polluce ii. 15. κήδεται τῆς πατρίδος. ἀλλʼ ὑμεῖς μὲν ᾐσχύνεσθε ἐπὶηςυ τοὺς περιεστηκότας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὅτε τινῶντινῶν Blass. κατεχειροτονεῖτε, εἰ τοιούτους καὶ δημαγωγοὺς καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ φύλακας τῶν πραγμάτων Desunt col. 22 versus quattuor et col. 23 fere tota.

Frag. VI (VII) -

Column 24 οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμοίως δεινόν,Col. 24 plerumque restituit Sauppe. εἴ τις ἔλαβεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, οὐδέ γʼ ὁμοίως ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἰδιῶται οἱ οἱ Blass. λαβόντες τὸ χρυσίον καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες καὶ οἱ στρατηγοί. διὰ τί; ὅτι τοῖς μὲνκαὶ usque ad μὲν Boeckh. ἰδιώταις Ἅρπαλος ἔδωκεν φυλάττειν τὸ χρυσίον, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες πράξεων ἕνεκα εἰλήφασιν.εἰλήφασιν Babington. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τοῖς μὲν ἀδικοῦσιν ἁπλᾶ, τοῖς δὲ δωροδοκοῦσιν δεκαπλᾶ τὰ ὀφλήματα προστάττουσινἁπλᾶ usque ad προστάττουσιν Blass. ἀποδιδόναι· ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ τίμημα τιμῆσαι ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν νόμων τούτοιςς, οὕτω καὶαι παρʼ ὑμῶνσι κατʼ αὐτῶναι. ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπον, πολλὰ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δίδοτε ἑκόντες τοῖς Column 25 στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, οὐ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑμετέρας πραότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας· ἓν μόνον παραφυλάττοντες, ὅπως διʼ ὑμᾶς καὶ μὴ καθʼ ὑμῶν ἔσται τὸ λαμβανόμενον. καὶ Δημοσθένη καὶ Δημάδην ἀπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ψηφισμάτων καὶ προξενιῶν οἶμαι πλείω ἢ ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα ἑκάτερον εἰληφέναι, ἔξω τῶν βασιλικῶν καὶ τῶν παρʼ Ἀλεξάνδρον. οἷς δὲ μήτε ταῦτα ἱκανά ἐστιν μήτʼ ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλʼ ἤδη ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τῆς πόλεως δῶρα εἰλήφασι, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον τούτους κολάζειν ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν ὑμῶν ἐάν Column 26 τις ἀρχήν τινα ἄρχωνἄρχων Boeckh. διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἢ διʼ ἀπειρίανδιʼ ἀπειρίαν Babington. ἁμάρτῃ τι, οὗτος οὗτος Sauppe. ὑπὸ τούτων καταρρητορευθεὶςκαταρρητορευθεὶς Sauppe. ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἀποθανεῖται ἢ ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπεσεῖται· αὐτοὶ δὲ τηλικαῦτα ἀδικήσαντες τὴν πόλιν οὐδεμιᾶς τιμωρίας τεύξονται; καὶ Κόνων Κόνων Boeckh. μὲν ὁ Παιανιεύς, ὅτι ὅτι Babington. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὑοῦ ἔλαβεν τὸ θεωρικὸν ἀποδημοῦντος, πέντε δραχμῶν ἕνεκεν ἱκετεύων ὑμᾶς τάλαντον ὦφλεν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, τούτων κατηγορούντων· καὶ Ἀριστόμαχος ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος τῆς Ἀκαδημείας, ὅτι σκαφεῖον ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας μετενεγκὼν εἰς τὸν κῆπον τὸν αὑτοῦ πλησίον ὄντα ἐχρῆτο καὶ ἐφη Desunt col. 27 fere tota et col. 28 versus septem.

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Column 24 οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμοίως δεινόν,Col. 24 plerumque restituit Sauppe. εἴ τις ἔλαβεν, ἀλλʼ εἰ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, οὐδέ γʼ ὁμοίως ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἰδιῶται οἱ οἱ Blass. λαβόντες τὸ χρυσίον καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες καὶ οἱ στρατηγοί. διὰ τί; ὅτι τοῖς μὲνκαὶ usque ad μὲν Boeckh. ἰδιώταις Ἅρπαλος ἔδωκεν φυλάττειν τὸ χρυσίον, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες πράξεων ἕνεκα εἰλήφασιν.εἰλήφασιν Babington. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τοῖς μὲν ἀδικοῦσιν ἁπλᾶ, τοῖς δὲ δωροδοκοῦσιν δεκαπλᾶ τὰ ὀφλήματα προστάττουσινἁπλᾶ usque ad προστάττουσιν Blass. ἀποδιδόναι· ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ τίμημα τιμῆσαι ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν νόμων τούτοιςς, οὕτω καὶαι παρʼ ὑμῶνσι κατʼ αὐτῶναι. ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπον, πολλὰ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δίδοτε ἑκόντες τοῖς Column 25 στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν ὠφελεῖσθαι, οὐ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑμετέρας πραότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας· ἓν μόνον παραφυλάττοντες, ὅπως διʼ ὑμᾶς καὶ μὴ καθʼ ὑμῶν ἔσται τὸ λαμβανόμενον. καὶ Δημοσθένη καὶ Δημάδην ἀπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ψηφισμάτων καὶ προξενιῶν οἶμαι πλείω ἢ ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα ἑκάτερον εἰληφέναι, ἔξω τῶν βασιλικῶν καὶ τῶν παρʼ Ἀλεξάνδρον. οἷς δὲ μήτε ταῦτα ἱκανά ἐστιν μήτʼ ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλʼ ἤδη ἐπʼ αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τῆς πόλεως δῶρα εἰλήφασι, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον τούτους κολάζειν ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν ὑμῶν ἐάν Column 26 τις ἀρχήν τινα ἄρχωνἄρχων Boeckh. διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἢ διʼ ἀπειρίανδιʼ ἀπειρίαν Babington. ἁμάρτῃ τι, οὗτος οὗτος Sauppe. ὑπὸ τούτων καταρρητορευθεὶςκαταρρητορευθεὶς Sauppe. ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ ἀποθανεῖται ἢ ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκπεσεῖται· αὐτοὶ δὲ τηλικαῦτα ἀδικήσαντες τὴν πόλιν οὐδεμιᾶς τιμωρίας τεύξονται; καὶ Κόνων Κόνων Boeckh. μὲν ὁ Παιανιεύς, ὅτι ὅτι Babington. ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὑοῦ ἔλαβεν τὸ θεωρικὸν ἀποδημοῦντος, πέντε δραχμῶν ἕνεκεν ἱκετεύων ὑμᾶς τάλαντον ὦφλεν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, τούτων κατηγορούντων· καὶ Ἀριστόμαχος ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος τῆς Ἀκαδημείας, ὅτι σκαφεῖον ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας μετενεγκὼν εἰς τὸν κῆπον τὸν αὑτοῦ πλησίον ὄντα ἐχρῆτο καὶ ἐφη Desunt col. 27 fere tota et col. 28 versus septem.

Frag. VII (VIII) -

Column 28 οὐ μέντοιColl. 28 et 29 plerumque restituit Blass. ἡμᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἐν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνῳ οὐκ εἴα προςιέναι αὑτῷ οὐδὲ διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβούλοις ἐχρῆτο καὶ ςυνηγόροιςDesunt versus fere duo. τοῦ δὲ ἐπιόντοςτοῦ δʼ ἐπιόντος ἔτους ci. Jensen.πὶ τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἅπασαν ταμίανταμίαν Kenyon. ἐχειροτόνηςεν, ὑπολαμβάνων χάριν αὐτῷ παρʼ ἡμῶν ὀφείλεσθαι, ὅπερ δίκαιον ἦν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀγώνων ἡμῖν ὕστερον πολλῶν γεγενημένων ἐξ ἐκείνωνἐξ ἐκείνων Kenyon. τῶν πραγμάτων πραγμάτων Kenyon. καὶ Column 29 αὐτοῦκαὶ αὐτοῦ Jensen: καὶ περὶ Blass. τοῦ πολέμου, οὐδεπώποτε ἡμν οὗτοι κατεψηφίσαντο, ἀλλʼ ἐκ πάντων ἔσωσαν, ὅπερ μέγιστον καὶ ἀξιοπιστότατονἀξιοπιστότατον Kenyon. τῆς τοῦ δήμου εὐνοίαςεὐνοίας Fuhr: διανοίας Blass. σημεῖον. καὶ γράψαι, ὦ ΔημόσθενεςDesunt aliquot versus. πὸHoc fragmentum, quod ad finem orationis habet Kenyon, huc inseruit Blass. τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἡλωκέναι σε αὐτόματον, οὐκ ἐποίησανγενομεν Desunt aliquot versus. Column 30 δῆμοςCol. 30 plerumque restituit Fuhr. ἐποίησεν, ὥστʼ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἀφαιρεθεὶς τὸν στέφανον, ἡμῶν ὃν ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἀφείλετο. οὕτως οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦ δήμου προσενηνεγμένου, οὐ πάντα τὰ δίκαιʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς ὑπηρετοῖμεν ὑπηρετοῖμεν Blass. καὶ εἰ δέοιδέοι Boeckh.ποθνῄσκοιμεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι· ἀλλὰ ςὺ κατὰ τοῦ δήμου Desunt aliquot versus. ςθαι εὐεργετήματα·Hoc fragmentum, quod ad finem orationis habet Kenyon, huc inseruit Blass. οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἑτέρων πατρίδα εὖ ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν, οὐδὲ Desunt aliquot versus. Column 31 αν καὶ λόγου δύναμιν ἀποδεικνύμενος διατετέλεκας· καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἡγοῦ τὴν βουλὴν ἀποφανεῖν τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ χρυσίον, πολεμικὸς ὢν καὶ ταράττων τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα τὴν ζήτησιν ἐκκρούοις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀναβάλοιτο τὸ ἀποφῆναι ἡ βουλή, οὔπω φάσκουσα εὑρηκέναι, τότʼ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγχωρῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος εἶναι εἰ βούλοιτο,εἶναι εἰ βούλοιτο Sauppe. καὶ ἀφικομένουἀφικομένου ci. Blass,τοῦ Νικάνορος add. Colin. Desunt col. 31 versus fere decem. Column 32 οστουςἐβούλετοColl. 32 et 34 plerumque restituit Sauppe. στῆσαι εἰκόνα Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλέως τοῦ ἀνικήτου θεοῦκαιἀγγελίαν ἀγγελίαν Blass.Ὀλυμπίας. Ὀλυμπίας Blass.ἀπήγγειλε τῷ δήμῳ Desunt col. 32 versus fere quattuordecim et col. 33 fere tota.

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Column 28 οὐ μέντοιColl. 28 et 29 plerumque restituit Blass. ἡμᾶς ὁ δῆμος ἐν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνῳ οὐκ εἴα προςιέναι αὑτῷ οὐδὲ διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβούλοις ἐχρῆτο καὶ ςυνηγόροιςDesunt versus fere duo. τοῦ δὲ ἐπιόντοςτοῦ δʼ ἐπιόντος ἔτους ci. Jensen.πὶ τὴν διοίκησιν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἅπασαν ταμίανταμίαν Kenyon. ἐχειροτόνηςεν, ὑπολαμβάνων χάριν αὐτῷ παρʼ ἡμῶν ὀφείλεσθαι, ὅπερ δίκαιον ἦν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀγώνων ἡμῖν ὕστερον πολλῶν γεγενημένων ἐξ ἐκείνωνἐξ ἐκείνων Kenyon. τῶν πραγμάτων πραγμάτων Kenyon. καὶ Column 29 αὐτοῦκαὶ αὐτοῦ Jensen: καὶ περὶ Blass. τοῦ πολέμου, οὐδεπώποτε ἡμν οὗτοι κατεψηφίσαντο, ἀλλʼ ἐκ πάντων ἔσωσαν, ὅπερ μέγιστον καὶ ἀξιοπιστότατονἀξιοπιστότατον Kenyon. τῆς τοῦ δήμου εὐνοίαςεὐνοίας Fuhr: διανοίας Blass. σημεῖον. καὶ γράψαι, ὦ ΔημόσθενεςDesunt aliquot versus. πὸHoc fragmentum, quod ad finem orationis habet Kenyon, huc inseruit Blass. τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἡλωκέναι σε αὐτόματον, οὐκ ἐποίησανγενομεν Desunt aliquot versus. Column 30 δῆμοςCol. 30 plerumque restituit Fuhr. ἐποίησεν, ὥστʼ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἀφαιρεθεὶς τὸν στέφανον, ἡμῶν ὃν ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἀφείλετο. οὕτως οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦ δήμου προσενηνεγμένου, οὐ πάντα τὰ δίκαιʼ ἂν αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς ὑπηρετοῖμεν ὑπηρετοῖμεν Blass. καὶ εἰ δέοιδέοι Boeckh.ποθνῄσκοιμεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι· ἀλλὰ ςὺ κατὰ τοῦ δήμου Desunt aliquot versus. ςθαι εὐεργετήματα·Hoc fragmentum, quod ad finem orationis habet Kenyon, huc inseruit Blass. οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἑτέρων πατρίδα εὖ ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν, οὐδὲ Desunt aliquot versus. Column 31 αν καὶ λόγου δύναμιν ἀποδεικνύμενος διατετέλεκας· καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἡγοῦ τὴν βουλὴν ἀποφανεῖν τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ χρυσίον, πολεμικὸς ὢν καὶ ταράττων τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα τὴν ζήτησιν ἐκκρούοις· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀναβάλοιτο τὸ ἀποφῆναι ἡ βουλή, οὔπω φάσκουσα εὑρηκέναι, τότʼ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγχωρῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος εἶναι εἰ βούλοιτο,εἶναι εἰ βούλοιτο Sauppe. καὶ ἀφικομένουἀφικομένου ci. Blass,τοῦ Νικάνορος add. Colin. Desunt col. 31 versus fere decem. Column 32 οστουςἐβούλετοColl. 32 et 34 plerumque restituit Sauppe. στῆσαι εἰκόνα Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλέως τοῦ ἀνικήτου θεοῦκαιἀγγελίαν ἀγγελίαν Blass.Ὀλυμπίας. Ὀλυμπίας Blass.ἀπήγγειλε τῷ δήμῳ Desunt col. 32 versus fere quattuordecim et col. 33 fere tota.

Frag. VIII (IX) -

Column 34 τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, καὶ κήρυγμα περὶ τούτων ἐποιήσατο· οἱ δʼ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποδόντες ἃ ἔλαβον ἀπηλλάχθαι τιμωρίας καθʼ αὑτῶν καὶ ζητήσεις ἔγραφον. τοὺς δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀδικήσαντας καὶ δωροδοκήσαντας, ἀδείας δʼ αὐτοῖς δοθείσης μὴ ἀποδόντας τὸ χρυσίον τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; ἐᾶν ἀτιμωρήτους; ἀλλʼ αἰσχρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἰδίων ἕνεκα ἐγκλημάτων πόλεως σωτηρίαν κινδυνεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὑμᾶς τούτων ἀποψηφίσασθαι, μὴ ἐθέλονταςἐθέλοντας Thalheim. ἀναδέξασθαι καὶ τὰκαὶ τὰ Thalheim. ἀδικήματα Column 35 Desunt col. 34 versus fere quattuor et col. 35 versus fere undeviginti. μCol. 35 restituit Blass. τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, προτιμᾶτε τὴν τούτων πλεονεξίαν τῆς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν σωτηρίας· μηδὲ λημμάτων αἰσχρῶν ἕνεκα τὸν πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ πραγμάτων ἀξιωτέρων Column 36 καὶ μεταλλαγῆς ἀμείνονος ποιήσησθε Desunt col. 36 versus fere viginti sex et col. 37 versus quinque.

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Column 34 τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, καὶ κήρυγμα περὶ τούτων ἐποιήσατο· οἱ δʼ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποδόντες ἃ ἔλαβον ἀπηλλάχθαι τιμωρίας καθʼ αὑτῶν καὶ ζητήσεις ἔγραφον. τοὺς δὴ τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀδικήσαντας καὶ δωροδοκήσαντας, ἀδείας δʼ αὐτοῖς δοθείσης μὴ ἀποδόντας τὸ χρυσίον τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; ἐᾶν ἀτιμωρήτους; ἀλλʼ αἰσχρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἰδίων ἕνεκα ἐγκλημάτων πόλεως σωτηρίαν κινδυνεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὑμᾶς τούτων ἀποψηφίσασθαι, μὴ ἐθέλονταςἐθέλοντας Thalheim. ἀναδέξασθαι καὶ τὰκαὶ τὰ Thalheim. ἀδικήματα Column 35 Desunt col. 34 versus fere quattuor et col. 35 versus fere undeviginti. μCol. 35 restituit Blass. τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικαςταί, προτιμᾶτε τὴν τούτων πλεονεξίαν τῆς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν σωτηρίας· μηδὲ λημμάτων αἰσχρῶν ἕνεκα τὸν πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ πραγμάτων ἀξιωτέρων Column 36 καὶ μεταλλαγῆς ἀμείνονος ποιήσησθε Desunt col. 36 versus fere viginti sex et col. 37 versus quinque.

Frag. IX (X) -

Column 37 εσαλεπὲρ αὐτῶν εοις τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιησάμεθαβουλευωων χρηεν χε Column 38 Desunt versus fere sedecim.αὐτῷ παρʼ ἑκάστου ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατηγορεῖν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐξελέγχειν τοὺς εἰληφότας τὰ χρήματα καὶ δεδωροδοκηκότας κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῖνCol. 38 plerumque restituit Blass. προςέταξεν τοῖς ᾑρημένοις κατηγόροις· τὸ δʼ ἀποφῆναι τοὺς εἰληφότας ἀπέδωκεν τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, ἣ τούτους εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἀπέδειξεν· τὸ δὲ κολάσαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας Fuhr:τοῖς δικάσταις Blass. ὑμῖν Desunt versus fere undecim. ἐξ Ἀρείου Column 39 πάγου. ἐὰν δὲ ἡ ψῆφος μὴ ἀκόλουθος γένηται τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις, τοῦτο δή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, παρʼ ὑμῖν ἔσται καταλελειμμένον. διόπερ δεῖ πάντας ὑμᾶςPost ὑμᾶς add.ἀποβλέψαντας εἰς Boeckh. Desunt versus fere quattuor. τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἄλλην [τὴν] τὴν del. Blass. εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων, τιμωρήσασθαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς πόλεως, καὶ μήτε λόγου παράκλησιν Desunt versus tres. τοὺς Column 40 εἰληφόταςCol. 40 plerumque restituit Boeckh, sed τοὺς εἰληφότας Sauppe. δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν νόμων· μηδὲ τοῖς δακρύοις τοῖς Ἁγνωνίδου προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, ἐκεῖνο λογιζόμενοι, ὅτι ἀτυχήσαντι μὲν Desunt versus fere decem. οὗτος δʼ ἂν κλαίων κλαίων Blass. οὐ δίκαια ποιήςειεν, ποιήσειεν Blass. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ λῃσταὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ κλαίοντες, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὸ πλοῖον. οὕτω καὶ Δημοσθένης τί προςῆκον προσῆκον Blass. κλαιήσει, ἐξὸν ἐξὸν Sauppe: δέον Blass. αὐτῷ μὴ λαμβάνειν

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Column 37 εσαλεπὲρ αὐτῶν εοις τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιησάμεθαβουλευωων χρηεν χε Column 38 Desunt versus fere sedecim.αὐτῷ παρʼ ἑκάστου ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατηγορεῖν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐξελέγχειν τοὺς εἰληφότας τὰ χρήματα καὶ δεδωροδοκηκότας κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος ἡμῖνCol. 38 plerumque restituit Blass. προςέταξεν τοῖς ᾑρημένοις κατηγόροις· τὸ δʼ ἀποφῆναι τοὺς εἰληφότας ἀπέδωκεν τῇ βουλῇ τῇ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου, ἣ τούτους εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἀπέδειξεν· τὸ δὲ κολάσαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας Fuhr:τοῖς δικάσταις Blass. ὑμῖν Desunt versus fere undecim. ἐξ Ἀρείου Column 39 πάγου. ἐὰν δὲ ἡ ψῆφος μὴ ἀκόλουθος γένηται τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις, τοῦτο δή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, παρʼ ὑμῖν ἔσται καταλελειμμένον. διόπερ δεῖ πάντας ὑμᾶςPost ὑμᾶς add.ἀποβλέψαντας εἰς Boeckh. Desunt versus fere quattuor. τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἄλλην [τὴν] τὴν del. Blass. εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑμῖν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τάφους τοὺς τῶν προγόνων, τιμωρήσασθαι τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς πόλεως, καὶ μήτε λόγου παράκλησιν Desunt versus tres. τοὺς Column 40 εἰληφόταςCol. 40 plerumque restituit Boeckh, sed τοὺς εἰληφότας Sauppe. δῶρα κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῶν νόμων· μηδὲ τοῖς δακρύοις τοῖς Ἁγνωνίδου προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, ἐκεῖνο λογιζόμενοι, ὅτι ἀτυχήσαντι μὲν Desunt versus fere decem. οὗτος δʼ ἂν κλαίων κλαίων Blass. οὐ δίκαια ποιήςειεν, ποιήσειεν Blass. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ λῃσταὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ κλαίοντες, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὸ πλοῖον. οὕτω καὶ Δημοσθένης τί προςῆκον προσῆκον Blass. κλαιήσει, ἐξὸν ἐξὸν Sauppe: δέον Blass. αὐτῷ μὴ λαμβάνειν

Priscianus xviii. 235 ἀλλὰ τοὺς νεωτέρους ἐπὶ βοήθειαν καλεῖς, οὓς ὕβριζες καὶ ἐλοιδοροῦ ἀκρατοκώθωνας ἀποκαλῶν;

diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/__cts__.xml index 30ebad54c..672967340 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ Ἐπιτάφιος - Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + Funeral Oration + Hyperides. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 34ef8f2c7..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0140", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Hyperides/opensource/hyp_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=6", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index ed6b7e5b5..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,454 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - Funeral Speech from Speeches (English). Machine readable text - Hyperides - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - - - Hyperides - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by - J. O. Burtt, M.A - - - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William - Heinemann Ltd. - 1962 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - - - - - edited markup - - - - -
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The words to be pronounced above this grave, a - tribute to Leosthenes the general and the others who have perished with him in - the war, for the courage they have shown, have as their witness time itself . . - .The missing words were restored by - Sudhaus so as to give the following sense: “. . . time itself which holds - the record of their deeds. For no man known during the history of the world - has seen in any land a nobler choice than this or better men, etc.” - nor better men than these now dead nor more resplendent actions. Indeed my - greatest doubt today is lest my speech may prove unworthy of their exploits. -

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I am, however, taking heart in this assurance: that what I leave unsaid will be - supplied by you who hear me; for my listeners will be no random audience but the - persons who themselves have witnessed the actions of these men.

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While praise is due to Athens for her - policy, for choosing as she did a course not only ranking with her past - achievements but even surpassing them in pride and honor, and to the fallen also - for their gallantry in battle, for proving worthy of their forbears' valor, to - Leosthenes the general it is doubly due; the city's guide in framing her - decision, he was besides the citizens' commander in the field.

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In the case of Athens, to recount in detail the benefits which she has - previously conferred upon the whole of Greece would be a task too great to compass in the time we - have, nor is the occasion one for lengthy speaking. Indeed it is not easy for a - single man, faced with so many noble actions, to recall the full story to your - minds. I shall, however, venture one general comment on her.

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Compare her with the sun which visits the whole world and duly separates the - seasons, disposing all things for the best, with provision, where men are - virtuous and prudent, for their birth and nurture, the crops and all the other - needs of life; for so our city never fails to punish the wicked, help the just, - mete out to all men fairness in place of wrong, and at her individual peril and - expense assure the Greeks a common safety.

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To deal with the achievements of the city as a whole is, as I said before, a task - which I shall not attempt, and I will here confine myself to Leosthenes and his - companions. At what point, then, shall I take up the story? What shall I mention - first? Shall I trace the ancestry of each?

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To do so would, I think, be foolish. Granted, if one is praising men of a - different stamp, such as have gathered from diverse places into the city which - they inhabit, each contributing his lineage to the common stock, then one must - trace their separate ancestry. But from one who speaks of Athenians, born of - their own country and sharing a lineage of unrivalled purity, a eulogy of the - descent of each must surely be superfluous.

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Am I then to touch upon their education, and, as other speakers often do, remind - you how as children they were reared and trained in strict self-discipline? None - of us, I think, is unaware that our aim in training children is to convert them - into valiant men; and that men who have proved of exceptional courage in war - were well brought up in childhood needs no stressing.

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The simplest course, I think, will be to tell you of their courage under arms, - revealing them as authors of many benefits conferred upon their country and the - rest of Greece. First I shall take the - general, as is his due.

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For Leosthenes perceived that the whole of Greece was humiliated and . . . cowed, corrupted by men who - were accepting bribes from Philip and Alexander against their native countries. - He realized that our city stood in need of a commander, and Greece herself of a city, able to assume the - leadership, and he gave himself to his country and the city to the Greeks, in - the cause of freedom.

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After raising a mercenary force he took command of the citizen army and defeated - the first opponents of Greek freedom, the Boeotians, Macedonians and Euboeans, - together with their other allies, in battle in Boeotia.

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Thence he advanced to PylaeIn fact Leosthenes - seems to have occupied Thermopylae before his victory in Boeotia. and occupied the pass - through which, in bygone days as well, barbarians marched against the Greeks. He - thus prevented the inroad of Antipater into Greece, and overtaking him in that vicinity, defeated him in - battle and shut him into Lamia, which - he then besieged.

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The Thessalians, Phocians, Aetolians, and all the other peoples of the region, he - made his allies, bringing under his control, by their own consent, the men whom - Philip and Alexander gloried in controlling against their wish. The - circumstances subject to his will he mastered, but fate he could not overpower. -

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Leosthenes must have first claim upon our gratitude for ever, not only for the - acts performed by him, but also for the later battle, fought after his death, - and for those other triumphs which the Greeks have gained in this campaign. For - on the foundations laid by Leosthenes the subsequent success of his survivors - rests.

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Let no one fancy that I disregard the other citizens and keep my eulogy for him - alone. The praise bestowed upon Leosthenes for these engagements is in fact a - tribute to the rest. For though sound strategy depends upon the leader, success - in battle is ensured by those who are prepared to risk their lives; and - therefore, in the praise that I bestow upon the victory gained, I shall be - commending not merely the leadership of Leosthenes but the courage of his - comrades too.

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For who could rightly grudge his praise to those of our citizens who fell in this - campaign, who gave their lives for the freedom of the Greeks, convinced that the - surest proof of their desire to guarantee the liberty of Greece was to die in battle for her?

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One circumstance did much to reinforce their purpose as champions of Greece: the fact that the earlier battle was - fought in Boeotia.The points which Hyperides makes in this and in the - following section will not bear examination. For (1) the first victory was - gained in the territory of Plataea, not within sight of Thebes; (2) the second battle was - probably fought near Heraclea in - Trachis, and its site could - not be seen from Anthela where - the Amphictyonic council met. Moreover, the council met there only once a - year and could hardly be called representative of the whole of Greece. They saw that the city of - Thebes had been tragically - annihilated from the face of the earth, that its citadel was garrisoned by the - Macedonians, and that the persons of its inhabitants were in slavery, while - others parcelled out the land among themselves. And so these threats, revealed - before their eyes, gave them an undaunted courage to meet danger gladly.

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Yet the action fought near Pylae and Lamia has proved to be as glorious for them - as the conflict in Boeotia, not solely - through the circumstances of victory in the field, over Antipater and his - allies, but on the grounds of situation also. The fact that this has been the - battle's site will mean that all the Greeks, repairing twice a year to the - council of the Amphictyones, will witness their achievements; for by the very - act of gathering in that spot they will recall the valor of these men.

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Never before did men strive for a nobler cause, either against stronger - adversaries or with fewer friends, convinced that valor gave strength and - courage superiority as no mere numbers could. Liberty they gave us as an - offering for all to share, but the honor of their deeds they have bestowed upon - their country as a wreath for her alone.

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Now we might well reflect what, in our opinion, - the outcome would have been, had these men failed to do their duty in the - struggle. Must we not suppose that the whole world would be under one master, - and Greece compelled to tolerate his - whim as law? In short that Macedonian arrogance, and not the power of justice, - would lord it among every people. . . .Various - attempts have been made to restore this corrupt passage, from which some - words seem to have dropped out, but none is wholly satisfactory. In any case - the sense appears to be that outrages on women, girls, and children would - continue without pause in every city. -

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The practices which even now we have to countenance are proof enough: sacrifices - being made to men; images, altars, and temples carefully perfected in their - honor, while those of the gods are neglected, and we ourselves are forced to - honor as heroes the servants of these people.

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If reverence for the gods has been removed by Macedonian insolence, what fate - must we conclude would have befallen the rules of conduct towards man? Would - they not have been utterly discounted? The more terrible therefore we think the - consequences would have been, the greater must be the praise which we believe - the dead have earned.

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For no campaign has better shown the courage of the soldiers than this last, when - they had daily to be arrayed for combat, to fight, on but one expedition, more - battles than the combats which any soldier of the past endured,The exaggeration of this remark has led some editors to - doubt the reading. and face extreme severities of weather and many - hard privations in the daily needs of life with an endurance almost beyond - description.

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Such trials Leosthenes induced the citizens to - brave undaunted, and they gave up their persons gladly to share the struggle - with so great a leader. Should they not then be counted fortunate in their - display of valor rather than unfortunate in their sacrifice of life? For in - exchange for a mortal body they gained undying glory, safeguarding by their - personal courage the universal liberty of Greece. . . .The Greek words - which follow here cannot be translated as they stand. Fritzsche's emendation - probably restores the correct sense, namely: “Nothing brings complete - happiness without self-government.” But the Greek wording is - uncertain. -

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If men are to be happy, the voice of law, and not a ruler's threats, must reign - supreme; if they are free, no groundless charge, but only proof of guilt, must - cause them apprehension; nor must the safety of our citizens depend on those who - slander them and truckle to their masters but on the force of law alone.

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Such were the aims with which these men accepted labor upon labor, and with the - dangers of the passing hour dispelled the terrors which the whole future held - for citizens and Greeks, sacrificing their lives that others might live well. -

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To them we owe it that fathers have grown famous, and mothers looked up to in the - city, that sisters, through the benefit of law, have made, and will make, - marriages worthy of them, that children too will find a passport to the people's - hearts in these men's valor; these men who, far from dying—death is no word to - use where lives are lost, as theirs were, for a noble cause—have passed from - this existence to an eternal state.

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For if the fact of death, to others a most grievous ill, has brought to them - great benefits, are we not wrong indeed to count them wretched or to conclude - that they have left the realm of life? Should we not rather say they have been - born anew, a nobler birth than the first? Mere children then, they had no - understanding, but now they have been born as valiant men.

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Formerly they stood in need of time and many dangers to reveal their courage; - now, with that courage as a base, they have become known to all, to be - remembered for their valor.

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On what occasion shall we fail to recollect the prowess of these men, in what - place fail to see them win their due of emulation and the highest praise? What - if the city prospers? Surely the successes, which they have earned, will bring - their praises, and none other's, to our lips and to our memories. Shall we then - forget them in times of personal satisfaction? We cannot; for it is through - their valor that we shall have the safe enjoyment of those moments.

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Will there be men of any age who will not count them blessed? What of the older - generation, who think that through the efforts of these men they have been - placed in safety and will pass the rest of their lives free from dread? Consider - their compeers . . .The sense is supplied by - Kenyon as follows: “To them it - has been given, because these died in battle, to enjoy their lives in honor - and safety.” -

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Think, too, of the younger men and boys. Will they not envy their death and - strive themselves to take as an example these men's lives, in place of which - they have left behind their valor?

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Ought we then to count them happy in so great an honor?The missing passage from h)/ - ti/nes to tw=| pole/mw| - has been tentatively restored by Blass and Kenyon to give the following sense: “Neither poets nor - philosophers will be in want of words or song in which to celebrate their - deeds to Greece. Surely this - expedition will be more famed in every land than that which overthrew the - Phrygians. Throughout all time in every part of Greece these exploits will be praised in verse and song. - Leosthenes himself and those who perished with him in the war will have a - double claim to be revered.” . . .

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For if it is for pleasure that men recall such feats of courage, what could be - more pleasing to Greeks than the praise of those who gave them freedom from the - Macedonian yoke? Or if it is desire for profit that prompts such recollections, - what speech could be of greater profit to the hearts of those about to hear it - than one which is to honor courage and brave men?

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With us and all mankind, it is clear, in the light - of these reflections, that their fame is now assured, but what of the lower - world? Who, we may well ask ourselves, are waiting there to welcome the leader - of these men? Are we not convinced that we should see, greeting Leosthenes with - wonder, those of the so-called demi-gods who sailed against Troy: heroes whom he so far excelled, though - his exploits were akin to theirs, that they with all Greece at their side took but one city, while - he with his native town alone brought low the whole power which held Europe and Asia beneath its sway?

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They championed one lone woman wronged, but he staved off from all Greek women - the violence coming upon them, aided by these men who now are being buried with - him.

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Remember the figures who,This sentence is - awkward in Greek because, though tw=n - gegenhme/nown is genitive, dependent on u(pere/sxen, the writer has inserted w(=n which is not needed. The diffculty can - be avoided by placing a comma after a)ndrw=n and the full stop after diapepragme/nwn, but then le/gw - dh\ makes an abrupt beginning to the new sentence. born - after the heroes of old, yet rivalled their deeds of valor, the followers of - Miltiades and Themistocles, and those others who, by freeing Greece, brought honor to their country and - glory to their lives;

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whom Leosthenes so far outdid in bravery and counsel, that where they beat back - the barbarian power as it advanced, he even forestalled its onslaught. They saw - a struggle with the foe in their own land, but he defeated his opponents on the - foe's own soil.

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Those too, I fancy, who gave the people the surest - token of their mutual friendship, Harmodius and Aristogiton,The sense appears to be that they regard no one as so - suitable to rank with themselves as Leosthenes and his comrades. Harmodius - and Aristogiton, who in 514 B.C. plotted to assassinate the two - sons of Pisistratus, and after killing one, Hipparchus, were captured and - put to death, were later looked upon as liberators of the city. They and - their descendants, who enjoyed special privileges, are not infrequently - referred to by the orators. Compare Din. 1.63 and - Din. 1.101; Hyp. - 2.3. do not regard . . . as Leosthenes and his comrades in - arms; nor are there any with whom they would rather hold converse in the lower - world than these. We need not wonder; for what these men did was no less a task - than theirs; it was indeed, if judgement must be passed, a greater service - still. Those two brought low the tyrants of their country, these the masters of - the whole of Greece.

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Noble indeed beyond our dreams was the courage these men attained, honorable and - magnificent the choice they made. How supreme was the valor, the heroism in - times of peril, which they, dedicating to the universal liberty of Greece . . .

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It is hard no doubt to offer consolation to those - borne down with griefs like these. For sorrows are not stilled by word or law; - only the individual's temper, and the measure of his feeling for the dead, can - set the limit to his mourning. Yet we must take heart, and restricting our grief - as best we may, bear in our minds, with the thought of death, the glorious name - which the fallen have left behind them.

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For though their fate deserves our tears, their conduct claims the highest - praise. Though they have failed to reach old age in life, they have achieved a - fame which knows no age, and have attained the height of satisfaction. For all - who were childless at their death the praises of the Greeks will be immortal - children. For all who have children alive the goodwill of their country will be - the children's guardian.

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And furthermore, if death means non-existence, they have been released from - sickness and from grief, and from the other ills which vex our human life. But - if in Hades we are conscious still and cared for by some god, as we are led to - think, then surely those who defended the worship of the gods, when it was being - overthrown, must receive from him the greatest care of all. . . .

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ee6724498 --- /dev/null +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ + + + + + +Funeral Speech +Hyperides +J. O. Burtt +Perseus Project, Tufts University +Gregory Crane + + Prepared under the supervision of + Lisa Cerrato + William Merrill + Elli Mylonas + David Smith + +The Annenberg CPB/Project + + +Trustees of Tufts University +Medford, MA +Perseus Project +Perseus 2.0 +tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + + + + + +Hyperides +Minor Attic Orators +J. O. Burtt + + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + +2 + + Internet Archive + + + + + + + +

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+ + + English + Greek + + + + EpiDoc and CTS conversion + edited markup + split composite text and converted to unicode + add refdecl, changed some of the FRAG attributes that had commentary in them, made notes have a space after them. + Put bios and intros to speeches into separate files. Change markup in accordance with orator dtd + +
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The words to be pronounced above this grave, a tribute to Leosthenes the general and the others who have perished with him in the war, for the courage they have shown, have as their witness time itself . . .The missing words were restored by Sudhaus so as to give the following sense: time itself which holds the record of their deeds. For no man known during the history of the world has seen in any land a nobler choice than this or better men, etc. nor better men than these now dead nor more resplendent actions. Indeed my greatest doubt today is lest my speech may prove unworthy of their exploits.

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I am, however, taking heart in this assurance: that what I leave unsaid will be supplied by you who hear me; for my listeners will be no random audience but the persons who themselves have witnessed the actions of these men.

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While praise is due to Athens for her policy, for choosing as she did a course not only ranking with her past achievements but even surpassing them in pride and honor, and to the fallen also for their gallantry in battle, for proving worthy of their forbears’ valor, to Leosthenes the general it is doubly due; the city’s guide in framing her decision, he was besides the citizens’ commander in the field.

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In the case of Athens, to recount in detail the benefits which she has previously conferred upon the whole of Greece would be a task too great to compass in the time we have, nor is the occasion one for lengthy speaking. Indeed it is not easy for a single man, faced with so many noble actions, to recall the full story to your minds. I shall, however, venture one general comment on her.

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Compare her with the sun which visits the whole world and duly separates the seasons, disposing all things for the best, with provision, where men are virtuous and prudent, for their birth and nurture, the crops and all the other needs of life; for so our city never fails to punish the wicked, help the just, mete out to all men fairness in place of wrong, and at her individual peril and expense assure the Greeks a common safety.

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To deal with the achievements of the city as a whole is, as I said before, a task which I shall not attempt, and I will here confine myself to Leosthenes and his companions. At what point, then, shall I take up the story? What shall I mention first? Shall I trace the ancestry of each?

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To do so would, I think, be foolish. Granted, if one is praising men of a different stamp, such as have gathered from diverse places into the city which they inhabit, each contributing his lineage to the common stock, then one must trace their separate ancestry. But from one who speaks of Athenians, born of their own country and sharing a lineage of unrivalled purity, a eulogy of the descent of each must surely be superfluous.

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Am I then to touch upon their education, and, as other speakers often do, remind you how as children they were reared and trained in strict self-discipline? None of us, I think, is unaware that our aim in training children is to convert them into valiant men; and that men who have proved of exceptional courage in war were well brought up in childhood needs no stressing.

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The simplest course, I think, will be to tell you of their courage under arms, revealing them as authors of many benefits conferred upon their country and the rest of Greece. First I shall take the general, as is his due.

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For Leosthenes perceived that the whole of Greece was humiliated and cowed, corrupted by men who were accepting bribes from Philip and Alexander against their native countries. He realized that our city stood in need of a commander, and Greece herself of a city, able to assume the leadership, and he gave himself to his country and the city to the Greeks, in the cause of freedom.

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After raising a mercenary force he took command of the citizen army and defeated the first opponents of Greek freedom, the Boeotians, Macedonians and Euboeans, together with their other allies, in battle in Boeotia.

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Thence he advanced to PylaeIn fact Leosthenes seems to have occupied Thermopylae before his victory in Boeotia. and occupied the pass through which, in bygone days as well, barbarians marched against the Greeks. He thus prevented the inroad of Antipater into Greece, and overtaking him in that vicinity, defeated him in battle and shut him into Lamia, which he then besieged.

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The Thessalians, Phocians, Aetolians, and all the other peoples of the region, he made his allies, bringing under his control, by their own consent, the men whom Philip and Alexander gloried in controlling against their wish. The circumstances subject to his will he mastered, but fate he could not overpower.

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Leosthenes must have first claim upon our gratitude for ever, not only for the acts performed by him, but also for the later battle, fought after his death, and for those other triumphs which the Greeks have gained in this campaign. For on the foundations laid by Leosthenes the subsequent success of his survivors rests.

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Let no one fancy that I disregard the other citizens and keep my eulogy for him alone. The praise bestowed upon Leosthenes for these engagements is in fact a tribute to the rest. For though sound strategy depends upon the leader, success in battle is ensured by those who are prepared to risk their lives; and therefore, in the praise that I bestow upon the victory gained, I shall be commending not merely the leadership of Leosthenes but the courage of his comrades too.

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For who could rightly grudge his praise to those of our citizens who fell in this campaign, who gave their lives for the freedom of the Greeks, convinced that the surest proof of their desire to guarantee the liberty of Greece was to die in battle for her?

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One circumstance did much to reinforce their purpose as champions of Greece: the fact that the earlier battle was fought in Boeotia.The points which Hyperides makes in this and in the following section will not bear examination. For (1) the first victory was gained in the territory of Plataea, not within sight of Thebes; (2) the second battle was probably fought near Heraclea in Trachis, and its site could not be seen from Anthela where the Amphictyonic council met. Moreover, the council met there only once a year and could hardly be called representative of the whole of Greece. They saw that the city of Thebes had been tragically annihilated from the face of the earth, that its citadel was garrisoned by the Macedonians, and that the persons of its inhabitants were in slavery, while others parcelled out the land among themselves. And so these threats, revealed before their eyes, gave them an undaunted courage to meet danger gladly.

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Yet the action fought near Pylae and Lamia has proved to be as glorious for them as the conflict in Boeotia, not solely through the circumstances of victory in the field, over Antipater and his allies, but on the grounds of situation also. The fact that this has been the battle’s site will mean that all the Greeks, repairing twice a year to the council of the Amphictyones, will witness their achievements; for by the very act of gathering in that spot they will recall the valor of these men.

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Never before did men strive for a nobler cause, either against stronger adversaries or with fewer friends, convinced that valor gave strength and courage superiority as no mere numbers could. Liberty they gave us as an offering for all to share, but the honor of their deeds they have bestowed upon their country as a wreath for her alone.

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Now we might well reflect what, in our opinion, the outcome would have been, had these men failed to do their duty in the struggle. Must we not suppose that the whole world would be under one master, and Greece compelled to tolerate his whim as law? In short that Macedonian arrogance, and not the power of justice, would lord it among every peopleVarious attempts have been made to restore this corrupt passage, from which some words seem to have dropped out, but none is wholly satisfactory. In any case the sense appears to be that outrages on women, girls, and children would continue without pause in every city.

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The practices which even now we have to countenance are proof enough: sacrifices being made to men; images, altars, and temples carefully perfected in their honor, while those of the gods are neglected, and we ourselves are forced to honor as heroes the servants of these people.

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If reverence for the gods has been removed by Macedonian insolence, what fate must we conclude would have befallen the rules of conduct towards man? Would they not have been utterly discounted? The more terrible therefore we think the consequences would have been, the greater must be the praise which we believe the dead have earned.

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For no campaign has better shown the courage of the soldiers than this last, when they had daily to be arrayed for combat, to fight, on but one expedition, more battles than the combats which any soldier of the past endured,The exaggeration of this remark has led some editors to doubt the reading. and face extreme severities of weather and many hard privations in the daily needs of life with an endurance almost beyond description.

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Such trials Leosthenes induced the citizens to brave undaunted, and they gave up their persons gladly to share the struggle with so great a leader. Should they not then be counted fortunate in their display of valor rather than unfortunate in their sacrifice of life? For in exchange for a mortal body they gained undying glory, safeguarding by their personal courage the universal liberty of GreeceThe Greek words which follow here cannot be translated as they stand. Fritzsche’s emendation probably restores the correct sense, namely: Nothing brings complete happiness without self-government. But the Greek wording is uncertain.

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If men are to be happy, the voice of law, and not a ruler’s threats, must reign supreme; if they are free, no groundless charge, but only proof of guilt, must cause them apprehension; nor must the safety of our citizens depend on those who slander them and truckle to their masters but on the force of law alone.

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Such were the aims with which these men accepted labor upon labor, and with the dangers of the passing hour dispelled the terrors which the whole future held for citizens and Greeks, sacrificing their lives that others might live well.

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To them we owe it that fathers have grown famous, and mothers looked up to in the city, that sisters, through the benefit of law, have made, and will make, marriages worthy of them, that children too will find a passport to the people’s hearts in these men’s valor; these men who, far from dying—death is no word to use where lives are lost, as theirs were, for a noble cause—have passed from this existence to an eternal state.

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For if the fact of death, to others a most grievous ill, has brought to them great benefits, are we not wrong indeed to count them wretched or to conclude that they have left the realm of life? Should we not rather say they have been born anew, a nobler birth than the first? Mere children then, they had no understanding, but now they have been born as valiant men.

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Formerly they stood in need of time and many dangers to reveal their courage; now, with that courage as a base, they have become known to all, to be remembered for their valor.

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On what occasion shall we fail to recollect the prowess of these men, in what place fail to see them win their due of emulation and the highest praise? What if the city prospers? Surely the successes, which they have earned, will bring their praises, and none other’s, to our lips and to our memories. Shall we then forget them in times of personal satisfaction? We cannot; for it is through their valor that we shall have the safe enjoyment of those moments.

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Will there be men of any age who will not count them blessed? What of the older generation, who think that through the efforts of these men they have been placed in safety and will pass the rest of their lives free from dread? Consider their compeers . . .The sense is supplied by Kenyon as follows: To them it has been given, because these died in battle, to enjoy their lives in honor and safety.

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Think, too, of the younger men and boys. Will they not envy their death and strive themselves to take as an example these men’s lives, in place of which they have left behind their valor?

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Ought we then to count them happy in so great an honor?The missing passage from ἤ τίνες to τῷ πολέμῳ has been tentatively restored by Blass and Kenyon to give the following sense: Neither poets nor philosophers will be in want of words or song in which to celebrate their deeds to Greece. Surely this expedition will be more famed in every land than that which overthrew the Phrygians. Throughout all time in every part of Greece these exploits will be praised in verse and song. Leosthenes himself and those who perished with him in the war will have a double claim to be revered.

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For if it is for pleasure that men recall such feats of courage, what could be more pleasing to Greeks than the praise of those who gave them freedom from the Macedonian yoke? Or if it is desire for profit that prompts such recollections, what speech could be of greater profit to the hearts of those about to hear it than one which is to honor courage and brave men?

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With us and all mankind, it is clear, in the light of these reflections, that their fame is now assured, but what of the lower world? Who, we may well ask ourselves, are waiting there to welcome the leader of these men? Are we not convinced that we should see, greeting Leosthenes with wonder, those of the so-called demi-gods who sailed against Troy: heroes whom he so far excelled, though his exploits were akin to theirs, that they with all Greece at their side took but one city, while he with his native town alone brought low the whole power which held Europe and Asia beneath its sway?

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They championed one lone woman wronged, but he staved off from all Greek women the violence coming upon them, aided by these men who now are being buried with him.

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Remember the figures who,This sentence is awkward in Greek because, though τῶν γεγενημένοων is genitive, dependent on ὑπερέσχεν, the writer has inserted ὧν which is not needed. The diffculty can be avoided by placing a comma after ἀνδρῶν and the full stop after διαπεπραγμένων, but then λέγω δὴ makes an abrupt beginning to the new sentence. born after the heroes of old, yet rivalled their deeds of valor, the followers of Miltiades and Themistocles, and those others who, by freeing Greece, brought honor to their country and glory to their lives;

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whom Leosthenes so far outdid in bravery and counsel, that where they beat back the barbarian power as it advanced, he even forestalled its onslaught. They saw a struggle with the foe in their own land, but he defeated his opponents on the foe’s own soil.

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Those too, I fancy, who gave the people the surest token of their mutual friendship, Harmodius and Aristogiton,The sense appears to be that they regard no one as so suitable to rank with themselves as Leosthenes and his comrades. Harmodius and Aristogiton, who in 514 B.C. plotted to assassinate the two sons of Pisistratus, and after killing one, Hipparchus, were captured and put to death, were later looked upon as liberators of the city. They and their descendants, who enjoyed special privileges, are not infrequently referred to by the orators. Compare Din. 1.63 and Din. 1.101; Hyp. 2.3. do not regard as Leosthenes and his comrades in arms; nor are there any with whom they would rather hold converse in the lower world than these. We need not wonder; for what these men did was no less a task than theirs; it was indeed, if judgement must be passed, a greater service still. Those two brought low the tyrants of their country, these the masters of the whole of Greece.

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Noble indeed beyond our dreams was the courage these men attained, honorable and magnificent the choice they made. How supreme was the valor, the heroism in times of peril, which they, dedicating to the universal liberty of Greece

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It is hard no doubt to offer consolation to those borne down with griefs like these. For sorrows are not stilled by word or law; only the individual’s temper, and the measure of his feeling for the dead, can set the limit to his mourning. Yet we must take heart, and restricting our grief as best we may, bear in our minds, with the thought of death, the glorious name which the fallen have left behind them.

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For though their fate deserves our tears, their conduct claims the highest praise. Though they have failed to reach old age in life, they have achieved a fame which knows no age, and have attained the height of satisfaction. For all who were childless at their death the praises of the Greeks will be immortal children. For all who have children alive the goodwill of their country will be the children’s guardian.

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And furthermore, if death means non-existence, they have been released from sickness and from grief, and from the other ills which vex our human life. But if in Hades we are conscious still and cared for by some god, as we are led to think, then surely those who defended the worship of the gods, when it was being overthrown, must receive from him the greatest care of all

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diff --git a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml index ea3dfd279..48f46c51a 100644 --- a/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -90,91 +90,91 @@
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Column 1 τῶν μὲν λόγων τῶν μελλόντωνCol. 1 plerumque restituit Blass. ῥηθήσεςθαι ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ τάφῳ περί τε περί τε Cobet. Λεωσθένους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μετʼ ἐκείνου τετελευτηκότων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ὡς ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, μάρτυς μάρτυς Buecheler. αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος Kenyon.ςωι τὰς πράξεις τὰς πράξεις Babington: τὰ ὅπλα Kenyon.ς ἀνθρωπν πω καώρακε ωρἐν τῷ παντὶ αἰῶνιγεγενηοὔτε ἄνδρας ἀμείνους τῶν τετελευτηκότων οὔτε πράξεις μεγαλοπρεπεστέρας.

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Column 1 τῶν μὲν λόγων τῶν μελλόντωνCol. 1 plerumque restituit Blass. ῥηθήσεςθαι ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ τάφῳ περί τε περί τε Cobet. Λεωσθένους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μετʼ ἐκείνου τετελευτηκότων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ὡς ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, μάρτυς μάρτυς Buecheler. αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος αὐτὸς ὁ χρόνος Kenyon.ςωι τὰς πράξεις τὰς πράξεις Babington: τὰ ὅπλα Kenyon.ς ἀνθρωπν πω καώρακε ωρἐν τῷ παντὶ αἰῶνιγεγενηοὔτε ἄνδρας ἀμείνους τῶν τετελευτηκότων οὔτε πράξεις μεγαλοπρεπεστέρας.

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διὸ καὶ μάλιστα νῦν φοβοῦμαι, νῦν φοβοῦμαι Jensen in add. (φοβοῦμαι iam Babington): πεφόβημαι Herwerden. μή μοι συμβῇ τὸν λόγον ἐλάττω φαίνεσθαι τῶν ἔργων τῶν γεγενημένων. πλὴν κατʼ ἐκεῖνό γε πάλιν θαρρῶ ὅτι τὰ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ κλειπόμενα ἐκλειπόμενα Sudhaus: παραλειπόμενα Sauppe. ὑμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες προσθήσετε· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τυχοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι ῥηθήσονται, ἀλλʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μάρτυσι τῶν ἐκείνοις Column 2 πεπραγμένων.

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διὸ καὶ μάλιστα νῦν φοβοῦμαι, νῦν φοβοῦμαι Jensen in add. (φοβοῦμαι iam Babington): πεφόβημαι Herwerden. μή μοι συμβῇ τὸν λόγον ἐλάττω φαίνεσθαι τῶν ἔργων τῶν γεγενημένων. πλὴν κατʼ ἐκεῖνό γε πάλιν θαρρῶ ὅτι τὰ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ κλειπόμενα ἐκλειπόμενα Sudhaus: παραλειπόμενα Sauppe. ὑμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες προσθήσετε· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τυχοῦσιν οἱ λόγοι ῥηθήσονται, ἀλλʼ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μάρτυσι τῶν ἐκείνοις Column 2 πεπραγμένων.

ἄξιον δέ ἐςτιν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἕνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι ὅμοια καὶ ἔτι σεμνότερα καὶ καλλίω τῶν πρότερον αὐτῇ πεπραγμένων, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας τῆς ἀνδρείας τῆς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, τὸ μὴ καταισχῦναι τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετάς, τὸν δὲ στρατηγὸν Λεωσθένη διὰ ἀμφότερα· τῆς τε γὰρ προαιρέσεως εἰσηγητὴς τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, καὶ τῆς στρατείας ἡγεμὼν τοῖς πολίταις κατέστη.

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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς πόλεως διεξιέναι τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον ὧν ὧν Blass olim: τῶν S, ret. Cobet. πρότερον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα εὐεργέτηκεν εὐεργέτηκεν add. Blass olim: πεπραγμένων suppl. Cobet qui ἀνὰ post πρότερον add. οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ὁ παρὼν ἱκανός, οὔτε ὁ καιρὸς ἁρμόττων τῷ μακρολογεῖν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ἕνα ὄντα τοσαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας πράξεις ἐπελθεῖν ἐπελθεῖν Babington: ἀπελθεῖν S. καὶ μνημονεῦσαι· ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου δὲ οὐκ ὀκνήσω εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς.

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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς πόλεως διεξιέναι τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον ὧν ὧν Blass olim: τῶν S, ret. Cobet. πρότερον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα εὐεργέτηκεν εὐεργέτηκεν add. Blass olim: πεπραγμένων suppl. Cobet qui ἀνὰ post πρότερον add. οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ὁ παρὼν ἱκανός, οὔτε ὁ καιρὸς ἁρμόττων τῷ μακρολογεῖν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ἕνα ὄντα τοσαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας πράξεις ἐπελθεῖν ἐπελθεῖν Babington: ἀπελθεῖν S. καὶ μνημονεῦσαι· ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου δὲ οὐκ ὀκνήσω εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς.

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ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος πᾶσαν Column 3 τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐπέρχεται, τὰς μὲνCol. 3 plerumque restituit Babington. ὥρας διακρίνων εἰς τὸ πρέπον εἰς τὸ πρέπον Blass. καὶ καλῶς πάντα καθιστάς, πάντα καθιστάς Cobet. τοῖς δὲ ςώφροσι καὶ ἐπιεικέσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς καὶ καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σώφροσι usque ad ἄλλων Blass.πάντων τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον χρησίμων, οὕτως καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διατελεῖ τοὺς μὲν κακοὺς κολάζουσα, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις βοηθοῦσα, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἀντί τῆς ἀδικίας ἀδικίας Jensen: πλεονεξίας anon. ap. Babington. ἅπασιν ἀπονέμουσα, ἀπονέμουσα Kaibel: φυλάττουσα Blass. τοῖς δὲ ἰδίοις κινδύνοις καὶ δαπάναις κοινὴν ἄδειαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν παρασκευάζουσα.

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ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος πᾶσαν Column 3 τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐπέρχεται, τὰς μὲνCol. 3 plerumque restituit Babington. ὥρας διακρίνων εἰς τὸ πρέπον εἰς τὸ πρέπον Blass. καὶ καλῶς πάντα καθιστάς, πάντα καθιστάς Cobet. τοῖς δὲ ςώφροσι καὶ ἐπιεικέσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελούμενος καὶ γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς καὶ καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σώφροσι usque ad ἄλλων Blass.πάντων τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον χρησίμων, οὕτως καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διατελεῖ τοὺς μὲν κακοὺς κολάζουσα, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις βοηθοῦσα, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἀντί τῆς ἀδικίας ἀδικίας Jensen: πλεονεξίας anon. ap. Babington. ἅπασιν ἀπονέμουσα, ἀπονέμουσα Kaibel: φυλάττουσα Blass. τοῖς δὲ ἰδίοις κινδύνοις καὶ δαπάναις κοινὴν ἄδειαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν παρασκευάζουσα.

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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κοινῶν ἔργων τῆς πόλεως ἔργων τῆς πόλεως Sauppe et Tell. ὥσπερ προεῖπον προεῖπον Blass. φράσαι φράσαι Kayser. παραλείψω, παραλείψω Buecheler: αλιφω S. περὶ δὲ Λεωσθένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι. νῦν δὲ πόθεν ἄρξωμαι λέγων, λέγων Sauppe. ἢ τίνος πρῶτον μνησθῶ; πότερα περὶ τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἑκάστου διεξέλθω;

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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κοινῶν ἔργων τῆς πόλεως ἔργων τῆς πόλεως Sauppe et Tell. ὥσπερ προεῖπον προεῖπον Blass. φράσαι φράσαι Kayser. παραλείψω, παραλείψω Buecheler: αλιφω S. περὶ δὲ Λεωσθένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι. νῦν δὲ πόθεν ἄρξωμαι λέγων, λέγων Sauppe. ἢ τίνος πρῶτον μνησθῶ; πότερα περὶ τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν ἑκάστου διεξέλθω;

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ἀλλʼ εὔηθες εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω· τὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸν μὲν γὰρ Schaefer. ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ἐγκωμιάζοντα, Column 4 οἳ πολλαχόθεν εἰς μίαν πόλιν συνεληλυθότες οἰκοῦσι γένος ἴδιον ἕκαστος συνεισενεγκάμενος, τοῦτον τοῦτον Cobet: τούτων S. μὲν δεῖ κατʼ ἄνδρα γενεαλογεῖν ἕκαστον· περὶ δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενον,ποιούμενον ποιούμενος Cobet. οἷς ἡ κοινὴ γένεσις αὐτόχθοσιν οὖσιν ἀνυπέρβλητον τὴν εὐγένειαν ἔχει, περίεργον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι ἰδίᾳ τὰ γένη ἐγκωμιάζειν.

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ἀλλʼ εὔηθες εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω· τὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸν μὲν γὰρ Schaefer. ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ἐγκωμιάζοντα, Column 4 οἳ πολλαχόθεν εἰς μίαν πόλιν συνεληλυθότες οἰκοῦσι γένος ἴδιον ἕκαστος συνεισενεγκάμενος, τοῦτον τοῦτον Cobet: τούτων S. μὲν δεῖ κατʼ ἄνδρα γενεαλογεῖν ἕκαστον· περὶ δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενον,ποιούμενον ποιούμενος Cobet. οἷς ἡ κοινὴ γένεσις αὐτόχθοσιν οὖσιν ἀνυπέρβλητον τὴν εὐγένειαν ἔχει, περίεργον ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι ἰδίᾳ τὰ γένη ἐγκωμιάζειν.

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ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς παιδείας αὐτῶν ἐπιμνησθῶ, καὶ ὡς ἐν πολλῇ ςωφροσύνῃ παῖδες ὄντες ἐτράφησαν καὶ ἐπαιδεύθησαν ἐπαιδεύθησαν Babington. ὅπερ εἰώθασίν τινες ποιεῖν; τινες ποιεῖν Jensen (ποιεῖν iam Lightfoot): παιδεύειν Sauppe. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πάντας εἰδέναι ὅτι τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνεκα Sauppe. τοὺς παῖδας παιδεύομεν, παιδεύομεν Sauppe. ἵνα ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γένωνται γένωνται Babington.· τοὺς δὲ γεγενημένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἄνδρας ὑπερβάλλοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι παῖδες ὄντες καλῶς ἐπαιδεύθησαν.

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ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς παιδείας αὐτῶν ἐπιμνησθῶ, καὶ ὡς ἐν πολλῇ ςωφροσύνῃ παῖδες ὄντες ἐτράφησαν καὶ ἐπαιδεύθησαν ἐπαιδεύθησαν Babington. ὅπερ εἰώθασίν τινες ποιεῖν; τινες ποιεῖν Jensen (ποιεῖν iam Lightfoot): παιδεύειν Sauppe. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πάντας εἰδέναι ὅτι τούτου ἕνεκα ἕνεκα Sauppe. τοὺς παῖδας παιδεύομεν, παιδεύομεν Sauppe. ἵνα ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γένωνται γένωνται Babington.· τοὺς δὲ γεγενημένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἄνδρας ὑπερβάλλοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ, πρόδηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι παῖδες ὄντες καλῶς ἐπαιδεύθησαν.

ἁπλούστατον οὖν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ διεξελθεῖν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὡς πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιοι γεγένηνται τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν. ἄρξομαι δὲ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιον.

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Λεωσθένης γὰρ ὁρῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν τεταπεινωμένην καὶPost καὶ add. ὥσπερ Kenyon. Column 5 ἐπτηχυῖαν, κατεφθαρμένην ὑπὸ τῶν δωροδοκούντων παρὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου κατὰ τῶν πατρίδων τῶν αὑτῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν δεομένην δεομένην Babington, qui coll. 5 et 6 plerumque restituit. ἀνδρός, τὴν δʼ Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν πόλεως, ἥτις προστῆναι δυνήσεται δυνήσεται Schaefer. τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἐπέδωκεν ἐπέδωκεν Kayser: ἀπέδωκεν Babington. ἑαυτὸν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν·

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Λεωσθένης γὰρ ὁρῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν τεταπεινωμένην καὶPost καὶ add. ὥσπερ Kenyon. Column 5 ἐπτηχυῖαν, κατεφθαρμένην ὑπὸ τῶν δωροδοκούντων παρὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου κατὰ τῶν πατρίδων τῶν αὑτῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν δεομένην δεομένην Babington, qui coll. 5 et 6 plerumque restituit. ἀνδρός, τὴν δʼ Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν πόλεως, ἥτις προστῆναι δυνήσεται δυνήσεται Schaefer. τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἐπέδωκεν ἐπέδωκεν Kayser: ἀπέδωκεν Babington. ἑαυτὸν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν·

καὶ ξενικὴν μὲν δύναμιν συστησάμενος, τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἡγεμὼν καταστάς, τοὺς πρώτους ἀντιταξαμένους τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίᾳ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας καὶ Εὐβοέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους αὐτῶν ἐνίκησε μαχόμενος ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ.

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ἐντεῦθεν δʼ ἐλθὼν εἰς Πύλας καὶ καταλαβὼν τὰς παρόδους, παρόδους Spengel. διʼ ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐπορεύθησαν, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πορείας Ἀντίπατρον ἐκώλυσεν, αὐτὸν δὲ καταλαβὼν ἐν τοῖς τόποις τούτοις καὶ μάχῃ νικήσας, ἐπολιόρκει κατακλείσας εἰς Λαμίαν.

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ἐντεῦθεν δʼ ἐλθὼν εἰς Πύλας καὶ καταλαβὼν τὰς παρόδους, παρόδους Spengel. διʼ ὧν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας οἱ βάρβαροι ἐπορεύθησαν, τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πορείας Ἀντίπατρον ἐκώλυσεν, αὐτὸν δὲ καταλαβὼν ἐν τοῖς τόποις τούτοις καὶ μάχῃ νικήσας, ἐπολιόρκει κατακλείσας εἰς Λαμίαν.

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Θετταλοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ὧν Φίλιππος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀκόντων ἡγούμενοι ἐσεμνύνοντο, τούτων Λεωσθένης ἑκόντων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔλαβεν. συνέβη δʼ αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν πραγμάτων ὧν προείλετο κρατῆσαι, Column 6 τῆς δὲ εἱμαρμένης οὐκ ἦν περιγενέσθαι.

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Θετταλοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ὧν Φίλιππος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἀκόντων ἡγούμενοι ἐσεμνύνοντο, τούτων Λεωσθένης ἑκόντων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔλαβεν. συνέβη δʼ αὐτῷ τῶν μὲν πραγμάτων ὧν προείλετο κρατῆσαι, Column 6 τῆς δὲ εἱμαρμένης οὐκ ἦν περιγενέσθαι.

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δίκαιον δʼ ἐστὶν μὴ μόνον ὧν ἔπραξεν Λεωσθένην ἀε ἀεὶ Jensen (sed in add.: καὶ) ζῶν Kenyon. χάριν ἔχειν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ, πρώτῳ Blass.λλὰ καὶ τῆς ὕστερον γενομένης μάχης μετὰ τὸν ἐκείνου ἐκείνου Muller. θάνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ ςτρατείᾳ ταύτῃ συμβάντων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς ὑπὸ Λεωσθένους τεθεῖσιν θεμελίοις οἰκοδομοῦσιν οἱ νῦν τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις.

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δίκαιον δʼ ἐστὶν μὴ μόνον ὧν ἔπραξεν Λεωσθένην ἀε ἀεὶ Jensen (sed in add.: καὶ) ζῶν Kenyon. χάριν ἔχειν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ, πρώτῳ Blass.λλὰ καὶ τῆς ὕστερον γενομένης μάχης μετὰ τὸν ἐκείνου ἐκείνου Muller. θάνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ ςτρατείᾳ ταύτῃ συμβάντων τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς ὑπὸ Λεωσθένους τεθεῖσιν θεμελίοις οἰκοδομοῦσιν οἱ νῦν τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις.

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καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ με τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν μηδένα λόγον ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ Sauppe. Λεωσθένη μόνον ἐγκωμιάζειν. ἐγκωμιάζειν Sauppe. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸν Λεωσθένους ἔπαινον ἐπὶ ταῖς μάχαις ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἄλλων Jensen. πολιτῶν εἶναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς ὁ στρατηγὸς αἴτιος, τοῦ δὲ νικᾶν μαχομένους οἱ κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες τοῖς σώμαςιν· ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινῶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν νίκην, ἅμα τῇ Λεωσθένους ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάςω. ἐγκωμιάσω Stahl: ἐγκωμιάζω Sauppe.

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καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ με τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν μηδένα λόγον ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ Sauppe. Λεωσθένη μόνον ἐγκωμιάζειν. ἐγκωμιάζειν Sauppe. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸν Λεωσθένους ἔπαινον ἐπὶ ταῖς μάχαις ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἄλλων Jensen. πολιτῶν εἶναι· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς ὁ στρατηγὸς αἴτιος, τοῦ δὲ νικᾶν μαχομένους οἱ κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες τοῖς σώμαςιν· ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινῶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν νίκην, ἅμα τῇ Λεωσθένους ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάςω. ἐγκωμιάσω Stahl: ἐγκωμιάζω Sauppe.

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τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐπαινοίη τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτήσαντας, οἳ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς ἔδωκαν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας, φανερωτάτην ἀπόδειξιν ταύτην ἡγούμενοι εἶναι τοῦ βούλεσθαι τῇ Ἑλλάδι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν Column 7 περιθεῖναι, τὸ μαχομένους μαχομένους Sauppe: μαχόμενοι Babington. τελευτῆσαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς.

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τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐπαινοίη τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτήσαντας, οἳ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς ἔδωκαν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας, φανερωτάτην ἀπόδειξιν ταύτην ἡγούμενοι εἶναι τοῦ βούλεσθαι τῇ Ἑλλάδι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν Column 7 περιθεῖναι, τὸ μαχομένους μαχομένους Sauppe: μαχόμενοι Babington. τελευτῆσαι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς.

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μέγα δʼ αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετο εἰς τὸ προθύμως ὑπὲρ τῆς ἙλλάδοςCol. 7 plerumque restituit Babington: sed Ἑλλάδος et προτέραν Sauppe. ἀγωνίσασθαι τὸ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ τὴν μάχην τὴν προτέρανSee above note. γενέσθαι. ἑώρων γὰρ τὴν μὲν πόλιν τῶν Θηβαίων οἰκτρῶς ἠφανισμένην ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ ἀκρόπολιν αὐτῆς φρουρουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων, τὰ δὲ σώματα τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἐξηνδραποδισμένα, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἄλλους διανεμομένους, ὥστε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρώμενα αὐτοῖς τὰ δεινὰ ἄοκνον παρεῖχε τόλμαν εἰς τὸ κινδυνεύειν προχείρως.

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μέγα δʼ αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετο εἰς τὸ προθύμως ὑπὲρ τῆς ἙλλάδοςCol. 7 plerumque restituit Babington: sed Ἑλλάδος et προτέραν Sauppe. ἀγωνίσασθαι τὸ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ τὴν μάχην τὴν προτέρανSee above note. γενέσθαι. ἑώρων γὰρ τὴν μὲν πόλιν τῶν Θηβαίων οἰκτρῶς ἠφανισμένην ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ ἀκρόπολιν αὐτῆς φρουρουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων, τὰ δὲ σώματα τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἐξηνδραποδισμένα, τὴν δὲ χώραν ἄλλους διανεμομένους, ὥστε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρώμενα αὐτοῖς τὰ δεινὰ ἄοκνον παρεῖχε τόλμαν εἰς τὸ κινδυνεύειν προχείρως.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν τήν γε περὶ Πύλας περὶ Πύλας Cobet. καὶ Λαμίαν μάχην γενομένην οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοῖς ἔνδοξον γενέσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἧς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς ἠγωνίσαντο, οὐ μόνον τῷ μαχομένους νικᾶν Ἀντίπατρον καὶ τοὺς ςυμμάχους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τόπῳ τῷ ἐνταυθοῖ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν μάχην. ἀφικνούμενοι γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἅπαντες δὶς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰς τὴν Πυλαίαν, θεωροὶ γενήσονται τῶν ἔργων τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς· ἅμα γὰρ εἰς τὸν τόπον ἁθροισθήσονται καὶ τῆς τούτων ἀρετῆς μνησθήσονται.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν τήν γε περὶ Πύλας περὶ Πύλας Cobet. καὶ Λαμίαν μάχην γενομένην οὐχ ἧττον αὐτοῖς ἔνδοξον γενέσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἧς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς ἠγωνίσαντο, οὐ μόνον τῷ μαχομένους νικᾶν Ἀντίπατρον καὶ τοὺς ςυμμάχους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τόπῳ τῷ ἐνταυθοῖ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν μάχην. ἀφικνούμενοι γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἅπαντες δὶς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰς τὴν Πυλαίαν, θεωροὶ γενήσονται τῶν ἔργων τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐτοῖς· ἅμα γὰρ εἰς τὸν τόπον ἁθροισθήσονται καὶ τῆς τούτων ἀρετῆς μνησθήσονται.

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οὐδένες γὰρ πώποτε τῶν γεγονότων οὔτε περὶ καλλιόνων οὔτε πρὸς ἰσχυροτέρους οὔτε μετʼ ἐλαττόνων ἠγωνίσαντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν πλῆθος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν πολὺν ἀριθμὸν τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρίνοντες. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν κατέθεσαν, τὴν δʼ εὐδοξίαν τὴν τὴν add. Blass. ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων ἴδιον στέφανον τῇ πατρίδι περιέθηκαν. περιέθηκαν Sauppe.

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οὐδένες γὰρ πώποτε τῶν γεγονότων οὔτε περὶ καλλιόνων οὔτε πρὸς ἰσχυροτέρους οὔτε μετʼ ἐλαττόνων ἠγωνίσαντο, τὴν ἀρετὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν πλῆθος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν πολὺν ἀριθμὸν τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι κρίνοντες. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν κατέθεσαν, τὴν δʼ εὐδοξίαν τὴν τὴν add. Blass. ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων ἴδιον στέφανον τῇ πατρίδι περιέθηκαν. περιέθηκαν Sauppe.

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ἄξιον Column 8 τοίνυν συλλογίσασθαι καὶ τί ἂν συμβῆναι νομίζομεν νομίζομεν Kayser: νομίζοιμεν S. μὴ κατὰ τρόπον τούτων ἀγωνισαμένων. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἑνὸς μὲν δεσπότου τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον ἅπασαν εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ τῷ τούτου τρόπῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης χρῆσθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα; συνελόντα δʼ εἰπεῖν, τὴν Μακεδόνων ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ μὴ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου δύναμιν ἰσχύειν παρʼ ἑκάστοις, ὥστε μήτε γυναικῶν μήτε παρθένων μήτε παίδων ὕβρειςἀνεκλείπτους ἀνεκλείπτους plerique edd., qui lacunam indicant: ἂν ἐκλείπτους (verbum ignotum) S: post ἑκάστοις add. μὴ Colin. ἑκάστοις καθεστάναι.

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ἄξιον Column 8 τοίνυν συλλογίσασθαι καὶ τί ἂν συμβῆναι νομίζομεν νομίζομεν Kayser: νομίζοιμεν S. μὴ κατὰ τρόπον τούτων ἀγωνισαμένων. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν ἑνὸς μὲν δεσπότου τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον ἅπασαν εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ τῷ τούτου τρόπῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης χρῆσθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα; συνελόντα δʼ εἰπεῖν, τὴν Μακεδόνων ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ μὴ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου δύναμιν ἰσχύειν παρʼ ἑκάστοις, ὥστε μήτε γυναικῶν μήτε παρθένων μήτε παίδων ὕβρειςἀνεκλείπτους ἀνεκλείπτους plerique edd., qui lacunam indicant: ἂν ἐκλείπτους (verbum ignotum) S: post ἑκάστοις add. μὴ Colin. ἑκάστοις καθεστάναι.

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φανερὸν δʼ ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔτι Kayser: ἐστι Cobet: ἐᾶν Caffiaux.· θυσίας μὲν ἀνθρώποις γιγνομένας γιγνομένας Cobet. ἐφορᾶν, ἀγάλματα δὲ καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ναοὺς τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀμελῶς, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιμελῶς συντελούμενα, καὶ τοὺς τούτων τούτων Cobet. οἰκέτας ὥσπερ ἥρωας τιμᾶν ἡμᾶς ἀναγκαζομένους.

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φανερὸν δʼ ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔτι Kayser: ἐστι Cobet: ἐᾶν Caffiaux.· θυσίας μὲν ἀνθρώποις γιγνομένας γιγνομένας Cobet. ἐφορᾶν, ἀγάλματα δὲ καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ ναοὺς τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀμελῶς, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιμελῶς συντελούμενα, καὶ τοὺς τούτων τούτων Cobet. οἰκέτας ὥσπερ ἥρωας τιμᾶν ἡμᾶς ἀναγκαζομένους.

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ὅπου δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς τοὺς add. Cobet. θεοὺς ὅσια διὰ τὴν Μακεδόνων τόλμαν ἀνῄρηται, τί τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπουςPost ἀνθρώπους add. δίκαια Fritzsche. χρὴ νομίζειν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν παντελῶς καταλελύσθαι; ὥστε ὅσῳ δεινότερα τὰ προςδοκώμενʼ ἂν γενέσθαι κρίνομεν, κρίνομεν Kayser: κρίνοιμεν S. τοσούτῳ μειζόνων ἐπαίνων τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἀξίους χρὴ νομίζειν.

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ὅπου δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς τοὺς add. Cobet. θεοὺς ὅσια διὰ τὴν Μακεδόνων τόλμαν ἀνῄρηται, τί τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπουςPost ἀνθρώπους add. δίκαια Fritzsche. χρὴ νομίζειν; ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν παντελῶς καταλελύσθαι; ὥστε ὅσῳ δεινότερα τὰ προςδοκώμενʼ ἂν γενέσθαι κρίνομεν, κρίνομεν Kayser: κρίνοιμεν S. τοσούτῳ μειζόνων ἐπαίνων τοὺς τετελευτηκότας ἀξίους χρὴ νομίζειν.

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οὐδεμία γὰρ στρατεία τὴν τῶν τῶν add. Babington. στρατευομένων ἀρετὴν ἐνεφάνισεν μᾶλλον τῆς νῦν γεγενημένης, ἐν ᾗ γε παρατάττεσθαι μὲν ὁσημέραι ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, πλείους δὲ μάχας ἠγωνίσθαι διὰ μιᾶς στρατείας ἢ τοὺς Column 9 ἄλλους πάντας πληγὰςπληγὰς del. Cobet. λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ, χειμώνων δʼ ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας τοςαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας οὕτως ἐγκρατῶς ὑπομεμενηκέναι, ὥςτε καὶ τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φράσαι.

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οὐδεμία γὰρ στρατεία τὴν τῶν τῶν add. Babington. στρατευομένων ἀρετὴν ἐνεφάνισεν μᾶλλον τῆς νῦν γεγενημένης, ἐν ᾗ γε παρατάττεσθαι μὲν ὁσημέραι ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, πλείους δὲ μάχας ἠγωνίσθαι διὰ μιᾶς στρατείας ἢ τοὺς Column 9 ἄλλους πάντας πληγὰςπληγὰς del. Cobet. λαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ, χειμώνων δʼ ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας τοςαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας οὕτως ἐγκρατῶς ὑπομεμενηκέναι, ὥςτε καὶ τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φράσαι.

τὸν δὴ τοιαύτας καρτερίας ἀόκνως ὑπομεῖναι τοὺς πολίτας προτρεψάμενον Λεωσθένη, καὶ τοὺς τῷ τοιούτῳ στρατηγῷ προθύμως συναγωνιστὰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρασχόντας, ἆρʼ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόδειξιν εὐτυχεῖς μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ζῆν ἀπόλειψιν ἀτυχεῖς νομιστέον; οἵτινες θνητοῦ σώματος ἀθάνατον δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν τὴν κοινὴν ἐλευθερίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβεβαίωσαν.

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φέρει γὰρ πᾶσαν εὐδαιμονίανIntercidisse aliquid videtur: ante πᾶσαν add. οὐδὲν Fritzsche: alii alia.ἄνευ τῆς αὐτονομίας. ο γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀπειλήν, ἀλλὰ νόμου φωνὴν κυριεύειν δεῖ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων, οὐδʼ αἰτίαν φοβερὰν εἶναι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλʼ ἔλεγχον, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς κολακεύουσιν τοὺς δυνάστας καὶ διαβάλλουσιν τοὺς πολίτας τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀσφαλές, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν νόμων πίστει γενέσθαι.

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φέρει γὰρ πᾶσαν εὐδαιμονίανIntercidisse aliquid videtur: ante πᾶσαν add. οὐδὲν Fritzsche: alii alia.ἄνευ τῆς αὐτονομίας. ο γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀπειλήν, ἀλλὰ νόμου φωνὴν κυριεύειν δεῖ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων, οὐδʼ αἰτίαν φοβερὰν εἶναι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλʼ ἔλεγχον, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς κολακεύουσιν τοὺς δυνάστας καὶ διαβάλλουσιν τοὺς πολίτας τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀσφαλές, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν νόμων πίστει γενέσθαι.

ὑπὲρ ὧν ἁπάντων οὗτοι πόνους πόνων διαδόχους ποιούμενοι, καὶ τοῖς καθʼ ἡμέραν κινδύνοις τοὺς εἰς τὴν ἅπαντα χρόνον φόβους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παραιρούμενοι, τὸ ζῆν ἀνήλωσαν εἰς τὸ τοὺς ἄλλους καλῶς ζῆν.

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διὰ τούτους πατέρες ἔνδοξοι, μητέρες περίβλεπτοι τοῖς πολίταις γεγόνασι, ἀδελφαὶ γάμων τῶν προσηκόντων ἐννόμως τετυχήκασι καὶ τεύξονται, παῖδες ἐφόδιον εἰς τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὔνοιαν εὔνοιαν Cobet. τὴν τῶν οὐκ ἀπολωλότων Column 10 ἀρετήν, οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυχεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ὑπὲρ καλῶν τὸν βίον ἐκλιπόντας, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὸ ζῆν εἰς αἰώνιον τάξιν μετηλλαχότων ἕξουσιν.

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διὰ τούτους πατέρες ἔνδοξοι, μητέρες περίβλεπτοι τοῖς πολίταις γεγόνασι, ἀδελφαὶ γάμων τῶν προσηκόντων ἐννόμως τετυχήκασι καὶ τεύξονται, παῖδες ἐφόδιον εἰς τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὔνοιαν εὔνοιαν Cobet. τὴν τῶν οὐκ ἀπολωλότων Column 10 ἀρετήν, οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυχεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ὑπὲρ καλῶν τὸν βίον ἐκλιπόντας, ἀλλὰ τῶν τὸ ζῆν εἰς αἰώνιον τάξιν μετηλλαχότων ἕξουσιν.

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εἰ γὰρ ὁ τοῖς ὁ τοῖς Cobet. ἄλλοις ὢν ἀνιαρότατος ἀνιαρότατος Babington. θάνατος τούτοις ἀρχηγὸς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν γέγονε, πῶς τούτους οκ εὐτυχεῖς κρίνειν δίκαιον, ἢ πῶς ἐκλελοιπέναι τὸν βίον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεγονέναι καλλίω γένεσιν τῆς πρώτης ὑπαρξάσης; τότε μὲν γὰρ παῖδες ὄντες ἄφρονες ἦσαν, νῦν δʼ ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν.

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εἰ γὰρ ὁ τοῖς ὁ τοῖς Cobet. ἄλλοις ὢν ἀνιαρότατος ἀνιαρότατος Babington. θάνατος τούτοις ἀρχηγὸς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν γέγονε, πῶς τούτους οκ εὐτυχεῖς κρίνειν δίκαιον, ἢ πῶς ἐκλελοιπέναι τὸν βίον, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεγονέναι καλλίω γένεσιν τῆς πρώτης ὑπαρξάσης; τότε μὲν γὰρ παῖδες ὄντες ἄφρονες ἦσαν, νῦν δʼ ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν.

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καὶ τότε μὲν ἐν πολλῷ ἐν πολλῷ Babington: πολλῶν S. χρόνῳ καὶ διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπέδειξαν· νῦν δʼ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρξαμένους ὑπάρχει ἀρξαμένους ὑπάρχει Kenyon: αξαθαι S: ᾁξαντας ἦν Jensen in add.: ὑπάρχει εὐθὺς Cobet. γνωρίμους πᾶσι καὶ μνημονευτοὺς διὰ ἀνδραγαθίαν γεγονέναι.

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καὶ τότε μὲν ἐν πολλῷ ἐν πολλῷ Babington: πολλῶν S. χρόνῳ καὶ διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπέδειξαν· νῦν δʼ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρξαμένους ὑπάρχει ἀρξαμένους ὑπάρχει Kenyon: αξαθαι S: ᾁξαντας ἦν Jensen in add.: ὑπάρχει εὐθὺς Cobet. γνωρίμους πᾶσι καὶ μνημονευτοὺς διὰ ἀνδραγαθίαν γεγονέναι.

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τίς γὰρ γὰρ add. Cobet. καιρὸς ἐν ᾧ τῆς τούτων ἀρετῆς οὐ μνημονεύσομεν; τίς τόπος ἐν ᾧ ζήλου καὶ τῶν ἐντιμοτάτων ἐπαίνων τυγχάνοντας οὐκ ὀψόμεθα; πότερον οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀγαθοῖς; ἀλλὰ τὰ διὰ τούτους γεγονότα τίνας ἄλλους ἢ τούτους ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ μνήμης τυγχάνειν ποιήσει; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις εὐπραξίαις; ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ τούτων ἀρετῇ βεβαίως αὐτῶν ἀπολαύσομεν.

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τίς γὰρ γὰρ add. Cobet. καιρὸς ἐν ᾧ τῆς τούτων ἀρετῆς οὐ μνημονεύσομεν; τίς τόπος ἐν ᾧ ζήλου καὶ τῶν ἐντιμοτάτων ἐπαίνων τυγχάνοντας οὐκ ὀψόμεθα; πότερον οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τῆς πόλεως ἀγαθοῖς; ἀλλὰ τὰ διὰ τούτους γεγονότα τίνας ἄλλους ἢ τούτους ἐπαινεῖσθαι καὶ μνήμης τυγχάνειν ποιήσει; ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις εὐπραξίαις; ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ τούτων ἀρετῇ βεβαίως αὐτῶν ἀπολαύσομεν.

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παρὰ ποίᾳ δὲ τῶν ἡλικιῶν οὐ μακαριστοὶ Column 11 γενήσονται; πότερον οὐ παρὰCol. 11 plerumque restituit Blass. τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, πρεσβυτέροις Cobet: γεραιτέροις Sauppe. οἳ ἄφοβον ἄξειν τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ γεγενῆςθαι νομίζουσι νομίζουσι Jensen: ἡγήσονται Blass. διὰ τούτους; ἀλλʼ οὐ παρὰ τοῖς ἡλικιώταις;τελευτὴ φκαλῶς παρὰ ποαι γεγον; ἀλλʼ οὐ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις καὶ παισίν;

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παρὰ ποίᾳ δὲ τῶν ἡλικιῶν οὐ μακαριστοὶ Column 11 γενήσονται; πότερον οὐ παρὰCol. 11 plerumque restituit Blass. τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, πρεσβυτέροις Cobet: γεραιτέροις Sauppe. οἳ ἄφοβον ἄξειν τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ γεγενῆςθαι νομίζουσι νομίζουσι Jensen: ἡγήσονται Blass. διὰ τούτους; ἀλλʼ οὐ παρὰ τοῖς ἡλικιώταις;τελευτὴ φκαλῶς παρὰ ποαι γεγον; ἀλλʼ οὐ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις καὶ παισίν;

ἔπειτα οὐ τὸν θάνατον ζηλώσουσιν αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ σπουδάσουσιν μιμεῖσθαι ὡς παράδειγμα τὸν τούτων βίον, ἀνθʼ οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν καταλελοίπασι;

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οὐκοῦν ἄξιον εὐδαιμονίζειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοσαύτῃ τιμῇ; ἢ τίνεςφοι λειἙλληντῶν πεπαρὰ ποτῆς Φρυγῶν κρατησάσης στρατείας ἐγκωμιασθήσεται; δὲ τῆς ἐλτάτοις εἅπασιν καὶ λόγοις καὶ ᾠδαῖς καὶ λόγοις καὶ ὠδαῖς Cobet. ἐπαιν

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οὐκοῦν ἄξιον εὐδαιμονίζειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοσαύτῃ τιμῇ; ἢ τίνεςφοι λειἙλληντῶν πεπαρὰ ποτῆς Φρυγῶν κρατησάσης στρατείας ἐγκωμιασθήσεται; δὲ τῆς ἐλτάτοις εἅπασιν καὶ λόγοις καὶ ᾠδαῖς καὶ λόγοις καὶ ὠδαῖς Cobet. ἐπαιν

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ἀμφότερα γὰρ επερὶ Λεωςθένους καὶ τῶν τελευτησάντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ. ἀμφότερα usque ad πολέμῳ Cobet. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν μνημονεύουσιν τὰς τοιαύτας καρτερίας, τί γένοιτʼ ἂν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἥδιον ἢ ἔπαινος τῶν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρασκευασάντων ἀπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ usque ad Μακεδόνων post Cobet et alios Blass. εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας ἕνεκεν Babington. ἡ τοιαύτη μνήμη μνήμη Cobet. Column 12 γίγνεται, τίς ἂν λόγος ὠφελήσειεν μᾶλλον τὰς τῶν ἀκουσόντωνἀκουσόντων ἀκουόντων Sauppe. ψυχὰς τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάσοντοςἐγκωμιάσοντος ἐγκωμιάζοντος Sauppe. καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας;

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ἀμφότερα γὰρ επερὶ Λεωςθένους καὶ τῶν τελευτησάντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ. ἀμφότερα usque ad πολέμῳ Cobet. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκεν μνημονεύουσιν τὰς τοιαύτας καρτερίας, τί γένοιτʼ ἂν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἥδιον ἢ ἔπαινος τῶν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρασκευασάντων ἀπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ usque ad Μακεδόνων post Cobet et alios Blass. εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας ἕνεκεν Babington. ἡ τοιαύτη μνήμη μνήμη Cobet. Column 12 γίγνεται, τίς ἂν λόγος ὠφελήσειεν μᾶλλον τὰς τῶν ἀκουσόντωνἀκουσόντων ἀκουόντων Sauppe. ψυχὰς τοῦ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάσοντοςἐγκωμιάσοντος ἐγκωμιάζοντος Sauppe. καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας;

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ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς λοιποῖς Babington: λόγοις S. πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν· ἐν Ἅιδου δὲ λογίσασθαι ἄξιον, τίνες οἱ τὸν ἡγεμόνα δεξιωσόμενοι τὸν τούτων. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμεθα ὁρᾶν Λεωσθένη δεξιουμένους καὶ θαυμάζοντας τῶν ἡμιθέων καλουμένων ἡμιθέων καλουμένων Cobet: δεηγορμένων καλουμένους S: διηγμένων καὶ ὑμνουμένων in obelis Kenyon: τῶνδε ἡγούμενον καὶ καλουμένους ci. l. a. Post. τοὺς ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατεύσαντας, τοὺς ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατεύσαντας Babington: τοὺς ἐπὶ στρατείαν στρασαντ. ς S. ὧν οὗτος ἀδελφὰς πράξεις ἐνστησάμενος τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε, ὥστε οἱ μὲν μετὰ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος μίαν πόλιν εἷλον, ὁ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος μόνης πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἄρχουσαν δύναμιν ἐταπείνωσεν.

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ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι παρʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς λοιποῖς Babington: λόγοις S. πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστιν· ἐν Ἅιδου δὲ λογίσασθαι ἄξιον, τίνες οἱ τὸν ἡγεμόνα δεξιωσόμενοι τὸν τούτων. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμεθα ὁρᾶν Λεωσθένη δεξιουμένους καὶ θαυμάζοντας τῶν ἡμιθέων καλουμένων ἡμιθέων καλουμένων Cobet: δεηγορμένων καλουμένους S: διηγμένων καὶ ὑμνουμένων in obelis Kenyon: τῶνδε ἡγούμενον καὶ καλουμένους ci. l. a. Post. τοὺς ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατεύσαντας, τοὺς ἐπὶ Τροίαν στρατεύσαντας Babington: τοὺς ἐπὶ στρατείαν στρασαντ. ς S. ὧν οὗτος ἀδελφὰς πράξεις ἐνστησάμενος τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε, ὥστε οἱ μὲν μετὰ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος μίαν πόλιν εἷλον, ὁ δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος μόνης πᾶσαν τὴν τῆς Εὐρώπης καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἄρχουσαν δύναμιν ἐταπείνωσεν.

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κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἕνεκα μιᾶς γυναικὸς ὑβρισθείσης ἤμυναν, ὁ δὲ πασῶν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων τὰς ἐπιφερομένας ὕβρεις ἐκώλυσεν, μετὰ τῶν συνθαπτομένων νῦν αὐτῷ ἀνδρῶν.Sic interpunxit Sauppe%10 ἀνδρῶν, et διαπεπραγμένων. Cobet.

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κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἕνεκα μιᾶς γυναικὸς ὑβρισθείσης ἤμυναν, ὁ δὲ πασῶν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων τὰς ἐπιφερομένας ὕβρεις ἐκώλυσεν, μετὰ τῶν συνθαπτομένων νῦν αὐτῷ ἀνδρῶν.Sic interpunxit Sauppe%10 ἀνδρῶν, et διαπεπραγμένων. Cobet.

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τῶν δὲ δὲ add. Sauppe. μετʼ ἐκείνους μὲν γεγενημένων, ἄξια δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς διαπεπραγμένων, λέγω δὴ τοὺς περὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Column 13 ἐλευθερώσαντες ἔντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν,

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τῶν δὲ δὲ add. Sauppe. μετʼ ἐκείνους μὲν γεγενημένων, ἄξια δὲ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς διαπεπραγμένων, λέγω δὴ τοὺς περὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Column 13 ἐλευθερώσαντες ἔντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν,

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ἔνδοξον δὲ δὲ add. Babington. τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἐποίησαν, ὧν οὗτος τοσοῦτον ὑπερέσχεν ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ φρονήσει, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν ἠμύναντο, ὁ δὲ μηδʼ ἐπελθεῖν ἐποίησεν. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπεῖδον ἀγωνιζομένους, οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγένετο τῶν ἀντιπάλων.

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ἔνδοξον δὲ δὲ add. Babington. τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἐποίησαν, ὧν οὗτος τοσοῦτον ὑπερέσχεν ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ φρονήσει, ὅσον οἱ μὲν ἐπελθοῦσαν τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν ἠμύναντο, ὁ δὲ μηδʼ ἐπελθεῖν ἐποίησεν. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπεῖδον ἀγωνιζομένους, οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγένετο τῶν ἀντιπάλων.

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οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τοὺς add. Babington. τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν τῷ δήμῳ βεβαιότατα ἐνδειξαμένους, λέγω δὲ Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα, οὐθένας οὕτως αὑτοῖς οἰκειοτέρους ὑμῖν εἶναι νομίζειν ὡς οὐθένας usque ad ὡς locus corruptus: οὐδένας οὕτως αὑτοῖς οἰκείους ἂν εἶναι Sauppe: οὐδαμῶς αὑτοὺς οἰκειοτέρους ὑμῖν εἶναι νομίζειν ἢ Kenyon: οἰκείους ἑτέρους pro οἰκειοτέρους ci. L. A. Post. Alii alia. Λεωσθένη καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνῳ συναγωνισαμένους, οὐδʼ ἔστιν οἷς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τούτοις πλησιάσειαν ἐν Ἅιδου. εἰκότως· οὐκ ἐλάττω γὰρ ἐκείνων ἔργα διεπράξαντο, ἀλλʼ εἰ δέον εἰπεῖν, καὶ μείζω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς τῆς πατρίδος τυράννους κατέλυσαν, οὗτοι δὲ τοὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης.

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οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τοὺς add. Babington. τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν τῷ δήμῳ βεβαιότατα ἐνδειξαμένους, λέγω δὲ Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα, οὐθένας οὕτως αὑτοῖς οἰκειοτέρους ὑμῖν εἶναι νομίζειν ὡς οὐθένας usque ad ὡς locus corruptus: οὐδένας οὕτως αὑτοῖς οἰκείους ἂν εἶναι Sauppe: οὐδαμῶς αὑτοὺς οἰκειοτέρους ὑμῖν εἶναι νομίζειν ἢ Kenyon: οἰκείους ἑτέρους pro οἰκειοτέρους ci. L. A. Post. Alii alia. Λεωσθένη καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνῳ συναγωνισαμένους, οὐδʼ ἔστιν οἷς ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ τούτοις πλησιάσειαν ἐν Ἅιδου. εἰκότως· οὐκ ἐλάττω γὰρ ἐκείνων ἔργα διεπράξαντο, ἀλλʼ εἰ δέον εἰπεῖν, καὶ μείζω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς τῆς πατρίδος τυράννους κατέλυσαν, οὗτοι δὲ τοὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης.

ὢ καλῆς μὲν καὶ παραδόξου τόλμης τῆς πραχθείσης ὑπὸ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐνδόξου δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς προαιρέσεως ἧς προείλοντο, ὑπερβαλλούσης δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, ἣν οὗτοι παρασχόμενοι εἰς τὴν κοινὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων

-

χαλεπὸνEpilogus apud Stobaeum, Florileg. cxxiv. 36 servatus est. μὲν ἴσως ἐστὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὄντας πάθεσι παραμυθεῖσθαι. τὰ γὰρ πένθη οὔτε λόγῳ οὔτε νόμῳ κοιμίζεται, ἀλλʼ ἡ φύσις ἑκάστου καὶ φιλία πρὸς τὸν τελευτήσαντα τὸν τὸν add. Sauppe. ὁρισμὸν ἔχει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι. ὅμως δὲ χρὴ θαρρεῖν καὶ τῆς λύπης παραιρεῖν παραιρεῖν Gesner: παραινεῖν codd. εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, καὶ μεμνῆσθαι μὴ μόνον τοῦ θανάτου τῶν τετελευτηκότων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἧς καταλελοίπασιν.

+

χαλεπὸνEpilogus apud Stobaeum, Florileg. cxxiv. 36 servatus est. μὲν ἴσως ἐστὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὄντας πάθεσι παραμυθεῖσθαι. τὰ γὰρ πένθη οὔτε λόγῳ οὔτε νόμῳ κοιμίζεται, ἀλλʼ ἡ φύσις ἑκάστου καὶ φιλία πρὸς τὸν τελευτήσαντα τὸν τὸν add. Sauppe. ὁρισμὸν ἔχει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι. ὅμως δὲ χρὴ θαρρεῖν καὶ τῆς λύπης παραιρεῖν παραιρεῖν Gesner: παραινεῖν codd. εἰς τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, καὶ μεμνῆσθαι μὴ μόνον τοῦ θανάτου τῶν τετελευτηκότων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἧς καταλελοίπασιν.

-

εἰ εἰ Leopardi: οὐ codd. γὰρ θρήνων ἄξια πεπόνθασιν, ἀλλʼ ἐπαίνων μεγάλων πεποιήκασιν. εἰ δὲ γήρως θνητοῦ μὴ μετέσχον, ἀλλʼ εὐδοξίαν ἀγήρατον εἰλήφασιν, εὐδαίμονές τε γεγόνασι κατὰ πάντα. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἄπαιδες τετελευτήκασιν, οἱ παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπαινοι παῖδες αὐτῶν ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται. ὅσοι δὲ παῖδας καταλελοίπασιν, ἡ τῆς πατρίδος εὔνοια ἐπίτροπος αὐτοῖς τῶν παίδων καταστήσεται.

+

εἰ εἰ Leopardi: οὐ codd. γὰρ θρήνων ἄξια πεπόνθασιν, ἀλλʼ ἐπαίνων μεγάλων πεποιήκασιν. εἰ δὲ γήρως θνητοῦ μὴ μετέσχον, ἀλλʼ εὐδοξίαν ἀγήρατον εἰλήφασιν, εὐδαίμονές τε γεγόνασι κατὰ πάντα. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἄπαιδες τετελευτήκασιν, οἱ παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπαινοι παῖδες αὐτῶν ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται. ὅσοι δὲ παῖδας καταλελοίπασιν, ἡ τῆς πατρίδος εὔνοια ἐπίτροπος αὐτοῖς τῶν παίδων καταστήσεται.

-

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσὶ νόσων καὶ λύπης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προσπιπτόντων εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον· εἰ δʼ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ ἐπιμέλεια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὥσπερ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, εἰκὸς εἰκὸς Toup: εἶναι vel εἴη codd. τοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς τῶν θεῶν καταλυομέναις βοηθήσαντας πλείστης κηδεμονίας κηδεμονίας Ruhnken: ἐπιμελείας vel εὐδαιμονίας codd.: ἐπιμελείας καὶ κηδεμονίας Fuhr. ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τυγχάνειν

+

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἀποθανεῖν ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀπηλλαγμένοι εἰσὶ νόσων καὶ λύπης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν προσπιπτόντων εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον· εἰ δʼ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ ἐπιμέλεια παρὰ τοῦ δαιμονίου, ὥσπερ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, εἰκὸς εἰκὸς Toup: εἶναι vel εἴη codd. τοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς τῶν θεῶν καταλυομέναις βοηθήσαντας πλείστης κηδεμονίας κηδεμονίας Ruhnken: ἐπιμελείας vel εὐδαιμονίας codd.: ἐπιμελείας καὶ κηδεμονίας Fuhr. ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τυγχάνειν

diff --git a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/__cts__.xml index 266025945..16482899a 100644 --- a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Κατὰ Λεωκράτους - Lycurgus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954. + Lycurgus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., editor. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + + + Against Leocrates + Lycurgus. Minor Attic Orators, Vol. 2. Burtt, J. O., translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954 (printing). + diff --git a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index 25e4a44e0..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0152", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Lycurgus/opensource/lyc_eng.xml---subdoc---speech=1", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": true -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml similarity index 73% rename from data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml rename to data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml index 92db942a1..b16281916 100644 --- a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng1.xml +++ b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml @@ -1,13 +1,12 @@ + - - - + - - Against Leocrates from Speeches (English). Machine readable text + Against Leocrates Lycurgus + J. O. Burtt Perseus Project, Tufts University Gregory Crane @@ -18,40 +17,45 @@ David Smith The Annenberg CPB/Project - Trustees of Tufts University Medford, MA Perseus Project + Perseus 2.0 + tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml + + Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License + - - - - - - Lycurgus - Minor Attic Orators in two volumes, 2, with an English translation by J. O. - Burtt, M.A - + Minor Attic Orators + J. O. Burtt - Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann - Ltd. - 1962 + London + William Heinemann, Ltd. + Cambridge, MA + Harvard University Press + 1954 + 1962 + 2 + Internet Archive - - + - + + +

This pointer pattern extracts section.

+
+
@@ -60,41 +64,27 @@ - English - Greek + English + Greek + Latin - + EpiDoc and CTS conversion edited markup + split speeches and converted to unicode + SGML markup -
-
-

After the disaster of Chaeronea the Athenian - people passed a decree forbidding persons to leave the city or to remove their wives or - children. Now a certain Leocrates left the city and, after going to Rhodes and later Megara, returned to Athens. He - made no secret of his story and so was accused of treason by Lycurgus. The case must be - classified as an instance of contradictory definition, since Leocrates admits that he left - the city but denies that he betrayed it. Others class it as an instance of conjecture as - to intention, since it is admitted that the accused left the city, while his purpose in - leaving it is doubtful: did he wish to be a traitor or only to trade? Others think it an - instance of counterplea, since he claims that he left the city not with treasonable - intentions but for commerce. The subject matter resembles that of the speech against - Autolycus.

-
-
-

Justice towards you, Athenians, and reverence for the +

+
+ Argument +

After the disaster of Chaeronea the Athenian people passed a decree forbidding persons to leave the city or to remove their wives or children. Now a certain Leocrates left the city and, after going to Rhodes and later Megara, returned to Athens. He made no secret of his story and so was accused of treason by Lycurgus. The case must be classified as an instance of contradictory definition, since Leocrates admits that he left the city but denies that he betrayed it. Others class it as an instance of conjecture as to intention, since it is admitted that the accused left the city, while his purpose in leaving it is doubtful: did he wish to be a traitor or only to trade? Others think it an instance of counterplea, since he claims that he left the city not with treasonable intentions but for commerce. The subject matter resembles that of the speech against Autolycus.

+
+
+

Justice towards you, Athenians, and reverence for the gods, shall mark the opening of my speech against Leocrates, now here on trial; so may Athena and those other gods and heroes whose statues are erected in our city and the country round receive this prayer. If I have done justly to prosecute Leocrates, if he @@ -102,7 +92,7 @@ traitor to the honors which your laws ordain and the sacrificial rituals which your ancestors have handed down,

-
+

may they make me on this day, in the interest of the city and its people, a worthy accuser of his crimes; and may you, who in your deliberation now are defending your fathers, wives and children, your country and your temples, who hold at the mercy of your @@ -111,24 +101,24 @@ bringing to trial neither betrayed his country nor forsook his city and its temples, I pray that he may be saved from danger by the gods and you, the members of the jury.

-
-

Gentlemen, it is a privilege for the city to have within +

+

Gentlemen, it is a privilege for the city to have within it those who prosecute transgressors of the law, and I could wish to find among the public an appropriate sense of gratitude. In fact the opposite is true, and anyone who takes the personal risk of unpopularity for our common good is actually regarded as an interferer - rather than a patriot, which makes neither for justice nor the state's advantage. For the - things which in the main uphold our democracy and preserve the city's prosperity are three + rather than a patriot, which makes neither for justice nor the state’s advantage. For the + things which in the main uphold our democracy and preserve the city’s prosperity are three in number:

-
+

first the system of law, second the vote of the jury, and third the method of prosecution by which the crimes are handed over to them. The law exists to lay down what must not be done, the accuser to report those liable to penalties under the law, and the juryman to punish all whom these two agencies have brought to his attention. And thus both law and - jury's vote are powerless without an accuser who will hand transgressors over to them. + jury’s vote are powerless without an accuser who will hand transgressors over to them.

-
+

I myself, Athenians, knew that Leocrates avoided the dangers to which his country called him and deserted his fellow citizens. I knew that he had utterly disregarded your authority and was chargeable with all the articles of the indictment. Therefore I @@ -137,22 +127,22 @@ this man to push into the market place and share the public sacrifices, when he had been a disgrace to his country and to you all.

-
+

A just citizen will not let private enmity induce him to start a public prosecution against one who does the state no harm. On the contrary, it is those who break his - country's laws whom he will look on as his personal enemies; crimes which affect the + country’s laws whom he will look on as his personal enemies; crimes which affect the public will, in his eyes, offer public grounds for enmity towards the criminals.

-
-

All public trials should therefore rank as important, but +

+

All public trials should therefore rank as important, but particularly this present one, in which you are about to cast your vote. For when you give a verdict on a charge of illegal proposals you merely rectify one single error, and in preventing the intended measure your scope depends upon the extent to which the decree in question will harm the city. But the present case is not concerned with some trifling - constitutional issue, nor yet with a moment of time; our city's whole life is at stake, + constitutional issue, nor yet with a moment of time; our city’s whole life is at stake, and this trial will leave a verdict to posterity to be remembered for all time.

-
+

So dangerous is the wrong which has been done and so far-reaching that no indictment adequate could be devised, nor have the laws defined a punishment for the crimes. What punishment would suit a man who left his country and refused to guard the temples of his @@ -160,7 +150,7 @@ the hands of the enemy? The greatest and final penalty, death, though the maximum punishment allowed by law, is too small for the crimes of Leocrates.

-
+

The reason why the penalty for such offences, gentlemen, has never been recorded is not that the legislators of the past were neglectful; it is that such things had not happened hitherto and were not expected to happen in the future. It is therefore most essential @@ -171,7 +161,7 @@ is equally chargeable with them all, your verdict must be left as a precedent for your successors.

-
+

I assure you, gentlemen, that if you condemn this man you will do more than merely punish him; you will be giving all younger men an incentive to right conduct. For there are two influences at work in the education of the young: the punishments suffered by wrongdoers @@ -180,8 +170,8 @@ therefore give your minds to the trial on hand and let your first consideration be justice.

-
-

In my speech also justice shall come first; on no occasion +

+

In my speech also justice shall come first; on no occasion will I have recourse to falsehoods or irrelevance. Most of the speakers who come before you behave in the strangest possible manner, either giving you advice from the platform on public affairs or wasting their charges and calumnies on any subject except the one on @@ -189,7 +179,7 @@ opinion on questions about which you are not deliberating or else to invent a charge to which no one is going to reply.

-
+

But it is wrong that they should ask for justice from you when you give your vote and yet be unjust themselves in handling the prosecution. And yet the blame for this is yours, gentlemen; for you have granted this freedom to speakers appearing before you, although @@ -197,15 +187,15 @@ key="tgn,1000074">Greece: a court so superior to others that even the men convicted in it admit that its judgements are just.

-
+

Let it be your pattern, and, like it, do not give way to speakers who digress from the point. If you take this advice, defendants will receive an unbiased hearing, accusers will be least able to give false information, and you will best be able to make the verdict in keeping with your oath. For those who have not been rightly informed cannot give their verdict rightly.

-
-

A further point for you to notice, gentlemen, is this: the +

+

A further point for you to notice, gentlemen, is this: the trial of Leocrates is not comparable with that of other ordinary men. For if the defendant were unknown in Greece, your verdict, whether good or bad, would be a matter solely for yourselves to contemplate. But where this man is @@ -215,7 +205,7 @@ discreditable report of you which he made officially to the Rhodians and to those merchants residing there;

-
+

merchants who sailed round the whole Greek world on their business and passed on the news of Athens which they had heard from Leocrates. It is important therefore to reach a correct verdict upon him. For you must realize, @@ -223,8 +213,8 @@ you from the rest of mankind, piety towards the gods, reverence for your ancestors and ambition for your country, if this man were to escape punishment at your hands.

-
-

I am asking you, Athenians, to listen to my accusation to +

+

I am asking you, Athenians, to listen to my accusation to the end and not to be impatient if I begin with the history of Athens at the time under discussion; you may reserve your anger for the men whose fault it is that I am now compelled to recall those @@ -237,29 +227,29 @@ 1.41. See Life of Hyperides and Hyperides, fragment 18, note.

-
+

Leocrates ignored all these provisions. He collected what belongings he had and with his - slaves' assistance placed them in the ship's boat, the ship itself being already anchored + slaves’ assistance placed them in the ship’s boat, the ship itself being already anchored off the shore. Late in the evening he went out himself with his mistress Irenis through the postern gate on to the open beach and sailed out to the ship. And so he disappeared, a - deserter, untouched by pity for the city's harbors from which he was putting out to sea, + deserter, untouched by pity for the city’s harbors from which he was putting out to sea, and unashamed in face of the walls which, for his own part, he left undefended. Looking back at the Acropolis and the temple of Zeus the Savior and Athena the Protectress, which he had betrayed, he had no fear, though he will presently call upon these gods to save him from danger.

-
+

He landed and entered Rhodes, where, as if he were bringing good news of great successes for his country, he announced that the main city had been captured when he left it, that the Piraeus was blockaded and that he was the only one who had escaped, feeling - no shame at speaking of his country's ruin as the occasion of his own safety. The Rhodians + no shame at speaking of his country’s ruin as the occasion of his own safety. The Rhodians took his news so seriously that they manned triremes and brought in their merchantmen; and the traders and shipowners who had intended to sail to Athens unloaded their corn and other cargoes there, because of Leocrates.

-
+

To prove the truth of this account the clerk shall read you the evidence of all concerned: first the testimony of the neighbors and the men living in this district who know that the defendant ran away during the war and sailed from Andoc. 1.133.

-
-

But before the witnesses come up I want to say a few words +

+

But before the witnesses come up I want to say a few words to you. You are well acquainted, gentlemen, with the tricks of defendants and with the requests made by others asking pardon for them. You know too well that desire for bribes and favors induces many witnesses to forget what they know, to fail to appear, or to @@ -295,11 +285,12 @@ Isaeus 9.18; Aeschin. 1.45; Dem. 19.176, etc. If they refuse both these alternatives, we will summons them in the interest of yourselves, our laws and our - democracy. Read the evidence.Evidence + democracy. Read the evidence.

-
-

To resume then, gentlemen. After this, time passed, +

+

+

To resume then, gentlemen. After this, time passed, merchant ships from Athens continued to arrive at Rhodes, and it was clear that no disaster had overtaken the city. So Leocrates grew alarmed, and embarking again, left Attica, an alien on the borders of the land that nurtured him.

-
+

He had condemned himself so finally to a lifetime of exile that he sent for Amyntas, the husband of his elder sister, and Antigenes of Xypete, a friend of his, to come to him from Hyp. 3.7 and note. and the balance restored to him.

-
+

After concluding all this business Amyntas resold the slaves himself for thirty-five - minas to Timochares of Acharnae who had married Leocrates' younger sister. Timochares had + minas to Timochares of Acharnae who had married Leocrates’ younger sister. Timochares had no ready money for the purchase and so drew up an agreement which he lodged with LysiclesA Lysicles of Leuconoe, possibly a banker, is mentioned in a similar connection in Hyp. 3.9. The rate of @@ -333,34 +324,34 @@ alive I should have produced him in person; since he is not, I am summoning for you the men who know the facts. Please read me this evidence showing that Amyntas bought the slaves and house from Leocrates at Megara.Evidence + >Megara.

-
-

Now hear how Philomelos of Cholargus and Menelaus, once an - envoy to the King, received from Amyntas forty minas owed them.Evidence

+
+

+

Now hear how Philomelos of Cholargus and Menelaus, once an + envoy to the King, received from Amyntas forty minas owed them.

+

Please take the evidence of Timochares who bought the slaves from Amyntas for thirty-five - minas, and also his agreement.EvidenceAgreement -

+ minas, and also his agreement.

-
-

You have heard the witnesses, gentlemen. What I am now +

+

+

You have heard the witnesses, gentlemen. What I am now going to say will give you good reason for indignation and hatred of this man Leocrates. For he was not content simply to remove his own person and his goods. There were the sacred images of his family which his forbears established and which, in keeping with your customs and ancestral tradition, they afterwards entrusted to him. These too he had sent to Megara. He took them out of the country - without a qualm at the name “ancestral images” or at the thought that he had uprooted them + without a qualm at the name ancestral images or at the thought that he had uprooted them from their country and expected them to share his exile, to leave the temples and the land which they had occupied and be established in a strange and uncongenial place, as aliens to the soil and to the rites traditionally observed in Megara.

-
+

Your fathers, honoringIn order to give what must be the - general sense of this corrupt passage I have translated Taylor's suggested addition of + general sense of this corrupt passage I have translated Taylor’s suggested addition of timw=ntes before th\n *)aqhna=n and ignored the words o(mw/numon. But the Greek text cannot be restored with certainty. @@ -379,7 +370,7 @@ >Leucas and from there to Corinth.

-
+

And yet, gentlemen, in cases of this sort your laws lay down the most severe penalties if an Athenian transports corn to any place other than your city. When therefore a man has been a traitor in war and has broken the laws in transporting corn, when he has had no @@ -388,18 +379,18 @@ do not it will show an apathy and lack of righteous indignation completely without parallel.

-
-

Consider these further proofs that my inquiry into this +

+

Consider these further proofs that my inquiry into this question has been just; for it is my opinion that in dealing with such serious crimes you must base your vote, not on conjecture, but on certainty; and that witnesses must prove their good faith before, not after, they give their evidence. I submitted to the defence a written challenge on all these points and demanded the slaves of Leocrates for torture, - according to the right procedure for making challenges. Please read the challenge.Challenge + according to the right procedure for making challenges. Please read the challenge.

-
-

You hear the challenge, gentlemen. By the very act of +

+

+

You hear the challenge, gentlemen. By the very act of refusing to accept this Leocrates condemned himself as a traitor to his country. For whoever refuses to allow the testing of those who share his secrets has confessed that the charges of the indictment are true. Every one of you knows that in matters of dispute it @@ -417,32 +408,32 @@ gratify his torturers (Antiph. 5.32).

-
+

Certainly I cannot be called unjust in my prosecution of Leocrates. I was even willing at my own risk to let the proof rest on the torture of his male and female slaves, but the defendant, realizing his guilt, rejected the offer instead of accepting it. Add yet, gentlemen, the male and female slaves of Leocrates would have been far readier to deny any of the real facts than to invent lies against their master.

-
+

Apart from this, Leocrates will presently proclaim that he is a simple citizen and is falling a prey to the cunning of an orator and false informer. But I am sure you all know well the characteristic behavior of those unscrupulous men who try to lay false information; for when they choose their part they look for vantage-points on which to quibble against those on trial, whereas the man whose aims in going to law are honest, who - brings proofs to bear against those who come under the herald's curse,Before meetings of the Assembly and the Council a curse was pronounced by the herald against all who might be acting treasonably against the state (see Dem. 19.70). does just the opposite, as I myself am doing.

-
+

Look at the present case yourselves in this way. Which people could not have been misled by cunning or a deceptive argument? The male and female slaves. Naturally, when tortured, they would have told the whole truth about all the offences. But it was just these persons - whom Leocrates refused to hand over, though they were his and no one else's.

+ whom Leocrates refused to hand over, though they were his and no one else’s.

-
+

On the other hand which people could he probably impose upon by arguments, appealing to their softer side by his tears and so winning their sympathy? The jury. Leocrates, the betrayer of his country, has come into court with only one fear, namely that the witnesses @@ -450,13 +441,13 @@ man whom they expose. What was the use of pretexts, pleas, excuses? Justice is plain, the truth easy and the proof brief.

-
+

If he admits that the articles of the indictment are true and right, why does he not suffer punishment as the laws require? But if he claims that they are false, why has he not handed over his male and female slaves? When a man is up for treason he should submit his slaves for torture, without evading a single one of the most searching tests.

-
+

Leocrates did nothing of the sort. Though he has condemned himself as a traitor to his country, a traitor to his gods and to the laws, he will ask you when you vote to contradict his own admissions and his own evidence. How can it be right, when a man has @@ -464,47 +455,47 @@ defence, for you to let him mislead your judgement on crimes to which he has confessed?

-
-

So much for the challenge and the crime. I think you have +

+

So much for the challenge and the crime. I think you have been shown well enough, gentlemen, that that part is beyond dispute. I want now to remind you what emergencies, what great dangers the city was facing when Leocrates turned traitor - to it. Please take the decree of Hyperides, clerk, and read it.Decree + to it. Please take the decree of Hyperides, clerk, and read it.

-
-

You hear the decree, gentlemen. It provided that the +

+

+

You hear the decree, gentlemen. It provided that the Council of Five Hundred should go down to the Piraeus armed, to consult for the protection of that harbor, and that it - should hold itself ready to do whatever seemed to be in the people's interest. And yet, if + should hold itself ready to do whatever seemed to be in the people’s interest. And yet, if the men who had been exempted from military service so that they might deliberate upon the - city's affairs were then playing the part of soldiers, do you think that the alarms which + city’s affairs were then playing the part of soldiers, do you think that the alarms which had taken hold upon the city were any trivial or ordinary fears?

-
+

Yet it was then that this man Leocrates made off himself—a runaway from the city; it was then that he conveyed to safety his available property and sent back for the sacred images of his family. To such a pitch did he carry his treason that, so far as his decision went, the temples were abandoned, the posts on the wall unmanned and the town and country left deserted.

-
+

And yet in those days, gentlemen, who would not have pitied the city, even though he were not a citizen but only an alien who had lived among us in previous years? Surely there was no one whose hatred of the people or of Athens was so intense that he could have endured to see himself remain outside the army. When the defeat and consequent disaster had been reported to the people and the city was tense with - alarm at the news, the people's hope of safety had come to rest with the men of over + alarm at the news, the people’s hope of safety had come to rest with the men of over fifty.

-
+

Free women could be seen crouching at the doors in terror inquiring for the safety of their husbands, fathers or brothers, offering a spectacle degrading to themselves and to the city. The men who had outlived their stength and were advanced in life, exempt by law from service in the field, could be seen throughout the city, now on the threshold of the grave, wretchedly scurrying with their cloaks pinned double round them.

-
+

Many sufferings were being visited upon the city; every citizen had felt misfortune at its worst; but the sight which would most surely have stirred the onlooker and moved him to tears over the sorrows of Athens was to see @@ -514,7 +505,7 @@ that once proudly claimed to be indigenous and free. The city had suffered a change indeed.

-
+

She who used once to champion the freedom of her fellow Greeks was now content if she could safely meet the dangers that her own defence entailed. In the past she had ruled a wide extent of foreign land; now she was disputing with Troezen and Epidaurus to send them aid.

-
+

Therefore, gentlemen, if at a time of fears like these, a time of such great danger and disgrace, there was a deserter from the city, a mall who neither took up arms in his - country's defence nor submitted his person to the generals for enrollment but ran away and + country’s defence nor submitted his person to the generals for enrollment but ran away and betrayed the safety of the people, what patriotic juryman with any scruples would vote for his acquittal? What advocate summoned into court would help a traitor to his city? He had not even the grace to share our grief at the misfortunes of his country, and he has made no contribution towards the defence of Athens and our democracy.

-
-

Yet men of every age offered their services for the city's defence on that occasion when +

+

Yet men of every age offered their services for the city’s defence on that occasion when the land was giving up its trees, the dead their gravestones, and the temples arms. Some set themselves to building walls, others to making ditches and palisades. Not a man in the city was idle. Leocrates did not offer himself to be enrolled for a single one of these tasks.

-
+

You would do well to remember this and punish with death this man who did not even deign to help collect the bodies or attend the funeral of those who at Chaeronea died for freedom and the safety of our people; for had it rested with him those men would be unburied. He was not even ashamed to pass their graves when he greeted their country eight years after.

-
-

I wish to say a few words more about these men, gentlemen, +

+

I wish to say a few words more about these men, gentlemen, and I ask you to listen and not regard such pleas as out of keeping with public trials. For the praise of brave men provides an unanswerable refutation of all whose conduct is opposed to theirs. And it is fair too that that praise which is to them the only reward for danger should be remembered at the public trials in which the entire city shares, since it was for her safety as a whole that they forfeited their lives.

-
+

Those men encountered the enemy on the borders of Boeotia, to fight for the freedom of Greece. They neither rested their hopes of safety on city walls nor @@ -573,35 +564,35 @@ their own fathers, and so towards countries which are not their own but which have been adopted during their lifetime they feel a weaker loyalty.

-
+

In such a spirit did these men bear their share of dangers with a courage unsurpassed; but their prowess was not equalled by their fortune. For they have not lived to reap the enjoyment of their valor; they died and have bequeathed their glory in its stead. Unconquered, they fell at their posts in the defence of freedom,

-
+

and if I may use a paradox but one which yet conveys the truth, they triumphed in their death. For liberty and courage, the prizes offered to brave men in war, are both in the possession of the dea neither can we say that men have been defeated whose spirits did not - flinch at the aggressor's threat. For it is only those who meet an honorable end in war + flinch at the aggressor’s threat. For it is only those who meet an honorable end in war whom no man justly could call beaten, since by the choosing of a noble death they are escaping slavery. The courage of these men has made this plain. They alone among us all held in their persons the liberty of Greece.

-
+

For at the very moment when they passed away her lot was changed to servitude. With the bodies of these men was buried the freedom of every other Greek, and thus they proved it to the world that they were fighting for no private ends but facing danger for our common liberty. I therefore say without misgiving that their lives have been a laurel wreath for Athens.

-
+

They had good reason for their conduct,The text of this - passage has been suspected because (a) the words di' + passage has been suspected because (a) the words di’ a(\ are difficult to understand; (b) there is no object for e)peth/deuon. But (a) di' - a(\ can be taken to refer to what follows in this sense: “Moreover,— and - here is the justification for their conduct,—you alone know, etc.”; (b) although + xml:lang="greek">e)peth/deuon. But (a) di’ + a(\ can be taken to refer to what follows in this sense: Moreover,— and + here is the justification for their conduct,—you alone know, etc.; (b) although epithdeu/w normally takes an object, at least the present participle can be used absolutely. I have therefore ventured to leave the text as it stands. since you, Athenians, alone among Greeks know how to honor valiant @@ -613,8 +604,8 @@ you pay the highest honors to your benefactors, that you should also punish with the utmost rigor those who dishonor and betray their country.

-
-

You should bear in mind, gentlemen, that it is not even in +

+

You should bear in mind, gentlemen, that it is not even in your power, unless you go beyond your rights, to acquit this man Leocrates, since his offence has had judgement passed upon it and a vote of condemnation too. For the council of the Areopagus;—(No one need interrupt me. That council was, in my opinion, the greatest @@ -623,7 +614,7 @@ councillors who are so scrupulous in trying other men for homicide would themselves have taken the life of any citizen unlawfully.

-
+

Moreover you condemned AutolycusFor the trial of Autolycus compare Lyc. Fr. 9 and note. and punished him because, though he himself had faced the dangers, he was charged with secretly sending @@ -631,18 +622,18 @@ away persons useless for war, what should your verdict be on one who, though a man, did not pay his country the price of his nurture? The people also, who looked with horror upon what was taking place, decreed that those who were evading the danger which their - country's defence involved were liable for treason, meriting in their belief the extreme + country’s defence involved were liable for treason, meriting in their belief the extreme penalty.

-
+

When therefore certain actions have been censured by the most impartial council and condemned by you who were the judges appointed by lot, when they have been recognized by the people as demanding the severest punishment, will you give a verdict which opposes all these views? If you do, you will be the most unconscionable of men and will have few indeed ready to risk themselves in your defence.

-
-

It is now clear, gentlemen, that Leocrates is liable under +

+

It is now clear, gentlemen, that Leocrates is liable under all the articles of the indictment. He will, I gather, try to mislead you by saying that it was merely as a merchant that he departed on this voyage and that the pursuance of this calling took him from his home to Rhodes. So if @@ -651,7 +642,7 @@ the harbor with all their friends watching to see them off. Secondly, they go alone with their attendant slave, not with their mistress and her maids.

-
+

Besides, what need had this Athenian to stay five years in Megara as a merchant? What need had he to send for the sacred images of his family or to sell his house in

-
-

For surely it is outrageous, when men abroad on business were hurrying to the city's +

+

For surely it is outrageous, when men abroad on business were hurrying to the city’s help, that Leocrates alone should sail away at such a time for purposes of trade, since no - one would then have thought of adding to his wealth. Men's only care was to preserve what + one would then have thought of adding to his wealth. Men’s only care was to preserve what they already had. I should like Leocrates to tell me what merchandise he could have brought us to render him more useful than he would have been, had he presented himself before the generals for enrollment and had resisted the invaders by fighting at your sides.

-
+

Personally I know no help to equal this. He deserves your anger for this conduct and for his explanation too, since he has not hesitated to tell a blatant lie. For he never previously carried on this trade, being in fact a master smith; and subsequently, after @@ -681,16 +672,16 @@ would never have left to live abroad on business. So if he says a word about these matters, I do not doubt that you will stop him.

-
-

He will perhaps in his impetuosity raise the argument, +

+

He will perhaps in his impetuosity raise the argument, suggested to him by certain of his advocates, that he is not liable on a charge of treason, since he was not responsible for dockyards, gates or camps nor in fact for any of - the city's concerns. My own view is that those in charge of these positions could have + the city’s concerns. My own view is that those in charge of these positions could have betrayed a part of your defences only, whereas it was the whole city which Leocrates surrendered. Again, it is the living only whom men of their kind harm, but Leocrates has wronged the dead as well, depriving them of their ancestral rites.

-
+

Had the city been betrayed by them it would have been inhabited though enslaved, but left as this man left it, it would have been deserted. Moreover, after suffering hardships cities may well expect to see a change to better times, but with complete destruction even @@ -699,7 +690,7 @@ means by which prosperity could come. And so it is with cities; their misfortune reaches its limit when they are destroyed.

-
+

Indeed, the plain fact is that for a city destruction is like death. Let us take the clearest illustration. Our city was enslavedBy the Pisistratids from c. 560 to 510 and by the Thirty from 404 to 403. The walls were @@ -707,7 +698,7 @@ the walls were demolished by the Spartans. Yet we were freed from both these evils and the Greeks approved us as the guardians of their welfare.

-
+

Not so with any city which has ever been destroyed. First, though it is to quote a rather early case, remember Troy. Who has not heard how, after being the greatest city of her time and ruling the whole of Din. 1.73 and note.

-
-

Perhaps one of his advocates will dare to belittle the +

+

Perhaps one of his advocates will dare to belittle the offence and say that none of these misfortunes could have resulted from the action of one man. They are not ashamed to make before you the kind of plea for which they deserve to die. For if they admit that he deserted his country, once they have granted this, let them @@ -732,21 +723,21 @@ none of these crimes, surely it is madness to say that this one man could cause no harm.

-
+

Personally, gentlemen, I think the opposite is true: the safety of the city rested with - this man. For the city's life continues only if each one guards her by personally doing + this man. For the city’s life continues only if each one guards her by personally doing his duty and if a man neglects his duty in a single aspect, he has, unwittingly, neglected it entirely. But it is easy, gentlemen, to ascertain the truth by referring to the attitude of the early lawgivers.

-
+

It was not their way, when prescribing the death penalty for the thief who stole a hundred talents, to approve a punishment less severe for one who took ten drachmas. Again with sacrilege: for a great offence they inflicted death, and for a small one too they had no milder punishment. They did not differentiate between him who killed a slave and him who killed a free man, by fining one and outlawing the other.

-
+

For all breaches of the law alike, however small, they fixed upon the death penalty, making no special allowances, in their assessment of the magnitude of crimes, for the individual circumstances of each. On one point only they insisted: was the crime such @@ -759,32 +750,32 @@ him? I think you would have been justified in doing so, at least if you intended to save the other laws.

-
+

The same applies here: you must punish this man with death if you intend to make the other citizens better, oblivious of the fact that he is only one. You must consider the act. There are not many like him. In my opinion we have our good fortune to thank for that; but Leocrates, I think, deserves a more severe punishment on this account, since he alone of his fellow citizens sought safety for himself rather than for the city.

-
-

Nothing angers me so much, gentlemen, as to hear some +

+

Nothing angers me so much, gentlemen, as to hear some person among his supporters saying that to have left the city is not treason, since your ancestors once left it when they crossed to Salamis during their war with Xerxes: a critic so senseless and contemptuous of you that he has presumed to confuse the most honorable action with the most base.

-
+

For where have men not proclaimed the valor of those heroes? Who is so grudging, who so completely without spirit, that he would not wish to have shared in their exploits? They did not desert Athens; they simply changed the scene, making an honorable decision in the face of the growing menace.

-
+

Eteonicus the Spartan, Adimantus the Corinthian and the Aeginetan fleet intended, under cover of night, to seek safety for themselves.There are at least two mistakes in this account. (1) The Spartan general was Eurybiadas. (2) The - Aeginetans supported the Athenians' policy, since a withdrawal to the isthmus of + Aeginetans supported the Athenians’ policy, since a withdrawal to the isthmus of Corinth would have entailed the surrender of their island. See Hdt. 8.74. Even the Athenian claim that Adimantus wished, or as Herodotus (Hdt. 8.94) records it, @@ -795,10 +786,10 @@ them assist at Salamis in the naval battle against the Persians, and so triumphed unaided over both enemy and ally, in a way appropriate to each, conferring a favor upon one and defeating the other in battle. A fit - comparison indeed to make with the man who escapes from his country on a four days' voyage + comparison indeed to make with the man who escapes from his country on a four days’ voyage to Rhodes!

-
+

Do you imagine that any one of those heroes would have been ready to condone such an act? Would they not have stoned to death one who was disgracing their valor? At least they all loved their country so much that they nearly stoned to death Alexander,) in which he is portrayed as a friend of the Athenians who, though pressed into the service of Persia, only visited them after Salamis to offer favorable - terms and was not “nearly stoned to death.” The only stoning described by Herodotus was + terms and was not nearly stoned to death. The only stoning described by Herodotus was the execution of a certain Lycidas who proposed that the Athenians should accept terms from Persia (Hdt. 9.5). the envoy from Xerxes, formerly their friend, because he demanded @@ -816,12 +807,12 @@ believe that they would not have visited with severe punishment a man who in fact delivered his country into the hands of the enemy?

-
+

It was because they held such beliefs as these that for ninety years they were leaders of the Greeks.Estimates of other orators range from 73 years (Dem. 9.23) to 65 years (Isoc. 12.56), but in view of the inaccuracy of Lycurgus on historical matters it does - not seem necessary to accept Taylor's suggestion to read “seventy” instead of “ninety.” + not seem necessary to accept Taylor’s suggestion to read seventy instead of ninety. The maximum possible length for the period would be 85 years, from the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C. to that of Aegospotami in 405. They ravaged Asia wasting it.

-
+

And to crown their victory: not content with erecting the trophy in Salamis, they fixed for the Persian the boundaries necessary for Greek freedom and prevented his overstepping them, making an agreement that @@ -850,20 +841,20 @@ Asiatic Greeks were guaranteed autonomy is certalnly false.

-
+

Do you think that if they had all adopted the attitude of Leocrates and fled, any of these glorious things would have been done or that you would still be living in this country? Then, gentlemen, as you praise and honor brave men so too you must hate and punish cowards, and particularly Leocrates who showed no fear or respect towards you.

-
-

Consider too what your traditional views have been in this +

+

Consider too what your traditional views have been in this respect and what your present feelings are. It is as well that I should remind you though you know already. For by Athena, in the ancient laws and in the principles of those who drew them up in the beginning we have indeed a panegyric on the city. You have but to observe them to do right and all men will respect you as worthy of her.

-
+

There is an oath which you take, sworn by all citizens when, as ephebi,The Ephebate, an organization for training the young men of Athens, chiefly in military matters, had @@ -879,37 +870,14 @@ himself and, quite apart from wronging you, has behaved impiously towards the god. But if he has not sworn it, it becomes immediately plain that he has been playing tricks in the hope of evading his duty; and for this you would be justified in punishing him, on your - own and Heaven's behalf.

-
-
-

I want you to hear the oath. Read, clerk.OathI will not bring dishonor an my sacred arms nor will I abandon my - comrade wherever I shall be stationed. I will defend the rights of gods and men and will - not leave my country smaller, when I die, but greater and better, so far as I am able by - myself and with the help of all. I will respect the rulers of the time duly and the - existing ordinances duly and all others which may be established in the future. And if - anyone seeks to destroy the ordinances I will oppose him so far as I am able by myself - and with the help of all. I will honor the cults of my fathers. Witnesses to this shall - be the gods Agraulus, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalius, Ares, Athena the Warrior, Zeus, Thallo, - Auxo, Hegemone, Heracles, and the boundaries of my native land, wheat, barley, vines, - olive-trees, fig-trees. . . .The inscription from - which the text of this oath is taken, found in 1932 ar - Acharnae, contains also a variant version of the next oath which Lycurgus quotes - (Lyc. 1.81). For the full text and notes on it see M.N. - Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, ii. 204. Agraulus (more commonly - called Aglaurus) had a temple on the north side of the Acropolis, in which the - Ephebate oath was taken. For Enyo the goddess of war compare Hom. Il. 5.333. Enyalius, though his name was often applied to Ares, was - regarded by some as a separate God. Thallo (Growth) was one of the Horae, Auxo and - Hegemone (Increase and Guidance) two of the Graces. The concluding words of the list - are lost.It is a fine and solemn oath, - gentlemen; an oath which Leocrates has broken in all that he has done. How could a man be - more impious or a greater traitor to his country? How could he disgrace his arms more than - by refusing to take them up and resist the enemy? Is there any doubt that a man has - deserted the soldier at his side and left his post, if he did not even offer his person - for enlistment?

-
-
+ own and Heaven’s behalf.

+
+
+

I want you to hear the oath. Read, clerk.

+

I will not bring dishonor an my sacred arms nor will I abandon my comrade wherever I shall be stationed. I will defend the rights of gods and men and will not leave my country smaller, when I die, but greater and better, so far as I am able by myself and with the help of all. I will respect the rulers of the time duly and the existing ordinances duly and all others which may be established in the future. And if anyone seeks to destroy the ordinances I will oppose him so far as I am able by myself and with the help of all. I will honor the cults of my fathers. Witnesses to this shall be the gods Agraulus, Hestia, Enyo, Enyalius, Ares, Athena the Warrior, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo, Hegemone, Heracles, and the boundaries of my native land, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees. . . .The inscription from which the text of this oath is taken, found in 1932 ar Acharnae, contains also a variant version of the next oath which Lycurgus quotes (Lyc. 1.81). For the full text and notes on it see M.N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, ii. 204. Agraulus (more commonly called Aglaurus) had a temple on the north side of the Acropolis, in which the Ephebate oath was taken. For Enyo the goddess of war compare Hom. Il. 5.333. Enyalius, though his name was often applied to Ares, was regarded by some as a separate God. Thallo (Growth) was one of the Horae, Auxo and Hegemone (Increase and Guidance) two of the Graces. The concluding words of the list are lost.

+

It is a fine and solemn oath, gentlemen; an oath which Leocrates has broken in all that he has done. How could a man be more impious or a greater traitor to his country? How could he disgrace his arms more than by refusing to take them up and resist the enemy? Is there any doubt that a man has deserted the soldier at his side and left his post, if he did not even offer his person for enlistment?

+
+

How could anyone have defended the rights of men and gods who did not face a single danger? What greater treachery could he have shown towards his country, which, for all that he has done to save it, is left at the mercy of the enemy? Then will you not kill @@ -917,8 +885,8 @@ only one such act? It will be easy then to commit serious offences among you, if you show that the smaller ones arouse your anger more.

-
-

There is a further point which you should notice, +

+

There is a further point which you should notice, gentlemen. The power which keeps our democracy together is the oath. For there are three things of which the state is built up: the archon, the juryman and the private citizen. Each of these gives this oath as a pledge, and rightly so. For human beings have often @@ -928,7 +896,7 @@ perjured man does not suffer himself, at least his children and all his family are overtaken by dire misfortunes.

-
+

It was for this reason, gentlemen of the jury, that all the Greeks exchanged this pledge at Plataea, before taking up their posts to fight against the power of Xerxes. The formula was not their own but borrowed from the @@ -936,27 +904,19 @@ events of that time are ancient history now we can discern clearly enough, in these recorded words, the courage of our forbears. Please read the oath.

-
-

OathI will not hold life - dearer than freedom nor will I abandon my leaders whether they are alive or dead. I will - bury all allies killed in the battle. If I conquer the barbarians in war I will not - destroy any of the cities which have fought for Greece but I will consecrate a tenth of all those which sided with the - barbarian. I will not rebuild a single one of the shrines which the barbarians have - burnt and razed but will allow them to remain for future generations as a memorial of - the barbarians' impiety. -

+
+

I will not hold life dearer than freedom nor will I abandon my leaders whether they are alive or dead. I will bury all allies killed in the battle. If I conquer the barbarians in war I will not destroy any of the cities which have fought for Greece but I will consecrate a tenth of all those which sided with the barbarian. I will not rebuild a single one of the shrines which the barbarians have burnt and razed but will allow them to remain for future generations as a memorial of the barbarians’ impiety.

-
-

They stood by this oath so firmly, gentlemen, that they +

+

They stood by this oath so firmly, gentlemen, that they had the favor of the gods on their side to help them; and, though all the Greeks proved courageous in the hour of danger, your city won the most renown. Your ancestors faced death to save the city from shame; nothing could then be worse than for you to pardon those who have disgraced her and allowed our national glory, won through many hardships, to perish by the wickedness of men like this.

-
-

Consider, gentlemen: you are the only Greeks for whom it +

+

Consider, gentlemen: you are the only Greeks for whom it is impossible to ignore any of these crimes. Let me remind you of a few past episodes; and if you take them as examples you will reach a better verdict in the present case and in others also. The greatest virtue of your city is that she has set the Greeks an example of @@ -964,7 +924,7 @@ 1.41 and Lyc. 1.100. she surpasses every city, and in valor too our ancestors have no less surpassed their fellows.

-
+

Remember the reign of Codrus.The story of Codrus is told, with minor variations, by other ancient writers,e.g. by Velleius Paterculus i. 2, but the version here given by Lycurgus is the earliest extant. The @@ -975,7 +935,7 @@ they would take the city so long as they did not kill Codrus, the king of the Athenians, they marched out against Athens.

-
+

But a Delphian Cleomantis, learning of the oracle, secretly told the Athenians. Such, it seems, was the goodwill which our ancestors always inspired even among aliens. And when the Pelopannesians invaded Attica, what did our @@ -984,16 +944,16 @@ Though they were few in number, shut inside the walls, they endured the hardships of a siege to preserve their country.

-
+

And such was the nobility, gentlemen, of those kings of old that they preferred to die for the safety of their subjects rather than to purchase life by the adoption of another country. That at least is true of Codrus, who, they say, told the Athenians to note the - time of his death and, taking a beggar's clothes to deceive the enemy, slipped out by the + time of his death and, taking a beggar’s clothes to deceive the enemy, slipped out by the gates and began to collect firewood in front of the town. When two men from the camp approached him and inquired about conditions in the city he killed one of them with a blow of his sickle.

-
+

The survivor, it is said, enraged with Codrus and thinking him a beggar drew his sword and killed him. Then the Athenians sent a herald and asked to have their king given over for burial, telling the enemy the whole truth and the Peloponnesians restored the body but @@ -1001,29 +961,29 @@ of Delphi the city made a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum for himself and his descendants for ever.

-
-

Is there any resemblance between Leocrates' love for his country and the love of those +

+

Is there any resemblance between Leocrates’ love for his country and the love of those ancient kings who preferred to die for her and outwit the foe, giving their own life in - exchange for the people's safety? It is for this reason that they and only they have given + exchange for the people’s safety? It is for this reason that they and only they have given the land their name and received honors like the gods, as is their due. For they were entitled, even after death, to a share in the country which they so zealously preserved.

-
+

But Leocrates, whether alive or dead, would have no claim to a portion in it; he of all men deserves to be cast out from the country which he abandoned to the enemy by his flight. For it is unfitting that the same ground should cover heroes and the most cowardly of mankind.

-
-

Yet he contended (and perhaps he will say this to you now +

+

Yet he contended (and perhaps he will say this to you now also) that he would not have faced this trial if he had been conscious of committing a crime like this. As if all thieves and temple-robbers did not use this argument! It is an argument which goes to prove their shamelessness rather than the fact of their innocence. That is not the point at issue; we need the assurance that he did not sail, that he did not leave the city or settle at Megara.

-
+

These are the facts by which the truth can be established. As for his appearance in court: surely some god brought him specially for punishment, so that, after shirking an honorable danger, he might meet a death of disgrace and shame and place himself at the @@ -1032,20 +992,20 @@ betrayed, it is obvious that his own transgressions of the law have brought upon him this reward.

-
+

For the first step taken by the gods in the case of wicked men is to unhinge their reason; and personally I value as the utterance of an oracle these lines, composed by ancient poets and handed down to posterityThe authorship of these verses is not known.: - When gods in anger seek a mortal's harm,First they + When gods in anger seek a mortal’s harm,First they deprive him of his sanity,And fashion of his mind a baser instrument,That he may have no knowledge when he errs. unknown

-
-

Who does not know the fate of Callistratus, +

Who does not know the fate of Callistratus,Callistratus, an orator whom Demosthenes much admired, was instrumental in building up the Second Athenian Confederacy. After a raid by Alexander of Pherae on the Piraeus he was condemned @@ -1057,20 +1017,20 @@ god at Delphi that if he returned to Athens he would have fair treatment by the laws, came back and taking refuge at the altar of the twelve gods was none the less put to - death by the state, and rightly so, for “fair treatment by the laws” is, in the case of + death by the state, and rightly so, for fair treatment by the laws is, in the case of wrongdoers, punishment. And thus the god too acted rightly in allowing those who had been wronged to punish the offender. For it would be an unseemly thing if revelations made to good men were the same as those vouchsafed to malefactors.

-
-

It is my belief, gentlemen, that the guidance of the gods +

+

It is my belief, gentlemen, that the guidance of the gods presides over all human affairs and more especially, as is to be expected, over our duty towards our parents, towards the dead and towards the gods themselves. For in our dealings with those to whom we owe our being, at whose hands we have enjoyed the greatest benefits, it is the utmost sacrilege that we should fail, not merely to do our duty, but even to dedicate our lives to their service.

-
+

Let me take an illustration. There is a story that in Sicily,—the tale, though half a legend, will, for the younger ones among you, be well worth the hearing,—a stream of fire burst forth from

-
+

Hindered no doubt by the additional weight of his burden, he too was overtaken. And now let us observe the mercy shown by God towards good men. For we are told that the fire spread round that spot in a ring and only those two men were saved, so that the place is still called the Place of the Pious, while those who had fled in haste, leaving their parents to their fate, were all consumed.

-
+

You too, therefore, following that divine example, should punish with one accord this man who spared no pains to show himself in all respects the greatest criminal, depriving the gods of their traditional cults, abandoning his parents to the enemy and denying the dead their dues.

-
-

Here is another story, gentlemen. Again I shall be +

+

Here is another story, gentlemen. Again I shall be speaking of our ancestors, since it is only right that you should hear of the deeds in which they took a pride and give them your approval. The tradition is that Eumolpus, the son of Poseidon and Chione, came with the Thracians to claim this country during the reign @@ -1111,14 +1071,14 @@ n="Apollod. 3.15.4">Apollod. 3.15.4).

-
+

As a large army was about to invade their country, he went to Delphi and asked the god by what means he could assure - a victory over the enemy. The god's answer to him was that if he sacrificed his daughter + a victory over the enemy. The god’s answer to him was that if he sacrificed his daughter before the two sides engaged he would defeat the enemy and, submitting to the god, he did this and drove the invaders from the country.

-
+

We have therefore good reason to thank Euripides, because, apart from his other merits as a poet, he chose this subject for a play,The Erechtheusof Euripides is now lost. Apart from the passage quoted by @@ -1129,61 +1089,86 @@ gentlemen of the jury, which, in the play, are spoken by the mother of the girl. You will find in them a greatness of spirit and a nobility worthy of Athens and a daughter of Cephisus. - Speech from EuripidesHe wins men's hearts - who with a ready handConfers his favors; he who in the doingDelays and - falters is less generous.But I consent to give my child to dieFor many - reasons: first there is no stateI count more worthy to accept my - giftThan Athens, peopled by no - alien race.For we are of this soil, while other towns,Formed as by - hazard in a game of draughts,Take their inhabitants from diverse - parts.He who adopts a city, having leftSome other town, resembles a - bad pegFixed into wood of better quality,A citizen in name but not in - fact.And secondly: it is that we may guardOur country and the altars - of the godsThat we get children for ourselves at all.This city, though - it bears a single name,Holds many people in it. Should I thenDestroy - all these, when it is in my powerTo give one girl to die on their - behalf?The mere ability to count, and tellThe greater from the less, - convinces meThat this, the ruin of one person's home,Is of less - consequence and brings less griefThan would result if the whole city - fell.If I had sons at home instead of girls,When hostile flames beset - the city's walls,Should I not send them forth into the fight,Though - fearing for them? May my children thenFight also, vie with men, and not - becomeMere shapes of vanity within the state.And yet, when mothers - send their sons to warWith tears, they often daunt them as they - leave.I hate the women who above all elsePrefer their sons to live and - put this thoughtBefore their honor, urging cowardice.But if they fall - in battle they obtainA common grave and glory which they shareWith - many others; whereas she, my child,By dying for this city will attainA - garland destined solely for herself.And she will save her mother and you - tooAnd both her sisters. Is it right to scornHonors like these? Except - in nature's wayThis girl whom I shall give for sacrificeTo save her - native land is not my own.And if the city falls, what further - chanceShall I have left me to enjoy my child?So far as rests with me, - all shall be saved.Let others rule in Athens; I will beHer savior, and without my wish no - manShall harm what most concerns our common good,The ancient laws our - fathers handed down.Eumolpus and his slavish Thracian trainShall set - no trident in our midst or deckIt round with garlands, where the olive - treeAnd Gorgon's golden head have been revered;Nor shall Athena meet - with utter scorn.Come, citizens, and use my travail's fruitTo save - yourselves and conquer, knowing wellThat I could never hesitate to - saveThis city for the sake of one poor life.My country, were the love - of all your sonsAs great as mine! You could not suffer ill,And we - possessing you would live secure. + He wins men’s hearts who with a ready hand +Confers his favors; he who in the doing +Delays and falters is less generous. +But I consent to give my child to die +For many reasons: first there is no state +I count more worthy to accept my gift +Than Athens, peopled by no alien race. +For we are of this soil, while other towns, +Formed as by hazard in a game of draughts, +Take their inhabitants from diverse parts. +He who adopts a city, having left +Some other town, resembles a bad peg +Fixed into wood of better quality, +A citizen in name but not in fact. +And secondly: it is that we may guard +Our country and the altars of the gods +That we get children for ourselves at all. +This city, though it bears a single name, +Holds many people in it. Should I then +Destroy all these, when it is in my power +To give one girl to die on their behalf? +The mere ability to count, and tell +The greater from the less, convinces me +That this, the ruin of one person’s home, +Is of less consequence and brings less grief +Than would result if the whole city fell. +If I had sons at home instead of girls, +When hostile flames beset the city’s walls, +Should I not send them forth into the fight, +Though fearing for them? May my children then +Fight also, vie with men, and not become +Mere shapes of vanity within the state. +And yet, when mothers send their sons to war +With tears, they often daunt them as they leave. +I hate the women who above all else +Prefer their sons to live and put this thought +Before their honor, urging cowardice. +But if they fall in battle they obtain +A common grave and glory which they share +With many others; whereas she, my child, +By dying for this city will attain +A garland destined solely for herself. +And she will save her mother and you too +And both her sisters. Is it right to scorn +Honors like these? Except in nature’s way +This girl whom I shall give for sacrifice +To save her native land is not my own. +And if the city falls, what further chance +Shall I have left me to enjoy my child? +So far as rests with me, all shall be saved. +Let others rule in Athens; I will be +Her savior, and without my wish no man +Shall harm what most concerns our common good, +The ancient laws our fathers handed down. +Eumolpus and his slavish Thracian train +Shall set no trident in our midst or deck +It round with garlands, where the olive tree +And Gorgon’s golden head have been revered; +Nor shall Athena meet with utter scorn. +Come, citizens, and use my travail’s fruit +To save yourselves and conquer, knowing well +That I could never hesitate to save +This city for the sake of one poor life. +My country, were the love of all your sons +As great as mine! You could not suffer ill, +And we possessing you would live secure. Euripides

-
-

On these verses, gentlemen, your fathers were brought up. +

+

On these verses, gentlemen, your fathers were brought up. All women are by nature fond of children, but this one Euripides portrayed as loving her country more than her offspring and made it clear that, if women bring themselves to act like this, men should show towards their country a devotion which cannot be surpassed, not forsake it and flee, as Leocrates did, nor disgrace it before the whole of Greece.

-
-

I want also to recommend Homer to you. In your fathers' +

+

I want also to recommend Homer to you. In your fathers’ eyes he was a poet of such worth that they passed a law that every four years at the Panathenaea he alone of all the poets should have his works recitedThe law that Homer should be recited at the festival of the Great @@ -1196,21 +1181,20 @@ festival.; and thus they showed the Greeks their admiration for the noblest deeds. They were right to do so. Laws are too brief to give instruction: they merely state the things that must be done; but poets, depicting life itself, select the noblest actions - and so through argument and demonstration convert men's hearts.

+ and so through argument and demonstration convert men’s hearts.

-
+

Thus Hector, while exhorting the Trojans to defend their country, speaks these words: - Fight on unresting by the ships; and if some meet their - fateBy wound of dart, or battling hand to hand, then let them die.To - fall in combat for your country's sake is no disgrace;For wife and child will - live unharmed, and home and plot last on,If once the Achaeans leave and sail - their ships to their own land. - Hom. Il. 15.494 - + + Fight on unresting by the ships; and if some meet their fate + By wound of dart, or battling hand to hand, then let them die. + To fall in combat for your country’s sake is no disgrace; + For wife and child will live unharmed, and home and plot last on, + If once the Achaeans leave and sail their ships to their own land. Hom. Il. 15.494

-
-

These are the lines, gentlemen, to which your forefathers +

+

These are the lines, gentlemen, to which your forefathers listened, and such are the deeds which they emulated. Thus they developed such courage that they were ready to die, not for their country alone, but for the whole of Greece as a land in whose heritage they shared. Certainly @@ -1221,7 +1205,7 @@ barbarians. Their pursuit of valor was no idle boast; they displayed it in action to the world.

-
+

Mark how the men who lived at Athens then excelled in public, and in private life; so greatly that when in days gone by the Spartans, so renowned for courage, were at war with the Messenians the god advised them to @@ -1231,7 +1215,7 @@ key="perseus,Sparta">Sparta, must we not conclude that nothing could surpass the valor of our ancestors?

-
+

Does any Greek not know that they took Tyrtaeus from our cityTyrtaeus, of whose date nothing certain is known, is generally thought to have lived at the time of the Second Messenian War (c. 640 @@ -1247,42 +1231,53 @@ elegiac poems by his own hand, and through listening to these they are trained to be brave.

-
+

Though they have no regard for other poets, they valued his works so highly that they passed a law which provides that their men, after taking the field, shall be summoned to - the king's tent to hear the verses of Tyrtaeus all together, holding that this of all + the king’s tent to hear the verses of Tyrtaeus all together, holding that this of all things would make them most ready to die for their country. It will be profitable for you to hear these elegiac verses too, that you may know what sort of conduct brought men fame among the Spartans.Alternative versions of these lines will be found in the Oxford Book of Greek Verse In Translation(no. 97) and in the Loeb Elegy and Iambus(vol. i., no. 258). - Nobly comes death to him who in the vanFighting - for fatherland has made his stand.Shame and despite attend the coward's - flight,Who, leaving native town and fruitful land,Wanders, a homeless - beggar, with his kin,True wife, old father, mother, tender - child.Unwelcome will he be where'er he goes,Bowed dawn with hardship - and by want defiled.Bringing his house dishonor, he beliesHis noble - mien, a prey to fear and shame.Thus roams the waif unpitied and - unloved,He and the line that after bears his name.Be stalwart then. - Think not of life or limb;Shielding our land and children let us - die.Youths, brave the fight together. Be not firstTo yield to craven - cowardice and fly.Make large your hearts within you. UndismayedEngage - in battle with grown men. Be bold;And standing fast forsake not those whose - feetNo longer keep their swiftness. Guard the old.For shame it is to - see an elder fall,Down in the forefront, smitten in the strife,Before - the youths, with grey beard, hair grown white,To breathe out in the dust his - valiant life,Clasping his bloody groin with clinging hands,(Fit sight - indeed to kindle wrath and shame!)His body bared. But those whom youth's - sweet flowerAdorns unfaded nothing can defame.Honor of men is theirs, - in life, and women's love;Fair are they too when in the van laid - low.Then clench your teeth and, with both feet astride,Firm planted on - the ground withstand the foe. + Nobly comes death to him who in the van +Fighting for fatherland has made his stand. +Shame and despite attend the coward’s flight, +Who, leaving native town and fruitful land, +Wanders, a homeless beggar, with his kin, +True wife, old father, mother, tender child. +Unwelcome will he be where’er he goes, +Bowed dawn with hardship and by want defiled. +Bringing his house dishonor, he belies +His noble mien, a prey to fear and shame. +Thus roams the waif unpitied and unloved, +He and the line that after bears his name. +Be stalwart then. Think not of life or limb; +Shielding our land and children let us die. +Youths, brave the fight together. Be not first +To yield to craven cowardice and fly. +Make large your hearts within you. Undismayed +Engage in battle with grown men. Be bold; +And standing fast forsake not those whose feet +No longer keep their swiftness. Guard the old. +For shame it is to see an elder fall, +Down in the forefront, smitten in the strife, +Before the youths, with grey beard, hair grown white, +To breathe out in the dust his valiant life, +Clasping his bloody groin with clinging hands, +(Fit sight indeed to kindle wrath and shame!) +His body bared. But those whom youth’s sweet flower +Adorns unfaded nothing can defame. +Honor of men is theirs, in life, and women’s love; +Fair are they too when in the van laid low. +Then clench your teeth and, with both feet astride, +Firm planted on the ground withstand the foe. Tyrtaeus

-
-

They are fine lines, gentlemen, and a lesson too for those +

+

They are fine lines, gentlemen, and a lesson too for those who wish to heed them. Such was the courage of the men who used to hear them that they disputed with our city for supremacy; no matter for surprise, since the most gallant feats had been performed by either people. Your ancestors defeated the barbarians who first set @@ -1291,15 +1286,15 @@ Thermopylae, and, though their fortune was less happy, in bravery they far surpassed all rivals.

-
+

And so over their graves a testimony to their courage can be seen, faithfully engraved for every Greek to read: to the Spartans: - Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,That + Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,That here obedient to their laws we lie. Simonides And to your ancestors: - Athenians, guarding Greece, subdued in fightAt Marathon the gilded Persians' + Athenians, guarding Greece, subdued in fightAt Marathon the gilded Persians’ might. Both epigrams are by Simonides of Ceos (c. 560-470 @@ -1307,20 +1302,20 @@ has been somewhat modified in the Oxford Book of Greek Verse in Translation(no. 212). Strabo, who quotes the original (Strab. 9.4.), agrees with the wording given by Lycurgus, except that for the - first three words he has: w)= ce/n' a)pa/ggeilon. + first three words he has: w)= ce/n’ a)pa/ggeilon. Herodotus (Hdt. 7.228) has a slightly different - version:w)= cei=n' + version:w)= cei=n’ a)gge/llein *lakedaimoni/ois, o(/ti th=|de kei/meqa toi=s kei/wn r(h/masi peiqo/menoi i. 42): - Dic, hospes, Spartae nos te hic vidisse + Dic, hospes, Spartae nos te hic vidisse iacentesdum sanctis patriae legibus obsequimur. Simonides

-
-

These are noble lines for us to remember, Athenians; they +

+

These are noble lines for us to remember, Athenians; they are a tribute to those whose deeds they record and an undying glory to the city. But Leocrates has not acted thus. Deliberately he sullied that honor which the city has accumulated from the earliest times. Therefore if you kill him all Greeks will believe @@ -1330,14 +1325,14 @@ old virtues had a place of honor, in your eyes shamelessness, treachery and cowardice are held in most esteem.

-
-

If I am unable to show you what your attitude towards such +

+

If I am unable to show you what your attitude towards such men should be, remember your ancestors and the methods of punishment which they employed against them. Capable as they were of the noblest actions, they were no less ready to punish what was base. Think of them, gentlemen; think how enraged they were with traitors and how they looked on them as common enemies of the city.

-
+

You remember when PhrynichusPhrynichus, commander of the Athenian fleet at Samos, took part in the Revolution of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C. According to @@ -1352,7 +1347,7 @@ held an inquiry after torture. On investigation they found that Phrynichus had been trying to betray the city and that his murderers had been unjustly imprisoned.

-
+

They decreed publicly, on the motion of Critias, that the dead man should be tried for treason, and that if it were found that this was a tratior who had been buried in the country, his bones should be dug up and removed from

-
+

They decreed also that if any persons defended the dead man and he were found guilty, they should be liable to the same punishment as he. Thus, in their view, it was wrong even to assist men who had deserted others; and to try to save the traitor would be to betray the city no less than he. In this way then, by hating wrongdoers and by passing such measures against them, they brought themselves safely out of dangers. Produce the decree - for them, clerk, and read it.Decree + for them, clerk, and read it.

-
-

You hear this decree, gentlemen. After it was passed your - ancestors dug up the traitor's bones and cast them out of +

+

You hear this decree, gentlemen. After it was passed your + ancestors dug up the traitor’s bones and cast them out of Attica; they killed his defenders, Aristarchus and Alexicles, and even refused them burial in the country. Will you then, who have the very person who has betrayed the city alive and at the mercy of your vote, let him go unpunished?

-
+

Your ancestors inflicted the extreme penalty on men who simply lent the traitor verbal help. Will you fall so short of their example as to let go as innocent the man who abandoned the state in deed as well as word? Do not do it, gentlemen of the jury. Do not @@ -1388,7 +1384,7 @@ to all alike it is surely plain that our ancestors were by nature bound to make war an all such crimes.

-
+

When Hipparchus, the son of Charmus,Lycurgus appears to be the sole authority for this story. Hipparchus, a relation of the Pisistratids, was the first Athenian to be ostracized (cf. Aristot. Const. @@ -1399,39 +1395,39 @@ decreed that the names of sinners and traitors should be inscribed. Hipparchus himself has his name recorded on this pillar and all other traitors too.

-
+

Clerk, please take the decree which authorized the statue of Hipparchus to be taken down from the Acropolis and then the inscription at the base of the pillar with the names of - the traitors later engraved upon it and read them out.Decree and Text of Inscription - on the Pillar + the traitors later engraved upon it and read them out.

-
-

What is your impression of them, gentlemen? Had they the +

+

+

What is your impression of them, gentlemen? Had they the same attitude as yourselves towards wrongdoers? Or did they, by obliterating the memorial of the traitor, since they could not command his person, punish him with all the means at their disposal? The simple fact of melting down the bronze statue was not enough for them; they wished to leave to their successors a lasting memorial of their attitude to traitors.

-
-

Let the jury hear the other decree, clerk, relating to the +

+

Let the jury hear the other decree, clerk, relating to the men who withdrew to DeceleaDecelea, a town in the North of Attica, was occupied by the Peloponnesians in 413 B.C. and therefore served as a haven for deserters from Athens. Lycurgus seems to be the only writer who mentions this decree. when the people were besieged by the Spartans, so that they will realize that the punishments inflicted by our ancestors on traitors were - uniform and self-consistent. Read it.Decree + uniform and self-consistent. Read it.

-
-

You hear this decree too, gentlemen. It says that they +

+

+

You hear this decree too, gentlemen. It says that they condemned any who moved to Decelea in war-time and laid it down that those who were caught returning should be led by any Athenian who cared to do so to the Thesmothetae who should take them into custody and hand them over to the executioner.Literally: “the man in charge of the pit.” to\ + resp="Loeb">Literally: the man in charge of the pit. to\ o)/rugma is the same as to\ ba/raqron, the cleft into which criminals at Athens were thrown. If they dealt thus with men who merely changed their place in @@ -1440,8 +1436,8 @@ >Rhodes and deserted the state? Will you not kill him? If you do not, how can you pass as the descendants of those men?

-
-

You ought also to hear the decree relating to the man +

+

You ought also to hear the decree relating to the man executed in Salamis.Lycurgus is probably alluding to the stoning of Lycidas (see note on Lyc. 1.71), which Herodotus (Hdt. 9.5) @@ -1451,11 +1447,12 @@ had only attempted to speak treason against the city, the Council, after removing their crowns, killed him with their own hands. It is an admirable decree, gentlemen, and well worthy of your ancestors. Their nobility, revealed in their characters, was shown too in - their punishment of criminals.Decree + their punishment of criminals.

-
-

What is your view, gentlemen? Do you think that if you +

+

+

What is your view, gentlemen? Do you think that if you wish to emulate your forefathers, it is in keeping to allow Leacrates to live? When they dispatched like that one who merely betrayed with his lips a city already desolate, how ought you, whose city prospered at the time, to treat the man who did in very fact desert @@ -1463,13 +1460,13 @@ tried to rob them of the security which the people offered,i.e. those who deserted to Decelea. The sense seems to demand an object for a)posterei=n. Hence the proposals by Reiske and - Blass to supply one. how ought you to treat a traitor to the people's own safety? + Blass to supply one. how ought you to treat a traitor to the people’s own safety? And if they, from considerations of honor only, took vengeance on criminals in this way, how should you react when your country is at stake?

-
-

These instances suffice to show you the attitude of our - ancestors towards those who broke the city's laws. Nevertheless I want also to remind you +

+

These instances suffice to show you the attitude of our + ancestors towards those who broke the city’s laws. Nevertheless I want also to remind you of the pillar in the Council Chamber which commemorates traitors and enemies of democracy. For if my point is backed by frequent illustrations, I am rendering your verdict easy. After the rule of the Thirty, your fathers, who had suffered from citizens what no other @@ -1477,7 +1474,7 @@ barred all the paths to crime, having learnt by experience the principles and methods followed by men who wished to overthrow democracy.

-
+

For they established it by decree and oath that anyone who found a person aspiring to tyranny or attempting to betray the city or overthrow the democracy should be guiltless if he killed him.The decree of Demophantus is mentioned @@ -1487,12 +1484,12 @@ n="Andoc. 1.96">Andoc. 1.96 sq.). They thought it better that imagined culprits should perish than that they themselves should have a real experience of slavery, holding that citizens must simply live in such a manner as to avoid the very suspicion of - any of these crimes. Please take the decree.Decree + any of these crimes. Please take the decree.

-
-

These words, gentlemen, they inscribed on the pillar, +

+

+

These words, gentlemen, they inscribed on the pillar, erecting it in the Council Chamber as a reminder to those who daily met in council over affairs of state what their attitude to men like this should be, and hence they swore a common oath to kill them if they saw them even contemplating such conduct. Naturally @@ -1502,19 +1499,19 @@ country, you cannot afterwards bring them to justice for their crimes, since by then they are too powerful to be punished by those whom they have wronged.

-
-

Let this foresight, gentlemen, and these actions be the +

+

Let this foresight, gentlemen, and these actions be the inspiration to you that they should. Remember, when you vote, the temper of your forbears, and urge each other to bring in today, before you leave the court, a verdict modelled to their pattern. You have memorials, you have examples of the punishments they meted out, embodied in the decrees concerning criminals. You have sworn in the decree of Demophantus to kill the man who betrays his country, whether by word or deed, hand or vote. I say - “you”; for you must not think that, as heirs to the riches bequeathed by your ancestors, + you; for you must not think that, as heirs to the riches bequeathed by your ancestors, you can yet renounce your share in their oaths or in the pledge your fathers gave as a security to the gods, thereby enjoying the prosperity of their city.

-
-

Your city was not alone in dealing thus with traitors. The +

+

Your city was not alone in dealing thus with traitors. The Spartans were the same. Please do not think me tedious, gentlemen, if I allude often to these men. We shall be well advised to take examples of just conduct from a city which has good laws, and so be surer that each of you will give a just verdict in keeping with his @@ -1523,7 +1520,7 @@ of the Brazen House, but they walled up the door, took off the roof and mounted guard in a circle round it, remaining at their posts until they had starved him to death

-
+

and made his punishment a proof to all that even divine assistance is not vouchsafed to traitors.Pausanias was, in actual fact, regent for Pleistarchus, not king (Hdt. 9.10). Though he led the Greeks @@ -1538,13 +1535,13 @@ expressly stated that they should be put to death. Thus the punishment which they laid down was the very fate which traitors most fear; survival after war was to be subject to a scrutiny which might involve disgrace and death. Let me convince you that what I have said - can be proved and that my examples are genuine. Produce the law for them.The Law of the Spartans + can be proved and that my examples are genuine. Produce the law for them.

-
-

See what an admirable law this is, gentlemen, and how - expedient it would be for other peoples too besides the Spartans. The fear of one's own +

+

+

See what an admirable law this is, gentlemen, and how + expedient it would be for other peoples too besides the Spartans. The fear of one’s own community is a strong thing and will compel men to face danger against an enemy; no one will forsake his country in times of peril when he sees that a traitor is punished with death. No one will turn coward when his city needs him, if he knows that the punishment in @@ -1553,32 +1550,32 @@ to meet the enemy far rather than stand out against the law and their fellow citizens.

-
-

Leocrates is much more deserving of death than deserters +

+

Leocrates is much more deserving of death than deserters from the army. They return to the city ready to defend it or to meet disaster in company with their fellow citizens, while he fled from his country and provided for his own safety, not daring to protect his hearth and home. He alone of men has betrayed even the natural ties of kinship and blood which the unthinking beasts themselves hold dearest and most sacred.

-
+

Birds at least, which by nature are best fitted for a swift escape, can be seen accepting death in defence of their brood. Hence the words of the old poets: - Nor does the wild fowl let another's broodBe laid + Nor does the wild fowl let another’s broodBe laid within the nest that she has built. unknown But the cowardice of Leocrates has so passed all bounds that he left his country to the enemy.

-
+

That is why no city let him reside within it as an alien. He was naturally expelled more quickly than a murderer. Exiles for murder who move into another city do not meet with enmity among their hosts; but what city could admit Leocrates? One who refused to help his - own country would indeed be likely to face danger for another's! Such men are bad, whether + own country would indeed be likely to face danger for another’s! Such men are bad, whether as citizens, guests, or personal friends; for they will enjoy the advantages offered by the state but will not consent to assist it too, in times of difficulty.

-
+

Consider: he is hated and expelled by those without a reason to resent him; what treatment should he get from you who have had the utmost provocation? Should it not be the extreme penalty? Indeed, gentlemen, if there were any punishment worse than death, @@ -1587,8 +1584,8 @@ committed. The defendant, alone of all men, by deserting the city, has, at the time of his trial, accomplished what he undertook to do.

-
-

I am amazed at the advocates who are going to defend him. +

+

I am amazed at the advocates who are going to defend him. Whatever justification, I wonder, will they find for his acquittal? Will it be his friendship with themselves? In my own view they are not entitled to indulgence but deserve to die for daring to be intimate with him. Though their attitude was not obvious, before @@ -1597,31 +1594,31 @@ far rather be required to plead their own defence than be allowed to win your pardon for him.

-
-

I believe myself that if the dead really do have any +

+

I believe myself that if the dead really do have any knowledge of earthly affairs, his own father, now no more, would be a sterner judge than any other; since he it was whose bronze statue Leocrates left behind him in the temple of Zeus the Savior, abandoned to the enemy for them to steal or mutilate. He turned that statue, which his father erected as a memorial of his own uprightness, into an object of reproach, since it commemorates a man now famed as father of a son like this.

-
+

It is with this in mind, gentlemen, that many have approached me and asked why I did not - include in the indictment the charge that he had betrayed his father's statue, dedicated + include in the indictment the charge that he had betrayed his father’s statue, dedicated in the temple of Zeus the Savior. Gentlemen, I fully realized that this offence called for the most severe punishment, but I did not think it right, when prosecuting the defendant for treason, to add the name of Zeus the Savior to the bill of indictment.

-
-

What astounds me most of all is, that though you are +

+

What astounds me most of all is, that though you are dealing with men who have no ties of blood or friendship with him but who always champion defendants for a fee, you do not realize that they deserve to feel your anger in its fullest violence. If they and their kind defend the criminals it is proof that they would associate themselves with the actual crimes. It is to defend you, in the interests of democracy and law, not to oppose you, that a speaker should have acquired his skill.

-
-

Some of them indeed are no longer using arguments to try +

+

Some of them indeed are no longer using arguments to try to deceive you; they will even cite their own public services in favor of the defendants. These I particularly resent. For having performed the services for the advancement of their own families, they are now asking you for public token of thanks. @@ -1637,17 +1634,17 @@ trierarch, or built walls to protect his city, or subscribed generously from his own property for the public safety. These are services to the state:

-
+

they affect the welfare of you all and prove the loyalty of the donors, while the others are evidence of nothing but the wealth of those who have spent the money. I do not believe that anyone has done the city so great a service that he can claim the acquittal of traitors as a special privilege for himself; nor do I believe that anyone, with ambitions - for the city's honor, is so unthinking as to help Leocrates, by whom he, first and + for the city’s honor, is so unthinking as to help Leocrates, by whom he, first and foremost, had those ambitions frustrated; unless indeed such people have interests other - than their country's.

+ than their country’s.

-
-

Though it may not be customary at any other time for +

+

Though it may not be customary at any other time for members of the jury to set their wives and children beside them in the court, at least in a trial for treason this practice ought to have been sanctioned, so as to bring into full view all those who shared in the danger, as a reminder that they had not been thought @@ -1657,7 +1654,7 @@ Leocrates by putting him to death, and so report to your own wives and children that when you had their betrayer in your power you took vengeance upon him.

-
+

It is an outrageous scandal for Leocrates to think that he, the runaway, should take his place in the city of those who stood their ground, the deserter among men who fought in battle, the one who left his post among those who saved their country; it is outrageous @@ -1669,7 +1666,7 @@ presuming to exhibit himself, in the way he does, before the eyes of those who mourn their loss.

-
+

He will shortly beg you to hear him plead his defence according to the laws. Ask him what laws. The ones he deserted in his flight. He will beg you to let him live within the walls of his native city. Which walls? Those which he, alone of Athenians, did not help to @@ -1679,7 +1676,7 @@ which he had not the courage to make? Let him make his plea to the Rhodians, since he thought their city safer than his own country.

-
+

Would any men, no matter what their age, be justified in pitying him? Take the older generation. He did his best to deny them so much as a safe old age or even a grave in the free soil of their native land. What of the younger men? Would any of them, remembering @@ -1688,20 +1685,21 @@ graves they lie in? Would they, in the same vote, denounce as mad those who died for freedom and let Leocrates who deserted his country go unpunished as a sane man?

-
+

By such means you will grant to all who wish it the power to injure the state and - yourselves whether by word or deed. This is no simple matter of an exile's coming back; + yourselves whether by word or deed. This is no simple matter of an exile’s coming back; the deserter of his city, who condemned himself to banishment and lived for more than five or six years in Megara with a sponsor, is now at large in Attica and in the city. It means that one who openly gave his vote for abandoning Attica to be a sheep-walk is in this country resident among you.

-
-

Before I leave the platform I want to add a few remarks +

+

Before I leave the platform I want to add a few remarks and to read you the decree relating to piety which the people drew up. It has a message - for you who are on the point of giving your verdict. Please read it.DecreeMy part consists in + for you who are on the point of giving your verdict. Please read it.

+

+

My part consists in exposing one who is doing away with all these principles, to you who are empowered to chastise him it remains for you, as a service to yourselves and Heaven, to take vengeance on Leocrates. For while crimes remain untried the guilt rests with those who committed @@ -1709,7 +1707,7 @@ not forget, gentlemen, that each of you now, though giving his vote in secret, will openly proclaim his attitude to the gods.

-
+

I believe, gentlemen, that all the greatest and most atrocious crimes are today included within the scope of your single verdict; for Leocrates can be shown to have committed them all. He is guilty of treason, since he left the city and surrendered it to the enemy; @@ -1720,15 +1718,15 @@ desertion and refusal to serve, since he did not submit his person to the leaders for enrollment.

-
+

Shall this man then find someone to acquit him or pardon his deliberate misdeeds? Who is so senseless as to choose to save Leocrates at the cost of leaving his own security at the mercy of men who wish to be deserters, to choose to pity him at the cost of being killed himself without pity by his enemies, or to grant a favor to the betrayer of his country and so expose himself to the vengeance of the gods?

-
-

My task has been to assist my country, its temples and its +

+

My task has been to assist my country, its temples and its laws. I have conducted the trial rightly and justly without slandering the private life of the defendant or digressing from the subject of my indictment. It is now for each of you to reflect that the absolver of Leocrates condemns his country to death and slavery, that @@ -1736,7 +1734,7 @@ the votes cast into one are given for the destruction of your country and the rest for safety and prosperity in Athens.

-
+

If you acquit Leocrates, you will vote for the betrayal of the city, of its temples and its fleet. But if you kill him, you will be encouraging others to preserve your country with its revenues and its prosperity. Imagine then, Athenians, that the country and its @@ -1744,7 +1742,7 @@ you for protection, yes, and the temples and sanctuaries too. Bear in mind the charges brought and make of Leocrates a proof that with you tears and compassion have not more weight than the salvation of the laws and people.

-
+
diff --git a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml index 6207af70f..ccc02a391 100644 --- a/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ William Heinemann, Ltd. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press - 1954 - 1962 + 1954 + 1962 2 diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/__cts__.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/__cts__.xml index d7e61b715..f95fb16ca 100644 --- a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/__cts__.xml +++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/__cts__.xml @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ Ῥητορική - Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959. + Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing). + + + The "Art" of Rhetoric + Aristotle. The "Art" of Rhetoric. Freese, John Henry, translator. London: William Heinemann, Ltd.; Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1926 (printing). + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.tracking.json b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.tracking.json deleted file mode 100644 index bdf708601..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.tracking.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ -{ - "epidoc_compliant": false, - "fully_unicode": true, - "git_repo": "canonical-greekLit", - "has_cts_metadata": false, - "has_cts_refsDecl": false, - "id": "1999.01.0060", - "last_editor": "", - "note": "", - "src": "texts/Classics/Aristotle/opensource/aristot.rh_eng.xml", - "status": "migrated", - "target": "canonical-greekLit/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml", - "valid_xml": false -} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml deleted file mode 100644 index 1e0746d86..000000000 --- a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng1.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7535 +0,0 @@ - - - -%PersProse; -]> - - - - - Rhetoric - Aristotle - J. H. Freese - - Perseus Project, Tufts University - Gregory Crane - - Prepared under the supervision of - Lisa Cerrato - William Merrill - Elli Mylonas - David Smith - - The Annenberg CPB/Project - - - Trustees of Tufts University - Medford, MA - Perseus Project - - - - - Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. - Aristotle - - Cambridge and London - Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. - 1926 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - English - Greek - Latin - German - French - Italian - transliterated Greek - - - - - - Spring, 1992 - - staff - scanning - - Text was scanned at St. Olaf - - - Spring 1993 - - JN - markup - - Tagged in conformance with Prose.e dtd. - - - 7/27, 1993 - - em - markup - - Put Bekker line 1 milestone tags at the beginning of each section so that the - incoming list creator would work. Changed RREFDECL. - - - 27-Apr-04 - - AEM - markup - - convert to TEI P4 - - - 5/27/09 - - RS - (n/a) - - - $Log: aristot.rh_eng.xml,v $ - Revision 1.4 2011-11-18 20:57:56 lcerrato - fixed bad bibl refs - - Revision 1.3 2010-06-29 21:31:20 student - fixing place tags - AD - - Revision 1.2 2010/06/16 19:18:47 rsingh04 - cleaned up bad place tags in a few texts and cleaned up the document format - - Revision 1.1 2009/10/09 19:49:17 rsingh04 - more reorganizing of texts module by collection - - Revision 1.1 2009/10/08 19:12:40 rsingh04 - began reorganizing texts module by collection. created separate work directory in texts module to keep hopper files separate from in progress files - - Revision 1.13 2009/08/19 15:57:59 lcerrato - fixing Athenaeus refs - - Revision 1.12 2009/06/19 19:02:19 lcerrato - fixed bad bibls - - Revision 1.11 2009/06/09 19:02:16 student - fixed bibl errors - zr - - Revision 1.10 2009/05/27 15:55:13 rsingh04 - added cvs log keyword - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Rhetoric is a - counterpartNot an exact copy, but making - a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the - strophe in a choral ode. of Dialectic; for both have to do with - matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not - confinedOr “and they - (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not - confined.” to any special science. Hence all men in a manner - have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point, endeavor to criticize or - uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a - familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is - clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine the - reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance; and such - an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art.The special characteristic of an art is the - discovery of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack ( - e)mpeiri/a).

-

Now, previous compilers of - “Arts”Manuals or - handbooks treating of the rules of any art or science. of Rhetoric - have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only - things in it that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an - accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of - proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; - for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, - anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is - directed only to the dicast.His functions - were a combination of those of the modern judge and juryman. The - result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some - States,especially those that are well administered, - there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men either think that all the laws ought so to - prescribe,That is, forbid speaking of - matters that have nothing to do with the case. or in fact carry out - the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of - Areopagus, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the dicast's - feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy or compassion, which would be like - making the rule crooked which one intended to use. Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to - prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not; - whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which - the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to - decide; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him.

-

First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, - properly enacted, should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as - possible, and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges; in - the first place, because it is easier to find one or a few men of good sense, - capable of framing laws - and pronouncing judgements, than a large number; secondly, legislation is the - result of long consideration, whereas judgements are delivered on the spur of - the moment, so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide questions - of justice or expediency. But what is most important of all is that the - judgement of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is - universal and applies to the future, whereas the member of the public assembly - and the dicast have to decide present and definite issues, and in their case - love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, so that they are no longer - capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgement being obscured by - their own pleasure or pain.

-

All other cases, as we have just said, should be - left to the authority of the judge as seldom as possible, except where it is a - question of a thing having happened or not, of its going to happen or not, of - being or not being so; this must be left to the discretion of the judges, for it - is impossible for the legislator to foresee such questions. If this is so, it is obvious that all those who - definitely lay down, for instance, what should be the contents of the exordium - or the narrative, or of the other parts of the discourse, are bringing under the - rules of art what is outside the subject; for the only thing to which their - attention is devotedis how to put the judge into a - certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs,Systematic logical proofs (enthymeme, - for example), including testimony as to character and appeals to - the emotions (2.3), which the rhetorician has to invent - ( eu(rei=n, inventio) for use in particular cases. They are - contrasted with “inartificial” proofs, which have - nothing to do with the rules of the art, but are already in existence, and - only need to be made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. 4-14, the - latter in ch. 15 of this book. which make a man a master of - rhetorical argument.

-

Hence, although the method of deliberative and - forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the pursuit of the former is nobler - and more worthy of a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited to - transactions between private citizens, they say nothing about the former, but - without exception endeavor to bring forensic speaking under the rules of art. - The reason of this is that in public speaking it is less worth while to talk of - what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to - trickery less than forensic, because it is of more general interest.koino/teron: - or, “more intelligible to the ordinary man.” For - in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing - necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a - measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient; there it is useful to win - over the hearers, for the decision concerns other interests than those of the - judges, who, having only themselves to consider and listening merely for their - own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision.The case as a rule being a matter of personal - indifference, the judges are likely to be led away by the arguments which - seem most plausible. - That is why, as I have said - before, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law - courts, whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions - against this.

-

It is obvious, therefore, that a system - arranged according to the rules of art is only concerned with proofs; that proof - is a sort of demonstration,Exact scientific - proof ( a)po/deicis), - which probable proof ( pi/stis) only to a certain extent resembles. - since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been - demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally - speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs and lastly, that the enthymeme - is a kind of syllogism. Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or - of one of its parts,Dialectic here apparently - includes logic generally, the “part” being either the - Analytica Priori, which deals with the syllogism, or the - Sophistici Elenchi, on Fallacies. to consider - every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most - capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest - degree a master of rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge of the - subjects with which enthymemes deal and the differences between them and logical - syllogisms. For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it come under the - purview of the same faculty, and at the same time men have a sufficient natural - capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it; wherefore one who - divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard - to probabilities.e)/ndoca, “resting on opinion”; defined - in the Topics (1.1) as “things - generally admitted by all, or by most men, or by the wise, and by all or - most of these, or by the most notable and esteemed.”

-

It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what - is outside the subject,anddio/ti either = o(/ti, “that”; or, - (it is clear) “why.” have - rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are - naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly - made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible. - Further, in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate - scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the - employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with - instruction,Almost equivalent to - demonstration or strictly logical proof. but in the case of such - persons instruction is impossible; our proofs and arguments must rest on - generally accepted principles, as we said in the Topics,1.2. The Topics is a treatise in - eight books on Dialectic and drawing conclusions from probabilities. - when speaking of converse with the multitude. Further, the orator should be able - to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; not that we should do both - (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong), - but that the real state of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may - be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them. - Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are - equally concerned with them. However, it is not the same with the subject - matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally - always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. Besides, it would be absurd - if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the help - of the body, but not - disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of - man than that of the body. If it is argued - that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal - of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and - above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, - wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, - so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.

-

It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal - with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of - general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its - function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing - means of persuasion.The early sophistical - definition was “the art of persuasion.” The same - holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the - function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this - end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be - properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover - the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to - discover the real and apparent syllogism. For what makes the sophist is not the - faculty but the moral purpose. But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who - acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with - moral purpose,are both called rhetoricians; but in - Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being - one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty.The essence of sophistry consists in the moral - purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the - dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; - when he does so deliberately, he is called a sophist. In Rhetoric, this - distinction does not exist; he who uses sound arguments as well as he who - uses false ones are both known as rhetoricians.

-

Let us now endeavor to treat of the method itself, to see how and by what means - we shall be able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were start again, - and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass on to the remainder of the subject.

-

Rhetoric then - may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in - reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other of the arts, - each of which is able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject; thus, - medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of - magnitudes, arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the other arts and - sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of - persuasion in reference to any given subject. That is why we say that as an art - its rules are not applied to any particular definite class of things.

-

As for proofs, some are artificial, others - inartificial. By the latter I understand all those which have not been furnished - by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, - contracts, and the like; by the former, all that can be constructed by system - and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the latter, whereas we - must invent the former.

-

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of - three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the - second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the - speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.

-

The orator persuades by moral character when his - speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for - we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in - regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is - room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to - the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character; for - it is not the case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down in their - “Art,” that the worth of the orator in no way contributes to - his powers of persuasion; on the contrary, moral character, so to say, - constitutes the most effective means of proof. The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion - by his speech; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are - influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone that, as we - have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavor to devote their - attention. (We will discuss these matters in detail when we come to - speak of the emotions.) Lastly, - persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the trueor apparently true from the means of persuasion - applicable to each individual subject.

-

Now, since proofs are effected by these means, - it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical - reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the - emotions—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner - in which it is produced. Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot - of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called - Politics.Rhetoric, as dealing with human - actions, characters, virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with - Politics, which includes Ethics. The two latter treat of the same subject - from a different point of view. Both deal with happiness and virtue, but the - object of Politics is, by comparison of the different forms of States to - find the one in which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an - important factor in the training and education of the individual citizen and - of the members of the State as a whole, may be described as an offshoot of - Politics, with which the sophistical rhetoricians identified - it. That is why Rhetoric assumesOr, “slips into the garb of” (Jebb). - Probably a stage metaphor. the character of Politics, and those who - claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly - from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset, - Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them - is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are - merely faculties of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly enough about - the faculties of these arts and their mutual relations.

-

But for purposes of demonstration, real or - apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or - apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and - the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. - Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example - rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs - either examples or enthymemes and nothing else; so that if, generally speaking, - it is necessary to prove any fact whatever either by syllogism or by - induction—and that this is so is clear from the - AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23; Aristot. Post. Anal. - 1.1.—each of the two former must be identical with each - of the two latter.That is, enthymeme and - example must be the same as syllogism and induction. - The difference between example and enthymeme is - evident from the Topics,From - the definitions of syllogism (1.1) and induction - (1.12). No particular passage, however, explains the - difference here mentioned. where, in discussing syllogism and - induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of - particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in - Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different - results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either - universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a - syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme.

-

It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these - advantagesThe employment of syllogism and - induction, to\ ei)=dos th=s r(htorikh=s - being taken as simply = h( r(htorikh/. - Another rendering is: “that each kind of Rhetoric (that - which depends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special - advantage.”for what has - been said in the MethodicaA - lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his Life of - Aristotle, 24, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first letter to Ammaeus, 6. It is - supposed to have dealt with some branch of Logic. holds good also in - this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by - examples and sometimes by enthymemes, and orators themselves may be similarly - distinguished by their fondness for one or the other. Now arguments that depend - on examples are not less calculated to persuade, but those which depend upon - enthymemes meet with greater approval. Their - origin and the way in which each should be used will be discussed later2.20-24.; for the moment let us define - more clearly these proofs themselves.

-

Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one, and is - persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it - appears to be proved by propositions that are convincingOr, “by persons which are so” - (Jebb).; further, no art has the particular in - view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of - persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, - whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true - science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems - probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or - that class of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw - conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some - fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned - discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of - deliberation.

-

The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with - things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules; and - in the presence of such hearers as are unable to take a general view of many - stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument. But we only deliberate about - things which seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those things which - cannot in the past, present, or future be otherwise, no one deliberates about - them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be gained by it. - Now, it is possible to draw conclusions - and inferences partly from what has been previously demonstrated - syllogistically, partly from what has not, which however needs demonstration, - because it is not probable.Certain - propositions, which seem paradoxical and improbable to a popular audience, - must be proved before it is able to understand them. The first of - these methods is necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for the - judge is supposed to be a simple person; the second will obtain little credence, - because it does not depend upon what is either admitted or probable. The - necessary result then is that the enthymeme and the example are concerned with - things which may, generally speaking, be other than they are, the example being - a kind of induction and the enthymeme a kind of syllogism, and deduced from few - premises, often from fewer than the regularprw=tos: the primary, typical syllogism - of the first figure. syllogism; for if any one of these is well - known, there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself. For - instance, to prove that DorieusSon of - Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his - father celebrated for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He - played a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support of the - Spartans (412-407 - B.C.) whom he afterwards offended, and by whom he is said to have - been put to death. was the victor in a contest at which the prize was - a crown,it is enough to say that he won a victory at the - Olympic games; there is no need to add that the prize at the Olympic games is a - crown, for everybody knows it.

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But since few of the propositions of the - rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and - examine can be other than they are, human actions, which are the subject of our - deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally - speaking, none of them necessary; since, further, facts which only generally - happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the - same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this - is so is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. APr. 1.8.13.), it is evident that the materials - from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most - part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it - follows that these two elements must correspond to these two kinds of - propositions, each to each.That is, - probabilities and signs correspond to general and necessary propositions. - This is not strictly correct; only the tekmh/ria correspond to the necessary propositions, the other - signs and the other probabilities to the general or contingent propositions. - For that which is probable is that which - generally happens, not however unreservedly, as some define it, but that which - is concerned with things that may be other than they are, being so related to - that in regard to which it is probable as the universal to the particular. As to signs, some are related as the particular to - the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are - called tekmeria; those which are not necessary have - no distinguishing name. I call those necessary - signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign - is called tekmērion; for when people think - that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward - a tekmērion, something as it were proved - and concluded; for in the old language tekmar and - peras have the same meaning (limit, - conclusion).

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Among signs, some are related as the particular - to the universal; for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, - because Socrates was both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though the - particular statement is true, it can be refuted, because it cannot be reduced to - syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill, - because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk, - this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a - tekmērion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is - the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the - particular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has - a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true,this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for a man to - breathe hard without having a fever. We have now explained the meaning of - probable, sign, and necessary sign, and the difference between them; in the - AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.27. we - have defined them more clearly and stated why some of them can be converted into - logical syllogisms, while others cannot.

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We have said that example is a kind of - induction and with what kind of material it deals by way of induction. It is - neither the relation of part to whole, nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to - another whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both come under the - same genus, but one of them is better known than the other. For example, to - prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, - one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained - what they asked for made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may - serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, however, for asking for a - bodyguard we do not yet know. All these examples are contained under the same - universal proposition, that one who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard. -

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We have now stated the materials of proofs which are thought to be demonstrative. - But a very great difference between - enthymemes has escaped the notice of nearly every one, although it also exists - in the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of them belong to Rhetoric, - some syllogisms only to Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, some - already existing and others not yet established. Hence it is that this escapes - the notice of the speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject, the more - they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and Dialectic. But this will be clearer - if stated at greater length.

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I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms - those which are concerned with what we call “topics,” which - may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics, and many other sciences that - differ in kind, such as the topic of the more or less, which will furnish - syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law, Physics, or any other science - whatever, although these subjects differ in kind. Specific topics on the other - hand are derived from propositions which are peculiar to each species or genus - of things; there are, for example, propositions about Physics which can furnish - neither enthymemes nor syllogisms about Ethics,and there - are propositions concerned with Ethics which will be useless for furnishing - conclusions about Physics; and the same holds good in all cases. The first kind - of topics will not make a man practically wise about any particular class of - things, because they do not deal with any particular subject matter; but as to - the specific topics, the happier a man is in his choice of propositions, the - more he will unconsciously produce a science quite different from Dialectic and - Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon first principles, it will no longer be - Dialectic or Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has arrived at.The common topics do not deal with particular - subject matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter, the - “better” (that is, in regard to a special - science) the propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without - knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and become a professor - of that special science whose first principles he has hit upon. - Most enthymemes are constructed from these - specific topics, which are called particular and special, fewer from those that - are common or universal. As then we have done in the TopicsAristot. Sophist. Elenchi (Fallacies) 9. This - treatise is really the ninth and concluding part of the - Topics., so here we must distinguish the specific and - universal topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed. By specific topics I - mean the propositions peculiar to each class of things, by universal those - common to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific topics, but before - doing so let us ascertain the different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having - determined their number, we may separately ascertain their elements and - propositions.Propositions (or - premises), the name given to the two first statements in a - syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn: All men are mortal - (major premise); Socrates is a man (minor - premise); therefore Socrates is mortal.

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The kinds of - Rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For - every speech is composed of three parts: the speaker, the subject of which he treats, and the person to - whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom the end or object of the speech - refers. Now the hearer must necessarily be - either a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of - things to come.All three kinds of hearers are - regarded as judges (the mere spectator as a - “critic”), although strictly krith/s should be limited to the law - courts. For instance, a member of the general assembly is a judge of - things to come; the dicast, of things past; the mere spectator, of the ability - of the speaker. Therefore there are necessarily - three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

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The deliberative kind is either hortatory or dissuasive; for both those who give - advice in private and those who speak in the assembly invariably either exhort - or dissuade. The forensic kind is either accusatory or defensive; for litigants - must necessarily either accuse or defend. The epideictic kind has for its - subject praise or blame.

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Further, to each of these a special time is - appropriate: to the deliberative the future,In 1.6.I and 8.7 the present is also mentioned as a time appropriate to - deliberative Rhetoric. for the speaker, whether he exhorts or - dissuades, always advises about things to come; to the forensic the past, for it - is always in reference to things done that one party accuses and the other - defends; to the epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is the - existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view. It - is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other - times, of the pastby way of recalling it, or of the - future by way of anticipating it.

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Each of the three kinds has a different special - end, and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there are three special ends. - The end of the deliberative speaker Is the expedient or harmful; for he who - exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises - against it as worse; all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, - honor and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this. The end of - the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust; in this case also all other - considerations are included as accessory. The end of those who praise or blame - is the honorable and disgraceful; and they also refer all other considerations - to these. A sign that what I have stated is the - end which each has in view is the fact that sometimes the speakers will not - dispute about the other points. For example, a man on trial does not always deny - that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he will never - admit that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary. - Similarly, the deliberative orator, although he often sacrifices everything - else, will never admit that he is recommending what is inexpedient or is - dissuading from what is useful; but often he is quite indifferent about showing - that the enslavement of neighboring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is - not an act of injustice.The omission of - ou)k before a)/dikon has been suggested. The sense would then be: - “As to the injustice of enslaving . . . he is quite - indifferent.” There is no doubt a reference to the cruel treatment - by Athens of the inhabitants of - the island of Melos (416 B.C.) for its loyalty to the Spartans - during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. - 5.84-116). The Athenian envoys declined to discuss the - question of right or wrong, which they said was only possible between equal - powers, and asserted that expediency was the only thing that - had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice (in the - Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken into account, - was merely accessory and intended to serve as a specious justification for - the policy of might. Similarly, those who praise or blame do not - consider whether a man has - done what is expedient or harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise - that, disregarding his own interest, he performed some deed of honor. For - example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade - Patroclus,To protect his body and avenge - his death (Hom. Il. - 18.). knowing that he was fated to die, although he might - have lived. To him such a death was more honorable, although life was more - expedient.

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From what has been said it is evident that the - orator must first have in readiness the propositions on these three - subjects.The expedient, the just, the - honorable, and their contraries. Now, necessary signs, probabilities, - and signs are the propositions of the rhetorician; for the syllogism - universallyo(/lws: or, reading o(/los, - “the syllogism as a whole.” consists of - propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions - above mentioned. Again, since what is - impossible can neither have been done nor will be done, but only what is - possible, and since what has not taken place nor will take place can neither - have been done nor will be done, it is necessary for each of the three kinds of - orators to have in readiness propositions dealing with the possible and the - impossible, and as to whether anything has taken place or will take place, or - not. Further, since all, whether they praise or - blame, exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, not only endeavor to prove what we - have stated, but also that the same things,whether good - or bad, honorable or disgraceful, just or unjust, are great or small, either in - themselves or when compared with each other, it is clear that it will be - necessary for the orator to be ready with propositions dealing with greatness - and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and in particular; - for instance, which is the greater or less good, or act of injustice or justice; - and similarly with regard to all other subjects. We have now stated the topics - concerning which the orator must provide himself with propositions; after this, - we must distinguish between each of them individually, that is, what the three - kinds of Rhetoric, deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, are concerned with.

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We must first - ascertain about what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises, - since he cannot do so about everything, but only about things which may possibly - happen or not. Everything which of necessity - either is or will be, or which cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside - the scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the - case of things that are possible advice is not universally appropriate; for they - include certain advantages, natural and accidental, about which it is not worth - while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects - about which we take counsel; and such are all those which can naturally be - referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose origination is in our own - power; for our examination is - limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to - perform.

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However, there is no need at present to endeavor - to enumerate with scrupulous exactness or to classify those subjects which men - are wont to discuss, or to define them as far as possible with strict accuracy, - since this is not the function of the rhetorical art but of one that is more - intelligent and exact, and further, more than its legitimate subjects of inquiry - have already been assigned to it. For what we - have said before is trueThe analytical - science is Dialectic, incorrectly regarded as a branch of Analytics, which - properly implies scientific demonstration.: that Rhetoric is composed - of analytical science and of that branch of political science which is concerned - with Ethics, and that it resembles partly Dialectic and partly sophistical - arguments. But in proportion as anyone - endeavors to make of Dialectic or Rhetoric, not what they are, faculties, but - sciences, to that extent he will, without knowing it, destroy their real nature, - in thus altering their character, by crossing over into the domain of - sciencesTaking ei)s - e)pisth/mas with metabai/nein. - If taken with e)piskeua/zwn, the sense will - be: “by changing his ground ( metabai/nein being used absolutely) while altering - their characters from faculties to sciences.”, whose - subjects are certain definite things, not merely words. Nevertheless, even at present we may mention such - matters as it is worth while to analyze, while still leaving much for political - science to investigate.

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Now, we may say that the most important subjects about which all men - deliberateand deliberative orators harangue, are - five in number, to wit: ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the - country, imports and exports, legislation.

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Accordingly, the orator who is going to give - advice on ways and means should be acquainted with the nature and extent of the - State resources, so that if any is omitted it may be added, and if any is - insufficient, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenses of - the State, that if any is superfluous, it may be removed, or, if too great, may - be curtailed. For men become wealthier, not only by adding to what they already - possess, but also by cutting down expenses. Of these things it is not only - possible to acquire a general view from individual experience, but in view of - advising concerning them it is further necessary to be well informed about what - has been discovered among others.

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In regard to war and peace, the orator should be - acquainted with the power of the State, how great it is already and how great it - may possibly become; of what kind it is already and what additions may possibly - be made to it; further, what wars it has waged and its conduct of them. These - things he should be acquainted with, not only as far as his own State is - concerned, but also in reference to neighboring States, and particularly those - with whom there is a likelihood of war, so that towards the stronger a pacific - attitude may be maintained, and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to making war on them may be left - to his own State. Again, he should know whether their forces are like or unlike - his own, for herein also advantage or disadvantage may lie. With reference to - these matters he must also have examined the results, not only of the wars - carried on by his own State, but also of those carried on by others; for similar - results naturally arise from similar causes.

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Again, in regard to the defense of the country, - he should not be ignorant how it is carried on; he should know both the strength - of the guard, its character, and the positions of the guard-houses - (which is impossible for one who is unacquainted with the - country), so that if any guard is insufficient it may be increased, or - if any is superfluous it may be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to - suitable positions.

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Again, in regard to food, he should know what - amount of expenditure is sufficient to support the State; what kind of food is - produced at home or can be imported; and what exports and imports are necessary, - in order that contracts and agreements may be made with thosetou/tous: those who will - receive exports and send imports. who can furnish them; for it is - necessary to keep the citizens free from reproach in their relations with two - classes of people—those who are stronger and those who are useful for - commercial purposes.

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With a view to the safety of the State, it is - necessary that the orator should be able to judge of all these questions, but an - understanding of legislation is of special importance, for it is on the lawsthat the safety of the State is based. Wherefore he must - know how many forms of government there are; what is expedient for each; and the - natural causes of its downfall, whether they are peculiar to the particular form - of government or opposed to it. By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I - mean that, with the exception of the perfect form of government, all the rest - are ruined by being relaxed or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only when - relaxed, but also when strained to excess, becomes weaker and will end in an - oligarchy; similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose reach the mean, - when one of these defects is relaxed, but when it becomes aquiline or snub to - excess, it is altered to such an extent that even the likeness of a nose is - lost. Moreover, with reference to acts of - legislation, it is useful not only to understand what form of government is - expedient by judging in the light of the past, but also to become acquainted - with those in existence in other nations, and to learn what kinds of government - are suitable to what kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for - legislation books of travel are useful, since they help us to understand the - laws of other nations, and for political debates historical works.This rendering, although convenient, hardly - represents the Greek, which, literally translated, is “the - investigations of those who write about human - actions” (cf. i(storiko/s, 4.8). All these things, however, - belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric.

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Such, then, are the most important questions upon which the would-be deliberative - orator must be well informed. - Now let us again state the sources whence we must derive our arguments for - exhortation or discussion on these and other questions.

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Men, - individually and in common, nearly all have some aim, in the attainment of which - they choose or avoid certain things. This aim, briefly stated, is happiness and - its component parts. Therefore, for the sake of - illustration, let us ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is, and what - its parts consist in; for all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the - things which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should do the things - which procure happiness or one of its parts, or increase instead of diminishing - it, and avoid doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what - is contrary to it.

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Let us then define happiness as well-being - combined with virtue, or independence of life, or the life that is most - agreeable combined with security, or abundance of possessions and slaves,This is the usual rendering, although it is - hardly satisfactory. Jebb translates “a flourishing state . . . of - body.” combined with power to protect and make use of - themOr, “bring - about,” “effect them.”; for nearly all - men admit that one or more of these things constitutes happiness. If, then, such is the nature of happiness, its - component parts must necessarily be:noble birth, - numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good - old age; further, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty, strength, stature, - fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honor, good luck, virtue. For - a man would be entirely independent, provided he possessed all internal and - external goods; for there are no others. Internal goods are those of mind and - body; external goods are noble birth, friends, wealth, honor. To these we think - should be added certain capacitiesi.e. of mind and body; or duna/meis may mean “positions of authority and - influence.” and good luck; for on these conditions life - will be perfectly secure. Let us now in the same way define each of these in - detail.

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Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State, - means that its members or inhabitants are sprung from the soilThis was a favorite boast of the - Athenians., or of long standing; that its first members were famous as - leaders, and that many of their descendants have been famous for qualities that - are highly esteemed. In the case of private individuals, noble birth is derived - from either the father's or the mother's side, and on both sides there must be - legitimacy; and, as in the case of a State, it means that its founders were - distinguished for virtue, or wealth, or any other of the things that men honor, - and that a number of famous persons, both men and women, young and old, belong - to the family.

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The blessing of good children and numerous - children needs little explanation. For the commonwealth it consists in a large number of good young men, - good in bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, fitness for - athletic contests; the moral excellences of a young man are self-control and - courage. For the individual it consists in a number of good children of his own, - both male and female, and such as we have described. Female bodily excellences - are beauty and stature, their moral excellences self-control and industrious - habits, free from servility.a)neleuqeri/a: literally, qualities unbecoming to - a free man or woman, ungentlemanly, unladylike; hence, mean, servile, - sordid. The object of both the individual and of the community should - be to secure the existence of each of these qualities in both men and women; for - all those States in which the character of women is unsatisfactory, as in - Lacedaemon,A similar charge against the Spartan woman is made in Aristot. Pol. 2.9.5: “Further - the looseness ( a)/nesis) - of the Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the constitution - and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one of absolute luxury - and intemperance” (compare Eur. Andr. 595-596 “even if she wished it, a Spartan - girl could not be chaste”). The opinion of Xenophon and - Plutarch is much more favorable. may be considered only half-happy.

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Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership - of land and properties, and further of movables, cattle, and slaves, remarkable - for number, size, and beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful. - Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has enjoyment for its - object is more liberal. By productive I mean that which is a source of income, - by enjoyable that which offers no advantage beyond the use of it—at - least, none worth mentioning. Security may be definedas - possession of property in such places and on such conditions that the use of it - is in our own hands; and ownership as the right of alienation or noth)\ mh/: in the - MS. readings these words follow tou= oi)kei=a - ei)=nai: “ownership or non-ownership.” The - alteration is Spengel's., by which I mean giving the property away or - selling it. In a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in possession; - for the actualizatione)ne/rgeia: realization in action or fact. and use of - such things is wealth.

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A good reputation consists in being considered a - man of worth by all, or in possessing something of such a nature that all or - most men, or the good, or the men of practical wisdom desire it.

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Honor is a token of a reputation for doing good; - and those who have already done good are justly and above all honored, not but - that he who is capable of doing good is also honored. Doing good relates either - to personal security and all the causes of existence; or to wealth; or to any - other good things which are not easy to acquire, either in any conditions, or at - such a place, or at such a time; for many obtain honor for things that appear - trifling, but this depends upon place and time. The components of honor are - sacrifices, memorials in verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front - seats, public burial, State maintenance, and among the barbarians, prostration - and giving place, and all gifts which are highly prized in each country. For a - gift is at once a giving of a possession and a token of honor; wherefore gifts - are desired by the ambitious and by those who are fond of money, since they are an acquisition for the - latter and an honor for the former; so that they furnish both with what they - want.

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Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind - that when exercising the body we are free from sickness; for many are healthy in - the way HerodicusOf Selymbria, physician and teacher of - hygienic gymnastics (c. 420 - B.C.). He is said to have made his patients walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. He was - satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippocrates as one who killed those - for whom he prescribed (cf. 2.23.29). is said to - have been, whom no one would consider happy in the matter of health, because - they are obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human enjoyments.

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Beauty varies with each age. In a young man, it - consists in possessing a body capable of enduring all efforts, either of the - racecourse or of bodily strength, while he himself is pleasant to look upon and - a sheer delight. This is why the athletes in the pentathlonFive contests: jumping, running, discus-throwing, - javelin-throwing, wrestling. are most beautiful, because they are - naturally adapted for bodily exertion and for swiftness of foot. In a man who - has reached his prime, beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the toils - of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at the same time awe-inspiring. In an - old man, beauty consists in being naturally adapted to contend with unavoidable - labors and in not causing annoyanceOr simply, - “freedom from pain” (5.15). to - others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable accompaniments of old age.

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Strength consists in the power of moving - another as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to pull or push, to - lift, to squeeze or crush, so that the strong man is strong by virtue of being - able to do all or some of these things.

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Excellence of stature consists in being - superior to most men in height, depth, and breadth,but - in such proportion as not to render the movements of the body slower as the - result of excess.

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Bodily excellence in athletics consists in - size, strength, and swiftness of foot; for to be swift is to be strong. For one - who is able to throw his legs about in a certain way, to move them rapidly and - with long strides, makes a good runner; one who can hug and grapple, a good - wrestler; one who can thrust away by a blow of the fist, a good boxer; one who - excels in boxing and wrestling is fit for the pancratium,A combination of wrestling and boxing. he who excels - in all for the pentathlon.

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A happy old age is one that comes slowly with - freedom from pain; for neither one who rapidly grows old nor one who grows old - insensibly but with pain enjoys a happy old age. This also depends upon bodily - excellences and good fortune; for unless a man is free from illness and is - strong, he will never be free from suffering, nor will he live long and - painlessly without good fortune. Apart from health and strength, however, there - is a power of vitality in certain cases; for many live long who are not endowed - with bodily excellences. But a minute examination of such questions is needless - for the present purpose.

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The meaning of numerous and worthy friends is - easy to understand from the definition of a friend. A friend is one who exerts - himself to do for the sake of another what he thinks is advantageous to him. A - man to whom many persons are so disposed, has many friends; if they are - virtuous, he has worthy friends.

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Good fortune consists in the acquisition or - possession of either all, or - the most, or the most important of those goods of which fortune is the cause. - Now fortune is the cause of some things with which the arts also are concerned, - and also of many which have nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are - due to nature (though it is possible that the results of fortune may be - contrary to nature); for art is a cause of health, but nature of beauty - and stature.The results of art and the - results due to nature are often assisted (or hindered) by - the interference of the irregular operations of fortune or chance. Health - may be the result of fortune, as well as art (a sick man may be - cured by a drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the - physician); beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It - is parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce unnatural - monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and the substitution of a comma - for the colon after fu/sis have been - suggested. The meaning would then be: “for instance, such as are - due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary to - nature.” Speaking generally, the goods which come from fortune - are such as excite envy. Fortune is also a cause of those goods which are beyond - calculation; for instance, a man's brothers are all ugly, while he is handsome; - they did not see the treasure, while he found it; the arrow hit one who stood by - and not the man aimed at; or, one who frequented a certain place was the only - one who did not go there on a certain occasion, while those who went there then - for the first time met their death. All such instances appear to be examples of - good fortune.

-

The definition of virtue, with which the topic - of praise is most closely connected, must be left until we come to treat of the - latter.

-

It is evident, - then, what things, likely to happen or already existing, the orator should aim - at, when exhorting, and what when dissuading; for they are opposites. But since - the aim before the deliberative orator is that which is expedient, and men - deliberate, not about the end, but about the means to the end, which are the - things which are expedient in regard toour actions; and - since, further, the expedient is good, we must first grasp the elementary - notions of good and expedient in general.

-

Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable - for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else; that which - is the aim of all things, or of all things that possess sensation or reason; or - would be, if they could acquire the latter. Whatever reason might assign to each - and whatever reason does assign to each in individual cases, that is good for - each; and that whose presence makes a man fit and also independent; and - independence in general; and that which produces or preserves such things, or on - which such things follow, or all that is likely to prevent or destroy their - opposites.

-

Now things follow in two - ways—simultaneously or subsequently; for instance, knowledge is - subsequent to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. Things which - produce act in three ways; thus, healthiness produces health; and so does food; - and exercise as a rule. This being laid down, - it necessarily follows that the acquisition of good things and the loss of evil - things are both good; for it follows simultaneously on the latter that we are - rid of that which is bad, and subsequently on the former that we obtain - possession of that which is good. The same - applies to the acquisition of a greater in place of a less good, and a less in - place of a greater evil; for - in proportion as the greater exceeds the less, there is an acquisition of the - one and a loss of the other. The virtues also - must be a good thing; for those who possess them are in a sound condition, and - they are also productive of good things and practical. However, we must speak - separately concerning each—what it is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good; for all living creatures - naturally desire it. Hence it follows that both agreeable and beautiful things - must be good; for the former produce pleasure, while among beautiful things some - are pleasant and others are desirable in themselves.

-

To enumerate them one by one, the following - things must necessarily be good. Happiness, since it is desirable in itself and - self-sufficient, and to obtain it we choose a number of things. Justice, courage, self-control, magnanimity, - magnificence, and all other similar states of mind, for they are virtues of the - soul. Health, beauty, and the like, for they - are virtues of the body and produce many advantages; for instance, health is - productive of pleasure and of life, wherefore it is thought to be best of all, - because it is the cause of two things which the majority of men prize most - highly. Wealth, since it is the excellence of - acquisitionThe excellence of anything is - proportionate to its success in the performance of its proper function. The - function of acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and its - “excellence” may be judges by the amount of wealth - obtained. and productive of many things.A friend and friendship, since a friend - is desirable in himself and produces many advantages. Honor and good repute, since they are agreeable and produce many - advantages, and are generally accompanied by the possession of those things for - which men are honored. Eloquence and capacity - for action; for all such faculties are productive of many advantages. Further, natural cleverness, good memory, readiness - to learn, quick-wittedness, and all similar qualities; for these faculties are - productive of advantages. The same applies to all the sciences, arts, and even - life, for even though no other good should result from it, it is desirable in itself. Lastly, justice, since it - is expedient in general for the common weal.

-

These are nearly all the things generally - recognized as good; in the case of doubtful - goods, the arguments in their favor are drawn from the following. That is good - the opposite of which is evil, or the opposite - of which is advantageous to our enemies; for instance, if it is specially - advantageous to our enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that courage - is specially advantageous to the citizens. And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our enemies desire or of that in - which they rejoice, appears to be advantageous; wherefore it was well said: - - Of a truth Priam would exult.Hom. Il.1.255. The words are those - of Nestor to Achilles and Agamemnon, in which he points out how - their enemies would rejoice if they heard all the story of their - quarrel. - - This is not always the case, but only as a general rule, for there is - nothing to prevent one and the same thing being sometimes advantageous to two - opposite parties; hence it is said that misfortune brings men together, when a - common danger threatens them.

-

That which is not in excessReading o(/. The ordinary - reading ou(= is taken to mean - “that which does not permit excess,” that which is - midway between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested rendering is, - “that of which one cannot have too much.” is - good, whereas that which is greater than it should be, is bad. And that which has cost much labor and expense, for - it at once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a thing is regarded as an - end, and an end of many efforts; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was said: - - And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the - Trojans] to boast of,Hom. Il. 2.160. Addressed - by Hera to Athene, begging her to prevent the Greeks departing - from Troy and leaving - Helen behind. - - and, - - It is disgraceful to tarry long,Hom. Il. 2.298. Spoken by - Odysseus. While sympathizing with the desire of the army to - leave, he points out that it would be “disgraceful - after waiting so long” to return unsuccessful, and - exhorts them to hold out. - - and the proverb, “[to break] the pitcher at - the door.”Proverbial for - “lost labor.” Cf. French “faire naufrage - au port,” and the English “there's many a - slip 'twixt cup and lip.”

-

And that which many aim at and which is seen to - be competed for by many; for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and - the majority may almost stand for “all.” And that which is the object of praise, for no one - praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies; for if - even those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, this amounts to a - universal recognition of it; for it is because of its goodness being evident - that they acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies praise are - worthless.Meaning that they cannot have - done their duty against their enemies, who would then have blamed them. - Another suggested reading is ou(\s oi( fi/loi ye/gousi - kai\ ou(\s oi( e)xqroi\ mh\ ye/gousi - (“those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies - do not blame.”) Wherefore the Corinthians imagined - themselves insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, - - Ilium does not blame the - Corinthians.In the - Iliad Glaucus, a Corinthian, is described as - an ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the - Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were meant - satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed by - Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos (Frag. 50, - P.L.G. 3, where the line is differently - given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as - he often does, although not always accurately. - - - And that which one of the practically wise or - good, man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene chose Odysseus, Theseus - Helen, the goddesses Alexander Paris, and Homer Achilles.

-

And, generally speaking, all that is - deliberately chosen is good.Now, men deliberately choose - to do the things just mentioned, and those which are harmful to their enemies, - and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. The last are of two kinds: things which might - happen,geno/mena - a)/n: Spengel omits a)/n: i.e. - “things which have happened.” and - things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without - labor or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labor or length of time. - And anything that happens as men wish is good; and what they wish is either what - is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for - instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light. And things that are peculiar to them, or which no one - else possesses, “Or which no one - else has done” (Jebb). or which are out - of the common; for thus the honor is greater. And things which are appropriate - to them; such are all things befitting them in respect of birth and power. And - things which they think they lack, however unimportant; for none the less they - deliberately choose to acquire them. And - things which are easy of accomplishment, for being easy they are possible; such - things are those in which all, or most men, or those who are equals or inferiors - have been successful. And things whereby they will gratify friends or incur the - hatred of enemies. And all things that those whom they admire deliberately - choose to do. And those things in regard to which they are clever naturally or - by experience; for they hope to be more easily successful in them. And things - which no worthless man would approve, for that makes them the more commendable. - And things which they happen to desire, for such things seem not only agreeable, - but also better. Lastly, and above all, each - man thinks those things good which are the object of his special desire, as victory of the man who - desires victory, honor of the ambitious man, money of the avaricious, and so in - other instances. These then are the materials from which we must draw our - arguments in reference to good and the expedient.

-

But since men - often agree that both of two things are useful, but dispute which is the more - so, we must next speak of the greater good and the more expedient. Let one thing, then, be said to exceed another, when - it is as great and something more—and to be exceeded when it is - contained in the other. “Greater” and - “more” always imply a relation with less; - “great” and “small,” - “much” and “little” with the general - size of things; the “great” is that which exceeds, and that - which falls short of it is “small”; and similarly - “much” and “little.” Since, besides, we call good that which is desirable - for its own sake and not for anything else, and that which all things aim at and - which they would choose if they possessed reason and practical wisdom; and that - which is productive or protective of good, or on which such things follow; and - since that for the sake of which anything is done is the end, and the end is - that for the sake of which everything else is done, and that is good for each - man which relatively to him presents all these conditions, it necessarily - follows that a larger number of good things is a greater good than one or a - smaller number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned as one of - them;The one, the smaller number, and the - greater number must be of the same species. Thus, 5 pounds is a greater good - than 2 pounds; but 5 farthings is not a greater good than 2 pounds, since - the smaller number is not reckoned in with the greater Buckley.for it exceeds them and that which is contained is exceeded.

-

And if that which is greatest in one class - surpass that which is greatest in another class, the first class will surpass - the second; and whenever one class surpasses another, the greatest of that class - will surpass the greatest of the other. For instance, if the biggest man is - greater than the biggest woman, men in general will be bigger than women; and if - men in general are bigger than women, the biggest man will be bigger than the - biggest woman; for the superiority of classes and of the greatest things - contained in them are proportionate. And when - this follows on that, but not that on this [then - “that” is the greater good];If B (life) follows on, is the consequent - of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is - a greater good than B. for the enjoyment of that which follows is - contained in that of the other. Now, things follow simultaneously, or - successively, or potentially; thus, life follows simultaneously on health, but - not health on life; knowledge follows subsequently on learning [but not - learning on knowledge]; and simple theft potentially on sacrilege, for - one who commits sacrilege will also steal. And - things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount [than something - else] are greater, for they must also exceed the greater.Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is - greater than 2. - And things which produce a greater good are - greater; for this we agreed was the meaning of productive of greater. And - similarly, that which is produced by a greater cause; for if that which produces - health is more desirable than that which produces pleasure and a greater good, - then health is a greater - good than pleasure. And that which is more - desirable in itself is superior to that which is not; for example, strength is a - greater good than the wholesome, which is not desirable for its own sake, while - strength is; and, this we agreed was the meaning of a good. And the end is a greater good than the means; for the - latter is desirable for the sake of something else, the former for its own sake; - for instance, exercise is only a means for the acquirement of a good - constitution. And that which has less need of - one or several other things in addition is a greater good, for it is more - independent (and “having less need” means needing - fewer or easier additions). And when - one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into existence without the aid of - another, but that other can, then that which needs no aid is more independent, - and accordingly is seen to be a greater good.

-

And if one thing is a first principle, and - another not; if one thing is a cause and another not, for the same reason; for - without cause or first principle nothing can exist or come into existence. And - if there are two first principles or two causes, that which results from the - greater is greater; and conversely, when there are two first principles or two - causes, that which is the first cause or principle of the greater is greater. - It is clear then, from what has been said, - that a thing may be greater in two ways; for if it is a first principle but - another is not, it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a first principle - [but an end], while another is; for the end is greater and not - a first principle.A thing may be of greater - importance in two ways: (a) that which is a first - principle is superior to that which is not; (b) that which - is not a first principle, but an end, is superior to that which is a first - principle; for the end is superior to the means. In the illustration that - follows: (a) the first principle (suggesting the - plot) is said to be of more importance (worse) - than the end or result (carrying out the plot); - (b) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than - the first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus the - question of the amount of guilt can be argued both ways. Thus, - Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus,Oropus, - a frontier-town of Boeotia and - Attica, had been occupied by - the Thebans (366 B.C.). - Callistratus suggested an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by - Chabrias—that the town should remain in Theban possession for the - time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and the Thebans refused to - leave, whereupon Chabrias and Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas - was an Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his political - views. declared that the man who had given the advicewas more guilty than the one who carried it out; for if he had not - suggested it, it could not have been carried out. And conversely, when accusing - Chabrias, he declared that the man who had carried out the advice was more - guilty than the one who had given it; for it could not have been carried out, - had there not been some one to do so, and the reason why people devised plots - was that others might carry them out.

-

And that which is scarcer is a greater good - than that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although it is less useful, but - the possession of it is more valuable, since it is more difficult of - acquisition. From another point of view, that which is abundant is to be - preferred to that which is scarce, because the use of it is greater, for - “often” exceeds “seldom,”; whence the - saying: - - Water is best.Pind. O. 1.1. - - - And, speaking generally, that which is more - difficult is preferable to that which is easier of attainment, for it is - scarcer; but from another point of view that which is easier is preferable to - that which is more difficult; for its nature is as we wish. And that, the contrary or the deprivation of which is - greater, is the greater good.e.g. it is worse - to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is better than hearing - (Schrader). And virtue is greater than non-virtue, - and vice than non-vice; for virtues and vices are ends, the others not. - And those things whose works are nobler or - more disgraceful are themselves greater; and the works of those things, the - vices and virtues of which are greater, will also be greater, since between - causes and first principles compared with results there is the same relation as - between results compared with causes and first principles. Things, superiority in which is more desirable or - nobler, are to be preferred; for instance, sharpness of sight is preferable to - keenness of smell for sight is better than smell. And loving one's friends more than money is nobler, - whence it follows that love of friends is nobler than love of money. And, on the - other hand, the better and nobler things are, the better and nobler will be - their superiority; and similarly, those things, the desire for which is nobler - and better, are themselves nobler and better, for greater longings are directed towards greater objects. For the same - reason, the better and nobler the object, the better and nobler are the desires.

-

And when the sciences are nobler and more - dignified, the nobler and more dignified are their subjects; for as is the - science, so is the truth which is its object, and each science prescribes that - which properly belongs to it; and, by analogy, the nobler and more dignified the - objects of a science, the nobler and more dignified is the science itself, for - the same reasons. And that which men of - practical wisdom, either all, or more, or the best of them, would judge, or have - judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily be such, either absolutely or in - so far as they have judged as men of practical wisdom. The same may be said in - regard to everything else; for the nature, quantity, and quality of things are - such as would be defined by science and practical wisdom. But our statement only - applies to goods; for we defined that as good which everything, if possessed of - practical wisdom, would choose; hence it is evident that that is a greater good - to which practical wisdom assigns the superiority. So also are those things which better menpossess, either absolutely, or in so far as they are better; for instance - courage is better than strength. And what the better man would choose, either - absolutely or in so far as he is better; thus, it is better to suffer wrong than - to commit it, for that is what the juster man would choose. And that which is more agreeable rather than that - which is less so; for all things pursue pleasure and desire it for its own sake; - and it is by these conditions that the good and the end have been defined. And - that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain and is agreeable for a - longer time. And that which is nobler than - that which is less noble; for the noble is that which is either agreeable or - desirable in itself. And all things which we - have a greater desire to be instrumental in procuring for ourselves or for our - friends are greater goods, and those as to which our desire is least are greater - evils. And things that last longer are - preferable to those that are of shorter duration, and those that are safer to - those that are less so; for time increases the use of the first and the wish - that of the second; for whenever we wish, we can make greater use of things that - are safe.

-

And things in all cases follow the relations - between coordinates and similar inflections; for instance, if - “courageously” is nobler than and preferable to - “temperately,” then “courage” is - preferable to “temperance,” and it is better to be - “courageous” than “temperate.” - And that which is chosen by all is better - than that which is not; and that which the majority choose than that which the - minority choose; for, as we - have said, the good is that which all desire, and consequently a good is - greater, the more it is desired. The same applies to goods which are recognized - as greater by opponents or enemies, by judges, or by those whom they select; for - in the one case it would be, so to say, the verdict of all mankind, in the other - that of those who are acknowledged authorities and experts. And sometimes a good is greater in which all - participate, for it is a disgrace not to participate in it; sometimes when none - or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer. And things which are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler. And - in the same way things which are more highly honored,“Things of which the prices are greater, price - being a sort of worth” (Jebb). for honor - is a sort of measure of worth; and conversely those things are greater evils, - the punishment for which is greater. And those - things which are greater than what is acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are - greater. And the same whole when divided into parts appears greater, for there - appears to be superiority in a greater number of things.Or, “superiority over a greater number of - things.” Whence the poet says that Meleager was persuaded - to rise up and fight by the recital ofAfter - pei=sai all the MSS. except A - Paris have - le/gousan. If this is retained, it must - refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra, who “persuaded him . . . by - quoting.” As the text stands, the literal rendering is: - “the poet says that (the recital of the three - verses) persuaded.” The passage is from Hom. Il. 9.592-594 (slightly - different). - - - All the ills that befall those whose city is taken; the people - perish, and fire utterly destroys the city, and strangers carry off - the children. - -

-

Combination and building up, as employed by Epicharmus,Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.) writer of comedies and Pythagorean - philosopher, was born at Megara - in Sicily (according to - others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, written in the Doric - dialect, and without a chorus, were either mythological or comedies of - manners, as extant titles show. Plato speaks of him as “the prince - of comedy” and Horace states definitely that he was imitated by - Plautus. produce the same effect as division, and for the same - reason; for combination is an exhibition of great superiority and appears to be - the origin and cause of great things. And - since that which is harder to obtain and scarcer is greater,it follows that special occasions, ages, places, times, and powers, - produce great effects; for if a man does things beyond his powers, beyond his - age, and beyond what his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner, in - such a place, and at such a time, they will possess importance in actions that - are noble, good, or just, or the opposite. Hence the epigramSimonides, Frag. 163 (P.L.G. - 3.). on the Olympian victor: - - Formerly, with a rough basketOr, - the yoke to which the basket, like our milk-pails long ago, was - attached. on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from - Argos to Tegea. - - And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, “Look what I started - from!” And that which is natural is - a greater good than that which is acquired, because it is harder. Whence the - poet says: - - Self-taught am I.Hom. Od. 22.347. The words are - those of the minstrel Phemius, who was forced to sing to the - suitors of Penelope. - - - And that which is the greatest part of that - which is great is more to be desired; as Pericles said in his Funeral Oration, - that the removal of the youth from the city was like the year being robbed of - its spring.Not in the oration in Thuc. 2.35. - And those things which are available in - greater need, as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And of two things - that which is nearer the end proposed is preferable. And that which is useful - for the individual is preferable to that which is useful absolutely;Or, reading kai\ - a(plw=s: “that which is useful both to the individual - and absolutely is a greater good” (than that which is - only useful in one way), but this necessitates a considerable - ellipse. that which is possible to that which is impossible; for it - is the possible that is useful to us, not the impossible. And those things which - are at the end of life; for things near the end are more like ends.

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And real things are preferable to those that - have reference to public opinion, the latter being defined as those which a man - would not choose if they were likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would - seem then that it is better to receive than to confer a benefit; for one would - choose the former even if it should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose - to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain unknown. Those things also are to be preferred, which men - would rather possess in reality than in appearance, because they are nearer the - truth; wherefore it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little - importance, because people prefer to appear just than to be just; and this is - not the case, for instance, in regard to health. The same may be said of things that serve several ends; for - instance, those that assist us to live, to live well, to enjoy life, and to do - noble actions; wherefore health and wealth seem to be the greatest goods, for - they include all these advantages. And that - which is more free from pain and accompanied by pleasure is a greater good; for - there is more than one good, since pleasure and freedom from pain combined are - both goods. And of two goods the greater is that which, added to one and the - same, makes the whole greater. And those - things, the presence of which does not escape notice, are preferable to those - which pass unnoticed, because they appear more real; whence being wealthy would - appear to be a greater good than the appearance of it.It is difficult to see the connection here. Munro's - suggestion, tw=| dokei=n for tou= dokei=n, adopted by Roemer, would mean - “by the show of it,” that is, by its attracting notice. - And that which is held most dear, sometimes - alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a greater good. Wherefore he - who puts out the eye of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of another - who has two, does not do equal injury;Or, - “is not punished equally.” for in the former - case, a man has been deprived of that which he held most dear.

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These are - nearly all the topics from which argumentsmay be drawn - in persuading and dissuading; but the most important and effective of all the - means of persuasion and good counsel is to know all the forms of government and - to distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each; - for all men are guided by considerations of - expediency, and that which preserves the State is expedient. Further, the - declaration of the authority is authoritative,The pronouncements of the supreme authority are themselves authoritative as - laying down laws and regulations for the citizens. and the different - kinds of authority are distinguished according to forms of government; in fact, - there are as many authorities as there are forms of government.

-

Now, there are four kinds of government, - democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, so that the supreme and deciding - authority is always a part or the whole of these. Democracy is a form of government in which the offices are - distributed by the people among themselves by lot; in an oligarchy, by those who - possess a certain property-qualification; in an aristocracy, by those who - possess an educational qualification, meaning an education that is laid down by - the law. In fact, in an aristocracy, power and office are in the hands of those - who have remained faithful to what the law prescribes, and who must of necessity - appear best, whence this form of government has taken its name. In a monarchy, - as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over all; if it is subject to certain regulations, - it is called a kingdom; if it is unlimited, a tyranny.

-

Nor should the end of each form of government be - neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the end. Now, the - end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating - to education and what the law prescribes, . . . ,The “end” of monarchy is wanting - here. of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then that we must - distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each form of - government, since it is in reference to this that men make their choice. - But as proofs are established not only by - demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—since we have confidence - in an orator who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or - both—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of - each form of government; for, in reference to each, the character most likely to - persuade must be that which is characteristic of it. These characters will be - understood by the same means; for characters reveal themselves in accordance - with moral purpose, and moral purpose has reference to the end.

-

We have now stated what things, whether future - or present, should be the aim of those who recommend a certain course; from what - topics they should derive their proofs of expediency; further, the ways and - means of being well equipped for dealing with the characters and institutionsof each form of government, so far as was within the - scope of the present occasion; for the subject has been discussed in detail in - the Politics.Aristot. Pol. 3.7.

-

We will next - speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and the disgraceful, since they - constitute the aim of one who praises and of one who blames; for, when speaking - of these, we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of - such and such a character, which, as we have said, is a second method of proof; - for it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in - ourselves or others in regard to virtue. But - since it happens that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a man or a - god but even inanimate things or any ordinary animal, we ought in the same way - to make ourselves familiar with the propositions relating to these subjects. Let - us, then, discuss these matters also, so far as may serve for illustration.

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The noble, then, is that which, being desirable - in itself is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, being good, is - pleasant because it is good. If this is the noble, then virtue must of necessity - be noble, for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good - things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things - in all cases.Or, “a faculty of - doing many and great benefits to all men in all cases” - (Jebb). - The components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control, - magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, practical and speculative - wisdom. The greatest virtues are necessarily - those which are most useful to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring - benefits. For this reason justice and courage are the most esteemed, the latter - being useful to others in war, the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, - for the liberal spend freely and do not dispute the possession of wealth, which - is the chief object of other men's desire. Justice is a virtue which assigns to each man his due in conformity with the - law; injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law. - Courage makes men perform noble acts in the - midst of dangers according to the dictates of the law and in submission to it; - the contrary is cowardice. Self-control is a - virtue which disposes men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law - prescribes; the contrary is licentiousness. Liberality does good in many matters; the contrary is avarice. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits; - the contrary is little-mindedness. Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in matters of expenditure; - the contraries are little-mindednessand meanness. - Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason, - which enables men to come to a wise decision in regard to good and evil things, - which have been mentioned as connected with happiness.Or, taking ei)s eu)daimoni/an - with bouleu/esqai, “come to a wise - decision conducive to their happiness.”

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Concerning virtue and vice in general and their - separate parts, enough has been said for the moment. To discern the resti.e. the causes and results of virtue - (Cope); or, the noble and the disgraceful - (Jebb). presents no difficulty; for it is evident - that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to it, must be noble, and so also - must be what comes from virtue; for such are its signs and works. But since the signs of virtue and such things as are - the works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it necessarily follows that - all the works and signs of courage and all courageous acts are also noble. The - same may be said of just things and of just actions; (but not of what - one suffers justly; for in this alone amongst the virtues that which is justly - done is not always noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful than an - unjust punishment). The same applies equally to the other virtues. - Those things of which the reward is honor - are noble; also those which are done for honor rather than money. Also, those - desirable things which a man does not do for his own sake; things which are absolutely good, which a man has - done for the sake of his country, while neglecting his own interests; things - which are naturally good; and not such as are good for the individual, since such things are inspired - by selfish motives.

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And those things are noble which it is possible - for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for the latter - involve more selfishness; all acts done for - the sake of others, for they are more disinterested; the successes gained, not - for oneself but for others; and for one's benefactors, for that is justice; in a - word, all acts of kinds, for they are disinterested. And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed; for we are - ashamed of what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention; as, for instance, - when Alcaeus said: - - I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,Frag. 55 - (P.L.G. 3.). - - Sappho rejoined: - - Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue - stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine - eyes; but thou would'st have spoken of what is right.Frag. 28 - (P.L.G. 3.). - -

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Those things also are noble for which men - anxiously strive, but without fear; for men are thus affected about goods which - lead to good repute. Virtues and actions are - nobler, when they proceed from those who are naturally worthier, for instance, - from a man rather than from a woman. It is the - same with those which are the cause of enjoyment to others rather than to - ourselves; this is why justice and that which is just are noble.To take vengeance on one's enemies - is nobler than to come to terms with them; for to retaliate is just, and that - which is just is noble; and further, a courageous man ought not to allow himself - to be beaten. Victory and honor also are - noble; for both are desirable even when they are fruitless, and are - manifestations of superior virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which are - the more honorable the longer their memory lasts; those which follow us after - death; those which are accompanied by honor; and those which are out of the - common. Those which are only possessed by a single individual, because they are - more worthy of remembrance. And possessions - which bring no profit; for they are more gentlemanly. Customs that are peculiar - to individual peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed among them are - noble; for instance, in Lacedaemon it - is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark of a gentleman, the - performance of any servile task being difficult for one whose hair is long. - And not carrying on any vulgar profession - is noble, for a gentleman does not live in dependence on others.

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We must also assume, for the purpose of praise - or blame, that qualities which closely resemble the real qualities are identical - with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold and designing, the - simpleton good-natured, and the emotionless gentle. And in each case we must adopt a term from qualities closely - connected, always in the more favorable sense; for instance, the choleric and - passionate man may be spoken of as frank and open, the arrogant as magnificent - and dignified; those in excess - as possessing the corresponding virtue,Those - whose qualities are extreme may be described as possessing the virtues of - which these are the excess. the fool-hardy as courageous, the - recklessly extravagant as liberal. For most people will think so, and at the - same time a fallacious argument may be drawn from the motive; for if a man risks - his life when there is no necessity, much more will he be thought likely to do - so when it is honorable; and if he is lavish to all comers, the more so will he - be to his friends; for the height of virtue is to do good to all. We ought also to consider in whose presence we - praise, for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among - Athenians.Plat. Menex. 235d. We ought also to speak of what is - esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or - philosophers,Thus, the Scythians may be - assumed to be brave and great hunters; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and - brief in speech; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should - be praised accordingly. as actually existing there. And, generally - speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed as noble, since there seems - to be a close resemblance between the two.That is, to\ ti/mion looks as if it were - really kalo/n, and should be spoken as if it - were so. - Again, all such actions as are in accord with - what is fitting are noble; if, for instance, they are worthy of a man's - ancestors or of his own previous achievements; for to obtain additional honor is - noble and conduces to happiness. Also, if the tendency of what is done is better - and nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected; for instance, if a man is - moderate in good fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when he becomes - greater, he is better and more forgiving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, - “Look what I started from !”Cp. 7.32 above. and of the Olympian victor: - - Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish - from Argos to Tegea.Frag. 111 (P.L.G. - 3.). - - - and of Simonides: - - Daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants.Archedice, daughter of Hippias, tyrant of - Athens, and wife - of Aeantides, son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus. - -

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Since praise is founded on actions, and acting - according to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy man, we must endeavor - to show that a man is acting in that manner, and it is useful that it should - appear that he has done so on several occasions. For this reason also one must - assume that accidents and strokes of good fortune are due to moral purpose; for - if a number of similar examples can be adduced, they will be thought to be signs - of virtue and moral purpose.

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Now praise is language that sets forth - greatness of virtue; hence it is necessary to show that a man's actions are - virtuous. But encomium deals with achievements—all attendant - circumstances, such as noble birth and education, merely conduce to persuasion; - for it is probable that virtuous parents will have virtuous offspring and that a - man will turn out as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce an encomium upon - those who have achieved something. Achievements, in fact, are signs of moral - habit; for we should praise even a man who had not achieved anything, if we felt - confident that he was likely to do so. Blessing and felicitation are identical with each other, but are not the same - as praise and encomium, which, as virtue is contained in happiness, are - contained in felicitation.

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Praise and counsels have a common aspect; for - what you might suggest in counseling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase. - Accordingly, when we know what we ought to do and the qualities we - ought to possess, we ought to make a change in the phrase and turn it, employing - this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that “one - ought not to pride oneself on goods which are due to fortune, but on those which - are due to oneself alone,” when expressed in this way, has the force - of a suggestion; but expressed thus, “he was proud, not of goods which - were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone,” it - becomes praise. Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would - suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise. The form of the expression will necessarily be - opposite, when the prohibitive has been changed into the non-prohibitive.In the first sentence, the statement is - imperative, there is a prohibition; in the second, it is a simple - affirmative, implying praise. In the one case there is forbidding, in the - other not-forbidding, which are opposites.

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We must also employ many of the means of - amplification; for instance, if a man has done anything alone, or first, or with - a few, or has been chiefly responsible for it; all these circumstances render an - action noble. Similarly, topics derived from times and seasons, that is to say, - if our expectation is surpassed. Also, if a man has often been successful in the - same thing; for this is of importance and would appear to be due to the man - himself, and not to be the result of chance. And if it is for his sake that - distinctions which are an encouragement or honor have been invented and - established; and if he was the first on whom an encomium was pronounced, as - Hippolochus,Nothing more is known of - him. or to whom a statue was set up in the market-place, as to Harmodius - and Aristogiton.Who slew Hipparchus, tyrant - of Athens. And similarly - in opposite cases. If he does not furnish you with enough material in - himself,you must compare him with others, as - Isocrates used to do, because of his inexperienceReading a)sunh/qeian. He had - no legal practice, which would have shown the irrelevancy of comparisons in - a law court, whereas in epideictic speeches they are useful. sunh/qeian gives exactly the opposite sense, and - must refer to his having written speeches for others to deliver in the - courts. of forensic speaking. And you must compare him with - illustrious personages, for it affords ground for amplification and is noble, if - he can be proved better than men of worth. Amplification is with good reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since - it consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the things that are noble. - That is why, if you cannot compare him with illustrious personages, you must - compare him with ordinary persons, since superiority is thought to indicate - virtue. Speaking generally, of the topics - common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable for - epideictic speakers, whose subject is actions which are not disputed, so that - all that remains to be done is to attribute beauty and importance to them. - Examples are most suitable for deliberative speakers, for it is by examination - of the past that we divine and judge the future. Enthymemes are most suitable - for forensic speakers, because the past, by reason of its obscurity, above all - lends itself to the investigation of causes and to demonstrative proof. - Such are nearly all the materials of - praise or blame, the things which those who praise or blame should keep in view, - and the sources of encomia and invective; for when these are known their - contraries are obvious, since blame is derived from the contrary things.

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We have next - to speak of the number and quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms - are constructed which have for their object accusation and defence. Three things have to be considered; first, the nature - and the number of the motives which lead men to act unjustly; secondly, what is - the state of mind of those who so act; thirdly, the character and dispositions - of those who are exposed to injustice. We will - discuss these questions in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly.

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Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the - law. Now, the law is particular or general. By particular, I mean the written - law in accordance with which a state is administered; by general, the unwritten - regulations which appear to be universally recognized. Men act voluntarily when - they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done - voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is done with - premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he - does with a purpose.proai/resis (premeditation, deliberate or moral - choice) is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not - premeditated; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. Choice is a - voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, including the use of reason - and knowledge. In Aristot. Nic. Eth. - 11 Aristotle defines proai/resis as “a deliberate appetition of - (longing for, o)/recis) - things in our power,” as to which we should necessarily be - well-informed. - The motives which lead men to do injury and - commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more - vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust; for - example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily - pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,Or, “in the matter of ease,” taking - ta\ r(a/quma as = r(aqumi/a. the coward in regard to dangers, for fright - makes him desert his comrades in peril;the ambitious in - his desire for honor, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer - in his desire for victory, the rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the - foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, the shameless from - his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind - is unjust in regard to his special weakness.

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This will be perfectly clear, partly from what - has already been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about - the emotions. It remains to state the motives and character of those who do - wrong and of those who suffer from it. First, - then, let us decide what those who set about doing wrong long for or avoid; for - it is evident that the accuser must examine the number and nature of the motives - which are to be found in his opponent; the defendant, which of them are not to - be found in him. Now, all human actions are - either the result of man's efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance, - others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to - compulsion, others to nature, so that the things which men do not do of - themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. As for those - which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause, some are the result of habit, others of - longing, and of the latter some are due to rational, others to irrational - longing. Now wish is a - [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything - unless he thinks it is good; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all - the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature, - compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

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But it is superfluous to establish further - distinctions of men's acts based upon age, moral habits, or anything else. For - if the young happen to beIn the cases of the - young, the poor, and the rich, their youth etc. are only - “accidents,” accidental not real causes. Aristotle - defines to\ sumbebhko/s (Aristot. Met. 4.30) as - “that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it - as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for instance, if a man, - when digging a hole for a plant, finds a treasure.” The color of a - man's eyes is an “inseparable” accident, the fact that a - man is a lawyer is a “separabIe” accident. - irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not because of their youth - that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of - wealth or poverty; but the poor happen to desire wealth because of their lack of - it, and the rich desire unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure - them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or poverty, but desire, that - will be the mainspring of their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and - all the others who are said to act in accordance with their moral habits, will - act from the same causes, either from reason or emotion, but some from good - characters and emotions, and others from the opposite. Not but that it does happenthat such and - such moral habits are followed by such and such consequences; for it may be that - from the outset the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate man good - opinions and desires in the matter of pleasant things, in the intemperate man - the contrary. Therefore we must leave these - distinctions on one side, but we must examine what are the usual consequences of - certain conditions. For, if a man is fair or dark, tall or short, there is no - rule that any such consequences should follow, but if he is young or old, just - or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word, it will be necessary to take - account of all the circumstances that make men's characters different; for - instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate, it - will make a difference. We will, however, discuss this laterBook 2.12-18.; let us now speak of what remains to be - said here.

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Things which are the result of chance are all - those of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen without any end in - view, and that neither always, nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of - chance will make this clear. Things which are - the result of nature are all those of which the cause is in themselves and - regular; for they turn out - always, or generally, in the same way. As for those which happen contrary to - nature there is no need to investigate minutely whether their occurrence is due - to a certain force of nature or some other cause (it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to - chance). Those things are the result of compulsion which are done by - the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation. Things are the result of habit, when they are done - because they have often been done. Things are - the result of calculation which are done because, of the goods already - mentioned, they appear to be expedient either as an end or means to an end, - provided they are done by reason of their being expedient; for even the - intemperate do certain things that are expedient, for the sake, not of - expediency, but of pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts of - revenge. But there is a difference between - revenge and punishment; the latter is inflicted in the interest of the sufferer, - the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain - satisfaction. We will define anger when we - come to speak of the emotions.Book - 2.2. Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently - pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed - are among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not - naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them.

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In short, all things that men do of themselves either are, or seem,good or pleasant; and since men do voluntarily what they - do of themselves, and involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all that - men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is - or seems pleasant. For I reckon among good things the removal of that which is - evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a greater evil for a less, because these - two things are in a way desirable; in like manner, I reckon among pleasant - things the removal of that which is or appears painful, and the exchange of a - greater pain for a less. We must therefore make ourselves acquainted with the - number and quality of expedient and pleasant things. We have already spoken of the expedient when discussing deliberative - rhetoricCf. Book 1.6 above.; let - us now speak of the pleasant. And we must regard our definitions as sufficient - in each case, provided they are neither obscure nor too precise.

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Let it be - assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a sudden and - perceptible settling down into its natural state, and pain the opposite. - If such is the nature of pleasure, it is evident that that which - produces the disposition we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that which - destroys it or produces the contrary settling down is painful. Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant - to enter into a normal state (especially when what is done in - accordance with that state has come into its own again)The true nature of the “normal - state” was lost during the period of disturbance and - unsettlement.; and the same with habits. For that which has become - habitual becomes as it were natural; in fact, habit is something like nature, - for the distance between “often” and - “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of - “always,” habit to that of “often.” - That which is not compulsory is also - pleasant, for compulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is necessary is - painful, and it was rightly said, - - For every act of necessity is disagreeable.From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G. - 2.): see Introd. - - Application, study, and intense effort are also painful, for these - involve necessity and compulsion, if they have not become habitual; for then - habit makes them pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant; wherefore - states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation,Or “rest” - (bodily). and sleep are among pleasant things, - because none of these is in any way compulsory. Everything of which we have in us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a - longing for the pleasant.

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Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those - that are not the result of anyassumption.There is no consideration or - “definite theory” (Jebb, Welldon) of - the results that may follow. The desires arise without anything of the kind; - they simply come. Such are all those which are called natural; for - instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the - desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular; - the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch, - smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our - being convinced; for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire - when we have heard them spoken of and are convinced that they are pleasant.

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And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a - certain emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, then both the man who - remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he - remembers or hopes.The passage e)pei\ d' e)sti\ . . . ai)/sqhsis has been - punctuated in two ways. (1) With a full stop at e)lpi/zei (Roemer, Jebb). The - conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are accompanied by imagination - of what is remembered or hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle - really wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of pleasure. - (2) With a comma at e)lpi/zei (Cope, Victorius). The steps in the - argument will then be: if pleasure is the sensation of a certain emotion; if - imagination is a weakened (faded) sensation; if one who - remembers or hopes is attended by an imagination of what he remembers or - hopes; then, this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or hopes, - since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and a kind of movement - (sect. 1). fantasi/a, the - faculty of forming mental images (variously translated - “imagination,” “mental impression,” - “fantasy”) is defined by Aristotle - (Aristot. De Anima - 3.3.11) as a kind of movement, which cannot - arise apart from sensation, and the movement produced must resemble the - sensation which produced it. But fantasi/a - is more than this; it is not merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place - midway between sense and intellect; while imagination has need of the - senses, the intellect has need of imagination. If fantasi/a is referred to an earlier perception of which the - sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination carries the sense images - ( fanta/smata) to the seat - of memory. They are then transformed into memory (of something - past) or hope (of something future) and are - handed on to the intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his - edition of the De Anima.) This being so, it - is evident that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who - hope, since there is sensation. Therefore all - pleasant things must either be present in sensation, or past in recollection, or - future in hope; for one senses the present, recollects the past, and hopes for - the future. Therefore our recollections are pleasant, not only - when they recall things which when present were agreeable, but also some things - which were not, if their consequence subsequently proves honorable or good; - whence the saying: - - Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it,Euripides, Andromeda - (Frag. 133, T.G.F.). - - and, - - When a man has suffered much and accomplished much, he afterwards - takes pleasure even in his sorrows when he recalls them.Hom. - Od. 15.400-401, but misquoted in the second line, - which runs: o(/s tis dh\ ma/la polla\ - pa/qh| kai\ po/ll' e)palhqh=|. - - - The reason of this is that even to be free from - evil is pleasant. Things which we hope for are pleasant, when their presence - seems likely to afford us great pleasure or advantage, without the accompaniment - of pain. In a word, all things that afford pleasure by their presence as a rule - also afford pleasure when we hope for or remember them. Wherefore even - resentment is pleasant, as Homer said of anger that it is - - Far sweeter than dripping honey;Hom. Il. - 18.109. - - for no one feels resentment against those whom vengeance clearly cannot - overtake, or those who are far more powerful than he is; against such, men feel - either no resentment or at any rate less.

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Most of our desires are accompanied by a - feeling of pleasure, for the recollection of a past or the hope of a future - pleasure creates a certain pleasurable enjoyment; thus, those suffering from - fever and tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of having drunk and the hope - that they will drink again. The lovesick - always take pleasure in talking, writing,or composing - versesOr “doing something that - has to do with the beloved.” about the beloved; for it - seems to them that in all this recollection makes the object of their affection - perceptible. Love always begins in this manner, when men are happy not only in - the presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when they recall him to - mind. This is why, even when his absence is - painful, there is a certain amount of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation; - for the pain is due to his absence, but there is pleasure in remembering and, as - it were, seeing him and recalling his actions and personality. Wherefore it was - rightly said by the poet; - - Thus he spake, and excited in all a desire of weeping.Hom. Il. - 23.108, on the occasion of the mourning for - Patroclus; Hom. Od. 4.183, - referring to the mourning for the absence of - Odysseus. - -

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And revenge is pleasant; for if it is painful - to be unsuccessful, it is pleasant to succeed. Now, those who are resentful are - pained beyond measure when they fail to secure revenge, while the hope of it - delights them. Victory is pleasant, not only - to those who love to conquer, but to all; for there is produced an idea of - superiority, which all with more or less eagerness desire. And since victory is pleasant, competitive and - disputatiousControversiae or - school rhetorical exercises, as well as arguing in the law courts; unless - e)ristika/s means simply “in - which there is rivalry.” amusements must be so too, for victories are often gained - in them; among these we may include games with knuckle-bones, ball-games, - dicing, and draughts. It is the same with serious sports; for some become - pleasant when one is familiar with them, while others are so from the outset, - such as the chase and every description of outdoor sport; for rivalry implies - victory. It follows from this that practice in the law courts and disputation - are pleasant to those who are familiar with them and well qualified. Honor and good repute are among the most pleasant - things, because every one imagines that he possesses the qualities of a worthy - man, and still more when those whom he believes to be trustworthy say that he - does. Such are neighbors rather than those who live at a distance; intimate - friends and fellow-citizens rather than those who are unknown; contemporaries - rather than those who come later; the sensible rather than the senseless; the - many rather than the few; for such persons are more likely to be trustworthy - than their opposites. As for those for whom men feel great contempt, such as - children and animals, they pay no heed to their respect or esteem, or, if they - do, it is not for the sake of their esteem, but for some other reason.

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A friend also is among pleasant things, for it - is pleasant to loveFor the meaning of - fili/a, filei=n cf. Book - 2.4.—for no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in - it—just as it is pleasant to be loved; for in this case also a man has - an impression that he is really endowedwith good - qualities, a thing desired by all who perceive it; and to be loved is to be - cherished for one's own sake. And it is - pleasant to be admired, because of the mere honor. Flattery and the flatterer - are pleasant, the latter being a sham admirer and friend. It is pleasant to do the same things often; for that - which is familiar is, as we said, pleasant. Change also is pleasant, since change is in the order of nature; for perpetual - sameness creates an excess of the normal condition; whence it was said: - - Change in all things is sweet.Eur. Orest. - 234. - - This is why what we only see at intervals, whether men or things, is - pleasant; for there is a change from the present, and at the same time it is - rare. And learning and admiring are as a rule - pleasant; for admiring implies the desire to learn, so that what causes - admiration is to be desired, and learning implies a return to the normal.True knowledge or philosophy, which is the - result of learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal or - settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure, which is defined - (11.1) as a settling down of the soul into its natural - state after a period of disturbance. - It is pleasant to bestow and to receive - benefits; the latter is the attainment of what we desire, the former the possession of more than - sufficient means,Or, “larger means - than the person benefited.” both of them things that men - desire. Since it is pleasant to do good, it must also be pleasant for men to set - their neighbors on their feet, and to supply their deficiencies. And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all - things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of - imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, - even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this that causes - pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object - imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something. - The same may be said of sudden changes and - narrow escapes from danger; for all these things excite wonder. And since that which is in accordance with nature is - pleasant, and things which are akin are akin in accordance with nature, all - things akin and like are for the most part pleasant to each other, as man to - man; horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the proverbs: - The old have charms for the old, the young for the - young,Like to like,Hom. Od. 17.218 - w(s ai)ei\ to\n o(moi=on a)/gei qeo\s w(s to\n - o(moi=on.Beast knows - beast,Birds of a feather flock together,Literally, “ever jackdaw to - jackdaw.” and all similar sayings.

-

And since things which are akin and like are - always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this - in regard to himself, it must needs bethat all men are - more or less selfish; for it is in himself above all that such conditionsOf likeness and kinship. are to be - found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it follows that all find pleasure in - what is their own, such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are - fond of those who flatter and love them, of honor, and of children; for the last - are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting,11.22. - for then it becomes our work. And since it is - most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wiseBoth practically and speculatively or - philosophically. for practical wisdom is commanding, and philosophy - consists In the knowledge of many things that excite wonder. Further, since men - are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with - our neighbors. And if a man thinks he excels - in anything, he likes to devote his time to it; as Euripides says: - - And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens - to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.Antiope - (Frag. 183, T.G.F.). - - - Similarly, since amusement, every kind of - relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words, - or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the - Poetics.Only the - definition appears in the existing text; “The ridiculous is an - error, painless and non-destructive ugliness (Aristot. Poet. - 5).” Let this suffice for things that are - pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.

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Such are the - motives of injustice; let us now state the frame of mind of those who commit it, - and who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when they think that it can be - done and that it can be done by them; when they think that their action will - either be undiscovered, or if discovered will remain unpunished; or if it is - punished, that the punishment will be less than the profit to themselves or to - those for whom they care. As for the kind of - things which seem possible or impossible, we will discuss them later,Book 2.19. for these topics are common - to all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong think they are most likely to - be able to do so with impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, experienced - in judicial trials, if they have many friends, and if they are wealthy. - They think there is the greatest chance of - their being able to do so, if they themselves belong to the above classes; if - not, if they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do; for thanks to these - qualities they are able to commit wrong and to escape discovery and punishment. - Similarly, if they are friends of those who - are being wronged, or of the judges; for friends are not on their guard against - being wronged and, besides, they prefer reconciliationto - taking proceedings; and judges favor those whom they are fond of, and either let - them off altogether or inflict a small penalty.

-

Those are likely to remain undetected whose - qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a man wanting in - physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly - manTwo different persons. If the second - o( be omitted, the reference is to - one. of adultery. Also, if the acts are done quite openly and in sight of - all; for they are not guarded against, because no one would think them possible. - Also, if they are so great and of such a - nature that no one would even be likely to attempt them, for these also are not - guarded against; for all guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no one - takes precautions against those ailments from which no one has ever yet - suffered. And those who have either no enemy at - all or many; the former hope to escape notice because they are not watched, the - latter do escape because they would not be thought likely to attack those who - are on their guard and because they can defend themselves by the plea that they - would never have attempted it. And, those who - have ways or places of concealment for stolen property, or abundant - opportunities of disposing of it.Or, a - “resourceful mind.” And those who, even if they - do not remain undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the - judges. And those who, if a fine be imposed, can get payment in full set aside - or put off for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have nothing to - lose. And in cases where the profit is certain, - large, or immediate, while the punishment is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can be no - punishment equal to the advantages, as seems to be the case in a tyranny. - And when the unjust acts are real gains - and the only punishment is disgrace; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts - tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father or mother, as was the - case with Zeno,Who Zeno was, and what the - story, is unknown. while the punishment only involves loss of money, - exile, or something of the kind. For men do wrong from both these motives and in - both these conditions of mind; but the persons are not the same, and their - characters are exactly opposite.Some do wrong - for the sake of gain, others for the sake of praise; but the former - sacrifice honor for self-interest, the latter self-interest for honor. - And those who have often been undetected or - have escaped punishment; and those who have often been unsuccessful; for in such - cases, as in actual warfare, there are always men ready to return to the fight. - And all who hope for pleasure and profit - at once, while the pain and the loss come later; such are the intemperate, - intemperance being concerned with all things that men long for. And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is - immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting“More distant” - (Jebb).; for temperate and wiser men pursue such - aims. And those who may possibly be thought to - have acted by chance or from necessity, from some natural impulse or from habit, - in a word, to have committed an error rather than a crime. And those who hope to obtain indulgence; and all - those who are in need, which is of two kinds;for men - either need what is necessary, as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the - wealthy. And those who are highly esteemed or - held in great contempt; the former will not be suspected, the latter no more - than they are already.

-

In such a frame of mind men attempt to do - wrong, and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and circumstances of the - following kind.With a comma or colon after - ta\ toiau=ta; without these render: - “those who possess such things as they . . .” - Those who possess what they themselves lack, things either necessary, or - superfluous, or enjoyable; both those who are - far off and those who are near, for in the one case the gain is speedy, in the - other reprisals are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder - Carthaginians.Who were too far off to - retaliate. - And those who never take precautions and are - never on their guard, but are confiding; for all these are easily taken - unawares. And those who are indolent; for it requires a man who takes pains to - prosecute. And those who are bashful; for they are not likely to fight about - money. And those who have often been wronged - but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, “Mysian - booty.”A proverb meaning - “an easy prey.” The Mysians were regarded as cowardly - and unwarlike. - And those who have never, or those who have - often, suffered wrong; for both are off their guard, the one because they have - never yet been attacked, the others because they do not expect to be attacked - again. And those who have been slandered, or - are easy to slander; for such men neither care to go to law, for fear of the - judges, nor, if they do, can they convince them; to this class belong those who - are exposed to hatred or envy. And those against whom the wrongdoer can - pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, or their friends, have - either committed, or intended to commit, wrong either against himself, or his - ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard; for, as the proverb says, - “evil-doing only needs an excuse.” And both enemies and friends; for it is easy to injure the latter, - and pleasant to injure the former. And those who are friendless. And those who - are unskilled in speech or action; for either they make no attempt to prosecute, - or come to terms, or accomplish nothing. And - those to whom it is no advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or - damages, such as strangers or husbandmen; for they are ready to compromise on - easy terms and to drop proceedings. And those - who have committed numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they themselves - are suffering; for it seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer a - wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer; if, for instance, - one were to assault a man who was in the habit of outraging others.ai)ki/a - (assault) was a less serious offence than u(/bris (wanton outrage). - And those who have already injured us, or - intended, or intend, or are about to do so; for in such a case vengeance is both - pleasant and honorable, and seems to be almost an act of justice. And those whom we wrongoi(=s i.e. supplying a)dikoume/nois, “by whose being - wronged.” ou(\s has been - suggested, i.e. supplying a)dikou=ntes, - “wronging whom.” in order to ingratiate ourselves - with our friends, or persons whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word, - those by whom our life is ruled. And those in - reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining merciful consideration.In our relations with whom, almost = from whom. - Another interpretation is: “In reference to whom there is a chance - . . . consideration from others, meaning the judges” - (Welldon). And those against whom we have a - complaint, or with whom we have had a previous difference, as Callippus acted in - the matter ofDionCallipus was a friend of - Dion, who freed Syracuse from - Dionysius the Younger. He afterwards accused Dion and contrived his murder. His excuse was that - Dion knew what he intended to - do, and would be likely to strike first, if he did not anticipate - him.; for in such cases it seems almost an act of justice. And those who are going to be attacked by others, if - we do not attack first, since it is no longer possible to deliberate; thus, - Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to - Gelon,Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini, - being anticipated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neighboring state, sent - him the cottabus prize, as a compliment for having “played the - game” so skilfully. The cottabus was originally a Sicilian - game. who, having reduced a town to slavery, had anticipated him by doing - what he had intended to do himself. And those - to whom, after having injured them, we shall be enabled to do many acts of - justice, in the idea that it will he easy to repair the wrong; as Jason the - ThessalianTyrant of Pherae. said - one should sometimes commit injustice, in order to be able also to do justice - often.

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Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or - many are in the habit of committing, for they hope to be pardoned for their - offences. They steal objects that are easy to - conceal; such are things that are quickly consumed, as eatables; things which - can easily be changed in form or color or composition; things for which there are many convenient hiding-places, such as - those that are easy to carry or stow away in a corner; those of which a thief already possesses a considerable number - exactly similar or hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which the victims - are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages upon the women of their family, upon - themselves, or upon their children. And all those wrongs in regard to which - appeal to the law would create the appearance of litigiousness; such are wrongs - which are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the dispositions which - induce men to commit wrong, the nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of - persons who are the victims of wrong.

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Let us now - classify just and unjust actions generally, starting from what follows. Justice - and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in two ways. - Now there are two kinds of laws, particular - and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in - reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten; by - general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of - just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even - if there is neither communication nor agreement between them. This is what - Antigone in SophoclesSoph. Ant. 456. evidently means, when she declares that - it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just: - - For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity, these - statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came. - - And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that which has life, - for this is not right for some and wrong for others, - - But a universal precept, which extends without a break throughout the - wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth. - - AlcidamasOf Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is - not extant, but the scholiast supplies his words: e)leuqe/rous a)fh=ke pa/ntas qeo/s: ou)de/na dou=lon h( fu/sis - pepoi/hken (“God has left all men free; - Nature has made none a slave”). The Messenians had - revolted from Sparta. - also speaks of this precept in his Messeniacus. . . . And in relation to persons, there is a twofold - division of law; for what one ought to do or ought not to do is concernedwith the community generally, or one of its members.

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Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust acts, since they can be - committed against a definite individual or against the community; he who commits - adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against a definite individual, he who - refuses to serve in the army of wrong against the State. All kinds of wrong acts having been thus - distinguished, some of which affect the State, others one or several - individuals, let us repeat the definition of being wronged,1.10.3. and then go on to the rest. Being wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of - one who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established that injustice is a - voluntary act. And since the man who suffers - injustice necessarily sustains injury and that against his will, it is evident - from what has been said in what the injuries consist; for things good and bad - have already been distinguished in themselves,Book 1.6. and it has been said that voluntary acts are all such as - are committed with knowledge of the case.1.10.3. - Hence it necessarily follows that all - accusations concern the State or the individual, the accused having acted either - ignorantly and against his will, or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the - latter case with malice aforethought or from passion. We will speak of anger when we come to treat of the passions,Book 2.2. and we have already - statedBook 1.11, 12. in what - circumstances and with what dispositions men act with deliberate purpose.

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But since a man, while admitting the fact, often denies the description - of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that - he took something, but did not steal it; that he was the first to strike, but - committed no outrage; that he had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a - woman; or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege, since the - object in question was not consecrated; or that he trespassed, but not on public - land; or that he held converse with the enemy, but was not guilty of - treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should - be given of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we desire to prove - that an offence has or has not been committed, we may be able to put the case in - a true light. In all such instances the - question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrongdoer and a - worthless person, or not; for vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, - and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose; for if a man has - struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but - only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute - upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by - stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he - has taken it to injure anotherRoemer reads, - after Dittmeyer, ei) e)pi\ bla/bh| [tou/tou - a)f' ou(= e)/labe] kai\ . . . from the old Latin - translation or to get something for himself. It is the same in all - other cases as in these.

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We have said that there are two kinds of just - and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are - unwritten),and have spoken of those - concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are - two kinds. One kind arises from an excess of - virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honor or dishonor, and - rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, - to help one's friends, and the like;Laws are - special and general, the former being written or unwritten. The unwritten - law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general; - (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general - law (not the same as the general law “based upon - nature” sect. 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal - standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by a remarkable - degree ( kaq' u(perbolh/n) - of virtue or the opposite. For these laws do not prescribe any special - reward or punishment, but acts are praised or blamed, honored or dishonored, - rewarded or punished, in accordance with the general feeling of - mankind. the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written - law. For that which is equitable seems to be - just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law. These omissions - are sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the legislators; - involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when, being unable - to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal statement, which - is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult - to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,“Inexperience” - (Jebb). as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron - instrument used in wounding; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the - possibilities. If then no exact definition is - possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms; - so that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually - strikes, according to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not; and - this is a case for equity.

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If then our definition of equity is correct, it - is easy to see what things and persons are equitable or not. Actions which should be leniently treated are cases - for equity; errors, wrong acts, and misfortunes, must not be thought deserving - of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are unexpected and not - vicious; errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious; wrong acts are such as - might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from - vice. And it is equitable to pardon human - weaknesses, and to look, not to the law but to the legislator; not to the letter - of the law but to the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but - to the moral purpose; not to the part, but to - the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or - generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received - rather than those conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to - appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence;“To be willing that a judicial sentence should be - nominal rather than real” - (Jebb).to - preferarbitration to the law court, for the - arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks only to the law, and - the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. Let - this manner of defining equity suffice.

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Wrong acts are - greater in proportion to the injustice from which they spring. For this reason - the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the charge brought by - Callistratus1.7.13. Callistratus and - Melanopus were rival orators. Nothing is known of this particular - charge. against Melanopus that he had fraudulently kept back three - consecrated half-obols from the temple-buildersThe magistrates who superintended the building and repairing - operations.; whereas, in the case of just actions, it is quite the - contrary. The reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the less; for he - who has stolen three consecrated half-obols will commit any wrong whatever. - Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of - the injury done. A wrong act is greater when - there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is - no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it;Understanding i)a=sqai. Or “to punish adequately,” - supplying ou(= mh\ i)/sh timwri/a. - and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction, since it is - irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedies. And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has - inflicted some terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person deserves greater - punishment; wherefore Sophocles,An orator, - not the tragic poet. when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had - committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the punishment at - less than the victim had assessed it for himself. A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of - its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices“Or has been seldom paralleled” - (Cope, but cp. 1.9.38).; and when it has been - frequently committed; or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have - been sought and found: thus, at Argos - the citizen owing to whom a new law has been passed, is punished, as well as - those on whose account a new prison had to be built. The crime is greater, the more brutal it is; or when it has been for - a long time premeditated; when the recital of it inspires terror rather than - pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used:—the - statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles - of justice, for example, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted word, the - sanctity of marriage; for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime. Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very - place where wrongdoers themselves are sentenced, as is done by false witnesses; - for where would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a court of justice? - They are also greater when accompanied by the greatest disgrace; when committed - against one who has been the guilty person's benefactor, for in that case, the - wrongdoer is guilty of wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but - does not return good for good. So too, again, - when a man offends against the unwritten laws of right, for there is greater - merit in doing right without being compelledAnd therefore the violation of them is more discreditable.; now the - written laws involve compulsion, the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, - wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws; for a man who commits - wrongs that alarm himWhen he thinks of the - punishment they may entail. and involve punishment, will be ready to - commit wrongfor which he will not be punished. Let this - suffice for the treatment of the greater or less degree of wrongdoing.

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Following on - what we have just spoken of, we have now briefly to run over what are called the - inartificial proofs, for these properly belong to forensic oratory. These proofs are five in number: laws, witnesses, - contracts, torture, oaths. Let us first then - speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or - dissuading,Although the use of - inartificial proofs is almost entirely confined to forensic oratory, they - may be used in deliberative oratory. accusing or - defending. For it is evident that, if the - written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and - equity, as more in accordance with justice; and - we must argue that, when the dicast takes an oath to decide to the best of his - judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws; - that equity is ever constant and never - changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written - laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself - for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to - the unwritten law: - - For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . . this I - was not likely [to infringe through fear of the - pride] of any man);The first line is quoted 1.13.2. The second - differs somewhat from Soph. Ant. - 458, where the passage runs, tou/twn e)gw\ ou)k e)/mellon, a)ndro\s ou)deno\s fro/nhma - dei/sas', e)n qeoi=si th\n di/khn dw/sein - (“I was not likely, through fear of the pride - of any man, to incur the penalty for violating these statutes at - the bar of heaven”). - - - and further, that justice is real and - expedient, but not that which only appears just; nor the written law either, - because it does not do the work of the lawWhich is the administration of real justice, not that which appears to the - legislator to be such and is embodied in legal enactments.; that the - judge is like an assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from - genuine justice; that it is the part of a - better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the written - law.Cp.14.7 above. - Again, it is necessary to see whether the law - is contradictory to another approved law or to itself; for instance, one law - enacts that all contracts should be binding, while another forbids making - contracts contrary to the law. If the meaning - of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about, and see in which way it is to be - interpreted so as to suit the application of justice or expediency, and have - recourse to that. If the conditions which led - to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself remains, one - must endeavor to make this clear and to combat the law by this argument. - But if the written law favors our case, we - must say that the oath of the dicast “to decide to the best of his - judgement” does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but - is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of - the meaning of the law; that no one chooses that which is good absolutely, but - that which is good for himself;that there is no - difference between not using the laws and their not being enacted; that in the - other arts there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician, for - an error on his part does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying the - authority; that to seek to be wiser than the laws is just what is forbidden in - the most approved laws. Thus much for the laws.

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Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent; - of the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are outside it. By - ancient I mean the poets and men of repute whose judgements are known to all; - for instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis, appealed to Homer*ai)/as d' e)k *salami=nos a)/gen duokai/deka - nh=as, sth=se d' a)/gwn i(/n' *a)qhnai/wn i(/stanto fa/lagges, - Hom. Il. 2.557-558. The - Lacedaemonians, acting as arbitrators between Athens and Megara, who were fighting - for the possession of Salamis, - decided in favor of Athens on - the strength of the two lines in the Iliad, which were taken - to show that Salamis belonged to - Athens. It was reported that - the second line was the invention of Solon. as a witness, and - recently the inhabitants of Tenedos - to Periander of CorinthIt is not known to what this refers. - against the Sigeans. Cleophon also made use of the elegiacs of Solon against - Critias, to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness, - otherwise Solon would never have written: - - Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.(Frag. 22, - P.L.G. 2, where the line runs, ei)pe/menai *kriti/a| canqo/trixi patro\s - a)kou/ein). The Critias attacked by - Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the first. - Cleophon argued from the phrase “bid him listen to his - father” that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a - degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the family, - and probably meant to praise the father. - - - One should appeal to such witnesses for the - past, but also to interpreters - of oracles for the future; thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the - wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.Hdt. 7.141. Further, - proverbs, as stated,They have not been - mentioned before. Spengel would therefore omit ei)/rhtai, and remove the commas: “proverbs are, as - it were, evidence.” are evidence; for instance, if one man - advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the - proverb, Never do good to an old man. And if he advises another - to kill the children, after having killed the fathers, he can say, - - Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the children to - live.From the - Cypria of Stasinus, of the “epic - cycle.” - -

-

By recent witnesses I mean all well-known - persons who have given a decision on any point, for their decisions are useful - to those who are arguing about similar cases. Thus for instance, Eubulus,Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian - commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known of Archibius. Plato is - probably the comic poet. when attacking Chares in the law courts, - made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, “that the open - confession of wickedness had increased in the city.” And those who share the risk of the trial, if they - are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only serve to establish whether an - act has taken place or not, whether it is or is not the case; but if it is a - question of the quality of the act, for instance, whether it is just or unjust, - expedient or inexpedient, they are not - competent witnesses; but witnesses from a distanceOr, “witnesses wholly unconnected with the - case.” are very trustworthy even in regard to this. But - ancient witnesses are the most trustworthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. - In regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man has no witnesses, he can - say that the decision should be given in accordance with probabilities, and that - this is the meaning of the oath “according to the best of one's - judgement”; that probabilities cannotbe bribed - to deceive, and that they cannot be convicted of bearing false witness. But if a - man has witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that probabilities - incur no responsibility, and that there would have been no need of evidence, if - an investigation according to the arguments were sufficient. Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our - adversary, as to the fact itself or moral character; so that it is evident that - one never need lack useful evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact - itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor against our opponent, it - will always be possible to obtain some evidence as to character that will - establish either our own respectability or the worthlessness of our opponent. - As for all the other questions relative to - a witness, whether he is a friend, an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or - middling reputation, and for all other differences of this kind, we must have - recourse to the same topics as those from which we derive our enthymemes.

-

As for contracts, argument may be used to the - extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance, of proving that they do or - do not deserve credit. If we - have them on our side, we must try to prove them worthy of credit and - authoritative; but if they are on the side of our opponent, we must do the - opposite. In view of rendering them worthy or - unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is exactly the same as in the case - of witnesses; for contracts are trustworthy according to the character of their - signatories or depositaries. When the existence of the contract is admitted, if - it is in our favor, we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract is a - law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that make the law - authoritative, but it is the laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a - general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever disobeys or - subverts a contract, subverts the laws. Further, most ordinary and all voluntary transactions are carried out - according to contract; so that if you destroy the authority of contracts, the - mutual intercourse of men is destroyed. All other arguments suitable to the - occasion are easy to see. But if the contract - is against us and in favor of our opponents, in the first place those arguments - are suitable which we should oppose to the law if it were against us; that it - would be strange if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to obey - ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we should be obliged to consider - ourselves always bound by contracts.Or, that - the judgeis the dispenser of justice; so that it is not - the contents of the contract that he has to consider, but what is juster. - Further, that one cannot alter justice - either by fraud or compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas contracts - may be entered into under both conditions. In addition to this, we must examine - whether the contract is contrary to any written law of our own or foreign - countries, or to any general law, or to other previous or subsequent contracts. - For either the latter are valid and the former not, or the former are right and - the latter fraudulent; we may put it in whichever way it seems fit. We must also - consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way - opposed to the interest of the judges. There are a number of other arguments of - the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.

-

Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears - trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached to it. Nor is it difficult - to see what may be said concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our - favor, we can exaggerate its importance by asserting that it is the only true - kind of evidence; but if it is - against us and in favor of our opponent, we can destroy its value by telling the - truth about all kinds of torture generally; for those under compulsion are as - likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to endure everything - rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false charges - against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture. It is also - necessary to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with which the judges - are acquainted. It may also be said that evidence given under torture is not - true; for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and those who are - stout-hearted heroically hold out under sufferings, while the cowardly and - cautious, before they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough; wherefore - evidence from torture may be considered utterly untrustworthy.

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As to oathsIn Attic legal procedure, the challenge ( pro/klhsis) to take an oath on the question at issue - was one method of deciding it. One party offered the other something to - swear by ( di/dwsi - o(/rkon), this being the real meaning of o(/rkos, and the other party either accepted - ( lamba/nei, de/xetai) it - or refused it. Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take the - oath. four divisions may be made; for either we tender an oath and - accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we - either tender but do not accept, or accept but do not tender. Besides this, one - may consider whether the oath has already been taken by us or by the other - party. If you do not tender the oath to the - adversary, it is because men readily perjure themselves, and because, after he - has taken the oath, he will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does not - take the oath, you think that the dicasts will condemn him; and also because the - risk incurred in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, for you have - confidence in them, but not in your adversary.There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1) - men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are likely to benefit by - doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the oath, he will - decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted, whereas, if he is not on - his oath, he will probably be condemned; (3) there is less - risk in leaving the decision to the dicasts, who can be trusted. - If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you - may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money; that, if you had - been a scoundrel, you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a - scoundrel for something than for nothing; that, if you take it, you will win - your case, if not, you will probably lose it; consequently, your refusal to take - it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the - apophthegm of XenophanesBorn at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of - philosophy. is apposite— that “it is unfairfor an impious man to challenge a pious one,” - for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. - If you accept the oath, you may say that - you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the - apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the only fair way is that the impious man should - tender the oath and the pious man take it; and that it would be monstrous to - refuse to take the oath yourself, while demanding that the judges should take it - before giving their verdict. But if you tender - the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to be willing to leave the - matter to the gods; that your opponent has no need to look for other judges, for - you allow him to make the decision himself; and that it would be ridiculous that he should be unwilling to take an oath in - cases where he demands that the dicasts should take one.

-

Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is - clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two; for instance, if we - wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to - accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other. For such cases, and similarly the - arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have - already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is - not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, - what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury - consists in the intention, not in what is said.The defence in such cases is: (1) that the - previous oath was taken as a result of fraud or compulsion; - (2) that you did not mean what you said. But if the - opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what - be has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an - oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]: - “They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they - themselves do not abide by theirs.” Further, we should employ all - means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.

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- - - -

Such then are - the materials which we must employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and - blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the opinions and propositions that - are useful to produce conviction in these circumstances; for they are the - subject and source of enthymemes,which are specially - suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.This is Cope's interpretation. Jebb renders: - “If we take each branch of Rhetoric by itself.” The - classes are of course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. - But since the object of Rhetoric is - judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and - judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to - consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also - that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should - know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. For it makes a great difference with regard to - producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, - in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be - possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is - disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should - be disposed in a certain way towards him.The - instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof should suffice; but - since the function of Rhetoric is to find the available means of persuasion - and its end is a judgement; and since an appeal to the speaker's own - character and to the passions of those who are to give the judgement is - bound to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with rules for - ethical and “pathetic” (emotional) - proofs. In Book 1.5 Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with - disapproval, but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those - which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (e.g. stirring up - envy, hatred, a desire for revenge). - In deliberative oratory, it is more useful that - the orator should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, that the - hearer should be disposed in a certain way; for opinions vary, according as men - love or hate, are wrathful or mild, and things appear either altogether different, or different in - degree; for when a man is favorably disposed towards one on whom he is passing - judgement, he either thinks that the accused has committed no wrong at all or - that his offence is trifling; but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And - if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come - is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good; but if - a man is unemotional or not hopefulOpposed to - eu)e/lpidi. Others render “in - a bad humor.” it is quite the reverse.

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For the orator to produce conviction three - qualities are necessary; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which - induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and - goodwill; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they - give, because they lack either all three or one of them. For either through want of sense they form incorrect - opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say - what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,e)pieikh/s and spoudai=os both = a)gaqo/s. In a restricted sense e)pieikh/s is “respectable,” spoudai=os “serious.” - they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best - advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are - necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily - convince his hearers. The means whereby he may - appear sensible and goodSee previous - note. must be inferred from the classification of the virtues;Book 1.9. for to make himself appear - such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others. We must - now speak of goodwill and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.

-

The emotions are all those affections which - cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are - accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar - emotions and their contraries. And each of them - must be divided under three heads; for instance, in regard to anger, the - disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are - usually angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger. For if we knew one or - even two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse - that emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, we have given a list - of propositionsIn Book 1 generally - (cp. 1.2.22). in what we have previously said, we - will do the same here and divide the emotions in the same manner.

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Let us then - define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge - for a real or apparent slight,Gomperz - translates fainome/nhs “real or - apparent”; Jebb omits fainome/nhs - and translates fainome/nhn - “apparent”; Cope confines both to the meaning - “manifest.” affecting a man himself or one of his - friends, when such a slight is undeserved. If - this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular - individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men - generally), and - because this individual has done, or was on the point of doing, something - against him or one of his friends; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a - certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to - think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what is - obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is - possible for himself. Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that - - Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men's - hearts.Hom. Il. 18.109 (cp. - 1.11.9). - - for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this reason - first,The thought of revenge in the - future, as distinguished from dwelling upon it in the present. and - also because men dwell upon the thought of revenge, and the vision that rises - before us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams.

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Slighting is an actualization of opinion in - regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or - good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are - of no importance or triflingOr, - “those in which this tendency does not exist, or is - trifling.” we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: - disdain, spitefulness, and insult. For he who - disdains, slights, since men disdain those things which they consider valueless - and slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man appears to show disdain; - for spitefulness consists in placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, - not in order that any advantage may accrue to him who spites, but to prevent any - accruing to the other. Since then he does not act in this manner from - self-interest, it is a slight;for it is evident that he - has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be - afraid of him instead of slighting him; nor that he will be of any use to him - worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his - friend.Or, “how to make him his - friend,” fi/los being for fi/lon by attraction.

-

Similarly, he who insults another also slights - him; for insultIn Attic law u(/bris (insulting, degrading - treatment) was a more serious offence than ai)ki/a (bodily ill-treatment). It was the - subject of a State criminal prosecution ( grafh/), ai)ki/a of - a private action ( di/kh) - for damages. The penalty was assessed in court, and might even be death. It - had to be proved that the defendant struck the first blow - (2.24.9). One of the best known instances is the action - brought by Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on himself, - when choregus of his tribe and responsible for the equipment of - a chorus for musical competitions at public festivals. consists in - causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any - other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one's - own pleasure; for retaliation is not insult, but punishment. The cause of the pleasure felt by those who insult is - the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing superiority. - That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults; for they think that, - in committing them, they are showing their superiority. Dishonor is - characteristic of insult; and one who dishonors another slights him; for that - which is worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence Achilles in his - wrath exclaims: - - He has dishonored me, since he keeps the prize he has taken for - himself,Hom. Il. 1.356. - - and - - [has treated me] like a dishonored vagrant,Hom. Il. - 9.648. metana/sths, - lit. “one who changes his home,” used as a - term of reproach. - - - as if being angry for these reasons. Now men - think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to - them in birth, power, and virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respecttau)tw=|. Other readings are - tau=ta, or tis. a man is far superior to another; for example, the - rich man to the poor man in the matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent - speaker in the matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, and the man who - thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it - has been said: - - Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus,Hom. Il. - 2.196. - - and - - Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his resentment,Hom. Il. - 1.82. The words are those of the soothsayer Calchas - to Achilles, and the reference is to Agamemnon. - - for kings are resentful in consideration of their superior rank. - Further, men are angry at slights from - those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated; such - are those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, either - themselves, or some one else for them, or one of their friends; and all those - whom they desire, or did desire, to benefit.

-

It is now evident from these considerations what - is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom they are angry, and for - what reasons. Men are angry when they are pained, because one who is pained aims - at something; if then anyone directly opposes him in anything, as, for instance, - prevents him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but seems to be doing - just the same; and if anyone goes against him or refuses to assist him, or - troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with - all such persons. Wherefore the sick, the - necessitous, [those at war], the lovesick, the thirsty, in a - word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and - easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present - condition; for instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his - illness,toi=s pro\s - th\n no/son: lit. “the sick man [is angry - with those who slight him] in regard to his illness,” - that is, by making light of it. the necessitous in regard to his - poverty, the warrior in regard to warlike affairs, the - lover in regard to love affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passionOr, “his suffering at the - moment.” present in his mind in each case paves the way for - his anger. Again, men are angry when the event - is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more - it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they - desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what are the seasons, times, - states of mind, and conditions of age in which we are easily movedeu)ki/nhtoi - refers grammatically to diaqe/seis and - h(liki/ai. to anger; and what are - the various times, places, and reasons, which make us more prone to anger in - proportion as we are subject to their influence.

-

Such then are the dispositions of those who are - easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their anger, men are angry with - those who ridicule, mock, and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with - those who injure them in ways that are indications of insult. But these acts - must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to - those who commit them; for if they are, they then appear due to gratuitous - insult. And men are angry with those who speak - ill of or despise things which they themselves consider of the greatest - importance; for instance, if a man speaks contemptuously of philosophy or of - personal beauty in the presence of those who pride themselves upon them; and so - in all other cases. But they are far more - angry if they suspect that they do not possess these qualities, either not at - all, or not to any great extent, or when others do not think they possess them. - For when they feel - strongly that they do possess those qualities which are the subject of mockery, - they pay no heed to it. And they are more - angry with those who are their friends than with those who are not, for they - think that they have a right to be treated well by them rather than ill. - And they are angry with those who have - been in the habit of honoring and treating them with respect, if they no longer - behave so towards them; for they think that they are being treated with contempt - by them, otherwise they would treat them as before. And with those who do not return their kindnesses nor requite them - in full; and with those who oppose them, if they are inferiors; for all such - appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if they regarded them as - inferiors, the former as if they had received kindnesses from inferiors.

-

And they are more angry with those who are of - no account, if they slight them; for anger at a slight was assumed to be felt at - those who ought not to behave In such a manner; for inferiors ought not to - slight their superiors. And they are angry - with friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them well, and in an even - greater degree, if they do the opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they - want something from them, as PlexippusPlexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is obscure. It may refer - to Meleager giving the skin of the Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his - uncle wanted. One of Antiphon's tragedies was named Meleager - (T.G.F. p.792). in Antiphon's - tragedy reproached Meleager; for failure to perceive this is a sign of slight; - since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.Literally, “for the things which (= the - persons whom) one respects, do not escape notice.” - And they are angry with those who rejoice, or - in a general way are cheerful when they are unfortunate; for this is an - indication of enmity or slight. And with those who do not care if they pain - them;whence they are angry with those who bring bad - news. And with those who listen to the tale of - their faults, or look on them with indifference, for they resemble slighters or - enemies; for friends sympathize and all men - are pained to see their own faults exposed.The real friend, therefore, would feel as much pain as the other whose - faults are exposed. And further, with those who slight them before - five classes of persons: namely, their rivals, those whom they admire, those by - whom they would like to be admired, those whom they respect, or those who - respect them; when anyone slights them before these, their anger is greater. - They are also angry with those who slight - such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not to defend, for instance, - parents, children, wives, and dependents.Cope - translates “rulers and governors”; but can a)/rxesqai be used in a middle sense? And - with those who are ungrateful,To avoid the - apparent tautology ( 2.17), Roemer - (<persName><surname>Rhein</surname></persName>. - Mus. 39 p. 503) boldly conjectures xai/rein: “not to return another's - greeting.” for the slight is contrary to all sense of - obligation. And with those who employ irony, - when they themselves are in earnest; for irony - shows contempt. And with those who do good to others, but not to them; for not - to think them worthy of what they bestow upon all others also shows contempt. - Forgetfulness also is a cause of anger, - such as forgetting names, although it is a mere trifle, since even forgetfulness - seems a sign of slight; for it is caused by indifference, and indifference is a - slight. We have thus stated at one and the same time the - frame of mind and the reasons which make men angry, and the objects of their - anger. It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his - eloquence, to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined - to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse - men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.

-

And since - becoming angry is the opposite of becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we must - determine the state of mind which makes men mild, towards whom they become mild, - and the reasons which make them so. Let us then - define making mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger. If then men are angry with those who slight them, and - slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild towards those who do none - of these things, or do them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such; - and towards those who intended the opposite - of what they have done, and all who behave in the same way to themselves, for no - one is likely to slight himself. And towards - those who admit and are sorry for a slight; for finding as it were satisfaction - in the pain the offenders feel at what they have done, men cease to be angry. - Evidence of this may be seen in the punishment of slaves; for we punish more - severely those who contradict us and deny their offence, but cease to be angry - with those who admit that they are justly punished. The reason is that to deny - what is evident is disrespect, and disrespectis slight - and contempt; anyhow, we show no respect for - those for whom we entertain a profound contempt. Men also are mild towards those - who humble themselves before them and do not contradict them, for they seem to - recognize that they are inferior; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and no - one who is afraid slights another. Even the behavior of dogs proves that anger - ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit - down.e)capi/nhs d' - *o)dush=a i)/don ku/nes u(lako/mwpoi: oi( me\n keklh/gontes e)pe/dramon: - au)ta\r *o)dusseu/s e(/zeto kerdosu/nh| (Hom. Od. 14.29-31). - And men are mild towards those who are serious - with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated - seriously, not with contempt. And towards those - who have rendered them greater services.That - is, greater than their present disservices. And towards those who - want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler. And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, - or slighting anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who resemble themselves. - And generally speaking, one can determine - the reasons that make for mildness by their opposites. Thus, men are mild - towards those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel so towards them, - for it is impossible to be afraid and angry at the same time. And against those who have acted in anger they either - feel no anger or in a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted from a - desire to slight. For no one slights another when angry, since slight is free - from pain, but anger is - accompanied by it. And men are not angry with - those who usually show respect for them.They - regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.

-

It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which - excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in - success, in abundance,plh/rwsis: lit. “filling up.” The - reference may be to the “fulfillment” of one's desires, - or to “repletion” in the matter of food (L. and - S.), which seems less likely; “in fulness of - content” (Jebb). and, in general, in - freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. - Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for - time appeases anger. Again, vengeance - previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it - be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,Opponent of - Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in - the disastrous “Peace of Philocrates,” he went into - exile and was condemned to death during his absence. when someone - asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, - made the judicious reply, “Not yet.” “When - then?” “When I see someone accused of the same - offence”; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon - another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, while Callisthenes concluded a - premature peace with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia. For although the Athenians were more - indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had - condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day. Men also grow mild towards those whom they pityAnother reading is e)a\n - e(/lwsi, “if they have convicted him.” This is - adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plat. Rep. - 558a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under - a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of - justice, he takes no heed of the sentence, which is very often not - enforced.; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those who - are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were - obtained reparation. And if they think that - they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused - against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise - than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore - we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less - indignant at punishmentof this kind. And men are milder if they think that those punished - will never know that the punishment comes from them in requital for - their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our - definition.Therefore, if you think that a - man will never learn who took vengeance on him, you will be - less cruel; for anger is personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, - inflicted a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it. - Wherefore it is justly said by the poet: - - Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,Hom. Od. - 9.504. - - as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,Or, “as if Odysseus would not have considered - himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . .” had he - remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry - either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,Or, “with any who can no longer feel their - anger.” Cope translates: “with all the rest - (besides those actually within reach) who are out of - sight.” or with the dead, since they have paid the last - penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those - who are angry.To make the offender - feel pain as part of the punishment. So then, in regard - to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a - dead man, well says: - - For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.Hom. Il. - 24.54. - - - It is evident, then, that men must have - recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting - them into the frame of mind required and representing those with whom they are - angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them - great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they - have done.

-

Let us now - state who are the persons that men lovefilei=n may be translated “to - love” or “to like”; fili/a by “love,” - “liking,” or “friendship”; for - fi/los “friend” - alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of aimer in French, and lieben in - German. or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving. - Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for - anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, - and procuring them for him - as far as lies in our power. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return, - and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves - friends. This being granted, it necessarily - follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and our sorrow in - affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason. For all men rejoice - when what they desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens, so - that pain and pleasure are indications of their wish. And those are friends who have the same ideas of good and bad, and - love and hate the same persons, since they necessarily wish the same things; - wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the - other's friend.

-

We also like those who have done good either to - us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services are important, or are - cordially rendered, or under certain circumstances, and for our sake only; and - all those whom we think desirous of doing us good. And those who are friends of our friends and who like those whom we - like, and those who are liked by those who are liked by us; and those whose enemies are ours, those who hate those - whom we ourselves hate, and those who are hated by those who are hated by us; - for all such persons have the same idea as ourselves of what is good, so that - they wish what is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic of a - friend.Further, we like those who are ready - to help others in the matter ofmoney or personal safety; - wherefore men honor those who are liberal and courageous and just. And such we consider those who do not live upon - others; the sort of men who live by their exertions, and among them - agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who work with their own - hands.Aristotle's opinion of husbandry, - in which tillage and planting, keeping of bees, fish, and fowl were - included, was not nearly so favorable as that of Xenophon in his - Oeconomicus. In two lists of the elements of a State - given in the Politics, it comes first at the head of the - lower occupations. In its favor it is said that it forms the best material - of a rural democracy, furnishes good sailors, a healthy body of men, not - money-grabbers like merchants and tradesmen, and does not make men unfit to - bear arms. On the other hand, it claims so much of a man's time that he is - unable to devote proper attention to political duties, and should be - excluded from holding office. He further says that husbandmen, if possible, - should be slaves (neither of the same race nor hot-tempered, for - they will work better and are less likely to revolt); or, as the - next best alternative, barbarians or serfs. The favorable view taken by - Aristotle here and in the Oeconomics (probably not - his) does not agree with that put forward in the - Politics. - And the self-controlled, because they are not - likely to commit injustice; and those who are - not busybodies, for the same reason. And those with whom we wish to be friends, - if they also seem to wish it; such are those who excel in virtue and enjoy a - good reputation, either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst those who are - admired by us or by whom we are admired.Spengel reads h)\ e)n oi(=s qauma/zousin - au)toi/ and brackets [ h)\ e)n - toi=s qaumazome/nois u(f' au(tw=n]. a(/pasin, - belti/stois, and oi(=s will then - all be neuter. - Further, those who are agreeable to live or - spend the time with; such are those who are good-tempered and not given to - carping at our errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all such persons - are pugnacious, and the wishes of the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours.

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And those are liked who are clever at making or - taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as his neighbor, being able to - take a joke and return it in good taste. And - those who praise our good qualities, especially those which we ourselves are - afraid we do not possess; those who are neat in their personal - appearance and dress, and clean-living; those - who do not make our errors or the benefits they have conferred a matter of - reproach, for both these are inclined to be censorious; those who bear no malice and do not cherish the - memory of their wrongs, but are easily appeased; for we think that they will be - to ourselves such as we suppose them to be to others; and those who are neither given to slander, or eager to know the - faults of their neighbors nor our own, but only the good qualities; for this is the way in which the good man acts. And - those who do not oppose us when we are angry or occupied, for such persons are - pugnacious; and those who show any good feeling towards us; for instance, if - they admire us, think us good men, and take pleasure in our company, especially those who are so disposed towards us in - regard to things for which we particularly desire to be either admired or to be - thought worthy or agreeable. And we like those - who resemble us and have the same tastes, provided their interests do not clash - with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way; for then it - becomes a case of - - Potter [being jealous] of potter.Two of a trade never agree - (Hes. WD - 25). - - - And those who desire the same things, provided - it is possible for us to share them; otherwise the same thing would happen - again. And those with whom we are on such - terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned bypublic opinion, provided that this is not due to - contempt; and those before whom we do blush - for faults that are really bad. And those whose rivals we are,Those with whom we are ambitious of entering - into competition “in the race for distinction” - (Cope). There is no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces - it. or by whom we wish to be emulated, but not - envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them. - And those whom we are ready to assist in - obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves. - And those who show equal fondness for - friends, whether absent or present; wherefore all men like those who show such - feeling for the dead.

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In a word, men like those who are strongly attached to their friends and do not - leave them in the lurch; for among good men they chiefly like those who are good - friends. And those who do not dissemble with - them; such are those who do not fear to mention even their faults. - (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely - condemned by public opinion; if then he who blushes for such faults is not a - friend, he who does not is likely to be one).A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is not - thinking of merely conventional faults; if, then, one who is - ashamed of these is no friend, then one who is not . . . - And men like those who are not formidable, and in whom they have confidence; for - no one likes one whom he fears. Companionship, - intimacy, kinship, and similar relations are species of friendship. Things that - create friendship are doing a favor, and doing - it unasked, and not making it public after doing it; for then it seems to have - been rendered for the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason.

-

As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that - they must be examined in the light of their contraries. The causes which produce - enmity are anger, spitefulness, slander. Anger - arises from acts committed against us, enmity even from those that are not; for - if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character, we hate him. Anger has - always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas - hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer. - Anger is curable by time, hatred not; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil; - for the angry man wishes to see what happens;He wishes to see and know the result of the measures taken against those - with whom he is angry. Or, it may mean that he wishes the object of his - anger to feel his wrath, and to know by whom, and for what, he is - punished. to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the things which - cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as - injustice or folly, are least perceptible; for the presence of vice causes no - pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not; for he who is angry suffers - pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many - cases, but one who hates, never; for the former wishes that the object of his - anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should perish. It is evident, then, from what we have just said, - that it is possible to prove that men are enemies or friends, or to make them - such if they are not; to refute those who pretend that they are, and when they - oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them over to whichever side may be - preferred.The things and persons that men fear and - in what frame of mind, will be evident from the following considerations.

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Let fear be - defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent - evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all evils, for - instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or - destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and - threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote; all know that they - have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they are indifferent. If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that - appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to - produce great pain. That is why even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, - for the fearful thing itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the - approach of anything fearful. Such signs are - the enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any way; for it is evident - that they have the wish,By the definitions of - anger and hatred. so that they are not far from doing so. And injustice possessed of power is fearful, for the - unjust man is unjust through deliberate inclination.And therefore, having the inclination to be unjust, if he has - the power, he will be so. - And outraged virtue when it has power, for it is evident that it - always desires satisfaction, whenever it is outraged, and now it has the power. - And fear felt by those able to injure us in - any way, for such as these also must be ready to act. And since most men are rather bad than good and the slaves of gain - and cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of another is generally - fearful, so that one who has committed a crime has reason to fear his - accomplices as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch. And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be - feared by those who can be so treated; for as a rule men do wrong whenever they - can. Those who have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also to be - feared, for they are ever on the look out for an opportunity. And those who have - committed some wrong, when they have the power, since they are afraid of - retaliation, which was assumed to be something - to be feared. And those who are our rivals for the same things, whenever it is - impossible to share them, for men are always contending with such persons. - And those who are feared by those who are - stronger than we are, for they would be better able to injure us, if they could - injure those stronger than ourselves and those whom those who are stronger than - ourselves are afraid of, for the same reason. And those who have overthrown those who are stronger than us and those who - attack those who are weaker, for they are either already to be feared, or will - be, when they have grown stronger.

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And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals,we should fear - not the hot-tempered oroutspoken, but those who are - mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals; for it is uncertain whether they are on - the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.Or simply, “near . . . far from - us.” - All things that are to be feared are more so - when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it, - either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in - that of our opponents; also when there is no possibility of help or it is not - easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, - or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion. These are, so to - say, nearly all the most important things which are to be feared and which men - fear. Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.

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If then fear is accompanied by the expectation - that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of - those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those - things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does - not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It - therefore needs be that those who think they are likely to suffer anything - should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of - certain things, and at certain times. Those - who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do not think they are likely to - suffer anything; wherefore - they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, - strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that - they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the - future, like those who are being beaten to death; for it is a necessary - incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the - cause of their distress. A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, - whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless. So that whenever it is preferable that the audience - should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to - suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and - showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands - of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when - they did not think it likely.

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Now, since we have made clear what fear and - fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each case which makes men fear, one - can see from this what confidence is, what are the things that give it, and the - frame of mind of those who possess it; for confidence is the contrary of fear - and that which gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that the hope of - what is salutary is accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, - while the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off. Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful - things,or by the nearness of things that justify - it.ta\ - swth/ria or some other word instead of ta\ - qarrale/a would be expected, to avoid the tautology. The fact - of remoteness inspires confidence, because we do not expect fearful things - to happen; while salutary things inspire it if near at hand, because we - expect them to happen. If remedies are possible, if there are means - of help, either great or numerous, or both; if we have neither committed nor - suffered wrong if we have no rivals at all, or only such as are powerless, or, - if they have power, are our friends, or have either done us good or have - received it from us; if those whose interests are the same as ours are more - numerous, or stronger, or both. We feel - confidence in the following states of mind: if we believe that we have often - succeeded and have not suffered, or if we have often been in danger and escaped - it; for men are unaffected by fear in two ways, either because they have never - been tested or have means of help; thus, in dangers at sea, those who have never - experienced a storm and those who have means of help as the result of experience - have confidence as to the future. We are also - reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear in our equals, our inferiors, or - those to whom we think ourselves superior; and we think ourselves superior to - those whom we have conquered, either themselves or their superiors or equals. - And if we think we possess more or more - considerable advantages, such as make their possessors formidable; such are abundance of money, - strength of body, friends, territory, military equipments, either all or the - most important. And if we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or - not to such as are to be feared; and, - generally, if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to - intimations from signs and oracles, and everything else of the kind; for anger - inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we suffer and not that which we - inflict upon others that causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those - who are wronged.It is assumed that the gods - will be on our side if we have suffered wrong; suffering wrong rouses anger - and at the same time inspires confidence, if our relations with the gods are - such that we feel we can rely upon them for assistance. - Lastly, we feel confidence when, at the - beginning of any undertaking, we do not expect disaster either in the present or - future, or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire fear or - confidence.

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What are the - things of which men are ashamed or the contrary, and before whom, and in what - frame of mind, will be clear from the following considerations. Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain or - uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend - to bring dishonor; and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in regard to - these same things. If this definition of shame - is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of all such misdeeds as seem to be - disgraceful, either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such are all - those that are due to vice, such as throwing away one's shield or taking to - flight, for this is due to cowardice;or withholding a - deposit, for this is due to injustice. And - illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is - due to licentiousness. And making profit out of - what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead; - whence the proverb, “to rob even a corpse,” for this is due - to base love of gain and stinginess. And to - refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give - less than we can; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than - ourselves; to borrow when anyone seems likely - to ask for a loan, to ask for a loan from one who wants his money back, and - asking for repayment from one who wants to borrow; to praise in order to seem to - be asking for a loan, and when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking; - for all these are signs of stinginess. And to - praise people when they are present, to overpraise their good qualities and to - palliate the bad, to show excessive grief at another's grief when present, and - all similar actions; for they are signs of flattery.

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And not to submit to toils, which those put up - with who are older or live - luxuriously or hold higher positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to - do so; for all these are signs of effeminacy. To accept favors from another and often, and then to throw them in his teeth; - for all these things are signs of littleness and abasement of soul. And to speak at great length about oneself and to - make all kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what another has done; - for this is a sign of boastfulness. Similarly, in regard to each of all the - other vices of character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, and the - things which resemble them, all these are disgraceful, and should make us - ashamed. It is also shameful not to have a - share in the honorable things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the - majority of them, have a share in. By those who resemble us I mean those of the - same race, of the same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, generally - speaking, those who are on an equality; for then it is disgraceful not to have a - share, for instance, in education and other things, to the same extent. All - these things are the more disgraceful, if the fault appears to be our own; for - they are at once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if we ourselves are - the cause of past, present, or future defects. And we are ashamed when we suffer or have suffered or are likely to suffer - things which tend to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting one's person - or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these - actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or - involuntary (the latter being those that are done under - compulsion),since meek endurance and the - absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice.

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These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed. And since shame is an impression about dishonor, and - that for its own sake and not for its results; and since no one heeds the - opinion of others except on account of those who hold it, it follows that men - feel shame before those whom they esteem. Now - men esteem those who admire them and those whom they admire, those by whom they - wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and whose opinion they do not - despise. They desire to be admired by those, - and admire those who possess anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from - whom they urgently require something which it is in their power to give, as is - the case with lovers. And they are rivals of - those who are like them; and they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as - likely to be truthful; such are the older and well educated. They are also more ashamed of things that are done - before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, The eyes are the - abode of shame.Euripides, - Cresphontes: ai)dw\s e)n o)fqalmoi=si - gi/gnetai, te/knon (T.G.F. frag. - 457). That is why they feel more ashamed before those who - are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases they are under the - eyes of others.

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Men are also ashamed before those who are not - open to the same accusations, for it is evident that their feelings are - contrary. And before those who are not indulgent towards those who appear to - err; for a man is supposed not to reproach others with what he does himself, so - it is clear that what he reproaches them with is what he does not do himself. - And before those who are fond of gossiping - generally; for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts to not regarding - it as a fault at all. Now those who are inclined to gossip are those who have - suffered wrong, because they always have their eyes upon us; and slanderers, - because, if they traduce the innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. - And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbors' faults, - for instance, mockers and comic poets; for they are also in a manner slanderers - and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in - vain,Jebb translates, “who have - never seen us break down.” for they feel as if they were - greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them - for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion. - Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have - only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to - the Syracusans),The Greek scholiast - says: “Euripides, having been sent as ambassador to the - Syracusans, to ask for peace and friendship, when they refused said: O - Syracusans, if for no other reason than that we are just feeling the need of - your friendship, you ought to respect our admiration.” Nothing is - known of this embassy. Hyperides has been suggested instead of - Euripides. or old acquaintances who know nothing against us. And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful - things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not - only of sensual pleasures, but also of the indications of them; and not only of - doing, but alsoof - saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who - have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, - such as their servants or friends. In a word, - they are not ashamed either before those whose opinion in regard to the truth - they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children - or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them - and those who are not; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear - really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by - convention.

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Men are likely to feel shame in the following - situations; first, if there are any who are so related to them as those before - whom we said that they feel shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are - admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from - whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their - reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on - (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the - territory of Samos, begged the - Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and - would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or - neighbors; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men - do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals, - for rivalry presumes - admiration. Men also feel shame when they are - connected with actions or things which entail disgrace,This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural verb. - Others take the actions or things in a good sense, “deeds and - fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which they are likely - to disgrace.” for which either they themselves, or their - ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible. - In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect;i.e. when they have done anything - disgraceful. such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to - them, for instance, whose teachers or advisers they have been; similarly, when - they are in rivalry with others who are like them; for there are many things which they either do or do not do owing to - the feeling of shame which these men inspire. And they are more likely to be ashamed when they have to be seen and to - associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the - tragic poet Antiphon,When on an embassy to - Syracuse, he was asked by - Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying, “that - from which the Athenians made their statues of Harmodius and - Aristogiton,” Dionysius ordered him to be put to death. - when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that - those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the - gates, said, “Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that - one of the crowd should see you tomorrow?” Let this account of shame - suffice; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain - ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.

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The persons - towards whom men feel benevolent,xa/ris may mean (1) - benevolence, the feeling which prompts a favor; (2) an - actual favor conferred; (3) gratitude. and for what - reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what - favor is. Let it then be taken to be the - feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to - one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who - renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favor will be greatif the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service - or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor - is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest - degree. By needs I mean longings, especially - for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain; such are the - desires, for instance, love; also those which arise in bodily sufferings and - dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why - those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so - small, are regarded with favor owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; - for instance, the man who gave the matProbably given to a beggar or vagrant who had nothing to sleep on. - to another in the Lyceum. It is necessary then, - if possible, that the service should be in the same directionThat is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent wants - and desires (Cope).; if not, that it should apply - to cases of similar or greater need.

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Since then it is evident on what occasions,Reading o(/te; others read oi(=s, “by whom.” for - what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is - clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one - side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has - rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to - make out that there is no favor at all, or that those who render it are not - actuated by benevolencea)xari/stous: the word generally means - “ungrateful,” and so Jebb takes it here: “and - to make men ungrateful.”; for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, - for their own sake, in which case there is no favor; or that it was mere chance; - or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a - gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, - so that in this case also there is no favor. And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if - there is a favor it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or - place.The other five categories in - Aristotle's list are: relation, position, possession, activity, - passivity. And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered - a smaller service,Because in that case their - motives in rendering the greater service cannot be disinterested. or - if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it - is evident that they do not act for our sake in this case either. Or if the - service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits - that he has need of what is insignificant.

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Let this - suffice for benevolence and the opposite. We will now state what things and - persons excite pity, and the state of mind of those who feel it. Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight - of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil - which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it - seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such - as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and - such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly - similar. Wherefore neither those who are - utterly ruined,are capable of pity, for they think they - have nothing more to suffer, since they have exhausted suffering; nor those who - think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather are insolent. For if they think - that all good things are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot - possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things. Now those persons who think they are likely to suffer - are those who have already suffered and escaped; the advanced in age, by reason - of their wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those who are rather more - timid; and the educated, for they reckon rightly; and those who have parents, children, or wives, for these are part of - them and likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken; and those who are not influenced by any courageous - emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these emotions do not take thought of - the future and those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of mind, for they - also take no thought of future suffering; but it is those who are between the - two extremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great fear; for those who are - panic-stricken are incapable of pity, because they are preoccupied with their - own emotion. And men feel pity if they think - that some persons are virtuous; for he who thinks that no one is will think that - all deserve misfortune. And, - generally speaking, a man is moved to pity when he is so affected that he - remembers that such evils have happened, or expects that they may happen, either - to himself or to one of his friends.

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We have stated the frame of mind which leads men - to pity; and the things which arouse this feeling are clearly shown by the - definition. They are all painful and distressing things that are also - destructive, and all that are ruinous; and all evils of which fortune is the - cause, if they are great. Things distressing - and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries, - old age, disease, and lack of food. The evils - for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends - (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and - intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to - pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good; - and if this happens often; and if good - fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents - from the Great King were not dispatched to Diopithes until he was dead. Those - also are to be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who are unable to - enjoy it when it has.

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These and the like things, then, excite pity. The persons men pity are those whom they know, provided they are not too - closely connected with them for if they are, they feel the same as if they - themselves were likelyto suffer. This is why AmasisHdt. 3.14, where the - story is told, not of Amasis, by of his son Psammenitus. is said not - to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a - friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The - terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often - serves to produce the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity.Jebb renders: “Again men pity when the danger is - near themselves,” which may mean when they see something terrible - happening to others and likely soon to befall themselves. Vahlen inserts - ou) ga\r before e)/ti: “for men cease to pity when the terrible - comes close to themselves. Men also pity those who resemble them in - age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man - more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in - general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to - themselves excites their pity when others are the victims. And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear - close at hand, while those that are past or future, ten thousand years backwards - or forwards, either do not excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because - men neither expect the one nor remember the other, it follows that those who - contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action - generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, - setting it before our eyes as either future or past. And disasters - that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the - same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs and - actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and - the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, - for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undaunted“When the men, who are in such - crises, are good men” (Jebb). If they were not, - their misfortune would appear deserved. at such critical times it is - specially pitiable; for all these things,The - signs and actions, and the demeanor of the sufferer. because they - come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both - because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the - suffering is before our eyes.

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Now what is - called indignationnemesa=n: “the nobler brother of envy” - (Nietzsche). is the antithesis to pity; for the - being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained - at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions - show good character, for if we sympathize with - and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who - prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, - wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods. It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being - akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy - also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that - of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal andlike. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in - common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will - happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be - indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from - the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune. - And it is evident that these feelings will - be accompanied by opposite feelings; for he who is pained at the sight of those - who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at - the sight of those who are deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be - pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished; we should rather rejoice at - their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both theseThere is justice both in the punishment of the - parricide and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion must - refer to the latter; if his like is fortunate, he hopes he may be. - are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that - what has happened to his like may also happen to himself. And all these feelings arise from the same character - and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious, - since, if the envious man - is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to - rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these - emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they differ for the reasons stated; - so that they are all equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.

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Let us then first speak of indignation, the - persons with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, and in what frame of - mind; and then proceed to the rest of the emotions. What we have just said will make matters clear. For if indignation is - being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the - first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good - things; for no one will be indignant with a man - who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not - feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities),Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is - only felt for what is undeserved. but men are indignant at wealth, - power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy. - [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, - and all such things.]The first part - of the sentence is clear: men are indignant when what good men deserve is - possessed by those who are not good. The literal translation o the text as - it stands is: “Men are indignant . . . at all the advantages of - which good men and those who possess natural advantages are - worthy”; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in - natural advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no - question of their being deserved or undeserved. Something may have fallen - out like “but they will not be indignant with those who possess - natural advantages.” Roemer (<persName><surname>Rhein</surname></persName>. Mus. 39 p. - 504) suggests ou)d' ei) ta\ fu/sei e)/xousin - a)gaqa/ (understanding nemesh/sei tou/tois). - And since that which is old seems closely to - resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same - good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes - his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who - have long possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to offices of - state,power, numerous friends, virtuous children, - and any other advantages of the kind. And if these advantages bring them some - other advantage, men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich - who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those who - have long been wealthy; and similarly in all other cases of the same kind. - The reason is that the latter seem to - possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows - itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess - what is not theirs.dokei=n is a stronger word than fai/nesqai, indicating an intellectual operation as opposed - to an impression received through the senses. The idea is that where - anything has been so long in a person's possession, it has come to he - regarded as his by right. - And since every kind of good is not suitable - to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary - (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to - the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the - nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him, - we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior, - especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying - of the poet, - - He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,Hom. Il. 11.542. - Only the first verse is given in the received text of Homer; the - second is not found in any of the mss. The reference is to - Cebriones, a son of Priam slain by Patroclus. for Zeus - was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better man; - - - or, if the pursuit is not the - same, wherever the inferior contends with the superior in anything whatever, as - for instance, the musician with the just man; for justice is better than music.

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From this it is clear, then, with whom men are indignant and for what reasons; - they are these or of such a kind. Men are - prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest - advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be - deemed worthy of the same advantages; secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy,It has been suggested to insert mh\ before tugxa/nwsi: - “if, although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess - such advantages.” for they both judge correctly and hate - what is unjust. And those who are ambitious - and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others, - although unworthy, have obtained.Or, - “of which others happen to be unworthy.” - And, in general, those who think themselves - worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be - indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the - servile and worthless and unambitious are not inclined to indignation; for there - is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill - fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel - no pain; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the - speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves thatthose who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do - so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve that it should be refused - them, then pity will be impossible.

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It is equally - clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, - if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods - mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man - getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be - envious who have, or seem to have, others “like” them. - I mean like in birth, relationship, age, - moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess - all but one of these advantagesIf some one - else possesses the one thing which they think necessary to complete their - happiness, they are envious of him, because they consider it ought to be - theirs.; that is why those who attempt great things and succeed are - envious, because they think that every one is trying to deprive them of their - own. And those who are honored for some special - reason, especially for wisdom or happiness. And the ambitious are more envious - than the unambitious. And those who are wise in their own conceit, for they are - ambitious of a reputation for wisdom; and, in general, those who wish to be - distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it. And the little-minded, - because everything appears to them to be great.

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The advantages which excite envy have already - been stated. Nearly all the - actions or possessions which make men desire glory or honor and long for fame, - and the favors of fortune, create envy, especially when men long for them - themselves, or think that they have a right to them, or the possession of which - makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior.

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And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just - been stated by implication. They envy those who are near them in time, place, - age, and reputation, whence it was said, - - Kinship knows how to envy also;According to the scholiast, from Aeschylus. - - and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of; - for no man tries to rival those who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about - to be born, or are already dead; nor those who live near the Pillars of - Hercules;Two rocks at the east end of the - Straits of Gibraltar, supposed to - be the limit westwards of the ancient world. nor those who, in his - own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him; - and the people and things which one envies are on the same footing.That is, no one will attempt to compete with - them in their special branch of study. Roemer reads kai\ pro\s tou\s peri\ ta\ toiau=ta, translated by Jebb as if - there were a full stop at u(pere/xein. - “In like manner we vie with those engaged in such or such - pursuits.” - And since men strive for honor with those who - are competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those who aim at the same - things, they are bound to feel most envious of these; whence the saying, - - Potter [being jealous] of potter.2.4.21. - - - And those who have succeeded with difficulty or - have failed envy those whose success has been rapid. And those whose possessions or successes are a reproach to - themselves, and these, too, are those near or like them; for it is clear that it - is their own faultthat they do not obtain the same - advantage, so that this pains and causes envy. And those who either have or have acquired what was naturally theirs or what - they had once acquired; this is why an older man is envious of a younger one. - Those who have spent much envy those who - have only spent little to obtain the same thing. And it is clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, and - in what frame of mind; for, as when they do not possess certain things, they are - pained, so when they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite - circumstances.“The same state - of mind which is absent in the painful feeling will be present in the joy - excited by the opposite occasions,” meaning that, if one set of - circumstances produces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure - (Cope). Or, omitting ou)k - before e)/xontes, “For in the same - frame of mind as they are pained (at another's good - fortune) they will rejoice in the contrary state of - things” (at another's bad fortune). So - that if the judges are brought into that frame of mind, and those who claim - their pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, it is plain that they - will not obtain pity from those with whom the decision rests.

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The frame of - mind in which men feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will - be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a - feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are - possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble - us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the - fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and - characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base - men; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while - the object of the other, owing to envy, is to prevent his neighbor possessing - them. Necessarily, then, those - are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not - possess;Something like - “although they are within their grasp” is needed to - complete the sense. for no one claims what seems impossible. - Hence the young and high-minded are - emulous. And so are those who possess such advantages as are worthy of honorable - men, which include wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all - similar things. For, believing it their duty to be good, because such goods - naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to preserve them. And those - are emulous, whom others think worthy of them. Honors obtained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or city make men - emulous in regard to such honors; for they think that these honors really belong - to them and that they are worthy of them. And - if highly valued goods are the object of emulation, it necessarily follows that - the virtues must be such and all things that are useful and beneficial to the - rest of mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are honored; to these we may - add all the goods which our neighbors can enjoy with us, such as wealth and - beauty, rather than health.Spending one's - money benefits one's neighbor to a certain extent, and beauty is always - pleasant to look upon. One does not admire anyone because he is in good - health, so much as because he is handsome.

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It is also evident who are the objects of - emulation; for they are those who possess these or similar goods, such as have - already been spoken of, for instance, courage, wisdom, authority; for those in - authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have similar powers, can do - good to many. And those whom many desire to be - like, or to be their acquaintancesor friends;“Who have many acquaintances or - friends” (Jebb). those whom many or - ourselves admire; those who are praised or - eulogized either by poets or by prose writers.logogra/foi means either the oldest - Greek historians (or rather - “chroniclers”), or the writers of speeches for - use in the law courts, or of panegyrics. The opposite characters we - despise; for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the idea of emulation of - the idea of contempt. And those who are in a condition which makes them emulate, - or be emulated by, others, must be inclined to despise those personskai\ e)pi\ - tou/tois. According to Cope, an unnecessary parenthetical note - (“and on such occasions”). Jebb refers - both tou/twn and tou/tois to persons: “tend to show contempt to or - about those who.” The “reason” in the - translation above is that they suffer from the want of “the highly - valued goods.” (and for that reason) who - suffer from defects contrary to the good things which excite emulation. That is - why we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever their good fortune is not - accompanied by highly valued goods. The means of producing and destroying the - various emotions in men, from which the methods of persuasion that concern them - are derived, have now been stated.

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Let us now - describe the nature of the characters of men according to their emotions, - habits, ages, and fortunes. By the emotions I - mean anger, desire, and the like, of which we have already spoken; by habits - virtues and vices, of which also we have previously spoken, as well as the kind - of things men individually and deliberately choose and practise. The ages are - youth, the prime of life, and old age. By fortune I mean noble birth, wealth, power, and their - contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.The pi/stis h)qikh/ is - resumed from 2.1.8. As the pa/qh and - e(/ceis have been discussed already, - only the ages and their character remain.

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The young, as to character, are ready to desire - and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those - of sensual pleasure and these they are unable to control. Changeable in their desires and soon tiring of them, - they desire with extreme ardor, but soon cool; for their will, like the hunger - and thirst of the sick, is keen rather than strong. They are passionate, hot-tempered, and carried away by impulse, and - unable to control their passion; for owing to their ambition they cannot endure - to be slighted, and become indignant when they think they are being wronged. - They are ambitious of honor, but more so of - victory; for youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. - And their desire for both these is greater than their desire for money, to which - they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced - want, as PittacusOne of the Seven Wise Men of - Greece. said in his - pithy remark on Amphiaraus. They are not - ill-natured but simple-natured,Or, - “they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a - good,” i.e., they are not always ready to suspect. because - they have never yet witnessed much depravity; confiding, because they have as - yet not been often deceived; full of hope, for - they are naturally as hot-blooded as those who are drunken with wine, and - besides they havenot yet experienced many failures. For - the most part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with the future as memory - is with the past. For the young the future is long, the past short; for in the - morning of life it is not possible for them to remember anything, but they have - everything to hope; which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily hope. - And they are more courageous, for they are - full of passion and hope, and the former of these prevents them fearing, while - the latter inspires them with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and hope - of some advantage inspires confidence. And - they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of other things that are - noble, but have been educated solely by convention.Social convention is the only law that they know, and they - are ashamed if they violate it, because as yet they have no idea of higher - laws which may command them to do so. - They are high-minded, for they have not yet - been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity; further, - there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling - which belongs to one who is full of hope.

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In their actions, they prefer the noble to the - useful; their life is guided by their characterh)=qos “in the - widest sense, includes all that is habitual and characteristic; in a limited - sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition” - (Twining). rather than by calculation, for the - latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble. At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions - because they take pleasure - in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their - friends. All their errors are due to excess - and vehemence and their neglect of the maxim of Chilon,One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. The maxim was *mhde\n - a)/gan, Ne quid nimis, Never go to extremes. - for they do everything to excess, love, hate, and everything else. And they - think they know everything, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause of - their excess in everything. If they do wrong, - it is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity, - because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselvesOr, “better than they really - are.”; for they measure their neighbors by their own - inoffensiveness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly. And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty; - for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the character of the young.

-

Older men and - those who have passed their prime have in most cases characters opposite to - those of the young. For, owing to their having lived many years and having been - more often deceived by others or made more mistakes themselves, and since most - human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything - they show an excessive lack of energy. They - always “think,” but “know” nothing; and - in their hesitation they always add “perhaps,” or - “maybe”; all theirstatements are of - this kind, never unqualified. They are - malicious; for malice consists in looking upon the worse side of everything. - Further, they are always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful owing to - experience. And neither their love nor their - hatred is strong for the same reasons; but, according to the precept of - Bias,One of the Seven Wise Men of - Greece. they love as if - they would one day hate, and hate as if they would one day love. And they are little-minded, because they have been - humbled by life; for they desire nothing great or uncommon, but only the - necessaries of life. They are not generous, for - property is one of these necessaries, and at the same time, they know from - experience how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. And they are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil, for their - state of mind is the opposite of that of the young; they are chilled, whereas - the young are hot, so that old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a - kind of chill. And they are fond of life, - especially in their last days, because desire is directed towards that which is - absent and men especially desire what they lack. And they are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind. And they - live not for the noble, but for the useful, more than they ought, because they - are selfish; for the useful is - a good for the individual, whereas the noble is good absolutely.

-

And they are rather shameless than modest; for - since they do not care for the noble so much as for the useful, they pay little - attention to what people think. And they are - little given to hope owing to their experience, for things that happen are - mostly bad and at all events generally turn out for the worse, and also owing to - their cowardice. They live in memory rather - than in hope; for the life that remains to them is short, but that which is past - is long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the past. This is the reason - of their loquacity; for they are incessantly talking of the past, because they - take pleasure in recollection. Their outbursts - of anger are violent, but feeble; of their desires some have ceased, while - others are weak, so that they neither feel them nor act in accordance with them, - but only from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are regarded as - self-controlled, for their desires have slackened, and they are slaves to gain. - In their manner of life there is more - calculation than moral character, for calculation is concerned with that which - is useful, moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of injustice it is - due to vice rather than to insolence. The old, - like the young, are inclined to pity, but not for the same reason; the latter - show pityfrom humanity, the former from weakness, - because they think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds of - misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that incline men to pity. That is - why the old are querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter; for a - querulous disposition is the opposite of a love of laughter. Such are the characters of the young and older men. - Wherefore, since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with - their own character and to speakers who resemble them,Or, “speeches which resemble (or - reflect) it” (their character). - it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our - speeches may appear to be of such and such a character.

-

It is evident - that the character of those in the prime of life will be the mean between that - of the other two, if the excess in each case be removed. At this age, men are - neither over-confident, which would show rashness, nor too fearful, but - preserving a right attitude in regard to both, neither trusting nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance with - actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the useful alone, - but both at once. They are - neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but preserve the due mean. It is the same in regard to passion and desire. Their - self-control is combined with courage and their courage with self-control, - whereas in the young and old these qualities are found separately; for the young - are courageous but without self-control, the old are self-controlled but - cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages that youth and old age possess - separately, those in the prime of life possess combined; and all cases of excess - or defect in the other two are replaced by due moderation and fitness. - The body is most fully developed from - thirty to thirty-five years of age, the mind at about forty-nine. Let this - suffice for youth, old age, and the prime of life, and the characters which - belong to each.

-

Let us next - speak of the goods that are due to fortune, all those, at least, which produce - certain characters in men. A characteristic of - noble birth is that he who possesses it is more ambitious; for all men, when - they start with any good, are accustomed to heap it up, and noble birth is a - heritage of honor from one's ancestors. Such men are prone to look down even - upon those who are as important as their ancestors,because the same thingsi.e., the advantages - and distinctions the family possessed of old; such distinctions, when - possessed by those of later date, are less thought of. are more - honorable and inspire greater vanity when remote than when they are recent. - The idea of noble birth refers to - excellence of race, that of noble character to not degenerating from the family - type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are - good for nothing. For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in - the fruits of the field; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain period - men out of the common are born in it, and then it deteriorates. Highly gifted - families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of - Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and - dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

-

The characters - which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and - arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition of wealth, for they seem to - think that they possess all good things; for wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything - else, so that everything seems purchasable by it. They are luxurious and swaggerers, luxurious because of their luxury - and the display of their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because all men - are accustomed to devote their attention to what they like and admire, and the - rich suppose that what they themselves are emulous of is the object of all other - men's emulation. At the same time this feeling is not unreasonable; for those - who have need of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the answer of Simonides - to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and the rich, when she asked which was - preferable, to be wise or to be rich. “Rich,” he answered, - “for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the - rich.” And the rich think they are - worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so.“What makes power worth - having” (Cope). In a word, the character - of the rich man is that of a fool favored by fortune. At the same time there is a difference between the character of the - newly rich and of those whose wealth is of long standing, because the former - have the vices of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so to say, they have - not been educated to the use of wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice, - but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which tends to make them commit - assault and battery and adultery.

-

In regard to - power, nearly all the characters to which it gives rise are equally clear; for - power, compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and partly superior - characteristics. Thus, the powerful are more - ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, since they aim at the - performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying - out. And they are more energetic; for being - obliged to look after their power, they are always on the watch.e)n - e)pimelei/a|: “because they are - administrators” (Jebb). - And they are dignified rather than heavily - pompous; for their rank renders them more conspicuous, so that they avoid - excess; and this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrongdoings - are never petty, but great.

-

Good fortune in its divisionsThe three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power. The - meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend or converge to these - (i.e., to noble birth, wealth, and power). kata\ ta\ mo/ria might also mean “in - part.” Hobbes, in his Brief of the Art of - Rhetorick, paraphrases: “the manners of men that prosper, - are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are - in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains.” - exhibits characters corresponding to those which have just been mentioned; for - those which appear to be the most important kinds of good fortune tend in their - direction; further, good fortune furnishes advantages over others in the - blessing of children and bodily goods. Now, although men are - more arrogant and thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied by a most - precious quality. Fortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and - love the gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits they have - received from fortune. We have spokenBook - 2.12-14, 15-17. of the characters associated with different ages and - fortunes; the opposite characters to those described, for instance, of the poor, - of the unfortunate, and of the weak, are obvious from their opposites.

-

NowHaving dealt with ethical and pathetic proofs, - Aristotle proceeds to the discussion of topics of enthymemes common to all - three kinds of Rhetoric. The difficulty in the Greek lies in - the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence beginning e)pei\ de\ h( tw=n piqanw=n. Grammatically, it - might be w(/ste diwrisme/non a)\n ei)/h, but - it by no means follows that “since the employment of persuasive - speeches is directed towards a judgement . . . therefore it has - been determined how . . . we must make our speeches ethical.” - Spengel, regarding e)pei\ de\ . . . - bouleu/ontai merely as an enlargement of Book 2.1, 2, brackets the - passage. Cope suggests that something has fallen out after bouleu/ontai: “Since in all the three - kinds of Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, [I have - shown how to put the judges into a certain frame of mind in the discussion - of the characters and emotions]. I have also spoken of the - characters of the forms of government; so that this part of the subject need - no longer detain us.” It is generally agreed that we have not the - chapter as originally arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of - it is non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb's - translation). the employment of persuasive speeches is - directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no - longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses - himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or - dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single - individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be - persuaded is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against - some theory, it is just the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to - destroy the opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if they were the - actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put - together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge. Generally - speaking, however, only he who decides questions at issue in civil - controversiesBoth forensic and - deliberative. is a judge in the proper sense of the word, for in - judicial cases the point at issue is the state of the case, in deliberative the - subjects of deliberation.Or, “for - in both forensic and deliberative arguments the issue is the state of the - case.” We have already spoken of the characters of forms of - government in treatingof deliberative rhetoric,Book 1.8. so that it has been determined - how and by what means we must make our speeches conform to those characters.

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Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was - said,Book 1.3. has its own special - end, and in regard to all of them we have gathered popular opinions and premises - whence men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, and judicial - speeches,Book 1.4-8. and, further, - we have determinedBook 1.9, 10-15. the - special rules according to which it is possible to make our speeches ethical, it - only remains to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric. - For all orators are obliged, in their - speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible and impossible, and to - endeavor to show, some of them that a thing will happen, others that it has - happened. Further, the topic of magnitude is - common to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ extenuation or amplification - whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending. When these topics have been determined, we will endeavor to say what - we can in general about enthymemes and examples, in order that, when we have - added what remains, we may carry out what we proposed at the outset. Now, of the - commonplaces amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has - been stated;1.9.40. Amplication is to be - understood of the exaggeration of both great and small things. It is most - suited to epideictic oratory, in which there is no doubt as to the facts; so - that it is only necessary to accentuate their importance or - non-importance. the past to forensic, since things past are the subject - of judgement; and the possible and future to deliberative.

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Let us first - speak of the possible and the impossible. If of two contrary things it is - possible that one should exist or come into existence, then it would seem that - the other is equally possible; for instance, if a man can be cured, he can also - be ill; for the potentiality of contraries, qua contraries, is the - same.As a general rule, from their nature - as contraries, although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man is - ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases certain qualities may - make him more liable to one or the other, e.g. he may suffer from an - incurable disease (Schrader). Similarly, if of two - like things the one is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier. - And if it is possible for a thing to be - made excellent or beautiful, it is possible for - it to be made in general; for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than - a mere house.An argument a - fortiori. If a beautiful house can be built, so can a house of any - kind; for this is easier. - Again, if the beginning is possible, so also is - the end; for no impossible thing comes, or begins to come, into existence; for - instance, that the diameter of a square should be commensurable with the side of - a square is neither possible nor could be possible. And when the end is - possible, so also is the beginning; for all things arise from a beginning. - And if that which is subsequent inbeing or generation can come into being, so then can - that which is antecedent; for instance, if a man can come into being, so can a - child, for the child is antecedent; and similarly, if a child can come into - being, so can a man, for the child is a beginning. And things which we love or desire naturally are possible; for as a - rule no one loves the impossible or desires it. And those things which form the subject of sciences or arts can also exist and - come into existence. And so with all those - things, the productive principles of which reside in those things which we can - control by force or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose superiors, - masters, or friends we are. And if the parts - are possible, so also is the whole; and if the whole is possible, so also are - the parts, speaking generally; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and upper - leather,The meaning of the Greek words is - quite uncertain. can be made, then shoes can be made, and if shoes, - then the above parts. And if the whole genus - is among things possible - to be made, so is the species, and if the species, so the genus; for example, if - a vessel can be built, so can a trireme, if a trireme can, so can a vessel. - If of two naturally corresponding things - one is possible, so also is the other; for instance, if the double is possible, - so is the half, if the half, so the double. If - a thing can be made without art or preparation, much the more can it be made - with the help of art and carefulness. Whence it was said by AgathonT.G.F. p. 765.: - - And moreover we have to do some things by art, while others fall to - our lot by compulsion or chance. - - - And if a thing is possible for those who are - inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so for those - whose qualities are the opposite; as Isocrates said, it would be very strange if - he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with - the help of others]. As for the - impossible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments to be derived from - the opposite of what has been said about the possible.

-

The question whether a thing has or has not - happened must be considered from the following points of view. In the first place, if that which is naturally less - likely has happened, then that which is more likely will most probably have - happened. If that which usually happens afterwards has happened, then that which - precedes must also have happened; for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, - he must once have learnt it. If a man was able - and wished to do a thing, he has done it; for all mendo - a thing, when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing hinders them. - Further, if a man wished to do it and - there was no external obstacle; if he was able to do it and was in a state of - anger; if he was able and desired to do it; for men as a rule, whenever they - can, do those things which they long for, the vicious owing to want of - self-control, the virtuous because they desire what is good. And if anything was on the point of being done, it - most probably was done; for it is likely that one who was on the point of doing - something has carried it out. And if all the - natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened; for instance, if it has - lightened, it has also thundered; and if a man has already attempted a crime, he - has also committed it. And if all the natural consequences or motives of actions - have happened, then the antecedent or the cause has happened; for instance, if - it has thundered, it has also lightened, and if a man has committed a crime, he - has also attempted it. Of all these things - some are so related necessarily, others only as a general rule. To establish - that a thing has not happened, it is evident that our argument must be derived - from the opposite of what has been said.

-

In regard to the future, it is clear that one - can argue in the same way; for if we are able and wish to do a thing, it will be - done; and so too will those things which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to - do, if we have the power. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or - intention, of doing a thing, it will probably be done; since, as a rule, things - that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not. - And if all the natural antecedents have - happened; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain. And if one thing has been done with a view to - another, it is probable that the latter will also be done; for instance, if a - foundation has been laid, a house will probably be built.

-

What we have previously said clearly shows the - nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of the greater and less, and of - things great and small generally. For, when treating of deliberative - rhetoric,Book 1.7. we spoke of - greatness of goods, and of the greater and less generally. Therefore, since in - each branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, such as the expedient, - the noble, or the just, it is evident that all must take the materials of - amplification from these. To make any further - inquiry as to magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste of words; for - the particular has more authority than the general for practical purposes.Let this suffice for the possible and impossible; for - the question whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or not; and for the - greatness or smallness of things.

-

It remains to - speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular - proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and - enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme). Let us then first speak of the example; for the - example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning.As a starting-point and first principle of knowledge.

-

There are two kinds of examples; namely, one which consists in relating things - that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are - subdivided into comparisons or fables, such as - those of Aesop and the Libyan.The Libyan - fables were of African origin. They are mentioned by Quintilian - (Quint. Inst. Orat. - 5.11.20) and belonged to the class of animal - fables. It would be an instance of the historical kind of example, if one - were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and - not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for - Darius did not cross over to Greece - until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as - soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had - obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; - consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, - wherefore it must not be allowed. Comparison is - illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that - magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing - as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the - lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the - helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a - man's knowledge.The parabolh/ as understood by Aristotle is a comparison and - application of cases easily supposable and such as occur in real life, for - the purpose of illustrating the point in question; the fable, on the other - hand, is pure fiction.

-

A fable, to give an example, is that of - Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. - For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were - on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to - them: “A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come - and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the - stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man - consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to - mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted - him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time - became the man's slave. So then,” said he, “do you take care - lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy,you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen - a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at - once be the slaves of Phalaris.” Aesop, when defending at Samos a - demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote. - “A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable - to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas - clung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with - compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when - the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of - me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are - hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O - Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you - put him to death, others will - come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds.” - Fables are suitable for public speaking, - and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things - that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they - must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy; - and this is easy if one studies philosophy.“Literary knowledge” (Jebb); - “literature” (Cope, Introd. p. 256, who, - however, in his annotated ed. explains: “intellectual study and - mental exercises in general”). - Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are - easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative - oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.

-

If we have no enthymemes, we must employ - examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these; but if we - have them, examples must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the - enthymemes.If we have no enthymemes, we - must use examples instead of them; for they are useful for persuasion, - although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we have enthymemes, we - must use examples in corroboration of them (see 21.3 - note). For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and - induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases; if - they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to - induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if - they are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put last; for even a - single trustworthy witness is of use. We have thus stated how many kinds of - examples there are, and how and when they should be made use of.

-

In regard to - the use of maxims, it will most readily be evidenton - what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims - should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has been defined. Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning - particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; - it does not even deal with all general things, as for instance that the straight - is the opposite of the crooked, but with the objects of human actions, and with - what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme - is, we may say,Putting the comma after - sxedo/n. the syllogism dealing - with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without - the syllogism. For example: - - No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be - excessively clever,Eur. Med. 294-297. - - is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole - makes an enthymeme; for instance, - - for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against - them,“The idle - habits which they contract” - (Cope). they earn jealous hostility from - the citizens. - - - Another example: - - There is no man who is happy in everything;Euripides, Stheneboea - (frag. 661, T.G.F.). - - or, - - There is no man who is really free. - - The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse it is an - enthymeme: - - for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.Eur. Hec. - 864-865. - - - Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it - follows that maxims are of four kinds; for they are either accompanied by an - epilogue or not.Maxims with an epilogue are - (1) imperfect enthymemes, or (2) - enthymematic in character, but not in form; those without an epilogue are - (1) such as are well known, or (2) such - as are clear as soon as they are uttered. - Now all those that state anything that is - contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative - proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue,Something added as a supplementary proof, the why and the - wherefore; in Book 3.19 it is used for the peroration of a speech. - either because they are already known, as, for - instance, - - Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our - opinion,From Simonides or - Epicharmus. - - for this is generally agreed; or because, no sooner are they uttered - than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance, - - He is no lover who does not love always.Eur. Tro. - 1051. - - - As for the maxims that are accompanied by an - epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as - - No one who is sensible, etc.,See - sect. 2. - - while others are enthymematic, but are not part - of an enthymeme;They partake of the nature - of, but not of the form of, enthymemes. and these are most highly - esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent: - for instance, - - Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;Author unknown (T.G.F. p. - 854). - - to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim, - but the addition “being a mortal” states the reason. It is - the same with - - A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.According to Bentley, from - Epicharmus. - -

-

It is evident, therefore, from what has been - said, how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what it is appropriate to apply - them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to - the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be - put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to - say, “As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy - nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated”; or put - the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made, - although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely - as possible. In such cases Laconic apophthegms - and riddling sayings are suitable; as, for instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, that - they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas should be forced to chirp from - the ground.Meaning that the land would be - devastated and the trees cut down. - The use of maxims is suitable for one who is - advanced in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience; since - the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and - to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack - of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of - coining maxims and ready to make display of them.

-

To express in general terms what is not general - is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and then either at the - beginning or after the demonstration. One - should even make use of common and frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful; - for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were - acknowledge them as such; for instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to - brave danger before having sacrificed may say, - - The best of omens is to defend one's country,Hom. Il. - 12.243. - - and if they are inferior in numbers, - - The chances of war are the same for both,Hom. Il. - 18.309. - - and if advising them to destroy the children of the enemy even though - they are innocent of wrong, - - Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the children to - live.1.15.14. - -

-

Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for - example,“An Attic - neighbor.”Cf. Thuc. 1.70, where the Corinthians complain of the - lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared with their own restless - and troublesome neighbors, the Athenians. - Maxims should also be used even when contrary - to the most popular sayings, such as “Know thyself” and - “Nothing in excess,” either when one's character is thereby - likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It - would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, “It - is not true that a man should know himself; at any rate, such a man as this, if - he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command.” And - one's character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as - men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were - bound to love. The moral purpose also should - be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason; for example, - either by saying “that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if - one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply - treachery”; or thus, “The maxim does not please me, for the - true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve - the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the - wicked too much.”

-

Further, maxims are of great assistance to - speakers, first, because of the vulgarity“Want of cultivation and intelligence” - (Cope). “Amour-propre” - (St. Hilaire). of the hearers, who are pleased if - an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially - hold.In reference to their own particular - case. What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one - should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the - general; accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms - the opinion which they have already specially formed. For instance, a man who - happened to have bad neighbors or children would welcome any one's statement - that nothing is more troublesome than neighbors or more stupid than to beget - children. Wherefore the speaker should endeavor to guess how his hearers formed - their preconceived opinions and what they are, and then express himself in - general terms in regard to them. This is one - of the advantages of the use of maxims, but another is greater; for it makes - speeches ethical. Speeches have this character, in which the moral purpose is - clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a - general manner declares his moral preferences; if then the maxims are good, they - show the speaker also to be a man of good character. Let this suffice for what - we had to say concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of them there are, - the way they should be used, and what their advantages are.

-

Let us now - speak of enthymemes in general and the manner of looking for them, and next of - their topics; for each of these things is different in kind. We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of - syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic - syllogisms; for the conclusion must neither be - drawn from too far backThe conclusion must - not be reached by means of a long series of arguments, as it were strung - together in a chain: cp. 1.2.12, where the hearers are spoken of as unable - to take in at a glance a long series of arguments or “to follow a - long chain of reasoning” ( ou)de\ - logi/zesqai po/rrwqen). nor should it include - all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in - the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is - obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in - the presence of crowds; as the poets say, “the ignorant are more - skilled at speaking before a mob.”Eur. Hipp. 989. For the educated - use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know - and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from - all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for - instance, either by the judges themselves or by those of whose judgement they - approve. Further, it should be - clear that this is the opinion of all or most of the hearers; and again, - conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from - those which are only true as a rule.

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First of all, then, it must be understood that, - in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or - of any other kind, it is necessary to be also acquainted with the elements of - the question, either entirely or in part; for if you know none of these things, - you will have nothing from which to draw a conclusion. I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the - Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not know in what their strength - consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources - of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have already - waged, with what success, and all similar things?Again, how could we praise them, if we did not know of the naval engagement at - Salamis or the battle of Marathon, - or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other similar things? for men always - base their praise upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious deeds. - Similarly, they base their censure upon - actions that are contrary to these, examining whether those censured have - really, or seem to have, committed them; for example, that the Athenians - subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeanswho had fought with distinction on their side against - the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences may have - been committed by them. Similarly, in accusation and defence, speakers argue - from an examination of the circumstances of the case. It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a question of - Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, - praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really - belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in - accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or - accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything - expedient or harmful. And similarly in regard - to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good - or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in - justice or the good.

-

Therefore, since it is evident that all men - follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly or loosely—since - they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from - what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it - is impossible to prove anything in any other wayOr, “by means of the speech it is - impossible to prove anything otherwise” - (Cope).—it is evidently necessary, as has - been stated in the Topics,Aristot. Top. 1.14. prw=ton: i.e. “the speaker's chief care - should be . . .” to have first on each subject a selection - of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable. As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the - same method of inquiry must be adopted; we must look, not at what is indefinite - but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as - many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the - subject; for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the - more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and - less common.The more suitable they will be, - and the less they will resemble ordinary, trivial generalities. - By common I mean, for instance, praising - Achilles because he is a man, or one of the demigods, or because he went on the - expedition against Troy; for this is - applicable to many others as well, so that such praise is no more suited to - Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to - no one else; for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and - Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking, being invulnerable; to - have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath; and all - such things.

-

One method of selection then, and this the - first, is the topical.Let us now speak of the elements - of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same - thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one - demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, - the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic. The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from - admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the - adversary.The demonstrative enthymeme - draws its conclusion from facts admitted by the opponent; the refutative - draws its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one which is - disputed by the opponent. - We know nearly all the general heads of each - of the special topics that are useful or necessary; for the propositions - relating to each have been selected, so that we have in like manner already - established all the topics from which enthymemes may be derived on the subject - of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. - Let us now endeavor to find topics about enthymemes in general in - another way, noting in passingOr, - “noting in addition” (Victorius); or, - “pointing out, side by side” - (Jebb). those which are refutative and those which are - demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really - enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we - will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be - derived to refute enthymemes.

-

One topic of - demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites; for it is necessary to - consider whether one opposite is predicable of the other, as a means of - destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it - is;Assuming that self-control is good, - then if the opposite of good (that is, bad) can be - predicated of lack of self-control, this proves the truth of the first - proposition; otherwise, it may be refuted. for instance, self-control - is good, for lack of self-control is harmful; or as in the - Messeniacus,Cf. 1.13.2 - note. - If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair them - with the aid of peace. And, - - For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done wrong - unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to one who is - forced to do us good.Authorship - unknown. - - Or, - - If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you - must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is - true.Euripides, - Thyestes (Frag. 396, - T.G.F.). - - -

-

Another topic is derived from similar - inflections, for in like manner the derivatives must either be predicable of the - subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that - case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly - put to death is not desirable.

-

Another topic is derived from relative terms. - For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have - suffered similarly may be predicated of the other; there is the same relation - between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said - about the taxes, “If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is - buying disgraceful for us.”The - argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling the right of farming - the taxes, there could be none in purchasing this right. And if - rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be - predicated of the one who inflicts suffering; if of the latter, then also of the - former. However, in this there is room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered - justly, he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one - must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts - suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either - way; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents - [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of - TheodectesPupil of Plato and Isocrates, - great friend of Aristotle, the author of fifty tragedies and also of an - “Art” of Rhetoric. Alcmaeon murdered his mother - Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated? To - this he replied, Yes, but there is a distinction; they said she deserved to - die, but not at my hands.: - - And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother? - - Alcmaeon replied: “We must make a division before we examine - the matter.” And when Alphesiboea asked “How?”, he - rejoined, - - Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to - kill her. - - Another example may be found in the trial of Demosthenes and those who - slew Nicanor.Nothing is known of this - trial. For since it was decided that they had justly slain him, it was - thought that he had been justly put to death. Again, in the case of the man who - was murdered at Thebes, when the - defendants demanded that the judges should decide whether the murdered man - deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could be put to death without - injustice.

-

Another topic is derived from the more and less. - For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this - amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one - thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of - which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father - also beats his neighbors, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, - the more also exists.The argument is that - since men beat their fathers less commonly than they do their neighbors, if - they beat their fathers they will also beat their neighbors, and the - Paris ms. in a longer form of - this argument has an explanatory addition to this effect, inserting after - u(pa/rxei the words tou\s ga\r pate/ras h(=tton tu/ptousin h)\ tou\s - plhsi/on. In a similar passage in Aristot. Top. 2.10 - ei)ko/s (or dokou=n) is inserted after ma=llon and h(=tton. Welldon - suggests that here also the reading should be to\ - h(=tton ei)ko/s and to\ ma=llon - ei)ko/s (Grote, Aristotle, p. - 294). Either of these arguments may be used, according as it - is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not. - Further, ifthere is - no question of greater or less; whence it was said, - - Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children; is not - Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious - offspring?From the - Meleager of Antiphon - (T.G.F. p. 885). - - Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong,In carrying off Helen. neither did Alexander - Paris; if the - sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander; and if Hector did no - wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles; if no - other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers; if - generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated,The Paris ms. has qanatou=ntai, - “are put to death.” neither are the sophists; or, - if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty - to take care of that of Greece.

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Another topic is derived from the consideration - of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: “If, - before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the event - of my success, you would have granted it; will you then refuse it, now that I - have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and - break it when you have received it.”Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to put up a statue to the - famous Athenian general Iphicrates in honor of his defeat of the Spartans - (393 B.C.). This was later - opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the tyrannicide. The speech, - which is considered spurious, was called h( peri\ th=s - ei)ko/nos. Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow - Philip to pass through their territory into Attica, they were - told that “if he had made this request before helping them against the - Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they - refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and - had trusted them.”

-

Another topic consists in turning upon the - opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent - method.Or, “the ways of doing - this are various” (Jebb). For instance, - in the TeucerThe illustration - is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as well known. The - Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles. . . . and - Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would - have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no, - “Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you, Aristophon, - would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?” But - the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime; - otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an - argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as AristidesIt would be absurd to use such an argument - against the accusation of a “just man” like Aristides, - and to pretend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It must - only be used when the opponent's character is suspect, and lends itself to - such a retort.; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For - in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant; accordingly, it - must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous - for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to - encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself.

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Another topic is derived from definition. For - instance, that the daimonionThe - reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that a - daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as - his internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When - accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, by his - definition of the daimonion, that he was no atheist. Similarly, - Iphicrates, by his definition of gennai=os - and suggenh/s could refute the allegation - that he was ignoble and show that his deeds were more akin to those of - Harmodius and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could say that he was not - intemperate, because he was satisfied with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates - refused an invitation to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would be unable to - return the benefits received, which would imply his being put to shame, and - make the invitation a kind of insult. is nothing else than a god or - the work of a god; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily - thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is - the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and - Aristogiton, before they did somethingnoble; and, - “I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are - more akin to theirs than yours.” And as it is said in the - AlexanderOf Polycrates. that it - would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied - with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates - refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a - position to return a favor as well as an injury.“Just as it is to requite them with evil” - (Jebb). In all these cases, it is by definition and - the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the - subject in question.

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Another topic is derived from the different - significations of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the - correct use of these terms has been discussed.Supplying [lele/ktai] peri\ tou= - o)rqw=s [xrh=sqai au)toi=s]. Others render - “in reference to the use of the word o)rqw=s” (but o)rqw=s does not occur in the passage in Aristot. Top. 1.15). A suggested - reading is peri\ tou/tou o)rqw=s - ei)/rhtai.

-

Another, from division. For example, - “There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from - consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert - it.”

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Another, from induction. For instance, from the - case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women - always discern the truth; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias - the orator was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth;Mantias had one legitimate son Mantitheus and - two illegitimate by a certain Plangon. Mantias at first refused to - acknowledge the latter as his sons, until the mother declared they - were. and again, at Thebes, - when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, DodonisThe name of the mother; or simply, - “the woman of Dodona,” like “the woman of - Peparethus.” declared that Ismenias was its father, - Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is - another instance in the “law” of Theodectes: “If - we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of - others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this - is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed - to preserve the safety of others.” Similarly, in order to prove that - men of talent are everywhere honored, Alcidamas said: “The Parians - honored Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians Homer, although - he had rendered no public services;Others - read poli/thn, “although he was - not their fellow-citizen” (but Chios was one of the claimants to his - birthplace). the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a - woman; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon - one of their senators; the Italiotes honored Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes - buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honor. . - .Something has fallen out, what follows - being intended to prove that the best rulers for a state are the - philosophers. The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under - the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at - Thebes, as soon as those who had - the conduct of affairs became philosophers,Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, “as soon as - philosophers had the conduct of affairs.”the city flourished.”

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Another topic is that from a previous judgement - in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the - judgement was unanimous or the same at all times; if not, when it was at least - that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good; or of - the judges themselves or of those whose judgement they accept, or of those whose - judgement it is not possible to contradict, for instance, those in authority, or - of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a - father, or instructors; as AutoclesAthenian - ambassador to Sparta - (371 B.C.), whose aggressive - policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the Eumenides could agree - without any loss of dignity to stand their trial before the Areopagus, as - described in Aeschylus, surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is - known of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit his case to - it, when charged with some offense. said in his attack on - Mixidemides, “If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial - before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides?” Or Sappho, - “Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would - die.” Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed - himself too presumptuously, said, “Our friend at any rate never spoke - like that,” referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read - here) in Xen. Hell. 4.7.2. The - Argives, when a Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory, - were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when there should - be a holy truce. This obviously left the door open to fraud, so Agesipolis - (one of the Spartan kings) consulted the oracle of Zeus at - Olympia to ask whether he - was to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that he might - decline a truce fraudulently demanded. To confirm this, Agesipolis put the - same question to Apollo: “Is your opinion as to the truce the same - as that of your father (Zeus)?” - “Certainly,” answered Apollo. Agesipolis thereupon - invaded Argos. The point is that - really Apollo had little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for - the son to contradict the father. after having first consulted the - oracle at Olympia, asked the god at - Delphi whether his opinion was - the same as his father's, meaning that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Helen was a virtuous - woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged; the same applies to Alexander - Paris, whom the - goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates says, for at - any rate Conon.After his defeat at Aegospotami (405 - B.C.) the Athenian general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with Evagoras, king of - Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle, of the goodness of the - latter. in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his - assistance.

-

Another topic is that from enumerating the - parts, as in the Topics: What kind of movement is the soul? for - it must be this or that.If the genus can be - affirmed of any subject, then one or other of the species, which make up the - genus, must also be predicable of it. If the proposition to be maintained - is, the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any of the - different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, change of - place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of the soul. If - not, the generic predicate is not applicable, and the proposition is - refuted. There is an instance of this in the Socrates - of Theodectes: “What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods - recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?”

-

Again, since in most human affairs the same - thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in - employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or - blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by - the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid - being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be - wise. This topic is identical with the “Art” of Callippus, - when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have - been mentioned.

-

Another topic may be employed when it is - necessary to exhort or dissuadein regard to two - opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of - both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind - whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused - to allow her son to speak in public; “For if,” said she, - “you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, - the gods will.” On the other hand, “you should - speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say - what is unjust, men will.” This is the same as the proverb, - “To buy the swamp with the salt”The bad with the good. The exact meaning of blai/swsis has not been satisfactorily explained. - In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two opposite - things would be speaking truth or untruth; the two opposite consequences, - pleasing men and pleasing God.; and retorting a dilemma on its - proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on - each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves.

-

Again, since men do not praise the same things - in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and - beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic - consists in endeavoring to infer its opposite from one or other of these - statements.e.g. a man may - say that an honorable death should be preferred to a pleasant - life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired wealth, whereas really he - wishes the opposite. “If then his words are in - accordance with his real wishes, he must be confronted with his public - statements; if they are in accordance with the latter, he must be confronted - with his secret wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and - contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions.” - (Aristot. Sophist. - Elenchi 2.12, Poste's translation). This topic is - the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

-

Another topic is derived from analogy in - things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform - public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said: - “If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are - boys.” Similarly, - Theodectes in his “law,”This “law” (already mentioned in - 23.11) is said to have been an oration on the legal position of - mercenaries. says: “Since you bestow the rights of - citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their - merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable - misfortunes?”

-

Another topic consists in concluding the - identity of antecedents from the identity of results.Cause and effect. Thus Xenophanes said: - “There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in - saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other - they did not exist.” And, generally speaking, one may always regard as - identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: “You - are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, - whether it is right to study philosophy.”Isoc. 15.173. And, - “to give earth and water is slavery,” and “to be - included in the common peaceThe peace - concluded between the Greeks (although the Lacedaemonians held - aloof) and Alexander the Great after the death of Philip of - Macedon (336 B.C.). implies obeying - orders.” Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.

-

Another topic is derived from the fact that the - same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary. - The following enthymeme is an example: “If, when in exile, we fought - to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that - we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting”!Lys. 34.11. - This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at - the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of not - remaining.i.e., after their return, they - preferred to leave the city rather than fight. This is Cope's explanation, - but the meaning of the clause o(te\ me\n . . . - h(|rou=nto is then somewhat obscure. A more suitable - interpretation would be: “At one time they preferred to return - from exile at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price - of being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire),” - but one does not see how this can be got out of the Greek. -

-

Another topic consists in maintaining that the - cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or - possibly might, be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present - of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it. - Whence it has been said: - - It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great blessings - upon many, but in order that they may suffer more striking - calamities.The author is - unknown. - - And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon: - - Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to - Greece of the valor of - Meleager.Frag. 2 - (T.G.F. p. 792). - - And the following remark from the Ajax of Theodectes, - that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others,Hom. Il. 10.218; cp. - T.G.F. p. 801. not to do him honor, but that his - companion might be his inferior; for this may have been the reason.

-

Another topic common to forensic and - deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, - and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if - they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is - possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and - prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From - these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse - and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence,By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from committing - a crime, and vice versa. what persuades, for accusation. - This topic comprises the whole “Art” of Pamphilus and - Callippus.

-

Another topic is derived from things which are - thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought - so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are - even more likely to be true; for we only believe in that which is, or that which - is probable: if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true; - for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true.The argument is: we accept either that which - really is, or that which is probable; if then a statement is made which is - incredible and improbable, we assume that it would not have been made, - unless it was true. Thus, AndroclesAthenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for whose banishment he was - chiefly responsible. When the Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death. - Pitthus was an Athenian deme or parish. of Pitthus, speaking against - the law, being shouted at when he said “the laws need a law to correct - them,” went on, “and fishes need salt, although it is - neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; - similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces - oil should itself need oil.”

-

Another topic, appropriate to refutation, - consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, - first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, “he says - that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty;” next, - separately in your own case, “he says that I am litigious, but he - cannotprove that I have ever brought an action - against anyone”; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and - yourself together: “he has never yet lent anything, but I have - ransomed many of you.”

-

Another topic, when men or things have been - attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,Understanding diabeblh=sqai. - Others read mh\ (for h)\) dokou=si, “when there seems no reason to suspect - them.” consists in stating the reason for the false - opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a - woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with - him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the - Ajax of Theodectes, Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although - really more courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

-

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the - cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does - not exist; for the effect exists with the cause, and without cause there is - nothing. For example, Leodamas, when defending himself against the accusation of - Thrasybulus that his name had been posted in the AcropolisThe names of traitors were inscribed on a brazen pillar in - the Acropolis. Leodamas supported the oligarchic, Thrasybulus the democratic - party. In answer to the charge that he had had his name removed from the - pillar when his party came into power, Leodamas replied that, if he had been - originally posted as an enemy of the people and a hater of democracy, he - would have preferred to keep the record, as likely to increase the - confidence of the Thirty in him, than to have it erased, even though it - branded him as a traitor. but that he had erased it in the time of - the Thirty, declared that it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had more - confidence in him if his hatred against the people had been graven on the stone.

-

Another topic consists in examining whether - there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, - or has been, carried out. For it is evident that, if this has not been done,If a person has not taken the better course, when he had the - chance of doing so, he cannot be guilty. a person has not committed a - certain action; because no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. - However, this argument may be false; for often it is not until later that it - becomes clear what was the better course, which previously was uncertain.

-

Another topic, when something contrary to what - has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them - together. For instance, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to - Leucothea,Leucothea was the name of the - deified Ino. She was the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas king of - Thebes. The latter went mad - and, in order to escape from him, Ino threw herself into the sea with her - infant son Melicertes. Both became marine deities. or not, he advised - them that, if they believed her to be a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, - but if they believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice to her.

-

Another topic consists in making use of errors - committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the - Medea of Carcinus,Tragic - poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (T.G.F. p. - 798). some accuse Medea of having killed her - children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the - mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself pleads that she would have - slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake - on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and - kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first - “Art” of Theodorus.An - early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have contained something more - than the topic of “errors” to be of any use.

-

Another topic is derived from the meaning of a - name. For instance, Sophocles says, - - Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.Sophocles, Tyro, Frag. 597 - (T.G.F.). The reference is - to Sidero ( si/dhros, - iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro. - - This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods.Conon used to - call Thrasybulus “the man bold in counsel,” and Herodicus - said of Thrasymachus, “Thou art ever bold in fight,” and of - Polus, “Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt - by nature,”Thompson's rendering (Introd. to - his edition of Plato's Gorgias p. 5). - “Colt” refers to Polus's skittishness and frisking from - one subject to another. and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of - a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in EuripidesEur. Tro. 990. speaks - thus of Aphro-dite: - - And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word - aphro-syne (folly); - - and ChaeremonFrag. 4 - (T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from - pe/nqos - (sorrow). of Pentheus, - - Pentheus named after his unhappy future. - -

-

Enthymemes that serve to refute are more - popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion - of opposites“Admitting the apparent - correctness of the opposing argument, we may prove the contradictory of its - conclusion by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then called an - elenchus” (Thomson, Laws of Thought, section - 127). in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always - clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or - demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers - foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial - (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the - conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind - that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.

-

But as it is - possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only - apparent, there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, since the enthymeme - is a kind of syllogism.

-

Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is - that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in - ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no - syllogistic process, “therefore it is neither this nor - that,” “so it must be this or that”; and similarly - in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be - an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy - appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the - diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state - the heads of several syllogisms: “He saved some, avenged others, and - freed the Greeks”;Isoc. 9.65-69. for each of these - propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a - fresh conclusion.

-

The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy.Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double - meaning. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important - animal, since from it is derived the most honored of all religious festivals, - namely, the mysteriesDeriving musth/ria ( mu/ein, to close the lips) from mu=s (mouse).; or if, in praising - the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or - Pan, because Pindar said,A fragment from the - Parthenia (songs sung by maidens to the - accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called “the dog of - Cybele,” the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being always - in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god. The fact that Pindar calls - Pan “dog” is taken as a glorification of that animal. - - - O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother, - taking every form, - - - or were to say that the dog is an honorable animal, - since to be without a dog is most dishonorable. And to say that Hermes is the - most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common;koino\s *e(rmh=s is an - expression meaning “halves!” When anyone had a stroke of - luck, such as finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with him - expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck, and such a find was - called e(rmai=on. koinwniko/s is taken to - mean (1) liberal to others, or (2) - sociable. and that words are most excellent, since good men are - considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for lo/gou a)/cios has a double meaning.lo/gos: (1) - speech; (2) account, esteem.

-

Another fallacy consists in combining what is - divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as - another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient - alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, to prove, for example, that a - man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the existence of two things, the - Piraeus and the trireme;Very obscure and no explanation is - satisfactory. The parallel passage in Aristot. Sophist. Elenchi 20.6 - is: “Do you being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the Piraeus?” The ambiguity lies - in the position of “now,” whether it is to be taken with - “in Sicily” or - with “in the Piraeus.” At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot know that there are at - this time triremes in the Piraeus; but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the Piraeus, which should be there, but - are now in Sicily - (Kirchmann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses - are: Do you now, being in Sicily, - see the triremes which are in the Piraeus? and, Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes which are now in the Piraeus? The fallacy consists in the - two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes in Sicily), true separately, being - untrue combined. or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows - the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since - twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount - wholesome; for it would be absurd that two halves separately should be good, but - bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another - way for demonstration, if one were to say, one good thing cannot make two bad - things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, one may quote what Polycrates - said of Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants,Thrasybulus deposed the thirty individuals and put down the - single tyranny which they composed; he then claimed a thirtyfold reward, as - having put down thirty tyrannies. for here he combines them; or the - example of the fallacy of division in the Orestes of - Theodectes:Frag. 5 - (T.G.F.). “It is just - that a woman who has killed her husband” should be put to death, and - that the son should avenge the father; and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are - combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as - an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put - the woman to death is not mentioned.

-

Another topic is that of constructing or - destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having - proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed - fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he - himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a - rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme; for the hearer falsely concludes that the - accused is guilty or not, although neither has been proved.

-

Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this - argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love - one another are useful to States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton - overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus; or that Dionysius is a thief, because he is a - rascal; for here again the argument is inconclusive; not every rascal is a thief - although every thief is a rascal.

-

Another fallacy is derived from accident; for - instance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that, they rendered great service by - gnawing the bowstrings.Hdt. 2.141. The story was that, when Sennacherib invaded - Egypt, a host of field-mice - devoured all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the - Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus ( smi/nqos, mouse) and was represented on coins with a - mouse in his hand, either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or - because the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to elsewhere, was - of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar panegyrics on ridiculous things or - animals included pots, counters, salt, flies, bees, and such subjects as - death, sleep, and food. Or if one were to say that nothing is more - honorable than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was not invited - Achilles was angry with the Achaeans at Tenedos; whereas he was really angry because he had been treated - with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been - invited.Sophocles, The Gathering - of the Greeks (T.G.F. p. 161), - a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident of the - disrespect. -

-

Another fallacy is that of the Consequence.Assuming a proposition to be convertible, when - it is not; it does not follow, assuming that all the high-minded dwell by - themselves, that all who dwell by themselves are highminded. For - instance, in the Alexander Paris it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of - the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; for because the high-minded are of - this character, Paris also might be - thought high-minded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at - night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this character. Similarly, - the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please; and - since these things belong to those who are apparently happy, those to whom they - belong may also be thought happy. But there is a difference in conditions;The poor want to get money; the rich dance and - sing to amuse themselves, or to show that they can do as they like. Exiles - can certainly live where they like in a foreign land, but would prefer to - live in their own country; the rich, who are not exiles, travel to amuse - themselves. wherefore this topic also falls under the head of - omission.

-

Another fallacy consists of taking what is not - the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as, or - after, another; for it is believed that what happens after is produced by the - other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades declared that the policy of - Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils that happened, since it was followed - by the war.

-

Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. - For instance, Alexander Paris had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a - husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a - fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only - for the first time; for the father's authority only lasts till then. Or, if one should say that it - is wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only - when the assailant gives the first blow.

-

Further, as in sophistical disputations, an - apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, - and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in - Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which - is not is that which is notThe - first “is” means “has a real, absolute - existence”; the second “is” merely expresses - the identity of the terms of the proposition, and is particular; but the - sophistical reasoner takes it in the same sense as the first. The same - applies to the argument about the unknown.; also, that the unknown - can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, - in Rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely - probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood - absolutely, as Agathon says: - - One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many - things happen to men that are not probable; - - for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so - that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that - which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely; but as, in the case of - sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the - circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so - owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular - cases. The “Art” of Corax - is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is - accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, - his defence will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be - guilty, for instance,if he is strong, it may be argued - again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to - appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to - have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally - probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only - in the conditions mentioned. And this is what “making the worse appear - the better argument” means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with - the promise of ProtagorasThis utterance of - Protagoras gave particular offense as apparently implying that the weaker - cause was really identical with the worse, so that to support it was to - support injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed to - Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as a statement of the - aim of all ancient orators—how to overcome stronger arguments by - arguments weaker in themselves.; for it is a lie, not a real but an - apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So - much for real or apparent enthymemes.

-

Next to what - has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by - a counter-syllogismIn which the contrary of - an opponent's conclusion is proved. or by bringing an objection. - It is clear that the same topics may - furnish counter-syllogisms; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials - and many probabilities are contrary to one another. An objection is brought, as shown in the Topics, in - four ways: it may be derived either from itself,i.e., the opponent's enthymeme. or from - what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided. - In the first case, if for instance the - enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, two objections might be made; either the general - statement that all wantLove is regarded as a - desire, and therefore as bad as any other desire. It is here included under - the general head of want. is bad, or in particular, that Caunian - loveIncest: Ovid Met. 9.454. would not have become proverbial, - unless some forms of love had been bad. An - objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is - that the good man does good to all his friends; it may be objected: But the bad - man does not do harm [to all his friends].The contrary of “good men do good to all their - friends” is “bad men do harm to all their - friends,” but this is not always true. Jebb gives the objection - as: “No, the bad man does not do evil to all his - enemies.” - An objection from what is similar is brought, - if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing - that those who have been benefited do not always love. The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of - well-known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance - for those who are drunk, for their offence is the result of ignorance, it may be - objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not - have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.

-

Now the material of enthymemes is derived from - four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. - Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most - commonly occur or seem to occur; from examples, when they are the result of - induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and - then concludes the particular by an example; from necessary signs, when based - upon that which is necessary and everTranslating a)ei/ inserted by Vahlen before - o)/ntos. exists; from signs, when - their material is the general orthe particular, whether - true or not. Now, the probable being not what occurs invariably but only for the - most part, it is evident that enthymemes of this character can always be refuted - by bringing an objection. But the objection is - often only apparent, not real; for he who brings the objection endeavors to - show, not that the argument is not probable, but that it is not necessary. - Wherefore, by the employment of this - fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the - latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing - to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, - and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection - (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and - necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made - in this manner,That is, if the argument is - shown to be not “necessary.” either that the - argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide,The important point in the conclusion drawn is - that the judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the argument - is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not about things that are - necessary but about things that are probable. being deceived by the - fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon - necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities; for this is what is - meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not - enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary; it must also - be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself - is specially based upon what happens generally. This may take place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of - the facts.xro/nw| . . . - pra/gmasin. If xro/nw| be - taken to mean the date, there are the following alternatives. The date may - be questioned, the facts admitted; both date and facts may be questioned; - both date and facts may be admitted, but circumstances may have altered - (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take - xro/nw| to mean the greater number of - times the same fact has occurred, pra/gmasi - the more numerous facts that increase probability. But xro/nw| can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's - note). The strongest objections are those in which both are - combined; for a thing is more - probable, the greater the number of similar cases.

-

Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if - true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated1.2.18; or, “at the beginning,” i.e., of - this book.; for it is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. - Anal. 2.27. that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion. - As for enthymemes derived from examples, - they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single - fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not - being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common - occurrence, are otherwiseOn the other side, - in the opponent's favor.; but if the majority and greater frequency - of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the - present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not - take place in the same way, or that there is some difference. But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from - them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as - is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. - 2.27.; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing - alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a - necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of - demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.That is, “when the tekmērion - is converted into a syllogism.” For - tekmērion see 1.2.16.

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Amplification - and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element - and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is - a head under which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes - which serve to show that a thing is great or small,just - as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything - else. All these are the materials of syllogisms - and enthymemes; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is - amplification or depreciation. Nor are - enthymemes by which arguments are refuted of a different kind from those by - which they are established; for it is clear that demonstration or bringing an - objection is the means of refutation. By the first the contrary of the - adversary's conclusion is demonstrated; for instance, if he has shown that a - thing has happened, his opponent shows that it has not; if he has shown that a - thing has not happened, he shows that it has. This, therefore, will not be the - difference between them; for both employ the same arguments; they bring forward - enthymemes to show that the thing is or that it is not. And the objection is not an enthymeme, but, as I said - in the Topics, it is stating an opinion which is intended to make - it clear that the adversary's syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed - some false premise. Now, since there are three - things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let - what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns - the intelligence“Intellectual - capacity, as evinced in language (or actions), and seen - when the actors argue or make an appeal to the feelings of others, in other - words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis - personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do” - (Bywater on Aristot. Poet. 1450a - 6, where the text is speaking of the dia/noia of the actors in a play). generally; for the sources of a supply of - arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and - arrangement.

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- - -

There are three - things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources - of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the - speech. We have already spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in - number, what is their nature, and why there are only three; for in all cases - persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a - certain manner, or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain - character, or because something has been demonstrated. We have also stated the - sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being - special, the others general commonplaces.

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We have therefore next to speak of style; for it - is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to - say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain - character. In the first place, following the - natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what - gives things themselves their persuasiveness;in the - second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery, - which is of the greatest importance but has not yet been treated of by anyone. - In fact, it only made its appearance late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first - the poets themselves acted their tragedies.Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays, there was no need for - professional actors, nor for instruction in the art of delivery or acting. - This explains why no attempt had been made to deal with the question. - Similarly, the rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were - at first as a rule the composers of the poems themselves. It is - clear, therefore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in - poetry, and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others. Now - delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be used for - each particular emotion; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate; - and how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used; and - what rhythms are adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are - considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly - nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present - day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same In - politicalIn the law courts and public - assembly. contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of - government. But no treatise has yet been - composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into - notice; and rightly considered - it is thought vulgar.Cope prefers: - “is thought vulgar, and rightly so considered.” - But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion,Or, “is concerned with - appearance.” we must pay attention to it, not as being - right, but necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more - in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should - consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that - is beside demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it - is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer. However, in every system of instruction there is some - slight necessity to pay attention to style; for it does make a difference, for - the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in this or that manner; still, the - difference is not so very great, but all these thingsi.e. style, delivery, and acting, which are of no use to - serious students. are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer; - wherefore no one teaches geometry in this way.

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Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will - have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words - about it, as Thrasymachus, in his EleoiA treatise on Pathos.; and in fact, a gift for acting - is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in regard to style it is - artificial. Wherefore people who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just - as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so - much to the sense as to the style.

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The poets, as was natural, were the first to - give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of - all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of - the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, - appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical - style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician (see - Introduction). Even now the majority of the uneducated think - that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the - case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result - proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same - manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic meter, - because the latter, of all other meters, most nearly resembles prose, they have - in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary - conversation, with which the early poets used to adorn their writings, and which - even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous - to imitate those who no longer employ that manner of writing. Consequently, it is evident that we need not enter - too precisely into all questions of style, but only those which concern such a - style as we are discussing. As for the other kind of style,i.e. the poetic style. See Aristot. Poet. 22, where the choice of words and the extent to - which out-of-the-way words and phrases may be used in poetry is - discussed. it has already been treated in the Poetics. -

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Let this - suffice for the consideration of these points. In regard to style, one of its - chief merits may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by the fact that the - speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper - function; neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of the subject, but - appropriate to it; for the poetic style may be is not mean, but it is not - appropriate to prose. Of nouns and verbs it is - the proper ones that make style perspicuous“Nouns and verbs” is a conventional expression for all - the parts of speech. Cp. Hor. AP 240 - “non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum verbaque,” - where dominantia is a literal adaptation of ku/ria, the usual Latin equivalent for which is - propria.; all the others which have been spoken of - in the PoeticsAristot. Poet. 21. elevate and make - it ornate; for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In - this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and - fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should give our - language a “foreignIt is impossible - to find a satisfactory English equivalent for the terms ce/nos, ceniko/s, to\ ceni/zon, as applied to - style. “Foreign” does not really convey the idea, which - is rather that of something opposed to - “home-like,”—out-of-the-way, as if from - “abroad.” Jebb suggests - “distinctive.” air”; for men admire - what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant. In poetry many - things conduce to this and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons - spoken of are more out of the common. But in prose such methods are appropriate - in much fewer instances, for the subject is less elevated; and even in poetry, - if fine language were used by a slave or a very young man, or about quite - unimportant matters, it would be hardly becoming; for even here due proportion - consists in contraction and amplification as the subject requires. Wherefore those who practise this artifice must - conceal it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of - naturally; for that which is natural persuades,but the - artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think to be - laying a trap for them, as they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with the - voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of the rest of the actors; for his - seemed to be the voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of someone - else. Art is cleverly concealed when the - speaker chooses his words from ordinary languageCp. Hor. AP. 46, where it is - said that the choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in - making an old word new by clever combination (callida - iunctura) being especially praised. and puts them - together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way.

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Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, and nouns being of the different - kinds which have been considered in the Poetics, of these we - should use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely and in few places. We - will state laterChaps. 3 and 7. in - what places they should be used; the reason for - this has already been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great a departure - from suitable language. Proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to - be employed in the style of prose; this is shown by the fact that no one employs - anything but these. For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as proper and - appropriate words; wherefore it is clear that, if a speaker manages well, there - will be some thing “foreign” about his speech, while - possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this, - as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language. (In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful - to the sophist, for it is by their aid that he employs captious arguments, and - synonyms to the poet. Instances of words that are both proper and synonymous are - “going” and “walking”: for these two - words are proper and have the same meaning.)This is a parenthetical note.

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It has already been stated, as we have said, in the Poetics,Aristot. Poet. - 21, 22. what each of these thingsThe different kinds of words. is, how many kinds of - metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose. - But the orator must devote the greater - attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It - is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and - it cannot be learnt from anyone else;Aristot. Poet. 22.9: “for this - alone cannot be borrowed from another.” - but we must make use of metaphors and epithets - that are appropriate. This will be secured by observing due proportion; - otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because it is when placed in - juxtaposition that contraries are most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak - suits a young man, what suits an old one; for - the same garment is not suitable for both. And if we wish to ornament our - subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same - genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have - two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, - or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of - asking)Begging (as a - beggar does) and praying (as a priest might) are - both forms of asking, and by substituting one for the other, you can amplify - or depreciate. is an instance of doing this; as, when IphicratesSee 1.7.32. called CalliasHead of a distinguished Athenian family which - held the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A man of - notoriously dissipated character, he took some part in politics.a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer, Callias - replied that Iphicrates himself could not be initiated, otherwise he would not - have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearerThe da|dou=xos or hereditary - torch-bearer ranked next to the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to - holding the torch during the sacrifices, he took part in the recitation of - the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The mhtragu/rtai or mendicant priests collected alms on behalf of - various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence their - name). They included both men and women of profligate character, - addicted to every kind of lewdness.; both titles indeed have to do - with a divinity, but the one is honorable, the other dishonorable. And some call - actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they call themselves - “artists.” Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a - term of abuse, the other the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves - purveyorsCf. - “‘convey’ the wise it call” - (Merry Wives, I. iii.). Either the - euphemistic or unfavorable application of the term may be adopted.; - and so it is allowable to say that the man who has committed a crime has - “made a mistake,” that the man who has “made a - mistake” is “guilty of crime”, and that one who - has committed a theft has either “taken” or - “ravaged.” The saying in the Telephus of - Euripides, - - Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia, - - is inappropriate, because the word ruling exceeds the dignity of the - subject, and so the artifice can be seen. Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not express an agreeable sound; for - instance, Dionysius the BrazenAccording to - Athenaeus, p. 669, he was a poet - and rhetorician who recommended the Athenians to use bronze money. in - his elegiacs speaks of poetry as - - the scream of Calliope; - - both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because the sounds have no - meaning.A scream is neither articulate - nor agreeable, like the sound of poetry, although both are voices or sound, - and to that extent the metaphor is correct.

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Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but - we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what - is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly - seen to be akin, as in the - famous enigma, - - I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another. - - There was no name for what took place, but as in both cases there is a - kind of application, he called the application of the cupping-glass gluing.Athenaeus, p. - 452. And, generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good - metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the - transference is clever. Metaphors should also - be derived from things that are beautiful, the beauty of a word consisting, as - Licymnius says, in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. There is a - third condition, which refutes the sophistical argument; for it is not the case, - as BrysonRhetorician and sophist of - Heraclea in Pontus. said, that no one ever uses - foul language, if the meaning is the same whether this or that word is used; - this is false; for one word is more proper than another, more of a likeness, and - better suited to putting the matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that - does not signify a thing under the same conditions; thus for this reason also it - must be admitted that one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, indeed, - signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair or foul; or if they - do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived - from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to - some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says - “rosy-fingered morn,” rather than - “purple-fingered,”or, what is - still worse, “red-fingered.”

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As for epithets, they may be applied from what - is vile or disgraceful, for instance, “the matricide,” or - from what is more honorable, for instance, “the avenger of his - father.”Eur. Orest. 1588. In the preceding line - Menelaus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to heap murder on murder, - to which Orestes replies, you should rather call me the avenger of my father - Agamemnon, who had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother of - Orestes. “Matricide” and “avenger of his - father” show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes. - When the winner in a mule-race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to - write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to write on half-asses; but when - he gave him a sufficient amount, he wrote, - - Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!Frag. 7 (P.L.G. 3, p. - 39O). The winner of the mule race was Anaxilaus of - Rhegium. - - and yet they were also the daughters of asses. Further, the use of - diminutives amounts to the same. It is the - diminutive which makes the good and the bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the - Babylonians jestingly uses “goldlet, cloaklet, - affrontlet, diseaselet” instead of “gold, cloak, affront, - disease.” But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use - as well as in that of epithets.

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Frigidity of - style arises from four causes: first, the use of compound words, as when - LycophronA sophist, not the poet - (author of the obscure Alexander or - Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle. - speaks of the “many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth,” - “narrow-passaged shore”; and Gorgias of “a - begging-poet flatterer,” “those who commit perjury and those who swear right - solemnly.Lobeck conjectured katepiorkh/santas, “who commit - out-and-out perjury.”” And as Alcidamas says, - “the soul full of anger and the face fire-colored,” - “he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing,” - “he made persuasive words end-accomplishing,” and - “the azure-colored floor of the sea,” for all these appear - poetical because they are compound.

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This is one cause of frigidity; another is the - use of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes “a monster of a - man,” Sciron “a human scourgeSciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, by - Lycophron turns Sinnis into a glw=tta, using - it adjectivally = “destructive”; cf. si=nos, “harm”; si/nths = si/nnis.”; and Alcidamas says - “plaything in poetry,” “the audaciousness of - nature,” “whetted with unmitigated wrath of - thought.”

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A third cause is the use of epithets that are - either long or unseasonable or too crowded; thus, in poetry it is appropriate to - speak of white milk, but in prose it is less so; and if epithets are employed to - excess, they reveal the art and make it evident that it is poetry. And yet such - may be used to a certain extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary - and gives a “foreign” air. But one must aim at the mean, for - neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random; for a random style - lacks merit, but excess is vicious. That is why the style of Alcidamas appears - frigid; for he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so - crowded,so long, and so glaring are they. For - instance, he does not say “sweat” but “damp - sweat”; not “to the Isthmian games” but - “to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games”; not - “laws”, but “the laws, the rulers of - states”; not “running”, but “with a - race-like impulse of the soul”; not “museum”, but - “having taken up the museum of nature”The meaning of paralabw/n is - quite obscure: various renderings are “having taken to - himself,” “received,” - “grasped,” “inherited.” The word - mousei=on, originally a haunt of the - Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature. The fault appears to - consist in the addition of th=s fu/sews, but - it is difficult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to understand the - passage. Jebb translates: “he does not say, ‘having - taken to himself a school of the Muses,’ but ‘to - Nature's school of the Muses.’”; - and “the scowling anxiety of the soul”; - “creator”, not “of favor”, but - “all-popular favor”; and “dispenser of the - pleasure of the hearers”; “he hid,” not - “with branches,” but “with the branches of the - forest”; “he covered,” not “his - body,” but “the nakedness of his body.” He also - calls desire “counter-initiative of the soul”—an - expression which is at once compound and an epithet, so that it becomes - poetry—and “the excess of his depravity so beyond all - bounds.” Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste - make the style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter produces obscurity; - for when words are piled upon one who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by - a cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, when a thing has no name and the - word is easy to combine, as xronotribei=n, to - pass time; but if the practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical. - This is why compound words - are especially employed by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise; strange - words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and self-assertion; metaphor to - writers of iambics, who now employ them, as we have stated.

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The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be - found in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are - ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others - because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic; and if they are farfetched, - they are obscure, as when Gorgias says: “Affairs pale and - bloodless”On this passage - Thompson - (Gorgias, p. 179) says: “The - metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere commonplace . . . but - ‘pallid and bloodless affairs’ is a phrase which would - need apology even from a modern.” On the other hand, it is - difficult to see what objection there is to calling the - Odyssey “a beautiful mirror of human - life.” Another reading is e)/naima, which Cope translates “events fresh with the - blood in them.” If the two extracts are taken together, it is - suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's notes) that - the sense may be: “things green and unripe (flushed with - sap), and this was the crop which you . . .,” the - adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn.; - “you have sown shame and reaped misfortune”; for this is too - much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy “a bulwark of the - laws,”Or, “a barrier - against the laws.” This is the general meaning of e)pitei/xisma, a border fortress commanding an - enemy's country. and the Odyssey “a - beautiful mirror of human life,” and “introducing no such - plaything in poetry.” All these expressions fail to produce - persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow - which, flying over his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best - tragic style. He exclaimed, “Fie, for shame, Philomela!”; - for there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it - would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate, - addressing her as she was, not as she is.

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The simile also - is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of - Achilles,Compare Hom. Il. 22.164 - e)na/ntion w)=rto lew\n w(/s. - - - he rushed on like a lion, - - it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,” - it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and - calls Achilles a lion. The simile is also - useful in prose, but should be less frequently used, for there is something - poetical about it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only differ in the - manner stated. The following are examples of - similes. AndrotionPupil of Isocrates and - historical writer. Idrieus was a prince of Caria, who had been - imprisoned. said of Idrieus that he was like curs just unchained; for as - they attack and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was dangerous. Again, - Theodamas likened Archidamus to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by - proportion;Meaning that there was no - difference between Euxenus without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus - with a knowledge of geometry. The proportion of geometrical knowledge will - remain the same, so that Archidamus can be called an ungeometrical Euxenus, - and Euxenus a geometrical Archidamus (see 4.4, note for - “by proportion”). for Euxenus - “will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry.” Again, Plato - in the RepublicPlat. Rep. 469d. compares those who - strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, but do not touch those who throw - them; he also says that the people is like a ship's captain who is vigorous, but - rather deaf;Plat. - Rep. 488a. that poets' verses resemble those who are in - the bloom of youth but lack beauty;Plat. Rep. 601b. for neither the one - after they have lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been broken - up,If metrical restrictions have been - removed and they are read as prose. - appear the same as before. - Pericles said that the Samians were like children who cry while they accept the - scraps.Meaning that they did not - appreciate the benefits received from the Athenians, who conquered the - islands (440 B.C.). He - also compared the Boeotians to holm-oaks; for just as these are beaten down by - knocking against each other,Or, - “are cut down by axes, the handles of which are made of their own - wood.” so are the Boeotians by their civil strife. - Demosthenes compared the people to passengers who are seasick.It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the - orator or the Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of the - comparison is that in a democracy the general instability of political - conditions makes the people sick of the existing state of things and eager - for a change. Democrates said that orators resembled nurses who gulp - down the morsel and rub the babies' lips with the spittle.Aristoph. Kn. - 715-718. Antisthenes likened the skinny Cephisodotus to incense, - for he also gives pleasure by wasting away. All such expressions may be used as - similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved as metaphors will obviously - also serve as similes which are metaphors without the details. But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should - be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for - instance, if the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly - be called the goblet of Ares.As the shield is - to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. Proportion is defined (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 5.3.8) - as “an equality of ratios, implying four terms at the - least,” and the proportional metaphor is one in which the second - term is to the first as the fourth is to the third; for then one can by - metaphor substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. - Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield. Then by the definition, - the goblet is to Dionysus as the shield is to Ares. The metaphor consists in - transferring to the goblet the name belonging to its analogue the shield. - Sometimes an addition is made by way of explanation of the word in its new - sense, and the goblet may be described as the shield of Dionysus and the - shield as the goblet of Ares. The shield and the goblet both come under the - same genus, being characteristics of a deity, and can therefore be - reciprocally transferred (Aristot. - Poet. 21.4).

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Such then are - the elements of speech. But purity,which is the - foundation of style, depends upon five rules. First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order, - before or after, as they require; thus, me/n and - e)gw\ me/n require to be followed by - de/ and o( - de/. Further, they should be made to correspond whilst the hearer - still recollects; they should not be put too far apart, nor should a clause be - introduced before the necessary connectionThe - apodosis. a)podido/nai is used in the sense - of introducing a clause answering to the pro/tasis, and a)po/dosis for - this answering clause.; for this is rarely appropriate. For instance, - “As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging - and praying—set out, taking them with me.” For in this - phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to - furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between “I” and - “set out” is too great, the result is obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of - connecting particles; the second, to employ special, not generic terms. - The third consists in avoiding ambiguous - terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having - nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the - use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles.Of Agrigentum (c. - 490-430), poet, philosopher, and physician. Among other legends - connected with him, he is said to have thrown himself into the crater of - Etna, so that by suddenly - disappearing he might be thought to be a god. His chief work was a poem - called Nature, praised by Lucretius. The principles of things are the four - elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which are unalterable and - indestructible. Love and hate, alternately prevailing, regulate the periods - of the formation of the world. The existing fragments corroborate - Aristotle's statement. For the long circumlocution takes in the - hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to - the soothsayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent; - for example, - - Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty dominion.Hdt. - 1.53, Hdt. 1.91. Croesus - consulted the Delphian oracle whether he should attack Cyrus the - Persian or not. Encouraged by the ambiguous oracle, he did so, - but was utterly defeated. - - - And as there is less chance of - making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general - terms on the question of fact; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely - to be right if he says “even” or “odd” - than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says “it - will be” than if he states “when.” This is why - soothsayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are - alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason.The deliberate intention to mislead. - The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders - distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter,skeu/h, “inanimate - things,” the classification probably being male, female, and - inanimate, not the grammatical one of masculine, feminine, and - neuter. as laid down by Protagoras; these also must be properly - introduced: “She, having come - (fem.) and having conversed - (fem.) with me, went away.” The - fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are - referred to: “They, having come (pl.), - began to beat (pl.) me.”

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Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to - utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number - of connecting particles, or when the punctuation is hard, as in the writings of - Heraclitus.Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475). - His chief work was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and the - carelessness of his style he was called o( - skoteino/s (the obscure). According to him, fire - was the origin of all things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes - all other things. All things are in a constant state of flux; all is the - same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded upon sensual perception, but - only the gods possess knowledge in perfection. For it is hard, since - it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or - that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says: - “Of this reason which existsOr, - “although this reason exists for ever men are born . . . without - understanding” (Welldon). always men are - ignorant,” where it is uncertain whether “always” - should go with “which exists” or with “are - ignorant.” Further, a solecism - results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which - is equally suitable to both.For instance, in speaking of - “sound” and “color”, the word - “seeing” should not be used, for it is not suitable to both, - whereas “perceiving” is. It also causes obscurity, if you do - not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of - details in the middle; for instance, if you say: “I intended after - having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead - of “I intended to set out after having spoken to him,” and - then this or that happened, in this or that manner.

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The following - rules contribute to loftiness of style. Use of the description instead of the - name of a thing; for instance, do not say “circle,” but - “a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the - center.” But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use - the name instead of the description. You should - do the same to express anything foul or indecent; if the foulness is in the - description, use the name; if in the name, the description. Use metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, - taking care, however, to avoid what is too poetical. Use the plural for the singular, after the manner of the poets, who, - although there is only one harbor, say - - to Achaean harbors, - - and, - - Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet.Eur. IT - 727. - - - You should avoid linking up, but each word - should have its own article: th=s gunaiko\s th=s - h(mete/ras. But for conciseness, the reverse: th=s h(mete/ras gunaiko/s. Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit it, but avoid - destroying the connection; for - instance “having gone and having conversed with him,” or, - “having gone, I conversed with him.”Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of - describing a thing by the qualities it does not possess; thus, in speaking of - the hill Teumessus,In Boeotia. The quotation is from the - <placeName key="tgn,4011135">Thebaid</placeName> - of Antimachus of Claros (c. 450 - B.C.). The Alexandrians placed him next to Homer among the epic - poets. In his eulogy of the little hill, he went on to attribute to it all - the good qualities it did not possess, a process which could - obviously be carried on ad infinitum. he says, - - There is a little windswept hill; - - for in this way amplification may be carried on ad - infinitum. This method may be applied to things good and bad, in - whichever way it may be useful. Poets also make use of this in inventing words, - as a melody “without strings” or “without the - lyre”; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is - approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of - the trumpet is a melody without the lyre.

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Propriety of - style will be obtained by the expression of emotion and character, and by - proportion to the subject matter. Style is - proportionate to the subject matter when neither weighty matters are treated - offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, and no embellishment is attached to - an ordinary word; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy, as in the poetry - of Cleophon,By some identified with the - tragic poet spoken of in Aristot. Poet. 2. - His manner of expression, due to the wish to use fine language, was - ridiculous owing to its being out of harmony with the subject. Others - consider that he was not a poet at all but an orator. po/tnia was a title of respect, applied to females, whether - they were goddesses or ordinary women. who used certain expressions - that reminded one of saying “madam fig.” Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger - of wanton outrage; with indignation and reserve, even in mentioning them, of - things foul or impious; with admiration of things praiseworthy; with lowliness - of things pitiable; and so in all other cases. Appropriate stylealso makes the fact appear credible; - for the mind of the hearer is imposed uponOr, - “draws a wrong conclusion.” under the impression - that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his - feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as - the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the - hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really - says nothing. This is why speakers often - confound their hearers by mere noise.

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Character also may be expressed by the proof - from signs, because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I - mean class in reference to age—child, man, or old man; to - sex—man or woman; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I - call habits those moral states which form a man's character in life; for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the - language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character; for the - uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated. But - the hearers also are impressed in a certain way by a device employed ad - nauseam by writers of speeches:Alluding to Isocrates. “Who does not know?” - “Everybody knows”; for the hearer agrees, because he is - ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge.

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The opportune or inopportune use of these - devices applies to all kinds - of Rhetoric.Or, “to all the special - rules given above.” - But whenever one has gone too far, the remedy - may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke - himself in advance;The exaggeration should be - brought forward first, by way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied - by some limiting phrase. Quintilian (Quint. Inst. Orat. 8.3.37) - gives as examples: “so to say,” “if I may be - allowed to say so.” then the excess seems true, since the - orator is obviously aware of what he is doing. Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of correspondenceAdaptation of voice, features, etc., to the - subject. together; for in this manner the hearer is deceived. I mean, - for instance, if the language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things - connected should not be equally harsh; otherwise what each really is becomes - evident. But if you do this in one instance and not in another, the art escapes - notice, although the result is the same. If mild sentiments are harshly - expressed or harsh sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.

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Compound words, a number of epithets, and - “foreign” words especially, are appropriate to an emotional - speaker; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil - “high-as-heaven” or “stupendous.” He may - do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, - either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of - his PanegyricusIsoc. 4.186, where mnh/mh is the reading, translated “name” - above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also - appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the Mss. of Aristotle give gnw/mhn here, which shows that it is a - misquotation.: “Oh, the fame and the name!” and - “In that they endured.” For such is the language of - enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a - sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry; for there is - something inspired in poetry. It should therefore be used either in this way - orwhen speaking ironically, after the manner of - Gorgias, or of Plato in the Phaedrus.Plat. Phaedrus 238d, - Plat. Phaedrus 241e. In the first - of these passages Socrates attributes his unusual flow of words to the - inspiration of the nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to - be in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into dithyrambs. An - example of the irony (a term implying a certain amount of contempt - (2.2.25)) of Gorgias is given in Aristot. Pol. 3.1. When asked how a person - comes to be a citizen, he answers: “as those are mortars which - have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made - by artisans ( dhmiourgou/s); for some of these were Larissa-makers ( larisopoiou/s).” There is a - play on the double meaning of dhmiourgo/s, - (1) artisan, (2) magistrate, - lit. people-maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans - in such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of Larissa itself. It - has also been suggested that larisopoiou/s - may mean “kettle-makers,” from la/risa “a kettle,” so called from having - been first made at Larissa, but this seems unnecessary. The point is that - Gorgias maintained that all were citizens who were made so by the - magistrates, that citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L. - Newman's note on the passage, and W. H. Thompson's Appendix to his edition - of Plato's Gorgias).

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The form of - diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it - lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it - distracts the hearer's attention, since it sets him on the watch for the - recurrence of such and such a cadence; just as, when the public criers ask, - “Whom does the emancipatedHe did - not generally possess full rights of citizenship. The point of the - illustration is that the hearer looks for the cadence just as confidently - as, when a freedman is asked what patron he selects, every one expects him - to say “Cleon.” choose for his patron?” - the children shout “Cleon.” If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited - (but not by meter); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant - and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging - to the form of diction is rhythm, of which the meters are divisions.Bywater's emendation for tmhta/ of the Mss. Aristotle seems to be referring to the - Pythagorean theory that “number” is the regulating force - in all things, and in giving shape to language “number” - is rhythm, which reduces a formless mass of words to order. - Wherefore prose must be rhythmical, but not - metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously - carried out, but only up to a certain point.

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Of the different rhythms the heroic is - dignified, but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation; the iambic is the - language of the many, wherefore of all meters it is most used in common speech; - but speech should be dignified and calculated to rouse the hearer. The trochaic - is too much like the cordax; this is clear from the tetrameters, which form a tripping rhythm. There - remains the paean, used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasymachus, although - they could not define it.

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The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related to those already mentioned; - for its proportion is 3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with both of - which the paean, whose proportion is 1 1/2 to 1, is connected.The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees, - and anapests) is as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one - long; trochaic and iambic 2 to 1 on the same principle; paean, 3 to 2 - (three shorts and one long), being the mean between the - other two. - All the other meters then are to be disregarded - for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical; but the paean should - be retained, because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned which is not - adapted to a metrical system, so that it is most likely to be undetected. - At the present day one kind of paean alone - is employed, at the beginning as well as at the end;Understanding kai\ - teleutw=ntes. the end, however, ought to differ from the - beginning. Now there are two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The one is - appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long - syllable and ends with three short: - - *da¯lo˘ge˘ne˘s ei)/te - *lu˘ki˘an, (“O - Delos-born, or it may be Lycia”), - - and - - *xru¯se˘o˘ko/˘ma¯ - *(/e˘ka˘te˘ pai= - *dio/˘s (“Golden-haired - far-darter, son of Zeus”). - - The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends - with one long one: - - me˘ta\˘ de˘ ga=n - u(/˘da˘ta/˘ t' - w)ke˘a˘no\n - h)fa/˘ni˘se˘nu/cAll three attributed to Simonides - (Frag. 26 B: P.L.G.). - (“after earth and waters, night obscured - ocean”). - - This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete, - mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable - andthe end should be clearly marked, not by the - scribe nor by a punctuation mark,A dash below - the first word of a line, indicating the end of a sentence. but by - the rhythm itself. That the style should be - rhythmical and not unrhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrangement of them - make it of this character, has now been sufficiently shown.

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The style must - be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic - preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The - continuous style is the ancient one; for example, “This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus - of Thurii.” It was - formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I - mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete. - It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight. - That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal,kampth=res, - properly the turning-point of the di/aulos - or double course, is here used for the goal itself. lose their breath - and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of - fatigue. Such is the continuous style. The - other style consists of periods, and by period I mean a sentence that has a - beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. What is written in this style - is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which - is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something - for himself and that some conclusion has been reached; whereas it is unpleasant - neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn, - because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that the periodic - style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember; that explains - why all learn verse with greater facility than prose,tw=n xu/dhn: lit. what is - poured fourth promiscuously: in flowing, unfettered language - (Liddell and Scott). for it has number by which it can be - measured. But the period must be completed with - the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,Really from the Meleager of Euripides, Frag. - 515 (T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes - after gai=a, *pelopi/as xqono/s really - belonging to the next line: e)n a)ntipo/rqmois pe/di' - e)/xous' eu)dai/mona. As it stands in the text, the line - implies that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was not. The meaning then is: - “This is the land of Calydon, with its fertile plains in the - country over against Peloponnesus” (on the opposite side of the - strait, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf). - - - This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops; - - for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose the contrary - of the fact, as in the example, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

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A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. - The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its parts and easy to repeat in a - breath, not divided like the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when it - is taken as a whole.It does not consist in - simply dividing off any words from the context as the speaker pleases, but - the parts of the sentence as a whole are properly constructed and - distinguished and the sense also is complete. By clause I mean one of - the two parts of this period, and by a simple period one that consists of only - one clause. But neither clauses nor periods - should be curtailed or too long. If too short, they often make the hearer - stumble; for when he is hurrying ontowards the measure - of which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked by the speaker - stopping, a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. - If too long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do not turn till past - the ordinary limit leave behind those who are walking with them. Similarly long - periods assume the proportions of a speech and resemble dithyrambic preludes. - This gives rise to what Democritus of ChiosA well-known - musician. jokingly rebuked in Melanippides,Of Melos. He wrote - rambling dithyrambic preludes without strophic correspondence. - Others take a)nabolh/ to mean an entire - ode. who instead of antistrophes composed - dithyrambic preludes: - - A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, and a long - prelude is most deadly to one who composes it;Hes. WD 265. The - second line is a parody of 266, h( de\ - kakh\ boulh\ tw=| bouleu/santi - kaki/sth. - - for these verses may be applied to those who employ long clauses. - Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the - hearer himself is carried away headlong.

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The clauses of the periodic style are divided or - opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: “I have often wondered - at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the - gymnastic contests”;The beginning - of Isoc. 4. opposed, in which, in each of - the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is - coupled with both contraries; for instance, “They were useful to both, both those who stayed and - those who followed; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions - than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own - country.” Here “staying behind,” - “following,” “sufficient,” - “more” are contraries. Again: “to those who need - money and those who wish to enjoy it”; where - “enjoying” is contrary to “acquiring.” - Again: “It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are - unsuccessful, while fools succeed”: “At once they were - deemed worthy of the prize of valor and not long after won the command of the - sea”: “To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the - sea, bridging over the Hellespont and - digging through Athos”: - “And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights - of citizenship by law”: “For some of them perished - miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully”: - “Privately to employ barbarians as servants,“To dwell with us” - (Jebb). The point seems to be that the barbarian domestics - were in a comfortable position as compared with those of the allies who were - reduced to slavery; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting - servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting public life - indifference was shown. but publicly to view with indifference many - of the allies reduced to slavery”: “Either to possess it - while living or to leave it behind when dead.”All the above quotations are from Isoc. 4.1, 35, 41, - 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations. The last - quotation is part of the sentence of which the beginning appears in 7.11 - above. The whole runs: “And how great must we consider the fame - and the name and the glory which those who have highly distinguished - themselves in such deeds of valor will either have when living or will leave - behind after their death.” And what some one said against - Pitholaus and LycophronThey murdered - Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being instigated by their sister, his wife. - Nothing is known of the case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is: - “When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, but - now they have come to buy you” (referring to bribery in - court). Others take w)nei=sqai in a - passive sense: “they have been bought,” i.e. have had to - sell themselves to you. in the lawcourt: “These men, who - used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought - you.”All these passages are examples of - antithesis. This kind of style is pleasing, - because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by - side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a - bringing together of contraries.

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Such then is the nature of antithesis; equality - of clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final syllables of each clause - paromoiosis. This must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the - beginning the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the - last syllables, or the inflections of one and the same word, or the repetition - of the same word. For instance, at the beginning: *)agro\n - ga\r e)/laben a)rgo\n par' au)tou=,Aristoph. frag. 649 - (Kock, Com. - Att. Frag. 1.1880). - “for he received from him land untilled”; - - dwrhtoi/ t' e)pe/lonto para/rrhtoi/ t' - e)pe/essin,Hom. Il. 9.526. - “they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by - words;” - - at the end: w)|h/qhsan au)to\n paidi/on - tetoke/nai, a)ll' au)tou= ai)/tion gegone/nai,The text is obviously corrupt. “they thought - that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it”; - e)n plei/stais de\ fronti/si kai\ e)n e)laxi/stais - e)lpi/sin, “in the greatest anxiety and the smallest - hopes.” Inflections of the same word: a)/cios - de\ staqh=nai xalkou=s, ou)k a)/cios w)\n xalkou=, - “worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass - farthing.” Repetition of a word: su\ d' au)to\n - kai\ zw=nta e)/leges kakw=s kai\ nu=n gra/feis kakw=s, - “while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of - him.” Resemblance of one syllable: ti/ a)\n - e)/paqes deino/n, ei) a)/ndr' ei)=des a)rgo/n, “what ill - would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man?” All these - figures may be found in the same sentence at once— antithesis, equality of clauses, and - similarity of endings. In the TheodecteaSee Introduction. nearly all the beginningsRoemer's text has a)retai/ (excellences). of periods - have been enumerated. There are also false - antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus: - - to/ka me\n e)n th/nwn e)gw\n h)=n, to/ka de\ - para\ th/nois e)gw/n, “at one time I was in - their house, at another I was with them.”There is no real antithesis, the - sense of both clauses being the same. - -

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Having settled - these questions, we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings. - They are produced either by natural genius or by practice; to show what they are - is the function of this inquiry. Let us - therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting-point be the - following. Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean something, - so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not - know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already. It is - metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when HomerHom. Od. 24.213 - a)ll' e)/mphs kala/mhn ge/ s' o)i+/mai ei)soro/wnta - gignw/skein. The words are those of Odysseus, whom Athene had - changed into an old beggar, to Eumaeus, his faithful swineherd, in whose - house he was staying unrecognized. calls old age stubble, he teaches - and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom. The similes of the poets also have the same effect; - wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced. - For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of - a word,prosqe/sei: the addition of the particle of comparison w(s. proqe/sei (the reading of the - Paris ms.) would mean, - (1) “manner of setting forth” - (Cope), or (2) “a metaphor, - with a preface” (Jebb) (but the meaning - of this is not clear). The simile only says that one thing - resembles another, not, like the metaphor, that it - is another; since the speaker does not say this, the result is - that the mind of the hearer does not go into the matter, and so the chance - of instruction, of acquiring some information, is lost. wherefore it - is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this is - that, so thatthe mind does not even examine this. - Of necessity, therefore, all style and - enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why - superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental - effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but - only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which - the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the - latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the - other.The meaning is: the two kinds of - enthymemes mentioned last do convey some information, whereas the - superficial enthymemes teach nothing, either at once, or a little later, - when reflection has made the meaning clear.

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In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, - such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to - antithetical statement; for instance, “accounting the peace that all - shared to be a war against their private interests,”Isoc. 5.73. - where “war” is opposed to “peace”; - as to words, they are popular if they - contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to - take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer; - further, if they set things “before the eyes”; for we ought - to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought - therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.

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Of the four kinds of metaphorIn Aristot. Poet. 21 - metaphor and its four classes are defined: “Metaphor consists in - assigning to a thing the name of something else; and this may take place - either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to - species, or proportionally. An instance of a metaphor from genus to species - is ‘here stands my ship,’ for - ‘standing’ is a genus, ‘being - moored’ a species; from species to genus: ‘Odysseus - truly has wrought a myriad good deeds,’ for - ‘myriad’ is a specific large number, used for the - generic ‘multitude’; from species to species: - ‘having drawn off the life with the bronze’ and - ‘having cut it with the unyielding bronze,’ where - ‘drawn off’ is used in the sense of - ‘cut,’ and ‘cut’ in the sense of - ‘drawn off,’ both being species of ‘taking - away.’” For the proportional metaphor see note on 4.4 - above. - the most popular are those - based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during - the war had disappeared from the State as if the year had lost its - springtime.1.7.34. Leptines, - speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not let the Athenians stand - by and see Greece deprived of one of - her eyes. When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war - examined, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that, now he had the people by the - throat, he was trying to get his accounts examinedeu)/quna was the technical - term for the examination of accounts to which all public officers had to - submit when their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were both - Athenian generals. “Having the people by the throat” may - refer to the condition of Athens - financially and his unsatisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase - ei)s pni=gma to\n dh=mon e)/xonta is - objected to by Cope, who reads a)gago/nta - and translates: “that he drove the people into a fit of choking by - his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way,” i.e. - he tried to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them. - Another reading suggested is a)/gxonta - (throttling so as to choke).; on another occasion - also he exhorted the Athenians to set out for Euboea without delay “and provision themselves there, - like the decree of Miltiades.This may refer - to a decree of Miltiades which was so speedily carried out that it became - proverbial. The expedition was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes.” After the - Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus - and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared “that they - had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.”By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians had - deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and plundering a weak - maritime city, and so securing provisions for the war. The word e)fo/dia properly means provisions for a journey - and travelling expenses. Pitholaus called the ParalusThe Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred - galleys which conveyed state prisoners. “the bludgeon of - the people,” and Sestos - “the corn-chestIt commanded the - trade of the Euxine. of the Piraeus.” Pericles recommended that Aegina, “the eyesore of the - Piraeus,” should be - removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very “respectable” person - by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that - honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was satisfied with 10 - per cent.Moerocles was a contemporary of - Demosthenes, and an anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a - money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The degree of the - respectability (or rather, the swindling practices) of - each is calculated by their respective profits. And the iambic of - Anaxandrides,Poet of the Middle Comedy: - Frag. 68 (Kock, - Com. Att. Frag. 2.). The metaphor in u(perh/menoi is from those who failed to keep the - term of payment of a fine or debt. Cope translates: “I find - ( moi) the young ladies - are . . .” on girls who wereslow to - marry, - - My daughters are “past the time” of marriage. - - And the saying of PolyeuctusAthenian - orator, contemporary of Demosthenes upon a certain paralytic named - Speusippus, “that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound - him in a five-holed pillory of disease.” Cephisodotus called the - triremes “parti-colored mills,”As grinding down the tributary states. They differed from - ordinary mills in being gaily painted. and - [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the tavernsContrasted with the Spartan - “messes,” which were of a plain and simple character, at - which all the citizens dined together. The tavern orgies, according to - Diogenes, represented these at Athens. were “the messes” of - Attica. AesionAthenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes. used to say - that they had “drained” the State into Sicily,Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition. which is a metaphor - and sets the thing before the eyes. His words “so that Greece uttered a cry” are also in a - manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians - take care not to hold their “concourses” too often; and in - the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those “who rush - together” in the assemblies.Isoc. 5.12. Both sundroma/s and suntre/xontas - refer to the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement. And as - Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of - those who fell at Salamis, since her - freedom was buried along with their valor. If the speaker had said that it was - fitting that Greece should weep, her - valor being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, whereas - “freedom” by the side of “valor” - produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, “The path of my - words leads through the center of the deeds of Chares”; here the - metaphor is proportional and the words “through the center” - create vividness. Also, to say that one “calls upon dangers to help - against dangers” is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of - Chabrias said, “not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his - statue of bronze,”The statue of - Chabrias, erected after one of his victories, represented him as kneeling on - the ground, the position which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when - awaiting the enemy. The statue was in the agora and could be seen from the - court. Lycoleon points to it, and bases his appeal on its suppliant - attitude. a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still - vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the - inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And - “in every way studying poorness of spirit,”Isoc. - 4.151. for “studying” a thing implies to - increase it.Metaphor from species to genus - (10.7, first note.), “studying” being - a species of “increasing.” As a rule one studies to - increase some good quality, not a bad one. And that “reason - is a light that God has kindled in the soul,” for both the words - reason and light make something clear. “For we do not put an end to - wars, but put them off,”Isoc. 4.172. for both ideas refer to the - future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a - metaphor to say that such a treaty is “a trophy far more splendid than - those gained in war; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages - and a single favor of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole - war”;Isoc. 4.180 (apparently from memory). - for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also - rendera heavy account to the censure of men; for - rendering an accounteu)/quna (see 10.7, third note) further - implies the punishment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts. - is a sort of just punishment.

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We have said - that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which - set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of “before - the eyes,” and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words - that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is - “four-square”Simonides, frag. 5 (P.L.G. 2.). Both a - good man and a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not - express actuality. is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but - the phrase does not express actuality, whereas “of one having the - prime of his life in full bloom”Isoc. 5.10. does; similarly, - “thee, like a sacred animal ranging at will”Isoc. 5.127. This - speech is an appeal to Philip to lead the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam - where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip could claim - the whole of Greece as his - fatherland, while other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates - calls the author of Philip's line) were tied down and their outlook - narrowed by the laws and constitution of the city in which they - dwelt. expresses actuality, and in - - Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feetEur. IA - 80, with dori/ for - posi/n. - - the word “shooting” contains both actuality and - metaphor. And as Homer often, by making use of - metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is to - creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the - following examples: - - Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.Hom. Od. 11.598, - with e)/peita pe/donde for - e)pi\ - da/pedo/nde. - - - - - The arrow flew.Hom. Il. 13.587. - - - - - [The arrow] eager to fly [towards the - crowd].Hom. Il. 4.126. - - - - - [The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to - take their fill of flesh.Hom. Il. 11.574. - - - - - The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.Hom. Il. - 15.541. - - . For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the - objects are represented as animate: “the shameless stone,” - “the eager spear-point,” and the rest express actuality. - Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional - metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one - who is shamelessly treated. In his popular - similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things: - - Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind;Hom. Il. - 13.799. The reference is to the “boiling - waves of the loud-roaring sea.” - - for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality is movement.

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As we have said before, metaphors should be - drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too obvious; just as, - for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things - that are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no difference between an - arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other. - Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were - identical; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in - this—that one is hung up above and the other below.The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot - hook is above, and the pot hangs down from it. And if - one were to say “the cities have been reduced to the same - level,” this amounts to the same in the case of things far - apart—the equality of “levelling” in regard to - superficies and resources.Cope, retaining - a)nwmali/sqai (as if from - a)nomali/zein, aequalitatem - restituere Bonitz, cf. a)noma/lwsis) says: “the widely dissimilar - things here compared are the areas of properties and the state offices and - privileges, which are to be alike equalized,” translating: - “And the re-equalization of cities, when the same principle is - applied to things standing wide apart, viz. to surface - (area) and powers (functions, - offices).” ( a)n- is not negative, but = re.) But the passage quoted - by Victorius from Isoc. 5.40: “for I - know that all the cities of Greece - have been placed on the same level ( w(mali/sqai) by misfortunes” suggests this - as a preferable reading here, w(mali/sqai - meaning (1) have been levelled to the ground - (although the Lexica give no instance of this use), - (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.

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Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor,and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.proecapata=n. - Or, reading prosecapata=n, “by - adding deception.” For it becomes more evident to him that - he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his - expectation, and the mind seems to say, “How true it is! but I missed - it.” And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in - the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that “the grasshoppers will sing to - themselves from the ground.”See - 2.21.8. And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for - something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus - calls “novel expressions” arise when what follows is - paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous - expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same - effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are - deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance, - the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected: - - And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains, - - whereas the hearer thought he was going to say - “sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from the moment - of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the - proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to - Nicon, the player on the cithara, “you are troubled” - ( qra/ttei); for while - pretending to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us; - for he means something else.According to - Cope, *qra=|tt' ei)=, “you are no - better than a Thracian slave-girl.” - Therefore the joke is only - agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon - is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it. Similarly, “you wish to destroy him ( pe/rsai).”There is obviously a play on pe/rsai - (aor. 1 infin. of pe/rqw) - and *pe/rsai (Persians), - but no satisfactory interpretation of the joke has been suggested. - Jokes of both these kindsThe paradoxical and - verbal. “Suitably” may refer to the manner of delivery; - to being used at the proper time; or to taking care that the word is one - that may be used in the two senses. must be suitably expressed. - Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that “the empire of - the sea” was not “the beginning of misfortunes” - for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates,Isoc. 5.61; Isoc. 8.101. The point in the illustrations lies - in the use of a)rxh/, first in the sense of - “empire,” then in that of - “beginning.” It could be said that the - “empire” of the sea was or was not “the - beginning of misfortunes” for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to them, but - in the end brought disaster, and thus was the - “beginning” of evil. that - “empire” was “the beginning of misfortunes for the - city”; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said - is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that - “empire is empire” shows no cleverness, but this is not what - he means, but something else; in the first, the a)rxh/ which is negatived is used in a different sense. In all these cases, success is attained when a word is - appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the - phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,Usually translated, “There is no bearing - Baring.” there is a contradiction of the homonym, which is - only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, “Thou - shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger,” or “not - more than you should be,” which is the same thing. And again, - - The stranger must not always be a stranger, - - for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense.Kock, - C.A.F. 3.209, p. 448. In the two first examples - “stranger” refers to a distant and reserved manner, as - we say “don't make yourself a stranger”; in the third - ce/nos is apparently to be taken in the - sense of “alien.” Cope translates: “for that - too is of a different kind” (foreign, alien to the two - others; a)llo/trion, belonging to something - or somebody else, opposed to oi)kei=on). But the whole passage is obscure. It - is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides, - - It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death;Kock, C.A.F. 2. Frag. 64, p. - 163. - - for this is the same as saying that “it is worthy to die when - one does notdeserve to die,” or, that - “it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death,” or, - “when one does nothing that is worthy of death.” Now the form of expression of these sayings is the - same; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater - is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and - conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly. Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must - always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is - possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, - “One ought to die guiltless of any offence,” “The - worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife.” There is no smartness - in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are - fulfilled: “It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of - death.” The more special qualities the expression possesses, the - smarter it appears; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a - metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.

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Similes also, as said above, are always in a - manner approved metaphors;Or, reading - ai( for a)ei\, “approved similes are . . .” - since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when - we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre - without strings. But such an - expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a - goblet, it is.In the simple metaphor - “goblet” is substituted for - “shield,” but sometimes additions are made to the word - as differently applied, such as “of Ares” and - “without strings.” These additions, besides involving - greater detail (a characteristic of the simile), - distinctly bring out the contrast of the two terms and make a simile, - whereas the metaphor simply transfers the meaning. - And similes may be formed as follows: a - flute-player resembles an ape,In - posture. a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp; for in both cases there - is contraction.Contraction of eyelids and - flame. - But they are excellent when there is a - proportional metaphor; for it is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of - Ares and a ruin to the rag of a house; to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes - bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, - defeated by Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with his hair - uncut.Like Philoctetes on Lemnos after he had been bitten by the - snake. It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail, - but applauded if they succeed. I mean, for instance, when they introduce an - answering clause:When the concluding - corresponds with the introductory expression. This “answering - clause” is called apodosis (5.2), not - restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion of a conditional sentence. - - - He carries his legs twisted like parsley, - - or again, - - Like Philammon punching the leather sack. - - All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has been often said, - are metaphors of a kind.

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Proverbs also are metaphors from species to - species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which - he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as - the CarpathianOr, “he says it is a - case of the Carpathian and the hare.” An inhabitant of the island - of Carpathus introduced a brace of - hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all the crops and ruined the - farmers (like the rabbits in Australia). says of the hare; for both haveexperienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all - that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them - so.

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Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For - instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, “you - would have thought he was a basket of mulberries,” because the black - eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole. - Again, when one says “like this or that” there is a - hyperbole differing only in the wording: - - Like Philammon punching the leather sack, - - or, “you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting - the sack”; - - Carrying his legs twisted like parsley, - - or, “you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley, - they being so twisted.” There is something youthful about hyperboles; - for they show vehemence. Wherefore those - who are in a passion most frequently make use of them: - - Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as the sand and - dust. . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, I will not - wed, not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene - in accomplishments.Hom. Il. 9.385. - - - (Attic orators are - especially fond of hyperbole.This must be - taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is Aristotle's at - all.) WhereforeBecause they - are boyish. it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.

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But we must - not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of - Rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate; nor, - in the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. - But it is necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one requires a knowledge - of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we - wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know - how to write. The style of written compositions - is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter - there are two kinds, ethical and emotional; this is why actors are always - running after plays of this character, and poets after suitable actors. However, - poets whose works are only meant for reading are also popular, as Chaeremon, who - is as precise as a writer of speeches, and LicymniusSee 2.13 of this book. among dithyrambic poets. When - compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those - of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read. The - reason is that they are only suitable to public debates; hence speeches suited - for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and - appear silly. For instance, asyndeta and frequentrepetition of the same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, but in - public debate even rhetoricians make use of them, for they lend themselves to - acting.What follows, to the end of sect. - 3, is of the nature of a parenthesis, not immediately connected with the - subject of the chapter. - (But one must vary the expression - when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for - declamation:The variation in the form of - the expression suggests a similar variation in the form of the delivery or - declamation. as, “This is he who robbed you, this is he who - deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you.” This is - what Philemon the actor did in The Old Man's Folly of - Anaxandrides, when he says “Rhadamanthus and Palamedes,” and - when he repeats the word “I” in the prologue to The - Pious.The meaning of this has not - been satisfactorily explained. On the face of it, it seems to mean that the - excellence of Philemon's delivery consisted in his way of declaiming - passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon is not to be - confused with the writer of the New Comedy, the rival and contemporary of - Menander. For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a - case of “the man who carries the beam”Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker. in the - proverb.)

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It is the same with asyndeta: “I came, - I met, I entreated.” For here delivery is needed, and the words should - not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one - clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space - of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes - many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will - be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces - amplification: thus, in “I came, I conversed, I besought,” - the hearer seems to be - surveying many things, all that the speaker said.Spengel's reading here is: polla\ - dokei=: “u(perei=den o(/sa ei)=pon,” polla\ - dokei= being parenthetical, and u(perei=don - o(/sa ei)=pon part of the quotation. Jebb translates: - “I came, I spoke to him, I besought” (these - seem many things); “he disregarded all I - said” (which certainly gives a more natural sense to - u(perei=don). This also - is Homer's intention in the passage - - Nireus, again, from Syme . . - ., - Nireus son of Aglaia . . ., - Nireus, the most beautiful . . . ; - Hom. Il. 2.671 ff. - - - for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often - mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been - saidCope translates: “they - think that, if the name is often repeated, there must be a great deal - to say about its owner”; but can this be got out of the - Greek ( ei)rh=sqai)?; so that, by means of this fallacy, - Homer has increased the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one - passage; he has perpetuated his memory, though he never speaks of him again.

-

The deliberative style is exactly like a rough - sketch,Intended to produce the effect of - finished work at a distance before a large number of spectators. for - the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view; wherefore in both - too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic - style is more finished, and more so before a single judge, because there is - least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily - takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it; - there is no discussion,The meaning apparently - is that there is no discussion, as might be the case when there were several - judges, so that the decision is clear and unbiased. a)gw/n and a)gwnistikh\ - le/cis are terms used for debate (e.g. in the law - courts) and the style suited to it (cf sect. 1). - Cope's editor refers to Cic. Ad Att. - 1.16.8 “remoto illo studio contentionis, quem vos - [you Athenians] a)gw=na - appellatis.” Jebb translates: “the turmoil is absent, so - that the judgement is serene” (in a note, - “unclouded”). so the judgement is clear. - This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles; where action is - most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which - voice, especially a loud one, is needed.

-

The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions, for its - function is reading;This does not seem to - agree with the general view. Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, - for instance, were certainly meant to be spoken; but the e)/rgon or proper function of an epideictic may - be said to consist in reading, in its being agreeable to read. Its te/los or end is to be read. - and next to it comes the forensic style. It is - superfluous to make the further distinctionthat style - should be pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than temperate, liberal, or - anything else that indicates moral virtue? For it is evident that, if virtue of - style has been correctly defined, what we have said will suffice to make it - pleasant. For why, if not to please, need it be clear, not mean, but - appropriate? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be clear; but it - is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style - pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and - “foreign” words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting - from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style; of all the three - kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains - to speak of arrangement.

-

A speech has - two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore - it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without - first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who - puts something forward does so in order to prove it. The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the - proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration. But the division now generally made is absurd; for - narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or - deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is - defined, or a refutation; or - an epilogue in demonstrative speeches?The - generally accepted divisions are: prooi/mion - (exordium), dih/ghsis - (narrative), pi/stis - (proof), e)pi/logos - (peroration). ( dih/ghsis is a species of pro/qesis, which is used instead of it just before.) - Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the forensic - speech which requires a regular dih/ghsis, a - full and detailed statement of what has happened before. In epideictic and - demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the object of which - is to prove something, there is no need of another existing division called - the refutation of the adversary, and in the demonstrative there can be no - room for an epilogue, which is not a summary of proofs and - arguments. Thus the necessary divisions of a speech are really only - two; pro/qesis and pi/stis, or at most four. In deliberative speeches, - again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there - is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in - deliberative, but not qua deliberative speech. And further, the - epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is - short, or the matter is easy to recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is - that there is a reduction of length.i.e. its - use is to recall the main facts briefly (sect. 4 end), - which in a short speech is needless.

-

So then the necessary parts of a speech are the - statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every - speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, - statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, - and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of - the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the - epilogue are merely aids to memory. Therefore, - if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following TheodorusPlat. Phaedrus - 266d, where the additional kinds of narrative are omitted, and - their place taken by pi/stwsis and e)pipi/stwsis (confirmation of the - proof). and his school, who distinguished narrative, - additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional - refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a - real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms - introduced by Licymnius in his “Art,” where he speaks of - “being wafted along,” “wandering from the - subject,”Or, - “diverting the judge's attention.” and - “ramifications.”

-

The exordium - is the beginning of a speech, asthe prologue in poetry - and the prelude in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a - paving the way for what follows. The prelude resembles the exordium of - epideictic speeches; for as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can - execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so also in epideictic speeches - should be the composition of the exordium; the speaker should say at once - whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject. And all - do this, an example being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates; - for the eristics and Helen have nothing in common.The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but - Isocrates took the opportunity of attacking the sophists. This exemplifies - his skill in the introduction of matter not strictly proper to, or in common - with, the subject. The key-note is Helen; but the exordium is an attack on - the Eristics, with special allusion to the Cynics and the Megarians. - At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from the point, this is more - appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous.

-

In epideictic speeches, the sources of the - exordia are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the Olympiacus, - says, “Men of Greece, you are - worthy to be admired by many,” where he is praising those who - instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand blames them - because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of - wisdom. Exordia may also be derived from - advice, for instance, one should honor the good, wherefore the speaker praises - Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor worthless, but who, although they - are good, remain obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; for this is a piece of advice. Again, they may be derived from forensic exordia, that - is to say, from appeals to the hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, - difficult, or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence, like ChoerilusOf Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian war, from - which this half-line and the context preserved in the Scholiast are taken. - He complains that whereas the poets of olden times had plenty to write - about, the field of poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all - apportioned, and he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find - “a new chariot for the race-course of his song. - ”: - - But now when all has been allotted. - - These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise, - blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer. And these exordiae)ndo/sima = - prooi/mia. may be either foreign - or intimately connected with the speech.

-

As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it - must be noted that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic - exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia: - For thee and thy presents or spoils).A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic - exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like prologues and - epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, which may be wild, - high-flown, as in the example given from an unknown author. - But in speechesThat is, forensic speeches. dra/masi has been suggested for lo/gois. and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of - the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about, and - that the mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is undefined leads - astray; so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand - enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence the following - exordia: - - Sing the wrath, O Muse.Hom. Il 1.1. - - - - - Tell me of the man, O Muse.Hom. Od. 1.1. - - - - - Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into - Europe.From Choerilus (sect. - 4). - - Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not - at the outset,like Euripides, at least somewhere in the - prologue, like Sophocles, - - My father was Polybus.Soph. OT 774. But this can hardly be - called the prologue. - - It is the same in comedy. So then the most essential and special - function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the - speech; wherefore it should not be employed, if the subject is quite clear or - unimportant. All the other forms of exordia in - use are only remedies,That is, special - remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from “inattention, - unfavorable disposition, and the like” - (Cope). and are common to all three branches of - Rhetoric. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the - opponent. From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create - prejudice. But this must not be done in the same way; for the defendant must - deal with this at the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is - obvious. The defendant, when about to introduce himself, must remove all - obstacles, so that he must first clear away all prejudice; the accuser must - create prejudice in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier - recollection of it.

-

The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him well disposed or to arouse - his indignation, and sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite; for it - is not always expedient to engage his attention, which is the reason why many - speakers try to make their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers - tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person wishes, including the - appearance of respectability, because respectable persons command more attention. Hearers pay most attention - to things that are important, that concern their own interests, that are - astonishing, that are agreeable; wherefore one should put the idea into their - heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To make his hearers inattentive, - the speaker must persuade them that the matter is unimportant, that it does not - concern them, that it is painful.

-

But we must not lose sight of the fact that all - such things are outside the question, for they are only addressed to a hearer - whose judgement is poor and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case; - for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need of an exordium, except - just to make a summary statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it may - have a head. Further, engaging the hearers' - attention is common to all parts of the speech, if necessary; for attention - slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is - ridiculous to put thisi.e., to claim the - hearer's attention at the beginning, for every one is keen to listen then, - but later on attention slackens. at the beginning, at a time when all - listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one - must say, “And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as - myself”; and, “I will tell you such a thing as you have - never yet” heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus - used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his - fifty-drachma lecture. But it is clear that - one does not speak thus to the hearer qua hearer;The hearer qua hearer should be - unbiased, but in fact hearers often suffer from the defects referred to in - sect. 7, for which certain forms of exordia are remedies. for all in - their exordia endeavor either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own - apprehensions: - - O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come - breathless].Soph. Ant. 223. - - - - - Why this preamble?Eur. IT 1162. - - This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, a bad case; for - it is better to lay stress upon anything rather than the case itself. That is - why slaves never answer questions directly but go all round them, and indulge in - preambles. We have stated2.1.7, 8. how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured - and all other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly said, - - Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friendship or - compassion,Hom. Od. 7.327. - - the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.

-

In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the - praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some - way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that “it - is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the - presence of Lacedaemonians.”See - 1.9.30.

-

Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from - forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers - are acquainted with the subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except for - the orator's own sake, or on account of his adversaries, or if the hearers - attach too much or too little importance to the question according to his idea. - Wherefore he must either excite or remove prejudice, and magnify or minimize the - importance of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia; or else they merely - serve the purpose of ornament, since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium - on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements, - starts off at once, “Elis, - happy city.”

-

One way of - removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear - oneself from disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference whether this - suspicion has been openly expressed or not; and so this may be taken as a - general rule. Another wayAnother reading is to/pos - (topic) and so throughout. consists in contesting - the disputed points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, at least to - the plaintiff; or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated; or that it is - not unjust at all, or only slightly so; or neither disgraceful nor important. - These are the possible points of dispute: as Iphicrates, in answer to - Nausicrates, admitted that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and inflicted - damage, but denied that he had been guilty of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike - the balance, when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that although the action - was injurious it was honorable, painful but useful, or anything else of the - kind.

-

Another method consists in saying that it was a - case of error, misfortune, or necessity; as, for example, Sophocles said that he - trembled, not, as the accuser said, in order to appear old, but from necessity, - for it was against his wish that he was eighty years of age.Sophocles had two sons, Iophon and Ariston, by different - wives; the latter had a son named Sophocles. Iophon, jealous of the - affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson, summoned him before the - phratores (a body which had some jurisdiction in - family affairs) on the ground that his age rendered him incapable - of managing his affairs. In reply to the charge, Sophocles read the famous - choric ode on Attica from the - Oedipus Coloneus, beginning *eu)i/ppou, ce/ne, ta=sde xw/ras (Soph. OC 668 ff.), and was - acquitted. The story in this form is probably derived from some comedy, - which introduced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the - tragedy). One may also substitute one motive for another, - and say that one did not mean to injure but to do something else, not that of - which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental: “I - should deserveyour hatred, had I acted so as to bring - this about.”

-

Another method may be employed if the accuser, - either himself or one closely related to him, has been involved in a similar - charge, either now or formerly; or, if others - are involved who are admittedly not exposed to the charge; for instance, if it - is argued that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy, then so-and-so - must be.

-

Again, if the accuser has already similarly - accused others, or himself been accused by others;In the reading in the text, au)tou/s must apparently refer to the defendant, and one would - rather expect au)to/n. Spengel suggested - h)\ a)/llos h)\ au)to/s for h)\ a)/llos au)tou/s: if he (i.e. the - adversary) or another has similarly accused others. or if - others, without being formally accused, have been suspected as you are now, and - their innocence has been proved.

-

Another method consists in counter-attacking the - accuser; for it would be absurd to believe the words of one who is himself - unworthy of belief.

-

Another method is to appeal to a verdict already - given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange of property;When a citizen was called upon to perform a - “liturgy” or public service (e.g. the equipment - of a chorus), if he thought that one richer than himself had been - passed over he could summon him and compel him to exchange - properties. when Hygiaenon accused him of impiety as having advised - perjury in the verse, - - My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,Eur. Hipp. 612. - This well-known verse is three times parodied in Aristophanes - (Aristoph. Thes. - 275; Aristoph. Frogs - 101, Aristoph. - Frogs1471). In the first passage, the sense is - reversed: Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a - woman in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly. - Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he - will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides takes - an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says to - Euripides: “Remember that it was your mind that swore, - but not your tongue.” When Euripides was engaged in a - lawsuit, his adversary quoted the line, implying that even on - oath Euripides could not be believed; Euripides replied that his - adversary had no right to bring before the law courts a matter - which had already been settled by the theatrical - judges. - - Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in transferring the - decisions of the court of Dionysus to the law courts; for he had already - rendered an account of what he had said there,In the great Dionysiac theater. or was still ready to do so, if his - adversary desired to accuse him.

-

Another method consists in attacking slander, - showing how great an evil it is, and this because it alters the nature of - judgements,Or, “makes - extraneous points the subject of decision” - (Cope), “raises false issues” - (Jebb). and that it does not rely on the real facts - of the case.

-

Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, as in the Teucer,Of Sophocles. Odysseus reproaches Teucer with being a - relative of Priam, whose sister his mother Hesione was; to which Teucer replied - that his father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that he himself did not - denounce the spies.Who had been sent to - Troy by the Greeks to spy upon - the Trojans. It seems that he was afterwards accused of treachery, the - token being the fact that Teucer was a near connection of - Priam; to which he replied with another token that his father - was an enemy of Priam, and further, when the Greek spies were in Troy, he never betrayed them.

-

Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to - praise something unimportant at great length, and to condemn something important - concisely; or, putting forward several things that are praiseworthy in the - opponent, to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing upon the case. - Such methodsJebb refers toiou=toi to the accusers, translating texnikoi/ “artistic,” certainly the - commoner meaning. are most artful and unfair; for by their use men - endeavor to make what is good in a man injurious to him, by mixing it up with - what is bad.

-

Another method is common to both accuser and defender. Since the same thing may - have been done from several motives, the accuser must disparage it by taking it - in the worse sense, while the defender must take it in the better sense. For - instance, when Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may be said on the - one hand that he did so because he considered him to be the bravest of men, on - the other, that it was because Odysseus was the only man who was no possible - rival for him, since he was a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of - prejudice.

-

In the - epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive, but disjointed; for it - is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech. For - a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being - in no way the authorof the actions which he - relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists - in showing that the action did take place, if it be incredible, or that it is of - a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together. This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all - the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kindInvolving a continuous succession of proofs. is - difficult to remember. From some facts a man may be shown to be courageous, from - others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the - other is intricate and not plain. It is only - necessary to recall famous actions; wherefore most people have no need of - narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles; for everybody - knows what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you wish - to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did - . . .Something has been lost here, as is - shown by the transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss. - have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing the passage - e)/sti d' e)/painos . . . metateqh|= - (1.9.33-37).

-

But at the present day it is absurdly laid down - that the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man said to the baker when - he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, “What! is it - impossible to knead it well?” so it is in this case; for the narrative - must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either. For in this case also - propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a due mean; - that is, one must say all that will make the facts clear, or create the belief that they have - happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish - to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite. And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your - own virtue, for instance, “I always recommended him to act rightly, - not to forsake his children”; or the wickedness of your opponent, for - instance, “but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always - find other children,” an answer attributed by HerodotusHdt. 2.30. The story - was that a number of Egyptian soldiers had revolted and left in a body for - Ethiopia. Their king - Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives and children, to which - one of them made answer ( tw=n de/ tina - le/getai de/canta to\ ai)doi=on ei)pei=n, e)/nqa a)\n tou=to h)=|, - e)/sesqai au)toi=si e)nqau=ta kai\ te/kna kai\ - gunai=kas). to the Egyptian rebels; or anything - which is likely to please the dicasts.

-

In defence, the narrative need not be so long; - for the points at issue are either that the fact has not happened or that it was - neither injurious nor wrong nor so important as asserted, so that one should not - waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless anything tends to prove that, - admitting the act, it is not wrong. Again, one - should only mention such past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation - if described as actually happening; for instance, the story of Alcinous, because - in the presence of Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines,Hom. Od. 23.264-284, - Hom. Od. 23.310-343. The title - referred to the narrative in Books 9-12. It became proverbial for a - long-winded story. and the way in which Phayllus dealt with the epic - cycle,he apparently summarized it. - and the prologue to the Oeneus.Of Euripides. It was apparently very compact.

-

And the narrative should be of a moral - character, and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing is - to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the - character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this reason - mathematical treatises have nomoral character, because - neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end. But the Socratic - dialogues have; for they discuss such questions. Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each - individual character; for instance, “He was talking and walking on at - the same time,” which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should - we speak as if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day orators; but - from moral purpose: “But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if - I profited nothing, it is better.” The first statement indicates - prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is - useful, virtue in that of what is honorable. If anything of the kind seems - incredible, then the reason must be added; of this Sophocles gives an example, - where his Antigone says that she cared more for her brother than for her husband - or children; for the latter can be replaced after they are gone, - - but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother can ever be - born.Soph. Ant. 911-912, where the - mss. have kekeuqo/toin instead - of Aristotle's bebhko/twn. - - If you have no reason, you should at least say that you are aware that - what you assert is incredible, but that it is your nature; for no one believes - that a man ever does anything of his own free will except from motives of - self-interest.Whereas this man makes his - temperament responsible for the strange things he does; he is built that way - and cannot help it.

-

Further, the narrative should draw upon what is - emotional by the introduction of such of its accompaniments as are well known, - and of what is specially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary: - “And he went off looking grimly at me”; and as AeschinesSupposed to be Aeschines called Socraticus from his intimate - friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and writer of speeches for the law - courts, he had a great reputation as an orator. says of Cratylus, - that he hissed violently and violently shook his fists. Such details produce - persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they become tokens of what he - does not know. Numerous examples of this may be found in Homer: - - Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with her - hands;Hom. Od. 19.361. - - for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on their eyes. And you - should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as being of a certain - character, that the hearers may regard you or him as such; but do not let it be - seen. That this is easy is perfectly cleardei= (omitted by - others) = “one cannot help seeing.” from - the example of messengers; we do not yet know what they are going to say, but - nevertheless we have an inkling of it.

-

Again, the narrative should be introduced in - several places, sometimes not at all at the beginning. In deliberative oratory - narrative is very rare, because no one can narrate things to come; but if there - is narrative, it will be of things past, in order that, being reminded of them, - the hearers may take better counsel about the future. This may be done in a - spirit either of blame or of praise; but in that case the speaker does not - perform the function of the deliberative orator. If there is anything - incredible, you should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once - and to submit it to the judgement of any whom the hearers approve;Omitting te. - The difficulty is diata/ttein, which can - apparently only mean “arrange.” Jebb retains te, and reads w(s - for oi(=s: “the speaker must make - himself responsible for the fact . . . and marshal his reasons in a way - acceptable to the hearers.” The old Latin translation vadiare quibus volunt suggested to Roemer diaithtai=s, “to the arbitrators they - approve.” as, for instance, Jocasta in the - Oedipus of CarcinusAccording - to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible things about her son, and - pledges her word for the facts. Cope says: “promises (to - do something or other to satisfy him).” is always - promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiriesof her; and similarly Haemon in Sophocles.Soph. Ant. - 683-723. On this Cope remarks: “This last example must be - given up as hopeless; there is nothing in the extant play which could be - interpreted as required here.” According to Jebb, the - “incredibility” consists in the fact that Haemon, - although in love with Antigone, and strongly opposed to the sentence - pronounced upon her by his father Creon, still remains loyal to the latter. - Haemon explains the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his - father's welfare more than anything else, for a father's good name and - prosperity is the greatest ornament for children, as is the son's for the - father.

-

Proofs should - be demonstrative, and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration should - bear upon the particular point disputed; for instance, if the fact is disputed, - proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else; or if it is - maintained that no injury has been done; or that the act was not so important as - asserted; or was just, then this must be proved, the three last questions being - matters of dispute just as the question of fact. But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question - of fact that one of the two parties must necessarilyAristotle's argument is as follows. But it must not be - forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of fact that one - of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. For ignorance is not the - cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. “you - hit me,” “no, I didn't,” where both know the - truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so - that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (i.e. - because here you can prove or disprove that A is ponhro/s). The passage is generally taken to mean - that when it is a question of fact it is universally true that one of the - disputants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes any comment. In - his note he says: “all that is meant is that there is a certain - class of cases which fall under this issue, in which this topic may be - safely used.” For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B - with theft; B denies it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is - strongly against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is necessarily - ponhro/s. be a rogue; for - ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question of right or wrong were - the issue; so that in this case one should spend time on this topic, but not in - the others.

-

In epideictic speeches, amplification is - employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honorable or useful; for the facts - must be taken on trust, since proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they - are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.Or, reading a)/llws, “if there is some other - reason.”

-

In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained - either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary - recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so - important as supposed. But one must also look to see whether he makes any false - statements as to things outside the issue; for these look like evidence that he - makes misstatements about the issue itself as well.

-

Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory - and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned with the future, so that its - examples must be derived from the past; the second with the question of the - existence or non-existence of facts, in which demonstrative and necessary proofs - are more in place; for the past involves a kind of necessity.It is irrevocable, and it is possible to discuss it with some - degree of certainty, whereas the future is quite uncertain, and all that can - be done is to draw inferences from the past. - One should not introduce a series of enthymemes - continuously but mix them up; otherwise they destroy one another. For there is a - limit of quantity; thus, - - Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would say,Hom. Od. - 4.204. - - - where Homer does not say toiau=ta (such things as), but to/sa (as many things as). Nor - should you try to find enthymemes about everything; otherwise you will be - imitating certain philosophers, who draw conclusions that are better known and - more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.For this passage see 1.2.12-13. The meaning is that it is - absurd to prove what every one knows already. - And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not - use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be - useless; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their - mutual destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for an enthymeme at the - time when you wish to give the speech an ethical character; for demonstration - involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.

-

Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used - in both narrative and proof; for they express moral character; for instance, - “I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to - trust.” Or, to arouse emotion: “I do - not regret it, although I have been wronged; his is the profit, mine the - right.”

-

Deliberative speaking is more difficult than - forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future; whereas - forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known, even by - diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said; for he used to divine, not the future, - but only things that were past but obscure.The remark of Epimenides is by many editors interpreted as a sarcasm upon - the fraternity of soothsayers, who pretended to be able to foretell - the future. But how is this to be got out of the Greek? The point - is perhaps something like: “it is easy enough to talk about the - past, for even soothsayers know it.” What Aristotle says here is - that Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating to the - obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an instance. After the - followers of Cylon, who tried to make himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had - been put to death by the Alcmaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the - terms of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was devastated by a - pestilence. On the advice of the oracle, Epimenides was summoned from - Crete, and by certain rites and - sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence. - Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a - starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative - speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance, - attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. - In this branch of Rhetoric there is less room for these than in any other, - unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for - topics, one must do as the orators at Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating, he - brings accusations against the Lacedaemonians, for instance, in the - Panegyricus,Isoc. 4.110-114. and against Chares in - the Symmachikos (On the Peace).Isoc. 8.27.

-

Epideictic speeches should be varied with - laudatory episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always bringing - somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant when he said that he was never at a loss - for something to say; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he praises Achilles, - then Aeacus, then the god; similarly courage, which does this and that,He enumerates all the deeds that proceed from - courage. Another reading is h)\ ta\ kai\ ta/, poiei= - o(\ toio/nde e)sti/n, i.e. when praising courage, and this or - that, he is employing a method of the kind mentioned. or is of such a - kind. If you have proofs, then, your language - must be both ethical and demonstrative; if you have no enthymemes, ethical only. - In fact, it is more fitting that a virtuous man should show himself good than that his speech should be - painfully exact.

-

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than - demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it is clearer that a logical - conclusion has been reached; for opposites are more noticeable when placed in - juxtaposition.There is no difference in - form between the demonstrative and refutative enthymeme, but the latter - draws opposite conclusions; and opposites are always more striking when they - are brought together, and a parallel drawn between them. It is then easy to - see where the fallacy lies. Cf. 2.23.30: “Refutative enthymemes - are more effective (popular) than demonstrative, because - they bring opposites together in a small compass, which are more striking - (clearer) to the hearer from being put side by - side.” - The refutation of the opponent is not a - particular kind of proof; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection, - partly by counter-syllogism.In the - translation tw=n pi/stewn is taken with - e)/sti: it is the business of, the - proper function of, proofs. Others take it with ta\ - me\n . . . ta\ de/: some . . . other (of the - opponent's arguments). In both deliberative and forensic - rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own proofs and afterwards meet the - arguments of the opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if - the opposition is varied,If the opponent's - arguments are numerous and strong, by reason of the varied nature of the - points dealt with. these arguments should be dealt with first, as - Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly; in fact, it was only after he had - first refuted what his opponents were likely to say that he put forward his own - proofs. He who replies should first state the - arguments against the opponent's speech, refuting and answering it by - syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with approval. For as the mind - is ill-disposed towards one against whom prejudices have been raised beforehand, - it is equally so towards a speech, if the adversary is thought to have spoken - well. One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one - intends to make; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by - the adversary. Wherefore it is only after having combated all the arguments, or - the most important, or those which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that - you should substantiate your own case: - - I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not - think] that Hera . . .Eur. Tro. 969-971. - Hecuba had advised Menelaus to put Helen to death; she defends - herself at length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which - these words form part. Her argument is that none of the three - goddesses who contended for the prize of beauty on Mt. Ida would - have been such fools as to allow Argos and Athens to become subject to Troy as the result of the - contest, which was merely a prank. - - in this passage the poet has first seized upon the weakest argument.

-

So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral - character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable - to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of - another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak - in our place, as Isocrates does in the PhilippusIsoc. 5.4-7. - Isocrates says that his friends thought very highly of one of - his addresses, as likely to bring peace. and in the - Antidosis.Isoc. 15.132-139, Isoc. 15.141-149. Here again Isocrates puts compliments on his - composition into the mouth of an imaginary friend. Archilochus uses - the same device in censure; for in his iambics he introduces the father speaking - as follows of his daughter: - - There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be sworn - impossible,Archilochus - (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule, the daughter of - Lycambes. Her father broke off the engagement, whereupon - Archilochus pursued father and daughter with furious and - scurrilous abuse. It is here said that, instead of attacking the - daughter directly, he represented her as being attacked by her - father. The meaning of a)/elpton - is not clear. It may be a general statement: the unexpected - often happens; or, there is nothing so bad that you may not - expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates: “There is - nothing that money cannot procure,” meaning that the - father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag. - 74). - - and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse beginning - - I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges;The line ends: tou= poluxru/sou me/lei. Archilochus - represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own - disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused by - others possessing it. - - Sophocles, also,Here again, Haemon - similarly puts his own feeling as to Creon's cruel treatment of Antigone - into the mouth of the people of the city, and refers to popular - rumor. introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as - if quoting the opinion of others. One should - also sometimes change enthymemes into moral maxims; for instance, - “Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous; for - in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages,” which is - equivalent to the enthymeme “If men should become reconciled whenever - it is most useful and advantageous, they should be reconciled in a time of - prosperity.”

-

In regard to - interrogation, its employment is especially opportune, when the opponent has already stated the opposite, - so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdityThe words o(/tan . . . - h)=| have been variously translated: (1) - when one of the two alternatives has already been stated; - (2) when the opponent has stated what is different from - the fact; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so - much, “made one admission” - (Jebb).; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated - Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the savior goddess. On Lampon - replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about - them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when - he said yes, Pericles further asked, “How can that be, seeing that you - are uninitiated?” Again, - interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident, - and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the - interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should - not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the - conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in - the gods, askedReading h)/reto. whether he did not say that there was a - divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine - beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus - again said yes, Socrates rejoined, “Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods - exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist?” - Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts - himself or puts forward a paradox. Further, - when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical - solution; for if he answers, “Partly yes, and partly no,” - “Some are, but some are not,” “In one sense it is - so, in another not,” the hearers cry out against him as being in a - difficulty.For the first of the quibbles - Sandys refers to Aristoph. Ach. 396, - where Cephisophon, being asked if Euripides was indoors, replies, - “Yes and no, if you understand me”; and he gives the - explanation, his mind is outside, collecting scraps of poetry, while he - himself is upstairs ( a)naba/dhn, - unless it means “with his legs up”) composing a - tragedy. The reference in the second instance is to the adversary being - reduced to such a position that he cannot answer without having recourse to - sophistical divisions and distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty. - Aristotle himself is fond of such “cautiously limited - judgements” (Gomperz). The translation is that - of the reading a)porou=ntos, a conjecture of - Spengel's. The audience will be ready to express its disapproval of his - shuffling answers, which are evidence of his perplexity. The ordinary - reading a)porou=ntes attributes the - “perplexity” to the hearers. Or, “the hearers, - thinking he is puzzled, applaud us [the - interrogator]” (Jebb). In other - cases interrogation should not be attempted; for if the adversary raises an - objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated; for it is impossible to ask a - number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. Wherefore also we should - compress our enthymemes as much as possible.

-

Ambiguous questions should be answered by - defining them by a regular explanation, and not too concisely; those that appear - likely to make us contradict ourselves should be solved at once in the answer, - before the adversary has time to ask the next question or to draw a conclusion; - for it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this, however, - and the means of answering will be sufficiently clear from the - Topics.Aristot. Top. 8.4. - If a conclusion is put in the form of a - question, we should state the reason for our answer. For instance, - SophoclesCp. 1.14.3. being asked - by Pisander whether he, like the rest of the Committee of Ten, had approved the - setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. “What then?” - asked Pisander, “did not this appear to you to be a wicked - thing?” Sophocles admitted it. “So then you did what was - wicked?” “Yes, for there was nothing better to be - done.” The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephoralty, - being asked if he did not think that the rest of his colleagues had been justly - put to death, answered yes. “But did not you pass the same measures as - they did?” “Yes.” “Would not you, then, - also be justly put to death?” “No; for my colleagues did - this for money; I did not, but acted according to my conscience.” For - this reason we should not ask any further questions after drawing the - conclusion, nor put the - conclusion itself as a question, unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in - our favor.

-

As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful - in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents' - earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the - PoeticsThe chapters are - lost (cp. 1.11.29). how many kinds of jests there - are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose - the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the - first is employed on one's own account, the second on that of another.

-

The epilogue - is composed of four parts: to dispose the hearer favorably towards oneself and - unfavorably towards the adversary; to amplify and depreciate; to excite the - emotions of the hearer; to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you are - truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to - praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.Or, “mould the hearers to one's will” - (L. and S.). One of two things should be aimed at, - to show that you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary - either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which serve to represent men as - good or bad have already been stated.Book - 1.9. - After this,when the - proof has once been established, the natural thing is to amplify or depreciate; - for it is necessary that the facts should be admitted, if it is intended to deal - with the question of degree; just as the growth of the body is due to things - previously existing. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been - previously set forth.Book 2.19. - Next, when the nature and importance of the - facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity, - indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The topics - of these also have been previously stated,Book 2.1-11. - so that all that remains is to recapitulate - what has been said. This may appropriately be done at this stage in the way - certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend for the exordium, when they advise - frequent repetition of the points, so that they may be easily learnt. In the - exordium we should state the subject, in order that the question to be decided - may not escape notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary statement of - the proofs.

-

We should begin by saying that we have kept our - promise, and then state what we have said and why. Our case may also be closely - compared with our opponent's; and we may either compare what both of us have - said on the same point, or without direct comparison: “My opponent - said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point and for these reasons.” Or ironically, as - for instance, “He said this and I answered that; what would he have - done, if he had proved this, and not simply that?” Or by - interrogation: “What is there that has not been proved?” or, - “What has my opponent proved?” We may, therefore, either sum - up by comparison, or in the natural order of the statements, just as they were - made, our own first, and then again, separately, if we so desire, what has been - said by our opponent. To the conclusion of the - speechReading teleuth=|, a conjecture of Victorius. With teleuth/, the sense will be: “as a - conclusion, the asyndectic style is appropriate.” the most - appropriate style is that which has no connecting particles, in order that it - may be a peroration, but not an oration: “I have spoken; you have - heard; you know the facts; now give your decision.”It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable - peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of Lysias - Against Eratosthenes.

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+ Rhetoric is a counterpartNot an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a choral ode. of Dialectic; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confinedOr and they (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not confined. to any special science. Hence all men in a manner have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point, endeavor to criticize or uphold an argument, to defend themselves or to accuse.

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Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with a familiarity arising from habit. But since both these ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine the reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance; and such an examination all would at once admit to be the function of an art.The special characteristic of an art is the discovery of a system or method, as distinguished from mere knack ( ἐμπειρία). +

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Now, previous compilers of ArtsManuals or handbooks treating of the rules of any art or science. of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; +

+

for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast.His functions were a combination of those of the modern judge and juryman. The result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some States, especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say. +

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For all men either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe,That is, forbid speaking of matters that have nothing to do with the case. or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the dicast's feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy or compassion, which would be like making the rule crooked which one intended to use. +

+

Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to decide; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him.

+

First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, properly enacted, should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges; in the first place, because it is easier to find one or a few men of good sense, capable of framing laws and pronouncing judgements, than a large number; secondly, legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas judgements are delivered on the spur of the moment, so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide questions of justice or expediency. But what is most important of all is that the judgement of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is universal and applies to the future, whereas the member of the public assembly and the dicast have to decide present and definite issues, and in their case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, so that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgement being obscured by their own pleasure or pain. +

+

All other cases, as we have just said, should be left to the authority of the judge as seldom as possible, except where it is a question of a thing having happened or not, of its going to happen or not, of being or not being so; this must be left to the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for the legislator to foresee such questions. +

+

If this is so, it is obvious that all those who definitely lay down, for instance, what should be the contents of the exordium or the narrative, or of the other parts of the discourse, are bringing under the rules of art what is outside the subject; for the only thing to which their attention is devoted is how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs,Systematic logical proofs (enthymeme, for example), including testimony as to character and appeals to the emotions (2.3), which the rhetorician has to invent ( εὑρεῖν, inventio) for use in particular cases. They are contrasted with inartificial proofs, which have nothing to do with the rules of the art, but are already in existence, and only need to be made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. 4-14, the latter in ch. 15 of this book. which make a man a master of rhetorical argument. +

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Hence, although the method of deliberative and forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited to transactions between private citizens, they say nothing about the former, but without exception endeavor to bring forensic speaking under the rules of art. The reason of this is that in public speaking it is less worth while to talk of what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to trickery less than forensic, because it is of more general interest.κοινότερον: or, more intelligible to the ordinary man. For in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient; there it is useful to win over the hearers, for the decision concerns other interests than those of the judges, who, having only themselves to consider and listening merely for their own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision.The case as a rule being a matter of personal indifference, the judges are likely to be led away by the arguments which seem most plausible. That is why, as I have said before, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions against this. +

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It is obvious, therefore, that a system arranged according to the rules of art is only concerned with proofs; that proof is a sort of demonstration,Exact scientific proof ( ἀπόδειξις), which probable proof ( πίστις) only to a certain extent resembles. since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs and lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism. Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or of one of its parts,Dialectic here apparently includes logic generally, the part being either the Analytica Priori, which deals with the syllogism, or the Sophistici Elenchi, on Fallacies. to consider every kind of syllogism in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most capable of examining the matter and forms of a syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge of the subjects with which enthymemes deal and the differences between them and logical syllogisms. For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it come under the purview of the same faculty, and at the same time men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it; wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities.ἔνδοξα, resting on opinion; defined in the Topics (1.1) as things generally admitted by all, or by most men, or by the wise, and by all or most of these, or by the most notable and esteemed.

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It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring under the rules of art what is outside the subject, andδιότι either = ὅτι, that; or, (it is clear) why. have rather inclined to the forensic branch of oratory. +

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Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made, they must owe their defeat to their own advocates; which is reprehensible. Further, in dealing with certain persons, even if we possessed the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to persuade them by the employment of such knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned with instruction,Almost equivalent to demonstration or strictly logical proof. but in the case of such persons instruction is impossible; our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, as we said in the Topics,1.2. The Topics is a treatise in eight books on Dialectic and drawing conclusions from probabilities. when speaking of converse with the multitude. Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; not that we should do both (for one ought not to persuade people to do what is wrong), but that the real state of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves may be able to counteract false arguments, if another makes an unfair use of them. Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally concerned with them. However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man than that of the body. +

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If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things which are most useful, such as strength, health, wealth, generalship; for as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm.

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It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic, [is of general application]; also, that it is useful; and further, that its function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in each case the existing means of persuasion.The early sophistical definition was the art of persuasion. The same holds good in respect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not the function of medicine to restore a patient to health, but only to promote this end as far as possible; for even those whose recovery is impossible may be properly treated. It is further evident that it belongs to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to discover the real and apparent syllogism. For what makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral purpose. But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one who acts in accordance with sound argument, and one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, are both called rhetoricians; but in Dialectic it is the moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialectician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral purpose but on the faculty.The essence of sophistry consists in the moral purpose, the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic, the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of them when he pleases; when he does so deliberately, he is called a sophist. In Rhetoric, this distinction does not exist; he who uses sound arguments as well as he who uses false ones are both known as rhetoricians.

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Let us now endeavor to treat of the method itself, to see how and by what means we shall be able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were start again, and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass on to the remainder of the subject.

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Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. This is the function of no other of the arts, each of which is able to instruct and persuade in its own special subject; thus, medicine deals with health and sickness, geometry with the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the other arts and sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say, appears to be able to discover the means of persuasion in reference to any given subject. That is why we say that as an art its rules are not applied to any particular definite class of things.

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As for proofs, some are artificial, others inartificial. By the latter I understand all those which have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in existence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like; by the former, all that can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to make use of the latter, whereas we must invent the former. +

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Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three kinds. The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove. +

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The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character; for it is not the case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down in their Art, that the worth of the orator in no way contributes to his powers of persuasion; on the contrary, moral character, so to say, constitutes the most effective means of proof. +

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The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion by his speech; for the judgements we deliver are not the same when we are influenced by joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone that, as we have said, the present-day writers of treatises endeavor to devote their attention. (We will discuss these matters in detail when we come to speak of the emotions.) +

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Lastly, persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the true or apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable to each individual subject. +

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Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions—the nature and character of each, its origin, and the manner in which it is produced. Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics.Rhetoric, as dealing with human actions, characters, virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with Politics, which includes Ethics. The two latter treat of the same subject from a different point of view. Both deal with happiness and virtue, but the object of Politics is, by comparison of the different forms of States to find the one in which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an important factor in the training and education of the individual citizen and of the members of the State as a whole, may be described as an offshoot of Politics, with which the sophistical rhetoricians identified it. That is why Rhetoric assumesOr, slips into the garb of (Jebb). Probably a stage metaphor. the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are merely faculties of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly enough about the faculties of these arts and their mutual relations.

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But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else; so that if, generally speaking, it is necessary to prove any fact whatever either by syllogism or by induction—and that this is so is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.23; Aristot. Post. Anal. 1.1.—each of the two former must be identical with each of the two latter.That is, enthymeme and example must be the same as syllogism and induction. +

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The difference between example and enthymeme is evident from the Topics,From the definitions of syllogism (1.1) and induction (1.12). No particular passage, however, explains the difference here mentioned. where, in discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously been said that the proof from a number of particular cases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic induction, in Rhetoric example; but when, certain things being posited, something different results by reason of them, alongside of them, from their being true, either universally or in most cases, such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme.

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It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these advantagesThe employment of syllogism and induction, τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς being taken as simply = ἡ ῥητορική. Another rendering is: that each kind of Rhetoric (that which depends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some special advantage. for what has been said in the MethodicaA lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in his Life of Aristotle, 24, and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first letter to Ammaeus, 6. It is supposed to have dealt with some branch of Logic. holds good also in this case—for rhetorical speeches are sometimes characterized by examples and sometimes by enthymemes, and orators themselves may be similarly distinguished by their fondness for one or the other. Now arguments that depend on examples are not less calculated to persuade, but those which depend upon enthymemes meet with greater approval. +

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Their origin and the way in which each should be used will be discussed later2.20-24.; for the moment let us define more clearly these proofs themselves.

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Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to some one, and is persuasive and convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it appears to be proved by propositions that are convincingOr, by persons which are so (Jebb).; further, no art has the particular in view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true science); similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons. It is the same with Dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen have some fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of deliberation.

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The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no systematic rules; and in the presence of such hearers as are unable to take a general view of many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument. But we only deliberate about things which seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those things which cannot in the past, present, or future be otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he supposes that they are such; for nothing would be gained by it.

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Now, it is possible to draw conclusions and inferences partly from what has been previously demonstrated syllogistically, partly from what has not, which however needs demonstration, because it is not probable.Certain propositions, which seem paradoxical and improbable to a popular audience, must be proved before it is able to understand them. The first of these methods is necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for the judge is supposed to be a simple person; the second will obtain little credence, because it does not depend upon what is either admitted or probable. The necessary result then is that the enthymeme and the example are concerned with things which may, generally speaking, be other than they are, the example being a kind of induction and the enthymeme a kind of syllogism, and deduced from few premises, often from fewer than the regularπρῶτος: the primary, typical syllogism of the first figure. syllogism; for if any one of these is well known, there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself. For instance, to prove that DorieusSon of Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his father celebrated for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He played a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support of the Spartans (412-407 B.C.) whom he afterwards offended, and by whom he is said to have been put to death. was the victor in a contest at which the prize was a crown, it is enough to say that he won a victory at the Olympic games; there is no need to add that the prize at the Olympic games is a crown, for everybody knows it. +

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But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which we judge and examine can be other than they are, human actions, which are the subject of our deliberation and examination, being all of such a character and, generally speaking, none of them necessary; since, further, facts which only generally happen or are merely possible can only be demonstrated by other facts of the same kind, and necessary facts by necessary propositions (and that this is so is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. APr. 1.8.13.), it is evident that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must correspond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each.That is, probabilities and signs correspond to general and necessary propositions. This is not strictly correct; only the τεκμήρια correspond to the necessary propositions, the other signs and the other probabilities to the general or contingent propositions. +

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For that which is probable is that which generally happens, not however unreservedly, as some define it, but that which is concerned with things that may be other than they are, being so related to that in regard to which it is probable as the universal to the particular. +

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As to signs, some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs are called tekmeria; those which are not necessary have no distinguishing name. +

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I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmērion; for when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmērion, something as it were proved and concluded; for in the old language tekmar and peras have the same meaning (limit, conclusion). +

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Among signs, some are related as the particular to the universal; for instance, if one were to say that all wise men are just, because Socrates was both wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though the particular statement is true, it can be refuted, because it cannot be reduced to syllogistic form. But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had a child because she has milk, this is a necessary sign. This alone among signs is a tekmērion; for only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal to the particular, for instance, if one were to say that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because he breathes hard; but even if the fact be true, this argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We have now explained the meaning of probable, sign, and necessary sign, and the difference between them; in the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.27. we have defined them more clearly and stated why some of them can be converted into logical syllogisms, while others cannot.

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We have said that example is a kind of induction and with what kind of material it deals by way of induction. It is neither the relation of part to whole, nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to another whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other. For example, to prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet know. All these examples are contained under the same universal proposition, that one who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard.

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We have now stated the materials of proofs which are thought to be demonstrative.

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But a very great difference between enthymemes has escaped the notice of nearly every one, although it also exists in the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of them belong to Rhetoric, some syllogisms only to Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, some already existing and others not yet established. Hence it is that this escapes the notice of the speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject, the more they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and Dialectic. But this will be clearer if stated at greater length.

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I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms those which are concerned with what we call topics, which may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics, and many other sciences that differ in kind, such as the topic of the more or less, which will furnish syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law, Physics, or any other science whatever, although these subjects differ in kind. Specific topics on the other hand are derived from propositions which are peculiar to each species or genus of things; there are, for example, propositions about Physics which can furnish neither enthymemes nor syllogisms about Ethics, and there are propositions concerned with Ethics which will be useless for furnishing conclusions about Physics; and the same holds good in all cases. The first kind of topics will not make a man practically wise about any particular class of things, because they do not deal with any particular subject matter; but as to the specific topics, the happier a man is in his choice of propositions, the more he will unconsciously produce a science quite different from Dialectic and Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon first principles, it will no longer be Dialectic or Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has arrived at.The common topics do not deal with particular subject matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter, the better (that is, in regard to a special science) the propositions chosen by a man, the more he will without knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and become a professor of that special science whose first principles he has hit upon.

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Most enthymemes are constructed from these specific topics, which are called particular and special, fewer from those that are common or universal. As then we have done in the TopicsAristot. Sophist. Elenchi (Fallacies) 9. This treatise is really the ninth and concluding part of the Topics., so here we must distinguish the specific and universal topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed. By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar to each class of things, by universal those common to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific topics, but before doing so let us ascertain the different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having determined their number, we may separately ascertain their elements and propositions.Propositions (or premises), the name given to the two first statements in a syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn: All men are mortal (major premise); Socrates is a man (minor premise); therefore Socrates is mortal.

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The kinds of Rhetoric are three in number, corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For every speech is composed of three parts: the speaker, the subject of which he treats, and the person to whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom the end or object of the speech refers. +

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Now the hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of things to come.All three kinds of hearers are regarded as judges (the mere spectator as a critic), although strictly κριτής should be limited to the law courts. For instance, a member of the general assembly is a judge of things to come; the dicast, of things past; the mere spectator, of the ability of the speaker. +

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Therefore there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

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The deliberative kind is either hortatory or dissuasive; for both those who give advice in private and those who speak in the assembly invariably either exhort or dissuade. The forensic kind is either accusatory or defensive; for litigants must necessarily either accuse or defend. The epideictic kind has for its subject praise or blame.

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Further, to each of these a special time is appropriate: to the deliberative the future,In 1.6.I and 8.7 the present is also mentioned as a time appropriate to deliberative Rhetoric. for the speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always advises about things to come; to the forensic the past, for it is always in reference to things done that one party accuses and the other defends; to the epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is the existing condition of things that all those who praise or blame have in view. It is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it.

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Each of the three kinds has a different special end, and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there are three special ends. The end of the deliberative speaker Is the expedient or harmful; for he who exhorts recommends a course of action as better, and he who dissuades advises against it as worse; all other considerations, such as justice and injustice, honor and disgrace, are included as accessory in reference to this. The end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust; in this case also all other considerations are included as accessory. The end of those who praise or blame is the honorable and disgraceful; and they also refer all other considerations to these. +

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A sign that what I have stated is the end which each has in view is the fact that sometimes the speakers will not dispute about the other points. For example, a man on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary. Similarly, the deliberative orator, although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending what is inexpedient or is dissuading from what is useful; but often he is quite indifferent about showing that the enslavement of neighboring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is not an act of injustice.The omission of οὐκ before ἄδικον has been suggested. The sense would then be: As to the injustice of enslaving . . . he is quite indifferent. There is no doubt a reference to the cruel treatment by Athens of the inhabitants of the island of Melos (416 B.C.) for its loyalty to the Spartans during the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. 5.84-116). The Athenian envoys declined to discuss the question of right or wrong, which they said was only possible between equal powers, and asserted that expediency was the only thing that had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice (in the Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken into account, was merely accessory and intended to serve as a specious justification for the policy of might. Similarly, those who praise or blame do not consider whether a man has done what is expedient or harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise that, disregarding his own interest, he performed some deed of honor. For example, they praise Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade Patroclus,To protect his body and avenge his death (Hom. Il. 18.). knowing that he was fated to die, although he might have lived. To him such a death was more honorable, although life was more expedient.

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From what has been said it is evident that the orator must first have in readiness the propositions on these three subjects.The expedient, the just, the honorable, and their contraries. Now, necessary signs, probabilities, and signs are the propositions of the rhetorician; for the syllogism universallyὅλως: or, reading ὅλος, the syllogism as a whole. consists of propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism composed of the propositions above mentioned. +

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Again, since what is impossible can neither have been done nor will be done, but only what is possible, and since what has not taken place nor will take place can neither have been done nor will be done, it is necessary for each of the three kinds of orators to have in readiness propositions dealing with the possible and the impossible, and as to whether anything has taken place or will take place, or not. +

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Further, since all, whether they praise or blame, exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, not only endeavor to prove what we have stated, but also that the same things, whether good or bad, honorable or disgraceful, just or unjust, are great or small, either in themselves or when compared with each other, it is clear that it will be necessary for the orator to be ready with propositions dealing with greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and in particular; for instance, which is the greater or less good, or act of injustice or justice; and similarly with regard to all other subjects. We have now stated the topics concerning which the orator must provide himself with propositions; after this, we must distinguish between each of them individually, that is, what the three kinds of Rhetoric, deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, are concerned with.

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We must first ascertain about what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises, since he cannot do so about everything, but only about things which may possibly happen or not. +

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Everything which of necessity either is or will be, or which cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the scope of deliberation. +

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Indeed, even in the case of things that are possible advice is not universally appropriate; for they include certain advantages, natural and accidental, about which it is not worth while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is limited to those subjects about which we take counsel; and such are all those which can naturally be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose origination is in our own power; for our examination is limited to finding out whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform.

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However, there is no need at present to endeavor to enumerate with scrupulous exactness or to classify those subjects which men are wont to discuss, or to define them as far as possible with strict accuracy, since this is not the function of the rhetorical art but of one that is more intelligent and exact, and further, more than its legitimate subjects of inquiry have already been assigned to it. +

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For what we have said before is trueThe analytical science is Dialectic, incorrectly regarded as a branch of Analytics, which properly implies scientific demonstration.: that Rhetoric is composed of analytical science and of that branch of political science which is concerned with Ethics, and that it resembles partly Dialectic and partly sophistical arguments. +

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But in proportion as anyone endeavors to make of Dialectic or Rhetoric, not what they are, faculties, but sciences, to that extent he will, without knowing it, destroy their real nature, in thus altering their character, by crossing over into the domain of sciencesTaking εἰς ἐπιστήμας with μεταβαίνειν. If taken with ἐπισκευάζων, the sense will be: by changing his ground ( μεταβαίνειν being used absolutely) while altering their characters from faculties to sciences., whose subjects are certain definite things, not merely words. +

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Nevertheless, even at present we may mention such matters as it is worth while to analyze, while still leaving much for political science to investigate.

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Now, we may say that the most important subjects about which all men deliberate and deliberative orators harangue, are five in number, to wit: ways and means, war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, legislation.

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Accordingly, the orator who is going to give advice on ways and means should be acquainted with the nature and extent of the State resources, so that if any is omitted it may be added, and if any is insufficient, it may be increased. Further, he should know all the expenses of the State, that if any is superfluous, it may be removed, or, if too great, may be curtailed. For men become wealthier, not only by adding to what they already possess, but also by cutting down expenses. Of these things it is not only possible to acquire a general view from individual experience, but in view of advising concerning them it is further necessary to be well informed about what has been discovered among others.

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In regard to war and peace, the orator should be acquainted with the power of the State, how great it is already and how great it may possibly become; of what kind it is already and what additions may possibly be made to it; further, what wars it has waged and its conduct of them. These things he should be acquainted with, not only as far as his own State is concerned, but also in reference to neighboring States, and particularly those with whom there is a likelihood of war, so that towards the stronger a pacific attitude may be maintained, and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to making war on them may be left to his own State. Again, he should know whether their forces are like or unlike his own, for herein also advantage or disadvantage may lie. With reference to these matters he must also have examined the results, not only of the wars carried on by his own State, but also of those carried on by others; for similar results naturally arise from similar causes.

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Again, in regard to the defense of the country, he should not be ignorant how it is carried on; he should know both the strength of the guard, its character, and the positions of the guard-houses (which is impossible for one who is unacquainted with the country), so that if any guard is insufficient it may be increased, or if any is superfluous it may be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to suitable positions.

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Again, in regard to food, he should know what amount of expenditure is sufficient to support the State; what kind of food is produced at home or can be imported; and what exports and imports are necessary, in order that contracts and agreements may be made with thoseτούτους: those who will receive exports and send imports. who can furnish them; for it is necessary to keep the citizens free from reproach in their relations with two classes of people—those who are stronger and those who are useful for commercial purposes.

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With a view to the safety of the State, it is necessary that the orator should be able to judge of all these questions, but an understanding of legislation is of special importance, for it is on the laws that the safety of the State is based. Wherefore he must know how many forms of government there are; what is expedient for each; and the natural causes of its downfall, whether they are peculiar to the particular form of government or opposed to it. By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I mean that, with the exception of the perfect form of government, all the rest are ruined by being relaxed or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only when relaxed, but also when strained to excess, becomes weaker and will end in an oligarchy; similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose reach the mean, when one of these defects is relaxed, but when it becomes aquiline or snub to excess, it is altered to such an extent that even the likeness of a nose is lost. +

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Moreover, with reference to acts of legislation, it is useful not only to understand what form of government is expedient by judging in the light of the past, but also to become acquainted with those in existence in other nations, and to learn what kinds of government are suitable to what kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for legislation books of travel are useful, since they help us to understand the laws of other nations, and for political debates historical works.This rendering, although convenient, hardly represents the Greek, which, literally translated, is the investigations of those who write about human actions (cf. ἱστορικός, 4.8). All these things, however, belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric.

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Such, then, are the most important questions upon which the would-be deliberative orator must be well informed. Now let us again state the sources whence we must derive our arguments for exhortation or discussion on these and other questions.

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Men, individually and in common, nearly all have some aim, in the attainment of which they choose or avoid certain things. This aim, briefly stated, is happiness and its component parts. +

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Therefore, for the sake of illustration, let us ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is, and what its parts consist in; for all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should do the things which procure happiness or one of its parts, or increase instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what is contrary to it.

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Let us then define happiness as well-being combined with virtue, or independence of life, or the life that is most agreeable combined with security, or abundance of possessions and slaves,This is the usual rendering, although it is hardly satisfactory. Jebb translates a flourishing state . . . of body. combined with power to protect and make use of themOr, bring about, effect them.; for nearly all men admit that one or more of these things constitutes happiness. +

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If, then, such is the nature of happiness, its component parts must necessarily be: noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good old age; further, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty, strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honor, good luck, virtue. For a man would be entirely independent, provided he possessed all internal and external goods; for there are no others. Internal goods are those of mind and body; external goods are noble birth, friends, wealth, honor. To these we think should be added certain capacitiesi.e. of mind and body; or δυνάμεις may mean positions of authority and influence. and good luck; for on these conditions life will be perfectly secure. Let us now in the same way define each of these in detail.

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Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State, means that its members or inhabitants are sprung from the soilThis was a favorite boast of the Athenians., or of long standing; that its first members were famous as leaders, and that many of their descendants have been famous for qualities that are highly esteemed. In the case of private individuals, noble birth is derived from either the father's or the mother's side, and on both sides there must be legitimacy; and, as in the case of a State, it means that its founders were distinguished for virtue, or wealth, or any other of the things that men honor, and that a number of famous persons, both men and women, young and old, belong to the family.

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The blessing of good children and numerous children needs little explanation. For the commonwealth it consists in a large number of good young men, good in bodily excellences, such as stature, beauty, strength, fitness for athletic contests; the moral excellences of a young man are self-control and courage. For the individual it consists in a number of good children of his own, both male and female, and such as we have described. Female bodily excellences are beauty and stature, their moral excellences self-control and industrious habits, free from servility.ἀνελευθερία: literally, qualities unbecoming to a free man or woman, ungentlemanly, unladylike; hence, mean, servile, sordid. The object of both the individual and of the community should be to secure the existence of each of these qualities in both men and women; for all those States in which the character of women is unsatisfactory, as in Lacedaemon,A similar charge against the Spartan woman is made in Aristot. Pol. 2.9.5: Further the looseness ( ἄνεσις) of the Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the constitution and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one of absolute luxury and intemperance (compare Eur. Andr. 595-596 even if she wished it, a Spartan girl could not be chaste). The opinion of Xenophon and Plutarch is much more favorable. may be considered only half-happy.

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Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership of land and properties, and further of movables, cattle, and slaves, remarkable for number, size, and beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful. Property that is productive is more useful, but that which has enjoyment for its object is more liberal. By productive I mean that which is a source of income, by enjoyable that which offers no advantage beyond the use of it—at least, none worth mentioning. Security may be defined as possession of property in such places and on such conditions that the use of it is in our own hands; and ownership as the right of alienation or notἢ μή: in the MS. readings these words follow τοῦ οἰκεῖα εἶναι: ownership or non-ownership. The alteration is Spengel's., by which I mean giving the property away or selling it. In a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in possession; for the actualizationἐνέργεια: realization in action or fact. and use of such things is wealth.

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A good reputation consists in being considered a man of worth by all, or in possessing something of such a nature that all or most men, or the good, or the men of practical wisdom desire it.

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Honor is a token of a reputation for doing good; and those who have already done good are justly and above all honored, not but that he who is capable of doing good is also honored. Doing good relates either to personal security and all the causes of existence; or to wealth; or to any other good things which are not easy to acquire, either in any conditions, or at such a place, or at such a time; for many obtain honor for things that appear trifling, but this depends upon place and time. The components of honor are sacrifices, memorials in verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front seats, public burial, State maintenance, and among the barbarians, prostration and giving place, and all gifts which are highly prized in each country. For a gift is at once a giving of a possession and a token of honor; wherefore gifts are desired by the ambitious and by those who are fond of money, since they are an acquisition for the latter and an honor for the former; so that they furnish both with what they want.

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Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind that when exercising the body we are free from sickness; for many are healthy in the way HerodicusOf Selymbria, physician and teacher of hygienic gymnastics (c. 420 B.C.). He is said to have made his patients walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles. He was satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippocrates as one who killed those for whom he prescribed (cf. 2.23.29). is said to have been, whom no one would consider happy in the matter of health, because they are obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human enjoyments.

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Beauty varies with each age. In a young man, it consists in possessing a body capable of enduring all efforts, either of the racecourse or of bodily strength, while he himself is pleasant to look upon and a sheer delight. This is why the athletes in the pentathlonFive contests: jumping, running, discus-throwing, javelin-throwing, wrestling. are most beautiful, because they are naturally adapted for bodily exertion and for swiftness of foot. In a man who has reached his prime, beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the toils of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at the same time awe-inspiring. In an old man, beauty consists in being naturally adapted to contend with unavoidable labors and in not causing annoyanceOr simply, freedom from pain (5.15). to others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable accompaniments of old age.

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Strength consists in the power of moving another as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to pull or push, to lift, to squeeze or crush, so that the strong man is strong by virtue of being able to do all or some of these things.

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Excellence of stature consists in being superior to most men in height, depth, and breadth, but in such proportion as not to render the movements of the body slower as the result of excess.

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Bodily excellence in athletics consists in size, strength, and swiftness of foot; for to be swift is to be strong. For one who is able to throw his legs about in a certain way, to move them rapidly and with long strides, makes a good runner; one who can hug and grapple, a good wrestler; one who can thrust away by a blow of the fist, a good boxer; one who excels in boxing and wrestling is fit for the pancratium,A combination of wrestling and boxing. he who excels in all for the pentathlon.

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A happy old age is one that comes slowly with freedom from pain; for neither one who rapidly grows old nor one who grows old insensibly but with pain enjoys a happy old age. This also depends upon bodily excellences and good fortune; for unless a man is free from illness and is strong, he will never be free from suffering, nor will he live long and painlessly without good fortune. Apart from health and strength, however, there is a power of vitality in certain cases; for many live long who are not endowed with bodily excellences. But a minute examination of such questions is needless for the present purpose.

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The meaning of numerous and worthy friends is easy to understand from the definition of a friend. A friend is one who exerts himself to do for the sake of another what he thinks is advantageous to him. A man to whom many persons are so disposed, has many friends; if they are virtuous, he has worthy friends.

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Good fortune consists in the acquisition or possession of either all, or the most, or the most important of those goods of which fortune is the cause. Now fortune is the cause of some things with which the arts also are concerned, and also of many which have nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are due to nature (though it is possible that the results of fortune may be contrary to nature); for art is a cause of health, but nature of beauty and stature.The results of art and the results due to nature are often assisted (or hindered) by the interference of the irregular operations of fortune or chance. Health may be the result of fortune, as well as art (a sick man may be cured by a drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the physician); beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It is parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce unnatural monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and the substitution of a comma for the colon after φύσις have been suggested. The meaning would then be: for instance, such as are due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary to nature. Speaking generally, the goods which come from fortune are such as excite envy. Fortune is also a cause of those goods which are beyond calculation; for instance, a man's brothers are all ugly, while he is handsome; they did not see the treasure, while he found it; the arrow hit one who stood by and not the man aimed at; or, one who frequented a certain place was the only one who did not go there on a certain occasion, while those who went there then for the first time met their death. All such instances appear to be examples of good fortune.

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The definition of virtue, with which the topic of praise is most closely connected, must be left until we come to treat of the latter.

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It is evident, then, what things, likely to happen or already existing, the orator should aim at, when exhorting, and what when dissuading; for they are opposites. But since the aim before the deliberative orator is that which is expedient, and men deliberate, not about the end, but about the means to the end, which are the things which are expedient in regard to our actions; and since, further, the expedient is good, we must first grasp the elementary notions of good and expedient in general.

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Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose something else; that which is the aim of all things, or of all things that possess sensation or reason; or would be, if they could acquire the latter. Whatever reason might assign to each and whatever reason does assign to each in individual cases, that is good for each; and that whose presence makes a man fit and also independent; and independence in general; and that which produces or preserves such things, or on which such things follow, or all that is likely to prevent or destroy their opposites.

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Now things follow in two ways—simultaneously or subsequently; for instance, knowledge is subsequent to learning, but life is simultaneous with health. Things which produce act in three ways; thus, healthiness produces health; and so does food; and exercise as a rule. +

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This being laid down, it necessarily follows that the acquisition of good things and the loss of evil things are both good; for it follows simultaneously on the latter that we are rid of that which is bad, and subsequently on the former that we obtain possession of that which is good. +

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The same applies to the acquisition of a greater in place of a less good, and a less in place of a greater evil; for in proportion as the greater exceeds the less, there is an acquisition of the one and a loss of the other. +

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The virtues also must be a good thing; for those who possess them are in a sound condition, and they are also productive of good things and practical. However, we must speak separately concerning each—what it is, and of what kind. +

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Pleasure also must be a good; for all living creatures naturally desire it. Hence it follows that both agreeable and beautiful things must be good; for the former produce pleasure, while among beautiful things some are pleasant and others are desirable in themselves.

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To enumerate them one by one, the following things must necessarily be good. Happiness, since it is desirable in itself and self-sufficient, and to obtain it we choose a number of things. +

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Justice, courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence, and all other similar states of mind, for they are virtues of the soul. +

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Health, beauty, and the like, for they are virtues of the body and produce many advantages; for instance, health is productive of pleasure and of life, wherefore it is thought to be best of all, because it is the cause of two things which the majority of men prize most highly. +

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Wealth, since it is the excellence of acquisitionThe excellence of anything is proportionate to its success in the performance of its proper function. The function of acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and its excellence may be judges by the amount of wealth obtained. and productive of many things. +

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A friend and friendship, since a friend is desirable in himself and produces many advantages. +

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Honor and good repute, since they are agreeable and produce many advantages, and are generally accompanied by the possession of those things for which men are honored. +

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Eloquence and capacity for action; for all such faculties are productive of many advantages. +

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Further, natural cleverness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick-wittedness, and all similar qualities; for these faculties are productive of advantages. The same applies to all the sciences, arts, and even life, for even though no other good should result from it, +

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it is desirable in itself. Lastly, justice, since it is expedient in general for the common weal.

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These are nearly all the things generally recognized as good; +

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in the case of doubtful goods, the arguments in their favor are drawn from the following. That is good the opposite of which is evil, +

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or the opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies; for instance, if it is specially advantageous to our enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that courage is specially advantageous to the citizens. +

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And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice, appears to be advantageous; wherefore it was well said: Of a truth Priam would exult.Hom. Il.1.255. The words are those of Nestor to Achilles and Agamemnon, in which he points out how their enemies would rejoice if they heard all the story of their quarrel. This is not always the case, but only as a general rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the same thing being sometimes advantageous to two opposite parties; hence it is said that misfortune brings men together, when a common danger threatens them.

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That which is not in excessReading . The ordinary reading οὗ is taken to mean that which does not permit excess, that which is midway between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested rendering is, that of which one cannot have too much. is good, whereas that which is greater than it should be, is bad. +

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And that which has cost much labor and expense, for it at once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a thing is regarded as an end, and an end of many efforts; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was said: And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the Trojans] to boast of,Hom. Il. 2.160. Addressed by Hera to Athene, begging her to prevent the Greeks departing from Troy and leaving Helen behind. and, It is disgraceful to tarry long,Hom. Il. 2.298. Spoken by Odysseus. While sympathizing with the desire of the army to leave, he points out that it would be disgraceful after waiting so long to return unsuccessful, and exhorts them to hold out. and the proverb, [to break] the pitcher at the door.Proverbial for lost labor. Cf. French faire naufrage au port, and the English there's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip.

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And that which many aim at and which is seen to be competed for by many; for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and the majority may almost stand for all. +

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And that which is the object of praise, for no one praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies; for if even those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, this amounts to a universal recognition of it; for it is because of its goodness being evident that they acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies praise are worthless.Meaning that they cannot have done their duty against their enemies, who would then have blamed them. Another suggested reading is οὓς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ μὴ ψέγουσι (those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies do not blame.) Wherefore the Corinthians imagined themselves insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.In the Iliad Glaucus, a Corinthian, is described as an ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were meant satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed by Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos (Frag. 50, P.L.G. 3, where the line is differently given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as he often does, although not always accurately. +

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And that which one of the practically wise or good, man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Alexander Paris, and Homer Achilles.

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And, generally speaking, all that is deliberately chosen is good. Now, men deliberately choose to do the things just mentioned, and those which are harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. +

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The last are of two kinds: things which might happen,γενόμενα ἄν: Spengel omits ἄν: i.e. things which have happened. and things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without labor or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labor or length of time. And anything that happens as men wish is good; and what they wish is either what is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light. +

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And things that are peculiar to them, or which no one else possesses, Or which no one else has done (Jebb). or which are out of the common; for thus the honor is greater. And things which are appropriate to them; such are all things befitting them in respect of birth and power. And things which they think they lack, however unimportant; for none the less they deliberately choose to acquire them. +

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And things which are easy of accomplishment, for being easy they are possible; such things are those in which all, or most men, or those who are equals or inferiors have been successful. And things whereby they will gratify friends or incur the hatred of enemies. And all things that those whom they admire deliberately choose to do. And those things in regard to which they are clever naturally or by experience; for they hope to be more easily successful in them. And things which no worthless man would approve, for that makes them the more commendable. And things which they happen to desire, for such things seem not only agreeable, but also better. +

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Lastly, and above all, each man thinks those things good which are the object of his special desire, as victory of the man who desires victory, honor of the ambitious man, money of the avaricious, and so in other instances. These then are the materials from which we must draw our arguments in reference to good and the expedient.

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But since men often agree that both of two things are useful, but dispute which is the more so, we must next speak of the greater good and the more expedient. +

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Let one thing, then, be said to exceed another, when it is as great and something more—and to be exceeded when it is contained in the other. Greater and more always imply a relation with less; great and small, much and little with the general size of things; the great is that which exceeds, and that which falls short of it is small; and similarly much and little. +

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Since, besides, we call good that which is desirable for its own sake and not for anything else, and that which all things aim at and which they would choose if they possessed reason and practical wisdom; and that which is productive or protective of good, or on which such things follow; and since that for the sake of which anything is done is the end, and the end is that for the sake of which everything else is done, and that is good for each man which relatively to him presents all these conditions, it necessarily follows that a larger number of good things is a greater good than one or a smaller number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned as one of them;The one, the smaller number, and the greater number must be of the same species. Thus, 5 pounds is a greater good than 2 pounds; but 5 farthings is not a greater good than 2 pounds, since the smaller number is not reckoned in with the greater Buckley. for it exceeds them and that which is contained is exceeded.

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And if that which is greatest in one class surpass that which is greatest in another class, the first class will surpass the second; and whenever one class surpasses another, the greatest of that class will surpass the greatest of the other. For instance, if the biggest man is greater than the biggest woman, men in general will be bigger than women; and if men in general are bigger than women, the biggest man will be bigger than the biggest woman; for the superiority of classes and of the greatest things contained in them are proportionate. +

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And when this follows on that, but not that on this [then that is the greater good];If B (life) follows on, is the consequent of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is a greater good than B. for the enjoyment of that which follows is contained in that of the other. Now, things follow simultaneously, or successively, or potentially; thus, life follows simultaneously on health, but not health on life; knowledge follows subsequently on learning [but not learning on knowledge]; and simple theft potentially on sacrilege, for one who commits sacrilege will also steal. +

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And things which exceed the same thing by a greater amount [than something else] are greater, for they must also exceed the greater.Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is greater than 2. +

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And things which produce a greater good are greater; for this we agreed was the meaning of productive of greater. And similarly, that which is produced by a greater cause; for if that which produces health is more desirable than that which produces pleasure and a greater good, then health is a greater good than pleasure. +

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And that which is more desirable in itself is superior to that which is not; for example, strength is a greater good than the wholesome, which is not desirable for its own sake, while strength is; and, this we agreed was the meaning of a good. +

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And the end is a greater good than the means; for the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, the former for its own sake; for instance, exercise is only a means for the acquirement of a good constitution. +

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And that which has less need of one or several other things in addition is a greater good, for it is more independent (and having less need means needing fewer or easier additions). +

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And when one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into existence without the aid of another, but that other can, then that which needs no aid is more independent, and accordingly is seen to be a greater good.

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And if one thing is a first principle, and another not; if one thing is a cause and another not, for the same reason; for without cause or first principle nothing can exist or come into existence. And if there are two first principles or two causes, that which results from the greater is greater; and conversely, when there are two first principles or two causes, that which is the first cause or principle of the greater is greater. +

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It is clear then, from what has been said, that a thing may be greater in two ways; for if it is a first principle but another is not, it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a first principle [but an end], while another is; for the end is greater and not a first principle.A thing may be of greater importance in two ways: (a) that which is a first principle is superior to that which is not; (b) that which is not a first principle, but an end, is superior to that which is a first principle; for the end is superior to the means. In the illustration that follows: (a) the first principle (suggesting the plot) is said to be of more importance (worse) than the end or result (carrying out the plot); (b) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than the first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus the question of the amount of guilt can be argued both ways. Thus, Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus,Oropus, a frontier-town of Boeotia and Attica, had been occupied by the Thebans (366 B.C.). Callistratus suggested an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by Chabrias—that the town should remain in Theban possession for the time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and the Thebans refused to leave, whereupon Chabrias and Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas was an Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his political views. declared that the man who had given the advice was more guilty than the one who carried it out; for if he had not suggested it, it could not have been carried out. And conversely, when accusing Chabrias, he declared that the man who had carried out the advice was more guilty than the one who had given it; for it could not have been carried out, had there not been some one to do so, and the reason why people devised plots was that others might carry them out.

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And that which is scarcer is a greater good than that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although it is less useful, but the possession of it is more valuable, since it is more difficult of acquisition. From another point of view, that which is abundant is to be preferred to that which is scarce, because the use of it is greater, for often exceeds seldom,; whence the saying: Water is best.Pind. O. 1.1. +

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And, speaking generally, that which is more difficult is preferable to that which is easier of attainment, for it is scarcer; but from another point of view that which is easier is preferable to that which is more difficult; for its nature is as we wish. +

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And that, the contrary or the deprivation of which is greater, is the greater good.e.g. it is worse to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is better than hearing (Schrader). And virtue is greater than non-virtue, and vice than non-vice; for virtues and vices are ends, the others not. +

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And those things whose works are nobler or more disgraceful are themselves greater; and the works of those things, the vices and virtues of which are greater, will also be greater, since between causes and first principles compared with results there is the same relation as between results compared with causes and first principles. +

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Things, superiority in which is more desirable or nobler, are to be preferred; for instance, sharpness of sight is preferable to keenness of smell for sight is better than smell. And loving one's friends more than money is nobler, whence it follows that love of friends is nobler than love of money. And, on the other hand, the better and nobler things are, the better and nobler will be their superiority; and similarly, those things, the desire for which is nobler and better, are themselves nobler and better, +

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for greater longings are directed towards greater objects. For the same reason, the better and nobler the object, the better and nobler are the desires.

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And when the sciences are nobler and more dignified, the nobler and more dignified are their subjects; for as is the science, so is the truth which is its object, and each science prescribes that which properly belongs to it; and, by analogy, the nobler and more dignified the objects of a science, the nobler and more dignified is the science itself, for the same reasons. +

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And that which men of practical wisdom, either all, or more, or the best of them, would judge, or have judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily be such, either absolutely or in so far as they have judged as men of practical wisdom. The same may be said in regard to everything else; for the nature, quantity, and quality of things are such as would be defined by science and practical wisdom. But our statement only applies to goods; for we defined that as good which everything, if possessed of practical wisdom, would choose; hence it is evident that that is a greater good to which practical wisdom assigns the superiority. +

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So also are those things which better men possess, either absolutely, or in so far as they are better; for instance courage is better than strength. And what the better man would choose, either absolutely or in so far as he is better; thus, it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it, for that is what the juster man would choose. +

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And that which is more agreeable rather than that which is less so; for all things pursue pleasure and desire it for its own sake; and it is by these conditions that the good and the end have been defined. And that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain and is agreeable for a longer time. +

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And that which is nobler than that which is less noble; for the noble is that which is either agreeable or desirable in itself. +

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And all things which we have a greater desire to be instrumental in procuring for ourselves or for our friends are greater goods, and those as to which our desire is least are greater evils. +

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And things that last longer are preferable to those that are of shorter duration, and those that are safer to those that are less so; for time increases the use of the first and the wish that of the second; for whenever we wish, we can make greater use of things that are safe.

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And things in all cases follow the relations between coordinates and similar inflections; for instance, if courageously is nobler than and preferable to temperately, then courage is preferable to temperance, and it is better to be courageous than temperate. +

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And that which is chosen by all is better than that which is not; and that which the majority choose than that which the minority choose; for, as we have said, the good is that which all desire, and consequently a good is greater, the more it is desired. The same applies to goods which are recognized as greater by opponents or enemies, by judges, or by those whom they select; for in the one case it would be, so to say, the verdict of all mankind, in the other that of those who are acknowledged authorities and experts. +

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And sometimes a good is greater in which all participate, for it is a disgrace not to participate in it; sometimes when none or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer. +

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And things which are more praiseworthy, since they are nobler. And in the same way things which are more highly honored,Things of which the prices are greater, price being a sort of worth (Jebb). for honor is a sort of measure of worth; and conversely those things are greater evils, the punishment for which is greater. +

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And those things which are greater than what is acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are greater. And the same whole when divided into parts appears greater, for there appears to be superiority in a greater number of things.Or, superiority over a greater number of things. Whence the poet says that Meleager was persuaded to rise up and fight by the recital ofAfter πεῖσαι all the MSS. except A Paris have λέγουσαν. If this is retained, it must refer to Meleager's wife Cleopatra, who persuaded him . . . by quoting. As the text stands, the literal rendering is: the poet says that (the recital of the three verses) persuaded. The passage is from Hom. Il. 9.592-594 (slightly different). All the ills that befall those whose city is taken; the people perish, and fire utterly destroys the city, and strangers carry off the children.

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Combination and building up, as employed by Epicharmus,Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.C.) writer of comedies and Pythagorean philosopher, was born at Megara in Sicily (according to others, in the island of Cos). His comedies, written in the Doric dialect, and without a chorus, were either mythological or comedies of manners, as extant titles show. Plato speaks of him as the prince of comedy and Horace states definitely that he was imitated by Plautus. produce the same effect as division, and for the same reason; for combination is an exhibition of great superiority and appears to be the origin and cause of great things. +

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And since that which is harder to obtain and scarcer is greater, it follows that special occasions, ages, places, times, and powers, produce great effects; for if a man does things beyond his powers, beyond his age, and beyond what his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner, in such a place, and at such a time, they will possess importance in actions that are noble, good, or just, or the opposite. Hence the epigramSimonides, Frag. 163 (P.L.G. 3.). on the Olympian victor: Formerly, with a rough basketOr, the yoke to which the basket, like our milk-pails long ago, was attached. on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea. And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, Look what I started from! +

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And that which is natural is a greater good than that which is acquired, because it is harder. Whence the poet says: Self-taught am I.Hom. Od. 22.347. The words are those of the minstrel Phemius, who was forced to sing to the suitors of Penelope. +

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And that which is the greatest part of that which is great is more to be desired; as Pericles said in his Funeral Oration, that the removal of the youth from the city was like the year being robbed of its spring.Not in the oration in Thuc. 2.35. +

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And those things which are available in greater need, as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And of two things that which is nearer the end proposed is preferable. And that which is useful for the individual is preferable to that which is useful absolutely;Or, reading καὶ ἁπλῶς: that which is useful both to the individual and absolutely is a greater good (than that which is only useful in one way), but this necessitates a considerable ellipse. that which is possible to that which is impossible; for it is the possible that is useful to us, not the impossible. And those things which are at the end of life; for things near the end are more like ends.

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And real things are preferable to those that have reference to public opinion, the latter being defined as those which a man would not choose if they were likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem then that it is better to receive than to confer a benefit; for one would choose the former even if it should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain unknown. +

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Those things also are to be preferred, which men would rather possess in reality than in appearance, because they are nearer the truth; wherefore it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little importance, because people prefer to appear just than to be just; and this is not the case, for instance, in regard to health. +

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The same may be said of things that serve several ends; for instance, those that assist us to live, to live well, to enjoy life, and to do noble actions; wherefore health and wealth seem to be the greatest goods, for they include all these advantages. +

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And that which is more free from pain and accompanied by pleasure is a greater good; for there is more than one good, since pleasure and freedom from pain combined are both goods. And of two goods the greater is that which, added to one and the same, makes the whole greater. +

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And those things, the presence of which does not escape notice, are preferable to those which pass unnoticed, because they appear more real; whence being wealthy would appear to be a greater good than the appearance of it.It is difficult to see the connection here. Munro's suggestion, τῷ δοκεῖν for τοῦ δοκεῖν, adopted by Roemer, would mean by the show of it, that is, by its attracting notice. +

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And that which is held most dear, sometimes alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a greater good. Wherefore he who puts out the eye of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of another who has two, does not do equal injury;Or, is not punished equally. for in the former case, a man has been deprived of that which he held most dear.

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These are nearly all the topics from which arguments may be drawn in persuading and dissuading; but the most important and effective of all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to know all the forms of government and to distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each; +

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for all men are guided by considerations of expediency, and that which preserves the State is expedient. Further, the declaration of the authority is authoritative,The pronouncements of the supreme authority are themselves authoritative as laying down laws and regulations for the citizens. and the different kinds of authority are distinguished according to forms of government; in fact, there are as many authorities as there are forms of government.

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Now, there are four kinds of government, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, so that the supreme and deciding authority is always a part or the whole of these. +

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Democracy is a form of government in which the offices are distributed by the people among themselves by lot; in an oligarchy, by those who possess a certain property-qualification; in an aristocracy, by those who possess an educational qualification, meaning an education that is laid down by the law. In fact, in an aristocracy, power and office are in the hands of those who have remained faithful to what the law prescribes, and who must of necessity appear best, whence this form of government has taken its name. In a monarchy, as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over all; if it is subject to certain regulations, it is called a kingdom; if it is unlimited, a tyranny.

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Nor should the end of each form of government be neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the end. Now, the end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and what the law prescribes, . . . ,The end of monarchy is wanting here. of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then that we must distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each form of government, since it is in reference to this that men make their choice. +

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But as proofs are established not only by demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or both—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of each form of government; for, in reference to each, the character most likely to persuade must be that which is characteristic of it. These characters will be understood by the same means; for characters reveal themselves in accordance with moral purpose, and moral purpose has reference to the end.

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We have now stated what things, whether future or present, should be the aim of those who recommend a certain course; from what topics they should derive their proofs of expediency; further, the ways and means of being well equipped for dealing with the characters and institutions of each form of government, so far as was within the scope of the present occasion; for the subject has been discussed in detail in the Politics.Aristot. Pol. 3.7.

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We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the aim of one who praises and of one who blames; for, when speaking of these, we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character, which, as we have said, is a second method of proof; for it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or others in regard to virtue. +

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But since it happens that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a man or a god but even inanimate things or any ordinary animal, we ought in the same way to make ourselves familiar with the propositions relating to these subjects. Let us, then, discuss these matters also, so far as may serve for illustration.

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The noble, then, is that which, being desirable in itself is at the same time worthy of praise, or which, being good, is pleasant because it is good. If this is the noble, then virtue must of necessity be noble, for, being good, it is worthy of praise. +

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Virtue, it would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving good things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases.Or, a faculty of doing many and great benefits to all men in all cases (Jebb).

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The components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, practical and speculative wisdom. +

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The greatest virtues are necessarily those which are most useful to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring benefits. For this reason justice and courage are the most esteemed, the latter being useful to others in war, the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, for the liberal spend freely and do not dispute the possession of wealth, which is the chief object of other men's desire. +

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Justice is a virtue which assigns to each man his due in conformity with the law; injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition to the law. +

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Courage makes men perform noble acts in the midst of dangers according to the dictates of the law and in submission to it; the contrary is cowardice. +

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Self-control is a virtue which disposes men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law prescribes; the contrary is licentiousness. +

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Liberality does good in many matters; the contrary is avarice. +

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Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefits; the contrary is little-mindedness. +

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Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in matters of expenditure; the contraries are little-mindedness and meanness. +

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Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason, which enables men to come to a wise decision in regard to good and evil things, which have been mentioned as connected with happiness.Or, taking εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν with βουλεύεσθαι, come to a wise decision conducive to their happiness.

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Concerning virtue and vice in general and their separate parts, enough has been said for the moment. To discern the resti.e. the causes and results of virtue (Cope); or, the noble and the disgraceful (Jebb). presents no difficulty; for it is evident that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to it, must be noble, and so also must be what comes from virtue; for such are its signs and works. +

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But since the signs of virtue and such things as are the works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it necessarily follows that all the works and signs of courage and all courageous acts are also noble. The same may be said of just things and of just actions; (but not of what one suffers justly; for in this alone amongst the virtues that which is justly done is not always noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful than an unjust punishment). The same applies equally to the other virtues. +

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Those things of which the reward is honor are noble; also those which are done for honor rather than money. Also, those desirable things which a man does not do for his own sake; +

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things which are absolutely good, which a man has done for the sake of his country, while neglecting his own interests; things which are naturally good; and not such as are good for the individual, since such things are inspired by selfish motives.

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And those things are noble which it is possible for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness; +

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all acts done for the sake of others, for they are more disinterested; the successes gained, not for oneself but for others; and for one's benefactors, for that is justice; in a word, all acts of kinds, for they are disinterested. +

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And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed; for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention; as, for instance, when Alcaeus said: I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,Frag. 55 (P.L.G. 3.). Sappho rejoined: Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine eyes; but thou would'st have spoken of what is right.Frag. 28 (P.L.G. 3.).

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Those things also are noble for which men anxiously strive, but without fear; for men are thus affected about goods which lead to good repute. +

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Virtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman. +

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It is the same with those which are the cause of enjoyment to others rather than to ourselves; this is why justice and that which is just are noble. +

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To take vengeance on one's enemies is nobler than to come to terms with them; for to retaliate is just, and that which is just is noble; and further, a courageous man ought not to allow himself to be beaten. +

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Victory and honor also are noble; for both are desirable even when they are fruitless, and are manifestations of superior virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which are the more honorable the longer their memory lasts; those which follow us after death; those which are accompanied by honor; and those which are out of the common. Those which are only possessed by a single individual, because they are more worthy of remembrance. +

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And possessions which bring no profit; for they are more gentlemanly. Customs that are peculiar to individual peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed among them are noble; for instance, in Lacedaemon it is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark of a gentleman, the performance of any servile task being difficult for one whose hair is long. +

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And not carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a gentleman does not live in dependence on others.

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We must also assume, for the purpose of praise or blame, that qualities which closely resemble the real qualities are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold and designing, the simpleton good-natured, and the emotionless gentle. +

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And in each case we must adopt a term from qualities closely connected, always in the more favorable sense; for instance, the choleric and passionate man may be spoken of as frank and open, the arrogant as magnificent and dignified; those in excess as possessing the corresponding virtue,Those whose qualities are extreme may be described as possessing the virtues of which these are the excess. the fool-hardy as courageous, the recklessly extravagant as liberal. For most people will think so, and at the same time a fallacious argument may be drawn from the motive; for if a man risks his life when there is no necessity, much more will he be thought likely to do so when it is honorable; and if he is lavish to all comers, the more so will he be to his friends; for the height of virtue is to do good to all. +

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We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians.Plat. Menex. 235d. We ought also to speak of what is esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or philosophers,Thus, the Scythians may be assumed to be brave and great hunters; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and brief in speech; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should be praised accordingly. as actually existing there. And, generally speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed as noble, since there seems to be a close resemblance between the two.That is, τὸ τίμιον looks as if it were really καλόν, and should be spoken as if it were so. +

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Again, all such actions as are in accord with what is fitting are noble; if, for instance, they are worthy of a man's ancestors or of his own previous achievements; for to obtain additional honor is noble and conduces to happiness. Also, if the tendency of what is done is better and nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected; for instance, if a man is moderate in good fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when he becomes greater, he is better and more forgiving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, Look what I started from !Cp. 7.32 above. and of the Olympian victor: Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.Frag. 111 (P.L.G. 3.). and of Simonides: Daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants.Archedice, daughter of Hippias, tyrant of Athens, and wife of Aeantides, son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus.

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Since praise is founded on actions, and acting according to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy man, we must endeavor to show that a man is acting in that manner, and it is useful that it should appear that he has done so on several occasions. For this reason also one must assume that accidents and strokes of good fortune are due to moral purpose; for if a number of similar examples can be adduced, they will be thought to be signs of virtue and moral purpose.

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Now praise is language that sets forth greatness of virtue; hence it is necessary to show that a man's actions are virtuous. But encomium deals with achievements—all attendant circumstances, such as noble birth and education, merely conduce to persuasion; for it is probable that virtuous parents will have virtuous offspring and that a man will turn out as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce an encomium upon those who have achieved something. Achievements, in fact, are signs of moral habit; for we should praise even a man who had not achieved anything, if we felt confident that he was likely to do so. +

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Blessing and felicitation are identical with each other, but are not the same as praise and encomium, which, as virtue is contained in happiness, are contained in felicitation.

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Praise and counsels have a common aspect; for what you might suggest in counseling becomes encomium by a change in the phrase. +

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Accordingly, when we know what we ought to do and the qualities we ought to possess, we ought to make a change in the phrase and turn it, employing this knowledge as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself alone, when expressed in this way, has the force of a suggestion; but expressed thus, he was proud, not of goods which were due to fortune, but of those which were due to himself alone, it becomes praise. Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you would suggest; if you desire to suggest, look what you would praise. +

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The form of the expression will necessarily be opposite, when the prohibitive has been changed into the non-prohibitive.In the first sentence, the statement is imperative, there is a prohibition; in the second, it is a simple affirmative, implying praise. In the one case there is forbidding, in the other not-forbidding, which are opposites.

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We must also employ many of the means of amplification; for instance, if a man has done anything alone, or first, or with a few, or has been chiefly responsible for it; all these circumstances render an action noble. Similarly, topics derived from times and seasons, that is to say, if our expectation is surpassed. Also, if a man has often been successful in the same thing; for this is of importance and would appear to be due to the man himself, and not to be the result of chance. And if it is for his sake that distinctions which are an encouragement or honor have been invented and established; and if he was the first on whom an encomium was pronounced, as Hippolochus,Nothing more is known of him. or to whom a statue was set up in the market-place, as to Harmodius and Aristogiton.Who slew Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens. And similarly in opposite cases. If he does not furnish you with enough material in himself, you must compare him with others, as Isocrates used to do, because of his inexperienceReading ἀσυνήθειαν. He had no legal practice, which would have shown the irrelevancy of comparisons in a law court, whereas in epideictic speeches they are useful. συνήθειαν gives exactly the opposite sense, and must refer to his having written speeches for others to deliver in the courts. of forensic speaking. And you must compare him with illustrious personages, for it affords ground for amplification and is noble, if he can be proved better than men of worth. +

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Amplification is with good reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since it consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the things that are noble. That is why, if you cannot compare him with illustrious personages, you must compare him with ordinary persons, since superiority is thought to indicate virtue. +

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Speaking generally, of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers, whose subject is actions which are not disputed, so that all that remains to be done is to attribute beauty and importance to them. Examples are most suitable for deliberative speakers, for it is by examination of the past that we divine and judge the future. Enthymemes are most suitable for forensic speakers, because the past, by reason of its obscurity, above all lends itself to the investigation of causes and to demonstrative proof. +

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Such are nearly all the materials of praise or blame, the things which those who praise or blame should keep in view, and the sources of encomia and invective; for when these are known their contraries are obvious, since blame is derived from the contrary things.

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We have next to speak of the number and quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms are constructed which have for their object accusation and defence. +

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Three things have to be considered; first, the nature and the number of the motives which lead men to act unjustly; secondly, what is the state of mind of those who so act; thirdly, the character and dispositions of those who are exposed to injustice. +

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We will discuss these questions in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly.

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Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law. Now, the law is particular or general. By particular, I mean the written law in accordance with which a state is administered; by general, the unwritten regulations which appear to be universally recognized. Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a purpose.προαίρεσις (premeditation, deliberate or moral choice) is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not premeditated; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment. Choice is a voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel, including the use of reason and knowledge. In Aristot. Nic. Eth. 11 Aristotle defines προαίρεσις as a deliberate appetition of (longing for, ὄρεξις) things in our power, as to which we should necessarily be well-informed. +

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The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust; for example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,Or, in the matter of ease, taking τὰ ῥάθυμα as = ῥαθυμία. the coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes him desert his comrades in peril; the ambitious in his desire for honor, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, the shameless from his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind is unjust in regard to his special weakness.

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This will be perfectly clear, partly from what has already been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the emotions. It remains to state the motives and character of those who do wrong and of those who suffer from it. +

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First, then, let us decide what those who set about doing wrong long for or avoid; for it is evident that the accuser must examine the number and nature of the motives which are to be found in his opponent; the defendant, which of them are not to be found in him. +

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Now, all human actions are either the result of man's efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance, others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to compulsion, others to nature, so that the things which men do not do of themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. As for those which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause, some are the result of habit, others of longing, and of the latter some are due to rational, others to irrational longing. +

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Now wish is a [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything unless he thinks it is good; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

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But it is superfluous to establish further distinctions of men's acts based upon age, moral habits, or anything else. For if the young happen to beIn the cases of the young, the poor, and the rich, their youth etc. are only accidents, accidental not real causes. Aristotle defines τὸ συμβεβηκός (Aristot. Met. 4.30) as that which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for instance, if a man, when digging a hole for a plant, finds a treasure. The color of a man's eyes is an inseparable accident, the fact that a man is a lawyer is a separabIe accident. irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not because of their youth that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of wealth or poverty; but the poor happen to desire wealth because of their lack of it, and the rich desire unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or poverty, but desire, that will be the mainspring of their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and all the others who are said to act in accordance with their moral habits, will act from the same causes, either from reason or emotion, but some from good characters and emotions, and others from the opposite. +

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Not but that it does happen that such and such moral habits are followed by such and such consequences; for it may be that from the outset the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate man good opinions and desires in the matter of pleasant things, in the intemperate man the contrary. +

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Therefore we must leave these distinctions on one side, but we must examine what are the usual consequences of certain conditions. For, if a man is fair or dark, tall or short, there is no rule that any such consequences should follow, but if he is young or old, just or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word, it will be necessary to take account of all the circumstances that make men's characters different; for instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate, it will make a difference. We will, however, discuss this laterBook 2.12-18.; let us now speak of what remains to be said here.

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Things which are the result of chance are all those of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen without any end in view, and that neither always, nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of chance will make this clear. +

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Things which are the result of nature are all those of which the cause is in themselves and regular; for they turn out always, or generally, in the same way. As for those which happen contrary to nature there is no need to investigate minutely whether their occurrence is due to a certain force of nature or some other cause +

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(it would seem, however, that such cases also are due to chance). Those things are the result of compulsion which are done by the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation. +

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Things are the result of habit, when they are done because they have often been done. +

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Things are the result of calculation which are done because, of the goods already mentioned, they appear to be expedient either as an end or means to an end, provided they are done by reason of their being expedient; for even the intemperate do certain things that are expedient, for the sake, not of expediency, but of pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts of revenge. +

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But there is a difference between revenge and punishment; the latter is inflicted in the interest of the sufferer, the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain satisfaction. +

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We will define anger when we come to speak of the emotions.Book 2.2. Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them.

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In short, all things that men do of themselves either are, or seem, good or pleasant; and since men do voluntarily what they do of themselves, and involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all that men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant. For I reckon among good things the removal of that which is evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a greater evil for a less, because these two things are in a way desirable; in like manner, I reckon among pleasant things the removal of that which is or appears painful, and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must therefore make ourselves acquainted with the number and quality of expedient and pleasant things. +

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We have already spoken of the expedient when discussing deliberative rhetoricCf. Book 1.6 above.; let us now speak of the pleasant. And we must regard our definitions as sufficient in each case, provided they are neither obscure nor too precise.

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Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a sudden and perceptible settling down into its natural state, and pain the opposite. +

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If such is the nature of pleasure, it is evident that that which produces the disposition we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that which destroys it or produces the contrary settling down is painful. +

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Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant to enter into a normal state (especially when what is done in accordance with that state has come into its own again)The true nature of the normal state was lost during the period of disturbance and unsettlement.; and the same with habits. For that which has become habitual becomes as it were natural; in fact, habit is something like nature, for the distance between often and always is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of always, habit to that of often. +

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That which is not compulsory is also pleasant, for compulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is necessary is painful, and it was rightly said, For every act of necessity is disagreeable.From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G. 2.): see Introd. Application, study, and intense effort are also painful, for these involve necessity and compulsion, if they have not become habitual; for then habit makes them pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant; wherefore states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation,Or rest (bodily). and sleep are among pleasant things, because none of these is in any way compulsory. +

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Everything of which we have in us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a longing for the pleasant.

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Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those that are not the result of any assumption.There is no consideration or definite theory (Jebb, Welldon) of the results that may follow. The desires arise without anything of the kind; they simply come. Such are all those which are called natural; for instance, those which come into existence through the body—such as the desire of food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular; the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our being convinced; for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire when we have heard them spoken of and are convinced that they are pleasant.

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And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, then both the man who remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes.The passage ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ . . . αἴσθησις has been punctuated in two ways. (1) With a full stop at ἐλπίζει (Roemer, Jebb). The conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are accompanied by imagination of what is remembered or hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle really wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of pleasure. (2) With a comma at ἐλπίζει (Cope, Victorius). The steps in the argument will then be: if pleasure is the sensation of a certain emotion; if imagination is a weakened (faded) sensation; if one who remembers or hopes is attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes; then, this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or hopes, since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and a kind of movement (sect. 1). φαντασία, the faculty of forming mental images (variously translated imagination, mental impression, fantasy) is defined by Aristotle (Aristot. De Anima 3.3.11) as a kind of movement, which cannot arise apart from sensation, and the movement produced must resemble the sensation which produced it. But φαντασία is more than this; it is not merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place midway between sense and intellect; while imagination has need of the senses, the intellect has need of imagination. If φαντασία is referred to an earlier perception of which the sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination carries the sense images ( φαντάσματα) to the seat of memory. They are then transformed into memory (of something past) or hope (of something future) and are handed on to the intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his edition of the De Anima.) This being so, it is evident that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who hope, since there is sensation. +

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Therefore all pleasant things must either be present in sensation, or past in recollection, or future in hope; for one senses the present, recollects the past, and hopes for the future.

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Therefore our recollections are pleasant, not only when they recall things which when present were agreeable, but also some things which were not, if their consequence subsequently proves honorable or good; whence the saying: Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it,Euripides, Andromeda (Frag. 133, T.G.F.). and, When a man has suffered much and accomplished much, he afterwards takes pleasure even in his sorrows when he recalls them.Hom. Od. 15.400-401, but misquoted in the second line, which runs: ὅς τις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πόλλʼ ἐπαληθῇ. +

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The reason of this is that even to be free from evil is pleasant. Things which we hope for are pleasant, when their presence seems likely to afford us great pleasure or advantage, without the accompaniment of pain. In a word, all things that afford pleasure by their presence as a rule also afford pleasure when we hope for or remember them. Wherefore even resentment is pleasant, as Homer said of anger that it is Far sweeter than dripping honey;Hom. Il. 18.109. for no one feels resentment against those whom vengeance clearly cannot overtake, or those who are far more powerful than he is; against such, men feel either no resentment or at any rate less.

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Most of our desires are accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, for the recollection of a past or the hope of a future pleasure creates a certain pleasurable enjoyment; thus, those suffering from fever and tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of having drunk and the hope that they will drink again. +

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The lovesick always take pleasure in talking, writing, or composing versesOr doing something that has to do with the beloved. about the beloved; for it seems to them that in all this recollection makes the object of their affection perceptible. Love always begins in this manner, when men are happy not only in the presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when they recall him to mind. +

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This is why, even when his absence is painful, there is a certain amount of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation; for the pain is due to his absence, but there is pleasure in remembering and, as it were, seeing him and recalling his actions and personality. Wherefore it was rightly said by the poet; Thus he spake, and excited in all a desire of weeping.Hom. Il. 23.108, on the occasion of the mourning for Patroclus; Hom. Od. 4.183, referring to the mourning for the absence of Odysseus.

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And revenge is pleasant; for if it is painful to be unsuccessful, it is pleasant to succeed. Now, those who are resentful are pained beyond measure when they fail to secure revenge, while the hope of it delights them. +

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Victory is pleasant, not only to those who love to conquer, but to all; for there is produced an idea of superiority, which all with more or less eagerness desire. +

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And since victory is pleasant, competitive and disputatiousControversiae or school rhetorical exercises, as well as arguing in the law courts; unless ἐριστικάς means simply in which there is rivalry. amusements must be so too, for victories are often gained in them; among these we may include games with knuckle-bones, ball-games, dicing, and draughts. It is the same with serious sports; for some become pleasant when one is familiar with them, while others are so from the outset, such as the chase and every description of outdoor sport; for rivalry implies victory. It follows from this that practice in the law courts and disputation are pleasant to those who are familiar with them and well qualified. +

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Honor and good repute are among the most pleasant things, because every one imagines that he possesses the qualities of a worthy man, and still more when those whom he believes to be trustworthy say that he does. Such are neighbors rather than those who live at a distance; intimate friends and fellow-citizens rather than those who are unknown; contemporaries rather than those who come later; the sensible rather than the senseless; the many rather than the few; for such persons are more likely to be trustworthy than their opposites. As for those for whom men feel great contempt, such as children and animals, they pay no heed to their respect or esteem, or, if they do, it is not for the sake of their esteem, but for some other reason.

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A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is pleasant to loveFor the meaning of φιλία, φιλεῖν cf. Book 2.4.—for no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in it—just as it is pleasant to be loved; for in this case also a man has an impression that he is really endowed with good qualities, a thing desired by all who perceive it; and to be loved is to be cherished for one's own sake. +

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And it is pleasant to be admired, because of the mere honor. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant, the latter being a sham admirer and friend. +

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It is pleasant to do the same things often; for that which is familiar is, as we said, pleasant. +

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Change also is pleasant, since change is in the order of nature; for perpetual sameness creates an excess of the normal condition; whence it was said: Change in all things is sweet.Eur. Orest. 234. This is why what we only see at intervals, whether men or things, is pleasant; for there is a change from the present, and at the same time it is rare. +

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And learning and admiring are as a rule pleasant; for admiring implies the desire to learn, so that what causes admiration is to be desired, and learning implies a return to the normal.True knowledge or philosophy, which is the result of learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal or settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure, which is defined (11.1) as a settling down of the soul into its natural state after a period of disturbance. +

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It is pleasant to bestow and to receive benefits; the latter is the attainment of what we desire, the former the possession of more than sufficient means,Or, larger means than the person benefited. both of them things that men desire. Since it is pleasant to do good, it must also be pleasant for men to set their neighbors on their feet, and to supply their deficiencies. +

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And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something. +

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The same may be said of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger; for all these things excite wonder. +

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And since that which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and things which are akin are akin in accordance with nature, all things akin and like are for the most part pleasant to each other, as man to man; horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the proverbs: The old have charms for the old, the young for the young,Like to like,Hom. Od. 17.218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον.Beast knows beast,Birds of a feather flock together,Literally, ever jackdaw to jackdaw. and all similar sayings.

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And since things which are akin and like are always pleasant to one another, and every man in the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it must needs be that all men are more or less selfish; for it is in himself above all that such conditionsOf likeness and kinship. are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, of honor, and of children; for the last are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting,11.22. +

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for then it becomes our work. And since it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wiseBoth practically and speculatively or philosophically. for practical wisdom is commanding, and philosophy consists In the knowledge of many things that excite wonder. Further, since men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with our neighbors. +

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And if a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote his time to it; as Euripides says: And allotting the best part of each day to that in which he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.Antiope (Frag. 183, T.G.F.). +

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Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation, and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men, words, or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the Poetics.Only the definition appears in the existing text; The ridiculous is an error, painless and non-destructive ugliness (Aristot. Poet. 5). Let this suffice for things that are pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these.

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Such are the motives of injustice; let us now state the frame of mind of those who commit it, and who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when they think that it can be done and that it can be done by them; when they think that their action will either be undiscovered, or if discovered will remain unpunished; or if it is punished, that the punishment will be less than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care. +

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As for the kind of things which seem possible or impossible, we will discuss them later,Book 2.19. for these topics are common to all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong think they are most likely to be able to do so with impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, experienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends, and if they are wealthy. +

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They think there is the greatest chance of their being able to do so, if they themselves belong to the above classes; if not, if they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do; for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit wrong and to escape discovery and punishment. +

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Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being wronged, or of the judges; for friends are not on their guard against being wronged and, besides, they prefer reconciliation to taking proceedings; and judges favor those whom they are fond of, and either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty.

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Those are likely to remain undetected whose qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly manTwo different persons. If the second be omitted, the reference is to one. of adultery. Also, if the acts are done quite openly and in sight of all; for they are not guarded against, because no one would think them possible. +

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Also, if they are so great and of such a nature that no one would even be likely to attempt them, for these also are not guarded against; for all guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no one takes precautions against those ailments from which no one has ever yet suffered. +

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And those who have either no enemy at all or many; the former hope to escape notice because they are not watched, the latter do escape because they would not be thought likely to attack those who are on their guard and because they can defend themselves by the plea that they would never have attempted it. +

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And, those who have ways or places of concealment for stolen property, or abundant opportunities of disposing of it.Or, a resourceful mind. And those who, even if they do not remain undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the judges. And those who, if a fine be imposed, can get payment in full set aside or put off for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have nothing to lose. +

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And in cases where the profit is certain, large, or immediate, while the punishment is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can be no punishment equal to the advantages, as seems to be the case in a tyranny. +

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And when the unjust acts are real gains and the only punishment is disgrace; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father or mother, as was the case with Zeno,Who Zeno was, and what the story, is unknown. while the punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or something of the kind. For men do wrong from both these motives and in both these conditions of mind; but the persons are not the same, and their characters are exactly opposite.Some do wrong for the sake of gain, others for the sake of praise; but the former sacrifice honor for self-interest, the latter self-interest for honor. +

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And those who have often been undetected or have escaped punishment; and those who have often been unsuccessful; for in such cases, as in actual warfare, there are always men ready to return to the fight. +

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And all who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the pain and the loss come later; such are the intemperate, intemperance being concerned with all things that men long for. +

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And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lastingMore distant (Jebb).; for temperate and wiser men pursue such aims. +

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And those who may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or from necessity, from some natural impulse or from habit, in a word, to have committed an error rather than a crime. +

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And those who hope to obtain indulgence; and all those who are in need, which is of two kinds; for men either need what is necessary, as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the wealthy. +

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And those who are highly esteemed or held in great contempt; the former will not be suspected, the latter no more than they are already.

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In such a frame of mind men attempt to do wrong, and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and circumstances of the following kind.With a comma or colon after τὰ τοιαῦτα; without these render: those who possess such things as they . . . Those who possess what they themselves lack, things either necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable; +

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both those who are far off and those who are near, for in the one case the gain is speedy, in the other reprisals are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder Carthaginians.Who were too far off to retaliate. +

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And those who never take precautions and are never on their guard, but are confiding; for all these are easily taken unawares. And those who are indolent; for it requires a man who takes pains to prosecute. And those who are bashful; for they are not likely to fight about money. +

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And those who have often been wronged but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says, Mysian booty.A proverb meaning an easy prey. The Mysians were regarded as cowardly and unwarlike. +

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And those who have never, or those who have often, suffered wrong; for both are off their guard, the one because they have never yet been attacked, the others because they do not expect to be attacked again. +

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And those who have been slandered, or are easy to slander; for such men neither care to go to law, for fear of the judges, nor, if they do, can they convince them; to this class belong those who are exposed to hatred or envy.

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And those against whom the wrongdoer can pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves, or their friends, have either committed, or intended to commit, wrong either against himself, or his ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard; for, as the proverb says, evil-doing only needs an excuse. +

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And both enemies and friends; for it is easy to injure the latter, and pleasant to injure the former. And those who are friendless. And those who are unskilled in speech or action; for either they make no attempt to prosecute, or come to terms, or accomplish nothing. +

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And those to whom it is no advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or damages, such as strangers or husbandmen; for they are ready to compromise on easy terms and to drop proceedings. +

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And those who have committed numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they themselves are suffering; for it seems almost an act of justice that a man should suffer a wrong such as he had been accustomed to make others suffer; if, for instance, one were to assault a man who was in the habit of outraging others.αἰκία (assault) was a less serious offence than ὕβρις (wanton outrage). +

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And those who have already injured us, or intended, or intend, or are about to do so; for in such a case vengeance is both pleasant and honorable, and seems to be almost an act of justice. +

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And those whom we wrongοἷς i.e. supplying ἀδικουμένοις, by whose being wronged. οὓς has been suggested, i.e. supplying ἀδικοῦντες, wronging whom. in order to ingratiate ourselves with our friends, or persons whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word, those by whom our life is ruled. +

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And those in reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining merciful consideration.In our relations with whom, almost = from whom. Another interpretation is: In reference to whom there is a chance . . . consideration from others, meaning the judges (Welldon). And those against whom we have a complaint, or with whom we have had a previous difference, as Callippus acted in the matter of DionCallipus was a friend of Dion, who freed Syracuse from Dionysius the Younger. He afterwards accused Dion and contrived his murder. His excuse was that Dion knew what he intended to do, and would be likely to strike first, if he did not anticipate him.; for in such cases it seems almost an act of justice. +

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And those who are going to be attacked by others, if we do not attack first, since it is no longer possible to deliberate; thus, Aenesidemus is said to have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to Gelon,Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini, being anticipated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neighboring state, sent him the cottabus prize, as a compliment for having played the game so skilfully. The cottabus was originally a Sicilian game. who, having reduced a town to slavery, had anticipated him by doing what he had intended to do himself. +

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And those to whom, after having injured them, we shall be enabled to do many acts of justice, in the idea that it will he easy to repair the wrong; as Jason the ThessalianTyrant of Pherae. said one should sometimes commit injustice, in order to be able also to do justice often.

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Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or many are in the habit of committing, for they hope to be pardoned for their offences. +

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They steal objects that are easy to conceal; such are things that are quickly consumed, as eatables; things which can easily be changed in form or color or composition; +

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things for which there are many convenient hiding-places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow away in a corner; +

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those of which a thief already possesses a considerable number exactly similar or hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages upon the women of their family, upon themselves, or upon their children. And all those wrongs in regard to which appeal to the law would create the appearance of litigiousness; such are wrongs which are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the dispositions which induce men to commit wrong, the nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of persons who are the victims of wrong.

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Let us now classify just and unjust actions generally, starting from what follows. Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to laws and persons in two ways. +

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Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves, which again are divided into written and unwritten; by general laws I mean those based upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communication nor agreement between them. This is what Antigone in SophoclesSoph. Ant. 456. evidently means, when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polynices, as being naturally just: For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity, these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came. And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that which has life, for this is not right for some and wrong for others, But a universal precept, which extends without a break throughout the wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth. AlcidamasOf Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is not extant, but the scholiast supplies his words: ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν (God has left all men free; Nature has made none a slave). The Messenians had revolted from Sparta. also speaks of this precept in his Messeniacus. . . . +

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And in relation to persons, there is a twofold division of law; for what one ought to do or ought not to do is concerned with the community generally, or one of its members.

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Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust acts, since they can be committed against a definite individual or against the community; he who commits adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against a definite individual, he who refuses to serve in the army of wrong against the State. +

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All kinds of wrong acts having been thus distinguished, some of which affect the State, others one or several individuals, let us repeat the definition of being wronged,1.10.3. and then go on to the rest. +

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Being wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established that injustice is a voluntary act. +

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And since the man who suffers injustice necessarily sustains injury and that against his will, it is evident from what has been said in what the injuries consist; for things good and bad have already been distinguished in themselves,Book 1.6. and it has been said that voluntary acts are all such as are committed with knowledge of the case.1.10.3. +

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Hence it necessarily follows that all accusations concern the State or the individual, the accused having acted either ignorantly and against his will, or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the latter case with malice aforethought or from passion. +

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We will speak of anger when we come to treat of the passions,Book 2.2. and we have already statedBook 1.11, 12. in what circumstances and with what dispositions men act with deliberate purpose.

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But since a man, while admitting the fact, often denies the description of the charge or the point on which it turns—for instance, admits that he took something, but did not steal it; that he was the first to strike, but committed no outrage; that he had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a woman; or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege, since the object in question was not consecrated; or that he trespassed, but not on public land; or that he held converse with the enemy, but was not guilty of treason—for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should be given of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we desire to prove that an offence has or has not been committed, we may be able to put the case in a true light. +

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In all such instances the question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrongdoer and a worthless person, or not; for vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose; for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he has taken it to injure anotherRoemer reads, after Dittmeyer, εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ [τούτου ἀφʼ οὗ ἔλαβε] καὶ . . . from the old Latin translation or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases as in these.

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We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (for some are written, but others are unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are two kinds. +

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One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honor or dishonor, and rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friends, and the like;Laws are special and general, the former being written or unwritten. The unwritten law, again, is of two kinds: (1) general; (2) supplementary to the special written law. This general law (not the same as the general law based upon nature sect. 2) refers to acts which go beyond the legal standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized by a remarkable degree ( καθʼ ὑπερβολήν) of virtue or the opposite. For these laws do not prescribe any special reward or punishment, but acts are praised or blamed, honored or dishonored, rewarded or punished, in accordance with the general feeling of mankind. the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law. +

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For that which is equitable seems to be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law. These omissions are sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the legislators; involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when, being unable to define for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,Inexperience (Jebb). as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding; for life would not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. +

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If then no exact definition is possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms; so that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according to the written law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is not; and this is a case for equity.

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If then our definition of equity is correct, it is easy to see what things and persons are equitable or not. +

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Actions which should be leniently treated are cases for equity; errors, wrong acts, and misfortunes, must not be thought deserving of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are unexpected and not vicious; errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious; wrong acts are such as might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from vice. +

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And it is equitable to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to the law but to the legislator; not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose; +

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not to the part, but to the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received rather than those conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to appeal to the judgement of reason rather than to violence;To be willing that a judicial sentence should be nominal rather than real (Jebb). +

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to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail. Let this manner of defining equity suffice.

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Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the injustice from which they spring. For this reason the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the charge brought by Callistratus1.7.13. Callistratus and Melanopus were rival orators. Nothing is known of this particular charge. against Melanopus that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated half-obols from the temple-buildersThe magistrates who superintended the building and repairing operations.; whereas, in the case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the less; for he who has stolen three consecrated half-obols will commit any wrong whatever. Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of the injury done. +

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A wrong act is greater when there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is no remedy, because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it;Understanding ἰᾶσθαι. Or to punish adequately, supplying οὗ μὴ ἴση τιμωρία. and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction, since it is irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedies. +

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And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person deserves greater punishment; wherefore Sophocles,An orator, not the tragic poet. when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the punishment at less than the victim had assessed it for himself. +

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A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplicesOr has been seldom paralleled (Cope, but cp. 1.9.38).; and when it has been frequently committed; or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have been sought and found: thus, at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new law has been passed, is punished, as well as those on whose account a new prison had to be built. +

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The crime is greater, the more brutal it is; or when it has been for a long time premeditated; when the recital of it inspires terror rather than pity. Rhetorical tricks of the following kind may be used:—the statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles of justice, for example, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted word, the sanctity of marriage; for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime. +

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Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very place where wrongdoers themselves are sentenced, as is done by false witnesses; for where would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a court of justice? They are also greater when accompanied by the greatest disgrace; when committed against one who has been the guilty person's benefactor, for in that case, the wrongdoer is guilty of wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but does not return good for good. +

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So too, again, when a man offends against the unwritten laws of right, for there is greater merit in doing right without being compelledAnd therefore the violation of them is more discreditable.; now the written laws involve compulsion, the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws; for a man who commits wrongs that alarm himWhen he thinks of the punishment they may entail. and involve punishment, will be ready to commit wrong for which he will not be punished. Let this suffice for the treatment of the greater or less degree of wrongdoing.

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Following on what we have just spoken of, we have now briefly to run over what are called the inartificial proofs, for these properly belong to forensic oratory. +

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These proofs are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths. +

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Let us first then speak of the laws, and state what use should be made of them when exhorting or dissuading,Although the use of inartificial proofs is almost entirely confined to forensic oratory, they may be used in deliberative oratory. accusing or defending. +

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For it is evident that, if the written law is counter to our case, we must have recourse to the general law and equity, as more in accordance with justice; +

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and we must argue that, when the dicast takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement, he means that he will not abide rigorously by the written laws; +

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that equity is ever constant and never changes, even as the general law, which is based on nature, whereas the written laws often vary (this is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for having buried Polynices contrary to the law of Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law: For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . . this I was not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride] of any man);The first line is quoted 1.13.2. The second differs somewhat from Soph. Ant. 458, where the passage runs, τούτων ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον, ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς φρόνημα δείσασʼ, ἐν θεοῖσι τὴν δίκην δώσειν (I was not likely, through fear of the pride of any man, to incur the penalty for violating these statutes at the bar of heaven). +

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and further, that justice is real and expedient, but not that which only appears just; nor the written law either, because it does not do the work of the lawWhich is the administration of real justice, not that which appears to the legislator to be such and is embodied in legal enactments.; that the judge is like an assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine justice; +

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that it is the part of a better man to make use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the written law.Cp.14.7 above. +

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Again, it is necessary to see whether the law is contradictory to another approved law or to itself; for instance, one law enacts that all contracts should be binding, while another forbids making contracts contrary to the law. +

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If the meaning of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about, and see in which way it is to be interpreted so as to suit the application of justice or expediency, and have recourse to that. +

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If the conditions which led to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself remains, one must endeavor to make this clear and to combat the law by this argument. +

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But if the written law favors our case, we must say that the oath of the dicast to decide to the best of his judgement does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of the meaning of the law; that no one chooses that which is good absolutely, but that which is good for himself; that there is no difference between not using the laws and their not being enacted; that in the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician, for an error on his part does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying the authority; that to seek to be wiser than the laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved laws. Thus much for the laws.

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Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent; of the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men of repute whose judgements are known to all; for instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis, appealed to HomerΑἴας δʼ ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας, στῆσε δʼ ἄγων ἵνʼ Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες, Hom. Il. 2.557-558. The Lacedaemonians, acting as arbitrators between Athens and Megara, who were fighting for the possession of Salamis, decided in favor of Athens on the strength of the two lines in the Iliad, which were taken to show that Salamis belonged to Athens. It was reported that the second line was the invention of Solon. as a witness, and recently the inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of CorinthIt is not known to what this refers. against the Sigeans. Cleophon also made use of the elegiacs of Solon against Critias, to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness, otherwise Solon would never have written: Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.(Frag. 22, P.L.G. 2, where the line runs, εἰπέμεναι Κριτίᾳ ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν). The Critias attacked by Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the first. Cleophon argued from the phrase bid him listen to his father that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the family, and probably meant to praise the father. +

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One should appeal to such witnesses for the past, but also to interpreters of oracles for the future; thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.Hdt. 7.141. Further, proverbs, as stated,They have not been mentioned before. Spengel would therefore omit εἴρηται, and remove the commas: proverbs are, as it were, evidence. are evidence; for instance, if one man advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb, Never do good to an old man. And if he advises another to kill the children, after having killed the fathers, he can say, Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the children to live.From the Cypria of Stasinus, of the epic cycle.

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By recent witnesses I mean all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point, for their decisions are useful to those who are arguing about similar cases. Thus for instance, Eubulus,Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known of Archibius. Plato is probably the comic poet. when attacking Chares in the law courts, made use of what Plato said against Archibius, namely, that the open confession of wickedness had increased in the city. +

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And those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only serve to establish whether an act has taken place or not, whether it is or is not the case; but if it is a question of the quality of the act, for instance, whether it is just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, +

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they are not competent witnesses; but witnesses from a distanceOr, witnesses wholly unconnected with the case. are very trustworthy even in regard to this. But ancient witnesses are the most trustworthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. In regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man has no witnesses, he can say that the decision should be given in accordance with probabilities, and that this is the meaning of the oath according to the best of one's judgement; that probabilities cannot be bribed to deceive, and that they cannot be convicted of bearing false witness. But if a man has witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there would have been no need of evidence, if an investigation according to the arguments were sufficient. +

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Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our adversary, as to the fact itself or moral character; so that it is evident that one never need lack useful evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor against our opponent, it will always be possible to obtain some evidence as to character that will establish either our own respectability or the worthlessness of our opponent. +

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As for all the other questions relative to a witness, whether he is a friend, an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or middling reputation, and for all other differences of this kind, we must have recourse to the same topics as those from which we derive our enthymemes.

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As for contracts, argument may be used to the extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance, of proving that they do or do not deserve credit. If we have them on our side, we must try to prove them worthy of credit and authoritative; but if they are on the side of our opponent, we must do the opposite. +

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In view of rendering them worthy or unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is exactly the same as in the case of witnesses; for contracts are trustworthy according to the character of their signatories or depositaries. When the existence of the contract is admitted, if it is in our favor, we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that make the law authoritative, but it is the laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever disobeys or subverts a contract, subverts the laws. +

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Further, most ordinary and all voluntary transactions are carried out according to contract; so that if you destroy the authority of contracts, the mutual intercourse of men is destroyed. All other arguments suitable to the occasion are easy to see. +

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But if the contract is against us and in favor of our opponents, in the first place those arguments are suitable which we should oppose to the law if it were against us; that it would be strange if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to obey ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we should be obliged to consider ourselves always bound by contracts. +

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Or, that the judge is the dispenser of justice; so that it is not the contents of the contract that he has to consider, but what is juster. +

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Further, that one cannot alter justice either by fraud or compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas contracts may be entered into under both conditions. In addition to this, we must examine whether the contract is contrary to any written law of our own or foreign countries, or to any general law, or to other previous or subsequent contracts. For either the latter are valid and the former not, or the former are right and the latter fraudulent; we may put it in whichever way it seems fit. We must also consider the question of expediency—whether the contract is in any way opposed to the interest of the judges. There are a number of other arguments of the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.

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Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached to it. Nor is it difficult to see what may be said concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our favor, we can exaggerate its importance by asserting that it is the only true kind of evidence; but if it is against us and in favor of our opponent, we can destroy its value by telling the truth about all kinds of torture generally; for those under compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from torture. It is also necessary to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with which the judges are acquainted. It may also be said that evidence given under torture is not true; for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and those who are stout-hearted heroically hold out under sufferings, while the cowardly and cautious, before they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough; wherefore evidence from torture may be considered utterly untrustworthy.

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As to oathsIn Attic legal procedure, the challenge ( πρόκλησις) to take an oath on the question at issue was one method of deciding it. One party offered the other something to swear by ( δίδωσι ὅρκον), this being the real meaning of ὅρκος, and the other party either accepted ( λαμβάνει, δέχεται) it or refused it. Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take the oath. four divisions may be made; for either we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we either tender but do not accept, or accept but do not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether the oath has already been taken by us or by the other party. +

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If you do not tender the oath to the adversary, it is because men readily perjure themselves, and because, after he has taken the oath, he will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does not take the oath, you think that the dicasts will condemn him; and also because the risk incurred in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable, for you have confidence in them, but not in your adversary.There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1) men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are likely to benefit by doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the oath, he will decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted, whereas, if he is not on his oath, he will probably be condemned; (3) there is less risk in leaving the decision to the dicasts, who can be trusted. +

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If you refuse to take the oath yourself, you may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a scoundrel for something than for nothing; that, if you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will probably lose it; consequently, your refusal to take it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing perjury. And the apophthegm of XenophanesBorn at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of philosophy. is apposite— that it is unfair for an impious man to challenge a pious one, for it is the same as a strong man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. +

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If you accept the oath, you may say that you have confidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and, reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the only fair way is that the impious man should tender the oath and the pious man take it; and that it would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath yourself, while demanding that the judges should take it before giving their verdict. +

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But if you tender the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to be willing to leave the matter to the gods; that your opponent has no need to look for other judges, for you allow him to make the decision himself; +

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and that it would be ridiculous that he should be unwilling to take an oath in cases where he demands that the dicasts should take one.

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Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two; for instance, if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other. For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary. +

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Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not in what is said.The defence in such cases is: (1) that the previous oath was taken as a result of fraud or compulsion; (2) that you did not mean what you said. But if the opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what be has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]: They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they themselves do not abide by theirs. Further, we should employ all means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.

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Such then are the materials which we must employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the opinions and propositions that are useful to produce conviction in these circumstances; for they are the subject and source of enthymemes, which are specially suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.This is Cope's interpretation. Jebb renders: If we take each branch of Rhetoric by itself. The classes are of course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. +

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But since the object of Rhetoric is judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should know how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. +

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For it makes a great difference with regard to producing conviction—especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, in forensic oratory—that the speaker should show himself to be possessed of certain qualities and that his hearers should think that he is disposed in a certain way towards them; and further, that they themselves should be disposed in a certain way towards him.The instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof should suffice; but since the function of Rhetoric is to find the available means of persuasion and its end is a judgement; and since an appeal to the speaker's own character and to the passions of those who are to give the judgement is bound to carry great weight, the speaker must be provided with rules for ethical and pathetic (emotional) proofs. In Book 1.5 Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with disapproval, but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (e.g. stirring up envy, hatred, a desire for revenge). +

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In deliberative oratory, it is more useful that the orator should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic, that the hearer should be disposed in a certain way; for opinions vary, according as men love or hate, are wrathful or mild, and things appear either altogether different, or different in degree; for when a man is favorably disposed towards one on whom he is passing judgement, he either thinks that the accused has committed no wrong at all or that his offence is trifling; but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. And if a man desires anything and has good hopes of getting it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is sure to come to pass and will be good; but if a man is unemotional or not hopefulOpposed to εὐέλπιδι. Others render in a bad humor. it is quite the reverse.

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For the orator to produce conviction three qualities are necessary; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they give, because they lack either all three or one of them.

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For either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say what they think, or, if they are sensible and good,ἐπιεικής and σπουδαῖος both = ἀγαθός. In a restricted sense ἐπιεικής is respectable, σπουδαῖος serious. they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers.

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The means whereby he may appear sensible and goodSee previous note. must be inferred from the classification of the virtues;Book 1.9. for to make himself appear such he would employ the same means as he would in the case of others. We must now speak of goodwill and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.

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The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries. +

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And each of them must be divided under three heads; for instance, in regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are usually angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger. For if we knew one or even two of these heads, but not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then, we have given a list of propositionsIn Book 1 generally (cp. 1.2.22). in what we have previously said, we will do the same here and divide the emotions in the same manner.

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Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight,Gomperz translates φαινομένης real or apparent; Jebb omits φαινομένης and translates φαινομένην apparent; Cope confines both to the meaning manifest. affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved. +

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If this definition is correct, the angry man must always be angry with a particular individual (for instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally), and because this individual has done, or was on the point of doing, something against him or one of his friends; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to come. For it is pleasant to think that one will obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and the angry man aims at what is possible for himself. Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads in men's hearts.Hom. Il. 18.109 (cp. 1.11.9). for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this reason first,The thought of revenge in the future, as distinguished from dwelling upon it in the present. and also because men dwell upon the thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams.

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Slighting is an actualization of opinion in regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are of no importance or triflingOr, those in which this tendency does not exist, or is trifling. we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and insult. +

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For he who disdains, slights, since men disdain those things which they consider valueless and slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man appears to show disdain; for spitefulness consists in placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes, not in order that any advantage may accrue to him who spites, but to prevent any accruing to the other. Since then he does not act in this manner from self-interest, it is a slight; for it is evident that he has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be afraid of him instead of slighting him; nor that he will be of any use to him worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his friend.Or, how to make him his friend, φίλος being for φίλον by attraction.

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Similarly, he who insults another also slights him; for insultIn Attic law ὕβρις (insulting, degrading treatment) was a more serious offence than αἰκία (bodily ill-treatment). It was the subject of a State criminal prosecution ( γραφή), αἰκία of a private action ( δίκη) for damages. The penalty was assessed in court, and might even be death. It had to be proved that the defendant struck the first blow (2.24.9). One of the best known instances is the action brought by Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on himself, when choregus of his tribe and responsible for the equipment of a chorus for musical competitions at public festivals. consists in causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act, but for one's own pleasure; for retaliation is not insult, but punishment.

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The cause of the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that, in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults; for they think that, in committing them, they are showing their superiority. Dishonor is characteristic of insult; and one who dishonors another slights him; for that which is worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence Achilles in his wrath exclaims: He has dishonored me, since he keeps the prize he has taken for himself,Hom. Il. 1.356. and [has treated me] like a dishonored vagrant,Hom. Il. 9.648. μετανάστης, lit. one who changes his home, used as a term of reproach. +

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as if being angry for these reasons. Now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respectταὐτῷ. Other readings are ταῦτα, or τις. a man is far superior to another; for example, the rich man to the poor man in the matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it has been said: Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus,Hom. Il. 2.196. and Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his resentment,Hom. Il. 1.82. The words are those of the soothsayer Calchas to Achilles, and the reference is to Agamemnon. for kings are resentful in consideration of their superior rank.

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Further, men are angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated; such are those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, either themselves, or some one else for them, or one of their friends; and all those whom they desire, or did desire, to benefit.

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It is now evident from these considerations what is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom they are angry, and for what reasons. Men are angry when they are pained, because one who is pained aims at something; if then anyone directly opposes him in anything, as, for instance, prevents him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but seems to be doing just the same; and if anyone goes against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other way when he is in this frame of mind, he is angry with all such persons. +

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Wherefore the sick, the necessitous, [those at war], the lovesick, the thirsty, in a word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present condition; for instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his illness,τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον: lit. the sick man [is angry with those who slight him] in regard to his illness, that is, by making light of it. the necessitous in regard to his poverty, the warrior in regard to warlike affairs, the lover in regard to love affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passionOr, his suffering at the moment. present in his mind in each case paves the way for his anger. +

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Again, men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectation, for the more unexpected a thing is, the more it pains; just as they are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what are the seasons, times, states of mind, and conditions of age in which we are easily movedεὐκίνητοι refers grammatically to διαθέσεις and ἡλικίαι. to anger; and what are the various times, places, and reasons, which make us more prone to anger in proportion as we are subject to their influence.

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Such then are the dispositions of those who are easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their anger, men are angry with those who ridicule, mock, and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with those who injure them in ways that are indications of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them; for if they are, they then appear due to gratuitous insult.

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And men are angry with those who speak ill of or despise things which they themselves consider of the greatest importance; for instance, if a man speaks contemptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in the presence of those who pride themselves upon them; and so in all other cases. +

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But they are far more angry if they suspect that they do not possess these qualities, either not at all, or not to any great extent, or when others do not think they possess them. For when they feel strongly that they do possess those qualities which are the subject of mockery, they pay no heed to it. +

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And they are more angry with those who are their friends than with those who are not, for they think that they have a right to be treated well by them rather than ill. +

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And they are angry with those who have been in the habit of honoring and treating them with respect, if they no longer behave so towards them; for they think that they are being treated with contempt by them, otherwise they would treat them as before. +

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And with those who do not return their kindnesses nor requite them in full; and with those who oppose them, if they are inferiors; for all such appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if they had received kindnesses from inferiors.

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And they are more angry with those who are of no account, if they slight them; for anger at a slight was assumed to be felt at those who ought not to behave In such a manner; for inferiors ought not to slight their superiors. +

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And they are angry with friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they want something from them, as PlexippusPlexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is obscure. It may refer to Meleager giving the skin of the Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his uncle wanted. One of Antiphon's tragedies was named Meleager (T.G.F. p.792). in Antiphon's tragedy reproached Meleager; for failure to perceive this is a sign of slight; since, when we care for people, these things are noticed.Literally, for the things which (= the persons whom) one respects, do not escape notice. +

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And they are angry with those who rejoice, or in a general way are cheerful when they are unfortunate; for this is an indication of enmity or slight. And with those who do not care if they pain them; whence they are angry with those who bring bad news. +

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And with those who listen to the tale of their faults, or look on them with indifference, for they resemble slighters or enemies; +

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for friends sympathize and all men are pained to see their own faults exposed.The real friend, therefore, would feel as much pain as the other whose faults are exposed. And further, with those who slight them before five classes of persons: namely, their rivals, those whom they admire, those by whom they would like to be admired, those whom they respect, or those who respect them; when anyone slights them before these, their anger is greater. +

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They are also angry with those who slight such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives, and dependents.Cope translates rulers and governors; but can ἄρχεσθαι be used in a middle sense? And with those who are ungrateful,To avoid the apparent tautology ( 2.17), Roemer (<persName><surname>Rhein</surname></persName>. Mus. 39 p. 503) boldly conjectures χαίρειν: not to return another's greeting. for the slight is contrary to all sense of obligation. +

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And with those who employ irony, when they themselves are in earnest; +

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for irony shows contempt. And with those who do good to others, but not to them; for not to think them worthy of what they bestow upon all others also shows contempt. +

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Forgetfulness also is a cause of anger, such as forgetting names, although it is a mere trifle, since even forgetfulness seems a sign of slight; for it is caused by indifference, and indifference is a slight. +

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We have thus stated at one and the same time the frame of mind and the reasons which make men angry, and the objects of their anger. It is evident then that it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence, to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger, and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry.

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And since becoming angry is the opposite of becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we must determine the state of mind which makes men mild, towards whom they become mild, and the reasons which make them so. +

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Let us then define making mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger. +

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If then men are angry with those who slight them, and slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild towards those who do none of these things, or do them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such; +

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and towards those who intended the opposite of what they have done, and all who behave in the same way to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself. +

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And towards those who admit and are sorry for a slight; for finding as it were satisfaction in the pain the offenders feel at what they have done, men cease to be angry. Evidence of this may be seen in the punishment of slaves; for we punish more severely those who contradict us and deny their offence, but cease to be angry with those who admit that they are justly punished. The reason is that to deny what is evident is disrespect, and disrespect is slight and contempt; +

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anyhow, we show no respect for those for whom we entertain a profound contempt. Men also are mild towards those who humble themselves before them and do not contradict them, for they seem to recognize that they are inferior; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and no one who is afraid slights another. Even the behavior of dogs proves that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit down.ἐξαπίνης δʼ Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνες ὑλακόμωποι· οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς ἕζετο κερδοσύνῃ (Hom. Od. 14.29-31). +

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And men are mild towards those who are serious with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously, not with contempt. +

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And towards those who have rendered them greater services.That is, greater than their present disservices. And towards those who want something and deprecate their anger, for they are humbler. +

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And towards those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slighting anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who resemble themselves. +

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And generally speaking, one can determine the reasons that make for mildness by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and angry at the same time. +

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And against those who have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted from a desire to slight. For no one slights another when angry, since slight is free from pain, but anger is accompanied by it. +

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And men are not angry with those who usually show respect for them.They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a temporary lapse.

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It is also evident that those are mild whose condition is contrary to that which excites anger, as when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance,πλήρωσις: lit. filling up. The reference may be to the fulfillment of one's desires, or to repletion in the matter of food (L. and S.), which seems less likely; in fulness of content (Jebb). and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is of long standing and not in its full flush, for time appeases anger. +

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Again, vengeance previously taken upon one person appeases anger against another, even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Macedonian party. Impeached for his share in the disastrous Peace of Philocrates, he went into exile and was condemned to death during his absence. when someone asked him why he did not justify himself when the people were angry with him, made the judicious reply, Not yet. When then? When I see someone accused of the same offence; for men grow mild when they have exhausted their anger upon another, as happened in the case of Ergophilus.Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace, while Callisthenes concluded a premature peace with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia. For although the Athenians were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they acquitted him, because they had condemned CalIicrates to death on the previous day. +

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Men also grow mild towards those whom they pityAnother reading is ἐὰν ἕλωσι, if they have convicted him. This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plat. Rep. 558a, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed of the sentence, which is very often not enforced.; and if an offender has suffered greater evil than those who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an idea that they have as it were obtained reparation. +

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And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be, which, as we have said, is the essence of anger. Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at punishment of this kind. +

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And men are milder if they think that those punished will never know that the punishment comes from them in requital for their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the individual, as is clear from our definition.Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn who took vengeance on him, you will be less cruel; for anger is personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry, inflicted a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know it. Wherefore it is justly said by the poet: Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,Hom. Od. 9.504. as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,Or, as if Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged, had P. remained ignorant . . . had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and for what. So that men are not angry either with any others who cannot know who punishes them,Or, with any who can no longer feel their anger. Cope translates: with all the rest (besides those actually within reach) who are out of sight. or with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which is the aim of those who are angry.To make the offender feel pain as part of the punishment. So then, in regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restraining the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well says: For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.Hom. Il. 24.54. +

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It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to these topics when they desire to appease their audience, putting them into the frame of mind required and representing those with whom they are angry as either formidable or deserving of respect, or as having rendered them great services, or acted involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they have done.

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Let us now state who are the persons that men loveφιλεῖν may be translated to love or to like; φιλία by love, liking, or friendship; for φίλος friend alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of aimer in French, and lieben in German. or hate, and why, after we have defined love and loving. +

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Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return, and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends. +

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This being granted, it necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason. For all men rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain and pleasure are indications of their wish. +

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And those are friends who have the same ideas of good and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since they necessarily wish the same things; wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the other's friend.

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We also like those who have done good either to us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services are important, or are cordially rendered, or under certain circumstances, and for our sake only; and all those whom we think desirous of doing us good. +

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And those who are friends of our friends and who like those whom we like, and those who are liked by those who are liked by us; +

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and those whose enemies are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves hate, and those who are hated by those who are hated by us; for all such persons have the same idea as ourselves of what is good, so that they wish what is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic of a friend. +

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Further, we like those who are ready to help others in the matter of money or personal safety; wherefore men honor those who are liberal and courageous and just. +

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And such we consider those who do not live upon others; the sort of men who live by their exertions, and among them agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who work with their own hands.Aristotle's opinion of husbandry, in which tillage and planting, keeping of bees, fish, and fowl were included, was not nearly so favorable as that of Xenophon in his Oeconomicus. In two lists of the elements of a State given in the Politics, it comes first at the head of the lower occupations. In its favor it is said that it forms the best material of a rural democracy, furnishes good sailors, a healthy body of men, not money-grabbers like merchants and tradesmen, and does not make men unfit to bear arms. On the other hand, it claims so much of a man's time that he is unable to devote proper attention to political duties, and should be excluded from holding office. He further says that husbandmen, if possible, should be slaves (neither of the same race nor hot-tempered, for they will work better and are less likely to revolt); or, as the next best alternative, barbarians or serfs. The favorable view taken by Aristotle here and in the Oeconomics (probably not his) does not agree with that put forward in the Politics. +

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And the self-controlled, because they are not likely to commit injustice; +

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and those who are not busybodies, for the same reason. And those with whom we wish to be friends, if they also seem to wish it; such are those who excel in virtue and enjoy a good reputation, either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst those who are admired by us or by whom we are admired.Spengel reads ἢ ἐν οἷς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτοί and brackets [ ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμαζομένοις ὑφʼ αὑτῶν]. ἅπασιν, βελτίστοις, and οἷς will then all be neuter. +

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Further, those who are agreeable to live or spend the time with; such are those who are good-tempered and not given to carping at our errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all such persons are pugnacious, and the wishes of the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours.

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And those are liked who are clever at making or taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as his neighbor, being able to take a joke and return it in good taste. +

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And those who praise our good qualities, especially those which we ourselves are afraid we do not possess; +

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those who are neat in their personal appearance and dress, and clean-living; +

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those who do not make our errors or the benefits they have conferred a matter of reproach, for both these are inclined to be censorious; +

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those who bear no malice and do not cherish the memory of their wrongs, but are easily appeased; for we think that they will be to ourselves such as we suppose them to be to others; +

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and those who are neither given to slander, or eager to know the faults of their neighbors nor our own, but only the good qualities; +

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for this is the way in which the good man acts. And those who do not oppose us when we are angry or occupied, for such persons are pugnacious; and those who show any good feeling towards us; for instance, if they admire us, think us good men, and take pleasure in our company, +

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especially those who are so disposed towards us in regard to things for which we particularly desire to be either admired or to be thought worthy or agreeable. +

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And we like those who resemble us and have the same tastes, provided their interests do not clash with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way; for then it becomes a case of Potter [being jealous] of potter.Two of a trade never agree (Hes. WD 25). +

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And those who desire the same things, provided it is possible for us to share them; otherwise the same thing would happen again. +

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And those with whom we are on such terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned by public opinion, provided that this is not due to contempt; +

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and those before whom we do blush for faults that are really bad. And those whose rivals we are,Those with whom we are ambitious of entering into competition in the race for distinction (Cope). There is no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces it. or by whom we wish to be emulated, but not envied,—these we either like or wish to be friends with them. +

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And those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves. +

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And those who show equal fondness for friends, whether absent or present; wherefore all men like those who show such feeling for the dead.

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In a word, men like those who are strongly attached to their friends and do not leave them in the lurch; for among good men they chiefly like those who are good friends. +

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And those who do not dissemble with them; such are those who do not fear to mention even their faults. (For, as we have said, before friends we do not blush for faults merely condemned by public opinion; if then he who blushes for such faults is not a friend, he who does not is likely to be one).A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is not thinking of merely conventional faults; if, then, one who is ashamed of these is no friend, then one who is not . . . And men like those who are not formidable, and in whom they have confidence; for no one likes one whom he fears. +

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Companionship, intimacy, kinship, and similar relations are species of friendship. Things that create friendship are doing a favor, +

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and doing it unasked, and not making it public after doing it; for then it seems to have been rendered for the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason.

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As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they must be examined in the light of their contraries. The causes which produce enmity are anger, spitefulness, slander. +

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Anger arises from acts committed against us, enmity even from those that are not; for if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character, we hate him. Anger has always an individual as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time, hatred not; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil; for the angry man wishes to see what happens;He wishes to see and know the result of the measures taken against those with whom he is angry. Or, it may mean that he wishes the object of his anger to feel his wrath, and to know by whom, and for what, he is punished. to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the things which cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as injustice or folly, are least perceptible; for the presence of vice causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but one who hates, never; for the former wishes that the object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should perish. +

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It is evident, then, from what we have just said, that it is possible to prove that men are enemies or friends, or to make them such if they are not; to refute those who pretend that they are, and when they oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them over to whichever side may be preferred. The things and persons that men fear and in what frame of mind, will be evident from the following considerations.

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Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled feeling caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-witted, but only such as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote; all know that they have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they are indifferent. +

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If then this is fear, all things must be fearful that appear to have great power of destroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce great pain. That is why even the signs of such misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself appears to be near at hand, and danger is the approach of anything fearful. +

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Such signs are the enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any way; for it is evident that they have the wish,By the definitions of anger and hatred. so that they are not far from doing so. +

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And injustice possessed of power is fearful, for the unjust man is unjust through deliberate inclination.And therefore, having the inclination to be unjust, if he has the power, he will be so. +

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And outraged virtue when it has power, for it is evident that it always desires satisfaction, whenever it is outraged, and now it has the power. +

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And fear felt by those able to injure us in any way, for such as these also must be ready to act. +

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And since most men are rather bad than good and the slaves of gain and cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of another is generally fearful, so that one who has committed a crime has reason to fear his accomplices as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch. +

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And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be feared by those who can be so treated; for as a rule men do wrong whenever they can. Those who have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also to be feared, for they are ever on the look out for an opportunity. And those who have committed some wrong, when they have the power, since they are afraid of retaliation, +

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which was assumed to be something to be feared. And those who are our rivals for the same things, whenever it is impossible to share them, for men are always contending with such persons. +

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And those who are feared by those who are stronger than we are, for they would be better able to injure us, if they could injure those stronger than ourselves and those whom those who are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the same reason. +

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And those who have overthrown those who are stronger than us and those who attack those who are weaker, for they are either already to be feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger.

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And among those whom we have wronged, or are our enemies or rivals,we should fear not the hot-tempered or outspoken, but those who are mild, dissemblers, and thorough rascals; for it is uncertain whether they are on the point of acting, so that one never knows whether they are far from it.Or simply, near . . . far from us. +

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All things that are to be feared are more so when, after an error has once been committed, it is impossible to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible, or no longer in our power, but in that of our opponents; also when there is no possibility of help or it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be feared which, when they happen, or are on the point of happening, to others, excite compassion. These are, so to say, nearly all the most important things which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.

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If then fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him, or of those from whom he does not expect them, or at a time when he does not think them likely to happen. It therefore needs be that those who think they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid, either of the persons at whose hands they expect it, or of certain things, and at certain times. +

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Those who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do not think they are likely to suffer anything; wherefore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those who are being beaten to death; for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the cause of their distress. A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate, whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless. +

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So that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered, and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, in such a manner and at times when they did not think it likely.

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Now, since we have made clear what fear and fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each case which makes men fear, one can see from this what confidence is, what are the things that give it, and the frame of mind of those who possess it; for confidence is the contrary of fear and that which gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off. +

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Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful things, or by the nearness of things that justify it.τὰ σωτήρια or some other word instead of τὰ θαρραλέα would be expected, to avoid the tautology. The fact of remoteness inspires confidence, because we do not expect fearful things to happen; while salutary things inspire it if near at hand, because we expect them to happen. If remedies are possible, if there are means of help, either great or numerous, or both; if we have neither committed nor suffered wrong if we have no rivals at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have power, are our friends, or have either done us good or have received it from us; if those whose interests are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger, or both. +

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We feel confidence in the following states of mind: if we believe that we have often succeeded and have not suffered, or if we have often been in danger and escaped it; for men are unaffected by fear in two ways, either because they have never been tested or have means of help; thus, in dangers at sea, those who have never experienced a storm and those who have means of help as the result of experience have confidence as to the future. +

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We are also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we think ourselves superior; and we think ourselves superior to those whom we have conquered, either themselves or their superiors or equals. +

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And if we think we possess more or more considerable advantages, such as make their possessors formidable; such are abundance of money, strength of body, friends, territory, military equipments, either all or the most important. And if we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be feared; +

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and, generally, if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles, and everything else of the kind; for anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are wronged.It is assumed that the gods will be on our side if we have suffered wrong; suffering wrong rouses anger and at the same time inspires confidence, if our relations with the gods are such that we feel we can rely upon them for assistance. +

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Lastly, we feel confidence when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do not expect disaster either in the present or future, or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire fear or confidence.

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What are the things of which men are ashamed or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame of mind, will be clear from the following considerations. +

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Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonor; and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things. +

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If this definition of shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing away one's shield or taking to flight, for this is due to cowardice; or withholding a deposit, for this is due to injustice. +

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And illicit relations with any persons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to licentiousness. +

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And making profit out of what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the indigent or dead; whence the proverb, to rob even a corpse, for this is due to base love of gain and stinginess. +

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And to refuse assistance in money matters when we are able to render it, or to give less than we can; to accept assistance from those less able to afford it than ourselves; +

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to borrow when anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a loan from one who wants his money back, and asking for repayment from one who wants to borrow; to praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking; for all these are signs of stinginess. +

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And to praise people when they are present, to overpraise their good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show excessive grief at another's grief when present, and all similar actions; for they are signs of flattery.

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And not to submit to toils, which those put up with who are older or live luxuriously or hold higher positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to do so; for all these are signs of effeminacy. +

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To accept favors from another and often, and then to throw them in his teeth; for all these things are signs of littleness and abasement of soul. +

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And to speak at great length about oneself and to make all kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what another has done; for this is a sign of boastfulness. Similarly, in regard to each of all the other vices of character, the acts resulting from them, their signs, and the things which resemble them, all these are disgraceful, and should make us ashamed. +

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It is also shameful not to have a share in the honorable things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the majority of them, have a share in. By those who resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the same city, of the same age, of the same family, and, generally speaking, those who are on an equality; for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for instance, in education and other things, to the same extent. All these things are the more disgraceful, if the fault appears to be our own; for they are at once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future defects. +

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And we are ashamed when we suffer or have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting one's person or performing disgraceful actions, including unnatural lust. And of these actions those that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that are done under compulsion), since meek endurance and the absence of resistance are the result of unmanliness or cowardice.

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These and similar things are those of which men are ashamed. +

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And since shame is an impression about dishonor, and that for its own sake and not for its results; and since no one heeds the opinion of others except on account of those who hold it, it follows that men feel shame before those whom they esteem. +

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Now men esteem those who admire them and those whom they admire, those by whom they wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and whose opinion they do not despise. +

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They desire to be admired by those, and admire those who possess anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from whom they urgently require something which it is in their power to give, as is the case with lovers. +

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And they are rivals of those who are like them; and they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as likely to be truthful; such are the older and well educated. +

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They are also more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, The eyes are the abode of shame.Euripides, Cresphontes: αἰδὼς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι γίγνεται, τέκνον (T.G.F. frag. 457). That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases they are under the eyes of others.

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Men are also ashamed before those who are not open to the same accusations, for it is evident that their feelings are contrary. And before those who are not indulgent towards those who appear to err; for a man is supposed not to reproach others with what he does himself, so it is clear that what he reproaches them with is what he does not do himself. +

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And before those who are fond of gossiping generally; for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered wrong, because they always have their eyes upon us; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty. And before those who spend their time in looking for their neighbors' faults, for instance, mockers and comic poets; for they are also in a manner slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom they have never asked anything in vain,Jebb translates, who have never seen us break down. for they feel as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason they feel ashamed before those who ask them for something for the first time, as never yet having lost their good opinion. Such are those who have recently sought their friendship (for they have only seen what is best in them, which is the point of the answer of Euripides to the Syracusans),The Greek scholiast says: Euripides, having been sent as ambassador to the Syracusans, to ask for peace and friendship, when they refused said: O Syracusans, if for no other reason than that we are just feeling the need of your friendship, you ought to respect our admiration. Nothing is known of this embassy. Hyperides has been suggested instead of Euripides. or old acquaintances who know nothing against us. +

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And men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things we have spoken of, but also of indications of them, for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also of the indications of them; and not only of doing, +

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but also of saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, such as their servants or friends. +

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In a word, they are not ashamed either before those whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly despise—for instance, no one feels shame before children or animals—or of the same things before those who are known to them and those who are not; before the former, they are ashamed of things that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of those which are only condemned by convention.

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Men are likely to feel shame in the following situations; first, if there are any who are so related to them as those before whom we said that they feel shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are admired by them or who admire them, or by whom they wish to be admired, or from whom they need some service, which they will not obtain if they lose their reputation. These, again, are either persons who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias, when haranguing the people about the allotment of the territory of Samos, begged the Athenians to picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing round them and would not only hear, but also see what they were going to decree); or neighbors; or those likely to be aware of what they say or do. That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to be seen by those who were once their rivals, for rivalry presumes admiration.

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Men also feel shame when they are connected with actions or things which entail disgrace,This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural verb. Others take the actions or things in a good sense, deeds and fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which they are likely to disgrace. for which either they themselves, or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are closely connected are responsible. In a word, men feel shame for those whom they themselves respect;i.e. when they have done anything disgraceful. such are those mentioned and those who have any relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or advisers they have been; similarly, when they are in rivalry with others who are like them;

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for there are many things which they either do or do not do owing to the feeling of shame which these men inspire.

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And they are more likely to be ashamed when they have to be seen and to associate openly with those who are aware of their disgrace. Wherefore the tragic poet Antiphon,When on an embassy to Syracuse, he was asked by Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying, that from which the Athenians made their statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton, Dionysius ordered him to be put to death. when he was about to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing that those who were to die with him covered their faces as they passed through the gates, said, Why cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that one of the crowd should see you tomorrow? Let this account of shame suffice; as for shamelessness, it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.

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The persons towards whom men feel benevolent,χάρις may mean (1) benevolence, the feeling which prompts a favor; (2) an actual favor conferred; (3) gratitude. and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what favor is. +

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Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to render a service to one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favor will be great if the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree. +

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By needs I mean longings, especially for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain; such are the desires, for instance, love; also those which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so small, are regarded with favor owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; for instance, the man who gave the matProbably given to a beggar or vagrant who had nothing to sleep on. to another in the Lyceum. +

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It is necessary then, if possible, that the service should be in the same directionThat is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent wants and desires (Cope).; if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or greater need.

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Since then it is evident on what occasions,Reading ὅτε; others read οἷς, by whom. for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. +

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It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favor at all, or that those who render it are not actuated by benevolenceἀχαρίστους: the word generally means ungrateful, and so Jebb takes it here: and to make men ungrateful.; for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, in which case there is no favor; or that it was mere chance; or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, so that in this case also there is no favor. +

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And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if there is a favor it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or place.The other five categories in Aristotle's list are: relation, position, possession, activity, passivity. And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered a smaller service,Because in that case their motives in rendering the greater service cannot be disinterested. or if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it is evident that they do not act for our sake in this case either. Or if the service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.

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Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite. We will now state what things and persons excite pity, and the state of mind of those who feel it. +

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Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or one similar, or nearly similar. +

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Wherefore neither those who are utterly ruined, are capable of pity, for they think they have nothing more to suffer, since they have exhausted suffering; nor those who think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather are insolent. For if they think that all good things are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things. +

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Now those persons who think they are likely to suffer are those who have already suffered and escaped; the advanced in age, by reason of their wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those who are rather more timid; and the educated, for they reckon rightly; +

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and those who have parents, children, or wives, for these are part of them and likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken; +

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and those who are not influenced by any courageous emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these emotions do not take thought of the future and those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of mind, for they also take no thought of future suffering; but it is those who are between the two extremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great fear; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable of pity, because they are preoccupied with their own emotion. +

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And men feel pity if they think that some persons are virtuous; for he who thinks that no one is will think that all deserve misfortune. And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity when he is so affected that he remembers that such evils have happened, or expects that they may happen, either to himself or to one of his friends.

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We have stated the frame of mind which leads men to pity; and the things which arouse this feeling are clearly shown by the definition. They are all painful and distressing things that are also destructive, and all that are ruinous; and all evils of which fortune is the cause, if they are great. +

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Things distressing and destructive are various kinds of death, personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease, and lack of food. +

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The evils for which fortune is responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (wherefore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation; if some misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one might have reasonably expected something good; +

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and if this happens often; and if good fortune does not come until a man has already suffered, as when the presents from the Great King were not dispatched to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who are unable to enjoy it when it has.

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These and the like things, then, excite pity. +

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The persons men pity are those whom they know, provided they are not too closely connected with them for if they are, they feel the same as if they themselves were likely to suffer. This is why AmasisHdt. 3.14, where the story is told, not of Amasis, by of his son Psammenitus. is said not to have wept when his son was led to execution, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable, for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce the opposite feeling. +

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Further, the nearness of the terrible makes men pity.Jebb renders: Again men pity when the danger is near themselves, which may mean when they see something terrible happening to others and likely soon to befall themselves. Vahlen inserts οὐ γὰρ before ἔτι: for men cease to pity when the terrible comes close to themselves. Men also pity those who resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or family; for all such relations make a man more likely to think that their misfortune may befall him as well. For, in general, here also we may conclude that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites their pity when others are the victims. +

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And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at hand, while those that are past or future, ten thousand years backwards or forwards, either do not excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because men neither expect the one nor remember the other, it follows that those who contribute to the effect by gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally, are more pitiable; for they make the evil appear close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either future or past. +

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And disasters that have just happened or are soon about to happen excite more pity for the same reason. +

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Pity is also aroused by signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words and everything else that concerns those who are actually suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And when men show themselves undauntedWhen the men, who are in such crises, are good men (Jebb). If they were not, their misfortune would appear deserved. at such critical times it is specially pitiable; for all these things,The signs and actions, and the demeanor of the sufferer. because they come immediately under our observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and because the suffering is before our eyes.

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Now what is called indignationνεμεσᾶν: the nobler brother of envy (Nietzsche). is the antithesis to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character, +

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for if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust, wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods. +

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It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different; envy also is indeed a disturbing pain and directed against good fortune, but not that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and like. Now, all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are disturbed, not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves, but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be indignation and envy, but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune. +

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And it is evident that these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feelings; for he who is pained at the sight of those who are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at least not be pained at the sight of those who are deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished; we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of men who are deservedly fortunate; for both theseThere is justice both in the punishment of the parricide and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion must refer to the latter; if his like is fortunate, he hopes he may be. are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his like may also happen to himself. +

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And all these feelings arise from the same character and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious, since, if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune, he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they differ for the reasons stated; so that they are all equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.

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Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind; and then proceed to the rest of the emotions. +

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What we have just said will make matters clear. For if indignation is being pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is not possible to feel indignation at all good things; +

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for no one will be indignant with a man who is just or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one does not feel pity in the case of opposites of those qualities),Because it is a man's own fault, and pity is only felt for what is undeserved. but men are indignant at wealth, power, in a word, at all the advantages of which good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such things.]The first part of the sentence is clear: men are indignant when what good men deserve is possessed by those who are not good. The literal translation o the text as it stands is: Men are indignant . . . at all the advantages of which good men and those who possess natural advantages are worthy; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in natural advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no question of their being deserved or undeserved. Something may have fallen out like but they will not be indignant with those who possess natural advantages. Roemer (<persName><surname>Rhein</surname></persName>. Mus. 39 p. 504) suggests οὐδʼ εἰ τὰ φύσει ἔχουσιν ἀγαθά (understanding νεμεσήσει τούτοις). +

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And since that which is old seems closely to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if two parties have the same good, men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who have long possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous children, and any other advantages of the kind. And if these advantages bring them some other advantage, men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those who have long been wealthy; and similarly in all other cases of the same kind. +

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The reason is that the latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess what is not theirs.δοκεῖν is a stronger word than φαίνεσθαι, indicating an intellectual operation as opposed to an impression received through the senses. The idea is that where anything has been so long in a person's possession, it has come to he regarded as his by right. +

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And since every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer, but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary (as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable to the just but to the courageous man, and distinguished marriages not to the newly rich but to the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly, if the inferior contends with the superior, especially among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence the saying of the poet, He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,Hom. Il. 11.542. Only the first verse is given in the received text of Homer; the second is not found in any of the mss. The reference is to Cebriones, a son of Priam slain by Patroclus. for Zeus was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better man; or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior contends with the superior in anything whatever, as for instance, the musician with the just man; for justice is better than music.

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From this it is clear, then, with whom men are indignant and for what reasons; they are these or of such a kind. +

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Men are prone to indignation, first, if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest advantages, for it is not just that those who do not resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same advantages; +

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secondly, if they happen to be virtuous and worthy,It has been suggested to insert μὴ before τυγχάνωσι: if, although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess such advantages. for they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust. +

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And those who are ambitious and long for certain positions, especially if they are those which others, although unworthy, have obtained.Or, of which others happen to be unworthy. +

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And, in general, those who think themselves worthy of advantages of which they consider others unworthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter and because of these advantages. This is why the servile and worthless and unambitious are not inclined to indignation; for there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. +

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It is evident from this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes, calamities, and lack of success must make us rejoice or at least feel no pain; for the opposites are clear from what has been said. If then the speaker puts the judges into such a frame of mind and proves that those who claim our pity (and the reasons why they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve that it should be refused them, then pity will be impossible.

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It is equally clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious, if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it. For those men will be envious who have, or seem to have, others like them. +

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I mean like in birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess all but one of these advantagesIf some one else possesses the one thing which they think necessary to complete their happiness, they are envious of him, because they consider it ought to be theirs.; that is why those who attempt great things and succeed are envious, because they think that every one is trying to deprive them of their own. +

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And those who are honored for some special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness. And the ambitious are more envious than the unambitious. And those who are wise in their own conceit, for they are ambitious of a reputation for wisdom; and, in general, those who wish to be distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it. And the little-minded, because everything appears to them to be great.

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The advantages which excite envy have already been stated. Nearly all the actions or possessions which make men desire glory or honor and long for fame, and the favors of fortune, create envy, especially when men long for them themselves, or think that they have a right to them, or the possession of which makes them slightly superior or slightly inferior.

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And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just been stated by implication. They envy those who are near them in time, place, age, and reputation, whence it was said, Kinship knows how to envy also;According to the scholiast, from Aeschylus. and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are those just spoken of; for no man tries to rival those who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to be born, or are already dead; nor those who live near the Pillars of Hercules;Two rocks at the east end of the Straits of Gibraltar, supposed to be the limit westwards of the ancient world. nor those who, in his own opinion or in that of others, are either far inferior or superior to him; and the people and things which one envies are on the same footing.That is, no one will attempt to compete with them in their special branch of study. Roemer reads καὶ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, translated by Jebb as if there were a full stop at ὑπερέχειν. In like manner we vie with those engaged in such or such pursuits. +

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And since men strive for honor with those who are competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those who aim at the same things, they are bound to feel most envious of these; whence the saying, Potter [being jealous] of potter.2.4.21. +

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And those who have succeeded with difficulty or have failed envy those whose success has been rapid. +

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And those whose possessions or successes are a reproach to themselves, and these, too, are those near or like them; for it is clear that it is their own fault that they do not obtain the same advantage, so that this pains and causes envy. +

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And those who either have or have acquired what was naturally theirs or what they had once acquired; this is why an older man is envious of a younger one. +

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Those who have spent much envy those who have only spent little to obtain the same thing. +

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And it is clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice, and in what frame of mind; for, as when they do not possess certain things, they are pained, so when they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite circumstances.The same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling will be present in the joy excited by the opposite occasions, meaning that, if one set of circumstances produces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure (Cope). Or, omitting οὐκ before ἔχοντες, For in the same frame of mind as they are pained (at another's good fortune) they will rejoice in the contrary state of things (at another's bad fortune). So that if the judges are brought into that frame of mind, and those who claim their pity or any other boon are such as we have stated, it is plain that they will not obtain pity from those with whom the decision rests.

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The frame of mind in which men feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble us—pain not due to the fact that another possesses them, but to the fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base men; for the one, owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the other, owing to envy, is to prevent his neighbor possessing them. Necessarily, then, those are emulous who hold that they have a claim to goods that they do not possess;Something like although they are within their grasp is needed to complete the sense. for no one claims what seems impossible. +

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Hence the young and high-minded are emulous. And so are those who possess such advantages as are worthy of honorable men, which include wealth, a number of friends, positions of office, and all similar things. For, believing it their duty to be good, because such goods naturally belong to those who are good, they strive to preserve them. And those are emulous, whom others think worthy of them. +

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Honors obtained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or city make men emulous in regard to such honors; for they think that these honors really belong to them and that they are worthy of them. +

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And if highly valued goods are the object of emulation, it necessarily follows that the virtues must be such and all things that are useful and beneficial to the rest of mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are honored; to these we may add all the goods which our neighbors can enjoy with us, such as wealth and beauty, rather than health.Spending one's money benefits one's neighbor to a certain extent, and beauty is always pleasant to look upon. One does not admire anyone because he is in good health, so much as because he is handsome.

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It is also evident who are the objects of emulation; for they are those who possess these or similar goods, such as have already been spoken of, for instance, courage, wisdom, authority; for those in authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have similar powers, can do good to many. +

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And those whom many desire to be like, or to be their acquaintances or friends;Who have many acquaintances or friends (Jebb). those whom many or ourselves admire; +

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those who are praised or eulogized either by poets or by prose writers.λογογράφοι means either the oldest Greek historians (or rather chroniclers), or the writers of speeches for use in the law courts, or of panegyrics. The opposite characters we despise; for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the idea of emulation of the idea of contempt. And those who are in a condition which makes them emulate, or be emulated by, others, must be inclined to despise those personsκαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις. According to Cope, an unnecessary parenthetical note (and on such occasions). Jebb refers both τούτων and τούτοις to persons: tend to show contempt to or about those who. The reason in the translation above is that they suffer from the want of the highly valued goods. (and for that reason) who suffer from defects contrary to the good things which excite emulation. That is why we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever their good fortune is not accompanied by highly valued goods. The means of producing and destroying the various emotions in men, from which the methods of persuasion that concern them are derived, have now been stated.

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Let us now describe the nature of the characters of men according to their emotions, habits, ages, and fortunes. +

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By the emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like, of which we have already spoken; by habits virtues and vices, of which also we have previously spoken, as well as the kind of things men individually and deliberately choose and practise. The ages are youth, the prime of life, and old age. By fortune I mean noble birth, wealth, power, and their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.The πίστις ἠθική is resumed from 2.1.8. As the πάθη and ἕξεις have been discussed already, only the ages and their character remain.

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The young, as to character, are ready to desire and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure and these they are unable to control. +

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Changeable in their desires and soon tiring of them, they desire with extreme ardor, but soon cool; for their will, like the hunger and thirst of the sick, is keen rather than strong. +

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They are passionate, hot-tempered, and carried away by impulse, and unable to control their passion; for owing to their ambition they cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant when they think they are being wronged. +

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They are ambitious of honor, but more so of victory; for youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. And their desire for both these is greater than their desire for money, to which they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced want, as PittacusOne of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. said in his pithy remark on Amphiaraus. +

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They are not ill-natured but simple-natured,Or, they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a good, i.e., they are not always ready to suspect. because they have never yet witnessed much depravity; confiding, because they have as yet not been often deceived; +

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full of hope, for they are naturally as hot-blooded as those who are drunken with wine, and besides they have not yet experienced many failures. For the most part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with the future as memory is with the past. For the young the future is long, the past short; for in the morning of life it is not possible for them to remember anything, but they have everything to hope; which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily hope. +

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And they are more courageous, for they are full of passion and hope, and the former of these prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and hope of some advantage inspires confidence. +

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And they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of other things that are noble, but have been educated solely by convention.Social convention is the only law that they know, and they are ashamed if they violate it, because as yet they have no idea of higher laws which may command them to do so. +

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They are high-minded, for they have not yet been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity; further, there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who is full of hope.

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In their actions, they prefer the noble to the useful; their life is guided by their characterἦθος in the widest sense, includes all that is habitual and characteristic; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual temper or disposition (Twining). rather than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble. +

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At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions because they take pleasure in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their friends. +

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All their errors are due to excess and vehemence and their neglect of the maxim of Chilon,One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. The maxim was Μηδὲν ἄγαν, Ne quid nimis, Never go to extremes. for they do everything to excess, love, hate, and everything else. And they think they know everything, and confidently affirm it, and this is the cause of their excess in everything. +

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If they do wrong, it is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are inclined to pity, because they think all men are virtuous and better than themselvesOr, better than they really are.; for they measure their neighbors by their own inoffensiveness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly. +

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And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty; for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the character of the young.

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Older men and those who have passed their prime have in most cases characters opposite to those of the young. For, owing to their having lived many years and having been more often deceived by others or made more mistakes themselves, and since most human things turn out badly, they are positive about nothing, and in everything they show an excessive lack of energy. +

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They always think, but know nothing; and in their hesitation they always add perhaps, or maybe; all their statements are of this kind, never unqualified. +

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They are malicious; for malice consists in looking upon the worse side of everything. Further, they are always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful owing to experience. +

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And neither their love nor their hatred is strong for the same reasons; but, according to the precept of Bias,One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. they love as if they would one day hate, and hate as if they would one day love. +

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And they are little-minded, because they have been humbled by life; for they desire nothing great or uncommon, but only the necessaries of life. +

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They are not generous, for property is one of these necessaries, and at the same time, they know from experience how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. +

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And they are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of that of the young; they are chilled, whereas the young are hot, so that old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill. +

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And they are fond of life, especially in their last days, because desire is directed towards that which is absent and men especially desire what they lack. +

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And they are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind. And they live not for the noble, but for the useful, more than they ought, because they are selfish; for the useful is a good for the individual, whereas the noble is good absolutely.

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And they are rather shameless than modest; for since they do not care for the noble so much as for the useful, they pay little attention to what people think. +

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And they are little given to hope owing to their experience, for things that happen are mostly bad and at all events generally turn out for the worse, and also owing to their cowardice. +

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They live in memory rather than in hope; for the life that remains to them is short, but that which is past is long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the past. This is the reason of their loquacity; for they are incessantly talking of the past, because they take pleasure in recollection. +

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Their outbursts of anger are violent, but feeble; of their desires some have ceased, while others are weak, so that they neither feel them nor act in accordance with them, but only from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are regarded as self-controlled, for their desires have slackened, and they are slaves to gain. +

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In their manner of life there is more calculation than moral character, for calculation is concerned with that which is useful, moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence. +

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The old, like the young, are inclined to pity, but not for the same reason; the latter show pity from humanity, the former from weakness, because they think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds of misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that incline men to pity. That is why the old are querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter; for a querulous disposition is the opposite of a love of laughter. +

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Such are the characters of the young and older men. Wherefore, since all men are willing to listen to speeches which harmonize with their own character and to speakers who resemble them,Or, speeches which resemble (or reflect) it (their character). it is easy to see what language we must employ so that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to be of such and such a character.

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It is evident that the character of those in the prime of life will be the mean between that of the other two, if the excess in each case be removed. At this age, men are neither over-confident, which would show rashness, nor too fearful, but preserving a right attitude in regard to both, +

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neither trusting nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance with actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the useful alone, but both at once. They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but preserve the due mean. +

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It is the same in regard to passion and desire. Their self-control is combined with courage and their courage with self-control, whereas in the young and old these qualities are found separately; for the young are courageous but without self-control, the old are self-controlled but cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages that youth and old age possess separately, those in the prime of life possess combined; and all cases of excess or defect in the other two are replaced by due moderation and fitness. +

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The body is most fully developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the mind at about forty-nine. Let this suffice for youth, old age, and the prime of life, and the characters which belong to each.

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Let us next speak of the goods that are due to fortune, all those, at least, which produce certain characters in men. +

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A characteristic of noble birth is that he who possesses it is more ambitious; for all men, when they start with any good, are accustomed to heap it up, and noble birth is a heritage of honor from one's ancestors. Such men are prone to look down even upon those who are as important as their ancestors, because the same thingsi.e., the advantages and distinctions the family possessed of old; such distinctions, when possessed by those of later date, are less thought of. are more honorable and inspire greater vanity when remote than when they are recent. +

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The idea of noble birth refers to excellence of race, that of noble character to not degenerating from the family type, a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing. For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the field; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain period men out of the common are born in it, and then it deteriorates. Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius; those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

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The characters which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess all good things; for wealth is a kind of standard of value of everything else, so that everything seems purchasable by it. +

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They are luxurious and swaggerers, luxurious because of their luxury and the display of their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because all men are accustomed to devote their attention to what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that what they themselves are emulous of is the object of all other men's emulation. At the same time this feeling is not unreasonable; for those who have need of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning the wise and the rich, when she asked which was preferable, to be wise or to be rich. Rich, he answered, for we see the wise spending their time at the doors of the rich. +

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And the rich think they are worthy to rule, because they believe they possess that which makes them so.What makes power worth having (Cope). In a word, the character of the rich man is that of a fool favored by fortune. +

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At the same time there is a difference between the character of the newly rich and of those whose wealth is of long standing, because the former have the vices of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so to say, they have not been educated to the use of wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice, but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which tends to make them commit assault and battery and adultery.

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In regard to power, nearly all the characters to which it gives rise are equally clear; for power, compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and partly superior characteristics. +

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Thus, the powerful are more ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, since they aim at the performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying out. +

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And they are more energetic; for being obliged to look after their power, they are always on the watch.ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ: because they are administrators (Jebb). +

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And they are dignified rather than heavily pompous; for their rank renders them more conspicuous, so that they avoid excess; and this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrongdoings are never petty, but great.

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Good fortune in its divisionsThe three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power. The meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend or converge to these (i.e., to noble birth, wealth, and power). κατὰ τὰ μόρια might also mean in part. Hobbes, in his Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, paraphrases: the manners of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the nobility, the rich, and those that are in power, for to some of these all prosperity appertains. exhibits characters corresponding to those which have just been mentioned; for those which appear to be the most important kinds of good fortune tend in their direction; further, good fortune furnishes advantages over others in the blessing of children and bodily goods.

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Now, although men are more arrogant and thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and love the gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits they have received from fortune. We have spokenBook 2.12-14, 15-17. of the characters associated with different ages and fortunes; the opposite characters to those described, for instance, of the poor, of the unfortunate, and of the weak, are obvious from their opposites.

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NowHaving dealt with ethical and pathetic proofs, Aristotle proceeds to the discussion of topics of enthymemes common to all three kinds of Rhetoric. The difficulty in the Greek lies in the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence beginning ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν. Grammatically, it might be ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη, but it by no means follows that since the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement . . . therefore it has been determined how . . . we must make our speeches ethical. Spengel, regarding ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . βουλεύονται merely as an enlargement of Book 2.1, 2, brackets the passage. Cope suggests that something has fallen out after βουλεύονται: Since in all the three kinds of Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, [I have shown how to put the judges into a certain frame of mind in the discussion of the characters and emotions]. I have also spoken of the characters of the forms of government; so that this part of the subject need no longer detain us. It is generally agreed that we have not the chapter as originally arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of it is non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb's translation). the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge; if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or against some theory, it is just the same, for it is necessary to make use of speech to destroy the opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if they were the actual opponent; and similarly in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge. Generally speaking, however, only he who decides questions at issue in civil controversiesBoth forensic and deliberative. is a judge in the proper sense of the word, for in judicial cases the point at issue is the state of the case, in deliberative the subjects of deliberation.Or, for in both forensic and deliberative arguments the issue is the state of the case. We have already spoken of the characters of forms of government in treating of deliberative rhetoric,Book 1.8. so that it has been determined how and by what means we must make our speeches conform to those characters.

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Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said,Book 1.3. has its own special end, and in regard to all of them we have gathered popular opinions and premises whence men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic, and judicial speeches,Book 1.4-8. and, further, we have determinedBook 1.9, 10-15. the special rules according to which it is possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric. +

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For all orators are obliged, in their speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible and impossible, and to endeavor to show, some of them that a thing will happen, others that it has happened. +

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Further, the topic of magnitude is common to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ extenuation or amplification whether deliberating, praising or blaming, accusing or defending. +

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When these topics have been determined, we will endeavor to say what we can in general about enthymemes and examples, in order that, when we have added what remains, we may carry out what we proposed at the outset. Now, of the commonplaces amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated;1.9.40. Amplication is to be understood of the exaggeration of both great and small things. It is most suited to epideictic oratory, in which there is no doubt as to the facts; so that it is only necessary to accentuate their importance or non-importance. the past to forensic, since things past are the subject of judgement; and the possible and future to deliberative.

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Let us first speak of the possible and the impossible. If of two contrary things it is possible that one should exist or come into existence, then it would seem that the other is equally possible; for instance, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill; for the potentiality of contraries, qua contraries, is the same.As a general rule, from their nature as contraries, although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man is ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases certain qualities may make him more liable to one or the other, e.g. he may suffer from an incurable disease (Schrader). Similarly, if of two like things the one is possible, so also is the other. +

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And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier. +

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And if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or beautiful, +

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it is possible for it to be made in general; for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than a mere house.An argument a fortiori. If a beautiful house can be built, so can a house of any kind; for this is easier. +

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Again, if the beginning is possible, so also is the end; for no impossible thing comes, or begins to come, into existence; for instance, that the diameter of a square should be commensurable with the side of a square is neither possible nor could be possible. And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning; for all things arise from a beginning. +

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And if that which is subsequent in being or generation can come into being, so then can that which is antecedent; for instance, if a man can come into being, so can a child, for the child is antecedent; and similarly, if a child can come into being, so can a man, for the child is a beginning. +

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And things which we love or desire naturally are possible; for as a rule no one loves the impossible or desires it. +

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And those things which form the subject of sciences or arts can also exist and come into existence. +

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And so with all those things, the productive principles of which reside in those things which we can control by force or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose superiors, masters, or friends we are. +

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And if the parts are possible, so also is the whole; and if the whole is possible, so also are the parts, speaking generally; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and upper leather,The meaning of the Greek words is quite uncertain. can be made, then shoes can be made, and if shoes, then the above parts. +

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And if the whole genus is among things possible to be made, so is the species, and if the species, so the genus; for example, if a vessel can be built, so can a trireme, if a trireme can, so can a vessel. +

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If of two naturally corresponding things one is possible, so also is the other; for instance, if the double is possible, so is the half, if the half, so the double. +

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If a thing can be made without art or preparation, much the more can it be made with the help of art and carefulness. Whence it was said by AgathonT.G.F. p. 765.: And moreover we have to do some things by art, while others fall to our lot by compulsion or chance. +

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And if a thing is possible for those who are inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so for those whose qualities are the opposite; as Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had learnt [with the help of others]. +

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As for the impossible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments to be derived from the opposite of what has been said about the possible.

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The question whether a thing has or has not happened must be considered from the following points of view. +

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In the first place, if that which is naturally less likely has happened, then that which is more likely will most probably have happened. If that which usually happens afterwards has happened, then that which precedes must also have happened; for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he must once have learnt it. +

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If a man was able and wished to do a thing, he has done it; for all men do a thing, when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing hinders them. +

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Further, if a man wished to do it and there was no external obstacle; if he was able to do it and was in a state of anger; if he was able and desired to do it; for men as a rule, whenever they can, do those things which they long for, the vicious owing to want of self-control, the virtuous because they desire what is good. +

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And if anything was on the point of being done, it most probably was done; for it is likely that one who was on the point of doing something has carried it out. +

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And if all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened; for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if a man has already attempted a crime, he has also committed it. And if all the natural consequences or motives of actions have happened, then the antecedent or the cause has happened; for instance, if it has thundered, it has also lightened, and if a man has committed a crime, he has also attempted it. +

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Of all these things some are so related necessarily, others only as a general rule. To establish that a thing has not happened, it is evident that our argument must be derived from the opposite of what has been said.

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In regard to the future, it is clear that one can argue in the same way; for if we are able and wish to do a thing, it will be done; and so too will those things which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we have the power. For this reason also, if a man has an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will probably be done; since, as a rule, things that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not. +

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And if all the natural antecedents have happened; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain. +

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And if one thing has been done with a view to another, it is probable that the latter will also be done; for instance, if a foundation has been laid, a house will probably be built.

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What we have previously said clearly shows the nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of the greater and less, and of things great and small generally. For, when treating of deliberative rhetoric,Book 1.7. we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good, such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is evident that all must take the materials of amplification from these. +

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To make any further inquiry as to magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste of words; for the particular has more authority than the general for practical purposes. Let this suffice for the possible and impossible; for the question whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or not; and for the greatness or smallness of things.

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It remains to speak of the proofs common to all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs have been discussed. These common proofs are of two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim is part of an enthymeme). +

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Let us then first speak of the example; for the example resembles induction, and induction is a beginning.As a starting-point and first principle of knowledge.

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There are two kinds of examples; namely, one which consists in relating things that have happened before, and another in inventing them oneself. The latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables, +

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such as those of Aesop and the Libyan.The Libyan fables were of African origin. They are mentioned by Quintilian (Quint. Inst. Orat. 5.11.20) and belonged to the class of animal fables. It would be an instance of the historical kind of example, if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and not to allow him to subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore it must not be allowed. +

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Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates; for instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend, but those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot, not by a man's knowledge.The παραβολή as understood by Aristotle is a comparison and application of cases easily supposable and such as occur in real life, for the purpose of illustrating the point in question; the fable, on the other hand, is pure fiction.

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A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to them: A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having come and done much damage to the pasture, the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time became the man's slave. So then, said he, do you take care lest, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy, you be treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of Phalaris. +

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Aesop, when defending at Samos a demagogue who was being tried for his life, related the following anecdote. A fox, while crossing a river, was driven into a ravine. Being unable to get out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a number of dog-fleas clung to her skin. A hedgehog, wandering about, saw her and, moved with compassion, asked her if he should remove the fleas. The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of me and draw little blood; but if you take them away, others will come that are hungry and will drain what remains to me.’ You in like manner, O Samians, will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is wealthy; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, who will steal and squander your public funds. +

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Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to find similar things that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables; for they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man is capable of seizing the analogy; and this is easy if one studies philosophy.Literary knowledge (Jebb); literature (Cope, Introd. p. 256, who, however, in his annotated ed. explains: intellectual study and mental exercises in general). +

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Thus, while the lessons conveyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory, because as a rule the future resembles the past.

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If we have no enthymemes, we must employ examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these; but if we have them, examples must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue to the enthymemes.If we have no enthymemes, we must use examples instead of them; for they are useful for persuasion, although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we have enthymemes, we must use examples in corroboration of them (see 21.3 note). For if they stand first, they resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to rhetorical speeches except in very few cases; if they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put last; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use. We have thus stated how many kinds of examples there are, and how and when they should be made use of.

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In regard to the use of maxims, it will most readily be evident on what subjects, and on what occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has been defined. +

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Now, a maxim is a statement, not however concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort of a man Iphicrates was, but general; it does not even deal with all general things, as for instance that the straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the objects of human actions, and with what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the enthymeme is, we may say,Putting the comma after σχεδόν. the syllogism dealing with such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example: No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught to be excessively clever,Eur. Med. 294-297. is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore are added, the whole makes an enthymeme; for instance, for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them,The idle habits which they contract (Cope). they earn jealous hostility from the citizens. Another example: There is no man who is happy in everything;Euripides, Stheneboea (frag. 661, T.G.F.). or, There is no man who is really free. The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse it is an enthymeme: for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.Eur. Hec. 864-865. +

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Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows that maxims are of four kinds; for they are either accompanied by an epilogue or not.Maxims with an epilogue are (1) imperfect enthymemes, or (2) enthymematic in character, but not in form; those without an epilogue are (1) such as are well known, or (2) such as are clear as soon as they are uttered. +

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Now all those that state anything that is contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue,Something added as a supplementary proof, the why and the wherefore; in Book 3.19 it is used for the peroration of a speech. +

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either because they are already known, as, for instance, Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our opinion,From Simonides or Epicharmus. for this is generally agreed; or because, no sooner are they uttered than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance, He is no lover who does not love always.Eur. Tro. 1051. +

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As for the maxims that are accompanied by an epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as No one who is sensible, etc.,See sect. 2. while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an enthymeme;They partake of the nature of, but not of the form of, enthymemes. and these are most highly esteemed. Such are those maxims in which the reason of what is said is apparent: for instance, Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath;Author unknown (T.G.F. p. 854). to say that one should not always nourish immortal wrath is a maxim, but the addition being a mortal states the reason. It is the same with A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.According to Bentley, from Epicharmus.

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It is evident, therefore, from what has been said, how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary; but either the epilogue may be put first and the conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one were to say, As for me, since one ought neither to be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that children ought not to be educated; or put the maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases where the statements made, although not paradoxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. +

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In such cases Laconic apophthegms and riddling sayings are suitable; as, for instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas should be forced to chirp from the ground.Meaning that the land would be devastated and the trees cut down. +

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The use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced in years, and in regard to things in which one has experience; since the use of maxims before such an age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and to speak about things of which one has no experience shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of coining maxims and ready to make display of them.

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To express in general terms what is not general is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and then either at the beginning or after the demonstration. +

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One should even make use of common and frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful; for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were acknowledge them as such; for instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave danger before having sacrificed may say, The best of omens is to defend one's country,Hom. Il. 12.243. and if they are inferior in numbers, The chances of war are the same for both,Hom. Il. 18.309. and if advising them to destroy the children of the enemy even though they are innocent of wrong, Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the children to live.1.15.14.

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Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for example, An Attic neighbor.Cf. Thuc. 1.70, where the Corinthians complain of the lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared with their own restless and troublesome neighbors, the Athenians. +

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Maxims should also be used even when contrary to the most popular sayings, such as Know thyself and Nothing in excess, either when one's character is thereby likely to appear better, or if they are expressed in the language of passion. It would be an instance of the latter if a man in a rage were to say, It is not true that a man should know himself; at any rate, such a man as this, if he had known himself, would never have claimed the chief command. And one's character would appear better, if one were to say that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were bound to love. +

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The moral purpose also should be made clear by the language, or else one should add the reason; for example, either by saying that it is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were going to love for ever, for the other kind of love would imply treachery; or thus, The maxim does not please me, for the true friend should love as if he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve the maxim ‘Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate the wicked too much.

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Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first, because of the vulgarityWant of cultivation and intelligence (Cope). Amour-propre (St. Hilaire). of the hearers, who are pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon the opinions which they specially hold.In reference to their own particular case. What I mean will be clear from the following, and also how one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the general; accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms the opinion which they have already specially formed. For instance, a man who happened to have bad neighbors or children would welcome any one's statement that nothing is more troublesome than neighbors or more stupid than to beget children. Wherefore the speaker should endeavor to guess how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions and what they are, and then express himself in general terms in regard to them. +

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This is one of the advantages of the use of maxims, but another is greater; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches have this character, in which the moral purpose is clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a general manner declares his moral preferences; if then the maxims are good, they show the speaker also to be a man of good character. Let this suffice for what we had to say concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of them there are, the way they should be used, and what their advantages are.

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Let us now speak of enthymemes in general and the manner of looking for them, and next of their topics; for each of these things is different in kind. +

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We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogisms; +

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for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far backThe conclusion must not be reached by means of a long series of arguments, as it were strung together in a chain: cp. 1.2.12, where the hearers are spoken of as unable to take in at a glance a long series of arguments or to follow a long chain of reasoning ( οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν). nor should it include all the steps of the argument. In the first case its length causes obscurity, in the second, it is simply a waste of words, because it states much that is obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in the presence of crowds; as the poets say, the ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a mob.Eur. Hipp. 989. For the educated use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore one must not argue from all possible opinions, but only from such as are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those of whose judgement they approve. Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion of all or most of the hearers; and again, conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule.

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First of all, then, it must be understood that, in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or of any other kind, it is necessary to be also acquainted with the elements of the question, either entirely or in part; for if you know none of these things, you will have nothing from which to draw a conclusion. +

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I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not know in what their strength consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further, what wars they have already waged, with what success, and all similar things? +

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Again, how could we praise them, if we did not know of the naval engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other similar things? for men always base their praise upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious deeds. +

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Similarly, they base their censure upon actions that are contrary to these, examining whether those censured have really, or seem to have, committed them; for example, that the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences may have been committed by them. Similarly, in accusation and defence, speakers argue from an examination of the circumstances of the case. +

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It makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him, in order that we may praise or censure in accordance with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful; defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust; advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful. +

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And similarly in regard to any subject whatever. For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good or not, we must consider the question in the light of what is inherent in justice or the good.

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Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason strictly or loosely—since they do not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject, and reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove anything in any other wayOr, by means of the speech it is impossible to prove anything otherwise (Cope).—it is evidently necessary, as has been stated in the Topics,Aristot. Top. 1.14. πρῶτον: i.e. the speaker's chief care should be . . . to have first on each subject a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable. +

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As for those to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method of inquiry must be adopted; we must look, not at what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject; for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and less common.The more suitable they will be, and the less they will resemble ordinary, trivial generalities. +

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By common I mean, for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man, or one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy; for this is applicable to many others as well, so that such praise is no more suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else; for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from disembarking, being invulnerable; to have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath; and all such things.

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One method of selection then, and this the first, is the topical. Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing). But let us first make some necessary remarks. +

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There are two kinds of enthymemes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic. +

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The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions from admitted premises, the refutative draws conclusions disputed by the adversary.The demonstrative enthymeme draws its conclusion from facts admitted by the opponent; the refutative draws its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one which is disputed by the opponent. +

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We know nearly all the general heads of each of the special topics that are useful or necessary; for the propositions relating to each have been selected, so that we have in like manner already established all the topics from which enthymemes may be derived on the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. +

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Let us now endeavor to find topics about enthymemes in general in another way, noting in passingOr, noting in addition (Victorius); or, pointing out, side by side (Jebb). those which are refutative and those which are demonstrative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which are not really enthymemes, since they are not syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will settle the question of solutions and objections, and whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes.

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One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites; for it is necessary to consider whether one opposite is predicable of the other, as a means of destroying an argument, if it is not, as a means of constructing one, if it is;Assuming that self-control is good, then if the opposite of good (that is, bad) can be predicated of lack of self-control, this proves the truth of the first proposition; otherwise, it may be refuted. for instance, self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful; or as in the Messeniacus,Cf. 1.13.2 note. If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must repair them with the aid of peace. And, For if it is unfair to be angry with those who have done wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to one who is forced to do us good.Authorship unknown. Or, If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false statements, you must also admit the contrary, that men often disbelieve what is true.Euripides, Thyestes (Frag. 396, T.G.F.).

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Another topic is derived from similar inflections, for in like manner the derivatives must either be predicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the just is not entirely good, for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly; but to be justly put to death is not desirable.

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Another topic is derived from relative terms. For if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be predicated of the other; there is the same relation between having ordered and having carried out, as Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, If selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying disgraceful for us.The argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling the right of farming the taxes, there could be none in purchasing this right. And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated of the one who inflicts suffering; if of the latter, then also of the former. However, in this there is room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly, he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either way; for sometimes there is a difference in such a case, and nothing prevents [its being argued], as in the Alcmaeon of TheodectesPupil of Plato and Isocrates, great friend of Aristotle, the author of fifty tragedies and also of an Art of Rhetoric. Alcmaeon murdered his mother Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated? To this he replied, Yes, but there is a distinction; they said she deserved to die, but not at my hands.: And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother? Alcmaeon replied: We must make a division before we examine the matter. And when Alphesiboea asked How?, he rejoined, Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not for me to kill her. Another example may be found in the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor.Nothing is known of this trial. For since it was decided that they had justly slain him, it was thought that he had been justly put to death. Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at Thebes, when the defendants demanded that the judges should decide whether the murdered man deserved to die, since a man who deserved it could be put to death without injustice.

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Another topic is derived from the more and less. For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbors, is an instance of the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists.The argument is that since men beat their fathers less commonly than they do their neighbors, if they beat their fathers they will also beat their neighbors, and the Paris ms. in a longer form of this argument has an explanatory addition to this effect, inserting after ὑπάρχει the words τοὺς γὰρ πατέρας ἧττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίον. In a similar passage in Aristot. Top. 2.10 εἰκός (or δοκοῦν) is inserted after μᾶλλον and ἧττον. Welldon suggests that here also the reading should be τὸ ἧττον εἰκός and τὸ μᾶλλον εἰκός (Grote, Aristotle, p. 294). Either of these arguments may be used, according as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not. +

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Further, if there is no question of greater or less; whence it was said, Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children; is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an illustrious offspring?From the Meleager of Antiphon (T.G.F. p. 885). Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong,In carrying off Helen. neither did Alexander Paris; if the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander; and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus, neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles; if no other professional men are contemptible, then neither are philosophers; if generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated,The Paris ms. has θανατοῦνται, are put to death. neither are the sophists; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care of that of Greece.

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Another topic is derived from the consideration of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, says: If, before accomplishing anything, I had demanded the statue from you in the event of my success, you would have granted it; will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something, and break it when you have received it.Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to put up a statue to the famous Athenian general Iphicrates in honor of his defeat of the Spartans (393 B.C.). This was later opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the tyrannicide. The speech, which is considered spurious, was called ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος. Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territory into Attica, they were told that if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians, they would have promised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused to let him through now, because he had thrown away his opportunity and had trusted them.

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Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves; and this is an excellent method.Or, the ways of doing this are various (Jebb). For instance, in the TeucerThe illustration is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as well known. The Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles. . . . and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe; when Aristophon said no, Then, retorted Iphicrates, if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so? But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed a crime; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous, if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent, for instance, as AristidesIt would be absurd to use such an argument against the accusation of a just man like Aristides, and to pretend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It must only be used when the opponent's character is suspect, and lends itself to such a retort.; it should only be used to discredit the accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant; accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself.

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Another topic is derived from definition. For instance, that the daimonionThe reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that a daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as his internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove, by his definition of the daimonion, that he was no atheist. Similarly, Iphicrates, by his definition of γενναῖος and συγγενής could refute the allegation that he was ignoble and show that his deeds were more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could say that he was not intemperate, because he was satisfied with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates refused an invitation to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would be unable to return the benefits received, which would imply his being put to shame, and make the invitation a kind of insult. is nothing else than a god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogiton, before they did something noble; and, I myself am more akin to them than you; at any rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours. And as it is said in the AlexanderOf Polycrates. that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful not to be in a position to return a favor as well as an injury.Just as it is to requite them with evil (Jebb). In all these cases, it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question.

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Another topic is derived from the different significations of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the correct use of these terms has been discussed.Supplying [λελέκται] περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς [χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς]. Others render in reference to the use of the word ὀρθῶς (but ὀρθῶς does not occur in the passage in Aristot. Top. 1.15). A suggested reading is περὶ τούτου ὀρθῶς εἴρηται.

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Another, from division. For example, There are always three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded from consideration as impossible; as for the third, not even the accusers assert it.

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Another, from induction. For instance, from the case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that in matters of parentage women always discern the truth; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias the orator was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth;Mantias had one legitimate son Mantitheus and two illegitimate by a certain Plangon. Mantias at first refused to acknowledge the latter as his sons, until the mother declared they were. and again, at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, DodonisThe name of the mother; or simply, the woman of Dodona, like the woman of Peparethus. declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is another instance in the law of Theodectes: If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others. Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are everywhere honored, Alcidamas said: The Parians honored Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians Homer, although he had rendered no public services;Others read πολίτην, although he was not their fellow-citizen (but Chios was one of the claimants to his birthplace). the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a woman; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators; the Italiotes honored Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and still hold him in honor. . .Something has fallen out, what follows being intended to prove that the best rulers for a state are the philosophers. The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, as soon as those who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers,Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect, as soon as philosophers had the conduct of affairs. the city flourished.

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Another topic is that from a previous judgement in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter, if possible when the judgement was unanimous or the same at all times; if not, when it was at least that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good; or of the judges themselves or of those whose judgement they accept, or of those whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for instance, those in authority, or of those whose judgement it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the gods, a father, or instructors; as AutoclesAthenian ambassador to Sparta (371 B.C.), whose aggressive policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the Eumenides could agree without any loss of dignity to stand their trial before the Areopagus, as described in Aeschylus, surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is known of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit his case to it, when charged with some offense. said in his attack on Mixidemides, If the awful goddesses were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus, should not Mixidemides? Or Sappho, Death is an evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they would die. Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, said, Our friend at any rate never spoke like that, referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read here) in Xen. Hell. 4.7.2. The Argives, when a Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory, were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when there should be a holy truce. This obviously left the door open to fraud, so Agesipolis (one of the Spartan kings) consulted the oracle of Zeus at Olympia to ask whether he was to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that he might decline a truce fraudulently demanded. To confirm this, Agesipolis put the same question to Apollo: Is your opinion as to the truce the same as that of your father (Zeus)? Certainly, answered Apollo. Agesipolis thereupon invaded Argos. The point is that really Apollo had little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for the son to contradict the father. after having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, asked the god at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his father's, meaning that it would be disgraceful to contradict him. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote Isocrates, because Theseus so judged; the same applies to Alexander Paris, whom the goddesses chose before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates says, for at any rate Conon.After his defeat at Aegospotami (405 B.C.) the Athenian general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with Evagoras, king of Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle, of the goodness of the latter. in his misfortune, passing over everyone else, sought his assistance.

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Another topic is that from enumerating the parts, as in the Topics: What kind of movement is the soul? for it must be this or that.If the genus can be affirmed of any subject, then one or other of the species, which make up the genus, must also be predicable of it. If the proposition to be maintained is, the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any of the different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay, change of place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of the soul. If not, the generic predicate is not applicable, and the proposition is refuted. There is an instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes: What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?

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Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evil of being envied, and by the good of being wise; therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather, we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the Art of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have been mentioned.

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Another topic may be employed when it is necessary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites, and one has to employ the method previously stated in the case of both. But there is this difference, that in the former case things of any kind whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; For if, said she, you say what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will. On the other hand, you should speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men will. This is the same as the proverb, To buy the swamp with the saltThe bad with the good. The exact meaning of βλαίσωσις has not been satisfactorily explained. In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two opposite things would be speaking truth or untruth; the two opposite consequences, pleasing men and pleasing God.; and retorting a dilemma on its proposer takes place when, two things being opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and evil being opposite like the things themselves.

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Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavoring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements.e.g. a man may say that an honorable death should be preferred to a pleasant life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired wealth, whereas really he wishes the opposite. If then his words are in accordance with his real wishes, he must be confronted with his public statements; if they are in accordance with the latter, he must be confronted with his secret wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions. (Aristot. Sophist. Elenchi 2.12, Poste's translation). This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox.

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Another topic is derived from analogy in things. For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his son to perform public services because he was tall, although under the legal age, said: If you consider tall boys men, you must vote that short men are boys. Similarly, Theodectes in his law,This law (already mentioned in 23.11) is said to have been an oration on the legal position of mercenaries. says: Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on account of their merits, will you not banish those of them who have wrought such irreparable misfortunes?

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Another topic consists in concluding the identity of antecedents from the identity of results.Cause and effect. Thus Xenophanes said: There is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist. And, generally speaking, one may always regard as identical the results produced by one or other of any two things: You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy.Isoc. 15.173. And, to give earth and water is slavery, and to be included in the common peaceThe peace concluded between the Greeks (although the Lacedaemonians held aloof) and Alexander the Great after the death of Philip of Macedon (336 B.C.). implies obeying orders. Of two alternatives, you should take that which is useful.

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Another topic is derived from the fact that the same men do not always choose the same thing before and after, but the contrary. The following enthymeme is an example: If, when in exile, we fought to return to our country [it would be monstrous] if, now that we have returned, we were to return to exile to avoid fighting!Lys. 34.11. This amounts to saying that at one time they preferred to hold their ground at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of not remaining.i.e., after their return, they preferred to leave the city rather than fight. This is Cope's explanation, but the meaning of the clause ὁτὲ μὲν . . . ᾑροῦντο is then somewhat obscure. A more suitable interpretation would be: At one time they preferred to return from exile at the price of fighting; at another, not to fight at the price of being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire), but one does not see how this can be got out of the Greek.

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Another topic consists in maintaining that the cause of something which is or has been is something which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause of it; for example, if one were to make a present of something to another, in order to cause him pain by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said: It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer more striking calamities.The author is unknown. And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon: Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be witnesses to Greece of the valor of Meleager.Frag. 2 (T.G.F. p. 792). And the following remark from the Ajax of Theodectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all others,Hom. Il. 10.218; cp. T.G.F. p. 801. not to do him honor, but that his companion might be his inferior; for this may have been the reason.

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Another topic common to forensic and deliberative rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they exist, determine us to act, if not, not; for instance, if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit. From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for defence,By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from committing a crime, and vice versa. what persuades, for accusation. This topic comprises the whole Art of Pamphilus and Callippus.

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Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought so, if they had not happened or almost happened. And further, these things are even more likely to be true; for we only believe in that which is, or that which is probable: if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will be true; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true.The argument is: we accept either that which really is, or that which is probable; if then a statement is made which is incredible and improbable, we assume that it would not have been made, unless it was true. Thus, AndroclesAthenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for whose banishment he was chiefly responsible. When the Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death. Pitthus was an Athenian deme or parish. of Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said the laws need a law to correct them, went on, and fishes need salt, although it is neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil.

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Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists in examining contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the adversary, for instance, he says that he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty; next, separately in your own case, he says that I am litigious, but he cannot prove that I have ever brought an action against anyone; lastly, separately in the case of your adversary and yourself together: he has never yet lent anything, but I have ransomed many of you.

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Another topic, when men or things have been attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,Understanding διαβεβλῆσθαι. Others read μὴ (for ) δοκοῦσι, when there seems no reason to suspect them. consists in stating the reason for the false opinion; for there must be a reason for the supposition of guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander was quashed. Again, in the Ajax of Theodectes, Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

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Another topic is derived from the cause. If the cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not exist, the effect does not exist; for the effect exists with the cause, and without cause there is nothing. For example, Leodamas, when defending himself against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name had been posted in the AcropolisThe names of traitors were inscribed on a brazen pillar in the Acropolis. Leodamas supported the oligarchic, Thrasybulus the democratic party. In answer to the charge that he had had his name removed from the pillar when his party came into power, Leodamas replied that, if he had been originally posted as an enemy of the people and a hater of democracy, he would have preferred to keep the record, as likely to increase the confidence of the Thirty in him, than to have it erased, even though it branded him as a traitor. but that he had erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had more confidence in him if his hatred against the people had been graven on the stone.

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Another topic consists in examining whether there was or is another better course than that which is advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For it is evident that, if this has not been done,If a person has not taken the better course, when he had the chance of doing so, he cannot be guilty. a person has not committed a certain action; because no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad. However, this argument may be false; for often it is not until later that it becomes clear what was the better course, which previously was uncertain.

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Another topic, when something contrary to what has already been done is on the point of being done, consists in examining them together. For instance, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea,Leucothea was the name of the deified Ino. She was the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas king of Thebes. The latter went mad and, in order to escape from him, Ino threw herself into the sea with her infant son Melicertes. Both became marine deities. or not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to sacrifice to her.

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Another topic consists in making use of errors committed, for purposes of accusation or defence. For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus,Tragic poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (T.G.F. p. 798). some accuse Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate, they had disappeared; for she had made the mistake of sending them out of the way. Medea herself pleads that she would have slain, not her children, but her husband Jason; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme is the subject of the whole of the first Art of Theodorus.An early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have contained something more than the topic of errors to be of any use.

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Another topic is derived from the meaning of a name. For instance, Sophocles says, Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.Sophocles, Tyro, Frag. 597 (T.G.F.). The reference is to Sidero ( σίδηρος, iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro. This topic is also commonly employed in praising the gods. Conon used to call Thrasybulus the man bold in counsel, and Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, Thou art ever bold in fight, and of Polus, Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by nature,Thompson's rendering (Introd. to his edition of Plato's Gorgias p. 5). Colt refers to Polus's skittishness and frisking from one subject to another. and of Draco the legislator that his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe were they. Hecuba in EuripidesEur. Tro. 990. speaks thus of Aphro-dite: And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the word aphro-syne (folly); and ChaeremonFrag. 4 (T.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from πένθος (sorrow). of Pentheus, Pentheus named after his unhappy future.

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Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion of oppositesAdmitting the apparent correctness of the opposing argument, we may prove the contradictory of its conclusion by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then called an elenchus (Thomson, Laws of Thought, section 127). in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are specially applauded, the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial (for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the conclusion); and also those which the hearers are only so little behind that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered.

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But as it is possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only apparent, there must also be real and apparent enthymemes, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.

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Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first, as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion syllogistically expressed, although there has been no syllogistic process, therefore it is neither this nor that, so it must be this or that; and similarly in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical statement is supposed to be an enthymeme; for such a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms: He saved some, avenged others, and freed the Greeks;Isoc. 9.65-69. for each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion.

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The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonymy.Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double meaning. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal, since from it is derived the most honored of all religious festivals, namely, the mysteriesDeriving μυστήρια ( μύειν, to close the lips) from μῦς (mouse).; or if, in praising the dog, one were to include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said,A fragment from the Parthenia (songs sung by maidens to the accompaniment of the flute). Pan is called the dog of Cybele, the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as being always in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god. The fact that Pindar calls Pan dog is taken as a glorification of that animal. O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great Mother, taking every form, or were to say that the dog is an honorable animal, since to be without a dog is most dishonorable. And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the gods, because he alone is called common;κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς is an expression meaning halves! When anyone had a stroke of luck, such as finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with him expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck, and such a find was called ἑρμαῖον. κοινωνικός is taken to mean (1) liberal to others, or (2) sociable. and that words are most excellent, since good men are considered worthy, not of riches but of consideration; for λόγου ἄξιος has a double meaning.λόγος: (1) speech; (2) account, esteem.

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Another fallacy consists in combining what is divided or dividing what is combined. For since a thing which is not the same as another often appears to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus, to prove, for example, that a man knows that there is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme;Very obscure and no explanation is satisfactory. The parallel passage in Aristot. Sophist. Elenchi 20.6 is: Do you being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the Piraeus? The ambiguity lies in the position of now, whether it is to be taken with in Sicily or with in the Piraeus. At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot know that there are at this time triremes in the Piraeus; but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the Piraeus, which should be there, but are now in Sicily (Kirchmann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses are: Do you now, being in Sicily, see the triremes which are in the Piraeus? and, Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes which are now in the Piraeus? The fallacy consists in the two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes in Sicily), true separately, being untrue combined. or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows the word made of them, for word and letters are the same thing. Further, since twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount wholesome; for it would be absurd that two halves separately should be good, but bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if one were to say, one good thing cannot make two bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again, one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, that he deposed thirty tyrants,Thrasybulus deposed the thirty individuals and put down the single tyranny which they composed; he then claimed a thirtyfold reward, as having put down thirty tyrannies. for here he combines them; or the example of the fallacy of division in the Orestes of Theodectes:Frag. 5 (T.G.F.). It is just that a woman who has killed her husband should be put to death, and that the son should avenge the father; and this in fact is what has been done. But if they are combined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put the woman to death is not mentioned.

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Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker, without having proved that any crime has actually been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme; for the hearer falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not, although neither has been proved.

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Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love one another are useful to States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus; or that Dionysius is a thief, because he is a rascal; for here again the argument is inconclusive; not every rascal is a thief although every thief is a rascal.

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Another fallacy is derived from accident; for instance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that, they rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings.Hdt. 2.141. The story was that, when Sennacherib invaded Egypt, a host of field-mice devoured all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus ( σμίνθος, mouse) and was represented on coins with a mouse in his hand, either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or because the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to elsewhere, was of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar panegyrics on ridiculous things or animals included pots, counters, salt, flies, bees, and such subjects as death, sleep, and food. Or if one were to say that nothing is more honorable than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was not invited Achilles was angry with the Achaeans at Tenedos; whereas he was really angry because he had been treated with disrespect, but this was an accident due to his not having been invited.Sophocles, The Gathering of the Greeks (T.G.F. p. 161), a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident of the disrespect.

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Another fallacy is that of the Consequence.Assuming a proposition to be convertible, when it is not; it does not follow, assuming that all the high-minded dwell by themselves, that all who dwell by themselves are highminded. For instance, in the Alexander Paris it is said that Paris was high-minded, because he despised the companionship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself; for because the high-minded are of this character, Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please; and since these things belong to those who are apparently happy, those to whom they belong may also be thought happy. But there is a difference in conditions;The poor want to get money; the rich dance and sing to amuse themselves, or to show that they can do as they like. Exiles can certainly live where they like in a foreign land, but would prefer to live in their own country; the rich, who are not exiles, travel to amuse themselves. wherefore this topic also falls under the head of omission. +

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Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as, or after, another; for it is believed that what happens after is produced by the other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils that happened, since it was followed by the war.

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Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. For instance, Alexander Paris had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but only for the first time; for the father's authority only lasts till then. Or, if one should say that it is wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only when the assailant gives the first blow.

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Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it is argued that that which is not is, for that which is not is that which is notThe first is means has a real, absolute existence; the second is merely expresses the identity of the terms of the proposition, and is particular; but the sophistical reasoner takes it in the same sense as the first. The same applies to the argument about the unknown.; also, that the unknown can be known, for it can be known of the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases. But this is not to be understood absolutely, as Agathon says: One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable, that many things happen to men that are not probable; for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so that that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable. But not absolutely; but as, in the case of sophistical disputations, the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added, so here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases. +

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The Art of Corax is composed of this topic. For if a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his defence will be that the crime is not probable; but if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable, for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear equally probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what making the worse appear the better argument means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of ProtagorasThis utterance of Protagoras gave particular offense as apparently implying that the weaker cause was really identical with the worse, so that to support it was to support injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed to Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as a statement of the aim of all ancient orators—how to overcome stronger arguments by arguments weaker in themselves.; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes.

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Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogismIn which the contrary of an opponent's conclusion is proved. or by bringing an objection. +

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It is clear that the same topics may furnish counter-syllogisms; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials and many probabilities are contrary to one another. +

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An objection is brought, as shown in the Topics, in four ways: it may be derived either from itself,i.e., the opponent's enthymeme. or from what is similar, or from what is contrary, or from what has been decided. +

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In the first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, two objections might be made; either the general statement that all wantLove is regarded as a desire, and therefore as bad as any other desire. It is here included under the general head of want. is bad, or in particular, that Caunian loveIncest: Ovid Met. 9.454. would not have become proverbial, unless some forms of love had been bad. +

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An objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is that the good man does good to all his friends; it may be objected: But the bad man does not do harm [to all his friends].The contrary of good men do good to all their friends is bad men do harm to all their friends, but this is not always true. Jebb gives the objection as: No, the bad man does not do evil to all his enemies. +

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An objection from what is similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing that those who have been benefited do not always love. +

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The fourth kind of objection is derived from the former decisions of well-known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance for those who are drunk, for their offence is the result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he would not have laid down severer punishment for a man who commits an offence when drunk.

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Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities, when based upon things which most commonly occur or seem to occur; from examples, when they are the result of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then concludes the particular by an example; from necessary signs, when based upon that which is necessary and everTranslating ἀεί inserted by Vahlen before ὄντος. exists; from signs, when their material is the general or the particular, whether true or not. Now, the probable being not what occurs invariably but only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes of this character can always be refuted by bringing an objection. +

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But the objection is often only apparent, not real; for he who brings the objection endeavors to show, not that the argument is not probable, but that it is not necessary. +

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Wherefore, by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this manner,That is, if the argument is shown to be not necessary. either that the argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide,The important point in the conclusion drawn is that the judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the argument is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not about things that are necessary but about things that are probable. being deceived by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities; for this is what is meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary; it must also be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself is specially based upon what happens generally. +

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This may take place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of the facts.χρόνῳ . . . πράγμασιν. If χρόνῳ be taken to mean the date, there are the following alternatives. The date may be questioned, the facts admitted; both date and facts may be questioned; both date and facts may be admitted, but circumstances may have altered (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take χρόνῳ to mean the greater number of times the same fact has occurred, πράγμασι the more numerous facts that increase probability. But χρόνῳ can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's note). The strongest objections are those in which both are combined; for a thing is more probable, the greater the number of similar cases.

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Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated1.2.18; or, at the beginning, i.e., of this book.; for it is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.27. that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion. +

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As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common occurrence, are otherwiseOn the other side, in the opponent's favor.; but if the majority and greater frequency of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference. +

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But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.27.; the only thing that remains is to prove that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for, by means of demonstration, everything at once becomes clear.That is, when the tekmērion is converted into a syllogism. For tekmērion see 1.2.16.

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Amplification and depreciation are not elements of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing is great or small, just as others serve to show that it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else. +

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All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthymemes; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation. +

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Nor are enthymemes by which arguments are refuted of a different kind from those by which they are established; for it is clear that demonstration or bringing an objection is the means of refutation. By the first the contrary of the adversary's conclusion is demonstrated; for instance, if he has shown that a thing has happened, his opponent shows that it has not; if he has shown that a thing has not happened, he shows that it has. This, therefore, will not be the difference between them; for both employ the same arguments; they bring forward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that it is not. +

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And the objection is not an enthymeme, but, as I said in the Topics, it is stating an opinion which is intended to make it clear that the adversary's syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some false premise. +

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Now, since there are three things in regard to speech, to which special attention should be devoted, let what has been said suffice for examples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns the intelligenceIntellectual capacity, as evinced in language (or actions), and seen when the actors argue or make an appeal to the feelings of others, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do (Bywater on Aristot. Poet. 1450a 6, where the text is speaking of the διάνοια of the actors in a play). generally; for the sources of a supply of arguments and the means of refuting them. It only remains to speak of style and arrangement.

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There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the speech. We have already spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in number, what is their nature, and why there are only three; for in all cases persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a certain manner, or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain character, or because something has been demonstrated. We have also stated the sources from which enthymemes should be derived—some of them being special, the others general commonplaces. +

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We have therefore next to speak of style; for it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character. +

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In the first place, following the natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself—what gives things themselves their persuasiveness; in the second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery, which is of the greatest importance but has not yet been treated of by anyone. In fact, it only made its appearance late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first the poets themselves acted their tragedies.Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays, there was no need for professional actors, nor for instruction in the art of delivery or acting. This explains why no attempt had been made to deal with the question. Similarly, the rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were at first as a rule the composers of the poems themselves. It is clear, therefore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in poetry, and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others. +

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Now delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be used for each particular emotion; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate; and how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used; and what rhythms are adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are considered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets, it is the same In politicalIn the law courts and public assembly. contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of government. +

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But no treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into notice; and rightly considered it is thought vulgar.Cope prefers: is thought vulgar, and rightly so considered. But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion,Or, is concerned with appearance. we must pay attention to it, not as being right, but necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer. +

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However, in every system of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay attention to style; for it does make a difference, for the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in this or that manner; still, the difference is not so very great, but all these thingsi.e. style, delivery, and acting, which are of no use to serious students. are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer; wherefore no one teaches geometry in this way.

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Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasymachus, in his EleoiA treatise on Pathos.; and in fact, a gift for acting is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in regard to style it is artificial. Wherefore people who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as orators who excel in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the style.

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The poets, as was natural, were the first to give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. +

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And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias.Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician (see Introduction). Even now the majority of the uneducated think that such persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the same as that of poetry. And the result proves it; for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it in the same manner, but as they have changed from the tetrametric to the iambic meter, because the latter, of all other meters, most nearly resembles prose, they have in like manner discarded all such words as differ from those of ordinary conversation, with which the early poets used to adorn their writings, and which even now are employed by the writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous to imitate those who no longer employ that manner of writing. +

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Consequently, it is evident that we need not enter too precisely into all questions of style, but only those which concern such a style as we are discussing. As for the other kind of style,i.e. the poetic style. See Aristot. Poet. 22, where the choice of words and the extent to which out-of-the-way words and phrases may be used in poetry is discussed. it has already been treated in the Poetics.

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Let this suffice for the consideration of these points. In regard to style, one of its chief merits may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by the fact that the speech, if it does not make the meaning clear, will not perform its proper function; neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate to it; for the poetic style may be is not mean, but it is not appropriate to prose. +

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Of nouns and verbs it is the proper ones that make style perspicuousNouns and verbs is a conventional expression for all the parts of speech. Cp. Hor. AP 240 non ego inornata et dominantia nomina solum verbaque, where dominantia is a literal adaptation of κύρια, the usual Latin equivalent for which is propria.; all the others which have been spoken of in the PoeticsAristot. Poet. 21. elevate and make it ornate; for departure from the ordinary makes it appear more dignified. In this respect men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to foreigners and fellow-citizens. +

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Wherefore we should give our language a foreignIt is impossible to find a satisfactory English equivalent for the terms ξένος, ξενικός, τὸ ξενίζον, as applied to style. Foreign does not really convey the idea, which is rather that of something opposed to home-like,—out-of-the-way, as if from abroad. Jebb suggests distinctive. air; for men admire what is remote, and that which excites admiration is pleasant. In poetry many things conduce to this and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and persons spoken of are more out of the common. But in prose such methods are appropriate in much fewer instances, for the subject is less elevated; and even in poetry, if fine language were used by a slave or a very young man, or about quite unimportant matters, it would be hardly becoming; for even here due proportion consists in contraction and amplification as the subject requires. +

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Wherefore those who practise this artifice must conceal it and avoid the appearance of speaking artificially instead of naturally; for that which is natural persuades, but the artificial does not. For men become suspicious of one whom they think to be laying a trap for them, as they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with the voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of the rest of the actors; for his seemed to be the voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of someone else. +

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Art is cleverly concealed when the speaker chooses his words from ordinary languageCp. Hor. AP. 46, where it is said that the choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in making an old word new by clever combination (callida iunctura) being especially praised. and puts them together like Euripides, who was the first to show the way.

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Nouns and verbs being the components of speech, and nouns being of the different kinds which have been considered in the Poetics, of these we should use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely and in few places. We will state laterChaps. 3 and 7. in what places they should be used; +

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the reason for this has already been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great a departure from suitable language. Proper and appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be employed in the style of prose; this is shown by the fact that no one employs anything but these. For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as proper and appropriate words; wherefore it is clear that, if a speaker manages well, there will be some thing foreign about his speech, while possibly the art may not be detected, and his meaning will be clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of rhetorical language. +

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(In regard to nouns, homonyms are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid that he employs captious arguments, and synonyms to the poet. Instances of words that are both proper and synonymous are going and walking: for these two words are proper and have the same meaning.)This is a parenthetical note.

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It has already been stated, as we have said, in the Poetics,Aristot. Poet. 21, 22. what each of these thingsThe different kinds of words. is, how many kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose. +

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But the orator must devote the greater attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learnt from anyone else;Aristot. Poet. 22.9: for this alone cannot be borrowed from another. +

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but we must make use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate. This will be secured by observing due proportion; otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one; +

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for the same garment is not suitable for both. And if we wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our metaphor from the better species under the same genus; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to say (for you have two opposites belonging to the same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that the man who prays begs (for both are forms of asking)Begging (as a beggar does) and praying (as a priest might) are both forms of asking, and by substituting one for the other, you can amplify or depreciate. is an instance of doing this; as, when IphicratesSee 1.7.32. called CalliasHead of a distinguished Athenian family which held the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A man of notoriously dissipated character, he took some part in politics. a mendicant priest instead of a torch-bearer, Callias replied that Iphicrates himself could not be initiated, otherwise he would not have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearerThe δᾳδοῦχος or hereditary torch-bearer ranked next to the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to holding the torch during the sacrifices, he took part in the recitation of the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The μητραγύρται or mendicant priests collected alms on behalf of various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence their name). They included both men and women of profligate character, addicted to every kind of lewdness.; both titles indeed have to do with a divinity, but the one is honorable, the other dishonorable. And some call actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they call themselves artists. Both these names are metaphors, but the one is a term of abuse, the other the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves purveyorsCf. ‘convey’ the wise it call (Merry Wives, I. iii.). Either the euphemistic or unfavorable application of the term may be adopted.; and so it is allowable to say that the man who has committed a crime has made a mistake, that the man who has made a mistake is guilty of crime, and that one who has committed a theft has either taken or ravaged. The saying in the Telephus of Euripides, Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia, is inappropriate, because the word ruling exceeds the dignity of the subject, and so the artifice can be seen. +

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Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not express an agreeable sound; for instance, Dionysius the BrazenAccording to Athenaeus, p. 669, he was a poet and rhetorician who recommended the Athenians to use bronze money. in his elegiacs speaks of poetry as the scream of Calliope; both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because the sounds have no meaning.A scream is neither articulate nor agreeable, like the sound of poetry, although both are voices or sound, and to that extent the metaphor is correct.

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Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin, as in the famous enigma, I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another. There was no name for what took place, but as in both cases there is a kind of application, he called the application of the cupping-glass gluing.Athenaeus, p. 452. And, generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference is clever. +

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Metaphors should also be derived from things that are beautiful, the beauty of a word consisting, as Licymnius says, in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. There is a third condition, which refutes the sophistical argument; for it is not the case, as BrysonRhetorician and sophist of Heraclea in Pontus. said, that no one ever uses foul language, if the meaning is the same whether this or that word is used; this is false; for one word is more proper than another, more of a likeness, and better suited to putting the matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that does not signify a thing under the same conditions; thus for this reason also it must be admitted that one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both, indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair or foul; or if they do, it is in a greater or less degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does make a difference, for instance, whether one says rosy-fingered morn, rather than purple-fingered, or, what is still worse, red-fingered.

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As for epithets, they may be applied from what is vile or disgraceful, for instance, the matricide, or from what is more honorable, for instance, the avenger of his father.Eur. Orest. 1588. In the preceding line Menelaus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to heap murder on murder, to which Orestes replies, you should rather call me the avenger of my father Agamemnon, who had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother of Orestes. Matricide and avenger of his father show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes. When the winner in a mule-race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to write on half-asses; but when he gave him a sufficient amount, he wrote, Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds!Frag. 7 (P.L.G. 3, p. 39O). The winner of the mule race was Anaxilaus of Rhegium. and yet they were also the daughters of asses. Further, the use of diminutives amounts to the same. +

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It is the diminutive which makes the good and the bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the Babylonians jestingly uses goldlet, cloaklet, affrontlet, diseaselet instead of gold, cloak, affront, disease. But one must be careful to observe the due mean in their use as well as in that of epithets.

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Frigidity of style arises from four causes: first, the use of compound words, as when LycophronA sophist, not the poet (author of the obscure Alexander or Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle. speaks of the many-faced sky of the mighty-topped earth, narrow-passaged shore; and Gorgias of a begging-poet flatterer, those who commit perjury and those who swear right solemnly.Lobeck conjectured κατεπιορκήσαντας, who commit out-and-out perjury. And as Alcidamas says, the soul full of anger and the face fire-colored, he thought that their zeal would be end-accomplishing, he made persuasive words end-accomplishing, and the azure-colored floor of the sea, for all these appear poetical because they are compound.

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This is one cause of frigidity; another is the use of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes a monster of a man, Sciron a human scourgeSciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus, by Lycophron turns Sinnis into a γλῶττα, using it adjectivally = destructive; cf. σῖνος, harm; σίντης = σίννις.; and Alcidamas says plaything in poetry, the audaciousness of nature, whetted with unmitigated wrath of thought.

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A third cause is the use of epithets that are either long or unseasonable or too crowded; thus, in poetry it is appropriate to speak of white milk, but in prose it is less so; and if epithets are employed to excess, they reveal the art and make it evident that it is poetry. And yet such may be used to a certain extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary and gives a foreign air. But one must aim at the mean, for neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random; for a random style lacks merit, but excess is vicious. That is why the style of Alcidamas appears frigid; for he uses epithets not as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so crowded, so long, and so glaring are they. For instance, he does not say sweat but damp sweat; not to the Isthmian games but to the solemn assembly of the Isthmian games; not laws, but the laws, the rulers of states; not running, but with a race-like impulse of the soul; not museum, but having taken up the museum of natureThe meaning of παραλαβών is quite obscure: various renderings are having taken to himself, received, grasped, inherited. The word μουσεῖον, originally a haunt of the Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature. The fault appears to consist in the addition of τῆς φύσεως, but it is difficult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to understand the passage. Jebb translates: he does not say, ‘having taken to himself a school of the Muses,’ but ‘to Nature's school of the Muses.’; and the scowling anxiety of the soul; creator, not of favor, but all-popular favor; and dispenser of the pleasure of the hearers; he hid, not with branches, but with the branches of the forest; he covered, not his body, but the nakedness of his body. He also calls desire counter-initiative of the soul—an expression which is at once compound and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry—and the excess of his depravity so beyond all bounds. Hence those who employ poetic language by their lack of taste make the style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter produces obscurity; for when words are piled upon one who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by a cloud of verbiage. People use compound words, when a thing has no name and the word is easy to combine, as χρονοτριβεῖν, to pass time; but if the practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical. This is why compound words are especially employed by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise; strange words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and self-assertion; metaphor to writers of iambics, who now employ them, as we have stated.

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The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous—for the comic poets also employ them—others because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic; and if they are farfetched, they are obscure, as when Gorgias says: Affairs pale and bloodlessOn this passage Thompson (Gorgias, p. 179) says: The metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere commonplace . . . but ‘pallid and bloodless affairs’ is a phrase which would need apology even from a modern. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what objection there is to calling the Odyssey a beautiful mirror of human life. Another reading is ἔναιμα, which Cope translates events fresh with the blood in them. If the two extracts are taken together, it is suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope's notes) that the sense may be: things green and unripe (flushed with sap), and this was the crop which you . . ., the adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn.; you have sown shame and reaped misfortune; for this is too much like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy a bulwark of the laws,Or, a barrier against the laws. This is the general meaning of ἐπιτείχισμα, a border fortress commanding an enemy's country. and the Odyssey a beautiful mirror of human life, and introducing no such plaything in poetry. All these expressions fail to produce persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow which, flying over his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best tragic style. He exclaimed, Fie, for shame, Philomela!; for there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was, not as she is.

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The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. When the poet says of Achilles,Compare Hom. Il. 22.164 ἐνάντιον ὦρτο λεὼν ὥς. he rushed on like a lion, it is a simile; if he says, a lion, he rushed on, it is a metaphor; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion. +

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The simile is also useful in prose, but should be less frequently used, for there is something poetical about it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only differ in the manner stated. +

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The following are examples of similes. AndrotionPupil of Isocrates and historical writer. Idrieus was a prince of Caria, who had been imprisoned. said of Idrieus that he was like curs just unchained; for as they attack and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was dangerous. Again, Theodamas likened Archidamus to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by proportion;Meaning that there was no difference between Euxenus without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus with a knowledge of geometry. The proportion of geometrical knowledge will remain the same, so that Archidamus can be called an ungeometrical Euxenus, and Euxenus a geometrical Archidamus (see 4.4, note for by proportion). for Euxenus will be Archidamus acquainted with geometry. Again, Plato in the RepublicPlat. Rep. 469d. compares those who strip the dead to curs, which bite stones, but do not touch those who throw them; he also says that the people is like a ship's captain who is vigorous, but rather deaf;Plat. Rep. 488a. that poets' verses resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty;Plat. Rep. 601b. for neither the one after they have lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been broken up,If metrical restrictions have been removed and they are read as prose. appear the same as before. Pericles said that the Samians were like children who cry while they accept the scraps.Meaning that they did not appreciate the benefits received from the Athenians, who conquered the islands (440 B.C.). He also compared the Boeotians to holm-oaks; for just as these are beaten down by knocking against each other,Or, are cut down by axes, the handles of which are made of their own wood. so are the Boeotians by their civil strife. Demosthenes compared the people to passengers who are seasick.It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the orator or the Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of the comparison is that in a democracy the general instability of political conditions makes the people sick of the existing state of things and eager for a change. Democrates said that orators resembled nurses who gulp down the morsel and rub the babies' lips with the spittle.Aristoph. Kn. 715-718. Antisthenes likened the skinny Cephisodotus to incense, for he also gives pleasure by wasting away. All such expressions may be used as similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes which are metaphors without the details. +

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But in all cases the metaphor from proportion should be reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things of the same genus; for instance, if the goblet is the shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be called the goblet of Ares.As the shield is to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus. Proportion is defined (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 5.3.8) as an equality of ratios, implying four terms at the least, and the proportional metaphor is one in which the second term is to the first as the fourth is to the third; for then one can by metaphor substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield. Then by the definition, the goblet is to Dionysus as the shield is to Ares. The metaphor consists in transferring to the goblet the name belonging to its analogue the shield. Sometimes an addition is made by way of explanation of the word in its new sense, and the goblet may be described as the shield of Dionysus and the shield as the goblet of Ares. The shield and the goblet both come under the same genus, being characteristics of a deity, and can therefore be reciprocally transferred (Aristot. Poet. 21.4).

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Such then are the elements of speech. But purity, which is the foundation of style, depends upon five rules. +

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First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order, before or after, as they require; thus, μέν and ἐγὼ μέν require to be followed by δέ and ὁ δέ. Further, they should be made to correspond whilst the hearer still recollects; they should not be put too far apart, nor should a clause be introduced before the necessary connectionThe apodosis. ἀποδιδόναι is used in the sense of introducing a clause answering to the πρότασις, and ἀπόδοσις for this answering clause.; for this is rarely appropriate. For instance, As for me, I, after he had told me—for Cleon came begging and praying—set out, taking them with me. For in this phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between I and set out is too great, the result is obscurity. +

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The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of connecting particles; the second, to employ special, not generic terms. +

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The third consists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles.Of Agrigentum (c. 490-430), poet, philosopher, and physician. Among other legends connected with him, he is said to have thrown himself into the crater of Etna, so that by suddenly disappearing he might be thought to be a god. His chief work was a poem called Nature, praised by Lucretius. The principles of things are the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, which are unalterable and indestructible. Love and hate, alternately prevailing, regulate the periods of the formation of the world. The existing fragments corroborate Aristotle's statement. For the long circumlocution takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the soothsayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent; for example, Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty dominion.Hdt. 1.53, Hdt. 1.91. Croesus consulted the Delphian oracle whether he should attack Cyrus the Persian or not. Encouraged by the ambiguous oracle, he did so, but was utterly defeated. And as there is less chance of making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general terms on the question of fact; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right if he says even or odd than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says it will be than if he states when. This is why soothsayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason.The deliberate intention to mislead. +

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The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter,σκεύη, inanimate things, the classification probably being male, female, and inanimate, not the grammatical one of masculine, feminine, and neuter. as laid down by Protagoras; these also must be properly introduced: +

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She, having come (fem.) and having conversed (fem.) with me, went away. The fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are referred to: They, having come (pl.), began to beat (pl.) me.

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Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number of connecting particles, or when the punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus.Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475). His chief work was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and the carelessness of his style he was called ὁ σκοτεινός (the obscure). According to him, fire was the origin of all things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes all other things. All things are in a constant state of flux; all is the same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded upon sensual perception, but only the gods possess knowledge in perfection. For it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says: Of this reason which existsOr, although this reason exists for ever men are born . . . without understanding (Welldon). always men are ignorant, where it is uncertain whether always should go with which exists or with are ignorant. +

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Further, a solecism results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which is equally suitable to both. For instance, in speaking of sound and color, the word seeing should not be used, for it is not suitable to both, whereas perceiving is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of details in the middle; for instance, if you say: I intended after having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out instead of I intended to set out after having spoken to him, and then this or that happened, in this or that manner.

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The following rules contribute to loftiness of style. Use of the description instead of the name of a thing; for instance, do not say circle, but a plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant from the center. But for the purpose of conciseness the reverse—use the name instead of the description. +

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You should do the same to express anything foul or indecent; if the foulness is in the description, use the name; if in the name, the description. +

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Use metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, taking care, however, to avoid what is too poetical. +

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Use the plural for the singular, after the manner of the poets, who, although there is only one harbor, say to Achaean harbors, and, Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet.Eur. IT 727. +

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You should avoid linking up, but each word should have its own article: τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας. But for conciseness, the reverse: τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός. +

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Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit it, but avoid destroying the connection; for instance having gone and having conversed with him, or, having gone, I conversed with him. +

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Also the practice of Antimachus is useful, that of describing a thing by the qualities it does not possess; thus, in speaking of the hill Teumessus,In Boeotia. The quotation is from the <placeName key="tgn,4011135">Thebaid</placeName> of Antimachus of Claros (c. 450 B.C.). The Alexandrians placed him next to Homer among the epic poets. In his eulogy of the little hill, he went on to attribute to it all the good qualities it did not possess, a process which could obviously be carried on ad infinitum. he says, There is a little windswept hill; for in this way amplification may be carried on ad infinitum. This method may be applied to things good and bad, in whichever way it may be useful. Poets also make use of this in inventing words, as a melody without strings or without the lyre; for they employ epithets from negations, a course which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a melody without the lyre.

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Propriety of style will be obtained by the expression of emotion and character, and by proportion to the subject matter. +

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Style is proportionate to the subject matter when neither weighty matters are treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity, and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary word; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy, as in the poetry of Cleophon,By some identified with the tragic poet spoken of in Aristot. Poet. 2. His manner of expression, due to the wish to use fine language, was ridiculous owing to its being out of harmony with the subject. Others consider that he was not a poet at all but an orator. πότνια was a title of respect, applied to females, whether they were goddesses or ordinary women. who used certain expressions that reminded one of saying madam fig. +

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Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks with anger of wanton outrage; with indignation and reserve, even in mentioning them, of things foul or impious; with admiration of things praiseworthy; with lowliness of things pitiable; and so in all other cases. +

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Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is imposed uponOr, draws a wrong conclusion. under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. +

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This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise.

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Character also may be expressed by the proof from signs, because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age—child, man, or old man; to sex—man or woman; to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I call habits those moral states which form a man's character in life; +

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for not all habits do this. If then anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit, he will represent the character; for the uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated. But the hearers also are impressed in a certain way by a device employed ad nauseam by writers of speeches:Alluding to Isocrates. Who does not know? Everybody knows; for the hearer agrees, because he is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge.

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The opportune or inopportune use of these devices applies to all kinds of Rhetoric.Or, to all the special rules given above. +

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But whenever one has gone too far, the remedy may be found in the common piece of advice—that he should rebuke himself in advance;The exaggeration should be brought forward first, by way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied by some limiting phrase. Quintilian (Quint. Inst. Orat. 8.3.37) gives as examples: so to say, if I may be allowed to say so. then the excess seems true, since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing. +

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Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of correspondenceAdaptation of voice, features, etc., to the subject. together; for in this manner the hearer is deceived. I mean, for instance, if the language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things connected should not be equally harsh; otherwise what each really is becomes evident. But if you do this in one instance and not in another, the art escapes notice, although the result is the same. If mild sentiments are harshly expressed or harsh sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.

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Compound words, a number of epithets, and foreign words especially, are appropriate to an emotional speaker; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil high-as-heaven or stupendous. He may do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of his PanegyricusIsoc. 4.186, where μνήμη is the reading, translated name above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the Mss. of Aristotle give γνώμην here, which shows that it is a misquotation.: Oh, the fame and the name! and In that they endured. For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry; for there is something inspired in poetry. It should therefore be used either in this way or when speaking ironically, after the manner of Gorgias, or of Plato in the Phaedrus.Plat. Phaedrus 238d, Plat. Phaedrus 241e. In the first of these passages Socrates attributes his unusual flow of words to the inspiration of the nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to be in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into dithyrambs. An example of the irony (a term implying a certain amount of contempt (2.2.25)) of Gorgias is given in Aristot. Pol. 3.1. When asked how a person comes to be a citizen, he answers: as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by artisans ( δημιουργούς); for some of these were Larissa-makers ( λαρισοποιούς). There is a play on the double meaning of δημιουργός, (1) artisan, (2) magistrate, lit. people-maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans in such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of Larissa itself. It has also been suggested that λαρισοποιούς may mean kettle-makers, from λάρισα a kettle, so called from having been first made at Larissa, but this seems unnecessary. The point is that Gorgias maintained that all were citizens who were made so by the magistrates, that citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L. Newman's note on the passage, and W. H. Thompson's Appendix to his edition of Plato's Gorgias).

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The form of diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it distracts the hearer's attention, since it sets him on the watch for the recurrence of such and such a cadence; just as, when the public criers ask, Whom does the emancipatedHe did not generally possess full rights of citizenship. The point of the illustration is that the hearer looks for the cadence just as confidently as, when a freedman is asked what patron he selects, every one expects him to say Cleon. choose for his patron? the children shout Cleon. +

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If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited (but not by meter); for that which is unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which the meters are divisions.Bywater's emendation for τμητά of the Mss. Aristotle seems to be referring to the Pythagorean theory that number is the regulating force in all things, and in giving shape to language number is rhythm, which reduces a formless mass of words to order. +

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Wherefore prose must be rhythmical, but not metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried out, but only up to a certain point.

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Of the different rhythms the heroic is dignified, but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation; the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore of all meters it is most used in common speech; but speech should be dignified and calculated to rouse the hearer. The trochaic is too much like the cordax; this is clear from the tetrameters, which form a tripping rhythm. There remains the paean, used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasymachus, although they could not define it.

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The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related to those already mentioned; for its proportion is 3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with both of which the paean, whose proportion is 1 1/2 to 1, is connected.The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees, and anapests) is as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one long; trochaic and iambic 2 to 1 on the same principle; paean, 3 to 2 (three shorts and one long), being the mean between the other two. +

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All the other meters then are to be disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because they are metrical; but the paean should be retained, because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that it is most likely to be undetected. +

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At the present day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the beginning as well as at the end;Understanding καὶ τελευτῶντες. the end, however, ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with three short: Δα¯λο˘γε˘νε˘ς εἴτε Λυ˘κι˘αν, (O Delos-born, or it may be Lycia), and Χρυ¯σε˘ο˘κό˘μα¯ Ἕ˘κα˘τε˘ παῖ Διό˘ς (Golden-haired far-darter, son of Zeus). The other on the contrary begins with three short syllables and ends with one long one: με˘τὰ˘ δε˘ γᾶν ὕ˘δα˘τά˘ τʼ ὠκε˘α˘νὸν ἠφά˘νι˘σε˘νύξAll three attributed to Simonides (Frag. 26 B: P.L.G.). (after earth and waters, night obscured ocean). This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period should be broken off by a long syllable and the end should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor by a punctuation mark,A dash below the first word of a line, indicating the end of a sentence. but by the rhythm itself. +

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That the style should be rhythmical and not unrhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrangement of them make it of this character, has now been sufficiently shown.

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The style must be either continuous and united by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic preludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient poets. The continuous style is the ancient one; for example, +

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This is the exposition of the investigation of Herodotus of Thurii. It was formerly used by all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous style I mean that which has no end in itself and only stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant, because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in sight. That explains why runners, just when they have reached the goal,καμπτῆρες, properly the turning-point of the δίαυλος or double course, is here used for the goal itself. lose their breath and strength, whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show no signs of fatigue. +

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Such is the continuous style. The other style consists of periods, and by period I mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped. What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something for himself and that some conclusion has been reached; whereas it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that the periodic style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember; that explains why all learn verse with greater facility than prose,τῶν χύδην: lit. what is poured fourth promiscuously: in flowing, unfettered language (Liddell and Scott). for it has number by which it can be measured. +

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But the period must be completed with the sense and not stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,Really from the Meleager of Euripides, Frag. 515 (T.G.F.). The break in the sense comes after γαῖα, Πελοπίας χθονός really belonging to the next line: ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πέδιʼ ἔχουσʼ εὐδαίμονα. As it stands in the text, the line implies that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was not. The meaning then is: This is the land of Calydon, with its fertile plains in the country over against Peloponnesus (on the opposite side of the strait, near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf). This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops; for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

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A period may be composed of clauses, or simple. The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when it is taken as a whole.It does not consist in simply dividing off any words from the context as the speaker pleases, but the parts of the sentence as a whole are properly constructed and distinguished and the sense also is complete. By clause I mean one of the two parts of this period, and by a simple period one that consists of only one clause. +

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But neither clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long. If too short, they often make the hearer stumble; for when he is hurrying on towards the measure of which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind those who are walking with them. Similarly long periods assume the proportions of a speech and resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to what Democritus of ChiosA well-known musician. jokingly rebuked in Melanippides,Of Melos. He wrote rambling dithyrambic preludes without strophic correspondence. Others take ἀναβολή to mean an entire ode. who instead of antistrophes composed dithyrambic preludes: A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another, and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it;Hes. WD 265. The second line is a parody of 266, ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη. for these verses may be applied to those who employ long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short, they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself is carried away headlong.

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The clauses of the periodic style are divided or opposed; divided, as in the following sentence: I have often wondered at those who gathered together the general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic contests;The beginning of Isoc. 4. opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another, or the same word is coupled with both contraries; for instance, They were useful to both, both those who stayed and those who followed; for the latter they gained in addition greater possessions than they had at home, for the former they left what was sufficient in their own country. Here staying behind, following, sufficient, more are contraries. Again: to those who need money and those who wish to enjoy it; where enjoying is contrary to acquiring. Again: It often happens in these vicissitudes that the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed: At once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valor and not long after won the command of the sea: To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging through Athos: And that, though citizens by nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship by law: For some of them perished miserably, others saved themselves disgracefully: Privately to employ barbarians as servants,To dwell with us (Jebb). The point seems to be that the barbarian domestics were in a comfortable position as compared with those of the allies who were reduced to slavery; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting public life indifference was shown. but publicly to view with indifference many of the allies reduced to slavery: Either to possess it while living or to leave it behind when dead.All the above quotations are from Isoc. 4.1, 35, 41, 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations. The last quotation is part of the sentence of which the beginning appears in 7.11 above. The whole runs: And how great must we consider the fame and the name and the glory which those who have highly distinguished themselves in such deeds of valor will either have when living or will leave behind after their death. And what some one said against Pitholaus and LycophronThey murdered Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being instigated by their sister, his wife. Nothing is known of the case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is: When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves, but now they have come to buy you (referring to bribery in court). Others take ὠνεῖσθαι in a passive sense: they have been bought, i.e. have had to sell themselves to you. in the lawcourt: These men, who used to sell you when they were at home, having come to you have bought you. All these passages are examples of antithesis. +

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This kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily understood and even more so when placed side by side, and also because antithesis resembles a syllogism; for refutation is a bringing together of contraries.

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Such then is the nature of antithesis; equality of clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At the beginning the similarity is always shown in entire words; at the end, in the last syllables, or the inflections of one and the same word, or the repetition of the same word. For instance, at the beginning: Ἀγρὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρʼ αὐτοῦ,Aristoph. frag. 649 (Kock, Com. Att. Frag. 1.1880). for he received from him land untilled; δωρητοί τʼ ἐπέλοντο παράρρητοί τʼ ἐπέεσσιν,Hom. Il. 9.526. they were ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words; at the end: ᾠήθησαν αὐτὸν παιδίον τετοκέναι, ἀλλʼ αὐτοῦ αἴτιον γεγονέναι,The text is obviously corrupt. they thought that he was the father of a child, but that he was the cause of it; ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν, in the greatest anxiety and the smallest hopes. Inflections of the same word: ἄξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ, worthy of a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing. Repetition of a word: σὺ δʼ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς, while he lived you spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him. Resemblance of one syllable: τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρʼ εἶδες ἀργόν, what ill would you have suffered, if you had seen an idle man? All these figures may be found in the same sentence at once— antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of endings. In the TheodecteaSee Introduction. nearly all the beginningsRoemer's text has ἀρεταί (excellences). of periods have been enumerated. +

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There are also false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus: τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγὼν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοις ἐγών, at one time I was in their house, at another I was with them.There is no real antithesis, the sense of both clauses being the same.

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Having settled these questions, we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They are produced either by natural genius or by practice; to show what they are is the function of this inquiry. +

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Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting-point be the following. Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when HomerHom. Od. 24.213 ἀλλʼ ἔμπης καλάμην γέ σʼ ὀΐμαι εἰσορόωντα γιγνώσκειν. The words are those of Odysseus, whom Athene had changed into an old beggar, to Eumaeus, his faithful swineherd, in whose house he was staying unrecognized. calls old age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the genus; for both have lost their bloom. +

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The similes of the poets also have the same effect; wherefore, if they are well constructed, an impression of smartness is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word,προσθέσει: the addition of the particle of comparison ὡς. προθέσει (the reading of the Paris ms.) would mean, (1) manner of setting forth (Cope), or (2) a metaphor, with a preface (Jebb) (but the meaning of this is not clear). The simile only says that one thing resembles another, not, like the metaphor, that it is another; since the speaker does not say this, the result is that the mind of the hearer does not go into the matter, and so the chance of instruction, of acquiring some information, is lost. wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this is that, so that the mind does not even examine this. +

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Of necessity, therefore, all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which, when stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated, or those of which the meaning, although not clear at first, comes a little later; for from the latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the other.The meaning is: the two kinds of enthymemes mentioned last do convey some information, whereas the superficial enthymemes teach nothing, either at once, or a little later, when reflection has made the meaning clear.

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In regard to the meaning of what is said, then, such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popularity of form is due to antithetical statement; for instance, accounting the peace that all shared to be a war against their private interests,Isoc. 5.73. where war is opposed to peace; +

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as to words, they are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at a glance, nor superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer; further, if they set things before the eyes; for we ought to see what is being done rather than what is going to be done. We ought therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, antithesis, actuality.

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Of the four kinds of metaphorIn Aristot. Poet. 21 metaphor and its four classes are defined: Metaphor consists in assigning to a thing the name of something else; and this may take place either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or proportionally. An instance of a metaphor from genus to species is ‘here stands my ship,’ for ‘standing’ is a genus, ‘being moored’ a species; from species to genus: ‘Odysseus truly has wrought a myriad good deeds,’ for ‘myriad’ is a specific large number, used for the generic ‘multitude’; from species to species: ‘having drawn off the life with the bronze’ and ‘having cut it with the unyielding bronze,’ where ‘drawn off’ is used in the sense of ‘cut,’ and ‘cut’ in the sense of ‘drawn off,’ both being species of ‘taking away.’ For the proportional metaphor see note on 4.4 above. the most popular are those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that the youth that had perished during the war had disappeared from the State as if the year had lost its springtime.1.7.34. Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, said that he would not let the Athenians stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes. When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat, he was trying to get his accounts examinedεὔθυνα was the technical term for the examination of accounts to which all public officers had to submit when their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were both Athenian generals. Having the people by the throat may refer to the condition of Athens financially and his unsatisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase εἰς πνῖγμα τὸν δῆμον ἔχοντα is objected to by Cope, who reads ἀγαγόντα and translates: that he drove the people into a fit of choking by his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny in this way, i.e. he tried to force his accounts down their throats, and nearly choked them. Another reading suggested is ἄγχοντα (throttling so as to choke).; on another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to set out for Euboea without delay and provision themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades.This may refer to a decree of Miltiades which was so speedily carried out that it became proverbial. The expedition was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes. After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly declared that they had deprived themselves of provisions for the war.By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians had deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and plundering a weak maritime city, and so securing provisions for the war. The word ἐφόδια properly means provisions for a journey and travelling expenses. Pitholaus called the ParalusThe Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred galleys which conveyed state prisoners. the bludgeon of the people, and Sestos the corn-chestIt commanded the trade of the Euxine. of the Piraeus. Pericles recommended that Aegina, the eyesore of the Piraeus, should be removed. Moerocles, mentioning a very respectable person by name, declared that he was as much a scoundrel as himself; for whereas that honest man played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was satisfied with 10 per cent.Moerocles was a contemporary of Demosthenes, and an anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The degree of the respectability (or rather, the swindling practices) of each is calculated by their respective profits. And the iambic of Anaxandrides,Poet of the Middle Comedy: Frag. 68 (Kock, Com. Att. Frag. 2.). The metaphor in ὑπερήμενοι is from those who failed to keep the term of payment of a fine or debt. Cope translates: I find ( μοι) the young ladies are . . . on girls who were slow to marry, My daughters are past the time of marriage. And the saying of PolyeuctusAthenian orator, contemporary of Demosthenes upon a certain paralytic named Speusippus, that he could not keep quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five-holed pillory of disease. Cephisodotus called the triremes parti-colored mills,As grinding down the tributary states. They differed from ordinary mills in being gaily painted. and [Diogenes] the Cynic used to say that the tavernsContrasted with the Spartan messes, which were of a plain and simple character, at which all the citizens dined together. The tavern orgies, according to Diogenes, represented these at Athens. were the messes of Attica. AesionAthenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes. used to say that they had drained the State into Sicily,Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition. which is a metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His words so that Greece uttered a cry are also in a manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again, as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not to hold their concourses too often; and in the same way Isocrates, who spoke of those who rush together in the assemblies.Isoc. 5.12. Both συνδρομάς and συντρέχοντας refer to the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement. And as Lysias says in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along with their valor. If the speaker had said that it was fitting that Greece should weep, her valor being buried with them, it would have been a metaphor and a vivid one, whereas freedom by the side of valor produces a kind of antithesis. And as Iphicrates said, The path of my words leads through the center of the deeds of Chares; here the metaphor is proportional and the words through the center create vividness. Also, to say that one calls upon dangers to help against dangers is a vivid metaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias said, not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of his statue of bronze,The statue of Chabrias, erected after one of his victories, represented him as kneeling on the ground, the position which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when awaiting the enemy. The statue was in the agora and could be seen from the court. Lycoleon points to it, and bases his appeal on its suppliant attitude. a metaphor for the moment, not for all time, but still vivid; for when Chabrias is in danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done for the State. And in every way studying poorness of spirit,Isoc. 4.151. for studying a thing implies to increase it.Metaphor from species to genus (10.7, first note.), studying being a species of increasing. As a rule one studies to increase some good quality, not a bad one. And that reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul, for both the words reason and light make something clear. For we do not put an end to wars, but put them off,Isoc. 4.172. for both ideas refer to the future—putting off and a peace of such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that such a treaty is a trophy far more splendid than those gained in war; for the latter are raised in memory of trifling advantages and a single favor of fortune, but the former commemorates the end of the whole war;Isoc. 4.180 (apparently from memory). for both treaty and trophy are signs of victory. Again, that cities also render a heavy account to the censure of men; for rendering an accountεὔθυνα (see 10.7, third note) further implies the punishment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts. is a sort of just punishment.

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We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of before the eyes, and what must be done to produce this. +

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I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For instance, to say that a good man is four-squareSimonides, frag. 5 (P.L.G. 2.). Both a good man and a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not express actuality. is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the phrase does not express actuality, whereas of one having the prime of his life in full bloomIsoc. 5.10. does; similarly, thee, like a sacred animal ranging at willIsoc. 5.127. This speech is an appeal to Philip to lead the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip could claim the whole of Greece as his fatherland, while other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates calls the author of Philip's line) were tied down and their outlook narrowed by the laws and constitution of the city in which they dwelt. expresses actuality, and in Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feetEur. IA 80, with δορί for ποσίν. the word shooting contains both actuality and metaphor. +

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And as Homer often, by making use of metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate; and it is to creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the following examples: Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.Hom. Od. 11.598, with ἔπειτα πέδονδε for ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε. The arrow flew.Hom. Il. 13.587. [The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd].Hom. Il. 4.126. [The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take their fill of flesh.Hom. Il. 11.574. The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.Hom. Il. 15.541. . For in all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the objects are represented as animate: the shameless stone, the eager spear-point, and the rest express actuality. Homer has attached these attributes by the employment of the proportional metaphor; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is shamelessly treated. +

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In his popular similes also he proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things: Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind;Hom. Il. 13.799. The reference is to the boiling waves of the loud-roaring sea. for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality is movement.

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As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too obvious; just as, for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for the wronged betakes itself to one or the other. Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook hung up were identical; for both are the same sort of thing, but they differ in this—that one is hung up above and the other below.The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot hook is above, and the pot hangs down from it. And if one were to say the cities have been reduced to the same level, this amounts to the same in the case of things far apart—the equality of levelling in regard to superficies and resources.Cope, retaining ἀνωμαλίσθαι (as if from ἀνομαλίζειν, aequalitatem restituere Bonitz, cf. ἀνομάλωσις) says: the widely dissimilar things here compared are the areas of properties and the state offices and privileges, which are to be alike equalized, translating: And the re-equalization of cities, when the same principle is applied to things standing wide apart, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions, offices). ( ἀν- is not negative, but = re.) But the passage quoted by Victorius from Isoc. 5.40: for I know that all the cities of Greece have been placed on the same level ( ὡμαλίσθαι) by misfortunes suggests this as a preferable reading here, ὡμαλίσθαι meaning (1) have been levelled to the ground (although the Lexica give no instance of this use), (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.

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Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor, and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.προεξαπατᾶν. Or, reading προσεξαπατᾶν, by adding deception. For it becomes more evident to him that he has learnt something, when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to say, How true it is! but I missed it. And smart apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says, as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that the grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the ground.See 2.21.8. And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learnt, and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls novel expressions arise when what follows is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectation; just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter; for they are deceptive. These novelties occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance, the following verse does not finish as the hearer expected: And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains, whereas the hearer thought he was going to say sandals. This kind of joke must be clear from the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the word are produced, not by giving it the proper meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara, you are troubled ( θράττει); for while pretending to say something troubles you, he deceives us; for he means something else.According to Cope, Θρᾷττʼ εἶ, you are no better than a Thracian slave-girl. Therefore the joke is only agreeable to one who understands the point; for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he will not see any joke in it. +

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Similarly, you wish to destroy him ( πέρσαι).There is obviously a play on πέρσαι (aor. 1 infin. of πέρθω) and Πέρσαι (Persians), but no satisfactory interpretation of the joke has been suggested. Jokes of both these kindsThe paradoxical and verbal. Suitably may refer to the manner of delivery; to being used at the proper time; or to taking care that the word is one that may be used in the two senses. must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are such witticisms as saying that the empire of the sea was not the beginning of misfortunes for the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with Isocrates,Isoc. 5.61; Isoc. 8.101. The point in the illustrations lies in the use of ἀρχή, first in the sense of empire, then in that of beginning. It could be said that the empire of the sea was or was not the beginning of misfortunes for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to them, but in the end brought disaster, and thus was the beginning of evil. that empire was the beginning of misfortunes for the city; in both cases that which one would not have expected to be said is said, and recognized as true. For, in the second example, to say that empire is empire shows no cleverness, but this is not what he means, but something else; in the first, the ἀρχή which is negatived is used in a different sense. +

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In all these cases, success is attained when a word is appropriately applied, either by homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,Usually translated, There is no bearing Baring. there is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person. And, Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a stranger, or not more than you should be, which is the same thing. And again, The stranger must not always be a stranger, for here too the word repeated is taken in a different sense.Kock, C.A.F. 3.209, p. 448. In the two first examples stranger refers to a distant and reserved manner, as we say don't make yourself a stranger; in the third ξένος is apparently to be taken in the sense of alien. Cope translates: for that too is of a different kind (foreign, alien to the two others; ἀλλότριον, belonging to something or somebody else, opposed to οἰκεῖον). But the whole passage is obscure. It is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides, It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death;Kock, C.A.F. 2. Frag. 64, p. 163. for this is the same as saying that it is worthy to die when one does not deserve to die, or, that it is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death, or, when one does nothing that is worthy of death. +

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Now the form of expression of these sayings is the same; but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed, the greater is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly. +

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Further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial, it must always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, One ought to die guiltless of any offence, The worthy man should take a worthy woman to wife. There is no smartness in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled: It is worthy for a man to die, when he is not worthy of death. The more special qualities the expression possesses, the smarter it appears; for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality.

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Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner approved metaphors;Or, reading αἱ for ἀεὶ, approved similes are . . . since they always consist of two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. But such an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is.In the simple metaphor goblet is substituted for shield, but sometimes additions are made to the word as differently applied, such as of Ares and without strings. These additions, besides involving greater detail (a characteristic of the simile), distinctly bring out the contrast of the two terms and make a simile, whereas the metaphor simply transfers the meaning. +

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And similes may be formed as follows: a flute-player resembles an ape,In posture. a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp; for in both cases there is contraction.Contraction of eyelids and flame. +

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But they are excellent when there is a proportional metaphor; for it is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and a ruin to the rag of a house; to say that Niceratus is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with his hair uncut.Like Philoctetes on Lemnos after he had been bitten by the snake. It is herein that poets are especially condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed. I mean, for instance, when they introduce an answering clause:When the concluding corresponds with the introductory expression. This answering clause is called apodosis (5.2), not restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion of a conditional sentence. He carries his legs twisted like parsley, or again, Like Philammon punching the leather sack. All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has been often said, are metaphors of a kind.

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Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species. If a man, for instance, introduces into his house something from which he expects to benefit, but afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the CarpathianOr, he says it is a case of the Carpathian and the hare. An inhabitant of the island of Carpathus introduced a brace of hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all the crops and ruined the farmers (like the rabbits in Australia). says of the hare; for both have experienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and the reasons which make them so.

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Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all black and blue, you would have thought he was a basket of mulberries, because the black eye is something purple, but the great quantity constitutes the hyperbole. Again, when one says like this or that there is a hyperbole differing only in the wording: Like Philammon punching the leather sack, or, you would have thought that he was Philammon fighting the sack; Carrying his legs twisted like parsley, or, you would have thought that he had no legs, but parsley, they being so twisted. There is something youthful about hyperboles; +

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for they show vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion most frequently make use of them: Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as the sand and dust. . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.Hom. Il. 9.385. (Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole.This must be taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is Aristotle's at all.) WhereforeBecause they are boyish. it is unbecoming for elderly people to make use of them.

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But we must not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate; nor, in the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know how to write. +

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The style of written compositions is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional; this is why actors are always running after plays of this character, and poets after suitable actors. However, poets whose works are only meant for reading are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as a writer of speeches, and LicymniusSee 2.13 of this book. among dithyrambic poets. When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read. The reason is that they are only suitable to public debates; hence speeches suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For instance, asyndeta and frequent repetition of the same word are rightly disapproved in written speech, but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of them, for they lend themselves to acting.What follows, to the end of sect. 3, is of the nature of a parenthesis, not immediately connected with the subject of the chapter. +

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(But one must vary the expression when one repeats the same thing, for this as it were paves the way for declamation:The variation in the form of the expression suggests a similar variation in the form of the delivery or declamation. as, This is he who robbed you, this is he who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted to betray you. This is what Philemon the actor did in The Old Man's Folly of Anaxandrides, when he says Rhadamanthus and Palamedes, and when he repeats the word I in the prologue to The Pious.The meaning of this has not been satisfactorily explained. On the face of it, it seems to mean that the excellence of Philemon's delivery consisted in his way of declaiming passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon is not to be confused with the writer of the New Comedy, the rival and contemporary of Menander. For unless such expressions are varied by action, it is a case of the man who carries the beamUsed of a stiff, ungraceful speaker. in the proverb.)

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It is the same with asyndeta: I came, I met, I entreated. For here delivery is needed, and the words should not be pronounced with the same tone and character, as if there was only one clause. Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic; for in an equal space of time many things appear to be said, because the connecting particle makes many things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that the contrary will be the case, and that the one will become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces amplification: thus, in I came, I conversed, I besought, the hearer seems to be surveying many things, all that the speaker said.Spengel's reading here is: πολλὰ δοκεῖ· ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον, πολλὰ δοκεῖ being parenthetical, and ὑπερεῖδον ὅσα εἶπον part of the quotation. Jebb translates: I came, I spoke to him, I besought (these seem many things); he disregarded all I said (which certainly gives a more natural sense to ὑπερεῖδον). This also is Homer's intention in the passage Nireus, again, from Syme . . ., Nireus son of Aglaia . . ., Nireus, the most beautiful . . . ; Hom. Il. 2.671 ff. for it is necessary that one of whom much has been said should be often mentioned; if then the name is often mentioned, it seems as if much has been saidCope translates: they think that, if the name is often repeated, there must be a great deal to say about its owner; but can this be got out of the Greek ( εἰρῆσθαι)?; so that, by means of this fallacy, Homer has increased the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions him in one passage; he has perpetuated his memory, though he never speaks of him again.

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The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch,Intended to produce the effect of finished work at a distance before a large number of spectators. for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view; wherefore in both too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic style is more finished, and more so before a single judge, because there is least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it; there is no discussion,The meaning apparently is that there is no discussion, as might be the case when there were several judges, so that the decision is clear and unbiased. ἀγών and ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις are terms used for debate (e.g. in the law courts) and the style suited to it (cf sect. 1). Cope's editor refers to Cic. Ad Att. 1.16.8 remoto illo studio contentionis, quem vos [you Athenians] ἀγῶνα appellatis. Jebb translates: the turmoil is absent, so that the judgement is serene (in a note, unclouded). so the judgement is clear. This is why the same orators do not excel in all these styles; where action is most effective, there the style is least finished, and this is a case in which voice, especially a loud one, is needed.

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The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions, for its function is reading;This does not seem to agree with the general view. Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, for instance, were certainly meant to be spoken; but the ἔργον or proper function of an epideictic may be said to consist in reading, in its being agreeable to read. Its τέλος or end is to be read. +

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and next to it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to make the further distinction that style should be pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates moral virtue? For it is evident that, if virtue of style has been correctly defined, what we have said will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate? If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be clear; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable. What we have said will make the style pleasant, if it contains a happy mixture of proper and foreign words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting from propriety. This finishes what we had to say about style; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in general, and of each of them in particular. It only remains to speak of arrangement.

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A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it. +

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The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the proof, a similar division to that of problem and demonstration. +

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But the division now generally made is absurd; for narrative only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refutation; or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches?The generally accepted divisions are: προοίμιον (exordium), διήγησις (narrative), πίστις (proof), ἐπίλογος (peroration). ( διήγησις is a species of πρόθεσις, which is used instead of it just before.) Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the forensic speech which requires a regular διήγησις, a full and detailed statement of what has happened before. In epideictic and demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the object of which is to prove something, there is no need of another existing division called the refutation of the adversary, and in the demonstrative there can be no room for an epilogue, which is not a summary of proofs and arguments. Thus the necessary divisions of a speech are really only two; πρόθεσις and πίστις, or at most four. In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, comparison, and recapitulation are only admissible when there is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation and defence are often found in deliberative, but not qua deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue does not even belong to every forensic speech, for instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to recollect; for in the epilogue what happens is that there is a reduction of length.i.e. its use is to recall the main facts briefly (sect. 4 end), which in a short speech is needless.

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So then the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech, and at the most the parts are four in number—exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of an opponent is part of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case, and therefore also part of the proofs; for he who does this proves something, whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory. +

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Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions we shall be following TheodorusPlat. Phaedrus 266d, where the additional kinds of narrative are omitted, and their place taken by πίστωσις and ἐπιπίστωσις (confirmation of the proof). and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative, refutation and additional refutation. But one must only adopt a name to express a distinct species or a real difference; otherwise, it becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced by Licymnius in his Art, where he speaks of being wafted along, wandering from the subject,Or, diverting the judge's attention. and ramifications.

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The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving the way for what follows. The prelude resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches; for as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so also in epideictic speeches should be the composition of the exordium; the speaker should say at once whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject. And all do this, an example being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates; for the eristics and Helen have nothing in common.The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but Isocrates took the opportunity of attacking the sophists. This exemplifies his skill in the introduction of matter not strictly proper to, or in common with, the subject. The key-note is Helen; but the exordium is an attack on the Eristics, with special allusion to the Cynics and the Megarians. At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from the point, this is more appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous.

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In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the Olympiacus, says, Men of Greece, you are worthy to be admired by many, where he is praising those who instituted the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand blames them because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom. +

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Exordia may also be derived from advice, for instance, one should honor the good, wherefore the speaker praises Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor worthless, but who, although they are good, remain obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; for this is a piece of advice. +

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Again, they may be derived from forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to the hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult, or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence, like ChoerilusOf Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian war, from which this half-line and the context preserved in the Scholiast are taken. He complains that whereas the poets of olden times had plenty to write about, the field of poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all apportioned, and he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find a new chariot for the race-course of his song. : But now when all has been allotted. These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearer. And these exordiaἐνδόσιμα = προοίμια. may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech.

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As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must be noted that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic exordia (for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia: For thee and thy presents or spoils).A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like prologues and epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic, which may be wild, high-flown, as in the example given from an unknown author. +

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But in speechesThat is, forensic speeches. δράμασι has been suggested for λόγοις. and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about, and that the mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is undefined leads astray; so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence the following exordia: Sing the wrath, O Muse.Hom. Il 1.1. Tell me of the man, O Muse.Hom. Od. 1.1. Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into Europe.From Choerilus (sect. 4). Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their drama, if not at the outset, like Euripides, at least somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles, My father was Polybus.Soph. OT 774. But this can hardly be called the prologue. It is the same in comedy. So then the most essential and special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech; wherefore it should not be employed, if the subject is quite clear or unimportant. +

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All the other forms of exordia in use are only remedies,That is, special remedies in the case of the hearers suffering from inattention, unfavorable disposition, and the like (Cope). and are common to all three branches of Rhetoric. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent. From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps to destroy or create prejudice. But this must not be done in the same way; for the defendant must deal with this at the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant, when about to introduce himself, must remove all obstacles, so that he must first clear away all prejudice; the accuser must create prejudice in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier recollection of it.

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The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite; for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, which is the reason why many speakers try to make their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person wishes, including the appearance of respectability, because respectable persons command more attention. Hearers pay most attention to things that are important, that concern their own interests, that are astonishing, that are agreeable; wherefore one should put the idea into their heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To make his hearers inattentive, the speaker must persuade them that the matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them, that it is painful.

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But we must not lose sight of the fact that all such things are outside the question, for they are only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case; for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need of an exordium, except just to make a summary statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it may have a head. +

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Further, engaging the hearers' attention is common to all parts of the speech, if necessary; for attention slackens everywhere else rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is ridiculous to put thisi.e., to claim the hearer's attention at the beginning, for every one is keen to listen then, but later on attention slackens. at the beginning, at a time when all listen with the greatest attention. Wherefore, when the right moment comes, one must say, And give me your attention, for it concerns you as much as myself; and, I will tell you such a thing as you have never yet heard of, so strange and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do; whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture. +

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But it is clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer qua hearer;The hearer qua hearer should be unbiased, but in fact hearers often suffer from the defects referred to in sect. 7, for which certain forms of exordia are remedies. for all in their exordia endeavor either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own apprehensions: O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come breathless].Soph. Ant. 223. Why this preamble?Eur. IT 1162. This is what those also do who have, or seem to have, a bad case; for it is better to lay stress upon anything rather than the case itself. That is why slaves never answer questions directly but go all round them, and indulge in preambles. +

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We have stated2.1.7, 8. how the hearer's goodwill is to be secured and all other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly said, Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friendship or compassion,Hom. Od. 7.327. the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.

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In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer believe that he shares the praise, either himself, or his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral Oration that it is easy to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of Lacedaemonians.See 1.9.30.

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Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except for the orator's own sake, or on account of his adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too little importance to the question according to his idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia; or else they merely serve the purpose of ornament, since their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For such is the encomium on the Eleans, in which Gorgias, without any preliminary sparring or movements, starts off at once, Elis, happy city.

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One way of removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference whether this suspicion has been openly expressed or not; and so this may be taken as a general rule. +

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Another wayAnother reading is τόπος (topic) and so throughout. consists in contesting the disputed points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness, at least to the plaintiff; or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated; or that it is not unjust at all, or only slightly so; or neither disgraceful nor important. These are the possible points of dispute: as Iphicrates, in answer to Nausicrates, admitted that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and inflicted damage, but denied that he had been guilty of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike the balance, when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that although the action was injurious it was honorable, painful but useful, or anything else of the kind.

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Another method consists in saying that it was a case of error, misfortune, or necessity; as, for example, Sophocles said that he trembled, not, as the accuser said, in order to appear old, but from necessity, for it was against his wish that he was eighty years of age.Sophocles had two sons, Iophon and Ariston, by different wives; the latter had a son named Sophocles. Iophon, jealous of the affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson, summoned him before the phratores (a body which had some jurisdiction in family affairs) on the ground that his age rendered him incapable of managing his affairs. In reply to the charge, Sophocles read the famous choric ode on Attica from the Oedipus Coloneus, beginning Εὐίππου, ξένε, τᾶσδε χώρας (Soph. OC 668 ff.), and was acquitted. The story in this form is probably derived from some comedy, which introduced the case on the stage (see Jebb's Introd. to the tragedy). One may also substitute one motive for another, and say that one did not mean to injure but to do something else, not that of which one was accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental: I should deserve your hatred, had I acted so as to bring this about.

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Another method may be employed if the accuser, either himself or one closely related to him, has been involved in a similar charge, either now or formerly; +

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or, if others are involved who are admittedly not exposed to the charge; for instance, if it is argued that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy, then so-and-so must be.

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Again, if the accuser has already similarly accused others, or himself been accused by others;In the reading in the text, αὐτούς must apparently refer to the defendant, and one would rather expect αὐτόν. Spengel suggested ἢ ἄλλος ἢ αὐτός for ἢ ἄλλος αὐτούς: if he (i.e. the adversary) or another has similarly accused others. or if others, without being formally accused, have been suspected as you are now, and their innocence has been proved.

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Another method consists in counter-attacking the accuser; for it would be absurd to believe the words of one who is himself unworthy of belief.

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Another method is to appeal to a verdict already given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange of property;When a citizen was called upon to perform a liturgy or public service (e.g. the equipment of a chorus), if he thought that one richer than himself had been passed over he could summon him and compel him to exchange properties. when Hygiaenon accused him of impiety as having advised perjury in the verse, My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,Eur. Hipp. 612. This well-known verse is three times parodied in Aristophanes (Aristoph. Thes. 275; Aristoph. Frogs 101, Aristoph. Frogs1471). In the first passage, the sense is reversed: Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a woman in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly. Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides takes an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says to Euripides: Remember that it was your mind that swore, but not your tongue. When Euripides was engaged in a lawsuit, his adversary quoted the line, implying that even on oath Euripides could not be believed; Euripides replied that his adversary had no right to bring before the law courts a matter which had already been settled by the theatrical judges. Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in transferring the decisions of the court of Dionysus to the law courts; for he had already rendered an account of what he had said there,In the great Dionysiac theater. or was still ready to do so, if his adversary desired to accuse him.

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Another method consists in attacking slander, showing how great an evil it is, and this because it alters the nature of judgements,Or, makes extraneous points the subject of decision (Cope), raises false issues (Jebb). and that it does not rely on the real facts of the case.

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Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, as in the Teucer,Of Sophocles. Odysseus reproaches Teucer with being a relative of Priam, whose sister his mother Hesione was; to which Teucer replied that his father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that he himself did not denounce the spies.Who had been sent to Troy by the Greeks to spy upon the Trojans. It seems that he was afterwards accused of treachery, the token being the fact that Teucer was a near connection of Priam; to which he replied with another token that his father was an enemy of Priam, and further, when the Greek spies were in Troy, he never betrayed them.

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Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to praise something unimportant at great length, and to condemn something important concisely; or, putting forward several things that are praiseworthy in the opponent, to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing upon the case. Such methodsJebb refers τοιοῦτοι to the accusers, translating τεχνικοί artistic, certainly the commoner meaning. are most artful and unfair; for by their use men endeavor to make what is good in a man injurious to him, by mixing it up with what is bad.

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Another method is common to both accuser and defender. Since the same thing may have been done from several motives, the accuser must disparage it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender must take it in the better sense. For instance, when Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may be said on the one hand that he did so because he considered him to be the bravest of men, on the other, that it was because Odysseus was the only man who was no possible rival for him, since he was a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of prejudice.

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In the epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive, but disjointed; for it is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech. For a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the author of the actions which he relates), and of another that does depend upon art. The latter consists in showing that the action did take place, if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three together. +

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This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kindInvolving a continuous succession of proofs. is difficult to remember. From some facts a man may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the other is intricate and not plain. +

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It is only necessary to recall famous actions; wherefore most people have no need of narrative—for instance, if you wish to praise Achilles; for everybody knows what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you wish to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did . . .Something has been lost here, as is shown by the transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss. have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing the passage ἔστι δʼ ἔπαινος . . . μετατεθῇ (1.9.33-37).

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But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man said to the baker when he asked whether he was to knead bread hard or soft, What! is it impossible to knead it well? so it is in this case; for the narrative must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either. For in this case also propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a due mean; that is, one must say all that will make the facts clear, or create the belief that they have happened or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite. +

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And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your own virtue, for instance, I always recommended him to act rightly, not to forsake his children; or the wickedness of your opponent, for instance, but he answered that, wherever he might be, he would always find other children, an answer attributed by HerodotusHdt. 2.30. The story was that a number of Egyptian soldiers had revolted and left in a body for Ethiopia. Their king Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives and children, to which one of them made answer ( τῶν δέ τινα λέγεται δέξαντα τὸ αἰδοῖον εἰπεῖν, ἔνθα ἂν τοῦτο ᾖ, ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖσι ἐνθαῦτα καὶ τέκνα καὶ γυναῖκας). to the Egyptian rebels; or anything which is likely to please the dicasts.

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In defence, the narrative need not be so long; for the points at issue are either that the fact has not happened or that it was neither injurious nor wrong nor so important as asserted, so that one should not waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless anything tends to prove that, admitting the act, it is not wrong. +

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Again, one should only mention such past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation if described as actually happening; for instance, the story of Alcinous, because in the presence of Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines,Hom. Od. 23.264-284, Hom. Od. 23.310-343. The title referred to the narrative in Books 9-12. It became proverbial for a long-winded story. and the way in which Phayllus dealt with the epic cycle,he apparently summarized it. and the prologue to the Oeneus.Of Euripides. It was apparently very compact.

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And the narrative should be of a moral character, and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this reason mathematical treatises have no moral character, because neither have they moral purpose; for they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues have; for they discuss such questions. +

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Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each individual character; for instance, He was talking and walking on at the same time, which indicates effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day orators; but from moral purpose: But I wished it, and I preferred it; and even if I profited nothing, it is better. The first statement indicates prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is honorable. If anything of the kind seems incredible, then the reason must be added; of this Sophocles gives an example, where his Antigone says that she cared more for her brother than for her husband or children; for the latter can be replaced after they are gone, but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother can ever be born.Soph. Ant. 911-912, where the mss. have κεκευθότοιν instead of Aristotle's βεβηκότων. If you have no reason, you should at least say that you are aware that what you assert is incredible, but that it is your nature; for no one believes that a man ever does anything of his own free will except from motives of self-interest.Whereas this man makes his temperament responsible for the strange things he does; he is built that way and cannot help it.

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Further, the narrative should draw upon what is emotional by the introduction of such of its accompaniments as are well known, and of what is specially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary: And he went off looking grimly at me; and as AeschinesSupposed to be Aeschines called Socraticus from his intimate friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and writer of speeches for the law courts, he had a great reputation as an orator. says of Cratylus, that he hissed violently and violently shook his fists. Such details produce persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they become tokens of what he does not know. Numerous examples of this may be found in Homer: Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with her hands;Hom. Od. 19.361. for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on their eyes. And you should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as being of a certain character, that the hearers may regard you or him as such; but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is perfectly clearδεῖ (omitted by others) = one cannot help seeing. from the example of messengers; we do not yet know what they are going to say, but nevertheless we have an inkling of it.

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Again, the narrative should be introduced in several places, sometimes not at all at the beginning. In deliberative oratory narrative is very rare, because no one can narrate things to come; but if there is narrative, it will be of things past, in order that, being reminded of them, the hearers may take better counsel about the future. This may be done in a spirit either of blame or of praise; but in that case the speaker does not perform the function of the deliberative orator. If there is anything incredible, you should immediately promise both to give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the judgement of any whom the hearers approve;Omitting τε. The difficulty is διατάττειν, which can apparently only mean arrange. Jebb retains τε, and reads ὡς for οἷς: the speaker must make himself responsible for the fact . . . and marshal his reasons in a way acceptable to the hearers. The old Latin translation vadiare quibus volunt suggested to Roemer διαιτηταῖς, to the arbitrators they approve. as, for instance, Jocasta in the Oedipus of CarcinusAccording to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible things about her son, and pledges her word for the facts. Cope says: promises (to do something or other to satisfy him). is always promising, when the man who is looking for her son makes inquiries of her; and similarly Haemon in Sophocles.Soph. Ant. 683-723. On this Cope remarks: This last example must be given up as hopeless; there is nothing in the extant play which could be interpreted as required here. According to Jebb, the incredibility consists in the fact that Haemon, although in love with Antigone, and strongly opposed to the sentence pronounced upon her by his father Creon, still remains loyal to the latter. Haemon explains the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his father's welfare more than anything else, for a father's good name and prosperity is the greatest ornament for children, as is the son's for the father.

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Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration should bear upon the particular point disputed; for instance, if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else; or if it is maintained that no injury has been done; or that the act was not so important as asserted; or was just, then this must be proved, the three last questions being matters of dispute just as the question of fact. +

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But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarilyAristotle's argument is as follows. But it must not be forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue. For ignorance is not the cause (of there being a dispute about the fact, e.g. you hit me, no, I didn't, where both know the truth), as it might be in a dispute on what was right or wrong, so that this is the topic on which you should spend some time (i.e. because here you can prove or disprove that A is πονηρός). The passage is generally taken to mean that when it is a question of fact it is universally true that one of the disputants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes any comment. In his note he says: all that is meant is that there is a certain class of cases which fall under this issue, in which this topic may be safely used. For instance, A may on justifiable grounds charge B with theft; B denies it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is strongly against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is necessarily πονηρός. be a rogue; for ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question of right or wrong were the issue; so that in this case one should spend time on this topic, but not in the others.

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In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honorable or useful; for the facts must be taken on trust, since proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they are incredible or the responsibility is attributed to another.Or, reading ἄλλως, if there is some other reason.

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In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important as supposed. But one must also look to see whether he makes any false statements as to things outside the issue; for these look like evidence that he makes misstatements about the issue itself as well.

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Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned with the future, so that its examples must be derived from the past; the second with the question of the existence or non-existence of facts, in which demonstrative and necessary proofs are more in place; for the past involves a kind of necessity.It is irrevocable, and it is possible to discuss it with some degree of certainty, whereas the future is quite uncertain, and all that can be done is to draw inferences from the past. +

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One should not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously but mix them up; otherwise they destroy one another. For there is a limit of quantity; thus, Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would say,Hom. Od. 4.204. +

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where Homer does not say τοιαῦτα (such things as), but τόσα (as many things as). Nor should you try to find enthymemes about everything; otherwise you will be imitating certain philosophers, who draw conclusions that are better known and more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.For this passage see 1.2.12-13. The meaning is that it is absurd to prove what every one knows already. +

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And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless; for simultaneous movements drive each other out, the result being their mutual destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give the speech an ethical character; for demonstration involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.

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Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used in both narrative and proof; for they express moral character; for instance, I gave him the money and that although I knew that one ought not to trust. Or, to arouse emotion: I do not regret it, although I have been wronged; his is the profit, mine the right.

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Deliberative speaking is more difficult than forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future; whereas forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known, even by diviners, as Epimenides the Cretan said; for he used to divine, not the future, but only things that were past but obscure.The remark of Epimenides is by many editors interpreted as a sarcasm upon the fraternity of soothsayers, who pretended to be able to foretell the future. But how is this to be got out of the Greek? The point is perhaps something like: it is easy enough to talk about the past, for even soothsayers know it. What Aristotle says here is that Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating to the obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an instance. After the followers of Cylon, who tried to make himself tyrant of Athens (c. 632) had been put to death by the Alcmaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the terms of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was devastated by a pestilence. On the advice of the oracle, Epimenides was summoned from Crete, and by certain rites and sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence. Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a starting-point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance, attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric there is less room for these than in any other, unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating, he brings accusations against the Lacedaemonians, for instance, in the Panegyricus,Isoc. 4.110-114. and against Chares in the Symmachikos (On the Peace).Isoc. 8.27.

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Epideictic speeches should be varied with laudatory episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always bringing somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant when he said that he was never at a loss for something to say; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he praises Achilles, then Aeacus, then the god; similarly courage, which does this and that,He enumerates all the deeds that proceed from courage. Another reading is ἢ τὰ καὶ τά, ποιεῖ ὃ τοιόνδε ἐστίν, i.e. when praising courage, and this or that, he is employing a method of the kind mentioned. or is of such a kind. +

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If you have proofs, then, your language must be both ethical and demonstrative; if you have no enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting that a virtuous man should show himself good than that his speech should be painfully exact.

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Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it is clearer that a logical conclusion has been reached; for opposites are more noticeable when placed in juxtaposition.There is no difference in form between the demonstrative and refutative enthymeme, but the latter draws opposite conclusions; and opposites are always more striking when they are brought together, and a parallel drawn between them. It is then easy to see where the fallacy lies. Cf. 2.23.30: Refutative enthymemes are more effective (popular) than demonstrative, because they bring opposites together in a small compass, which are more striking (clearer) to the hearer from being put side by side. +

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The refutation of the opponent is not a particular kind of proof; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection, partly by counter-syllogism.In the translation τῶν πίστεων is taken with ἔστι: it is the business of, the proper function of, proofs. Others take it with τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ: some . . . other (of the opponent's arguments). In both deliberative and forensic rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own proofs and afterwards meet the arguments of the opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces beforehand. But if the opposition is varied,If the opponent's arguments are numerous and strong, by reason of the varied nature of the points dealt with. these arguments should be dealt with first, as Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly; in fact, it was only after he had first refuted what his opponents were likely to say that he put forward his own proofs. +

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He who replies should first state the arguments against the opponent's speech, refuting and answering it by syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with approval. For as the mind is ill-disposed towards one against whom prejudices have been raised beforehand, it is equally so towards a speech, if the adversary is thought to have spoken well. One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one intends to make; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary. Wherefore it is only after having combated all the arguments, or the most important, or those which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that you should substantiate your own case: I will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not think] that Hera . . .Eur. Tro. 969-971. Hecuba had advised Menelaus to put Helen to death; she defends herself at length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which these words form part. Her argument is that none of the three goddesses who contended for the prize of beauty on Mt. Ida would have been such fools as to allow Argos and Athens to become subject to Troy as the result of the contest, which was merely a prank. in this passage the poet has first seized upon the weakest argument.

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So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates does in the PhilippusIsoc. 5.4-7. Isocrates says that his friends thought very highly of one of his addresses, as likely to bring peace. and in the Antidosis.Isoc. 15.132-139, Isoc. 15.141-149. Here again Isocrates puts compliments on his composition into the mouth of an imaginary friend. Archilochus uses the same device in censure; for in his iambics he introduces the father speaking as follows of his daughter: There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be sworn impossible,Archilochus (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule, the daughter of Lycambes. Her father broke off the engagement, whereupon Archilochus pursued father and daughter with furious and scurrilous abuse. It is here said that, instead of attacking the daughter directly, he represented her as being attacked by her father. The meaning of ἄελπτον is not clear. It may be a general statement: the unexpected often happens; or, there is nothing so bad that you may not expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates: There is nothing that money cannot procure, meaning that the father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag. 74). and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse beginning I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges;The line ends: τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει. Archilochus represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused by others possessing it. Sophocles, also,Here again, Haemon similarly puts his own feeling as to Creon's cruel treatment of Antigone into the mouth of the people of the city, and refers to popular rumor. introduces Haemon, when defending Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion of others. +

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One should also sometimes change enthymemes into moral maxims; for instance, Sensible men should become reconciled when they are prosperous; for in this manner they will obtain the greatest advantages, which is equivalent to the enthymeme If men should become reconciled whenever it is most useful and advantageous, they should be reconciled in a time of prosperity.

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In regard to interrogation, its employment is especially opportune, when the opponent has already stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdityThe words ὅταν . . . ᾖ have been variously translated: (1) when one of the two alternatives has already been stated; (2) when the opponent has stated what is different from the fact; (3) when the opponent has already conceded so much, made one admission (Jebb).; as, for instance, when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation into the sacred rites of the savior goddess. On Lampon replying that it was not possible for one who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles asked him if he himself was acquainted with the rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked, How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated? +

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Again, interrogation should be employed when one of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious that the opponent will admit the other if you ask him. But the interrogator, having obtained the second premise by putting a question, should not make an additional question of what is evident, but should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates, when accused by Meletus of not believing in the gods, askedReading ἤρετο. whether he did not say that there was a divine something; and when Meletus said yes, Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not either children of the gods or something godlike. When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, +

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Is there a man, then, who can admit that the children of the gods exist without at the same time admitting that the gods exist? Thirdly, when it is intended to show that the opponent either contradicts himself or puts forward a paradox. +

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Further, when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical solution; for if he answers, Partly yes, and partly no, Some are, but some are not, In one sense it is so, in another not, the hearers cry out against him as being in a difficulty.For the first of the quibbles Sandys refers to Aristoph. Ach. 396, where Cephisophon, being asked if Euripides was indoors, replies, Yes and no, if you understand me; and he gives the explanation, his mind is outside, collecting scraps of poetry, while he himself is upstairs ( ἀναβάδην, unless it means with his legs up) composing a tragedy. The reference in the second instance is to the adversary being reduced to such a position that he cannot answer without having recourse to sophistical divisions and distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty. Aristotle himself is fond of such cautiously limited judgements (Gomperz). The translation is that of the reading ἀποροῦντος, a conjecture of Spengel's. The audience will be ready to express its disapproval of his shuffling answers, which are evidence of his perplexity. The ordinary reading ἀποροῦντες attributes the perplexity to the hearers. Or, the hearers, thinking he is puzzled, applaud us [the interrogator] (Jebb). In other cases interrogation should not be attempted; for if the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator seems to be defeated; for it is impossible to ask a number of questions, owing to the hearer's weakness. Wherefore also we should compress our enthymemes as much as possible.

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Ambiguous questions should be answered by defining them by a regular explanation, and not too concisely; those that appear likely to make us contradict ourselves should be solved at once in the answer, before the adversary has time to ask the next question or to draw a conclusion; for it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this, however, and the means of answering will be sufficiently clear from the Topics.Aristot. Top. 8.4. +

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If a conclusion is put in the form of a question, we should state the reason for our answer. For instance, SophoclesCp. 1.14.3. being asked by Pisander whether he, like the rest of the Committee of Ten, had approved the setting up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. What then? asked Pisander, did not this appear to you to be a wicked thing? Sophocles admitted it. So then you did what was wicked? Yes, for there was nothing better to be done. The Lacedaemonian, who was called to account for his ephoralty, being asked if he did not think that the rest of his colleagues had been justly put to death, answered yes. But did not you pass the same measures as they did? Yes. Would not you, then, also be justly put to death? No; for my colleagues did this for money; I did not, but acted according to my conscience. For this reason we should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion itself as a question, unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our favor.

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As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to confound the opponents' earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the PoeticsThe chapters are lost (cp. 1.11.29). how many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the first is employed on one's own account, the second on that of another.

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The epilogue is composed of four parts: to dispose the hearer favorably towards oneself and unfavorably towards the adversary; to amplify and depreciate; to excite the emotions of the hearer; to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you are truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.Or, mould the hearers to one's will (L. and S.). One of two things should be aimed at, to show that you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which serve to represent men as good or bad have already been stated.Book 1.9. +

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After this, when the proof has once been established, the natural thing is to amplify or depreciate; for it is necessary that the facts should be admitted, if it is intended to deal with the question of degree; just as the growth of the body is due to things previously existing. The topics of amplification and depreciation have been previously set forth.Book 2.19. +

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Next, when the nature and importance of the facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to certain emotions—pity, indignation, anger, hate, jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The topics of these also have been previously stated,Book 2.1-11. +

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so that all that remains is to recapitulate what has been said. This may appropriately be done at this stage in the way certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend for the exordium, when they advise frequent repetition of the points, so that they may be easily learnt. In the exordium we should state the subject, in order that the question to be decided may not escape notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary statement of the proofs.

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We should begin by saying that we have kept our promise, and then state what we have said and why. Our case may also be closely compared with our opponent's; and we may either compare what both of us have said on the same point, or without direct comparison: My opponent said so-and-so, and I said so-and-so on this point and for these reasons. Or ironically, as for instance, He said this and I answered that; what would he have done, if he had proved this, and not simply that? Or by interrogation: What is there that has not been proved? or, What has my opponent proved? We may, therefore, either sum up by comparison, or in the natural order of the statements, just as they were made, our own first, and then again, separately, if we so desire, what has been said by our opponent. +

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To the conclusion of the speechReading τελευτῇ, a conjecture of Victorius. With τελευτή, the sense will be: as a conclusion, the asyndectic style is appropriate. the most appropriate style is that which has no connecting particles, in order that it may be a peroration, but not an oration: I have spoken; you have heard; you know the facts; now give your decision.It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of Lysias Against Eratosthenes.

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diff --git a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-grc2.xml b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-grc2.xml index ad3d46b5a..26e7d6aff 100644 --- a/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-grc2.xml +++ b/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-grc2.xml @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Oxford Clarendon Press -1959 +1959 @@ -1087,8 +1087,8 @@

καὶ σπουδαστικώτεροι διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν,

καὶ σεμνότεροι ἢ βαρύτεροι· ποιεῖ γὰρ σεμνοτέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν, ἔστι δὲ ἡ σεμνότης μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης· κἂν ἀδικῶσιν, οὐ μικραδικηταί εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι.

ἡ δʼ εὐτυχία κατὰ μόριά τε τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει τὰ ἤθη (εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυχίαι), καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρασκευάζει ἡ εὐτυχία πλεονεκτεῖν.

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ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν, ἓν δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτιστον ἦθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὸ θεῖόν πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης.

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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθʼ ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἠθῶν εἴρηται· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἦθος καὶ ἀδυνάτου.

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ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν, ἓν δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτιστον ἦθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὸ θεῖόν πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης.

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περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθʼ ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἠθῶν εἴρηται· τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἦθος καὶ ἀδυνάτου.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις πρὸς κρίσιν ἐστί (περὶ ὧν γὰρ ἴσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου), ἔστι δʼ ἐάν τε πρὸς ἕνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ, οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον κριτὴς ὁ εἷς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πεῖσαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς κριτής), ἐάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγῃ τις, ὁμοίως (τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ ἐναντία, πρὸς ἃ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται), ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς κριτὴς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων· τά τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται), περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον—ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἠθικοὺς ποιητέον.

diff --git a/manifest.txt b/manifest.txt index 06e2014cd..09778369a 100644 --- a/manifest.txt +++ b/manifest.txt @@ -1126,23 +1126,32 @@ /data/tlg0028/tlg006/tlg0028.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0029/__cts__.xml /data/tlg0029/tlg004/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0029/tlg004/tlg0029.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0029/tlg005/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0029/tlg005/tlg0029.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0029/tlg006/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0029/tlg006/tlg0029.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0030/__cts__.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg001/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg001/tlg0030.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg002/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg002/tlg0030.tlg002.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg003/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg003/tlg0030.tlg003.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg004/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg004/tlg0030.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg005/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg005/tlg0030.tlg005.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg006/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0030/tlg006/tlg0030.tlg006.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0031/__cts__.xml /data/tlg0031/tlg001/__cts__.xml @@ -1284,6 +1293,7 @@ /data/tlg0033/tlg004/tlg0033.tlg004.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0034/__cts__.xml /data/tlg0034/tlg001/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0034/tlg001/tlg0034.tlg001.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0035/__cts__.xml /data/tlg0035/tlg001/__cts__.xml @@ -1820,6 +1830,7 @@ /data/tlg0086/tlg035/tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0086/tlg035/tlg0086.tlg035.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0086/tlg038/__cts__.xml +/data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-eng2.xml /data/tlg0086/tlg038/tlg0086.tlg038.perseus-grc2.xml /data/tlg0086/tlg045/__cts__.xml /data/tlg0086/tlg045/tlg0086.tlg045.perseus-grc2.xml