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At various points in the history of philosophy going right back to the ancient Greek problem of finding "[[The One in the Many|the one in the many]]," a tendency has existed where [[Metaphysics|metaphysicians]] have attempted to elucidate the fundamental building blocks of reality---whether it be [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]]' [[Monad (Leibniz)|monads]], or the fire of [[Heraclitus]]. These philosophers are mistaken in their pursuit:
The task of identifying the [[The Law of Identity|nature]] of physical objects as they are apart from [[Different Forms of Sense Perception does not Invalidate Sense Perception|man's form of perception]] does not belong to philosophy, but to [[Physics|physics]]. There is no philosophic method of discovering the fundamental attributes of matter; there is only the scientist's method of specialized observation, experimentation, and inductive inference. Whatever such attributes turn out to be, however, they have no philosophic significance, neither in regard to [[Metaphysics|metaphysics]] nor to [[Epistemology|epistemology]].1
[[Leonard Peikoff|Peikoff]] highlights this by supposing that one day physicists are able to reduce every physical phenomenon down to so-called "puffs of meta-energy:"
At this stage of cognition, scientists have discovered that the material world as men perceive it, the world of three-dimensional objects possessing color, texture, size, and shape is not a primary, but merely an effect, an effect of various combinations of puffs acting on men's means of perception.2
He then goes on to explain that:
- [[A Physical Description of Entities does not Negate The Metaphysical Status of Sensory Qualities|this does not invalidate the metaphysical status of sensory qualities]], and;
- [[A Physical Description of Entities does not Negate Their Existence|this does not negate the existence of entities]].