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This repository has been archived by the owner on May 13, 2022. It is now read-only.
Enable RBF on everything, and potentially still offer maker's UTXOs for coinjoining if the taker pays for the RBFing.
For now we yield-generators should monitor how many UTXOs and transactions we have tied up in the mempool, and raise the alarm if it looks like somebody is actually doing this.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Attacker is a taker and coinjoins with many makers and sets a 0.5 sat/b miner fee on the transaction, which remains unmined for a long time
Makers are by-default programmed to not offer UTXOs that are currently in the mempool
The attacker could then run their own makers, either for sybil-attack/deanonymizing or to increase their own maker income due to reduced supply
Thanks to a redditor who PM'd me this idea.
Possible solutions are:
Proper handling of miner fees as in Make use of maker contribution to tx fee #120 (comment) where every make has a "minimum fee rate" so they can use that to stop their UTXOs being stuck with a very low fee.
Enable RBF on everything, and potentially still offer maker's UTXOs for coinjoining if the taker pays for the RBFing.
For now we yield-generators should monitor how many UTXOs and transactions we have tied up in the mempool, and raise the alarm if it looks like somebody is actually doing this.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: