Humanities_AnIntroductiontoMetaphysics_1918.txt

An Introduction to
Metaphysics
By

Henri Bergson
Member of the Lutitute and Profeaaor of the Collllge de
Franoe

Translated by T. E. Hulme

Authorized Bdition, Revised by the Author, with
Additional Material

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
�be 'lmlcketbocka L'tess

CornuGRT, 1918
BY

0. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

Third Pri.nti.Dg

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

T

HIS

celebrated essay

was

first

pub­

lished in the Revue de M ctaphysique

et de Morale, in January, 1903.

It ap­

peared then after Time and Ji'ree Will and
Matter and Memory and before Creative
Evolution j and while containing ideas set

forth in the first two of these works, it
announces some of those which were after­
wards developed in the last.
Though this book can in no sense be
regarded as an epitome of the others, it
yet forms the best introduction to them.
M. Edouard Le Roy in his lately published
book on M. Bergson's philosophy speaks

of

" this marvelously suggestive study which
<'onstitutes the best preface to the books

themselves."
It has, however, more importance than a
flimple introduction would have, for in it

l\1. Bergson explains, at greater length and
in greater detail than in the other
i.ii

books,

Preface

IV

exactly what be means to convey by the
word intuition.

The intuitive method is

treated independently and not, as elsewhere
in his writings, incidentally, in its appli­
cations to particular problems.

For this

reason every writer who bas attempted to
give a complete exposition of M. Bergson's
philosophy has been obliged to quote this

eRsay at length ; and it is indispensable
therefore to the full understanding of its
author's position.

Translations into Ger­

man, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, Swedish,
and Russian have lately appeared, but the

l"rP.nch original is at present out of print.
This translation bas had the great ad­
vantage of being revised in proof by the
author.

I have to thank him for many

alternative renderings, and also for a few
slight alterations

in t he text, which he

thought would make his meaning clearer.

T. E. llULME.
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

An Introduction to
Metaphysics

A

COMPARISON of the definitions of
metaphysics and the various concep-

tions of the absolute leads to the discovery
that philosophers, in spite of their apparent
divergencies, agree in distinguishing two
profoundly different ways of knowing a
thing.

The

first

implies

that

we

move

round the object; the second that we enter
into it.

The first depends on the point of

view at which we are placed and on the
symbols by which we express ourselves.
The second neither depends on a point of
view nor relies on any symbol.

The first

kind of knowledge may be said to stop at
the

relative;

the

second,

in

those cases

where it is possible, to attain the
I

absolute.

An Introduction to

2

Consider, for example, the movement of
an object in space.

i

l\Iy perception of the

motion will vary w th the point of view,
moving or stationary, from which I observe
i t.

�I�· expression of it will v ary with the

systems of axes, or the points of reference,
to wh ich I relate it; that i s, with the sym­
bols

by

double

which

I

translate

it.

For this

reason I call such motion relative:

in the one l'al'le, as in the othe r, I am placed

nnt!oliclP thc• ohjPct itself.

R ut when I speak

of an absolute movement, I am attributing

to tbt> mewing object an interior and, so to
Rpeak, stateR of mind; I also imply that I

am in sympathy with those states, and that
I inRt>rt myRelf in them by an effort of
imagination.

ject

Then,

according as the ob­

iH moving or s tationary, according as

it adopts one movement or another, what
I experience will vary.

And what I ex­

neither on the point
of viPw I may take up in regard to the
ohjt>ct, sine(> I am inHide the object itself,
JWrienee will depend

nor on the f!ymhols hy wh i ch I may t.rana·

Metaphysics

3

late the motion, since I have rejected all
translations in order to possess the original.
In short, I shall no longer grasp the move­
ment from without, remaining where I am,
but from where it is, from within, as it is
in itself.

I shall possess an absolute.

Consider, again, a character whose ad­
ventures are related to me in a novel.

The

author may multiply the traits of his hero's
character, may make him speak and act as
much as he pleases, but all this can never
be equivalent to the simple and indivisible
feeling which I should experience if I were
able for an instant to identify my�elf with
the person of the hero himself.

Out of that

indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the
words, gestures, and actions of the man
would

appear

to me

to

1low

naturally.

They would no longer be accidents which,
added to the idea I had already formed of
the
idea,

character,
without

continually
ever

enriched

completing

it.

that
The

character would be given to me all at once,
in its entirety, and the thousand incidents

An Introduction to

4

which ma ni fest

it, i nstead of

t«>lves to the id ea and so

on

seem to me,

addi n g them­

enriching it, would

the c o n t rary ,

to detach

themselveR from it, without, howe ver,
it

hausting
All the

or· impoverishing

t hin g�o� I

from whil'h I

t'llll

essence.

its

am told ah ou t

provide me with so

ex­

t he man

many points of view
All th e

ohHt• rve him.

traits whieh di'HcriL<� him, and w hi ch can
make him known to me only uy flO many

compm·i�o�on�o� wi I h pt•r�o�ons o1· 1 h i n gs I kn o w

ah·Ntdy, art•

�o�

i�nH h_v whkh he i�o� expresst•d
Ry m hols and

more or l£':-11'1 s,nnholieally.

poin ts of

view, t lwl'(�for·e, plaec me outHitlc•

him; tlwy �-tivt• Ill<' only what he

has in

<·ommon with o tlwr�o�, nntl not wha t helongR

to him anti to him nlout•.

Jlut that which

is properly hi m Hel f, I hat wh ieh eo n s titu tes

e�o�sent'l'1

his

t 'tlll no t

he•

pt•r<·ei ved

from

w i t hou t, heing iutt·J·nnl by tlefinition, nor
lit'

expreHHetl

nwmmrahle

h_y
with

HJluhohl,

<'Vt•J·�·thing

�niptiou, hi �o� t ot·y , llntl

here

in

the

lj(_•ing

l't'lntiw.

in eo m­

eli.4e.

Dt•­

uunly�o�is lt•Rve me
Coinddence

with

Metaphysics

5

the person himself would alone give me
the absolute.
It is in this sense, and in this sense only,
that absolute is synonymous with perfec­

tion.

Were all the photographs of a town,

taken from all possible points of view, to
go on indefinitely completing one another,
they would never be equivalent to the solid
town in which we walk about.

Were all

the translations of a poem into all possible
languages to add together their various
shades of meaning and, correcting each
other by a kind of mutual retouching, to
give a more and more faithful image of
the poem they translate, they would yet
never succeed in rendering the inner mean­
ing of the original.

A representation taken

from a certain point of view, a translation
made with certain symbols, will always
remain imperfect in comparison with the
object of which a view has been taken, or,
which the symbols seek to express.

But the

absolute, which is the object and not its
representation, the original and not its

An Introduction to

6

translation, is perfect, by being perfectly
what it is.
It is doubtless for this reason that the

absolute has often been identified with the
infinite.

Suppose that I wished to com­

municate to some one who did not know
Greek the extraordinarily simple impres­
sion that a passage in Homer makes upon
me; I should first give a translation of the
lines, I should then comment on my trans­
lation, and then develop the commentary;
in this way, by piling up explanation on
explanation, I might approach nearer and
nearer to what I wanted to express; but I
should never quite reach it.

When you

raise your arm, you accomplish a movement
of which you have, from within, a simple
perception; but for me, watching it from
the outside, your arm passes through one
point, then through another, and between
these two there will be still other points;
so that, iC I began to count, the operation
would go on for ever.

Viewed from the
.....

-. . .

inside, then, an absolute is a simple thing;

Metaphysics

7

but looked at from the outside, that is to
say, relatively to other things, it becomes,
in relation to these signs which express it,
the gold coin for which we never seem able
to finish giving small change.

Now, that

which lends itself at the same time both
to an indivisible apprehension and to an
inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very
definition of the word, an infinite.
It follows from this that an absolute
could only be given in an intuition, whilst
everything else falls within the province of

analysis.

By intuition is meant the kind

of ·intellectual sympathy by which

one

places oneself within an object in order to
coincide with what is unique in it and con­
sequently inexpressible.

Analysis, on the

contrary, is the operation which reduces the
object to elements already known, that is,
to elements common both to it •and other
objects.

To analyze, therefore, is to ex­

press a thing as a function of something
other than itself.

All analysis is thus a

translation, a development into symbols, a

An Introduction to

8

representation taken from successive points
of view from which we note as many re­
semblances as possible

between

the

new

object which we are studying and other�o�
which we believe we know alreacly.

In its

eternally unsatisfied desire to emh1·ace the
object around

which

it

is

compelled

to

turn, analyRis multiplies without end the
number of itR pointR of view in order to
complete its always incomplet e representa­
tion, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that

it may perfect the always imperfect
lation.

tram�­

lt goes on, therefore, to infinity.

Rut intuition, if intuition is possible, is a
simple act.
Now it is eafoly to see tha t the ordinary
function

of

positive

seienee iR

ana lysh� .

Positive science works, then, above all, with
symbols.

Even the most. conerde of t h e

natural sciences, those concerned with life,
confine themselves to the visible form of
living beings, their organs and anatomita I
elements.

They make comparisons between

these forms, they reduce the more complex

Metaphysics
to the more simple; in short, they study
the workings of life in what is, so to speak,
only its visual symbol. If there exists any
means of possessing a reality absolutely in­
stead of knowing it relatively, of placing
oneself within it instead of looking at it
from outside pofnts of view, of having the
intuition instead of making the analysis :
in short, of seizing it without any expres­
sion, translation, or symbolic representation
-metaphysics is that means. _A!_etaphysicsJ

Jhen, is the science which claims to dispense
_with symbols.
•
•

•

'.r.IJ�re .is .one reality, at least, which WE

�� �_seize from within, by intuition and no1
by simple analysis. It is our own person·
ality in its flowing through time---{)ur sell
which endures. We may sympathize in·
tellectually with nothing else, but WE
certainly sympathize with our own selves.
When I direct my attention inward t<
contemplate my own self (supposed for >t�E

10

An Introduction to

moment to be inactive), I perceive a t first,
as a crust solidified on the s u rface, all the
perceptions which come to it from the
material world. These perceptions are clear ,
d ist inct, juxtaposed or juxtaposable one
with another; they tend to group them­
selves into objects. Next, I notice the
memories which more or less adhere to
these perceptions and which serve to in­
terpret them.
These memories have been
d etach Nl, as it were, from the depth of my
])Crsonality, d ra wn to the s urface by the
perceptions which resemble them ; they res t
on the surface of my mlnd without being
absolutely myse lf.

La s t l � , I
·

feel the stir of

tendencies and mo tor bahits-a crowd of
virtual actions, more or less firmly bound
to these perceptions and memm·ies .. All
•-

these clearly defint.>d elements appear more

d i sti nct from me, the more distinct they

from each other. Radia tin g, as they
do, from within outwards, tlJey form, c ol
m·e

­

led ivel y, the surface of a sphere wh ic h
te�u}R

to

grow la rger and lose itself in the

Metaphysics

II

exterior world. But if I draw myself in
from the periphery towards the centre, if I
search in the depth of my being that which
most uniformly, most constantly, and
most enduringly myself, I find an altogether
different thing.
is

There is, beneath these sharply cut crys­
tals and this frozen surface, a continuous
flux which is not comparable to any flux I
have ever seen. There is a succession of
states, each of which announces that which
follows and contains that which precedes
it. They can, properly speaking, only be
said to form multiple states when I have
already passed them and turn back to ob­
serve their track. Whilst I was experien­
cing them they were so solidly organized, so
profoundly animated with a common life,
that I could not have said where any one
of them finished or where another com­
menced. In reality no one of them begins
or ends, but all extend into each other.
This inner life may be compared to the
unrolling of a coil, for there is no living

An Introduction to

12
being

who does not

feel himself coming

g radually to the end of his r<ile; and to
live is to grow old.

llut it ma.r ju!4t as

well be compared to a continual rolling np.

like

that of a thread on a ba II, fo1· our past

follows us, it swells incessantly with the
present that it pickH up on its way; and
consciousness means memory.
But actually it is neither an unrolling
nor

a

rolling up, for these two similes t>voke

the idea of lines and surfaces

\Vhose

parts

are homogeneous and superposable on one
+
another.
Now, ther e are no two id{'utkal
moments
being.
poRe

it

in

the life of the same consdous

Take the t-�impleHt senHatiou, sup·
c onstant, abtmrb in it the entire

JX'rsonality: the consciommess which will
accompany

this

sensation cannot

I't>main

idl'nticnl with itself for two eon�t>l'ntive
moments, because t he seeond moment al­
ways contains, over and above the first, the
memory that the first has hequeatbed to it.

A

consciousness which could experience two

identical

moments would be a consciousness

13

Metaphysics

It would die and be born
again continually. I n what other way
could one represent unconsciousness?
without memory.

It would be better, then, to use as a
comparison

the

myriad-tinted

spectrum,

with its insensible gradations leading from
one shade to another.

A current of feeling

whieh passed along t he �'�Pt>Ctrum, aBRuming
in turn the tint of eaeh of its shades, woulrl
experience

of which

a series of gradu al changes, each

would

announce the one to follow

and would sum u p thoRe which preceded
it.

Yet even here the successive shades of

the spectrum always remain external one
to another.

They are juxtaposed ; they

occupy space.

But

pure duration, on the

contrary, excludes all idea of juxtapm�ition,
reciprocal

externality,

Let us, then, rather,

and extension.
imagine

an infinitely

small elastic bod .v, contracted, if it were
possible, to a mathematical point. J.Rt this
he flrawn out gradually in such a manner

that from the point comes a constantly
lengthening

line.

Let us fix our attention

An Introduction to

14
not

on the line

as

a

line,

action by which it is traced.

but

on

the

Let us bear

in mind that this action, in spite of its
duration, is indivisible if accomplished with­
out stopping, that if a stopping-point is in­
serted, we have two actions instead of one,
that each of these separate actions is then
the indivisible operation of which we speak,
and that it is not the moving action itself
which is divisible, but, rather, the Rtation­
ary line it leaves behind it as its track in
space.

Finally, let us free ourselves from

the space which underlies the movement in
order to consider only the movement itself,
the act of tension or extension; in short,
pure mobility.

We shall have this time a

more faithful image of the. development of
our self in duration.
However, even this image is incomplete,
and, indeed, every comparison will be in­
sufficient,

because

the

unrolling

of

our

duration resembles in some of its aspectH
the unity of an advancing movement and
. in

others the

multiplicity

of

expanding

15

Metaphysics

states; and, clearly, no metaphor can ex­
press one of these two aspects without
sacrificing the other. If I use the com­
parison of the spectrum with its thousand
shades, I have before me a thing already
made, whilst duration is continually in the
,.
making. If I think of an elastic which is
being -stretched, or of a spring which is
extended or relaxed, I forget the richness of
color, characteristic of duration that is
lived, to see O!J.ly the simple movement by
which consciousness passeR from one shade
to another. The inner life i� all thj,�_.at
once : variety of qualities, continuity of
-·-

· - ---·- ----·

__

progress, and unity of direction.
be represented by images.

It cannot

But it is even less possible to represent
it by concepts, that is by abstract, general,
or simple ideas. It is true that no image
can reproduce exactly the original feeling
I have of the flow of my own conscious life.
But it is not even necessary that I should
attempt to render it. If a man is incapable
of getting for himself the intuition of the

An Introduction to

16

constitutive duration of his own being,
nothing will ever give it to him, concepts
.no more than images.

Here the single aim

of the philosopher should be to promote a

certain effort, which in most men is usually
fettered by habitt� of mind more u�ful to
life.

Now the image hat� at least this ad­

vantage, that it keeps us in the concrete.
Nu image can replace the intuition of dura­

tion, :but many diverse images, borrowed
from very different orders of thinbrs, may,
hy the convergence of their action, direct

l'onsciousnet�s to

the

prt'eise point where

there iH a certain intuition to
By choosing images

as

be

seized.

dissimilar as pos­

sible, we shall prevent any one of them
from usurping t he

pla('e of

the intuition it

is intended to call up, since it would then
be driven away at once by its rivals.

providing
of aspect,

that,
the,v

in

spite of

By

their differences

all require from the mind

the same kind of attention, and in

some

sort the same degree of tension, we shall
gradually accustom consciousness to a par-

Metaphysics

17

ticular and clearly-defined d isposition-that
precisely which it must adop t in order to
appear to itself as it really is, w i thou t any

veil .

But,

then ,

consciousness

least consent to make the effort.
will

have

been

shown

nothing:

must

at

For it
it

will

simply have been placed in t he attitude it

must

take up

in

order to make the de­

si red effort, and so come by itself to the
intuition.
e8pecially

C onc ept s
if

they

on

are

the

contrary­

simple-have

the

ditW.dvantage of being i n rea lit y symbols
substituted for the object they sym bol ize,

and demand no effort on our part.

Ex­

amined closely, each of them, it would be
seen, retain s only that part of the object

whi(·h is common to it and to others, and
eXIJ!esse�1 still more than the image does,
a compa1·ison between the object and others

which rc>semble it.

But as the comparison

baN made manifest a resemblance, as the
re�owmiJlance is a p roperty of the object, anrl
a s a property has Pvery appearance of being
a part of the object which possesses it, we

An Introduction to

18

easily persuade ourselves that by setting
concept beside concept we are reconstruct­
ing the whole of the object with its parts,
thus obtaining, so to speak, its intellectual
equivalent.

-£� this way we believe that we

can form a faithful representation of dura­
tion

by setting in line the

concepts

of

unity, multiplicity, continuity, finite or in­
finite divisibility, etc.
the

illusion.

There precisely is

There also

is

the

danger.

Just in so far as abstract ideas can render
service to analysis, that is, to the scientific
study of the object in its relations to other
objects, so far are they incapable of replac­
ing intuition, that is, the metaphysical in­
vestigation of what is essential and unique
in the object.

For on the one hand these

concepts, laid side by side, never actua1ly
give us more than an artificial reconstruc­
tion of the object, of which they can only
symbolize certain general, and, in a way ,
impersonal aspects; it is therefore useless
to believe that with them we can seize a
reality of which they present to us the

Metaphysics
shadow alone.

19

And, on the other hand,

besides the illusion there is also
serious danger.

a

izes at the same time as it abstracts.
concept

very

For the concept general­

can only

The

symbolize a particular

property by making it common to an in­
finity of things.

It therefore always more

or· less deforms the property by the exten­
sion it gives to it.
physical

object

to

Replaced in the meta­
which

it

belongs,

a

property coincides with the object, or at least
moulds itself on it, and adopts the same
outline.

Extracted from the metaphysical

object, and presented in a concept, it grows
indefinitely larger,

and

goes beyond the

object i tself, since henceforth it has to con­
tain it, along with a number of other objects.
Thus the different concepts that we form of
the properties of a thing inscribe round it
1:10 many circles, each much too large and

none of them fitting it exactly.

And yet,

in the thing itself the properties coincided
with the thing, and coincided consequently
with one another.

So that if we are bent

An Introduction to

20

on reconstructing t he object with conce p ts,

some artifice mnst be sought whereby this
coineidt>nce of the object and its properties
can

be

broug ht about.

For e xample, we

may ehoose one of the concepts and try,
starting fro m it, to get round to t he others.
B11t we Rhall th t>n soon discover t hat ac­
corlling as we start from one c oncep t OI'
anotlJPr, the meeting and combination of
the eoneepts will ta k e place in an al together
different way.

According as we start, for

example, from unity m· from mnltiplieity,
we shall have t o conceive ditl't>rentl.r the
nmltiple unity

will

d epend

of

duration.

Every thing

on the weight we attribute to

thiR or that concept, and this wei ght will
always be arhitrat·y, since the concept ex·
tJ·acted ft•om the obj e c t has no weight, being
only the shatlo\\' of a body. In this way,
as many different systems will sp ring up
ns the1·e are external points of view from
which the reality can be e xamined , or larger
cireles in which it t�an h£> l:'nclose1l.
concepts

haw,

then, not only

Aimplt>

the incon·

Metaphysics

21

venience of dividing the concrete unity of
the object into so many symbolical expres­
sions; they also divide philosophy into dis­
tinct schools, each of which takes its seat,
chooses its counters, and carries on with
the others a game that will never end.
Either metaphysics is only this play of
ideas, or else, if i� is a serious occupation
of the mind, if it is a science and not simply
an exercise, it must transcend concepts in
order to reach intuition.
Certainly, conJ
-/
cepts are necessary to it, ·for all the other
sciences work as a rule with concepts, and
metaphysics cannot dispense with the other
sciences. But it is only truly itself when
it goes beyond the concept, or at least when
it frees itself from rigid and ready-made
concepts in order to create a kind very dif­
ferent from those which we habitually use;
I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluid
representations, always ready to mould
themselves on the fleeting forms of intui­
tion. We shall return later to this import­
---·

ant point

.

..1

Let it suffice us for the moment

An Introduction to

22

to have shown that
presented to us dire

:

�
:J

r duration can be

l in an intuition,

that it can be suggested to us indirectly
by images, but that it can never-if we
confine

the

word

meaning-be

concept

enclosed

in

to

its proper

a

conceptual

representation.
Let us try for an instant to consider our
duration as a multiplicity.

It will then be

necessary to add that the terms of this
multiplicity, instead of �eing distinct, as
they are in any other multiplicity, encroach
on one another; and that while we can no
doubt, by an effort of imagination, solidify
dm-ation once it has elapsed, divide it into
juxtaposed portions and count all these
portions, yet this operation is accomplished
on the frozen memory of the duration, on
the stationary trace which the mobility of
duration leaves behind it, and not on the
duration itself.

We must admit, therefore,

that if there is a multiplicity here, it bears
no resemblance to any other multiplicity
we know.

Shall we say, then, that dura·

Metaphysics
tion has unity?

23

Doubtless, a continuity of

elements which prolong themselves into one
another participates in unity as much as
in multiplicity; but this moving, changing,
colored, living unity has hardly anything
in common with the abstract, motionless,
and empty unity which the concept of pure
unity

circumscribes.

Shall

we

conclude

from this that duration must be defined as
unity and multiplicity at the same time?
But singularly enough, however much I
manipulate

the

two

concepts,

portion

them out, combine them differently, prac­
tise on them the most subtle operations
of mental chemistry, I never obtain any­
thing

which

tuition that

resembles

the

simple

in·

I have of duration; while,

on the contrary, when I replace myself in
duration by an effort of intuition, I im­
mediately percW.ve how it is unity, multi­
plicity,

and

many

other

things

besides.,.

These different concepts, then, were only so
many

standpoints' from

consider duration.

which we could

Neither separated nor

An Introduction to

24

reunited

it.

have they made us penetrate into

We do penetrate into it, however, and
that can only be by an effort of intuition.
In t his sense, an inner,

absolute knowledgl:'

of the duration of the sel f hy t he self h�

possi ble .

But

if metaphysics here demands

aml can obtain an intuition, science baR

none the less need of an analysis.
it

is

a

confusion

between

t he

Now

function

of a na lysis and that of intuition wbieh
gives
the

bir t h

to

schools

the

and

discussions

the

conflicts

hetwf'en
between

systems.
Psychology, in fact, proceeds like all the
other sciences by anal ysis .
self, which bas been

It

gi ven

resolves

the

to it at first in

a simple in tui tion , into sensations, feeling8,

idea s, etc., which it Rtudies separately.

substitutes,
elements

which

chology.

But

parts?

It

then, for the self a series of
form

are

the

t h e !'W

faets

of psy·

elements

really

That is the whole qu estio n, and it

is because it has been evaded that the

Metaphysics
problem of human personality has so often
been stated in insoluble terms.
It is incontestable �hat every psychical
state, simply because it belongs to a per­
son, reflects the whole of a personality.
Every feeling, however simple it may be,
contains

virtually

within

it

the

whole

past and present of the being experiencing
it, and, consequently, can only be separated
and .constituted into a " state " by an effort
of abstraction or of analysis.

But it is no

less incontestable that without this effort
of abstraction or analysis there would be
no possible development of the science of
psychology.

What,

then,

exactly, is

the

operation by which a _psycholo$ detaches
a mental state in order to erect it into a
more or less independent entity?
gins by neglecting that special
of the personality
pressed

in

known

which
and

cannot
common

He be­
coloring
be

ex­

terms.

Then he endeavors to isolate, in the person
already thus simplified, some aspect which
lends itself to an interesting inquiry.

If

An Introduction to

26

be is con s idering inclination, for example,
be

will

neglect the inexpressible shade

which colors i t, and which

makes the in­

clination mine and no t yours; he will
h i s attention on the mo ve men t by
our

fix

whic h

personality leans towards a certain

object: he will isolate this at ti tude , and it
is this special aspect of the personality, this
snapshot of the mobilit y of

the inner life,

this " diagram " of concrete inclinati on ,
that be will erect into an independent
fact.

There

is in this something very like

what an artist passing through Paris does
when be m ak es, for

example, a sketch of a

tower of Notre Dame.

The

tower is in­

u nited to the b nilding , which is
itst>lf no less inseparably united to the

separably

ground, to its surroundings, to

the whole

of Paris, and so on.

It is first necessary

to detach it from all

these; only on e aspect

of the whole is noted, that formerl by the
tower of Notre Dame.
cial form of

1\Ioreove r, tbe

Rpe­

this tower is due to the group­

ing of the stones of which it is compose d ;

Metaphysics
but the artist does not concern himself with
these stones, he notes only the silhouette of
the tower.

For the real and internal organi­

zation of the thing he substitutes, then, an
external and schematic representation.

So

that, on the whole, his sketch corresponds
to an observation of the object from a cer·
tain point of view and to the choice of a
certain means of representation.

But ex­

actly the same thing holds true of the
operation by which the psychologist ex­
tracts a single mental state from the whole
personality.

This isolated psychical state

is hardly anything but a sketch, the com­
mencement of an artificial reconstruction;
it is the whole considered under a certain
elementary aspect in which we are specially
interested
noted.

and

which

we

have carefully

It is not a part, but an element.

It has not

been obtained

by a natural

dismemberment, but by analysis.
Now beneath all the sketches he has made
at Paris the visitor will probably, by way
of memento, write the word " Paris."

And

An Introduction to

28
as he has

Paris, he will he

really seen

able,

wit h the help of the original intuition h e
had

of t h e whole, t o

t hert:•i n,
t here

place his sketcheH

and so join thPm up t oge th er.

But

is no way of performi ng the inverl"e

operation ;

it i� impossible,

i n fi nite number of

accurate

ewn

wit h an

sketches,

and

even with the word " Pari s " which intli·
cates that they must be
to get

back to an

newr had,

and

This is lwcauRe we

with

real p!1rt:�,

total

striking

example,

an

seen

tlealing

here

are not

To

hat,J

one

imp1-ession

one has never

but with

imprf'sRion.

togeth f• r,

in t u i tion that

t o give one !'lel f

of what Paris is like if
it.

combined

mere

take

a

where the

notes of the

more

still

notation

is

mOJ"e completely symbolic, sn ppn� that T

am

shown, mixed

letters

'"bi(·h

ign oran t of.

t ogether

m ak e

up

at ra ndom,

If the lettf'rs

the p()('m, I could

poPrn

a

were parts

attempt to

the poem with them

hy

t he

I

am
of

rf'eonstitnte

t r yi n g tlw d i fferen t

po��Sihle arrangPments, a s a child dnf'S with

the piec es

of

a

Chinese puzzle.

But

I

29

Metaphysics

should never for a moment think of attempt­
ing such a thing in this case, because the

component parts, but only
partial expressions, which is quite a dif­

letters are not

That is why, if I know the

ferent thing.

poem, I at once put each of the letters in
its proper place and join them up without
difficulty

by

a

continuous

connection,

whilst the inverse operation is impossible.
Even when

I

believe

I

am actually attempt­

ing this inverse operation, even when I put
the letters end to end, I begin by thinking
of some plausible meaning.

I thereby give

myself an intuition, and from this intuition
I attempt to redescend to the elementary
symbols which would reconstitute its ex­
pression.

The very idea of reconstituting a

thing by operations practised on symbolic
elements alone implies such an absurdity
that it would never occur to any one if
they recollected that they were not dealing
with fragments of the thing, but only, as
it were, with fragments of its symbol.
Such is, however, the undertaking of the

30

An Introduction to

philosopherH who try to ret:onstruct per­
so nality with p�o��·chkal states, whether t hey
confine themselves to those l'tates alone, or
whether they add a kind of thrl�a.d for the
purpose of joining the states together.

Bot h

empiri c· is t s and rationalh•ts are victims nf
the same fa llacy .

partia.l n-otations

Both of them mis t a k e
fnr

real parts,

th us con­

fusing the p oint of viPw of analy si s and
of intuiti on , of scienee and of metaphy"ics.
The emp i rici sts Ray quite
psychological

rightly that

diseovers

analysiK

nothing

more in personality t han psych ical states.
liluch is, in fact, the function, and the ver�·
definition of analysis.

The psychologist has

nothing else tn do hut a nalyze JWI'I'onality,
that is, to note certain states ; at the most
he may put the label

in saying they

"

ego '' on these states

are "states of the ego," just

as the artist writes the word "Paris" on
eat • h of his sketches.

the

ps_vchologist

On the level at which

places

himself,

and

on

\vhich he mu8t place him!'lPlf, the "ego'' is
only a sign by whi c h the primitive, and

Metaphysics
moreover very
has

31

confused, intuition which

furnished the

psychologist

with

his

subject-matter is recalled; it is only a word,
and the great error here lies in believing
that while remaining on the same level we
can find behind the word a thing.

Such

has been the error of those philosophers who
have not been able to resign themselves to
being only

psychologists

in

psychology,

Taine and Stuart Mill, for example.

�in

chologi

.

Psy­

the method they apply, they

have remained metaphysicians in the object
they set before themselves.

They desire an

intuition, and by a strange inconsistency
they seek thiR intuition in analysis, which

u:-1 They look for
claim tO" find it in psy­

is the very negation of
the ego, and they

chical states, though this diversity of states
has itself only been obtained, and could only
be obtained, by transporting oneself outside
the ego altogether, so as to make a series
of sketches, notes, and more or less symbolic
and

schematic

diagrams.

Thus,

however

much they place the states side by side,

An Introduction to

32

m]Jltiplying points of contact and exploring
the i nter v als, the ego always escapes them,

so that they finish by seeing in it nothing
but a vain phantom.

We might as well

deny that the Iliad had

a

meaning, on the

gro und that we had looked in vain for that
meaning in the intervals between the letters
of w hich it is composed.
Philosophical empiricism is born here,

then, of
view

a co n fu sion between the point of

of intuition

and

that

Reeking for the origin al

of

analysis .

in the translation ,

where naturally it cannot be, it denies the
existence of the o r ig i nal on the ground that

it ito� not found in the translation. It leads
of necessity to negations ; but on examining
the matter closely, we pe rceive that these
ne�atinns simply mean tha t analysis

int uition, which is self-evident.
original, and , one mm1t

adrl,

is

not

From the

very indistinct

i nt uit ion which gives positive science its
i m m ed iately

to

anal.n1h<, whi1·h multiplies to infinity

its

material,

l-lcience

passes

observations of this

material

from outside

Metaphysics
points of view.

33

It soon comes to believe

that by putting together all these diagrams
it can reconstitute the object itself.

No

wonder, then, that it sees this object fly be·
fore it, like a child that would like to make
a solid pla�'thing out of the shadows out·
lined along the wall!
But rationalism is the dupe of the same
illusion.

It starts out from the same con·

fusion as empiricism, and remains equally
powerless to rPach the inner splf.

Like

empiricism, it considers psychical states as
so many fragments detached from an ego
that hinds them together.

Like empiricism,

it tries to join these fragments together· in
order to re-create the unity of the self.
!.ike empiricism, finally, it sees this unity
of the self, in the continually renewed effort

it makes to clasp it, steal away indefinitely
like a phantom.

But whilst empiricism,

weary of the struggle, ends by declarin�
that there is nothing else but the multi·
plieity of ps)·chical states, rationalism per·
sists in affirming the 'tinity of the person;

An Introduction to

34

It is true that, seeking this unity on the
level of the psychical states themselves, and
obliged, besides, to put down to the account
of these states all the qualities and deter­
minations that it finds by analysis (since
analysis by its very definition leads always
to states), nothing is left to it, for the unity
of personality, but something purely nega­
tive, the absence of all determination.

The

psychical states having necessarily in this
analysis

taken

and

kept

for themselves

everything that can serve as matter, the
" unity of the ego " can never be more than
a form without content.

It will be abso­

lutely indeterminate and absolutely void.
To

these

detached

psychical

states,

to

these shadows o f the ego, t h e sum of which
was for the empiricists the equivalent of
the self, rationalism, in order to reconstitute
personality, adds something still more un­
real, the void in which these shadows move
-a place for shadows, one might say.

How

could this " form," which is,..iif truth form­
less, serve to characterize a living, active,

Metaphysics

35

concrete personality, or to distinguish Peter
from

Paul?

Is it

astonishing that

the

philosophers who have isolated this " form ''
of personality should, then, find it insuf­
ficient to characterize a definite person, and
that they should be gradually led to make
their empty ego a kind of bottomless re­
ceptacle, which belongs no more to Peter
than to Paul, and in which there is room,
according to our preference, for entire hu­
manity, for God, or for existence in general?
I Bee in this matter only one dift'erence
between empiricism and rationalism.

The

former, seeking the unity of the ego in
the gaps, as it were, between the psychi­
cal states,

is

other states,

led to
and

so

fill

the

gaps

with

on

indefinitely,

so

that the ego, compressed in a constantly
narrowing interval, tends towards zero, as
analysis

is

pushed farther and

farther;

whilst rationalism, making the ego the place
where mental states are lodged, is confronted
with an empty space which we have no rea­
son to limit here rather than there, which

36

An I ntroduction to

goes beyond each of the successive boun­
daries that we try to assign to it, which

constantly grows larger, and which tends
to lose itself no longer in zero, but in the
infinite.
The distance, then, between a so-called
"empiricism'' like that of Taine and the
most transcendental speculations of certain
German pantheists is very much less than is

g ene r ally supposed.

The method is analo­

gom� in both cases; it consists in reason­

i ng about the elements of a translation as
if they were

parts of the original.

Bu t

a

true empiricism is that which proposes to
get as near to the original itself as pos·
sible, to search deeply into its life, and so,
by a kind of

intellectual auscultation, to

feel the throbbings of its soul; and thh�
true empiricism is the true metaphysics.

It

is true that the task is an extreme ly diffi­
cult one, for none of the ready·made concep­
tions which thought employs in its daily
operations can be of any use.

Xothing is

more easy than to say that the ego is multi·

Metaphysics

37

plicity, or that it is unity, or that it is the
s�·nthesis of both.

Unity and multiplicity

are here representations that we have no
need to cut out on the model of the object;
they are found ready-made, and have only
to be chosen from a heap.

They are stock­

l'lize clothes which do just as well for Peter
as for Paul, for they set off the form of
nPither.

But an empiriciRm worthy of the

name, an empiricism which works only to
measure, is obliged for each new object that
it studies to make an absolutely fresh effort.
It cuts out for the object a concept which
is appropriate to that object alone, a con­
cept which can as yet hardly be called a
concept, Rince it applies to this one thing.
It does not proceed hy combining current
ideas Jike unity and multiplicity; hut it
leads us, on the contrary, to a

simple,

unique representation, which, however once
formed, enableH us to understand easily how
it is that we can place it in the frames
unity, multiplicity, etc., all much larger
than it�lf.

In short, philosophy thus. de·

38

An Introduction to

fined does not consist in the choice of cer·
tain concepts, and in taking sitles with a
school, but in the search for a unique intui·
tion from which we can desceml with equal
ease to different concepts, because we are
placed above the d ivisions of the schools.
/

That personality has unity cannot be de­

nied ; but such an affirmation teaches one
nothing about the extraord inary nature of
the particular unity presented by person­
ality.

That

our self is

multiple

I also

agree, but then it must be understood that

it is a multiplicity which has nothing in
common with any other multiplicity.

Wha t

is really important for philosophy is

to

know exactly what unity, what mul tiplicity,
and what reality superior both to abstraet
unity and multiplicity the multiple unity

of the self actually is.

Now philosophy

will know this only when it recovers pos­
session of the simple intuit ion of the self
by the self.

Then, according t o tlw direc·

tion it chooses for its descent from this
summit, it will arrive at unity or multi-

Metaphysics

39

plicity, or at any one of the concepts by
which we try to define the moving life of
the self.

But no mingling of these con­

cepts would give anything which at all
resembles the self that endures.
If we are shown a solid cone, we see with·
out any difficulty how it narrows towards
the summit and tends to be lost in a mathe·
matical point, and also how it enlarges in
the direction of the base into an indefinitely
increasing circle.

But neither the point

nor the circle, nor the juxtaposition of the
two on a plane, would give us the least
idea of a cone.

The same thing holds true

of the unity and multiplicity of mental life,
and of the zero and the infinite towards
- --- -·-

-

--

which empiricism and rationalism conduct
--

··· ·

personality.
Concepts, as we shall show elsewhere,
generally go together in couples and repre-.
sent two contraries.

There is hardly any

concrete reality which cannot be observed
from two opposing standpoints, which can­
not consequently be subsumed under two

An Introduction to

40

antagonistic concepts.

Hence a thesis and

an antithesis which we endeavor in vain
to reconcile logically, for the very simple
reason that it is impossible, with concepts
and obRervations taken from outside points
of view, to make a t hing.

But from the

object, seized by intuition,_ we pass easily
in many cases to the two contrary conceptR ;
and

as

in that. way thesis and antithesis can

be seen to spring from reality, we grasp at
the same time how it is that the two are
opposed and how they are reconciled.
It is true thut to accomplish this, it is

necessary to pt·oceerl by a rcverRul of the
usual work of the intellect.

Think,in,q

mm­

ally consists in paRHing from concept!-� to
things, and not from things to concepts.
To know a reality, in the usual sense of the
word " know,'' is to take ready-made con­
cepts, to portion them out and to mix them
together until a practical equivalent of the
reality is obtained.

But it m ust be remem­

bered that the normal work of the intellect
is far from being disinterested.

We do not

Metaphysics
aim generally at �-!l(J\Vlecfge for the sake of

.
knowledge, btrt in order to take sides, to
draw profit-in ��?rt! ���!�s �y a !!-_ inter�
__
est. We inquire up to what point the

object we seek to know is this or that, to
what known class it belongs, and what kind
of action, bearing, or attitude it should
suggest to us. These different possible
actions and attitudes are so many concep·
tual directions of our thought, determined
once for all; it remains only to follow
them : in that precisely consists the appli­
cation of concepts to things. To try to fit
a concept on an object is simply to ask
what we can do with the object, and what
it can do for us. To label an object with
a certain concept is to mark in precise terms
the kind of action or attitude the object
should suggest to us. All knowledge, prop­
erly so called, is then oriented in a certain
------direction, o!_!���!l-�!'� a �er_!��.J?Qi!tt_ �f
.
view. It is true that our interest is often '
complex. This is why it happens that our
knowledge of the same object may face sev__

An Introduction to

42

••ml Muf:ceMive directioBH and may be taken
ft•flm varlouH point:H of view.

It is this

whlth '�'mHtltu tL>H, in the usual meaning of

Hw U!MnH, a " broad " and " comprehensive "
lmowlmlg•! of tlw object ; the object is then
brought not under one single concept, but

u rul••r Mtweral in which it is supposed to
" tntrt.l dpate."

How does it participate in

n i l tlwMtl <�oncepts at the same time?- . . This
IM

qlwMt.Jon which does not concern our

n

Jlrn rtlrnl ac ti on and about which we need
It is, therefore, natural and

nut. t ruu hh1.

lt1t(ttlnlll t e in ()aily life to proceed by the

juxtapoedthm

an<l portioning out of con­

t't'pt R ; nu phi loNophil'nl difficulty will arise

trmn thiN prtM.'l>thtn•, since by a tacit agree1\lt'llt

Wt.'

shn l l ubstain frtlm philosophizing.

Uut to t.'Rtty t his m odt18 OJH'tll lldi into
J'blh�t,phy.

tu l\t\88

ht'rt.> also frtlm concepts

t u tht' thin� to use in ordt'r t o obtain a
ttl:�tll\h'�h-..l km.,wlt"ltg\' of an objt'Ct ( that
thl:�t dU\t' ""'' tt�irt.> to p8.."'P as it is in it�lf)
• ""'nnt'r

•""

,.r kn,,"·i� inspi� by a d�t�rmin­

iutf'l\"$f� �tillg by d�.linirlon

in an

Metaphysics

43

externally-taken view of the object, is to
go against the end that we have chosen, to
condemn philosophy to an eternal skirmish­
ing between the schools and to install con­
tradiction in the very heart of the object
and of the method.

Either there is no

philosophy possible, and all knowledge of
things is a practical knowledge aimed at
the profit to be drawn from them, or else
philosophy consists in placing oneself with­
iii Hie object itself by an effort of intuition.
But in order to understand the nature of
this intuition, in order to fix with precision
where intuition ends and where analysis
begins, it is necessary to return to what waR
said earlier about the flux of duration.
It will be noticed that an essential char­
acteristic of the concepts and diagrams to
which analysis leads is that, while being
considered, th� :r�main stationary.

I

iso­

late from the totality of interior life that
psychical entity which
tion.
it

I call a

simple sensa·

So long as I study it, I suppose that

remains

constant.

If

I

noticed any

An Introduction to

44

change in it, I should say that it w as not
a si n gle sensation but several successive
sensat ions, and I should then t ransfer to
each of these successive sen�o�at io n s t he im­
m u tability that

I

firflt

to

at t ributed

t he

In a ny case I can , hy

total sensation.

pu sh i ng the analysis far enough, a l ways
manuge to arrive at elements which I agree
to conl'lider immutable.

The re, and there

only, sha l l I find the Holid hasis of opera­

tions whh-b science needs for its own p roper
rlPvelopruent.

*

Hut,

t hen,

cannot escape

I

t h e objec­

tion that t here is no state of mind, how­
e ver simpl«>, which does not change every
moment, since

there is

no consciousnt•ss

w ith o u t memor�·. anti no con tinuat ion of a
tdate wit hont the a d di t i on , to thP present

((•£>l ing, of t b� mt'mory of paRt moment!-;.
i s t h i s wh ich constitutes duration.

It

Inner

d m·ntion is the con tinuous life of a memor y
whieh prolou� t he past i n t o t h e present ,
t hP p resent either c o nt ai nin g within i t i n
a

di s tinct

form

the

ceaselessly

growing

Metaphysics

45

image of the past, or, more probably, show­
ing by its continual change of quality the
heavier and still heavier load we drag be­
hind us as we grow older.

Without this

survival of the past into the present there
would be no duration, but only instantaneity.
Probably if I am thus accused of taking
the mental state out of duration by the mere
fact that I analyze it, I shall reply, " Is not
each of these elementary psychical states, to
which my analysis leads, itself a state which
occupies time?

My analysis," I shall say,

" does indeed resolve the inner life into
states, each of which is homogeneous with
itself ; only, since the homogeneity extends
over a definite number of minutes or of
seconds, the elementary psychical state does
not cease to endure, although it does not
change."
But, in saying that, I fail to see that the
definite number of minutes and of seconds,
which I am attributing here to the elemen­
tary psychical state, has simply the value of

a sign intended to remind me that the psy-

An Introduction to

46

chkal state, suppo&'d homogeneous, is in
reality a state which changes and endures.
The

state, taken in itself, is a perpetual

heeoming.
l'nming

I

have extracted from t his be·

a certain aYerage of quality, which

I have suppo�o�ed invariable ; I have in this
way

constituted a stable and consequently

schematic state.

I have, on the other hand,

ext racted from it Becoming in general, i. e.,
a becoming which is not the becoming of
any
have

particular thing, and this is what I
call<><l the tim e the stat� occupies.

Were I to look at it closely, I should

see

that this abstract time is as immobile for
me as the state whic h I localize in it, that
it could flow only by a continual change of

quality, and that if it is without quality,
merely the theatre of t he change, it thus
heromes an immobile medium.

I should see

that the construction of this homogeneous
t ime

is simply designed to facilitate the

comparison between the different concrete
durations, to permit us to count simulta·
neities, and to measure one ftux of duration

Metaphysics
in relation to another. . . And lastly

47

I should

understand that, in attaching the sign of
a definite number of minutes and of seconds
to the representation of an elementary psy·
chical state, I am merely reminding myself
and others that the state has been detached
from an ego which endures, and merely
marking

out

the

place

where

it

must

again be set in movement in order to bring
it back from the abstract schematic thing
it has become to the concrete state it was
at first.

But

I ignore all that, because it

has nothing to do with analysis.
This means that analysis operates always
··
on the immobile wh ilst intuition places it--- .

;

self in mobility, or, what comes to the same
thing, in duration.

There lies the very dis­

tinct line of demarcation between intuition
and analysis.

The real, the experienced,

and the concrete are recognized by the fact
that they are variability itself, the element
by the fact that it is invariable.

And the

element is invariable by definition, being a
diagram, a simplified reconstruction, often

An Introduction to

48

a mere

symbo l

,

in any case a motionless

view of the m oving

(' But
we

reality

.

the error co nsi sts in

can reconstruct the real

grams.

believing

that

with these d ia­

already said and may

As we have

as well repeat here-frol1l_ intuition one can

,

but not from analysis to

pass to an alysi s

intuition.
vari ab i li ty

Out of

variations, qualities

can make as many

we

and m odification s as

pll•ase, sim·e these are so
taken by

,

a nalysiN of

end,

m obili ty given

will prouuce

to

nothing which re­

sembles variability, since they

are

of it, but elements, which is quite

thing

we

sta t i c views,

Rut the�e m od ific ation lil, put end

intuition.
to

the

many

.

Cnmlider,
whieh is

for

f>Xample,

the

not parts

a d ifferent
variability

nearest to homogeneity, that

movement i n space.

can

imagine possible liltop·

what

we call the po si tio ns

this movemt•nt we
pages ; these are
of

the m oving

it

passes.

of

Along the whole of

body, or the poi n t s hy

which

,

But with these po s iti ons

even

Metaphysics

..

49

with an infinite number of them, we shall
never make movement.

They are not parts

of the movement, they are so many snap­
shots of it ; they are, one might say, only
supposed stopping-places. The moving b nilv

v:...._.;,.�..

is never really in any of the points

A

the

most we can say is that it passes through
them.

But passage, which is movement, has

nothing in common with stoppage, which
is immobility.

A

movement cannot be

superposed on an immobility, or it would
then coincide with it, which would be a
contradiction.

The points are not in the

movement, as parts, nor even beneath it,
as positions occupied by the moving body.
They are simply projected by us under the
movement, as so many places where a mov­
ing body, which by hypothesis does not
stop, would be if it were to stop.

They are

not, therefore, properly speaking, positions,
but " suppositions," aspects, or points of
view of the mind.

B ut how could we con­

struct a thing with points of view?
Nevertheless, this is what we try to do

so

An Introduction to

whenever we reason about movement, and
also about time, for which movement serves
as a means of representation.

As a result

of an illusion deeply rooted in our mind,
and because we cannot prevent ourselves
from considering analysis as the equivalent
_of intuition, we begin by distinguishing
along the whole extent of the movement, a
certain number of possible stoppages or
points, which we make, whether they like
it or no, parts of the movement.

Faced

with our impotence to reconstruct the move­
ment with these points, we insert other
points, believing that we can in this way
get nearer to the essential mobility in the
movement.

Then, as this mobility still es·

capes us, we substitute for a

fixed and

finite number of points an " indefinitely in­
creasing " number-thus vainly trying to
counterfeit, by the movement of a thought
that goes on indefinitely adding points to
points, the real and .undivided motion of
the moving body.

Finally, we say that

movement is composed of points, but that

51

Metaphysics

it comprises, i n addition, the obscure and

fs

p

� teriow;- assage from one position · to
the next. As if the obscurity was not due
entirely to the fact that we have supposed
immobility to be clearer than mobility and
rest anterior to

movement !

As

if the

mystery did not follow entirely from our
attempting

to

pass

from

stoppages

to

movement by way of addition, which is im­
possible, when it is so easy to pass, by
simple diminution, from movement to the
slackening of movement, and so to im·
mobility !

It i!_Elo��_!lle:r:t�. !�l!t ��-must aoL

custo� ?�:t:.�l!es �o �ook upon as simplest
-andclearest, immobility being only the ex- - - · -- -· -

.

treme limit of the slowing down of movement, a limit reached only, perhaps, in
thought and never realized in nature.

What

we have done is to seek for the meaning of
the poem in the form of the letters of which
it is composed ; we have believed that by
considering an .increasing number of letters
we would grasp at last the ever-escaping
meaning, and in desperation, seeing that it

52

An I ntroduction to

was
in

ufoU>less to seek for a part of the sense

each

of

the letters, we have supposed

t hat it was between each letter and the
that this long-sought fragment of

next

the myst e ri ous
le t te rs, it

sense

t he

symboL

the thing, but e leme nt s

Again,

moving body are
ment ; they
iH

suppol'led

But the

pointed out once again,

must be

are not parts of

w as lodged !

of

the posi t i ons of the

not parts of the move­

are points

of

the space wh i c h

to underlie the movement.

This empty and immobile space which is
percei ved , has the

merely concPived, never
v a i n £' o f a R_vmhol only.

How could you

ev£'r II_lll.��factu re reality_ bJ' ��n i pu lat i ng
_

f!�ls?

_

_

llnt the symbol in this case responds to

the most i n ve t erate habits of our thought.
We place o u rse l ves
in

as a

rule in immobility,

which we find a point of su p po rt fo r

p rac t ical

bil ity

purposes, and wit h

we try

ohtain in

this immo­

to reconst rud motion.

thiR wa,v a clumsy

We only

i m i t at io n , a

counterfeit of real movement, but this imita-

Metaphysics

53

tion is much more useful in life than the
intuition of the thing itself would be.

Now

our mind has an irresistible tendency to
consider that idea clearest which is most
often useful to it.

That is why immobility

see ms to it clearer than mobility, and rest
anterior to movement.
The dimculties to which the problem of
movement has given rise fr om the earliest
antiquity have originated in this way.

They

result always from the fact that we insis t
on passing from space to movement, from
the trajectory to the flight, from immobile
positions to mobility, and on passing from
one to the other by way of addition.

But

it is movement which is anterior to im­
mobility, and the relation between positions
and a d isplacement is not that of parts to
a whole, but that of the d iversity of pos­
sible points of view to the real indivisibility
of the object.
Many other problems are born of the
same illusion.

What stationary points are

to the movement of a moving body, concepts

An Introduction to

54

of different qualities are to the qualitative
The various concepts

change of an object.

into which a change can be analyzed at·e
therefore so many stable views of the in­
stability of the real.

And to think of an

object-in the usual meaning of the word
" think "-is to take one or more of these
immobile views of its mobi lity.

It consists,

in short, in asking from time to time where
the object is,

in order that we may know

what to do with it.

Nothing could be more

legitimate, moreover, than this method of
procedure, so long as we are concerned only
with

a

practical

knowletlge

of

reality.

Knowledge, in so far as it is directed to
practical matters, has only to enumerate
the principal possihle atti tudes of the thing
towards us, as well as our best possible

attitude towards it.

Therein lies the ordi­

nary function of ready-made concepts, thoHe
1 stations with which we mark out the path
of becoming.

But to seek to penetrate with

them into the inmost nature of things, is
to apply to the

mobility of the real a

Metaphysics

55

method created in order to give stationary
points of observation on it.

It is to forget

that, if metaphysic is possible, it can only
be a laborious, and even painful, effort to
remount the natural slope of the work of
thought, in order to place oneself directly,
by a kind of intellectual expansion, within
the thing studied : in short, a passage from
reality to concepts and no longer from con­
cepts to reality.

Is it astonishing that, like

children trying to catch smoke by closing
their hands, philosophers so often see the
object they would grasp fly before them ?
It is in this way that many of the quarrels
between the schools are perpetuated, each
of them reproaching the others with having
allowed the real to slip away.
f'

,. .

But if metaphysics is to proceed by in­

)uition, if intuition has the mobility of
duration

as

its object, and if duration is

of a psychical nature, shall we not be con·

'-

fining the

philosopher to

contemplation

of himself?

the exclusive
Will not phi­

losophy come to consist in watching oneself

56

An Introduction to

merely live, " as a sleepy shepherd watcheR
the water

flow " ? 1

To

would be to return to the

talk

in this way

error

which, sin ce

the beginning of t his study, we have n ot
ceased

to

point

conceive the
and at

out.

It

would be to mis­

singular nature of duration,

the same t ime t he

essentia l l."V active,

I might almost say violent, character of
metaphysical intuition. It w ou l d he fail­
ing to see that the method we speak of
alone permits us to go beyond id ea l is m ,
as wel l as realism , to affirm the existence
of obj ec t s inferior a nd superior ( th o ugh in
a certain sem�e interior) to us, to make
them co-exist together without d ifficu l ty,
and to d issipate gradually the ohscuri tie8
th at analysis accumulates round these great
problems. Without entering here upon the
study o f these different points, l e t us con­

fine ourselves to showing how the int nit ion
we speak o f is not a single act, but an in­
definite series of acts, all doubtless of the
1 "

Comme un patre assoupi regarde l'eau couler."

-Rolla, Alfred de Musset.

( Translator's note.)

Metaphysics

57

[18.me kind, bu t each of a very particular
species,

and bow

this

diversity of acts

corresponds to a ll the degrees of being.
I f I seek to analyze d u ration-that is, to
resolve it

ready-made concepts-! am

into

compelled,

by

the Vt>ry nature of

the

con­

cepts and of analysis, to take two opposing
views of

duration. in general,

I then attempt to reconstruct it.

wi t h which
This com­

bination, whkh will have, nwreovPr, some­
thing m i raculous ahout it-since one does
no t understand bow t w o contraries would
evl'r

meet each

otht•t'--<'an pre�Wnt neithet•

a diversity of degrees nor a variety of forms ;
like a l l miracles, it is or it is not.

I sha ll

have to say, for example, that there is on
the one hand a

multiplicity

of �o�u<"cessive

states of consciousne�o�s, and on thf' other a

unity which

binds them t oge the r.

Duration

will be the " s�-nthe�o�is " of this unity and
this

multi plicity, a mysterious operation

which takes place in darkness, and in re­
gard to which, I rt:'peat , one does not Nt'e
bow it wou ld admit of shades or of degrees.

58

An Introduction to

In this hypothe��is there is, and can only
be, one single duration, that in which our
own consciousness habitually works.
express it

more

clearly-if

we

To

coll8ider

duration onder the simple aspect of a move­
ment accomplishing itself in space, and we
Meek to reduce to concepts movement con­
sidered BH representative of time, we shall

have, on the one hand, as great a number
of points on the t rajectory as we may de­
Hire, and, on the other hand, an abstract
unity which holds them together as a thread
holds together the pearls of a necklace.

Be­

tween this abstract multiplicity and this
ahMtract unity, the combination, when once

it haK bee n posited as possible, is something
u ni que, which will no more admit of shades
than does the addition of given numbers

arithmetic

.

in

But if, instead of professing to

analyze duration (i. e., at bottom, to make

a AynthesiK of it with concepts ) , we at once
place our��eJves in it by an effort of intu­

Ition, we have the feeling of a certain very

determinate tension, in which the determina-

Metaphysics

59

tion itl!elf appears as a choice between an
infinity of possible durations.

Hencefor­

ward we can picture to ourselves as many
durations as we wish, all very different
from each other, although each of them, on
being reduced to concepts-that is, observed
externally from two opposing points of view
-always comes in the end to the same in­
definable combination of the many and the
one.
Let us express the same idea with more
precision.

If I consider duration as a

multiplicity of moments bound to each
other by a unity which goes through them
like a thread, then, however short the chosen
duration may be, these moments are un­
limited in number.

I can suppose them as

close together as I please ; there will always
be between these mathematical points other
mathematical points, and

so

on to infinity.

Looked at from the point of view of multi­

plicity, then, duration disintegrates into a
powder of moments, none of which endure8,
each being

an

i.nartantaneity.

If, on the

An Introduction to

6o
other

hand,

I consider

the

unity

which

binds the moments together, this cannot

endure either, since

by hypothesis every­
changing, and everything that

thing that is

is reall�· durable in the duration, bas been

put to the account of the m u l tiplicity of
moments.

I

As

probe more deeply into its

es..�nce, this unity ";n appear to me as some

immobile �ubs t ra t n m of that which is mov­

ing, as some in temporal essence of time ; it

i� this t ha t

�hall call eternity ; an eter­

I

nity of death, since it is nnthing elMe than

t he movemPnt emptied of the
made its life.

i_ql!�

Clo.<�elv
.

mobility which
examined, the opin-

of the oppoji;ing schools

of durat ion ,n;uhl- be

m

�-

on the subject
to diffpr solely

in t his, that the�· attribute a eapital impm·t ­

ance to o nP or t he other nf t hP� two
repts.

St!nll'

S(!here

to tht>

t•on·

point nf vie\\·

of the mu !_! iple ; they Foet up a.�

concrete

reality the il i�tinct moments of a t i me wbicb
they have rednrf'rl

to po'\\·der ;

the nnity

which enables us to call t he �ins a powder
they

hold

to

be

much

more

a rtificial.

Metaphysics

61

Othe1'8, on the contrary, set up the unity of
.....

duration as concrete reality.
._

themselves in the eternal.

They place
But as their

eternity remains, notwithstanding, abstract,
since it is empty, being the eternity of a
concept which, by hypothesis, excludes from
itself the opposing concept, one does not
see how this eternity would permit of an
indefinite number of moments coexisting in
it.

In the first
hypothesis we have a world
....

resting on nothing, which must end and
begin again of its own accord at each in­
stant.

In the se�nd we have an infinity

of abstract eternity, about which also it
is just as difficult to understand why it does
not remain enveloped in itself and how it

./

allows things to coexist with it.

But ig.

both cases, iand whichever of the two meta­
_;.J

physics it be that one is switched into;, time
....
appears, from the psychological point of
view, as a mixture of two abstractions,
which admit of neither degrees nor shades.
In one system as in the other, there is only
one unique duration, which carries every-

An Introduction to

62

thing with it-a bot to mless, hankless river,
wh ich flows wit hout a ss i gnable force in a
d irection which cou ld not.

be defined. ,. Even

t hen we can ca ll it only a river, and the
river only

from

the

flows,

because

tl oc t r i nes

t wo

reality

obtains

concession,

this

profiting by a mo men t of perplexity in their
logic.

As Roon

as t h ey recover from this

perplexity, they freeze this flux either into
an

immense

solid

sheet,

or

into an

in­

fi n ity of crystallized needles, always into a

th ing which

par tak es

necerumrily

i m m ob i li ty of a

point of

of

the

view.

I t is quite otherwise i f we place our­
selves from the first, by an effort of intu­

ition,

in

Ce rt ai n ly,
rea�o�on

the

con c rete

we shall

for posi t.ing

du rations.

flow

then

of duration.

find

no logi cal

mu lt ip le and diverse

Strictly, there might well be

no other duration than our own, as, for
example, there mi gh t be no other color iii
the worltl but orange.
sci o mmess

based

on

But just as a con­
color,

w hich

sym­

pathized internally with OJ•ange instead or

Metaphysics
percetvmg it externally, would feel itself
held between red and yellow, would even
perhaps suspect beyond this laBt color a
romplete spectrum into which the conti­
nuity from red to yellow might expand
naturally, so the intuition of our duration,
far from leaving us suspended in the void
as pore analysis would do, brings us into
contact with a whole con�inuity of dura­
tions which we must try to follow, whether
downwards or upwards ; in both cases we
can extend ourselves indefinitely by an in­
creasingly violent effort, in both cases we
transcend ourselves.

In the 1lnt we ad­

vance towards a more and more attenu­
ated

duration,

the

pulsations

of

which,

being rapider than ours, and dividing our
simple sensation, dilute its quality

into

quantity ; at the limit would be pure homO­
geneity, that pure

repetition by which we

define materiality.

Advancing in the other

direction, we approach a duration which

strains, contracts, and intensifies itself
more and more ; at the limit would be

64

An Introduction to

eternit.,v •..

No longer conceptual eternity,

which is an eternity of death, but an eter­
nity of life.

A

living, and therefore still

moving eternity in which our own particular
duration would be incl ud ed as

t he

vibra·

tions are in light ; an eternity which would

he the concentration of all duration, as
materiali t y is its dispersion. Between these
two extreme limits intuition moves, ami
this movement is the very essence of
metaphysics
.

•
•

•

There can be no question of following
here the various stages of t his movement.
Hut ha,·ing presented a general view of Uu�

meth od and made a fi rst applit-ation of it,
it m ay not be a miss to formulate, as pre­
cisely as we can, the pr·inciples on w h ich
it rests. M oRt of t he following prupo�o�i­
tions have already recei vt'(l in this esAAy
:mme degrre of proof. ""p hope to tlt>mon·
Rtratt• them mort> eompletPly when we come
to deal with othe1· prohlemt!.

Metaphysics
I.

7'here i.s a reality that is ezternal and
11et gi t,en immediately to the mind. Com·
mon·sense is right on this point, as against
the idt>alism and realism of the philosophers.
_
I I . This reality is mobility. Not thin,qs .

J

made, hut things in the making, not self­
maintaining

sta,tes,

states, exist.

Rest is never more than appar­

but

ent, or, rather, relative.

only

changing

The consciousness

we have of our own self in its continual tlux
introduces us to the interior of a reality,
on the model of which we must represent
other realities.

A ll 1·eality, therefore, is
tendenc,11, if we agree to mean by tendency
a n incipient change of direction.
III.

Our mind, which seeks for solid

points of support, has for its main func­
tion in the ordinary course of life that of
representing
at

long

states and things.

intervals,

almost

It takes,

instantaneous

views of the undivided mobility of the real.
It thus obtains

sensations ancl ideas.

In

this way it substitutes for the continuous
the discontinuous, for motion stability, for

An Introduction to

66

tendency in process of change, fixed points
marking a direction of change and ten­
dency.

This substitution is necessary to

&,mmon-Rense,

to language, to practical

life, and ewn, in a certain degree, which
we shall endeavor to determine, to posi­
tive science.

Our intellect, when it follows

Us natural bent, proceeds on the one hmz d
by solid pe1·ceptions, and on the other by

It

sta b le conception s.

starts from the im­

mobile, and only conceives and expressefl
movement as a function of immobility.

It

takes up its position in ready-made con­
cepts, and endeavors to catch in them,
as in a

net,

something of the reality

whkh passes.

This is certainly not done

in order to obtain an internal and meta­
physical

knowledge

of

the

real,

hut

simply in order to util� the real, each

concept ( as also each sensation ) being a
practical question

which our activity puts

to reality and to which reality rE'plies, as
mm�t he done in bm�iness, by a Yes or
a No.

But,

in doing that, it lets that

Metaphysics
which is its very essence escape from the
real.
The inherent difficulties of meta­

IV.

physic, the antinomies which it gives rise

to; ·

and the contradictions into which it

falls, the division into antagonistic schools,
and

the

systems

irreducible
ar_e

_ __

!_!�� to

largely

opposition
the

result

between
of

our

ap}l

the disinterested knowledge of
_
the real, processes which we generally em­
P.�«?Y- . for practical ends.

They arise from

the fact that we place ourselves in the im­
mobile in order to lie in wait for the mov­
ing thing as it passes, instead of replacing
ourselves in
order to
positions.

the moving thing itself, in

traverse

with

it

the immobile

They arise from our professing

to reconstruct reality-which is tendency
and conseque�tly mobility-with percepts
and concepts whose function it is to make
it

stationary.

With

stoppages,

however

numerous they may be, we shall never make
mobility ; whereas, if mobility is given, we
can, by means of diminution, obtain from

An Introduction to

68

it by thought as many stoppages as we de­
.

sire.

it is clear that �ed
concepts may be extracted by our thought
from mobile reality; but there are no
means of reconstructing the mobility of
the real with fixed concepts. Dogmatism,
however, in so far as it has been aoUI.i.der
of

In other words,

systems,

has

always

attempted

this

reconstruction.

V.

In this it was bound to fail

It is

on this impotence and on this impotence
only that the

sceptical,

idealist,

critical

doctrines really dwell : in fact, all doctrines
that deny to our intelligence the power o f
attaining the absolute.

But because we

fail to reconstruct the living reality with
stiff and ready-made concepts, it does not
follow that we cannot grasp it in some other
way.

Th e dem onstrations

which haoe been
given of the rela tivity of our kn 010ledge
are therefore tai11 ted 1dth an original vice;
they imply, like the dog m at ism they attack_.
that all kn o wledge m ust necessarily start
from concepts with jUed outline•, iA order

Metaphysics
to clasp with them the reality which
flows.
.. VI.

But the truth is that our intelligence

can follow the opposite method.

It can

place itself within the mobile reality, and
adopt its ceaselessly changing direction ; in
short, can grasp it by means of that

lectual sympathy

intel­

which we call intuition.

This is extremely difficult.

The mind haR

to do violence to itself, has to reverse the
direction of the operation by which it habitu­
ally thinks, has perpetually to revise, or
rather to recast, all its categories.

But in

this way it will attain to fluid concepts,
capable of following reality in all its sinu­
osities and of adopting the very movement
of the inward life of things.

Only thus

will a progressive philosophy be built up,

freed from the disputes which arise be­
tween

the

various

schools,

and

able

to

solve its problems naturally, because it will
be released from the artificial expression
in

terms

posited.

of

which

such

problems

are

To philosophize, therefore, is to

70

An Introduction to

imJert the habitual direction of the work
of thought.
VII.

tlAed

This inversion has never been prac­

in a methodical manner ; but a pro­

fou ndly

t•omddered

hist�ry

oftL� lJ�!�,

thought would show t hat c"e owe to

� all

all t bnt iK p<>rmanent in metaphysics.

The

t hat. it� gt't'Atest in the sciences, as well as

moHt pt•wt•rfu l of t he methods of investiga­
t ion nt

t lw disposal of the human mind,

tht' iutlnitt'sima l <'lllculus, originated from

tbls wry in\'t>rsion.

llodt>rn mathemati<'R

lB p�isc.·ly nn t•tfort to substitute t he beit�g

'"ndft for Cbt> rro dy rnnde. to follow t he

lt''nt•rnt ion of magnit udes, to grasp motion
uu

lnn�"\·r frnm

·�d t hout

llla,\"\"tl "-su i t . but fr..1m

and

in

i t s dis­

; t h in and in its

"

h•n,lt•nt·y t n t•han�· ; in short. to adopt the
mubUt• \"\lnt lnnity o f t bt> ont liJK.s of t hings.
I t is trut" that it i s l''o n fined t o thE' outline�

twoi� unly tbt' Slt'it'Dl"'l' of mapitude:F..

It

i� trut' al�l t hat it ha� only be.:>n able- to
at"bW.w ils m&M'\'loos applkat ions by the
inwntk\D ,,f

i n symbols. and that if

"�na

Metaphysics

71

the intuition of which we have j u st spoken
lies at the origin of invention, it is the
alone which is concerned

symbol

a p plicat ion .

in

the

But me ta ph ysic s, which aims

at no ap p l ica t ion, can and usually must

abstain from con verti ng intuition i nto sym­
bols.

Liberated

from

the

obl i ga t ion

of

working for practically useful result s , it
will indefinitely enla rge the domain o f i t s
in vestiga t i o ns .

What it may lm�e in com­

pnt iso n wi th sc i enc e i
·

tude, it will regain in

�i l i t y

and exacti­

_ra.nge...iL.ild �0!1·

Though ma th ema tics is only t he sci en ce o f

m agni t ude s , t hough ma t h em a t ical p ro cesses

are ap pl icabl e only to quantities, it mu s t

not be forgotten that q u a n t i ty is always
quality in a nascent state ; i t is, we might
say,

the

nat u ra l ,

lim iti ng

then ,

case

that

of quality.

metaphyHics

It

is

should

atlopt the generative idea of our mathe­

matics in rmler to extend it to all qu al iti es ;
t hat is, to rea lity in ge nera l .

It will not,

b�· doing t h is , in any way be moving to­
wards u ni versal m athem a t i cs, that chimera

72

An Introduction to

of modern philosophy.
farther it goes,
into

symbols

counters.

On the contrary, the

the

will

But it

more

be

untranslatable

the

obj ects

it

en­

will at least have begun

by gett ing into contact wi t h
and mobility of the rea l ,
contact can be most

the co nt in uity

just where this

marvelously u tilized.

It will ha ve contemplated itself
which reflects an

in a mirror

image of itself, much

shrunken, no doubt, but for that reason
very

luminous.

It

have

will

greater clearness what the
processes borrow
it will

seen

with

m at h e m a t i t · a l

from concrete real it ,v , and

continue in t he direction of

com-re t e

reality, and n o t in that of mathematical
processes.

Having then

discounted before­

hand what is too modest,
time

too

ambitious,

in

and at the same
the

followin�

formula, we may say that the objeet of
metaphysics is to perform qualitative d if­
ferentiations and integra tions.
VIII. The reason why this object has
been lost sight of, and why scie nce itself
has been mistaken in the origin of the pro-

Metaphysics

73

cesses it employs, is that intuition, once
attained, must find a mode of expression
and of application which conforms to the
habits of our thought, and one which fur­
nishes us, in the shape of well-defined con­
cepts, with the solid points of support which
we so greatly need.

In that lies the con­

dition of what we call exactitude and pre­
cision,

and

also

the

condition

of

the

unlimited extension of a general method to
particular cases.

Now this extension and

this work of logical improvement can be
continued

for

centuries,

whilst

the

act

:which creates the method lasts but for a
moment.

That is why we so often take the

logical equipment of science for science it­
self/ forgetting the metaphysical intuition

�rom

which all the rest has sprung.

-----

From the overlooking of this intuition
proceeds all that has been said by phi­
losophers and by men of science themselves
1

On this point

as

on several other questions treated

in the present essay, see the interesting articles by
MM.

Le

Roy,

Vincent,

and

Wilbois,

which

have

appeared in the Re'IJUe de Metc.physique et de Morale.

An Introduction to

74
about

the " relativity " of scientific knowl­

edge.

lVhat

is

rela tine

is

the

sym fwlic

con cepts, which
frorn th e fixed to the m o t'ing, a n d
in tuitive knowledge trh irh insta ll.�

knowledge by pre-e:ristin y
proceeds
not the

itself in that which ,is m o nin g a nd a doptR
the

very life of

things.

Th i s

intuition at­

tains the absolute.
Science and metaphysics therefore come
toget h e r in intuition.

A t ru l y intuitive

philosophy would realize t h e m uch-detii n.•d
u n io n of science and metaphysics. V\'h i le
it would make of metaphyRics a pml it i ve
science-that is, a progt·essiw and indefi­
nitely perfec t i ble o ne-- i t would at the same
time lead the positive scie nces, p ro perl y so­
l'a l l ed, to hecome l'onscious of their t rue
Hcope, often far greater than t h ey i magine.
It

would

put

ph ysic s , noll

mm·e

more

science

me ta ph ysics

into

into science.

It wo u l d ret-mit in resto ring the
between

t ht' in t u i t ion s

which

meta­

c on t in u i ty

tlw

varionR

se iences have obtai ned here and t here in

the cotmJc of their history, and whkil

Metaphysics
they

have

obtained

only

75

by

strokes

genius.
IX.

of

../

That there are not two different

ways of knowing things fundamentally, that
the

various

sciences

have

their

root

in

metaphysics, is what the �n_cie_!l_L_E�jl_o_s�
phers generally thought.
not lie there.

Their error did

It consisted in their being

always dominated by the belief, so natural
to the human mind, that a variation can
only be the expression and devPlopment of
what

is

invariable.

Whence

it

followed

that action was an enfeebled contemplation,
d uration a deceptive and shifting image of
immobile eternity, the Soul a fall from the
Idea.

The whole of the philosophy which

begins with Plato and culminates in Ploti­
nus is the development of a principle which

may be formu lated thus :

" There is

more

in the immutable than in the moving, and
we pass from the stable to the unstable by
a mere diminution."

Now it is the contrary

which is true.
Modern science dates from the day when

76

An In troduction to

mobility

was

reality.

It

eet

up

dates

as

an

from

independent

the

day

when

Galileo, setting a ball rolling down an in­
c li ne_'<.! plane, firmly resolved to

�tudy

thi�

mu\·ement from t o p to bottom for itself, i n
i teelf, i nstead o f seek ing its prindple in
the

concepts

m obilit ies

of h igh

by

which

and

lotr. two

im­

Aristotle believed he

could adequately explain the mobility.

Ami

this is not an isolated fact in t he history
of science.

Several of t he great rliscoveri{'H,

of those at least which have t ransformecl

the

positive sciences or which have created

new ones, have been so many sounding�;
in t he depths of pure duration.

The mo1-e

living the reality touched, the deeper was
the sounding.
But the lead-line sunk to the sea bottom

brings up a fluid mass which the sun's heat

quickly

d ries into solid and discontinuou H

the _! 11tuition _QLd u ra­
���� when it is exposed to the rays o_f _the_
understanding, in like manner quickly t_l!_r ns

grains of sand.

And

into tlxed, distinct , and immobile concepts.

Metaphysics

77

I n the living mobility of things the un·
derstanding is

bent on marking real or

virtual stations, it notes departures and
arrivals ; for this is all that concerns the
thought of man in so far as it is simply
human.
what

It is more than human to grasp

is happening in

the interval.

But

philosophy can only he a n effort t o tran­
scend the human condition.
Men of science have fixed their attention
mainly on the concepts wit h which they
have marked out the path way of intuition.
The more they laid stress on t hese residual
products, which have t urned into symbols,
the more they attributed a symbolic char­
acter to every kind of science.

And the

more they believed in the symbolic char­
acter of science, the more did they indeed
make science symbolical.

Gradually they

have blotted out all difference, in positive
science, between the natural and the arti­
ficial, between the data of immediate intu­
ition, and the enormous work of analysis
which

the

understanding

pursues

round

78

An Introduction to

intuition.

Thus t hey have prepared the way

for a doctrine which affirms the relativity
of all our knowledge.
But metaphysics has also

labored to

the

Harne end .
.H ow coul d the masters of modern philoso­
phy, who have been renovators of science
as well as of metaphysics, have had no sense

of the moving continuity of reality?
could

they have abstained

from

How

placing

themsel ves in what we call concrete dura­
tion '?

They have <lone so to a greater ex­

tent than they

more

were

aware ; above all, much

than they sai<l.

I f we endeavor to

link together, by a continuous connection,
the int uitions about which systems have

become

organize<l, we fi nd, together with

other convergent an<l divergent lines, one
very de terminate direction of thought and
of feeling.

What is this latent though t ?

How

w e express

shall

borrow

once

Platonists,

more

we

will

t he

the

feeling?

language

To

of t he

say-depriving

the

words of their psychological sense, and giv-

Metaphysics

79

ing the name of Idea to a certain settling
down into easy intelligibility, and that of
Soul to a certain longing after the restless­
ness

of

life-that

an

invisible

current

causes modern philosophy to place the Soul
above the Idea.

It thus tends, like mod�rn

science, and even more so than modern
science, to advance in an opposite direc­
tion to ancient thought.
But this metaphysics, like this science,
has enfolded its deeper life in a rich tissue
of symbols, forgetting something that, while
science needs symbols for its analytical de­
velopment, the main object of metaphysics
is to do away with symbols.

Here, again,

the understanding has pursued its work of
fixing, dividing, and reconstructing.

It has

pursued this, it is true, under a rather d�fferent form.

Without insisting on a point

.

which we propose to develop elsewhere, it
is enough here to say th�t the understand._.. .

ing, whose function it is to operate on stable
elements, may look for stability either in

relations or in things.

In so far as it work�

An I ntroduction to

8o

on concepts of relations, it culminates in

scien tific symbolism.

In so far as it works

on concepts of things, it culminates in

metaphysical symbolism. But in both cases
the arrangement comes from the under­
�tanding. Hence, it would fain believe itself
independent.

Rather t han recognize at once

what it owes to an intuition of t he depths

.J t prefers exposing itself

of reality

to the

1langer that its whole work may he looked
upon as nothing but an artificial arrange­
ment of symbols. So that if we were to bold
on to the letter of what metaphysicians and
Hcientists say, and also to the material
aspect of what t hey do, we might believe
that t he metaphysicians have dug a deep
tu nnel beneath rea lity, that the scientista
have thrown an elegant bridge over it, but
that the moving stream of

th i n gs passes

between these two artificial constructions
without touching them.
One of the principal artifices of the
Kantian criticism consisted in taking the
metaphysician and the scientist literally,

Metaphysics

81

forcing both metaphysics and science t o the
extreme limit of symbolism to which they
could go, and to which, moreover, they make
their way of their own accord as soon as
the understanding claims an independence
fu ll of perils.

Having once overlooked the

ties that bind science and metaphysics to
intellectual

intu ition,

Kant

has

no difll ·

culty in showing that our science is wholly
relative, and our metaphysics entirely arti�
ficial.
Since he has exaggerated the ind¢'·
,
pendence of t he understanding in botlL
cases, since he has relieved both meta·
physi c s and science of the intellectual in·
tuition which served them as inward ballast,
science with its relations presents to him
no more than a film of form, and meta·
physics, with its things, no more than a
film of matter.
fi rst,

then,

Is it surprising that the

reveals

to

him

only

frames

packed within frames, and the second only

phantoms chasing phantom s ?
He has Rtruck Rnch telling blows a t our
science and our metaphysic that they have

An Introduction to

82

not even yet quite

bewi ldermen t.
sign

recovered from their

Our mind would readily re­

itself to seeing in science a knowledge

wholly relative, and in metap hysics a

t hat is

speculation that is enti rely empty. It seems
to us, even
Kantian

at this present date, that the

criticism

applies

ph ysi cH and to all science.

a p p li es
of the

to all

meta­
it

In reality,

more espec ia l ly to the philosophy

ancien ts, as also to the form-itself

borrowed from the ancients-in which the

m ode rn s have most often left their t hou gh t .
It

is

valid

against

c laims to give us

a

metaphysic

which

a single and com plet ed

sy�o�tt•m of t h i ng�c�, agai n st a science profess­
i ng to be

short,

a sinylc

a gains t

fly st e m of relations ; in

a science

and a metaphysic

presenting themselvc�c� with t he a rc h itec­
t u ra l s im p l i c i t y

ideas

or

of

of the Platonic theory of

a Greek temp le .

physit•s claims to be

If meta·

made up of conce pts

which were ou rs lx>fm-e itR advt>nt, i f it con·

si sts in an in ge nious

arrangement

of pre­

exis t ing ideas which we utilize ns building

Metaphysics
material for an edifice, if, in short, it i8
anything else but t he constant expansion
of our m ind, the ever-renewed effort to
transcend

our actual

ideas

and

perhaps

ah;o our elementary logic, it is but too evi·
dent that, like all the works of pure u nder·
standing,

it

becomes

arti ficial .

And

if

science is wholly and e nti rt· l �· a work of
analysis or of conceptual repreRentation,
if experience is only to �;erve tht>J•ein as a
verification for " clear ideaN," if, instead of
starting from m ultiple and diverse intu·

ition-which insert themselves in the par·
ticular movement of each reality, but do not

always dovetail into each other,-it pro·
fesses to be a vast mathematic, a single
- - iui
and closed-in system of relations,
prison·

--

ing the whole of reality in a network pre­

pared in advance,--it

�c�m�s

�- �n_Q.wledie

purely relative to human understanding. I f
e
w look carefully into t h e Critique of Pure

Reason,

we see that science for Kant did

indeed mean t his kind of

universa l mathe·

maNe, aud metaphysics this practically un·

An Introduction to

84

altPred Plato11 is m.

a

universal

In t nt t h, the

mathematic h� i t self but a sur­

vival of

Platonif'm.

is wha t

the world of

we su ppose t ha t

Universal

Kant

the

Idea consists

in

a

no l o nger in

a

t his drea m

took

1

mathema tic

ideas beco m es when

relation or in a law, a n d
t h i ng.

dream of

of a few

modern phi losophers for a real ity ; more
t han

this, he

believed

that

all

sc ien t i fic

knowledge was only a clPtached fragment
stepping-stone to, universal

of, or rat her a
matltf:'mat kR.

Hem·e

the ma in task of t h e

Critique was to lay the foundation of this
mathematic-that is, to d et e rm i ne what the
intel lect

order

in

mat ic

must

be,

t ha t

an

may bind

necessity,

if all

and

what

the

u n interrupted

t h em

po ssib l e

t oget her.

object,

m at h e­
And of

experie nce can be

made to

enter t hus into the rigid and al­
of our understand·
Jug, it it� ( u nless w e assume a pre-established
n•ady foruw1l framework

1

gee on this subject a very interesting article by
" Zur Entwickelung von Kant's
Theorie der Naturcausalitlit," in Wundt's Philoso­
phisclle Studieu ( vol. ix., 1894 ) .
Radulescu-Motru,

Metaphysics

ss

harmony ) because our understanding itself
organizes nature, and

finds itself again

therein as in a mirror.

Hence the possi·

bility of science, which owes all its efficacy
to its relativity, and the impossibility of
metaphysics, since the latter finds nothing
more to do than to parody with phantoms of
things the work of conceptual arrangement
which science practises seriously on rela­
tions.

Briefly,

the whole Critique of Pure

Reason ends in establishing that Platonism,
illegitimate if Ideas are things, becomes le­
gitimate if Ideas are relations, and that the
ready-made idea, once brought down in thi11
way from heaven to earth, is in fact, as Plato

held, the common basis alike of thought and
of nature. But the whole of the Critique of
Pure Reason also rests on this postulate,
that our in.tellect is incapable of anything
but Platonizing-that is, of pouring all pos­
sible experience into pre-existing moulds.
On this the whole question depends.

It

scientific knowledge is indeed what Kant
supposed, then there is one simple science,

An Introduction to

86

preformed and even preformulated in na·
hue, as Aristotle believed ;

great discov·

eries, then, serve only to illuminate, point
hy point, the already drawn line of t his
logic, immanent in things, j ust as on the
night of a fMe we light up one by one the
rows

of

gas-jets

which

already

the shape of some bui lding.
physical

knowledge is

And if meta­

really

supposed , it is rerluced to a

out line

what Kant

choice between

two attitudes of the mind before all the
grea t problems, both equally possible ; it�
man i festations a re so man�· a r bit ra ry and

al ways ephc:>meral choices bet wee n two solu­
t inn�o�, virt ually formu lated from a l l eter1lit�· : it l i ves a n d dies by antinomies.

But

the t r u t h is t hat modern science does not
preRent thb nnilinear simplicity, nor does
mode•·n

metaphysics

present

these

irre­

ducible oppositions.
Modern science is neither one nor simple.
It rests, I freely admit, on ideas which in
the end. we find clear ; but these ideaR have
gradually

become

clear through

the

use

Metaphysics
made of them ; they owe most of their clear·
ness to the light which the facts, and the
applications to which they led, have by
reflection shed on them-the clearness of a
concept being scarcely anything more at
bottom than the certainty, at last obtained,
of manipulating the concept profitably.

At

its origin, more than one of these concepts
must

have appeared obscure,

not easily

reconcilable with the concepts already ad·
mitted into science, and indeed very near
the border-line of absurdity.

This means

that science does not proceed by an orderly
dovetailing together of concepts predestined
to fit each other exactly.

True and fruitful

ideas are 80 many close contacts with cur·
rents of reality, which d� not necessarily
converge on the same point.

However, the

concepts in which they lodge themselves
manage somehow, by rubbing oft' each other' It
corners, to settle down well enough together.
On the other hand, modern metaphysics

is not made up of 801 utions 80 radical that
they can

culminate

in

irreducible oppo-

An Introduction to

88

It

sitiona..

would be so, no doubt, if t here

were no means of accepting at t he same
time and on t he same Jewl the t hesis and
the

antit hesis

of

t he

antinomies.

But.

phi losoph�· consil-lfs precisely i n t h is, that
by a u effort uf int uit ion one phwt>s oneself
within that conercte realit�·, of whic·h the

('ritique

takes from without

the t wo op­

po!-lt'tl views, thesis and antithesis.

I could

never imagine how black and white inter­
penetrate if I had never set"n

gray ;

but

once I have seen gray I easily understand
how it can be considered from t wo points
of riew, that of white and that of black.
Doct rines "·hich have a certain basis of in­
tuition escape the

Kantian

criticism ex­

act }�· in so far as they are intuitive ; and
t hese

doctrines

are the whole of meta­

pbysie�, providro we ignore the metaphysics
which is fixed and dead in theses and con­
..

sider only t hat which is living in philoso­

phers. The dh·er�endes between the schools
-that

is, bt·oadl�· speaking, between. the

groups of disciples Cormed round a few

Metaphysics

89

great masters--are certainly striking.

But

woulu we find them as marked between the
masters themselves ?

Something here domi­

nates the uiversity of systems, something,
we repeat, which is simple anu definite like
a sounuing, about which one feels that it has
touched at greater or les8 depth the bottom of
the same ocean, though each t i me it brings up
to the surface very different materials.

It is

on these materials that the disciples usually
work ; in this lies the function of analy­
sis.

And the master, in so far as he formu­

lates, develops, and translates into abstract
ideas what he brings, is already in a way
his own disciple.

)lut the simple act which

started the analysis, and which

--����----�----�---- ·

�.Qil.ceiila'

itself behind the naJJ:Iil�.,_ _J!roceeds from a:
�
faculty quite d fferent from the analytical.
ThfsTs, b:f1fs -very e 11!_tigiJ,...ilttuition.

i

d !!

In conclusion, we may remark that there
is

nothing

mysterious

in

this

faculty.

Every one of us has had occasion to ex­
ercise. it to a certain extent.

Any one of

us, for instance, who has attempted literary

An Introduction to

90

�mpoaition, knows that when the subject
bu been studied at lengt h , the materialM
all collected, and the notes all made, some­
thing more is needed in o rde r to set about
the "·ork of composition it�lf, and th a t is

an often very painful effort to place our­
aelves directly at the heart of the subject,
and to 8eek as d eepl y as possi b le an im·
pulae, after which we need only let our­
selves go.

This

impulse,

atarts the mind on

a

once

pa th

received,

where it re­

all the information it had col­
and a thousand other tit-tails besides ;

d ii!Covers
lected,

i t develops and anal�·zes itNC.• l f into terms

which

could

be enumeratoo

indefinitely.

The farther we go, the m ore terms we dis­
cover ; we shall never say all that could be
88id,

and

yet,

if

we turn back suddenly

upon the impulse th�t �e feel behind us..

and try to seize it, it is gone ; for it w.aa
not a thing, but the dil"('{'tion of a move­
ment, and though indefinitely extensible...lt
lB infinitely simple.
Metaphysical intu\
i.tion seems to be something of the same

91

Metaphysics

kind. What corresponds here to the docu­
------ments and notes of literary composition is
the

sum

of

observations

and

experience

gathered together by positive science.

For

we do not obtain an intuition from reality
-that is, an intellectual sympathy with the
most intimate part of it-unless we have
won its confidence by a long fellowshi
with its superficial manifestations.

�

And it

is not merely a question of assimilating the
most conapicuous facts ; so immense a mass
of facts must be accumulated and fused to­
gether, that in this fusion all the precon­
ceived and premature ideas which observers
may unwittingly have put into their ob­
servations will
other.

be certain to neutralize each

In this way only can the bare ma­

teriality of the known facts be exposed to
view.

Even in the simple and privileged

case which we have used as an example,
even for the direct contact of the self with
the self, the final effort of distinct intu­
ition would be impossible to any one who
had not combined and compared with each

An Introduction to Metaphysics

92

other a very large number of P�'JCbological
analyses.

The m as t e rs of m1Hlcrn ph i l ol'o­

phy

men

were

who

h ad

a RRim il at ed

n 11

the scientific knowledge o f their time, and
the partial ec l i pl'le of metaphysics fot• t h e
last

half-century

cause

than

PvidPn t l.v

no o t lwr

ext raordinu.r

<l iffk n l t y

ha�

the

which the phi l oso p her finds to d a y i n get­
-

ting into touch wit h posi ti ve science, which
has become far too speci a l ized

.

Hut meta­

physical intuition, although it can be ob­
tained only t h rough material know lPdgt>, iR
qui t e other than the mere summa r.v or. Ry n ­
thesis

of that knowledge.

It

iH

distinct

from these, we repea t , as the m o t o r i m ­
pulse i s distinct from t h e path trawrF�£>d by
the

moving body,

as the tension of t he

spring is distinct from the visi bl e move­

ments of the pendulum.

In

this senRe

metaphysics has nothing in common with
a generalization of facts, and new•rthelesH

it might

be defined as

integral exper-ience.

THl!l END