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USER: CIA, Memorandum of Conversation, "Discussion of the Chilean Political Situation," September 18, 1970. (Two versions are presented - see description below.)

1S September lvfEMORAINDUlvf SUBJECT I 1970 OR TFIE 'RLCOR D Discussion of Chilean Political Situation PA1% TJC IPA NTS Hue gl BACKCR OUli D The Chilean p esiden'ial election ivas held on Septemb -r 1970 Socialist Senator Salvador Aller de the cand''date of the Popular Unity UP r- a co 1'tion of the pro-Cuban Socialist Par PS the Commur ist Party PCCh the leftist-lcd P adical Party PR and other small leftist groups - ivor a plurality 36 3 a of the votes cast in a three-way race Jorgc Ales sandr' independent candidate of the center rif' ht including the Natiorial Party P N was generally expected to come in first but ives a close second ivith 35Vo Radomiro Tomic candidate of the Christian Demo ratic Party PDC came in third with 27 8% PECLASS - cD 7-'158 3 qttlfi sc AIStlafii van o 4 i 2The Chilean constitution requires that be use no candida e received a majority of hc votes cast thc Congress ivill meet on 2 October to elect a pre sid cnt from the tvio top vote-gettcrs The Congress has selected the op vote --gcltcr on the three occasions in his ccn ut y vvhcn no cand' da e received the required majori y Alcss ndri ha s said publicly th t if Congress elects lum president he ivill resign hereby forcing a new presidential electio in ivhich he vrould not bd 'a cand 'date Tomic the Christian Democr atic candidate has publicly recognized llende's victory Outgoing President Eduardo Prei a Christi n Democr-t ' vho was not eligible to run on 4 September vvould qualify in a neve elec ion if Ales sandri vtere electecl by the Congress and then rasignecl I rei has said that cons itutionally he canr ot recognize anyone as president until after the Co gree s has votec At p e sent he PDC olds the 75 svring v tea in Cong'ress a Reason for Alessandri's Loss h to gct out the precinc Tyomen voters probably conaprised the bulk of the the Alessandri vote ' IR'lf 8 C g qII I I s c forces had E ilcd -35 increase over the 1964 abstention figure b Possibilit of Constitutional Solutio On election night Frei after allo ing Allende to have a victory parade heard of Alessa dr s plan to try to venin the presidency on 2-' October ano then steo dovvn in f vor of a n vr election vvhicn vvould probably find 1 rei opposing Allende Frei sent Berne rrlor Leighton an influen- tial Christian Democrat national dep ty as his emissary' to Alcssandri Their discussions resulted in Ales s ndri's statement issued several days later 9 Septcm'oet that he vvas not conceding to Alle de and ti t he vrould resign if elected by thc Con ress The chances of Alessandri's 'being named president ac e slina Alienee need- 'at most only 18 additional ' Congressional votes to secure his victory full Congress o 200 Alessandri on the other h ndr needs to attract 58 votes n ost of them from the PDC Pxei is scared blue oi Allende's corning to popover but he can only count on 20 PDC Congressmen to vote for Ales sand r i some peoole be getting scat'c e ommunists are circulating may blacklists xvith the names of PDC bureaucrats in t e 3 P eiir cd G n zal Rob rto Viau leader of the military d s sension of October 1969 oz some other nut might try to sta c a ccup t archy prcclud ng any ser'ious effort Viau in October 1969 led a 74z amour z cbellion o' the T cna Az illery P op ment la S 'ntiago to e ores tmi dtary dis satisfa ct on viith i s pooi pay 2nd ecl pmcn' The rebellion ended v'ithou b ood hed rvhen be @over nznent promi cd to meet some of Vi u 's denaauds Viau had v 'idesp' ead moral support becau e of overall dissa isfaction in the mi tery He vvas convicted of militapy rebellion and even ually placed or Darole ' At present he does not appear to have subs' antial support among active duty military personnel c ii'I 8 g pj's I I S C c' c Timinc' for Possible Militar mid-October By W Action after the PDC Congress it should ' d Car abinc r os National Police the Carabineros particularly the r comma ant General Vicente Huerta u ant to do -omcthing to prevent an Allende presidency but they cannot do it alone The Carabineros a xvell formcc and discipl' 'ned force of 24 00 e ll' ai I 14 000 145 in thc Naval Air once and 2 200 in ines largely based ai the port of Valoaraisn an 'c s cribed Pleas Admiral Ecr endo elite service Po t Comman er-rn- hicf of thc Navy xvho oppos s Allanclc as indecisive ar d overly cautious the l f ort oo'c a star cc simila to that o en ra 1 P cne Schneider rmy Commanderin Chief to k e effect that the military xvou d suppori tne constitut on At that time it vvas expected that Ales sandri nvoulc ivin a plurality but not a ma'crit and the Congress v ould el ct Allendc -6Aller dc's political had bccn able to shift the votes of some iorccs of the v ives of thc levy enlisted mcn by promisins them Allcndc becamo presdent enlisted men could m vc that up to become officers hov ever 6 c I215'8 g g l 0 t i S 0 3 57 f Air Force 9 720 49 0 of them pilots vrith 227 aircraft 60 of tl em jct-powered General Carlos Guerre Coram nder of the Air wants to act against Allende Force his immediate dcout General Cesar Ruin Chief of Staff is ndoubtfuli u g Ar m 23 000 in six under str ength inadequately equipped divisions The Arm Viaux episode is uite divide partly because of the C I ' the kcy to a coup viould be to Genera Carlos ra s hief of the fi tionel Defense get Staff to move vvhich vvould involve neutralizinvtchneider the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Prats vvas Army Attache to Buenos Aires three years ago Ccneral Camilo Valenzucla Conunandcr of during elections or under a of all t'roops in the Santiago but usus as nosv has no rnand I21$ s Z Qjh i S Cz I ll the Santiago Garrison vvho state of siege takes command area including thc Carabinero troops under his direct com- the Army is concerned about he reliability of non- ornmissioned larly those in the YCO Sc 'ool officers i%CO particu- Chile produces limited cIuani '-'cs of s a'i' arms and amrnunitiod It is dependent on the U S anc Lyestern Lurope for all categories of equipment including add tie al ouantities of type s pr oduc ed locally 1 Jf the Chilear Government vie re overturned in milItary ac ion v ou d the nesv government hen installed receive diplomatic recogni ion rr om the U S 2 i Sc gq3 Thc main svorry of all those svho might bc involved in a action military is the protection of their families and o ' their followers should they decide to act against Allende United State- Chile Al y q- is oi th Ctrl - ' i c lg Does the U S care The' eight-ho r TV interidcw cn by I idol Castro w h' ch v as played extensively in Chile prior to the election told the Chilean peoole not to worry a'oout U S intervention ii' Allende won since the present non-intctventionist atti ude in the U S combined v ith pressure in the iNcar and Far East -- plus dom stic unrest in thc U S -- svould heep the U S neutralized The following version of the same document consists of just the first four pages released in July 2000 but with less of the text excised overall - ' oooo o iI - -r k - ' - - - - - - MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Discussion or Chilean Political Situation _ PARTICIPANTS ' ' '-' ' - c ' '- ' o ' o -' ' '- o -APprove rfOfRe1ease - - ' July 2000 ct o ' - ' ' -- ' - o ' - ' 1 o ' ' ' - o o ' - - - ' A - _ -- - - ' ' - - t ' ' TheChileanconstibiti 'n reCJ ui i-es that beca use 'nocandidate o ' r ceive amajorityof the vOte Ii cast the Congresli will eeton ' Z4 qctober to etecta pres dentfroIIl tl ietwoto vote getter8 The '- COngre sshas'seteCt dtp e tol --y ite -gett' o tithethreeoccasic ns ' iii this century wherinocandidate receivedthe 'required majority Alessandriha s' said p bliCly-tha t ifGongress etectahiinpresident h inre sign tb ereby forCing a neW p e id nticq et ctionin hich hewou1d not be candida te Tonlic theChristiaii i emoc ratiC ' ln4ida t _hi p 'Qli lyr c girlzedAtte n 4 vict 6 o Qutgoiili ' ' ' P1'esideti Edu8 iiIo Freio aChristianDeIftoc rat whOWltsnot eligible e m e 'vv'ou UIl Y iI new eec on esaa 3were electedlly he ongr essa dt h'enresigned Fi'eihas-saidthat c 1stitutlonallyhe ca iin itr cogniz l1yoiie a s p esident uIitil after ' ' tJi Congi'es13' svot d At presen h PDqhtii lS the75sWin gvot iiiCongr-es8 1 ' ' ' ' ' ' a ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' y' ' ' ' ' t ' ' ' ' o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ----- ''' ' ' '- - ' ' ' ' - - - ' ' ' ' ' ' ' M r ' Helmiiatt n edtJ1 m et aith reque8tOfpr He# mtl ilinger whoo ith i' 6hzi Mit h Ii til eAttorn y-qe#eral 'h lidIriE ear lier with ' xpr ssedtl iefoll6wing View 3 DtheChi1ean ' -' ' ' '- ' ' a o ReasoriforAiessa nd riI8L08 'q8 e 9' %o 1ftdi g at ' ' ' oo 0 c ' ' the Alessandri force8had failedtogetout the precinct vote W'0 envoten P rc 1 a1 J ycoznprij edthe bu1k ofth o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' -' ' ' ' ' 3 '- - o ' - - ' 1d crease ovet- the 1964a bstenfionfigure ' hatitwas ''too bad that we could not have been oo iJ lowed to take votes away fr m To J1 This was a ' rer'erenccl totheU S Covernmeiitcaveaiwhichlliii ited ifor s on u beha lf to ananti ' Allende carnpa1gn vOlthno d11 ect support to Ales Sandr1o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - --- - ' o n eieetiohnight Frei aft r a U ingAllende ' 0 avea V1cory para e ear 0 essan 18 p an to ' b y to wiD the presidency on 4 e tobe 'ancltb en step down in favor of a new 'election whichwQuldprobably find Frei oppoSing Allende rei sent Be nardCiLeightClii aniti iIuentialChristia Deiri ocratnationa deiJlu ty' as his em ssarY to Ale $ sand ri Their discussionsrifsulted in Alessandri's statem ent isstiedseveraldays later 9Septemberlthathe was nOt conceding to Allende arid that he ouldreslgnif electedbytheCorigress o o ThechancesofAleils ndrila ' being named president are slim Allende needs at most ' onJ y-18additiona 1'c'ongressioiiaivotes to se curehis'victory intheJull Congress of 200 Ale s sandri on the otherh2 ncJ needs to attract58 vOtes m ost of them fro aithe PDC Frei-iil scared blue cifAllende1 sco$g to power bat h-e can only cou on 20 P CConiressment o vote f ' 4Iessaridri has heard tlui t somepeoplexnay be getting scar Commililists are circulating black' 1istswith the nam es ofPDC bUieailcrats o Theseblackllsts Ifiay boo merang against the Comm l iliststotheexterit that PDC'Congressmenwhowereneatralor fnCl iJ ledto yote for 'I '10 l j iiui a i te oLe fox l Baftc1i l - - -- - c h T ' _' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' _ ' ''' ' _ ' - ' ' ' ' I --' oo ' _ ' ' ' 7 o o - ' ' _ ' - _ _ _ o - ' j ij1 t - _ i i 't ' i gi j lq j kt o i L L Lc 511 t 't 1M i t i ik LiLs i -- ik o ooooo ' - 4 - The Congressional route to prevent Allende from coming to power while remote should not be ignored but it entails the following risks 1 It might not work and then what president takes office on 4 November o - - - - - - - _ __ The new 2 Some Congressmen might move too soon or announce tlieir intention prematurely thereby triggering the Communists to move into the streets -- ---- -------- ----- -- o e 0 er nut might try to s age a coup tp erEUR by precluding any serious effort Comment ' Viat x in October 1969 led a 24-hour rebellion of the Tacna Artillery Regiment in Santiago to express military dissatisfaction with its poor pay and equipment The rebellion ended without bloodshed when the government promised to meet some of Viaux's demands Viaux had widespread moral support because of overall dissatisfaction in the military He was convicted of i'nrllitary rebellion and eventually placed on parole At present he does not appear to have substantial support am ong active duty military personnel ' C Timing for Possible Military Action o By mid-October -after the PDCCongress ' it should I I U o obu il I J he-C cng ces s Can we run the risk that the Alessandril work ' o ' National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994‐7000 Fax 202 994‐7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu ASSISTANT: Based on the contextual clues and textual analysis, here are some hypotheses about the redacted portions of the document:

1. The redacted text likely contains information about the candidates and political parties involved in the Chilean presidential election that was held on September 4, 1970. Specifically, it may mention their respective platforms and policies.

2. There is a possibility that the redacted text discusses the specific voting results for each candidate, including their percentages and number of votes.

3. The redacted portion may contain information about the political implications of not having a candidate receive a majority of the votes cast, and the subsequent need for Congress to elect a president from the top two vote-getters.

4. It is likely that there is further discussion about the strategies and plans USER: CIA, Memorandum of Conversation, "Discussion of the Chilean Political Situation," September 18, 1970. (Two versions are presented - see description below.)

1S September lvfEMORAINDUlvf SUBJECT I 1970 OR TFIE 'RLCOR D Discussion of Chilean Political Situation PA1% TJC IPA NTS Hue gl BACKCR OUli D The Chilean p esiden'ial election ivas held on Septemb -r 1970 Socialist Senator Salvador Aller de the cand''date of the Popular Unity UP r- a co 1'tion of the pro-Cuban Socialist Par PS the Commur ist Party PCCh the leftist-lcd P adical Party PR and other small leftist groups - ivor a plurality 36 3 a of the votes cast in a three-way race Jorgc Ales sandr' independent candidate of the center rif' ht including the Natiorial Party P N was generally expected to come in first but ives a close second ivith 35Vo Radomiro Tomic candidate of the Christian Demo ratic Party PDC came in third with 27 8% PECLASS - cD 7-'158 3 qttlfi sc AIStlafii van o 4 i 2The Chilean constitution requires that be use no candida e received a majority of hc votes cast thc Congress ivill meet on 2 October to elect a pre sid cnt from the tvio top vote-gettcrs The Congress has selected the op vote --gcltcr on the three occasions in his ccn ut y vvhcn no cand' da e received the required majori y Alcss ndri ha s said publicly th t if Congress elects lum president he ivill resign hereby forcing a new presidential electio in ivhich he vrould not bd 'a cand 'date Tomic the Christian Democr atic candidate has publicly recognized llende's victory Outgoing President Eduardo Prei a Christi n Democr-t ' vho was not eligible to run on 4 September vvould qualify in a neve elec ion if Ales sandri vtere electecl by the Congress and then rasignecl I rei has said that cons itutionally he canr ot recognize anyone as president until after the Co gree s has votec At p e sent he PDC olds the 75 svring v tea in Cong'ress a Reason for Alessandri's Loss h to gct out the precinc Tyomen voters probably conaprised the bulk of the the Alessandri vote ' IR'lf 8 C g qII I I s c forces had E ilcd -35 increase over the 1964 abstention figure b Possibilit of Constitutional Solutio On election night Frei after allo ing Allende to have a victory parade heard of Alessa dr s plan to try to venin the presidency on 2-' October ano then steo dovvn in f vor of a n vr election vvhicn vvould probably find 1 rei opposing Allende Frei sent Berne rrlor Leighton an influen- tial Christian Democrat national dep ty as his emissary' to Alcssandri Their discussions resulted in Ales s ndri's statement issued several days later 9 Septcm'oet that he vvas not conceding to Alle de and ti t he vrould resign if elected by thc Con ress The chances of Alessandri's 'being named president ac e slina Alienee need- 'at most only 18 additional ' Congressional votes to secure his victory full Congress o 200 Alessandri on the other h ndr needs to attract 58 votes n ost of them from the PDC Pxei is scared blue oi Allende's corning to popover but he can only count on 20 PDC Congressmen to vote for Ales sand r i some peoole be getting scat'c e ommunists are circulating may blacklists xvith the names of PDC bureaucrats in t e 3 P eiir cd G n zal Rob rto Viau leader of the military d s sension of October 1969 oz some other nut might try to sta c a ccup t archy prcclud ng any ser'ious effort Viau in October 1969 led a 74z amour z cbellion o' the T cna Az illery P op ment la S 'ntiago to e ores tmi dtary dis satisfa ct on viith i s pooi pay 2nd ecl pmcn' The rebellion ended v'ithou b ood hed rvhen be @over nznent promi cd to meet some of Vi u 's denaauds Viau had v 'idesp' ead moral support becau e of overall dissa isfaction in the mi tery He vvas convicted of militapy rebellion and even ually placed or Darole ' At present he does not appear to have subs' antial support among active duty military personnel c ii'I 8 g pj's I I S C c' c Timinc' for Possible Militar mid-October By W Action after the PDC Congress it should ' d Car abinc r os National Police the Carabineros particularly the r comma ant General Vicente Huerta u ant to do -omcthing to prevent an Allende presidency but they cannot do it alone The Carabineros a xvell formcc and discipl' 'ned force of 24 00 e ll' ai I 14 000 145 in thc Naval Air once and 2 200 in ines largely based ai the port of Valoaraisn an 'c s cribed Pleas Admiral Ecr endo elite service Po t Comman er-rn- hicf of thc Navy xvho oppos s Allanclc as indecisive ar d overly cautious the l f ort oo'c a star cc simila to that o en ra 1 P cne Schneider rmy Commanderin Chief to k e effect that the military xvou d suppori tne constitut on At that time it vvas expected that Ales sandri nvoulc ivin a plurality but not a ma'crit and the Congress v ould el ct Allendc -6Aller dc's political had bccn able to shift the votes of some iorccs of the v ives of thc levy enlisted mcn by promisins them Allcndc becamo presdent enlisted men could m vc that up to become officers hov ever 6 c I215'8 g g l 0 t i S 0 3 57 f Air Force 9 720 49 0 of them pilots vrith 227 aircraft 60 of tl em jct-powered General Carlos Guerre Coram nder of the Air wants to act against Allende Force his immediate dcout General Cesar Ruin Chief of Staff is ndoubtfuli u g Ar m 23 000 in six under str ength inadequately equipped divisions The Arm Viaux episode is uite divide partly because of the C I ' the kcy to a coup viould be to Genera Carlos ra s hief of the fi tionel Defense get Staff to move vvhich vvould involve neutralizinvtchneider the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Prats vvas Army Attache to Buenos Aires three years ago Ccneral Camilo Valenzucla Conunandcr of during elections or under a of all t'roops in the Santiago but usus as nosv has no rnand I21$ s Z Qjh i S Cz I ll the Santiago Garrison vvho state of siege takes command area including thc Carabinero troops under his direct com- the Army is concerned about he reliability of non- ornmissioned larly those in the YCO Sc 'ool officers i%CO particu- Chile produces limited cIuani '-'cs of s a'i' arms and amrnunitiod It is dependent on the U S anc Lyestern Lurope for all categories of equipment including add tie al ouantities of type s pr oduc ed locally 1 Jf the Chilear Government vie re overturned in milItary ac ion v ou d the nesv government hen installed receive diplomatic recogni ion rr om the U S 2 i Sc gq3 Thc main svorry of all those svho might bc involved in a action military is the protection of their families and o ' their followers should they decide to act against Allende United State- Chile Al y q- is oi th Ctrl - ' i c lg Does the U S care The' eight-ho r TV interidcw cn by I idol Castro w h' ch v as played extensively in Chile prior to the election told the Chilean peoole not to worry a'oout U S intervention ii' Allende won since the present non-intctventionist atti ude in the U S combined v ith pressure in the iNcar and Far East -- plus dom stic unrest in thc U S -- svould heep the U S neutralized The following version of the same document consists of just the first four pages released in July 2000 but with less of the text excised overall - ' oooo o iI - -r k - ' - - - - - - MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Discussion or Chilean Political Situation _ PARTICIPANTS ' ' '-' ' - c ' '- ' o ' o -' ' '- o -APprove rfOfRe1ease - - ' July 2000 ct o ' - ' ' -- ' - o ' - ' 1 o ' ' ' - o o ' - - - ' A - _ -- - - ' ' - - t ' ' TheChileanconstibiti 'n reCJ ui i-es that beca use 'nocandidate o ' r ceive amajorityof the vOte Ii cast the Congresli will eeton ' Z4 qctober to etecta pres dentfroIIl tl ietwoto vote getter8 The '- COngre sshas'seteCt dtp e tol --y ite -gett' o tithethreeoccasic ns ' iii this century wherinocandidate receivedthe 'required majority Alessandriha s' said p bliCly-tha t ifGongress etectahiinpresident h inre sign tb ereby forCing a neW p e id nticq et ctionin hich hewou1d not be candida te Tonlic theChristiaii i emoc ratiC ' ln4ida t _hi p 'Qli lyr c girlzedAtte n 4 vict 6 o Qutgoiili ' ' ' P1'esideti Edu8 iiIo Freio aChristianDeIftoc rat whOWltsnot eligible e m e 'vv'ou UIl Y iI new eec on esaa 3were electedlly he ongr essa dt h'enresigned Fi'eihas-saidthat c 1stitutlonallyhe ca iin itr cogniz l1yoiie a s p esident uIitil after ' ' tJi Congi'es13' svot d At presen h PDqhtii lS the75sWin gvot iiiCongr-es8 1 ' ' ' ' ' ' a ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' y' ' ' ' ' t ' ' ' ' o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ----- ''' ' ' '- - ' ' ' ' - - - ' ' ' ' ' ' ' M r ' Helmiiatt n edtJ1 m et aith reque8tOfpr He# mtl ilinger whoo ith i' 6hzi Mit h Ii til eAttorn y-qe#eral 'h lidIriE ear lier with ' xpr ssedtl iefoll6wing View 3 DtheChi1ean ' -' ' ' '- ' ' a o ReasoriforAiessa nd riI8L08 'q8 e 9' %o 1ftdi g at ' ' ' oo 0 c ' ' the Alessandri force8had failedtogetout the precinct vote W'0 envoten P rc 1 a1 J ycoznprij edthe bu1k ofth o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' -' ' ' ' ' 3 '- - o ' - - ' 1d crease ovet- the 1964a bstenfionfigure ' hatitwas ''too bad that we could not have been oo iJ lowed to take votes away fr m To J1 This was a ' rer'erenccl totheU S Covernmeiitcaveaiwhichlliii ited ifor s on u beha lf to ananti ' Allende carnpa1gn vOlthno d11 ect support to Ales Sandr1o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - --- - ' o n eieetiohnight Frei aft r a U ingAllende ' 0 avea V1cory para e ear 0 essan 18 p an to ' b y to wiD the presidency on 4 e tobe 'ancltb en step down in favor of a new 'election whichwQuldprobably find Frei oppoSing Allende rei sent Be nardCiLeightClii aniti iIuentialChristia Deiri ocratnationa deiJlu ty' as his em ssarY to Ale $ sand ri Their discussionsrifsulted in Alessandri's statem ent isstiedseveraldays later 9Septemberlthathe was nOt conceding to Allende arid that he ouldreslgnif electedbytheCorigress o o ThechancesofAleils ndrila ' being named president are slim Allende needs at most ' onJ y-18additiona 1'c'ongressioiiaivotes to se curehis'victory intheJull Congress of 200 Ale s sandri on the otherh2 ncJ needs to attract58 vOtes m ost of them fro aithe PDC Frei-iil scared blue cifAllende1 sco$g to power bat h-e can only cou on 20 P CConiressment o vote f ' 4Iessaridri has heard tlui t somepeoplexnay be getting scar Commililists are circulating black' 1istswith the nam es ofPDC bUieailcrats o Theseblackllsts Ifiay boo merang against the Comm l iliststotheexterit that PDC'Congressmenwhowereneatralor fnCl iJ ledto yote for 'I '10 l j iiui a i te oLe fox l Baftc1i l - - -- - c h T ' _' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' _ ' ''' ' _ ' - ' ' ' ' I --' oo ' _ ' ' ' 7 o o - ' ' _ ' - _ _ _ o - ' j ij1 t - _ i i 't ' i gi j lq j kt o i L L Lc 511 t 't 1M i t i ik LiLs i -- ik o ooooo ' - 4 - The Congressional route to prevent Allende from coming to power while remote should not be ignored but it entails the following risks 1 It might not work and then what president takes office on 4 November o - - - - - - - _ __ The new 2 Some Congressmen might move too soon or announce tlieir intention prematurely thereby triggering the Communists to move into the streets -- ---- -------- ----- -- o e 0 er nut might try to s age a coup tp erEUR by precluding any serious effort Comment ' Viat x in October 1969 led a 24-hour rebellion of the Tacna Artillery Regiment in Santiago to express military dissatisfaction with its poor pay and equipment The rebellion ended without bloodshed when the government promised to meet some of Viaux's demands Viaux had widespread moral support because of overall dissatisfaction in the military He was convicted of i'nrllitary rebellion and eventually placed on parole At present he does not appear to have substantial support am ong active duty military personnel ' C Timing for Possible Military Action o By mid-October -after the PDCCongress ' it should I I U o obu il I J he-C cng ces s Can we run the risk that the Alessandril work ' o ' National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994‐7000 Fax 202 994‐7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu ASSISTANT: Based on the provided document, here are some hypotheses and educated guesses about the redacted portions:

1. Based on the context of the Chilean political situation in September 1970, it is likely that the redacted portion of the document contains discussions or information about the specific parties and individuals involved in the election, such as Salvador Allende, Jorgc Alessandrí, and Radomiro Tomic. The missing information may provide further details about their strategies, speeches, or political activities.

2. The redacted portion may contain information about the concerns and debates surrounding the election results and the subsequent meeting of the Congress. It is possible that the discussion includes debates about the legitimacy of Salvador Allende's victory and the potential impact on the political landscape of Chile.